REFLECTIONS ON THE COURSE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
After the lapse of a third of a century the course of the British
government in the affair of the Trent may be considered calmly and
without passion or prejudice. In the absence of such influences, it
should be easy to draw correct conclusions concerning the motives
which controlled the action of the English ministry on that occasion.
The facts which have been presented in former chapters speak for
themselves. Extended comment upon them is unnecessary.
In view of all the circumstances of the case there can be but one
conclusion possible, and that is one which is unfavorable to England.
The action taken by her government in that instance was unwarranted by
the nature of the case; it was not consistent with either the pretended
position of England as a leader of civilization or with the past record
of that country as regards her treatment of neutrals; and last but
not least, her course was adopted and pursued with the intention of
deliberately menacing the United States of America at a time when they
were already engaged in a deadly struggle, and least able to resent
foreign insults.
It is true that no government can hope to maintain the respect of the
civilized world, if it tamely submits to wanton outrage perpetrated
against its flag. When premeditated insult is offered, the national
honor should be vindicated, although it be necessary to do so by
an appeal to arms, and the fortunes of even a doubtful war. These
things have been urged in justification of the conduct of the British
government in the affair of the Trent.
It is not true that the act of Captain Wilkes was an “outrage on the
British flag,” as has been so often affirmed by apologists for the
course pursued by England on that occasion. The seizure of the southern
commissioners was not an act which can be said to possess any of the
essential qualities of outrage. It was done, as has already been stated
in a preceding chapter, without any authority whatever from the Federal
government. Although the proceeding was irregular, and not sanctioned
by the principles of international law, there existed on the part of
Captain Wilkes not the slightest intention to offer an affront to the
British flag. Filled with patriotic zeal to serve his own country he
was guilty of having stopped a British mail packet on the high seas and
taken from her four American citizens, insurgents, proceeding to Europe
in the hope of securing assistance there to accomplish the ruin of
their country. No harm was done or offered to the person or property of
any British subject. It did not lie within the power of Captain Wilkes
to insult the British nation unless his act had been previously ordered
by his government or afterward sanctioned by it.
It often happens in war, and not infrequently in peace, that an act
not permitted by the law of nations will be done toward a neutral
by some over-zealous commander of a single cruiser. In such a case,
the government of the injured party, after having been officially
informed of the matter, usually brings it to the notice of the
offender’s government and seeks redress through diplomatic means upon
the assumption that the act complained of was done without authority.
This is the recognized and proper method of adjusting such cases among
friendly civilized nations. Such cases are constantly being settled
in this friendly and pacific manner without even a hint or a thought
of a resort to arms by either party. Quite a different course was
pursued in England on this occasion. “Within a week the demand for
reparation was on its way to America; within a fortnight, several of
the finest regiments in the Queen’s army were on their way to Canada;
immense stores of war were embarked; the _matériel_ of a considerable
army was in readiness; a fleet of incomparable power was in commission
which would have been tripled at the first moment of hostilities; the
sea-faring population joined the naval reserve with alacrity; and
throughout the nation one spirit prevails of absolute confidence in its
rulers, and absolute determination to maintain its rights.”[1]
This would have been justifiable in case of a deliberate and
premeditated insult for which the offending government was undoubtedly
responsible. In the case under consideration there was nothing in
question except the isolated act of the commander of a single detached
cruiser. Upon the mere hearing of this one such act, the British
government made an instant and peremptory demand for reparation which
was dictated by themselves and backed by more active preparations
for war than had been made in that country since the Napoleonic
era.[2] No one knew whether the act had been committed in pursuance
of instructions from the Federal government or not. There was to be
no discussion of the case; no consideration of what the American
government might have to say; no arbitration or diplomatic means of
obtaining redress in accordance with the practice of friendly nations.
The United States were given the alternative of acceding to the
peremptory demand of Great Britain or of engaging in a war with that
country.
The first communication to the Washington government was an
ultimatum--a last and only condition, a beginning with the end.
