In reality the experience of humanity shows such a union. Of primary

importance in this connection is the fact of the power of so-called

"ideas" in history--the fact that certain aims transcending natural

welfare win power over the whole domain of culture, bind men together

and lift them above their selfish interests. To be sure, in the

movements which arise to carry out these ideas much that is

insignificantly human is introduced; and the interests of individuals

and of classes often largely preponderate, but the origin and the

progress of these movements cannot be accounted for by the merely human;

they are only to be explained as due to man feeling directly within

himself the necessity of spiritual tasks. If he feels this necessity

only under particular conditions, and if it is only for a short time

that it asserts itself at its highest, still it extends its influence

over life as a whole, and is everywhere a unique phenomenon, even when

limited and confused by much that is alien to it.

Further, the fact that whole peoples have developed distinctive national

characters is of importance in this connection. Such a character is

distinguished essentially from all mere participation of common

conditions, not only physical but also psychical, that social life

brings with it. For the development of such a character life must rise

to energetic activity and become unified; there must be an advance

towards a common goal; an active relation must be taken up not only

towards the environment but also towards itself. A national character is

not "given," but is attained through the work of history; it develops

only through common experiences, sufferings, and triumphs: in its origin

and its continuance it involves an elevation above the aims of physical

and social preservation, a development of pure inwardness.

Finally, no inner relation of humanity proceeds from the physical

association of men, from their meeting in a common world. If a vital

whole, a common truth, did not exist within us, all our relations would

be external: we could not follow common aims in life and endeavour or

have common experiences; we could not think and live for one another, or

develop spiritual contents in different departments, such as those of

law and religion, science and art, and give to them a cognate spiritual

character. It is always the presence of a self-conscious reality that

binds humanity together inwardly. We can be as certain in our

acknowledgment of this presence as we can that our experience shows such

an inner unity in important achievements and in the formation of whole

departments of work and other complexes.

With its acknowledgment we avoid the severe contradiction that is shown

in the contemporary estimate and conception of humanity. To our more

dispassionate consideration of things the disagreeable aspect of the

social machinery, the growing sharpness of the conflict, the passionate

eagerness of the desire for more, the inconsistency between the enormous

amount of subjective excitement and the spiritual poverty, are clear.

Logically, this confused and self-contradictory state of affairs ought

to lead to a rejection of the whole, and to a pronounced pessimism. Yet

humanity is regarded as noble and worthy of respect; it is made the

value of all values; the object of our faith and our hope; all our

efforts are directed towards its well-being. And this is done without it

being perceived that thus the basis of experience is forsaken and that

the impression of humanity obtained from experience is bluntly

contradicted: the introduction of an abstract conception seems to alter

everything and to lead to its being regarded as good. In the shattering

of beliefs at least this one has remained: belief in the power of

abstractions. He who would abandon this belief and at the same time hold

fast to the high estimate of humanity must admit that a spiritual world

is active in man, and in so doing acknowledge that man is more than he

appears in immediate experience. Such a one will feel increasingly the

necessity of actively comprehending and definitely distinguishing from

the medley of trivial social concerns every manifestation of a spiritual

world in man. It is not out of society but in conflict with it that

everything great has grown. And yet that which is great is rooted in a

whole of life. Spiritual work must have its basis in this invisible

whole, not in mere society; and from this position it must protest

against the presumptuous claim of society to evolve the spiritual life

of its own power. The community that proceeds from a spiritual union

will be primarily an invisible one; but whether this invisible unity

could not realise itself better and be effective also in the visible

world is a serious and difficult question that continually becomes more

urgent.

If the conviction that we have here given an account of definitely

contradicts the historico-social view of life which was so potent in the

nineteenth century, and which deeply degraded the spiritual life and its

self-conscious and self-determining activity, it by no means fails to

recognise the significance of history and society; and has no intention

of taking up again the mode of thought common in the period of the

Enlightenment. History and society are indispensable means for the

development of the spiritual life in humanity: from mere individuals and

from individual moments it could attain neither content nor power. But

to declare for this reason that history and society are the generating

basis of the spiritual life was a definite error; though in the

historical movement of the problem it certainly finds an explanation and

an excuse. The higher estimate of history and society has grown up on

the basis of Idealism; to Idealism the spiritual life seemed to live and

first to attain to its complete truth in history and society. Later on,

attention and activity were diverted from a world of thought chiefly to

the world of sense; and with this change history and society lost their

spiritual foundation and their animating soul. Nevertheless, their claim

to produce the spiritual life remained; they were expected to achieve of

their own power more than was possible even with the greatest exertion.

