VIEWS OF OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS CONCERNING THE TRENT CASE.
The forcible seizure of the Confederate commissioners while on board
the Trent caused more or less of discussion throughout Europe. The
technical right of Captain Wilkes to make the capture was not admitted.
Neutral governments regarded it as prejudicial to their own interests.
It was held that such an act tended toward an abridgment of the rights
and privileges which had been previously enjoyed by the neutral
flag. Many of the European governments took occasion to make public
their views concerning the matter, and to express the hope that the
government at Washington would not insist upon maintaining the right
to seize even its own rebellious citizens on board a neutral ship.
Such a proceeding, it was said, did not conform to the principles of
international law, and was not consistent even with American precedents
and practice.
Many of the United States ministers in Europe sent reports to
Washington concerning the feeling in the various capitals to which they
were respectively accredited.
Three of the principal European powers communicated their views of
the matter to the United States government. This was done in the
usual courteous language of diplomacy and through the medium of their
respective ministers at Washington. In a dispatch to M. Mercier, M.
Thouvenel, the French minister for foreign affairs, communicated his
opinion as follows:
“PARIS, December 3, 1861.
“SIR--The arrest of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board the English
mail packet Trent by an American cruiser has produced in France, if
not the same emotion as in England, at least a profound astonishment
and sensation. Public opinion was immediately occupied with the
legality and the consequences of such an act, and the impression
which has been thereby produced has not been for an instant doubtful.
The act seemed to the public to be so entirely at variance with
the ordinary rules of international law that it has determined to
throw the responsibility exclusively on the commander of the San
Jacinto. We are not yet in a position to know if this supposition is
well founded, and the government of the emperor have been therefore
compelled to examine the question raised by the removal of the
two passengers from the Trent. The desire to aid in preventing a
conflict, perhaps imminent, between the powers towards whom they are
animated by equally friendly sentiments, and the desire to maintain,
with a view to placing the rights of their own flag beyond the
danger of any attack, certain principles essential to the security
of neutrals, have convinced them, after mature reflection, that they
could not remain perfectly silent on the matter.
“If, to our great regret, the cabinet at Washington should be
disposed to approve the conduct of the commander of the San Jacinto,
it would be because they consider Messrs. Mason and Slidell as
enemies, or because they only recognize them as rebels. In the
one case as in the other there would be an extremely painful
forgetfulness of principles on which we have always found the United
States agree with us.
“On what ground can the American cruiser, in the first case, have
arrested Messrs. Mason and Slidell? The United States have admitted,
with us, in the treaties concluded between the two countries, that
the freedom of the flag extends to persons found on board, even
were they enemies of one of the two parties, except, at least, in
the case of military men actually in the service of the enemy.
Messrs. Mason and Slidell were, by virtue of this principle, the
insertion of which in our treaties of amity and commerce has never
encountered any difficulty, perfectly free under the neutral flag
of England. It will not, doubtless, be pretended that they could be
considered as contraband of war. That which constitutes contraband
of war has not yet, it is true, been precisely determined. Its
limits are not absolutely the same with all the powers. But, as far
as regards persons, the special stipulations which are found in
treaties concerning military men clearly define the character of
those who may be seized by belligerents. Now there is no occasion to
demonstrate that Messrs. Mason and Slidell can not be assimilated to
persons in this category. There would therefore remain nothing to
explain their capture but this pretext--that they were bearers of
official dispatches of the enemy. Now this is the place to recall
a circumstance which should govern this entire affair, and which
renders unjustifiable the conduct of the American cruiser. The Trent
was not bound to a point belonging to either of the belligerents. She
was carrying her cargo and passengers to a neutral country, and it
was, moreover, in a neutral port where she had embarked them. If it
was admissible that, under such circumstances, the neutral flag did
not completely cover the persons and goods on board, its immunity
would be an empty word. At any moment the commerce and navigation
of third powers would be liable to suffer in their innocent or
even indirect relations with one or other of the belligerents.
These latter would not have the right to require from the neutral
a complete impartiality--to prohibit him from all participation in
acts of hostility; they would impose upon his liberty of commerce and
navigation restrictions of which modern international law has refused
to admit the legality. In a word, we should return to those vexatious
practices against which, in former times, no power has protested more
energetically than the United States.
“If the cabinet at Washington could only regard the two persons
arrested as rebels, whom they have always a right to seize, the
question, to place it in another light, could not thereby be solved
any the more in a sense favorable to the conduct of the commander of
the San Jacinto.
“In such a case there would be a non-recognition of the principle
which constitutes a ship to be a portion of the territory of the
country whose flag she bears, and there would be a violation of the
immunity which forbids a foreign sovereign to exercise there his
jurisdiction. It is not necessary, doubtless, to recall the energy
with which on every occasion the government of the United States
have defended this immunity, and the right of asylum, which is a
consequence of it.
