AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES IN THE WRITINGS
OF THE LIMITISTS.
ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.
It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended
examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice
it particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the
refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated
essay, "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has
generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof;
and which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments
adduced, and illustrations presented, in the first part, in behalf of
the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the analysis and
attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes,
an excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as
sufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and
the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as
Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark
will be expected. A few subordinate passages in the essay above referred
to may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of
criticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention
is now called.
In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: "Now, it is
manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the
proposition, _that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is
immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality,
and relation_." It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism,
that the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when
used to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite--what? The
fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates
every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus
stated:--The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in
that Person, is _immediately_ known in consciousness, and this, not by
difference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the
Pure Reason. In this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the
Reason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not
known by difference, because there is no other object but the one before
that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality,
because it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated,
with which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen
to be what it is _in itself_, and as out of all relation. A little
below, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin,
thus:--"The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of
intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of
philosophy." The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact
that, by a constituting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately
intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of _a priori_ first
principles, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the
condition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.
These two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated
"statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the
Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." The
four "opinions," to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are
too well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to
afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is
believed, the true opinion, which is as follows.
The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable as a fact, is
known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all
this, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the
spiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to
be primarily unconditioned, _i. e._ out of all relation, difference, and
plurality.
"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force
except with regard to things in nature.
Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an
_exhaustive_ knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But
equally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive,
_reliable_ knowledge of him _as he is_, we cannot be moral beings under
his moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the
expression of God's nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not
love--hate; or he is indifferent, _i. e._ love has no relation to him.
If the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to
the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true
that he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which
the Limitists assert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our
whole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is
possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we
ought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him
and beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of
affection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow;
and, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable
mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does
such a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer
sensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a
conclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made
the soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It
is impossible, then, to think of God except as _love_. We know what love
is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and
his spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as
follows.
_In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities in common
with him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to
which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him
negatively;_ i. e. _they know that he is the opposite of themselves._
That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir
William Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the
Understanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination.
He says: "In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same
function; both seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the
Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the
Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'" In this sentence, and the
remarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends
the assigned function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any
accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes
judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than
his. For "both faculties" do _not_ "perform the same function." Only the
Understanding seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks _the many in
the one_. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are
exactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and
gathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason
sees the truth _first_, as necessary _a priori_ law, and holding it up
as standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts
in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is guilty
of a most glaring _petitio principii_. For, the very question at issue
is, whether "both faculties" do "perform the same function"; whether
"both" do "seek the one in the many." In order not to leave the hither
side of the question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to
revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the
truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice is criminal. Is this
primarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which
conditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to
be taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its
letters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it
spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true
experience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an
idea of right and wrong, as an _a priori_ law, is organic in man; and,
by our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in
consciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one
principle was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the
many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was
seen _first_, and as necessarily true. Take another illustration. All
religions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of
agreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men,
produced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more
subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form,
is associated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How
shall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first
human beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable
objection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then
there would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant
people have the experience,--persons who never learned anything but the
rudest forms of work, from the accumulated experience of others; nor by
their own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple
agricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one
of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said
they were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact,
that philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people,
either immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the
least philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point,
none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the
idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or
Brahm, or God, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem
that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men,
were this possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn now
and examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above,
respecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come
directly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its
form, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual
takes it--"the one,"--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of
nature--"the many,"--and is satisfied. And this is an experience not
peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the
illiterate,--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions.
These illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length,
showing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are
accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is
cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure phenomena by
an original and fixed standard, as, "This man is malicious, and
therefore wicked." Between the two modes of procedure, the following
distinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful,
only probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what
may be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and
experience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is
made plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir
William Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely
mistaken one class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the
actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind.
In view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that,
whether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never "has clearly shown that
the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality," for it is
impossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective
reality is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important
"knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover,
unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," and not "a
fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of God, who comprehends
all positives. A little after, Hamilton says: "And while he [Kant]
appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these
negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of
_Ideas_," &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the
Reason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they
hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative
answer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly,
and the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of
thought into _positive_ and _negative_ is simply absurd. All thought is
_positive_. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient
expression for the refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not
thoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the
operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are
a part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The
phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction,
we see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of
the human race affirms this.
The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. "For those who,
with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and
real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who
consequently employ the terms _Absolute_, _Infinite_, _Unconditioned_,
as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively
bound to prove that their idea of _the One corresponds, either with that
Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that
Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes
both, or that it excludes both_. This they have not done, and, we
suspect, have never attempted to do." The italics are Hamilton's. The
above statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute,
therein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand,
and an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," as
applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since
we seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the
definitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found
consistent, and pertinent to Space and Time, have been further found
irrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is
the Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to Space
and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The
terms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to
him, have entirely different significations from what they will when
applied to Space and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in
this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former.
The questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as
must those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the
Person, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as
qualities, consistently inhere in that _unity_. As this has already been
done in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.
Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton
quotes from him as follows: "The condition of intelligence _is
difference_; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists
a plurality of terms." In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues
from this, thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the
condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference;
consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which
it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of
knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable,
it must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or,
second, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of
both." Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: "The _third_ hypothesis,
on the other hand, is _contradictory of the plurality of intelligence_;
for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of
terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is
therefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at
all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of
plurality and difference."
In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author
is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician
presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost,
if not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to assign
plurality, relation, difference, and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of
Mr. Spencer--likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them
those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The
error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely
psychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed
out, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the
Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about,
things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with
an _absolutely certain_ knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject
this faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if
the logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If "an
act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of
terms," then is it impossible that we should know God, _or that he
should know himself_. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is
revolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of
mental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not
satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as
a most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is
so plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked
it. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will
give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle
that _every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth_; and
hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is
true. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic
will give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A
plurality of terms is _not_ the necessary condition of intelligence; but
objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly known by
an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference,
and likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense
and Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the
Reason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are
_self-evident_, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions.
Whatever knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly gain under
the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for
"mammals" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple,
unanalyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a
direct insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and
likeness: for this is a _quality_ of the self-existent Person, and so
belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined
only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.
Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given
by the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for
example, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that
many characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color,
skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also,
that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as
well, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One
color belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover,
relates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is
distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of
likeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different
flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and
possesses those marks just named, which, though differing among
themselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a
commonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This
distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of characteristics, and
connecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and
Understanding.
2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of _a priori_ laws,
of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of God as the
Supreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental
difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's
attention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and
_analysis_. In the latter it is by comprehension and _synthesis_. Take
the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. No one but a
Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr
Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or _oughtness_ is a simple idea."
This being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the
author seeks to maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot be
distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is _sui generis_. Hence, it
cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If
known at all, it must be known _as it is in itself_, by a spontaneous
insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason,
and such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the
doctrine of "intellectual intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in
subjecting all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and
difference."
Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states
certain problems, which he is "confident" Cousin cannot solve. There is
nothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should
have so presented them. Following the passage--which is here
quoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions.
