INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TRENT CASE.
In any discussion of the Trent case from the standpoint of
international law, all purely political phases of the matter should be
omitted. That the captured persons were dangerous enemies of the United
States, that they were going to Europe to secure aid in the destruction
of the American Union, that the British demand for their surrender
was backed by extensive preparations for war, that a refusal to give
up the men meant a conflict with England and a permanently divided
republic--these are all matters not easy to leave out of consideration.
They have no place, however, in this chapter, since they can have no
bearing upon the principles of international law which are applicable
to this case.
It may be safely assumed that the right of a belligerent to proceed
against a neutral in any given case depends upon the legality of the
act of the neutral which it is proposed to call in question. The law
of nations forbids a neutral to perform for either belligerent any
service which will aid in conducting hostilities. Among the acts thus
prohibited may be mentioned the transportation of either officers or
dispatches when they are of a military character; also soldiers, arms,
ammunition and other things which are classed as contraband of war.
Knowingly to violate this law renders a neutral ship liable to capture
and confiscation.
If these premises be correctly stated, it follows that the legality
of the course of the Trent will settle the question as to what
Captain Wilkes had a right to do in this case. The first matter to
be considered then is whether the law of nations was violated when
the Confederate commissioners with their secretaries and dispatches
were knowingly received on board the Trent at Havana and allowed to
proceed toward their destination. If these men and their dispatches
were contraband of war by the law of nations, it follows that the
vessel which carried them was liable to seizure and condemnation by the
Federal authorities.
In his letter conceding the British demand Mr. Seward discussed this
matter and arrived at the conclusion that the commissioners and
their dispatches were contraband. He said: “All writers and judges
pronounce naval or military persons in the service of the enemy
contraband. Vattel says war allows us to cut off from an enemy all of
his resources, and to hinder him from sending ministers to solicit
assistance. And Sir William Scott says you may stop the ambassador of
your enemy on his passage. Dispatches are not less clearly contraband,
and the bearers or couriers who undertake to carry them fall under the
same condemnation.” Mr. Seward also held that “pretended ministers of
a usurping power, not recognized as legal by either the belligerent
or the neutral,” were none the less contraband and, in support of his
position, quoted from Sir William Scott, who had once expressed an
opinion upon the matter, as follows: “It appears to me on principle to
be but reasonable that when it is of sufficient importance to the enemy
that such persons shall be sent out on the public service at the public
expense, it should afford equal ground of forfeiture against the vessel
that may be let out for a purpose so intimately connected with the
hostile operations.”
Vattel, whom Mr. Seward quotes in support of his position that
ambassadors of an enemy may be cut off, wrote at a time when many
principles of international law were not fully settled. His doctrines
were in accordance with the illiberal ideas of international comity
which prevailed in that age. The passage referred to by Mr. Seward
reads as follows, when carefully translated from the original French:
“His (the enemy’s) people may also be attacked and seized wherever we
have a right to commit acts of hostility. Not only, therefore, may
we justly refuse a passage to the ministers whom our enemies send to
other sovereigns; we may even arrest them if they attempt to pass
privately and without permission through places belonging to our
jurisdiction.”[1] To illustrate his meaning more fully Vattel then
gives an instance of what he regards as a lawful arrest, viz.: that of
Marshall Belle-Isle, a French minister who was arrested in 1744 while
passing through Hanover. He was seized by the troops of George II, who
was then at war with France. As George II of England was also ruler of
Hanover, he had a right to make the seizure in his own territory.
It is evident that Vattel means to limit the right to seize the
ambassador of an enemy, and that in his opinion this right can be
exercised only where one has a “right to commit acts of hostility.”
This can not be done on the deck of a neutral ship unless there is
sufficient cause for such a proceeding. If the Trent had been conveying
troops to the Confederates, or if she had escaped through a Federal
blockading squadron, she would then have become liable to seizure, and
acts of hostility could have been exercised against her by Captain
Wilkes. Since she had been guilty of nothing of this character, it
is evident that the only ground for proceeding against her was the
assumption that the Confederate ambassadors were on board her and that
their presence there gave to her a hostile character. But the latter
fact is the test of right--a thing which we are not warranted in
assuming. A neutral vessel is not a place over which one can exercise
acts of hostility, unless there be evidences of a breach of neutrality.