The natural beginning in such a case would have been to ask for an
explanation of intentions, and to demand reparation of the wrong done,
without at the same time preparing for war. In discussing the English
ultimatum Count De Gasparin says: “Public opinion, moreover, was
aroused in Europe with unforeseen rapidity; the precipitation of the
measure adopted at London was judged severely; the clause concerning
apology was also abandoned in fact. But it is no less incredible that
it figured in the original programme. Little children are made to ask
pardon, the humiliation of apology is inflicted on countries without
regular government, on Turks and savages; between nations which respect
each other mutually, it is always deemed sufficient satisfaction to
repair the wrong and deny the hostile intention.”[3]
The Morning Post and other London newspapers defended the ultimatum on
the ground that the act of Captain Wilkes was the last of a series of
hostile acts designed to bring about a war. It was said that the United
States were seeking a pretext for declaring war against England, and
that Mr. Seward desired to heal the domestic difficulty by proposing to
reconcile all differences with the South and make a common assault on
Canada. They said that if war must come it is best to choose one’s own
time instead of awaiting the inevitable.
These statements are too silly to deserve serious consideration. In
refuting these absurdities, Count De Gasparin says:[4] “I have followed
the progress of events in America as attentively as any one, I have
read the American newspapers, I have studied documents, among others
the famous circular of Mr. Seward; I have seen there more than one
sign of discontent with the unsympathizing attitude of England; I have
also seen there the symptoms of the somewhat natural fear which the
intervention of Europe in Mexico excites in men attached to the Monroe
doctrine; but as to these incredible plans (annexing Canada, etc.),
I have never discovered the slightest trace of them.” It was only
Englishmen who could discover such plans.
An ultimatum to the Federal government--one prepared and forwarded
without seeking explanations--was the panacea for English wounded honor
in this instance. Only five years before, in the Paris congress, an
Englishman, Lord Clarendon, had proposed a rule of arbitration that
he said would be a “barrier to those conflicts which not infrequently
break out only because of the impossibility of offering explanations or
of coming to an understanding.”
This was a question introduced by the English government. It was
discussed with earnestness, and a final vote postponed until the
Russian representative could obtain the views of his government by
telegraph. The unanimous declaration assented to by all the powers,
including the United States, was as follows: “The plenipotentiaries do
not hesitate to express the wish, in the name of their governments,
that states, between which serious dissensions may arise, shall
have recourse to the good offices of a friendly power, as far as
circumstances permit, before appealing to arms.”
If there has ever been a case where this rule, proposed and adopted
at the suggestion of England, could be applied advantageously, it
was certainly in the instance under consideration. A war was about
to break out through “the impossibility of offering explanations, or
of coming to an understanding.” This proposition, so earnestly made
and so cheerfully assented to only five years before, was utterly
disregarded at the first opportunity to put it into practice. This was
an inconsistency, not creditable to English character.
There was absolutely nothing in the affair which justified a menace of
war, and, if the British government ever believed that such was the
case, it was soon undeceived. It has already been stated in a previous
chapter that on November 30, Mr. Seward took the precaution to write
to Mr. Adams at London, and inform him that the act of Captain Wilkes
was entirely upon his own responsibility, and without instructions from
the government; that the United States was uncommitted and ready to
meet Great Britain half way in any sort of a friendly disposition of
the matter.
On December 19 Mr. Adams called upon Lord Russell at the foreign
office, and read the dispatch to him. This was an absolute assurance
that any reasonable terms would be accepted, and that all warlike
demonstrations were needless. This pacific dispatch from Mr. Seward,
however, did not have the slightest effect upon the British government.
All knowledge of the dispatch or even of the interview was carefully
concealed from the British public lest this assurance--given in
advance--of a willingness to settle the matter in a peaceable manner,
would destroy the warlike enthusiasm which was then so nearly universal
among the British people. The preparations for war continued with
unabated vigor. The British government did not care to take into
consideration anything just then that would interfere with the parade
of its military power, which was being made in order to overawe the
United States and secure the concession of the English demands.