"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)--(1) how liberty can be
conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a
knowledge of that plurality;--(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by
preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final
causes;--(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without
operating as an efficient cause;--(4) or how, in fine, morality can be
founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking
refuge with chance;--these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his
works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve."
1. Liberty cannot be _conceived_. It must be intuited. There is "a
plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge of that plurality." 2. "A
faculty" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot
determine itself _at all_. Only a _spiritual person_ can _resolve_, can
have a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence.
Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be
influenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and
only he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a
liberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;"
and, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as
possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the
Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment
both in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and
qualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is
thoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to
answer this whole passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The
infinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible,
and indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of
personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint
in the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a
multitude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which
enables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring
accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure
the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put
in force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides
that the best mode shall _be_. He also possesses all-power. This is
_his_ endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not
person, but _faculty_ in the person. So is it with the _power_. So then
this Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his
dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is
efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He
is not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him
to choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under
chance, because he is _certain_ which is the best mode of action to gain
the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity,
which has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in
the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for
answering _all_ difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or
chance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's
philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his
followers.
REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."
This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid
and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is
manifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety,
and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom
its author reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe him
to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever
inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the
intellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but
desire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems
inscrutable.
In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly
noticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found
plainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the
Understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the
consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge.
The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the
mind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word
and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies
them; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak
of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human"; or of
"starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine"; where, upon
the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process,
based upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any
knowledge of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the
ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain
respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly
declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, "God made man
in his own image." If man's mind is wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot
know truth as God knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty,
man cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a
moral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must
know the law _as it is_. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will
do. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is
_one_. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees
it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation that God feels. And
such an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an
agent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of
society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be
assumed as granted.
Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which Mr. Mansel, in
his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that "First
Cause," if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and
that "Infinite" and "Absolute" are not pertinent to Cause, but to
Person. So then when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him,
not as Cause, for this is _incidental_, but as the infinite and absolute
Person, for these three marks are _essential_. Further, these
last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause
expresses "an _a priori_ Element of connection, and thus a primitive
understanding-conception." Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the
term Cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He
defines "the Absolute" to be "that which exists in and by itself, having
no necessary relation to any other Being," when it is rather the
exclusion of the possibility of any other Being. Again, he defines "the
Infinite" to be "that which is free from all possible limitation; that
than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can
receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not
from all eternity." "That which" means the thing which, for which is
neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the _Thing_. This _Thing_ "is
free from all possible limitation." How can that be when the Being he
thus defines is, must be, necessarily existent, and so is bound by one
of the greatest of limitations, the inability to cease to be. But some
light may be thrown upon his use of the term "limitation" by the
subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing "which is free from all
possible limitation" is "that than which a greater is inconceivable."
Moreover, this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible
"attributes," and is in every possible "mode of existence" "from all
eternity." Respecting the phrase "than which a greater is
inconceivable," two suppositions may be made. Either there may be a
thing "greater" than, and diverse from, all other things; or there may
be a thing greater than, and including all, other things. Probably the
latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but it is Materialistic Pantheism. This
Being must be in every "mode of existence" "from all eternity."
Personality is a "mode of existence"; therefore this Being must forever
have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode of existence,
therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. Yet again
these two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive; then this
Being must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually
exclusive modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show
that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the
understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, therefore,
utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great as to be without
limits? Has greatness anything to do with infinity? Manifestly not. It
becomes necessary, then, to recur to and amplify those definitions which
we have already given to the terms he uses.
Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary Being.
Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by which he is
endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and totality. Or in other
words, having this quality, he is wholly independent of any other being;
and also the possibility of the existence of any other independent Being
is excluded; and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all
possible beings must depend.
Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives him
universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that he possesses
all possible endowments in perfection.
Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external
restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, which his
very constituting elements themselves impose, are not removed by these
qualities. For instance, the possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom,
Power, and the like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession
of them in _perfect harmony_ is essential to his perfectness in the
entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars him from the
_undue_ exercise of any one of his attributes; or, concisely, his
perfection restrains him from being imperfect. We revert, then, to the
fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, between improper
limitations, or those which are involved in perfection; and proper
limitations, or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence;
and applying it here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of
as belonging to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are
necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection
which constitutes him the Ultimate.
In this view infinity can have no relevancy to "number." It is not that
God has one, or one million endowments. It asks no question about the
number; and cares not for it. It is satisfied in the assertion that he
possesses _all that are possible_, and in perfect harmony. It is,
further, an idea, not a concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be
"conceived." No analogy of "line" or "surface" has any pertinence;
because these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding and
Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, _is_, the quality of an
intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes;--for there can
be no number without limitation, since the phrase unlimited number is a
contradiction of terms;--but this limitation involves no lack, because
there are no "others," which can be "thereby related to it, as cognate
or opposite modes of consciousness." Without doubt it is, in a certain
sense, true, that "the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as
absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest
metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of
all reality." This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and
from him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion by
no means follows, in which he says: "What kind of an Absolute Being is
that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil
included." This is founded upon the suppressed premiss, that such a
Being _must_ do what he does, and his creatures _must_ do what they do;
and so evil must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may be
admitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: viz., that he
sees in the ideals of his Reason _how_ his laws may be violated, and so,
how sin may and will be in this moral system; but it is a perversion of
words to say that this knowledge on the part of God is evil.
The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law, is involved in
the knowing how such agent may keep that law. But the fact of the
knowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation.
On the other hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth
of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced by
those persons whom God has made, who violate his moral laws. He being
perfectly wise and perfectly good, for perfectly wise and good reasons
sustains them in the ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of
things, no persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not
direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon
him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. That definition
of the term absolute, upon which Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit
only for the Sense and Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of
all existence. It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the
definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid down, it
may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, as that of finite
person, may be denied to God, and no lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's
blasphemy may, then, be answered as follows: God is the infinite and
absolute spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The
form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. Infinity and
absoluteness are _qualities_ of the Person as thus organized. The
quality of absoluteness, for instance, as transfusing the essence, is
the endowment of pure independence, and involves the exclusion of the
possibility of any other independent Being, and the possession of the
ability to create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as
Hegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, except he
is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. But in so far as it
means--and this is undoubtedly what Hegel did mean--that God must be the
efficient author of sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must
produce evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been
uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the
Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true
nature of the subject he had in hand,--the character of God. From the
above considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the
Reason are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things--the
Universe--are dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent.
The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted with entire
approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly vitiated by their
author's indefensible assumption, that cause is "indispensable" to our
idea of the Deity. As was remarked above, the notion of cause is
incidental. The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall
decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not.
Hence we may freely admit that "the cause, as such, exists only in
relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the
effect is an effect of the cause." It is also true that "the
conception"--idea--"of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of
all relation." The position we have taken is in advance of this, for we
say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. Introducing,
then, not "the idea of succession in time," but the idea of the logical
order, we rightly say, "the Absolute exists first by itself, and
afterwards becomes a Cause." Nor are we here "checked by the third
conception, that of the Infinite." "Causation is a possible mode of
existence," and yet "that which exists without causing" is infinite. How
is this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment.