It is not a place “over which one is master.” The mere fact that
ambassadors of a hostile power are on board a neutral vessel is not
of itself evidence of a breach of neutrality. If Captain Wilkes had
made the arrest in one of the southern blockaded harbors, or if he
had intercepted the Theodora and captured the commissioners, the act
would have been, in either case, entirely in accordance with Vattel’s
rule, but, as it was, there is certainly much room for doubt. The legal
_status_ of the commissioners, or the rights of a Federal naval officer
toward them while on board a Confederate vessel or in a southern
harbor, was quite different from their _status_ on a neutral deck.
When Sir William Scott said, as asserted by Mr. Seward, that you may
stop the ambassador of your enemy on his passage, the opinion was only
a quotation from Vattel and was prefaced by the assertion that “you
may exercise your right of war against them (ambassadors) wherever the
character of hostility exists.”[2] The ambassador of an enemy may be
captured, then, only in those places where you can exercise acts of
hostility. Mr. Seward’s isolated quotation conveys a meaning different
from that of the passage taken as a whole.
From the case of the Orozembo[3] (1807) Mr. Seward concludes that
persons in the civil employ of a government may be captured on the
passage, and that, when sent out at public expense, they may be seized,
whether their government be a recognized one or not.
The Orozembo was an American vessel which went from Rotterdam to Lisbon
and there took in three Dutch military officers of distinction; also
two persons to be employed in a civil capacity at Batavia--the place
to which the vessel was proceeding, although she falsely held out as
her destination Macao, another and neutral port. It also appeared
that she was under contract with the Dutch government to carry for
a consideration such persons as might be designated, without regard
to number. She thus became a transport ship under the control of the
enemy, let to do hostile service. During the term of her contract she
was subject to the orders of an enemy; her voyage in this instance
began at a hostile port; it was to end at a port of the same enemy. An
attempt was made to conceal these facts.
Such were the circumstances in the case which led to the condemnation
of the Orozembo. The conditions under which the voyage was made and
the presence on board her of three distinguished military officers
would have been sufficient cause for condemnation, without taking into
account the fact that she carried two officers in the civil employ of
Holland. After announcing the principle that “a vessel hired by the
enemy for the conveyance of military persons is to be considered a
transport subject to condemnation,” Sir William Scott says, “whether
the principle would apply to them alone (civil officers) I do not feel
it necessary to determine.” He then uses the language quoted by Seward.
The passage referred to by Mr. Seward is only a _dictum_--a personal
opinion of the judge--and is not to be understood or construed as an
established principle of public law. An able writer of international
law says of this quotation: “Even as a _dictum_, it does not touch the
case of a neutral vessel not let out as a transport, and merely having
civil officers of a belligerent government on board, without other
circumstances tending to show the vessel herself to be in the enemy’s
service.”[4]
It appears, then, from a careful consideration of the authorities
relied upon by Mr. Seward to establish the contraband character of the
men, that his conclusion is not warranted.
He also held that the dispatches of the Confederate commissioners were
contraband and their bearers liable to condemnation. No reason for
this opinion was given save the relation of the supposed contents of
the dispatches to the errand of Messrs. Mason and Slidell abroad. The
only knowledge of the nature or even the existence of these dispatches
was based upon information of their arrival in Europe furnished by the
United States consul at Paris.[5] In the case of the Rapid (1810), an
American vessel proceeding from New York to Tonningen, both neutral
ports, it was held that where a neutral vessel not in the employ of
an enemy transports noxious dispatches while pursuing her regular
employment, her guilt depends upon the act of her master or those in
charge of her, in receiving such communications. In such cases Sir
William Scott laid down the rule that “the caution must be proportioned
to the circumstances under which such papers are received.”
It was held that when each terminus of the voyage is a neutral port
“there is less to excite his vigilance.”[6] Even this rule is relaxed
in the case of diplomatic dispatches.[7] A more stringent rule would
subject neutral vessels to a most irksome surveillance, and greatly
disturb mail communications, since not even a single letter could be
accepted with safety.
The case of the Caroline has already been cited. This was the case of
an American vessel which was captured while proceeding from New York
to Bordeaux in 1808. She carried a dispatch from the French minister
in the United States to his own government. Sir William Scott held in
this instance that diplomatic dispatches are not contraband of war,
since they are not presumed to partake of a hostile nature. It is true
that they may be so, but the remedy is not the capture of the ship. The
redress must be political and diplomatic.