Mr. Adams regarded the contents of the dispatch as confidential and
so took care that no one outside the legation should know of its
existence or of the interview with Lord Russell. Finally certain
London newspapers published rumors of the whole matter. On December 21
the Morning Post, the organ of the ministry, hastened to publish, in
large type, the official contradiction of the news, and stated that
no dispatch had been received which had the slightest bearing on the
Trent case. Only a few days later the Observer published a summary
of all the events relating to the case, at the close of which was a
fairly correct account of the substance of Mr. Seward’s dispatch of
November 30. “After the appearance of that,” says Mr. Adams, “I had no
hesitation in disclosing to persons with whom I conversed my knowledge
of its correctness. It was then with no little surprise that they
perceived last week, when intelligence was received from America of
the existence of such a paper, a formal denial in the Post that any
such paper had ever been communicated to the British government. No
longer able to deny the existence of it, the next step was to affirm
that I must have suppressed it. And not satisfied with that, the same
press went on to supply a motive for doing so, in the fact that certain
American parties had about the same time appeared in the market buying
up stock, which was the cause of the rise in the funds already alluded
to. Of course the assumption was that I was engaged in a heavy stock
jobbing operation for my own benefit and that of my friends.”[5]
The Post evidently wanted to have the British public believe a
falsehood as long as possible. Finally Lord Russell’s account of the
matter, as given in a note to Lord Lyons, was published and the case
was clear to all. But the Post remained silent. It made no retraction
of its statements; no justification for making them; neither did it
disclaim the authority upon which they were made.
There seemed to be an eagerness on the part of the British government
to seize on the occasion and to grasp the pretext for making war. It
was loth to give up this chance which had been so hastily accepted.
Peace was not wanted, but war. A kindred people were already engaged
in a struggle for their very existence, yet, for a difference which
it was easily possible to arrange by diplomatic means, this professed
leader of civilization and boasted enemy of human slavery did all in
her power to make a conflict inevitable and the triumph of an insurgent
slave republic certain. A few almost unknown Englishmen presented an
address to the prime minister at this time. It was an appeal from the
Anti-Slavery Society. The case was well stated. They said: “Such an
undertaking on the part of England would not only be most humiliating,
but would lamentably contradict her past efforts and former sacrifices
for the liberty of slaves; it would expose her protests to the reproach
of hypocrisy from the rest of the world; it would destroy her claim and
close her lips henceforth to every appeal addressed to the intelligence
and conscience of other nations. The members of the society experience
inexpressible horror and repugnance at the thought of seeing their
country engaged in a war the virtual end of which would be the defense
of slavery.”
The circumstances of this case permitted “recourse to the good offices
of a friendly power” before rushing to arms. This would probably have
been proposed by the United States, if any opportunity to do so had
been permitted. It is known that this method would have been most
satisfactory to President Lincoln. But the English view of the case
was that a blow had been received and this was not a matter which
admitted of arbitration. It must be settled by war unless the British
demands were instantly granted. It was not an ordinary infraction of
international law; it was an enormity, and therefore entirely proper
that the first message sent to Lord Lyons should instruct him to demand
his passports in seven days if the Federal government did not submit
fully to the conditions dictated by England.
Captain Wilkes’s error was entirely excusable. It was in no respect
like any of the genuine outrages which England has been guilty of in
her dealings with America. In 1795 the British war ship Africa entered
American waters with the avowed intention of seizing M. Fauchet, the
French minister to the United States. He was traveling from New York to
Newport in the packet Peggy, a neutral American vessel. Having received
intimations of the intention of the commander of the Africa, M. Fauchet
left the American vessel at Stonington, Conn. When the Peggy had
arrived almost at the harbor of Newport, and while within the maritime
jurisdiction of the United States, she was boarded from the Africa, the
trunks of the passengers were searched and great disappointment shown
on account of the absence of M. Fauchet. The British vice-consul at
Newport aided in this matter. These facts show that the French minister
to the United States escaped seizure, only because he had left the
American packet a few hours before.[6]
For three-quarters of a century England maintained and practiced the
“right of search and seizure.” “The victims were counted by thousands.
