It is with regard to content as well as to form that beginnings of a new

life appear. At the level of nature only that which serves the

self-preservation and the advancement of the life of the individual

being is estimated as a good; all that is involved in this may be

comprehended under the conception of utility. But notwithstanding its

great power over man the consideration of utility does not form the only

motive of his life. For a detailed treatment of this matter we may refer

to what was said in the discussion of "The Growth of Man beyond Nature."

At present we are concerned especially with the view that the new that

appears in us should be acknowledged to be the manifestation of a new

world and the expression of our real being. In the growing of man beyond

nature negation usually preponderates; he must limit the impulses of

his natural _ego_, acknowledge and respect the rights of others, be

ready to subordinate and sacrifice himself. It is for the most part not

evident what can commend such a negation to him and give it power over

him; and an impulse aroused to clear consciousness and strong desire

may, therefore, feel this entire connection with a new world to be an

unwarrantable limitation, and reject it as a violent intimidation and a

degradation of life. The matter is seen in its right light only when

negation is regarded as the reverse side of affirmation, and even then

only if the winning of a new life and being is acknowledged in this

affirmation. The positive impulse of self-preservation is indispensable

to complete vital-energy, but mere self-assertion on the part of an

individual in opposition to others does not constitute a genuine self; a

genuine self is constituted only by the coming to life of the infinite

spiritual world in an independent concentration in the individual. Only

thus does life, which otherwise were empty, acquire a content. Then the

individual is no longer compelled to develop his powers in conflict with

other individuals, but in directing his life towards this infinite

spiritual world, in its complete appropriation and organisation. Hence,

only that which raises the spiritual content of life can be regarded as

good, and goods will be compared in value in accordance with this

standard. The more they lead beyond mere results to the development of a

new being and self, the more essential they are to spiritual

self-preservation; everything else becomes a means or a preliminary

condition. Negation, also, has greater significance and importance from

this point of view. The new affirmation can acquire no complete truth

and no real power in man without a fundamental deliverance of life from

mere nature and its particularity. Without earnestness of renunciation

the new life sinks back to the old or both are combined in an

undifferentiated unity, with the consequence that the new life loses its

power to stimulate to new endeavour. As human beings are, this negation

must always be a sharp one.

In this connection, it may be said that life needs the stage of law

which restricts natural impulse, and constrains to the acknowledgment of

superior organisations of life; but from the stage of law there must be

progress to the stage of love, which for the first time reveals an inner

relation to reality and reacts upon the stage of law, giving it a soul.

On the other hand, a love that would be genuine comes not to destroy the

law, but to fulfil, to take it up into itself. As love and law are

indisputable powers in the life of humanity, so they also proclaim the

emergence of a new world and the development of a new being within the

domain of humanity.

(d) _The Transcending of Division_

A particularly severe conflict with regard to the problem of the unity

of life arises between the natural condition of man and the requirements

of an independent spiritual life. The spiritual life demands an enduring

whole which includes all multiplicity within itself and of which the

movement originates within: human existence is primarily a juxtaposition

of individuals and a succession of moments; no union seems to be more

than that which is constituted by a mere collection of the individuals.

If the division were not in some way transcended no spiritual life could

grow up within humanity, and man have no share in the building up of a

spiritual world. The nineteenth century gave a confident answer to the

problem: it contended that history and society of their own capacity

bind the elements of life into stable forms which take up all

multiplicity into themselves and raise our existence to spirituality. We

most emphatically deny the validity of this contention, and hope to show

that history and society themselves involve difficult problems; further,

that only when we conceive them in a particular way are they able to

help in the unification of life and then only in a limited manner; and

lastly, that they do not so much produce a spiritual life as presuppose

it, as essential to their own existence. Naturalism and Intellectualism

have also confused the outlook; if we free it from this confusion,

history and society will take a secondary place in our estimation; they

will themselves be seen to be deeper and more comprehensive and to

involve movements which extend further than appears in immediate

experience; and they will become witnesses to the living presence of the

spiritual life within humanity.

(i.) _The Spiritual Conception of History_

The nineteenth century transmitted to us a conception of history that is

far more peculiar in nature and far more open to attack than is usually

recognised: history is represented as a great stream which takes up all

individual achievements into itself, unites them, and, regardless of all

human error and caprice, leads surely to its end. No genuine achievement

is lost, and all gain seems to be permanent; beyond all the trouble and

uncertainty of the moment appeal is made to the power which, directing

and elevating, permeates the movement, clarifies and refines it. In this

conception the necessity of a process that has the power of determining

its own activity and making its own decision is primary. The fact that

the matter is not so simple as this conception of history represents is

shown by the experience of the age itself, which directly contradicts

it. For according to this conception the whole past should discharge

itself into the present and so impart its whole result immediately to

us, and the direction that our activity ought to take should be pointed

out to us with complete certainty by history. But we are distinctly

aware of the extent to which this direction is a matter of question and

doubt, and of the uncertainty into which we have fallen with regard to

the relation of the present to the past: in the process of our

investigation we saw this in particular in the division and conflict

between the different systems of life. History is seen to be a difficult

problem far more than a secure fact; and we are compelled to take up a

new consideration of the question.