In truth they can bring forth spiritual contents, and serve the

development of the spiritual life within man, only under the

presupposition of the presence of a transcendent spiritual life. At the

same time their achievement in the combination of forces and in the

production of spiritual results is a witness to the reality of the

spiritual life.

(e) _The Elevation of Life above Division_

We saw that the spiritual life attains an independence only if it does

not simply bring about an effect upon a world independent of it, but

produces a reality from itself; concentrates so as to become a reality

itself. At the first glance man seems by no means to satisfy this

demand. For his life, after, in its progress, rising above its initial

stages, in which it was undifferentiated from the environment, is

subject to the antithesis of man and world, of subject and object, and

the divergence seems to increase continually in the course of his

development. The more power the life of the soul wins, the more it

produces a characteristic content, the freer and more active reflection

becomes, the more does the world recede before man, the more definitely

is immediate contact with the world prevented. The gulf is not bridged

by the epistemological consideration that that over against which we

place ourselves must also, fundamentally, belong to our own life, be in

some way included within it: this treatment signifies a removal of the

antithesis to another region rather than an inner transcendence of it. A

genuine transcendence cannot be effected without an expansion and

development of life, evolving new connections which transcend the

division, and lifting us into a sphere above mere subjectivity.

Connections such as these are, as a fact, brought about by an expansion

and development of life; but these connections which in their individual

appearances are evident to all are seldom adequately estimated as a

whole, and in respect of the problems to which they give rise. These

connections are effected in work, in work as a spiritual occurrence. We

have already seen how in work the object loses its alien nature and is

taken up into our own life; we must now follow more closely the process

by which work is extended and deepened; produces a characteristic sphere

of life and establishes a spiritual reality in the domain of man.

At first we are occupied in work with an abundance of individual tasks

that have no inner relation to one another. But the more work advances

from an external contact with objects to an inner change of them, the

more necessary is it that these tasks should be unified so as to form a

whole; and that each task should have its position in this whole, and

represent in itself a particular aspect of the whole. The proof of

greatness in a "work" is just that the nature of the individual aspects

is determined fundamentally by their relation within the whole; that

what is characteristic in the work as a whole is manifested even in its

simplest elements; thus, for example, every independent thinker has

particular views with regard to the nature of the fundamental forms of

logical thought such as the concept and the judgment; in the same way

every independent artist creates his own language of forms. Work not

only leads to a unity of life in the case of individuals; but, further,

without a union of individual forces for a common end, without an

organisation of all human work, we should stand defenceless in face of

the infinity of the world, and we could never advance to a state of

culture. In such community of work man creates a new sphere of existence

for himself; he forms his world of work and sets it in contrast to

everything which does not come within it. This world of work transcends

the individual; and yet it is our world; it is sustained by human power

and, directing and forming, reacts upon man. For, the more unity this

world of work acquires and the more control it wins over the object, the

more definite departments and relations it evolves in itself, the more

does it manifest characteristic laws and methods which, with superior

power, prescribe to human activity its nature and direction, but which

can originate nowhere else than in the domain of man. And so within the

domain of man we rise above all caprice and subjectivity: since the law

of the object determines man's work, his life is raised above the

antithesis between soul and object. Work is not something that man,

essentially perfect, undertakes incidentally and as something

supplementary, but it is that through which he first develops a

spiritual life; through which he acquires a spiritual existence; and the

character of the work determines at the same time the nature of this

existence. As the individual departments of work evolve characteristic

modes of thought and conviction, so out of work as a whole a particular

spiritual nature arises which does not exist in relation to a world

external to it, but contains within itself a world formed by its own

activity. All this, in conformity with our fundamental conviction,

involves the implication that man is not a spiritual being from the

beginning, but only has the potency to become one.

Such a raising of the aim which is set to work involves an increase in

the amount of toil that it necessitates, and the dangers which are

incurred: the object and the encompassing life are subject to these

dangers. For the complete success of work and the formation of a genuine

self, it is as necessary that the object be taken up entirely into the

process of work as that there should not be another vital unity more

ultimate than the self which grows up in the work, but that the self

should form the final conclusion: whatever is not taken up into the

process of work lessens its content, weakens its power, endangers its

truth, and prevents just that from being achieved which is here in

question. If, however, we consider the opposition that arises at

different points, genuine work is seen to be a high ideal, an infinite

task which even in favourable cases is only approximately fulfilled. At

the same time it is a witness to the sway of elevating and modifying

powers within the domain of man.