Lord Castlereagh himself admitted, on the floor of the House of
Commons, that an inquiry instituted by the British government had
discovered in the British fleet three thousand five hundred men
claiming to be impressed Americans. At our department of state six
thousand cases were recorded, and it was estimated that at least
as many more might have occurred, of which no information had been
received. Thus according to this official admission of the British
minister there was reason to believe that the quarter-deck of a British
man-of-war had been made a floating judgment-seat three thousand
five hundred times, while according to the records of our own state
department, it had been made a floating judgment-seat six thousand
times and upwards, and each time an American citizen had been taken
from the protection of his flag without any form of trial known to
the law.”[7] The practice was pursued with the utmost arrogance and
without discrimination among those who were liable to seizure. On one
occasion two nephews of Washington, returning from Europe, were seized
on board an American vessel and placed under the ordinary discipline of
a British man-of-war.
In 1837 a body of British troops entered the territory of the United
States, seized the American steamer Caroline, which, it was claimed,
had rendered some sort of service to the rebellious Canadians, set her
on fire and allowed her to drift over the Falls of Niagara. But it is
unnecessary to extend this list of outrages. There are enough of them
to satisfy any one that the London Times was correct when it admitted
that Great Britain was not “immaculate.”
In commenting upon this matter, Mr. Blaine says: “Whatever wrong was
inflicted on the British flag by the action of Captain Wilkes had been,
time and again, inflicted on the American flag by officers of the
English navy, without cause, without redress, without apology. * * *
But in view of the past, and of the long series of graver outrages with
which Great Britain had so wantonly insulted the American flag, she
might have refrained from invoking the judgment of the civilized world
against us, and especially might she have refrained from making, in the
hour of our sore trial and our deep distress, a demand which no British
minister would address to this government in the day of its strength
and its power.”[8]
In conclusion it is worthy of remark that, with unimportant exceptions,
the relations of the United States with the various countries of
continental Europe have always been of the most friendly and agreeable
character. In the revolution, France recognized the struggling
Americans and furnished them timely and substantial aid. Russia has
always been the steadfast friend of America and probably would have
aided the United States in a third war against England in 1861.
War in the early history of the United States, and, in later times,
a succession of diplomatic disputes which have often threatened war,
constitute much the larger portion of the record of Anglo-American
international relations. This should be a matter of sincere regret
in both countries. President Buchanan stated the case well when he
said, “No two nations have ever existed on the face of the earth which
could do each other so much good or so much harm.”[9] It is for this
reason that every friend of either country should desire that the next
century of their relations may be one of continuous peace and good-will.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress.
2. Dana’s Wheaton’s International Law, section 504, note.
3. De Gasparin: L’Amérique devant l’Europe.
4. De Gasparin: Un Grand Peuple qui se relève.
5. Edinburgh Review, Vol. CXV.
6. Ex. Document, 2d Session 35th Congress, Vol. II.
7. Senate Ex. Documents: Vol. I, 3d Session 37th Congress; No. 4,
37th Congress, 3d Session.
8. Sumner, Charles: Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 9, 1862.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Edinburgh Review, Vol. CXV, p. 284.
[2] See Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. I, p. 643.
[3] “L’Amérique devant l’Europe,” chapter on the Trent.
[4] See the last chapter of his “Un Grand Peuple qui se relève.”
[5] Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, Jan. 17, 1862.
[6] See Senate Executive Document, No. 4, 37th Cong., 3d Sess.
[7] Sumner’s speech on the Trent affair.
[8] Blaine’s Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. I, pp. 586-7.
[9] Ex. Doc., 2d Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. II, p. 2.
INDEX.
_The Numbers Refer to Pages._
Adams, Charles Francis, U. S. minister to England, instructed to
oppose recognition of Confederacy, 34;
to oppose neutrality measures, 37;
refused audience prior to recognition of Confederate belligerency,
36-7;
conveys assurances of Mr. Seward’s pacific intentions in Trent case
to Lord Russell, 275.
Albert, Prince, revises British demand for surrender of Mason and
Slidell, 165-6.