Now, taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort
of the Deity, this is true. Before that act he was perfect in every
possible endowment, and accorded his choice thereto. He was able to
create, but did not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that
act, he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no
_essential_ change in God. But he was in one mode of being before, and
in another mode of being in and after that act. Yet he was equally
perfect, and equally blessed, before as after. What then follows? This:
that there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he
should be a potential creator, and in that act he should become an
actual creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, _i. e._ the
infinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "if
Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without
causing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has passed beyond
its former limits," his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic
understanding-conception of God, which thinks him the sum of all that
was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this, he is
_actual_. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that is required to
fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, whom it qualifies,
possesses all fulness, has all the forms and springs of being in
himself. It is optional with him whether he will create or not; and his
remaining out of all relation, or his creating a Universe, and thus
establishing relations to and for himself, in no way affect his
essential nature, _i. e._ his infinity. He is a person, possessing all
possible endowments, and in this does his infinity consist. In this
view, "creation at any particular moment of time" is seen to be the only
possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. Such a
_Person_, the necessary Being, must have been in existence before the
Universe; and his first act in producing that Universe would mark the
first moment of time. No "alternative of Pantheism" is, can be,
presented to the advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that
scheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd.
One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next paragraph he says,
that, "supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it
operates by means of free will and consciousness." But the difficulties
which he then raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained
thus. Always in God's consciousness _the subject and object are
identical_. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. Hence all
relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent upon him; and it
is a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose, that any relation
which falls _in idea_ within him, and only becomes actual at his will,
is any proper limitation. Both subject and object are thus absolute,
being identical; and yet there is no contradiction.
The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute
Being any interrelations, as of attributes among themselves, or of
attributes to the Being. This arises from an erroneous definition of the
term absolute. The definition heretofore given in this treatise presents
no such difficulty. The possession of these attributes and
interrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of
another independent Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality
which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the
consistency of his being what he must be. If then "the almost unanimous
voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and
simple," uses the term "simple" in the same sense that it would have
when applied to the idea of moral obligation, viz., that it is
unanalyzable, then that voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice
of antiquity in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong;
and is to be treated as that was. On such questions _opinions_ have no
weight. The search is after a knowledge which is sure, and which every
man may have within himself. We land, then, in no "inextricable
dilemma." The absolute Person we see to be conscious; and to possess
complexity in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition
we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, difference, and
likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, established the Universe,
which is still entirely dependent upon him; from which he differs, and
with which he is not identified.
Again Mr. Mansel says: "A mental attribute to be conceived as infinite,
must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is
potential only, with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and
an unrealized potentiality is a limitation." With our interpretation the
assertion is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute of the
Deity is most assuredly "in actual exercise," upon every one of its
"possible objects" _as ideas_. But the objects are not therefore actual.
Neither is there any need that they should ever become so. He sees them
just as clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he does
as actual objects. All ideal objects are "unrealized potentialities";
and yet they are the opposite of limitations proper. But this sentence,
as an expression of the thought which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to
convey, is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception
that infinity is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity as
_quality_ of the necessarily existent Person, and it directly follows
that this or that act, of that Person, in no way disturbs that infinity.
The quality conditions the acting being; but the act of that being
cannot limit the quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the
reverse. Hence the questions arising from the interrelations of Power
and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at once. Infinity as
quality, not amount, pervades them all, and holds them all in perfect
harmony, adjusting each to each, in a melody more beautiful than that of
the spheres. Even "the existence of Evil" is "compatible with that of"
this "perfectly good Being." He does not will that it shall be; neither
does he will that it shall not be. If he willed that it should not be,
and it was, then he would be "thwarted"; but only on such a hypothesis
can the conclusion follow. But he does will that certain creatures shall
be, who, though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, are,
like him, final causes,--the final arbiters of their own destinies, who
in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and may choose good or ill. He
made these creatures, knowing that some of them would choose wrong, and
so evil would be: but _he_ did not will the evil. He only willed the
conditions upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper bars to
prevent the evil; and the _a priori_ facts of his immutable perfection
in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, are decisive of the
consequent fact, that, in willing those conditions, God did the very
best possible deed. If it be further asserted that the fact, that the
Being who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not
wisely prevent sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better
to have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a
wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same as to say, that it is
essential to God's perfection that he be imperfect; or, that it was
better for the perfect Being to violate his Self than to permit sin. If
any one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives, there
remains no ground of argument with him; but only "a certain fearful
looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the
adversary."
Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel further
remarks: "Let us however suppose for an instant, that these difficulties
are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established
on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling
this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining
how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the
finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that
of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or
involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection
to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally
perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of
quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original
perfection." On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore
adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not
belong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God _is_, as ground for
what God does, and standing in the logical order before his act; and it
will directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity
in no way modifies his perfection. What God is, remains permanent and
perfect, and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and
perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as the point
of departure, that, before that point, God was in a state of complete
blessedness, and that after that point he was also in such a state; and,
further, that while these two states are equal, there is not "complete
indifference," because there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine
mind, why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when it was,
and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged in his
conduct, gives to the two states equality, and yet differentiates the
one from the other.
"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being?" It
cannot be _conceived_ at all. The faculty of the mind by which it forms
a concept--the discursive Understanding--is impotent to conceive what
cannot be conceived--the act of creation. The changes of matter can be
concluded into a system, but not the power by which the matter came to
be, and the changes were produced. If the how is known at all, it must
be seen. The laws of the process must be intuited, as also the process
as logically according with those laws. The following is believed to be
an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the above
question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses as _a priori_
organic elements of his being, all possible endowments in perfect
harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible combinations of laws, are at
once and always present before the Eye of his Reason, which is thus
constituted Universal Genius. These combinations may be conveniently
named ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way dependent
upon his will, but are rather _a priori_ conditional of any creative
activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange themselves into
systems,--archetypes of what may be, some of which may appear nobler,
and others inferior. This Person, being such as we have stated,
possesses also as endowment all power, and thereby excludes the
possibility of there being any "_other_" power. This power is adequate
to do all that _power_ can do,--to accomplish all that lies within the
province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not to exert his
power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and the power will be simply
power. But whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power, and
organize it according to the ideal forms, the Universe will become. In
all this the Person, "of his own will," freely establishes whatever his
unerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the
actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or
restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but are only a
manifestation of that fulness,--a declaration of his glory. In a word,
Creation is that executive act of God by which he combines with his
power that ideal system which he had chosen because best, or _it is the
organization of ample power according to perfect law_. If one shall now
ask, "How could he send forth the power?" it is to be replied that the
question is prompted by the curiosity of the "flesh," man's animal
nature; and since no representation--picture--can be made, no answer can
be furnished. It is not needed to know _how_ God is, or does anything,
but only that he does it. All the essential requirements of the problem
are met when it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all
fulness is in God, that from this fulness he established all other
beings and their natural relations, and that no relation is _imposed_
upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the evil of the
understanding-conception, that creation is the bringing of something out
of nothing. There is an actual self-existent ground, from which the
Universe is produced. Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts
with the _a priori_ idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is
"before all things, and by whom all things consist,"--who organizes his
own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces the
Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness.