The object is concealed from man chiefly by his own inclination to treat

himself as the centre of reality; to transform the environment into a

reflection of his own being; and to measure the infinite by the standard

of his own well-being. Along with this humanising of the environment,

man develops the most diverse forms of occupation with it, but however

far such occupation may be extended, it does not lead man beyond his own

domain; it does not aid him in his spiritual progress. It is possible

for occupation upon the environment to aid spiritual progress only when

things attain an independence, and from this firmly resist the tendency

of man to represent them in accordance with his subjective wishes. Only

such independence of the objective makes it possible for it to arouse

new powers in man and for his life to be based on something deeper than

immediate feeling and desire, and to begin an inner transformation. But

this movement has various levels which differ distinctly from one

another; and from the position of a higher level it is difficult to

regard the achievement at a lower one as genuine and complete work. The

Modern Age with its exact research often cannot regard the work of early

natural science as work of high value. A similar gradation is evident in

the striving for happiness; for the raising of human well-being. So long

as endeavour is directed to attaining and preserving mere subjective

states of feeling, and so long as a movement beyond this subjectivity is

not acknowledged to exist within man himself, and the requirements of

this movement are not satisfied--as is the case with Epicureanism and

Utilitarianism--endeavour, earnest as it may be, does not acquire the

character of spiritual work; it does not essentially advance life, and

therefore in the long run does not satisfy human needs. Epicureanism and

Utilitarianism with all their results inevitably become insipid and

empty to him.

If there are powerful hindrances to this endeavour for something more

than the subjective, there is at the same time a wealth of movement

which bids defiance to them, and the course of history shows continuous

expansion and development of this movement; it shows that man is able to

take up a conflict against the trivially human, and, in the building up

of a new world, to raise himself essentially above his original

condition. Exact science breaks away from the object of perception,

removes it to a distance, analyses it there, ascertains its laws, and

then restores it in changed form to men: in this it also advances human

life in itself, in that thought rises more freely above perception, and

a system of pure thought sustains the whole world of sense. A further

divergence between the struggle for physical existence and the building

up of a new world appears in history in the endeavour for happiness and

a significant content of life. In the experience of humanity, morality

and religion, looked at inwardly, assume two fundamentally different

forms. On the one hand they are looked upon as a mere means to support

man in a given world; to bring him into congenial relation with the

world; and so to organise this world that it may achieve as much as

possible for human well-being. This form governs human experience at its

general level, and easily comes to be regarded as the only form. At

higher levels of creative activity, however, a totally different form

made its appearance: there was a break with the whole world of sense and

well-being as though with something intolerably narrow, and in a

self-conscious life a new world arose and brought forth characteristic

contents; the appropriation of this world raised life above all mere

particularity and subjectivity; at the same time this appropriation

became an infinite task and work for man and for humanity as a whole. If

this form of religion and morality has been manifested with complete

clearness only at high levels of life in history, from these heights

this form has also exerted an influence upon the rest of life, animating

and raising it; indeed, it is only this genuine conception of religion

and morality which first gives to them an independence and a value in

themselves. Thus, notwithstanding the inadequacy of human achievement we

cannot but recognise that life transcends mere subjectivity and the

separation that it involves.

In another direction complexities arise in that something objective is

evolved and established which, however, is not brought sufficiently into

relation with life as a whole and united with it. Then, work may

progress within its own province constantly and vigorously, but it loses

touch with our soul; we do not realise or develop ourselves in it. With

all the feverish tension of individual powers work is then inwardly

alien to us, and its power over us may become a heavy oppression.