American doctrine in Trent case, 262-264.
Atalanta, case of the, cited, 254.
Austrian government, views of in Trent case, 201-203;
Mr. Seward’s answer to, 203-204.
Belligerency, recognition of Confederate, discussed by parliament, 38;
what is meant by recognition of, 39-41.
Benjamin, Judah P., advocates secession and resumption of allegiance
to British crown, 70.
Bernard, Montague, defends British neutrality proclamation, 48.
Black, J. S., secretary of state, sends circular letter to U. S.
ministers abroad, 31.
Blaine, Jas. G., comments on Trent case, 180.
Blair, Montgomery, denounces capture of Mason and Slidell, 126.
Boundary disputes, 12.
Bright, John, opposes position of English government in Trent case,
158-9.
British demand for surrender of Mason and Slidell, first draft of,
164-5;
revised by Prince Albert and the Queen, 165-6;
text of, 167-9;
comments upon, 169-170;
presented to Mr. Seward, 172.
British government, course of in Trent case discussed, 269;
ultimatum of in Trent case considered, 272-4;
inconsistency of, 274;
menaces of war by unnecessary, 274;
receives through Mr. Adams assurances of Mr. Seward’s pacific
intentions, 275;
treatment of same, 275-6;
addressed on Trent case by Anti-slavery society, 277.
Buchanan, James, comments of on British and American relations, 13,
14, 280.
Canada, troops pushed into by England, 60, 143-6;
comments upon by Thurlow Weed, 144;
by the London press, 144-5;
preparations for war in, 158.
Caroline, case of the, cited, 254, 279.
Circular letter to U. S. ministers abroad by Mr. Black, 31;
by Mr. Seward, 32;
by Mr. Seward to governors of the northern states, 61-4;
commented upon by the London and the Canadian press, 65-67.
Commons, House of, motion to recognize Confederate independence in,
35;
Mr. Gregory supports same in London Times, 35.
Derby, Earl of, consulted by British government in Trent case, 143.
Dispatches of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, 112;
contraband nature of, 253-6;
the commissioners considered living dispatches by Capt. Wilkes,
113, 119;
this doctrine not tenable, 260.
European powers, real motives of in sustaining England in Trent case,
206-8.
Everett, Edward, expresses opinion in Trent case, 128.
Excitement in England over Trent affair, 140;
reaches U. S., 175.
Fairfax, Lieut. D. M., receives instructions from Capt. Wilkes,
101-102;
part taken in seizure of envoys, 103-108;
discusses Trent case with British Capt. Moir, 109.
Fauchet, M., French Minister to U. S., attempted seizure of in
American waters by a British man-of-war, 278.
Foreign countries, responses of to Mr. Seward’s circular letter, 33.
Freeman, Edward A., English historian regards the American Union as
at an end, 29.
Garibaldi, wishes to volunteer in Federal army, 33.
Gladstone, Wm. E., expresses sympathy with the South, 28;
charges American people with instability and cowardice, 235-6.
Grotius cited, 249.
International law in Trent case, 247-262.
Irish people, sympathize with U. S. in Trent affair, 148.
Iverson, Senator, predicts foreign aid for the Confederacy, 70.
King, T. Butler, see Yancey.
Lincoln, Abraham, views on capture of Mason and Slidell, 125-6;
illustrates Trent case by stories, 185-6;
proposed dispatch of to Great Britain relative to Trent case,
188-190.
Liverpool, excited public meeting at on account of seizure of Mason
and Slidell, 146-7.
London, press of, comments on seizure of Mason and Slidell, 148-152;
a dissenting newspaper in, 159-160.
Lovejoy, Representative, comments of upon surrender of Mason and
Slidell, 229-231.
Lyons, Lord, British minister to U. S., reports secession of southern
states to his government, 17;
expresses no opinion in Trent case, 131;
conditional order to leave Washington in seven days, 171;
to give information to British governors, 171;
to make verbal demand for surrender of Mason and Slidell, 172.
Lytton, Sir Edward Bulwer, expresses sympathy for the Confederacy, 27.