On page eighty-four, in speaking "of the atheistic alternative," Mr.
Mansel makes use of the following language: "A limit is itself a
relation; and to conceive a limit as such, is virtually to acknowledge
the existence of a correlative on the other side of it." Upon reading
this sentence, some sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense.
Some object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. But
let the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses all limitation
within himself, and for whom there is no "other side," nor any
"correlative," and the difficulty vanishes. We do not seek to account
for sensuous objects. It is pure Spirit whom we consider. We do not need
to form a concept of "a first moment in time," or "a first unit of
space," nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty
which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization.
What we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit is, who, possessing
personality as form, and absoluteness and infinity as qualities, thereby
contains all limits and the ground of all being in himself, and
antithetical to whom is only negation.
From the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not the dreary
Sahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair land of harmonious
consistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, self-conscious, the absolute and
infinite Person, is the Being we seek and have found; and upon such a
Being the soul of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant
in its mother's arms. One cannot pass by unnoticed the beautiful spirit
of religious reverence which shines through the closing paragraphs of
this lecture. It is evident with what dissatisfaction the writer views
the sterile puzzles of which he has been treating, and what a relief it
is to turn from them to "the God who is 'gracious and merciful, slow to
anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the evil.'" The
wonder is, that he did not receive that presentation which his devout
spirit has made, as the truth--which it is--and say, "I will accept this
as final. My definitions and deductions shall accord with this highest
revelation. This shall be my standard of interpretation." Had he done
so, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and truthful
would have been the conclusions he would have given us.
In his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination of the
human nature, for the purpose, if possible, of finding "some explanation
of the singular phenomenon of human thought," which he has just
developed. At the threshold of the investigation the fact of
consciousness appears, and he begins the statement of its conditions in
the following language: "Now, in the first place, the very conception of
Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily
implies _distinction between one object and another_. To be conscious we
must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as
that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." In
this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very
question at issue; for, the position maintained by one class of writers
is, that in certain of our mental operations, viz., in intuitions, the
mind sees a simple truth, idea, first principle, as it is, in itself,
and that there is no distinction in the act of knowledge. It is
unquestionably true that, in the examination of objects on the Sense,
and the conclusion of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come
into consciousness without implying a "distinction between one object
and another." But it is also evident that a first truth, to be known as
such, must be intuited--seen as it is in itself; and so directly known
to have the qualities of necessity and universality which constitute it
a first truth. Of this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been
aware, when he denied the actuality of the Reason,--perceiving,
doubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his own theory
tenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would seem it must be, that
men have necessary and universal convictions, then it must also be
admitted that these convictions are not entertained by distinguishing
them from other mental operations, but that they are seen of themselves
to be true; and thus it appears that there are some modes of
consciousness which do not imply the "distinction" claimed. The
subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. If
the author means that "the Infinite" cannot be infinite without he is
also finite, so that all distinction ceases, then his meaning is both
pantheistic and contradictory; for the word infinite has no meaning, if
it is not the opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly
Pantheism. Or if he means "that the Infinite cannot be distinguished" as
independent, from the Finite _as independent_, and thus, as possessing
some quality with which it was not endowed by the infinite Person, then
there can be no doubt of his correctness. But if, as would seem, his
idea of infinity is that of amount, is such that it appears
inconsistent, contradictory, for the infinite Person to retain his
infinity, and still create beings who are really other than himself, and
possessing, as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality,
then is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, and the
capacity to thus create is essential to it. All that the Reason requires
is, that the finite be created by and wholly dependent upon the infinite
Person; then all the relations and conditions are only _improper_,--such
as that Person has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish
his glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "A
consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a
self-contradiction, for it implies the recognition, by limitation and
difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and
indifferent," it is evident that he uses the term infinite to express
the understanding-conception of unlimited amount, which is not relevant
here, rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not
contradictory to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite.
There is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we have no
knowledge except of the limited and different, or, in other words, that
the Understanding is the highest faculty of the mind. It has already
been abundantly shown that this is erroneous,--that the Reason knows its
objects in themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or
likeness. Dropping now the abstract term "the infinite," and using the
concrete and proper form, we may say:
We are conscious of infinity, _i. e._ we are conscious that we see with
the eye of Reason infinity as a simple, _a priori_ idea; and that it is
quality of the Deity.
2. We are conscious of the infinite Person; in that we are conscious,
that we see with the eye of Reason the complex _a priori_ idea of a
perfect Person possessing independence and universality as qualities of
his Self. But we are not conscious of him in that we exhaustively
comprehend him. As is said elsewhere, we know that he is, and to a
certain extent, but not wholly what he is.
In further discussing this question Mansel is guilty of another grave
psychological error. He says, "Consciousness is essentially a
limitation, for it is the determination to one actual out of many
possible modifications." There is no truth in this sentence.
Consciousness is not a limitation; it is not a determination; it is not
a modification. It may be well to state here certain conclusions on this
assertion, which will be brought out in the fuller discussion of it,
when we come to speak of Mr. Spencer's book. Consciousness is _one_, and
retains that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur in the
unity as items of experience affect it. Doubtless Dr. Hickok's
illustration is the best possible. Consciousness is the _light_ in which
a spiritual person sees the modifications of himself, _i. e._ the
activity of his faculties and capacities. Like Space, only in a
different sphere, it is an illimitable indivisible unity, which is, that
all limits may be in it--that all objects may come into it. If, then,
only one modification--object--comes into it at a time, this is because
the faculties which see in its light are thus organized;--the being to
whom it belongs is partial; but there is nothing pertaining to
consciousness _as such_, which constitutes a limit,--which could bar the
infinite Person from seeing all things at once in its light. This
Person, then, so far as known, must be known as an actual absolute,
infinite Spirit, and hence no "thing"; and further as the originator and
sustainer of all "_things_,"--which, though dependent on him, in no way
take aught from him. He may be known also, as potentially everything, in
the sense that all possible combinations, or forms of objects, must ever
stand as ideals in his Reason; and he can, at his will, organize his
power in accordance therewith. But he must also be known as free to
create or not to create; and that the fact that many potential forms
remain such, in no way detracts from his infinity.
Another of Mr. Mansel's positions involve conclusions which, we feel
assured, he will utterly reject. He says, "If all thought is
limitation,--if whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception,
regarded as finite,--the infinite, from a human point of view, is merely
a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is
possible." "From a human point of view," and _we_, at least, can take no
other, what follows? That the Deity _can have no thoughts_; cannot know
what our thoughts are, or that we think. But three suppositions can be
made. Either he has no thoughts, is destitute of an intellect; or his
intellect is Universal Genius, and he sees all possible objects at once;
or there is a faculty different in kind from and higher than the Reason,
of which we have, can have, no knowledge. The first, though acknowledged
by Hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted, and logically following from
the position taken by Mr. Mansel, is so abhorrent to the soul that it
must be unhesitatingly rejected. The second is the position advocated in
this treatise. The third is hinted at by Mr. Herbert Spencer. We reject
this third, because the Reason affirms it to be impossible; and because,
being unnecessary, by the law of parsimony it should not be allowed. To
advocate a position of which, in the very terms of it, the intellect can
have no possible shadow of knowledge, is, to say the least, no part of
the work of a philosopher. "The condition of consciousness is" not
"distinction" in the understanding-conception of that term. So
consciousness is not a limitation, though all limits when cognized are
seen in the light of consciousness. According to the philosophy we
advocate, God is a particular being, and is so known; yet he is not
known as "one thing out of many," but is known in himself, as being such
and such, and yet being _unique_. When Mr. Mansel says, "In assuming the
possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore,
that it is at the same time limited and unlimited," he evidently uses
those terms with a signification pertinent only to the Understanding. He
is thinking of _amount_ under the forms of Space and Time; and so his
remark has no validity. He who thinks of God rightly, will think of him
as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person; and will define infinity
and absoluteness in accordance therewith.