In this consideration a distinct delimitation of the achievements

characteristic of man is primarily necessary. Modern science already

recognises a history of nature, and much that was formerly regarded as

complete is now seen to be in a state of flux and movement. Since every

event leaves effects behind, in the course of ages the results

accumulate, develop, and act upon one another, that which comes later is

conditioned by the influence of the earlier and is intelligible only in

relation to it, a distinctive historical method gains currency. Geology

presents to us with particular clearness a history of this type. In so

far as man belongs to nature and the spiritual life has not yet

developed to any degree of independence in him, he is also the subject

of such a history. That which happens within him leaves behind effects

that become the conditions of later occurrence. This conception of

history, as determined solely by mechanical causes, is still maintained

in some quarters in spite of further developments of thought. But it is

not apparent from this point of view how, even with the greatest

accumulation of effects, history could yield anything of gain to an

inner unity, to a life from the whole: for that, man must bring with him

something essentially new; and as a matter of fact this is what he does.

Not only do events happen to us and change our condition, but with our

own activity we are able to hold fast to these events, to give to them

an inner permanence, to bring them ever anew from the dim distance into

the living present. We do not drift onward with the stream of time, but

withstand it; seek to wrest something fixed from "becoming" and change,

and salvation in the eternal. We cannot do this without altering the

whole view of things and manifesting a new spiritual capacity.

The retention in mind of individual events by means of annals, monuments

and similar methods is the beginning of a history of a higher kind: even

so much shows a greater activity, since it involves a judgment of the

significance of events, and on the basis of this judgment begins to

wage war against the destroying power of "cormorant devouring time." The

achievement is incomparably higher, if certain spiritual unities and

tendencies are adhered to and are given permanent currency: thus

religion in particular gave a stability to life and delivered men from

the tyranny of the mere moment. The matter remains simple so long as the

movement is within a single people or a definite sphere of culture. But

in its progress it goes far beyond these limits. New peoples arise; the

state of culture undergoes great changes, indeed revolutions; life is

taken up from new starting points, from which everything of importance

to earlier ages loses its value. But it is lost only for a time; a

desire to return to it and to bring it into complete harmony with the

new is soon felt. The circle of vision is thus increasingly widened, and

all multiplicity is finally united into a whole. This retention of the

past is primarily a matter of knowledge and of intellectual

appropriation. But it is not limited to this; it would operate not only

in the extension of knowledge but beyond this in the development of

life. Whatever has been won by human power is to be preserved, unified,

and used to advance the present. Thus, there arises a historical

culture; an education on a historical basis; religion and philosophy,

art and law derive power and content from the work of universal history,

and life as a whole seems to win a greater comprehensiveness and

stability. And so it has come to appear as though the past imparts its

whole result to the present without any effort on the part of man and

without incurring him in any risk.

In reality the case is entirely different. The stream of the ages

becomes spiritually significant to us only in so far as we develop an

independence of it. The stream does not itself, automatically and

independently of us, select the elements of value which it contains or

unite the ages to a harmonious result: we ourselves must achieve this.

Spiritually regarded, we do not from the beginning stand upon a sure

foundation, on which we might peacefully build; we must first acquire

such a foundation through endeavour, and in this matter we see doubt and

violent change continually make that uncertain which is apparently most

secure, and make it necessary to seek greater depths.

For this treatment of history, involving, as it does, self-determining

activity, an elevation above time is essential. Without in some way

transcending time we could not survey individual events and unite them

in one representation. But we would do far more than that; we would

select and take up into our own life that which is valuable in the

earlier, in order thereby to enrich and strengthen our life, and to lead

it as far as possible from the present of the mere moment to a present

encompassing the ages. How could this come to pass unless we were able

to secure an independent vantage ground transcending the stream of the

ages; a vantage ground from which we may survey and judge the ages,

appropriate some elements from them and reject others? Experience shows

clearly enough that the tendency and the content of life with which we

meet the past, decide what shall be its spiritual representation, and

how we shall stand in relation to it. For experience shows that each

main tendency of life has its own view of history and its own treatment

of history; it shows further that every change in life which is in any

way far-reaching involves an alteration in our relation to the past;

gives prominence to the new, and relegates the old to the background.

There arises therefore a history of history; a history, for example, of

that which in the life of Antiquity has seemed essential and valuable to

the different later ages. For us, therefore, history, in regard to its

spiritual nature, is involved in constant change. The past does not

decide concerning the present so much as the present concerning the

past; the past is not something dead and fixed behind us; ever anew it

becomes the object of passionate conflict.