“Without wishing to enter into a deeper discussion of questions
raised by the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, I have said
enough, I think, to establish that the cabinet of Washington can not,
without aiming a blow at those principles which all neutral powers
are equally interested in maintaining, nor without putting itself in
contradiction with its own conduct up to the present day, give its
approval to the proceedings of the commander of the San Jacinto.
“In this state of things, there can not be, in our opinion, any
hesitation as to the course to pursue. Lord Lyons is already
instructed to present the demands for satisfaction which the English
government is under the necessity of drawing up, and which consist in
the immediate release of the persons taken from on board the Trent,
and in sending explanations calculated to remove from this act its
offensive character to the British flag.
“The Federal government would be inspired by a just and elevated
sentiment in yielding to these demands. One would vainly search for
what object or in what interest they would risk to provoke, by a
different attitude, a rupture with Great Britain. For ourselves, who
would see in this case a complication, in every way deplorable, of
the difficulties with which the cabinet at Washington has already to
struggle against, and a precedent of a nature to render seriously
uneasy all those powers not parties to the present contest, we
think we are giving a proof of loyal amity towards the cabinet of
Washington in not allowing them to be ignorant of our opinion in
this circumstance. I invite you, sir, to take the first opportunity
of speaking frankly to Mr. Seward, and if he should ask it, to leave
with him a copy of this dispatch.
Receive, etc., THOUVENEL.”
This dispatch was submitted to the president, but it had been
previously decided to give up the commissioners. After stating this
fact in his answer to the French dispatch, Mr. Seward said: “That
disposition of the subject, as I think, renders unnecessary any
discussion of it, in reply to the comments of Mr. Thouvenel. I am
permitted, however, to say that Mr. Thouvenel has not been in error
in supposing, first, that the government of the United States has not
acted in any spirit of disregard of the rights or of the sensibilities
of the British nation, and that he is equally just in assuming that the
United States would consistently vindicate, by their practice on this
occasion, the character they have so long maintained as an advocate of
the most liberal principles concerning the rights of neutral states in
maritime war.
“You will assure Mr. Thouvenel that this government appreciates as well
the frankness of his explanations, as the spirit of friendship and
good-will towards the United States in which they are expressed.”
Exception may be taken to some of the things said by M. Thouvenel in
this letter. He expressed the opinion that Messrs. Mason and Slidell
were “perfectly free under the neutral flag of England,” and referred
to the treaties between the United States and France, which provided
that persons, though enemies to either or both countries, should not be
taken from a free ship. The treaties referred to had expired and were,
consequently, of no effect. If they had been in full force, however,
they could have determined nothing definitely in the settlement of a
maritime question between the United States and England. The analogy
only, in such a case, would be of any value.
M. Thouvenel also held that in this case “there would be a
non-recognition of the principle which constitutes a ship to be
a portion of the territory of the country whose flag she bears.”
This doctrine is not sound. Neutral territory can not be seized and
condemned because offenses against the rights of neutrals are practiced
upon it. If a ship were simply a bit of neutral territory it could not
be seized and condemned for carrying contraband of war or otherwise
offending against neutral rights. The law of nations, however,
permits capture and confiscation of a vessel for such offenses. If M.
Thouvenel’s doctrine be admitted, who can tell what this small portion
of neutral territory, protected by its own flag, might not do?
The views of the Austrian government were duly submitted in the
following dispatch to its representative at Washington.
“VIENNA, December 18, 1861.
(Confidential.)
“The difference which has occurred between the government of the
United States and that of Great Britain in consequence of the arrest
of Messrs. Slidell and Mason, effected by the captain of the American
ship of war, the San Jacinto, on board the English packet, the Trent,
has not failed to attract the most serious attention of the imperial
cabinet. The more importance we attach to the preservation of good
relations between the United States and England the more must we
regret an accident which has complicated in such a grave manner a
situation already surrounded with difficulties.
“Without having any intention of entering here into an examination of
the question of right, we can not, however, overlook the fact that
according to the notions of international law adopted by all the
powers, and which the American government itself has often taken as
the rule of its conduct, England could not by any means refrain in
the present case from making a representation against the attack made
on its flag, and from demanding a just reparation for it. It appears
to us, moreover, that the demands drawn up for this purpose by the
cabinet of St. James have nothing in them hurtful to the feelings of
the cabinet of Washington, and that the latter will be able to do
an act of equity and moderation without the least sacrifice of its
dignity.