Through such a detachment from life as a whole work loses soul and is

nothing more than mechanical; in short, we have all those results of

division between work and soul which we may feel with particular

acuteness in the contemporary state of culture. Experiences rising from

this division lead us to demand that work shall be so organised as to be

capable of taking up life as a whole into itself, and with this of

becoming our true self. Again, life as a whole cannot enter upon work as

complete, for then it would force something alien upon work, and by this

pervert it; life as a whole can be evolved only from the unification and

elevation of work itself. We do not begin and carry on work as a fixed

individuality, but we form individuality first through work by the

continual overcoming of the opposition of subjective disposition and

object. Spiritual contents are not produced by a communication of

something that is in itself complete to something else that is in itself

complete, an interaction of disposition and object; rather must we say

that genuine work sets both sides in motion and with elevating power

unites them in a single life. So understood, every movement which tends

to the development of spirituality in individuals, peoples, ages, and

finally of humanity as a whole, is a witness to the possibility of a

transcendence of this opposition, of the emergence of a reality within

the life-process.

We cannot give work a spiritual nature in this way, and make it the

instrument of a new reality, without being compelled to acknowledge that

there is much less genuine work among men than we are accustomed to

assume. On the other hand, we must also recognise that the little that

there is signifies much more, and indicates much greater advances of

life than it is usual to admit. Nothing differentiates individuals and

ages more from one another than the extent to which they take part in

genuine work; the degree to which they transform their life in such

work. Mere reflection and good will can accomplish very little in this

matter; without an energetic nature, a strong inner disposition with a

definite tendency, as well as the favour of destiny, not much can be

achieved. What is usually called "life" is only a will to live, a

straining after life; it yields but an outward appearance and a shadow

of life: genuine life is first brought forth by that transformation.

But the less human existence in general immediately includes genuine

work, the more indispensable is it that there should be firmly rooted

tendencies to such work in the basis of our being, and that these

tendencies should be developed to greater clearness of form and to

greater effect in the work of universal history. So that our work may

not be split up and destroyed, we need definite syntheses that establish

a structure of life. On the one hand we must accomplish an analysis into

individual tendencies and departments of life which, operating

independently, generate life; and on the other hand we must find a unity

of endeavour among these tendencies and departments; a movement from one

to another; a common activity directed towards the building up of a new

world. These syntheses must be an immediate experience at each point;

they must be involved in all division of work; everywhere set

distinctive tasks; produce characteristic achievements; and in energetic

organisation of existence elevate it to the level of a characteristic

system of life, full of power, which presses forward to further

development. Only thus could a movement originate which might expand to

a real whole and be capable of establishing this whole against the world

as it is for immediate experience; only thus could humanity defend

itself against the power of the environment and of destiny.

Experience alone can decide whether our life contains such syntheses,

and whether by means of them it forms a whole: the movement of universal

history shows that there are such syntheses. The natures of these

syntheses give to the chief epochs of culture their distinctive

characters, by which the natures of their elements and of the relations

between them are determined; and man acquires a definite relation to

the world and can make a judgment upon it. Such a synthesis, with its

life-penetrating and life-forming power, certainly contains some truth;

it is not a product of narrowly human reflection and imagination. The

course of time and the changes of history, therefore, cannot simply

break it down completely; rather with the truth that it contains such a

synthesis elevates life above time into the eternal. But it has not been

demonstrated that life is capable of only one synthesis, or that it may

not produce a variety of such: life does not necessarily realise its

unity in simply establishing a single synthesis; it can seek unity in

the supremacy of a chief synthesis above others. That experience in our

own sphere of culture shows the latter to be the case we intend to

indicate in a few lines.

A characteristic synthesis first made its appearance at the height of

classical Antiquity. It was art, chiefly plastic art, that determined

the nature of this synthesis. Form as a unifying and systematising power

is at the centre of life, takes possession of matter and organises it,

transforms chaos into a cosmos; and in this exercise of power it

realises itself, even though its fundamental nature is regarded as

transcending all change and variation. Spiritual work is formative and

selective; it is the triumphant realisation of form; it is necessary

that life in all its stages of development should be permeated by this

formative spiritual activity. There are numerous independent centres of

life, but the tendencies from each are towards the realisation of the

whole, and find their perfection in it alone.

Thought, independent of the world, must extract from the medley of first

impressions permanent forms, and unite these into a consistent

representation of the whole; it finds the acme of its achievement in

bringing this representation clearly to consciousness in a form that is

complete and free from subjective addition. In conduct, an organisation

and a unifying of the elements so as to produce a harmonious effect is

the chief thing. From the chaotic mass of individuals, the state by

constitution and law forms a living work of art, a differentiated

organism. For the individual the chief matter in conduct is to bring the

diverse forces in the soul into the right relation of order and

gradation, to reach the highest of all harmonies, the harmonious life.

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