But does not this dependence of the past upon the present deprive

history of all independence and of all value? Does it not surrender life

completely to the contingency of the changing moments? Does it not

destroy all inner unity of the ages? This would, in fact, be the case

if the matter remained on a simply human basis; if a spiritual life

transcending time were not manifested through all the changes of the

ages; if a spiritual history could not be distinguished from a narrowly

human one. Spiritual history is concerned with that which through all

human activity and endeavour reveals a self-conscious inner life and

which, as such a revelation, is valid not only for a particular age but

through all ages and independently of all ages. Spiritual history would

be impossible unless there is active within us from the beginning an

independent spiritual life which first realises its content through the

historical process.

Such a transcendent nature is most evident at those highest points of

human development which we call "classical," not because they should

dominate and bind all ages, but because in them the spiritual life

attained to a complete independence over against man, lifted him above

himself into the fire and flood of creative activity, and made it

possible for him to produce characteristic contents. These classical

achievements are especially important for the development of life if

they not only bring something new in individual departments and in

particular directions, but also shape and present the whole to us in a

distinctive manner, and seek to appropriate to themselves, and in the

appropriation to elevate, the spiritual impulse that exists in man; if a

new being, in contrast to nature and society, emerges and would become

lord of the whole. Life as a whole is thus transformed into a problem

and a conflict. The question is whether this movement is able to take up

everything into itself and to lead life to its highest level, or whether

it meets with an insuperable resistance. In this matter life tests

itself by itself, by its own development--a thing which is possible only

if its experiences arise out of its being as a whole. If in a particular

case it proves that essential requirements remain unsatisfied, that the

movement is not able to include the spiritual life within itself, a

severe convulsion is inevitable, the spiritual life as a whole comes to

a standstill, and there can be no advance until life concentrates anew

and the new concentration gains ground. It is to be expected that a new

concentration will bring forward and develop that, in particular, which

formerly did not find complete satisfaction. In the first place,

therefore, there is an abrupt break and the emergence of an apparently

irreconcilable opposition: the old is relegated to the background;

tested by the new, the old soon comes to be regarded as a complete

mistake. In reality it is not so. For, as certainly as spontaneous

creative activity was operative in the old and produced characteristic

contents, it involves something which, superior to all the change of

time, will survive convulsion and doubt, and assert itself in some way

in a more comprehensive life. But the old will not survive and re-assert

itself unless the timeless reality within it separates itself from all

human and temporary addition; unless it manifests what lies behind the

historical form.

The same thing happens in the case of the new movement that arises. With

all its greatness of achievement, limitations become manifest in it;

then, more comprehensive forms arise; and so in the historical movement

as a whole the spiritual life is revealed in forms continually

increasing in content. In opposition to the tendency for one age to be

separated from another, however, a desire for unity, for a life which in

some way embraces the multiplicity of movements and concentrations of

life, and binds them into a whole, makes itself felt. A unity can hardly

be achieved by simply regarding the different concentrations and

tendencies as on the same level and making a compromise between them;

rather it is necessary that the different concentrations and different

movements contend with one another; it is just their conflict which may

elevate and deepen life. The movement to secure this unity and to retain

elements from the past is not an accumulation of elements and tendencies

in time, but an increasing deliverance from time, the establishment of a

timeless truth independent of the change of things. Experiences, of

which the external manifestations no longer exist, are again called to

life, and preserved for all time by spiritual power; indeed, that which

is lost in immediacy by the absence of the external manifestation is

more than compensated for by an advance to the source of the power:

things which in their temporal form are a mere co-existence are

transformed into an organised whole. Movements, which in history have

often been engaged in passionate conflict, may enter into a relation of

interaction, and may be regarded as a sequence of stages, in which the

earlier prepares for the later, and the later presupposes the earlier;

in which all give life to and further one another. A universal life thus

progressively arises within the domain of man; the individual

achievements unite more and more to the building up of a new, enduring

world; the whole realises itself in the individual occurrence, and

through the development of a time-inclusive present transcends the mere

moment.

This movement of life in history involves more unrest, conflict and

doubt, than the nineteenth-century doctrine of evolution implied. For

this doctrine saw in the historical movement the unfolding of a

spiritual life, sure as regards its foundation and its main direction;

the antitheses within that movement seemed to be involved in a single

process, which determined the limits of each tendency in relation to the

others; a transcendent necessity was regarded as leading to the

development of all in their relation to one another. As a fact, the

conflict is also concerning the substance and the main direction of the

whole; the spiritual life must first realise itself within the region of

mankind, and it is realised through the toil and work of man himself. It

is just the fact that the problem is an ultimate one, that even the

fundamental forms of life develop only in conflict and experience, and

that we are concerned not with winning simply this or that in life, but

genuine life itself, that makes history significant. At the same time,

this brings man into a more inward relation to the spiritual life, and

this life is made more his own life and being than if he were

surrounded by the power of physical or intellectual processes. Nothing

makes humanity as a whole more significant than that in its province and

through its work the new world begins to develop.