“We think that we can hope that the government of the United States,
in taking counsel both from the rules which govern international
relations, as well as from considerations of enlightened policy
rather than from the manifestations produced by an over-excitement
of national feeling, will bring to bear on its deliberation all the
calmness which the gravity of the case requires, and will think it
right to decide on a course which, while preserving from rupture the
relations between two great states to which Austria is equally bound
in friendship, will tend to avert the grave disturbances which the
eventuality of a war could not fail to bring about, not only upon
each one of the contending parties, but upon the affairs of the world
in general.
“Be so good, M. le Chevalier, as to bring the preceding reflections
to the notice of Mr. Seward, and to inform us of the manner in which
the minister shall have received your communication.
Receive, etc.,
“RECHBERG.”
This dispatch having been submitted to the president, a brief answer
was prepared by Mr. Seward as soon as a settlement of the matter had
been effected with Great Britain. A copy of the correspondence which
had passed between the United States government and those of Great
Britain and France, concerning the detention of the Trent, and the
capture of the Confederate commissioners, was also forwarded to the
Austrian government with the statement that important facts would be
learned from them as follows:
“First. That the United States are not only incapable, for a moment, of
seeking to disturb the peace of the world, but are deliberate, just and
friendly in their intercourse with all foreign nations.
“Secondly. That they will not be unfaithful to their traditions and
policy, as an advocate of the broadest liberality in the application of
the principle of international law to the conduct of maritime warfare.
“The United States, faithful to their sentiments, and at the same time
careful of their political constitution, will sincerely rejoice if the
occasion which has given rise to this correspondence shall be improved
so as to obtain a revision of the law of nations, which will render
more definite and certain the rights and obligations of states in time
of war.”
Assurances were also expressed that the president highly appreciated
the frankness and sincerity of the Austrian government on an occasion
of such great interest to the welfare of the United States.
In about a month after the reception of the news of the capture of the
Confederate commissioners, the Prussian government expressed its views
in the following dispatch to its minister at Washington:
“BERLIN, December 25, 1861.
“M. LE BARON--The maritime operations undertaken by President Lincoln
against the southern seceding states could not, from their very
commencement, but fill the king’s government with apprehension lest
they should result in possible prejudice to the legitimate interests
of neutral powers.
“These apprehensions have unfortunately proved fully justified by the
forcible seizure on board the neutral mail packet the Trent, and the
abduction therefrom of Messrs. Slidell and Mason by the commander of
the United States man-of-war the San Jacinto.
“This occurrence, as you can well imagine, has produced in England
and throughout Europe the most profound sensation, and thrown, not
cabinets only, but also public opinion into a state of the most
excited expectation. For, although at present it is England only
which is immediately concerned in the matter, yet, on the other hand,
it is one of the most important and universally recognized rights of
the neutral flag which has been called into question.
“I need not here enter into a discussion of the legal side of the
question. Public opinion in Europe has, with singular unanimity,
pronounced in the most positive manner for the injured party. As
far as we are concerned we have hitherto abstained from expressing
ourselves to you upon the subject, because in the absence of any
reliable information we were in doubt as to whether the captain of
the San Jacinto, in the course taken by him, had been acting under
orders from his government or not. Even now we prefer to assume that
the latter was the case. Should the former supposition, however, turn
out to be the correct one, we should consider ourselves under the
necessity of attributing greater importance to the occurrence, and
to our great regret we should find ourselves constrained to see in
it not an isolated fact, but a public menace offered to the existing
rights of all neutrals.
“We have as yet no certain information as to the demands made by
England to the American cabinet, upon the acceptance of which
the maintenance of peace appears to depend. As far, however, as
our information reaches on the subject, we are convinced that no
conditions have been put forward by the British government which
could justly offend President Lincoln’s sense of honor.
“His majesty, the king, filled with the most ardent wishes for
the welfare of the United States of North America, has commanded
me to advocate the cause of peace with President Lincoln, through
your instrumentality, to the utmost of my power. We should reckon
ourselves fortunate if we could in this wise succeed in facilitating
the peaceful solution of a conflict from which the greatest dangers
might arise. It is possible, however, that the president has already
taken his decision and announced it. Whatever that decision may be,
the king’s government, when they reflect upon the uninterrupted
relations of friendship and amity which have existed between Prussia
and the United States ever since the latter was founded, will
derive satisfaction from the thought of having laid with the most
unreserved candor their views of this occurrence before the cabinet
at Washington, and expressed the wishes which they entertain in
connection with it.
“You will read this dispatch without delay to the secretary of state
for foreign affairs, and, should he desire it, you will give him a
copy of it. I shall await your report upon the instructions contained
in this dispatch, and I avail, etc.,
BERNSTORFF.”