Mann, Dudley, see Yancey.
Mason, James Murray, sketch of, 80.
Mason and Slidell, nature and objects of their mission abroad, 79,
83, 84;
Mr. Seward’s letter for thwarting efforts of, 84-8;
escape from Charleston, 91-2;
comments of Richmond Examiner upon, 94-6;
arrival and reception at Havana, 93-4;
embark upon British steamer Trent, 94;
seized by Capt. Wilkes, 106-7;
become prisoners at Fort Warren, Boston, 111;
protest against seizure, 111;
dispatches in possession of, 112;
reception of news of capture of in North, 117-119;
rejoicing in North at capture of, 124;
northern newspaper comments on capture of, 124, 127-9;
attitude of Mr. Lincoln on capture of, 125-6;
capture of denounced by Mr. Blair, 126;
comments on capture of, by Confederate press, 131;
by Jefferson Davis, 131-2;
by Canadian press, 132-4;
capture of anticipated in England, 163-4;
considered by British cabinet, 164-5;
belief in the North that they would not be surrendered, 176-7;
surrender of a disappointment to the South, 233;
opposed by Senator Hale, 177-9;
by C. L. Vallandigham, 180;
by people of the North, 226;
by Northern newspapers, 180-2;
commented upon by John W. Forney, 164-5;
by Mr. Wright, of Pa., 228;
by Mr. Thomas, of Mass., 227-8;
by Mr. Lovejoy, of Ill., 229-31;
by the Canadian press, 233-4;
by English press, 234-5;
demand for surrender of, significance of, 186-7;
caused rejoicing at the South, 185;
surrender of discussed in cabinet meeting, 190-4;
surrendered to Lord Lyons, 225;
proceed to Europe, 226;
sink into insignificance when surrendered, 236;
comments upon after difficulty is settled, by London Star, 236;
by London Times, 236-7;
diplomatic character of, 258-9;
not “living dispatches,” 260;
entitled to right of asylum, 261;
_status_ of in a maritime court, 262.
McCarthy, Justin, defense of neutrality proclamation by, 47.
Moir, captain of the Trent, behavior of when his vessel was boarded,
103, 108;
discusses Trent affair with Lieut. Fairfax, 109.
Neutrality proclamation, British, issue of, 38;
discussion of, 42-47;
defense of by Justin McCarthy, 47;
by Lord Stanley, 47;
by Montague Bernard, 48;
the defenses examined, 48-51;
not violated by captain of Trent, 257-8.
Newcastle, Duke of, 153.
Orozembo, case of the, cited, 251-2.
Pakington, Sir John, expresses sympathy for the South, 28.
Palmerston, Lord, British premier, an enemy to the North, 28.
Paris, declaration of, adopted, 53;
refused by U. S., 54;
discussion of by Sir H. S. Maine, 54;
urged upon the Confederates by Lord Russell and Consul Bunch, 55;
adopted by the Confederate Congress, 56;
indorsed by Lord Russell, 57;
Mr. Bunch’s course, a violation of U. S. law, 57;
discussion of, 58-9.
Presidential messages dealing with difficulties between U. S. and
Great Britain, 13.
Prince of Wales visits America, 14;
the queen thanks people of the U. S. for his reception, 15;
reply of the president, 16;
comments of the London press, 16-17.
Prussia offers opinion in Trent case, 204-206.
Queen Victoria thanks people of U. S. for Prince of Wales’s
reception, 15;
revises demand for surrender of Mason and Slidell, 165-6.
Quarterlies, British, encourage secession, 23-26.
Results of successful secession, 21-2.
Richmond Examiner, comments of, upon the escape of Mason and Slidell,
94-6.
Right of search, abandoned by Great Britain, 12;
England criticised for practicing, 278-9.
Rost, P. A., see Yancey.
Russell, Lord John, threatens U. S., 18;
expresses sympathy for the Confederacy, 27;
indifferent to the cause of the Union, 33;
receives first Confederate diplomatic agents, 73;
views of American position in Trent case, 239-245;
addresses demand for surrender of Mason and Slidell to Lord Lyons,
167-9;
addresses private notes at same time to Lord Lyons, 170-2.