The case of the Atalanta[8] has been cited as one where diplomatic
dispatches were regarded as contraband of war. There are, however, many
points of difference between the case of this vessel and that of the
Trent. The Atalanta was a neutral vessel which carried dispatches of an
official character. They were in charge of the supercargo who planned
to conceal them, and actually did this when his vessel was boarded
and searched by a British cruiser. The noxious papers were discovered
only by accident. This vessel also carried a French artillery officer
who was disguised as a planter, and who was the real bearer of the
dispatches. These facts having been proved, Sir William Scott held
that the vessel was answerable for the acts of her supercargo, who
had refused to grant, in good faith, the right of search, and had
fraudulently concealed the dispatches which were on board. It was
decided that, by such a course, the officer of the ship “lends himself
to effect a communication the enemy may cut off; under protection of
an ostensible neutral character, he does in fact place himself in the
service of the enemy’s state.” The many points of difference between
this case, then, and the one under consideration are quite apparent.
In Mr. Seward’s letter conceding the demands of Great Britain, he held
that the circumstance that the Trent was proceeding from one neutral
port to another neutral port was not proof of her innocence, and
that it in no way modified the right of the captor. He said that he
read British authorities to this effect. Lord Russell thought this a
remarkable passage in Mr. Seward’s letter, and held that the fact that
both _termini_ of the voyage were not only ostensibly but _bona fide_
neutral was conclusive evidence of the innocence of the vessel. There
is certainly no good reason why this should be the rule in such cases,
and if the matter is to be determined by British precedent, Mr. Seward
was correct in his assumption. The case of the Rapid (already referred
to) may be cited as one directly in point. In this instance the voyage
began at a neutral port, and was to end at another neutral port. The
Rapid was released, but this was done solely on the ground that her
master had not been at fault in receiving the noxious papers for
transmission. He had, in fact, exercised all of the legal caution that
was necessary in receiving them on board his ship. He had no knowledge
of their contents. If, in 1810, British law regarded as innocent every
vessel plying between neutral ports, this would have been conclusive
in favor of the Rapid, without any inquiry whatever into the conduct
of her master. The fact of neutral _termini_ of her voyage would
undoubtedly have been the ground of her release, if Sir William Scott
had understood this to be British law at that time. Since he did not so
decide, the only inference which can be drawn from his course is that
he did not understand such to be the law.
Dana, in discussing the probable decision of an American prize court,
concerning this matter, says: “As the official character of these
persons, the general nature of their mission, and the probable general
character of their papers, and the _termini_ of their journey, were
well known to the persons in charge of the Trent, and they took them on
board knowingly and voluntarily to frank them under the neutral flag
over a part of their hazardous passage, there can be no doubt that
the fate of the Trent would have been the same, whether her _termini_
were neutral or hostile ports.”[9] Contrary opinions, however, are not
difficult to find. An eminent American authority says: “The character
of the vessel (_i. e._, the Trent) as a packet ship conveying mails
and passengers from one neutral port to another, almost precluded the
possibility of guilt. Even if hostile military persons had been found
on board, it might be a question whether their presence would involve
the ship in guilt, as they were going from a neutral country to a
neutral country.”[10]
As an example of an opinion in which this same doctrine is carried to
the extreme, that of M. Hautefeuille may be mentioned. He sustains Lord
Russell’s position and declares without reserve that the sailing of a
neutral vessel between two neutral ports is absolute and conclusive
evidence in her favor.[11] This, however, is only a personal opinion
not based upon judicial precedent, and hence, not worthy of special
consideration.
The sounder rule of international law, as deduced from the practice of
both English and American prize courts, seems to be that the fact of
the sailing of a neutral vessel between two neutral ports is not to be
regarded as an indifferent matter in determining the question of her
guilt or innocence. It is always an evidence in favor of the neutral,
although not by any means a conclusive one.
The Queen’s neutrality proclamation, issued at the beginning of
the war, forbade her majesty’s subjects from “carrying officers,
soldiers, _dispatches_, arms, military stores,” etc., for either of
the contending parties. It has been held that this alone would have
been sufficient to decide the case against the Trent. Such a view of
the matter is, however, not correct. The term “_dispatches_,” as used
in the proclamation, evidently means those of a military nature only,
since it is enumerated along with other words used to define operations
of that kind. The language does not express or even imply any relation
to communications of a diplomatic nature.
It was not the design or intent of the proclamation to lay down any new
international law, but only to warn British subjects against the things
already forbidden by the law of nations and by the statutes of Great
Britain. It was simply an application of these various laws to the
existing _status_ of the belligerents.
Diplomatic persons are, by the law of nations, entitled to the
special favor and protection of governments. Since Messrs. Mason and
Slidell were the representatives of an unrecognized insurgent power,
the question arises as to whether they were entitled to any of the
immunities and privileges uniformly extended to diplomatic ministers.