With such a conception of history, the philosophical treatment of it

must direct its attention chiefly to the independent spirituality which

in the course of the centuries, and especially in great changes, is

evolved in contrast with the narrowly human; and to the main direction

which is given to life by this spirituality. The philosophical treatment

of history ought first of all to trace the liberation of life from the

simply human; the inner elevation of our being to a more-than-human.

Antiquity at the height of its spiritual development began to desire a

universal truth independent of man; a moulding of life in accordance

with an inner right; and an order of things beyond the power of human

caprice, as was shown by the giving symmetry and harmony precedence in

art, and justice in conduct. Christianity brought about a liberation of

the innermost disposition, the root of endeavour and of love, from

purely natural impulse, however ennobled; and in this way brought men

into new relationships and set them before new tasks. The Modern Age on

the part of science began a relentless conflict against the

anthropomorphism of the mode of life as immediately experienced; thus it

has made the spiritual life even in its form independent of man, in that

it has created spiritual complexes and has recognised in them movements

and inner necessities of their own. Through the whole of this movement

of universal history life frees itself more and more from its dependence

upon mere man, and from the bondage to "given" presuppositions and

"given" natural impulses, and from a "given" world in general. Life is

based more and more upon its own independent nature, and from its

position of independence develops a new kind of being. It is this gain

of a new world through struggle that alone gives to history a meaning

and an inner unity.

If history thus accomplishes the formation of great spiritual complexes,

and if there is an endeavour to fit these with all their antitheses into

an all-comprehensive whole, if it unites all ages and all powers with

the bond of a universal task, it is a clear witness to the living

presence of the spiritual life within the human sphere. Apart from this

presence all these achievements would be impossible, and the whole

movement must vanish into thin air. The estimate of history here given

is valid only when a spiritual history is clearly distinguished from

merely human history. Only when history as a whole gains a soul and a

support from this spiritual history are the non-spiritual factors able

to attain to any rational significance; only then can history have a

meaning and transcend the relativity from which otherwise it cannot

escape. On the one hand, history demands for its own existence the

presence of a spiritual world within humanity; on the other, it

testifies to this presence by that which is characteristic in its own

content; by that which can be understood only as a progressive

disclosure of such a world.

(ii.) _The Spiritual Conception of Society_

The problem of society is closely akin to that of history. In the life

around us a certain union is attained in that men dwell together, but

this immediate union does not simply of itself produce a spiritual

unity, a spiritual whole: if society manifests such a unity, then in it,

also, a distinctive revelation of the spiritual must be acknowledged.

Modern science shows clearly and distinctly that the individual is not

an isolated atom, but exists in relation with a social environment; and

that, even to the innermost recesses of his being, he is determined by

the constitution of this environment. But science falls into serious

error if it goes beyond the truth of this contention and attempts to

represent spiritual creation as the result of the mere inter-relation

and accumulation of individual powers. For between spiritual creation

and this inter-relation and accumulation of individual powers, in spite

of all their external proximity, there is the widest divergence.

Spiritual creation requires to be treated as an end complete in itself,

and must follow the laws of its own being; it claims an inalienable

supremacy above all trivial human interests, which yet for a time

dominate the common life. Further, it cannot succeed without the

development of an inner unity which maintains and characteristically

forms a whole of life. The existence of men side by side gives rise to a

variety of opinions, strivings, dispositions, which mingle confusedly

together; the usual condition of things that arises from this confusion

has anything but a definite character. The condition of our own time

must convince everyone who is unprejudiced, how little this pitiable

confusion can of itself produce anything spiritual and associate men

together in an inner unity. For in the epoch of railways, telegraphs and

newspapers, of large towns and of factories, movements of the masses are

certainly not lacking; they surround the individual and influence him

more strongly than ever before. But where, out of all the fluctuation of

public opinion, out of the confusion and bustle of life, does creative

spiritual activity arise, give to life an inner content, and unite

humanity in an inner community? Rather, we see humanity continually

split up into opposing factions; we see the strife tend more and more to

affect the foundation of our existence.

However, in spite of the spiritual impotency of the movements of the

masses, creative spiritual activity has emerged in humanity, has

overcome the separation of the individuals and inwardly unified the

forces of life. It must not only be possible to effect, but we must

actually effect a unity which transcends the individuals, a union which

has its source in the spiritual life itself.

Life's Basis and Life's Ideal: The Fundamentals of a New Philosophy of Life · 第 17 / 33 段