If the views now advanced are presentations of truth, a consistent
rationalism _must_ attribute "consciousness to God." _We_ are always
conscious of "limitation and change," because partiality and growth are
organic with us. But we can perceive no peculiarity in consciousness,
which should produce such an effect. On the contrary we see, that if a
person has little knowledge, he will be conscious of so much and no
more. And if a person has great capabilities, and corresponding
information, he is conscious of just so much. Whence, it appears, that
the "limitation and change" spring from the nature of the constitution,
and not from the consciousness. If, then, there should be one Person who
possessed the sum of all excellencies, there could arise no reason from
consciousness why he should be conscious thereof.
Mr. Mansel names as the "second characteristic of Consciousness, that it
is only possible in the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject,
or person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious."
This utterance, taken in the sense which Mr. Mansel wishes to convey,
involves the denial of consciousness to God. But upon the ground that
the subject and object in the Deity are always identical the difficulty
vanishes. But how can man be "conscious of the Absolute?" If by this is
meant, have an exhaustive comprehension of the absolute Person, the
experience is manifestly impossible. But man may have a certain
knowledge, _that_ such Person is without knowing in all respects _what_
he is, just as a child may know that an apple is, without knowing what
it is. Again Mr. Mansel uses the terms absolute and infinite to
represent a simple unanalyzable Being. In this he is guilty of
personifying an abstract term, and then reasoning with regard to the
Being as he would with regard to the term. Absoluteness is a simple
unanalyzable idea, but it is not God; it is only one quality of God. So
with infinity. God is universal complexity; and to reason of him as
unanalyzable simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the
apple's skin, and call that the apple, and then reason from it about the
apple. So, then, though man cannot comprehend the absolute Person _as
such_, he has a positive idea of absoluteness, and a positive knowledge
that the Being is who is thus qualified. Upon the subsequent question
respecting the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute
Person, a remark made above may be repeated and amplified. We may have a
true, clear, thorough knowledge _that_ he exists without having an
exhaustive knowledge of _what_ he is. The former is necessary to us; the
latter impossible. So, too, the knowledge by us, of any _a priori_ law,
will be exhaustive. Yet while we know that it _must_ be such, and not
otherwise, it neither follows that we know all other _a priori_ laws,
nor that we know all the exemplifications of this one. And since, as we
have heretofore seen, neither absoluteness nor infinity relate to
number, and God is not material substance that can be broken into
"parts," but an organized Spirit, we see that we may consider the
elements of his organization in their logical order; and, remembering
that absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all, we may examine
his nature and attributes without impiety.
Mr. Mansel says further: "But in truth it is obvious, on a moment's
reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite can be
represented in the form of a whole composed of parts." This is
tantamount to saying, the spiritual cannot be represented under the form
of the material--a truth so evident as hardly to need so formal a
statement. But what the Divine means is, that that Being cannot be known
as having qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and
from himself; which is an error. God is infinite. So is his Knowledge,
his Wisdom, his Holiness, his Love, &c. Yet these are distinguished from
each other, and from him. All this is consistent, because infinity is
_quality_, and permeates them all; and not amount, which jumbles them
all into a confused, _indistinguishable_ mass.
In speaking of "human consciousness" as "necessarily subject to the law
of Time," Mr. Mansel says, "Every object of whose existence we can be in
any way conscious is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time
to some former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a
certain portion of time." In so far as there is here expressed the law
of created beings, under which they must see objects, the remark is
true. But when Mr. Mansel proceeds further, and concludes that, because
we are under limitation in seeing the object, it is under the same
limitation, so far as we apprehend it in being seen, he asserts what is
a psychological error. To show this, take the mathematical axiom,
"Things which are equal to the same things, are equal to one another."
Except under the conditions of Time, we cannot see this, that is, we do,
must, occupy a time in observing it. But do we see that the axiom is
under any condition of Time? By no means. We see, directly, that it is,
_must be_, true, and that in itself it has no relation to Time. It is
thus _absolutely_ true; and as one of the ideas of the infinite and
absolute Person, it possesses these his qualities. We have, then, a
faculty, the Reason, which, while it sees its objects in succession, and
so under the law of Time, also sees that those objects, whether ideas,
or that Being to whom all ideas belong, are, _in themselves_, out of all
relation to Time. Thus is the created spiritual person endowed; thus is
he like God; thus does he know "the Infinite." Hence, "the command, so
often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians, 'In contemplating
God, transcend time,'" means, "In all your reflections upon God, behold
him in his true aspect, in the reason-idea, as out of all relation." It
is true that "to know the infinite" _exhaustively_, "the human mind must
itself be infinite." But this knowledge is not required of that mind.
Only that knowledge is required which is possible, viz., that the Deity
is, and what he is, _in so far as we are in his image_.
Again; personality is not "essentially a limitation and a relation," in
the sense that it necessarily detracts aught from any being who
possesses it. It rather adds,--is, indeed, a pure addition. We appear to
ourselves as limited and related, not because of our personality, but
because of our finiteness as _quality_ in the personality.
Hence we not only see no reason why the complete and universal Spirit
should not have personality, but we see that if he was destitute of it,
he must possess a lower form of being,--since this is the highest
possible form,--which would be an undoubted limitation; or, in other
words, we see that he must be a Person. In what Mr. Mansel subsequently
says upon this subject, he presents arguments for the personality of God
so strong, that one is bewildered with the question, "How could he
escape the conviction which they awaken? How could he reject the cry of
his spiritual nature, and accept the barren contradictions of his lower
mind?" Let us note a few sentences. "It is by consciousness alone that
we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer him any service.
It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in
any religious relation to Him at all,--that we can form such a
representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants,
insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity."
"Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation
to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist.