There is no judicial decision which bears even remotely upon a matter
of this kind. On the one hand it may be said that the government
represented by these men had received no sort of recognition except
that of belligerency. Their mission was not the usual one of diplomatic
representatives who conduct the friendly and established diplomacy of
sovereign nations, but it was to obtain foreign aid for an insurrection
in America, and to become recognized ministers abroad, should the
independence of the Confederacy be established.
On the other hand it may be argued that where an insurgent power has
been recognized as a belligerent, this carries with it the right to
maintain at least informal relations with foreign states whose subjects
may have extensive material interests in the insurgent state or be
temporary residents of it. The interest and convenience of foreign
nations require this. To cut off all diplomatic communication, even of
an informal character, in such cases, would be to declare a practical
outlawry against a nation already in possession of the rights of
belligerents. Such a course would also prevent any new nation from ever
becoming recognized as sovereign and independent. Informal diplomatic
relations must precede formal ones, and if the former be entirely cut
off, how can the latter be established at all? Informal diplomatic
relations were held between the representatives of the South American
republics and the United States government, prior to the recognition
of the independence of the former.[12] If a diplomatic agent of one
of these insurgent republics had embarked on a United States merchant
vessel at some neutral foreign port, with the design of coming to New
York, and if this vessel had been stopped by a Spanish man-of-war, and
the diplomatic agent forcibly removed, or if the American ship had been
captured for no other reason than the presence on board her of such an
emissary, it is doubtful whether the United States government would
have quietly acquiesced in either of these proceedings.
If it be conceded that informal diplomatic relations may be held
between an unrecognized government and a foreign state, this would seem
to carry with it the right to whatever of immunity is necessary to make
such relations effective. Whenever an international law court shall
be called upon to decide this question, it will have to be done upon
principle and without the aid of a judicial precedent.
In considering the question as to whether the Confederate commissioners
were contraband of war or not, Captain Wilkes’s theory that they were
“the embodiment of dispatches” or “living epistles,” deserves a brief
notice. It was only a cleverly devised fiction of public law, and of no
value. It has never received any recognition whatever from official or
authoritative sources. Dr. Woolsey says: “It is simply absurd to say
that these men were living dispatches.”[13] Count de Gasparin says:
“The doctrine of _man dispatches_ is the weak side of the American
argument. In such a matter, it is not permissible to extend by force
of reasoning, or even _a fortiori_, the categories fixed by the law of
nations.”[14]
Captain Wilkes had an undoubted right to stop and search the Trent for
contraband of war. Officially, it was neither denied nor complained of
by the British government. Writers on international law are practically
unanimous in their support of the doctrine that a belligerent cruiser
may search neutral ships for contraband, in time of war. This is a
right that is both just and necessary, since it is the only way by
which the belligerent may ascertain beyond doubt whether the neutral is
performing contraband service for an enemy.
In the beginning of this discussion it was stated that the right of
Captain Wilkes to capture the Trent depended upon the legality of her
act in carrying the men and their dispatches, and that this, in turn,
depended upon their contraband character. When Mr. Seward assumed that
they were contraband, the burden of proof rested upon him. He appealed
to British authorities only in support of his position. If the present
examination of these authorities has shown that Mr. Seward’s position
was untenable and that the men were not contraband of war, it follows
that Captain Wilkes had no right to capture the Trent, unless there
were other reasons for such a procedure. If no such right existed
then, clearly, no right was waived--as claimed by Mr. Seward--when she
was permitted to proceed upon her journey instead of being brought
into port for adjudication. If the men and their dispatches were not
contraband of war, there appears to be no valid reason for the capture.
It can not be held that the United States had the right to seize them
as an exercise of ocean police powers, such as England practiced a half
century before when she took out of neutral ships men of pretended
English birth. Any such position was disclaimed by Mr. Seward, and it
is a matter of history that the United States has always denied the
existence of such a right.
Neither can it be pretended that the seizure was justifiable because
the men were rebels or political offenders, no matter what the relation
of their government was to the other governments of the world. The
United States has always maintained the right of asylum for this class
of men, and the right of a foreign power to do this in the case of
American offenders could not be consistently denied. A criminal or
a traitor can not be taken from the protection of a neutral foreign
flag except in accordance with the provisions of a treaty between the
powers providing for the extradition of such offenders according to
forms of law.