Russia, friendly to U. S., 208;
sends fleet to America when war with England is probable, 209-10.
San Jacinto, character of the, 97.
Scott, Gen. Winfield, writes letter to Paris press on Trent affair,
155-6;
returns hastily to U. S., 156-7.
Scott, Sir William, cited, 248, 251-2-3, 255.
Seward, Wm. H., secretary of state, sends circular letter to U. S.
ministers abroad, 32;
to northern governors, 61-4;
informs Minister Adams that seizure of Mason and Slidell was
unauthorized, 134-5;
this dispatch promptly communicated to Lord Russell, 275;
no attention paid to it, 275-7;
abused by British press, 152;
accused of insulting the Duke of Newcastle, 153;
answer of to British demand for Mason and Slidell, 211-220;
strength of this document, 221-2;
its weakness, 222-3;
position in Trent case untenable, 265-6;
offers passage across Maine to British troops, 238.
Shrewsbury, Earl of, expresses sympathy for the Confederacy, 28.
Slavery in America, a source of trouble to Great Britain, 22.
Slidell, John, sketch of, 81;
predicts foreign aid for the Confederacy, 70.
Spence, James, a prominent Englishman, publishes a book to encourage
Confederate cause, 25.
Sumner, Charles, senator from Mass., confers with Mr. Lincoln and
cabinet relative to surrender of Mason and Slidell, 125, 190;
speech in senate on same, 231-2;
condemns England for practicing “search and seizure,” 278-9.
Thouvenel, M., offers opinion of French government on seizure of
Mason and Slidell, 196-200;
Mr. Seward replies, 200;
Mr. Thouvenel’s position examined, 200-201.
Trent, character of the, 94;
why she was not seized, 108;
purser of publishes account of seizure of Mason and Slidell in
London Times, 137-9;
affair of the, creates great excitement in England, 140-1;
neutral _termini_ of discussed, 255-6-7;
case of, summary of principles involved in, 264-5.
Vallandigham, C. L., opposes surrender of Mason and Slidell, 180,
227, 229.
Vattel cited, by Mr. Seward: discussion of, 248, 249, 250.
War preparations on account of Trent affair, in Canada, 158;
in England, 141-142;
necessary in U. S., discussion of by newspapers, 181-2.
Weed, Thurlow, letter of in London Times on Trent affair, 153-4;
reply of Times to same, 154-5;
notices warlike preparations in England, 144.
Wilkes, Capt. Charles, character of, 97-8;
returns from Africa to West Indies, 98;
learns of the Mason and Slidell mission, 98-9;
makes preparations to seize the commissioners, 99-100;
instructions to Lieut. Fairfax, 101-2;
intercepts the Trent and seizes the commissioners, 102-7;
proceeds to Fortress Monroe, 109,
thence to New York, 110,
and finally to Boston, 109, 111-112;
reasons for not seizing the Trent, 112-115;
made a hero of, 117-119;
thanked by secretary of war, 120-1;
act of, approved by navy department, 121;
resolutions of thanks to, by Congress, 122-3;
had right to stop and search Trent, 260-1.
Williams, Commander Richard, behavior of while Mason and Slidell were
being seized, 104-5;
makes official report of Trent affair to British admiralty, 140,
164;
makes ridiculous speech, 157-8.
Yancey, Rost, Mann, and King, Messrs., first Confederate agents in
Europe, 71;
sketch of these men, 71-72;
comments of Jefferson Davis concerning their labors, 76;
received by Lord Russell, 72-3;
protest against their reception by Mr. Seward, 73-4;
Mr. Yancey’s speech before Fishmonger’s Society, London, 74;
Mr. King’s pamphlet for foreign circulation, 75-6.
Transcriber note
Spelling and punctuation errors have been corrected.
Footnotes have been moved to the end of chapters.
Italics have been enclosed in underscores.
Smallcaps have been capitalised.