And when, from the little world of man's consciousness and its objects,
we would lift up our eyes to the inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask
to whom all this is related, the highest existence is still the highest
personality, and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, 'I
AM.'" "It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our
duty to believe that He is infinite." We may at this point quote with
profit the words of that Book whose authority Mr. Mansel, without
doubt, most heartily acknowledges. "And for this cause God shall send
them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all
might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in
unrighteousness." "I have not written unto you because ye know not the
truth, but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth." Either
God is personal or he is not. If he is, then all that we claim is
conceded. If he is not personal, and "it is our duty to think" of him as
personal, then it is our duty to think and believe a _falsehood_. This
no man, at least neither Mr. Mansel nor any other enlightened man, _can_
bring his mind to accept as a moral law. The soul instinctively asserts
that obligation lies parallel with _truth_, and "that no lie is of the
truth." So, then, there can be no duty except where truth is. And the
converse may also be accepted, viz.: Where an enlightened sense of duty
is, there is truth. When, therefore, so learned and truly spiritual a
man as Mr. Mansel asserts "that it is our duty to think God personal,
and believe him infinite," we unhesitatingly accept it as the utterance
of a great fundamental truth in that spiritual realm which is the
highest realm of being, and so, as one of the highest truths, and with
it we accept all its logical consequences. It is a safe rule anywhere,
that if two mental operations seem to clash, and one must be rejected,
man should cling to, and trust in the higher--the teaching of the nobler
nature. Thus will we do, and from the Divine's own ground will we see
the destruction of his philosophy. "It is our duty to think of God as
personal," because he is personal; and we know that he is personal
because it is our duty to think him so. We need pay no regard to the
perplexities of the Understanding. We soar with the eagle above the
clouds, and float ever in the light of the Sun. The teachings of the
Moral Sense are far more sure, safe, and satisfactory than any
discursions of the lower faculty. Therefore it is man's wisdom, in all
perplexity to heed the cry of his highest nature, and determine to
stand on its teachings, as his highest knowledge, interpret all
utterances by this, and reject all which contradict it. At the least,
the declaration of this faculty is _as_ valid as that of the lower, and
is to be more trusted in every disagreement, because higher. Still
further, no man would believe that God, in the most solemn, yea, awful
moment of his Self-revelation, would declare a lie. The bare thought,
fully formed, horrifies the soul as a blasphemy of the damned. Yet, in
that supreme act, in the solitude of the Sinaitic wilderness, to one of
the greatest, one of the profoundest, most devout of men, He revealed
Himself by the pregnant words, "I AM": the most positive, the most
unquestionable form in which He could utter the fact of His personality.
This, then, and all that is involved in it, we accept as truth; and all
perplexities must be interpreted by this surety.
In summing up the results to which an examination of the facts of
consciousness conducted him, Mr. Mansel utters the following
psychological error: "But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation
between something within and something without itself; and the
consciousness of a limit of thought implies, though it does not directly
present to us, the existence of something of which we do not and cannot
think." Not so; for a limit may be seen to be wholly within the being to
whom it belongs, and so _not_ to be "a relation between something within
and something without itself." This is precisely the case with the
Deity. All relations and limits spring from within him, and there is
nothing "without" to establish the relation claimed. This absence of all
limit from without is rudely expressed in such common phrases as this:
"It must be so in the _nature of things_." This "nature of things" is,
in philosophical language, the system of _a priori_ laws of the
Universe, and these are necessary ideas in the Divine Reason. It
appears, then, that what must be in the nature of things, finds its
limits wholly within, and its relations established by the Deity.
With these remarks the author would close his criticism upon Mr.
Mansel's book. We start from entirely different bases, and these two
systems logically follow from their foundations. If Sir William Hamilton
is right in his psychology, his follower is unquestionably right in his
deductions. But if that psychology is partial, if besides the
Understanding there is the Reason, if above the judgment stands the
intuition, giving the final standard by which to measure that judgment,
then is the philosophical system of the Divine utterly fallacious. The
establishment of the validity of the Pure Reason is the annihilation of
"the Philosophy of the Unconditioned." On the ground which the author
has adopted, it is seen that "God is a spirit," infinite, absolute,
self-conscious, personal; and a consistent interpretation of these terms
has been given. We have found that certain objects may be seen as out of
all relation, plurality, difference, or likeness. Consciousness and
personality have also been found to involve no limit, in the proper
sense of that term. On the contrary, the one was ascertained to be the
light in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions of
Time, or at once; and that this seeing was according to the capacity
with which the being was endowed, and was not determined by any
peculiarity of the consciousness; while the other appeared to be the
highest possible form of existence, and that also in which God had
revealed himself. From such a ground it is possible to go forward and
construct a Rational Theology which shall verify by Reason the teachings
of the Bible.
REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES."
In the criticisms heretofore made, some points, held in common by the
three writers named early in this work, have been, it may be, passed
over unnoticed. This was done, because, being held in common, it was
believed that an examination of them, as presented by the latest writer,
would be most satisfactory. Therefore, what was peculiar in thought or
expression to Sir Wm. Hamilton or Mr. Mansel, we have intended to notice
when speaking of those writers. But where Mr. Spencer seems to present
their very thought as his own, it has appeared better to remark upon it
in his latest form of expression. Mr. Spencer also holds views peculiar
to himself. These we shall examine in their place. And for convenience'
sake, what we have to say will take the form of a running commentary
upon those chapters entitled, "Ultimate Religious Ideas," "Ultimate
Scientific Ideas," "The Relativity of all Knowledge," and "The
Reconciliation." Before entering upon this, however, some general
remarks will be pertinent.
1. Like his teachers, Mr. Spencer believes that the Understanding is the
highest faculty of the human intellect. This is implied in the following
sentence: "Those imbecilities of the understanding that disclose
themselves when we try to answer the highest questions of objective
science, subjective science proves to be necessitated by the laws of
that understanding."--_First Principles_, p. 98.
His illustrations, also, are all, or nearly all, taken from sensuous
objects. In speaking of the Universe, evidently the _material_ Universe
is present to his mind. His questions refer to objects of sense, and he
shows plainly enough that any attempt to answer them by the Sense or
Understanding is futile. Hence he concludes that they cannot be
answered. But those who "know of a surety," that man is more than an
animal nature, containing a Sense and an Understanding; that he is also
a spiritual person, having an _Eye_, the pure Reason, which can _see_
straight to the central Truth, with a clearness and in a light which
dims and pales the noonday sun, know also that, and how, these
difficulties, insoluble to the lower faculties, are, in this noble
alembic, finally dissolved.
2. As Mr. Spencer follows his teachers in the psychology of man's
faculties, so does he also in the use of terms. Like them, he employs
only such terms as are pertinent to the Sense and Understanding. So also
with them he is at fault, in that he raises questions which no Sense or
Understanding could suggest even, questions whose very presence are
decisive that a Pure Reason is organic in man; and then is guilty of
applying to them terms entirely impertinent,--terms belonging only to
those lower tribunals before which these questions can never come. For
instance, he always employs the word "conceive" to express the effort of
the mind in presenting to itself the subjects now under discussion. In
some form of noun, verb, or adjective, this word seems to have rained
upon his pages; while such terms as "infinite period," "infinitely
divisible," "absolutely incompressible," "infinitesimal," and the like,
dot them repeatedly. Let us revert, then, a moment to the positions
attained in an earlier portion of this work. It was there found that the
word conceive was _utterly irrelevant_ to any subject except to objects
of Sense and the Understanding in its work of classifying them, or
generalizing from them, so, also, with regard to the other terms quoted,
it was found that they not only presented no object of thought to the
mind, but that the words had no relation to each other, and could not
properly be used together. For instance, infinite has no more relation
to, and can no more qualify period, than the points of the compass are
pertinent to, and can qualify the affections. The phrase, infinite
period, is simply absurd, and so also are the others. The words infinite
and absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort. They can be
pertinent only to God and his _a priori_ ideas. Many, perhaps most of
the criticisms in detail we shall have to make, will be based on this
single misuse of words; which yet grows naturally out of that denial and
perversion of faculties which Mr. Spencer, in common with the other
Limitist writers, has attempted. On the other hand, it is to be
remembered, that, if we arrive at the truth at all, we must _intuit_ it;
we must either see it as a simple _a priori_ idea, or as a logical
deduction from such ideas.