If, independently of the fact that the commissioners and their
dispatches were on board, there had existed any valid reason for
seizing the Trent and bringing her into port, this course could have
been pursued, and, as soon as she had entered American waters, these
men, being citizens of the United States, would have been amenable to
the laws of their country. Their arrest and imprisonment then would
have been entirely legal. It would have been, in that case, only an
incidental matter which could be in no way connected with the capture
and detention of the vessel upon which they traveled.
If the Trent had been brought into port, a prize court would have met
with difficulties in adjusting the case. Maritime law deals only _in
rem_, that is, with things or property, not with persons. The ship and
her cargo would have been either condemned as prize or released with an
award of damages to her owners. But whatever the decision of the court
concerning the vessel and her cargo, the _status_ of Messrs. Mason
and Slidell would have been precisely the same. Dana, in reviewing
this matter, says that under these circumstances they “could not be
condemned or released by the court. They would doubtless have been held
as prisoners of war by the United States government. In the event of a
decision favorable to the captors, the case of the persons would still
be a diplomatic one.”[15]
If American doctrine had been consulted, Mr. Seward could have found in
it nothing to sustain his views concerning the contraband character of
the men and their dispatches. The United States government, from the
earliest period of its history, had pursued a maritime policy entirely
different from that sustained by Mr. Seward in his dispatch conceding
the British demand for the surrender of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. The
doctrine, announced by the founders of the American republic in their
earliest state papers and steadily adhered to thereafter, was not left
to the uncertainties of maritime court decisions, but was put into the
form of positive law and made a special part of the treaty stipulations
with foreign countries. In the very first treaty ever made by the
United States with a foreign power, namely, the one negotiated with
France by Benjamin Franklin in 1778, it was provided that no class of
persons should be taken out of a free ship except “soldiers in actual
service of an enemy.” This same doctrine was re-affirmed in an unbroken
line of treaties--eighteen in number--negotiated with foreign countries
prior to the period of the civil war.
In all of these treaties it was expressly provided that nothing should
be considered as contraband of war except the things therein specified
and enumerated. Non-military dispatches were not enumerated in the
list of contraband, and hence could not be classed as such. It is true
that the language of these treaty stipulations had never been passed
upon by any American courts of admiralty, but nothing of this kind was
necessary, for the terms used were so definite and precise that no
other construction could possibly have been placed upon them. British
prize courts passed upon the guilt or innocence of the American ships
referred to in this chapter, because there was no treaty between the
two countries by which contraband of war was defined in precise terms.
Where no such treaties existed between these two countries, it can
not be held that anything is positively proved by the argument here
offered, but the conclusion to be drawn by analogy is self-evident.
It would have been more consistent with the past record of American
diplomacy, if the release of the Confederate commissioners had
been made upon the ground that the law of nations, as understood
and interpreted by the United States government, does not permit a
belligerent to take from a free neutral ship either non-military
dispatches or any class of persons except officers or soldiers in the
actual service of the enemy. It is to be regretted that the men were
surrendered upon the ground that although they and their dispatches
were contraband, yet the right to retain them had been forfeited when
Captain Wilkes voluntarily released the Trent instead of bringing her
into port for adjudication.
The following general conclusions seem to be warranted from a careful
examination of the Trent case:
1. The commissioners were not contraband of war in any sense of that
term.
2. Their dispatches being of a non-military character were not
contraband of war.
3. A neutral power is entitled to hold necessary informal relations
with an unrecognized belligerent.
4. The Trent had in no way violated her duties as a neutral ship when
she was stopped by the San Jacinto.
5. Captain Wilkes had an undoubted right to stop and search the Trent
for contraband of war. In the absence of anything of this character,
only resistance to the right of search would have made the Trent
liable to capture. As a matter of fact her captain did refuse all
facilities for search and made it known that he yielded only to
superior force. What view a prize court might have taken of this can be
only a matter of conjecture.
6. In any event Captain Wilkes had no right to seize the persons or
dispatches of the Confederate commissioners while they were on board
the Trent on the high seas.
7. Viewed solely from the standpoint of international law, sound
reasons were not given for the surrender of the commissioners by
Secretary Seward.
Mr. Blaine says: “It is not believed that the doctrine announced by Mr.