3. A third, and graver error on Mr. Spencer's part is, that he goes on
propounding his questions, and asserting that they are insoluble,
apparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an enchanted castle that they
have all been solved, or at least that the principles on which it would
seem that they could be solved have been stated by a man of no mean
ability,--Dr. Hickok,--and that until the proposed solutions are
thoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound, his own pages are idle. He
implies that there is no cognition higher than a conception, when some
very respectable writers have named intuitions as incomparably superior.
He speaks of the Understanding as if it were without question the
highest faculty of man's intellect, when no less a person than Coleridge
said it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into English
thinking the distinction between the Understanding, as "the faculty
judging according to sense," and the Reason, as "the power of universal
and necessary convictions," which, being such, must necessarily rank far
above the other. And finally he uses the words and phrases above
disallowed, and the faculties to which they belong, in an attempt to
prove, by the citation of a few items in an experience, what had already
been demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning as
Calculus. No one, it is believed, can master the volume heretofore
alluded to, entitled "Rational Psychology," and so appreciate the
_demonstration_ therein contained, of the utter incompetency of the
Sense or Understanding to solve such questions as Mr. Spencer has raised
by his incident of the partridge, (p. 69,) and the utter irrelevancy to
them of the efforts of those faculties, without feeling how tame and
unsatisfactory in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few facts in a
sensuous experience. One cares not to see a half dozen proofs, more or
less that a theory is fallacious who has learned that, and why, the
theory _cannot_ be true. Let us now take up in order the chapters
heretofore mentioned.
"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS."
The summing up of certain reflections with which this chapter opens,
concludes thus: "But that when our symbolic conceptions are such that no
cumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain
that there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made
whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and
illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions,"--p. 29. So
far very good; but his use of it is utterly unsound. "And now to
consider the bearings of this general truth on our immediate
topic--Ultimate Religious Ideas." But this "general truth" has _no_
bearings upon "ultimate religious ideas"; how then can you consider
them? _No_ ideas, and most of all religious ideas, are conceptions, or
the results of conceptions--or are the products of "cumulative or
indirect processes of thought." They are not results or products _at
all_. They are organic, are the spontaneous presentation of what is
inborn, and so must be directly seen to be known at all. Man might pile
up "cumulative processes of thought" for unnumbered ages, and might form
most exact conceptions of objects of Sense,--conceptions are not
possible of others,--and he could never creep up to the least and
faintest religious idea.
On the next page, speaking of "suppositions respecting the origin of the
Universe," Mr. Spencer says, "The deeper question is, whether any one of
them is even conceivable in the true sense of that word. Let us
successively test them." This is not necessary. It has already been
_demonstrated_ that a conception, or any effort of the Understanding,
cannot touch, or have relation to such topics. But it does not follow,
therefore, that no one of them is cognizable at all; which he implies.
Take the abstract notion of self-existence, for example. No "vague
symbolic conceptions," or any conception at all, of it _can be formed_.
A conception is possible only "under relation, difference, and
plurality." _This_ is a pure, simple idea, and so can only be known in
itself by a seeing--an immediate intuition. It is seen by itself, as out
of all relation. It is seen as simple, and so is learned by no
difference. It is seen as a unit, and so out of all plurality. The
discursive faculty cannot pass over it, because there are in it no
various points upon which that faculty may fasten. It may, perhaps,
better be expressed by the words pure independence. Again, it is _not_
properly "existence without a beginning," but rather, existence out of
all relation to beginning; and so it is an idea, out of all relation to
those faculties which are confined to objects that did begin. Because we
can "by no mental effort" "form a conception of existence without a
beginning," it does not follow that we cannot _see_ that a Being
existing out of all relation to beginning _is_. "To this let us add"
that the intuition of such a Being is a complete "explanation of the
Universe," and does make it "easier to understand" "that it existed an
hour ago, a day ago, a year ago"; for we see that this Being primarily
is _out of all relation to time_, that there is no such thing as an
"infinite period," the phrase being absurd; but that through all the
procession of events which we call time he _is_; and that before that
procession began--when there was no time, he was. Thus we see that all
events are based upon Him who is independent; and that time, in our
general use of it, is but the measure of what He produces. We arrive,
then, at the conclusion that the Universe is not self-existent, not
because self-existence cannot be object to the human mind, and be
clearly seen to be an attribute of one Being, but because the Universe
is primarily object to faculties in that mind, which cannot entertain
such a notion at all; and because this notion is _seen_ to be a
necessary idea in the province of that higher faculty which entertains
as objects both the idea and the Being to whom it primarily belongs.
The theory that the Universe is self-existent is Pantheism, and not the
theory that it is self-created, though this latter, in Mr. Spencer's
definition of it, seems only a phase of the other. To say that
"self-creation is potential existence passing into actual existence by
some inherent necessity," is only to remove self-existence one step
farther back, as he himself shows. Potential existence is either no
existence at all, or it is positive existence. If it is no existence,
then we have true self-creation; which is, that out of nothing, and with
no cause, actual existence starts itself. This is not only unthinkable,
but absurd. But if potential existence is positive, it needs to be
accounted for as much as actual. While, then, there can be no doubt as
to the validity of the conclusions to which Mr. Spencer arrives,
respecting the entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence
and self-creation, to account for the Universe, the distinction made
above between self-existence as a true and self-creation as a pseudo
idea, and the fact that the true idea is a _reality_, should never be
lost sight of. By failing to discriminate--as in the Understanding he
could not do--between them, and by concluding both as objects alike
impossible to the human intellect, and for the same reasons, he has also
decided that the "commonly received or theistic hypothesis"--creation by
external agency--is equally untenable. In his examination of this, he
starts as usual with his ever-present, fallacious assumption, that this
is a "conception"; that it can be, _is_ founded upon a "cumulative
process of thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it."
These words, phrases, and notions, are all irrelevant. It is not a
conception, process, or prediction that we want; it is a _sight_. Hence,
no assumptions have to be made or granted. No "proceedings of a human
artificer" _can in the least degree_ "vaguely symbolize to us" the
"method after which the Universe" was "shaped." This differed in _kind_
from all possible human methods, and had not one element in common with
them.