Seward can be maintained on sound principles of international law. The
restoration of the envoys on any such apparently insufficient basis did
not avoid the mortification of the surrender; it only deprived us of
the fuller credit and advantage which we might have secured from the
act. It is to be regretted that we did not place the restoration of the
prisoners upon franker and truer ground, viz., that their seizure was
in violation of the principles which we would not abandon either for a
temporary advantage or to save the wounding of our national pride.”[16]
Viewed from any standpoint Mr. Seward’s position is untenable. If
it had prevailed and had been fully recognized as a doctrine of
international law, a backward step in maritime affairs would have been
taken. Instead of enlarged rights for neutrals and a greater freedom
upon the ocean, there would have been a return toward the narrow and
illiberal maritime policy which prevailed during the Napoleonic wars.
Reprisals would have been invited; naval commanders everywhere would
have been transformed into admiralty judges; and every neutral deck
would have been liable to be changed into “a floating judgment-seat.”
American maritime policy and principle would have been reversed.
The right to capture the Confederate commissioners seemed very dear
to the people of the North. By the surrender of the captured persons,
all of the immediate results of the seizure were lost. Although the
sacrifice seemed a grievous one, yet the apparently unfavorable outcome
of the whole matter, from the standpoint of international law, was
a benefit not only to the United States but to the world. It was a
vindication of the principle for which America had always contended.
England having committed herself to the American doctrine, it became,
in this unexpected manner, firmly and forever imbedded in the
principles of international law. A triumph was thus realized, for there
remained not a single nation in all the world to dispute this principle.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. Adams, J. Q.: Memoirs, Vol. V.
2. Admiralty Reports, Edwards’s and Robinson’s.
3. American Law Review, Vol. V.
4. Bernard, Montague: Neutrality of Great Britain during the American
Civil War.
5. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. I.
6. Dana’s Wheaton’s International Law.
7. Edinburgh Review, January, 1862.
8. Grotius: De Jure Belli et Pacis.
9. Hall, W. E.: International Law.
10. Hautefeuille, M.: Questions of Maritime International Law.
11. Hunt’s Merchant Magazine, Vol. XLVI.
12. Marquardsen, Heinrich Dr.: Der Trent Fall.
13. North American Review, January, 1862, and July, 1862.
14. Nys, M.: La Guerre Maritime, p. 46.
15. Quarterly Review, January, 1862.
16. Seward, W. H.: Works of, Vol. V.
17. Southern Law Review, Vol. VIII.
18. Sumner, Charles: Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 9, 1862.
19. Westminster Review, January, 1862.
20. Woolsey, T. D.: Introduction to the Study of International Law.
21. Wharton, Francis: Digest of the International Law of the United
States.
22. Vattel, M.: The Law of Nations, Book IV.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Vattel, Book IV, chapter 7, section 85. As further evidence that
the older writers on international law did not hold to the doctrine
that an ambassador may be arrested on neutral territory, Grotius may
be quoted. He says: “Aliud sit si, quis extra fines suos, insidias
ponat legatis alienis; eo enim jus gentium violarentur.” De Jure Belli
et Pacis, Lib. II, cap. 18, sec. 5. Translated as follows by Sir T.
Twiss: “It is quite another thing, if any prince shall out of his own
territory contrive to surprise the ambassadors of another state, for
this would be a direct breach of the law of nations.”
[2] Case of the Caroline, 6 Robinson’s Admiralty Reports, pp. 467, 468.
[3] See 6 Robinson’s Adm. Rep., 430.
[4] See Wheaton’s International Law, edited by Dana, note, page 641.
[5] The commissioners had official dispatches in their possession
while on board the Trent. Mr. Alfred Slidell, a son of one of the
commissioners and a passenger on the Trent at the time she was stopped,
said in answer to a recent letter of inquiry from the author: “At the
time Messrs. Mason and Slidell were seized by Capt. Wilkes, they were,
of course, in possession of their letters of credence, besides other
official documents. As far as I can remember, no search was made,
by the officers of the San Jacinto, for official documents, nor any
attempt made to interfere with the members of the families of the four
gentlemen seized.”
[6] See case of the Rapid, Edwards’ Reports, p. 228.
[7] See case of the Madison, Edwards’ Reports, p. 224.
[8] See 6 Robinson’s Adm. Rep., 440-460.
[9] Dana’s Wheaton, note, section 504.
[10] Dr. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law,
section 199.
[11] See Hautefeuille’s Pamphlet, “Questions of Maritime International
Law.”
[12] See J. Q. Adams’s Memoirs, Vol. V, chapter 12.
[13] Introduction to the Study of International Law, section 199.
[14] “L’Amérique devant l’Europe,” chapter on the Trent.
[15] Wheaton’s International Law, section 504, note.
[16] Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. I, p. 585.