Mr. Spencer's remarks at this point upon Space do not appear to be well
grounded. "An immeasurable void"--Space--is not an entity, is _no_
thing, and therefore cannot "exist," neither is any explanation for it
needed. His question, "how came it so?" takes, then, this form: How came
immeasurable nothing to be nothing? Nothing needs no "explanation." It
is only _some_ thing which must be accounted for. The theory of creation
by external agency being, then, an adequate one to account for the
Universe, supplies the following statement. That Being who is primarily
out of all relation, produced, from himself, and by his immanent
power, into nothing--Space, room, the condition of material
existence,--something, matter and the Universe became. "The genesis of
the universe" having thus been explained and seen to be "the result of
external agency," we are ready to furnish for the question, "how came
there to be an external agency?" that true answer, which we have already
shadowed forth. That pure spiritual Person who is necessarily existent,
or self-existent, _i. e._ who possess pure independence as an essential
attribute, whose being is thus fixed, and is therefore without the
province of power, is the external agency which is needed. This Person,
differing in kind from the Universe, cannot be found in it, nor
concluded from it, but can only be known by being seen, and can only be
seen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual _Eye_, like in
kind to His own All-seeing eye, by which spiritual things may be
discerned. This Person, being thus seen immediately, is known in a far
more satisfactory mode than he could be by any generalizations of the
Understanding, could he be represented in these at all. The knowledge of
Him is, like His self, _immutable_. We KNOW that we stand on the eternal
Rock. Our eye is illuminated with the unwavering Light which radiates
from the throne of God. Nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist.
It is the simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure
truth in itself. It is the Pure Reason seeing, by an immediate
intuition, God as pure spirit, revealed directly to itself. It is, then,
because self-existence is a pure, simple idea, organic in man, and seen
by him to be an attribute of God, that God is known to be the Creator of
the Universe. Having attained to this truth, we readily see that the
conclusions which Mr. Spencer states on pages 35, 36, as that
"self-existence is rigorously inconceivable"; that the theistic
hypothesis equally with the others is "literally unthinkable"; that "our
conception of self-existence can be formed only by joining with it the
notion of unlimited duration through past time"; so far as they imply
our destitution of knowledge on these topics, are the opposite of the
facts. We _see_, though we cannot "conceive," self-existence. The
theistic hypothesis becomes, therefore, literally thinkable. We see,
also, that unlimited duration is an absurdity; that duration must be
limited; and that self-existence involves existence out of all relation
to duration.
Mr. Spencer then turns to the nature of the Universe, and says: "We find
ourselves on the one hand obliged to make certain assumptions, and yet,
on the other hand, we find these assumptions cannot be represented in
thought." Upon this it may be remarked:
1. What are here called assumptions are properly assertions, which man
makes, and cannot help making, except he deny himself;--necessary
convictions, first truths, first principles, _a priori_ ideas. They are
organic, and so are the foundation of all knowledge. They are not
results learned from lessons, but are _primary_, and conditional to an
ability to learn. But supposing them to be assumptions, having, at
most, no more groundwork than a vague guess, there devolves a labor
which Mr. Spencer and his coadjutors have never attempted, and which, we
are persuaded, they would find the most difficult of all, viz., to
account for the fact of these assumptions. For the question is pertinent
and urgent;
2. How came these assumptions to suggest themselves? Where, for
instance, did the notion of self come from? Analyze the rocks, study
plants and their growth, become familiar with animals and their habits,
or exhaust the Sense in an examination of man, and one can find no
notion of self. Yet the notion is, and is peculiar to man. How does it
arise? Is it "created by the slow action of natural causes?" How comes
it to belong, then, to the rudest aboriginal equally with the most
civilized and cultivated? Was it "created" from nothing or from
something? If from something, how came that something to be? We might
ask, Does not the presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality
of a somewhat, in which that phenomenon inheres, and of a receptivity by
which it is appreciated? Does not the fact of this assumption, as a
mental phenomenon, involve the higher fact of some mental ground, some
form, some capacity, which is both organic to the mind, and organized in
the mind, in accordance with which the assumption is, and which
determines what it must be? Or are we to believe that these assumptions
are mere happenings, without law, and for which no reason can be
assigned? Again we press the question, How came these assumptions to
suggest themselves?
3. "These assumptions cannot be represented in thought." If "thought" is
restricted to that mental operation of the Understanding by which it
generalizes in accordance with the Sense, the statement is true. But if
it is meant, as seems to be implied, that the notions expressed in these
assumptions are not, cannot be, clearly and definitely known at all by
the mind, then it is directly contrary to the truth. The ideas presented
by the phrases are, as was seen above, clear and definite.
Since Mr. Spencer has quoted _in extenso_, and with entire approbation,
what Mr. Mansel says respecting "the Cause, the Absolute, and the
Infinite," we have placed the full examination of these topics in our
remarks upon Mr. Mansel's writings, and shall set down only a few brief
notes here.
Upon this topic Mr. Spencer admits that "we are obliged to suppose
_some_ cause"; or, in other words, that the notion of cause is organic.
Then we must "inevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a First
Cause." Then, this First Cause "must be infinite." Then, "it must be
independent;" "or, to use the established word, it must be absolute."
One would almost suppose that a _rational_ man penned these decisions,
instead of one who denies that he has a _reason_. The illusion is
quickly dispelled, however, by the objections he lifts out of the dingy
ground-room of the Understanding. It is curious to observe in these
pages a fact which we have noticed before, in speaking of Sir William
Hamilton's works, viz.: how, on the same page, and in the same sentence,
the workings of the Understanding and Reason will run along side by
side, the former all the while befogging and hindering the latter. Mr.
Spencer's conclusions which we have quoted, and his objections which we
are to answer, are a striking exemplification of this. Frequently in his
remarks he uses the words limited and unlimited, as synonymous with
finite and infinite, when they are not so, and cannot be used
interchangeably with propriety. The former belong wholly in the Sense
and Understanding. The latter belong wholly in the Pure Reason. The
former pertain to material objects, to mental images of them, or to
number. The latter qualify only spiritual persons, and have no
pertinence elsewhere. Limitation is the conception of an object _as
bounded_. Illimitation is the conception of an object as without
boundaries. Rigidly, it is a simple negation of boundaries, and gives
nothing positive in the Concept. Finity or finiteness corresponds in the
Reason to limitation in the Sense and Understanding. It does not refer
to boundaries at all. It belongs only to created spiritual persons, and
expresses the fact that they are partial, and must grow and learn. Only
by its place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the Reason to
illimitation in the lower faculties. It is _positive_, and is that
quality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as _universality_.
It expresses the idea of _all possible endowments in perfect harmony_.
From his misuse of these terms Mr. Spencer is led to speak in an
irrelevant manner upon the question, "Is the First Cause finite or
infinite?" He uses words and treats the whole matter as if it were a
question of material substance, which might be "bounded," with a "region
surrounding its boundaries," and the like, which are as out of place as
to say white love or yellow kindness. His methods of thought on these
topics are also gravely erroneous. He attempts an analysis by the
logical Understanding, where a synthesis by the Reason is required,--a
synthesis which has already been given by our Creator to man as an
original idea. It is not necessary to examine some limited thing, or all
limited things, and wander around their boundaries to learn that the
First Cause is infinite. We need to make no discursus, but only to look
the idea of first cause through and through, and thoroughly analyze it,
to find all the truth. By such a process we would find all that Mr.
Spencer concedes that "we are obliged to suppose," and further, that
such a being _must be_ self-existent. And this conviction would be so
strong that the mind would rest itself in this decision: "A thousand
phantasmagoria of the imagination may be wrong," says the soul, "but
this I know must be true, or there is no truth in the Universe."