The publication of the opinions of other European governments caused
the expression of much gratification in England. There appeared to
be so much harmony of sentiment throughout Europe upon this matter
that the confidence of the British ministry was much increased in the
position which it had at first assumed. It endured with the greatest
patience the severe criticism upon the past policy of Great Britain
relating to the rights of neutrals. The cabinet probably thought that
a substantial advantage would be gained to England in the immediate
dispute which was under consideration, and hence it was easier to bear
censure for past misconduct. In a discussion of the matter one of the
English reviews said: “The whole of Europe has pronounced that we were
right.”[1]
A brief consideration of the matter, however, is sufficient to show
that it was not sentiments of unfriendliness toward the United States
which prompted the other nations of Europe so quickly to disapprove the
the act of Captain Wilkes, and urge the Federal government to concede
the British demand to surrender the commissioners. For a century the
tendency of Great Britain had been toward a restriction of the rights
of neutrals to the narrowest possible limits. When an act of doubtful
legality was performed on the deck of an English cruiser by an American
captain, it was with the greatest satisfaction that the nations on
the continent of Europe saw England disavow her own former precedents
bearing upon this case, and plant herself squarely upon the doctrine
of enlarged neutral rights. The view of the other countries was that
it was a most fortunate opportunity for securing new and enlarged
modifications of the law of nations such as would restrain England in
future from a policy that was disagreeable to themselves. It was their
own interests which they were seeking to promote, not those of England.
The concession of the British demand by the Federal government would
establish a principle of maritime law which would be of value to the
world in all future time. This was the motive which induced the other
nations to assume the position that was common to all of them.
One of the most devoted European friends of the United States at
that time was Count Agénor De Gasparin of France.[2] He says in his
discussion of the views of other nations concerning the matter: “On
seeing such haste and so haughty a proclamation of indisputable
exigence, on seeing the idea of an impious war accepted with so much
readiness by some, and so much ill-dissembled joy by others, Europe
declared without circumlocution or reserve that if England were not
miraculously rescued from her own enterprise, if she drew the sword
against the North in the capacity of an ally of the South, she would
destroy with her own hands her chief claim to the respect of the
civilized world. The language on this point was the same at Paris,
Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Turin. As they were unanimous in
deciding the technical question of right against America, so were they
unanimous in deciding the moral question against England. To recognize
the technical right in favor of England, was to recognize the right
of neutrals against her. Who is simple enough to be astonished at the
eagerness displayed here by the other powers?”
It is worthy of special notice that, during the entire period of the
American civil war, the most powerful ruler in all Europe was an
outspoken and steadfast friend of the United States. If a war had
occurred between England and the northern states of America as a result
of the affair of the Trent, it is well-nigh certain that the Federal
government would have had a powerful ally in the czar, Alexander
of Russia, who, doubtless, remembered the losses he had recently
sustained in the Crimean war. In this war England had been his most
powerful enemy. In a few weeks after the capture of the Confederate
commissioners, a fleet of Russian war vessels appeared in New York
harbor and remained there for several months. At the same time a number
of Russian men-of-war were stationed at San Francisco. No official
explanation was ever given for the long-continued presence of these
war vessels in American waters. Their extended visit caused much
comment, but their purpose was easily divined and their presence was
not unwelcome while a war between England and the northern states was
imminent.
While at the Astor House, in New York, Admiral Farragut was visited by
the Russian admiral, with whom he had formerly become well acquainted.
On being asked why he was spending the winter in idleness in an
American harbor the Russian replied: “I am here under sealed orders,
to be broken only in a contingency which has not yet occurred.” He
also added that the commander of the Russian men-of-war lying off San
Francisco harbor had received similar orders. In the same interview he
admitted that his orders were to break the seals, if, while he remained
at New York, the United States became involved in a war with any
foreign nation.
Soon afterward, when Secretary Seward asked the Russian minister why
the czar kept his war vessels so long in American harbors, he replied
that, while he did not know the exact nature of the orders under which
the commanders of the fleets were acting, he felt at liberty to say
that it was no unfriendly purpose which caused the prolonged stay of
these men-of-war in the waters of the United States.
It seems that when official knowledge was conveyed to the czar that
England was making preparations for war with the United States
on account of the detention of the Trent and the seizure of the
Confederate commissioners two fleets of war vessels were immediately
sent to America under orders which were sealed so that the intentions
of the Russian government might remain unknown to the world in the
event that the services of the men-of-war should not be needed on this
side of the Atlantic.
A prominent American who was in St. Petersburg at that time made an
unofficial call upon the Russian chancellor, and was shown the czar’s
order to his admiral to report to the president of the United States
for duty in case the northern states became involved in a war with
England.[3]
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. Bernard, Montague: Pamphlet on the Trent Question.
2. British Annual Register, 1861.
3. Dana’s Wheaton’s International Law, section 504, note.
4. De Gasparin: L’Amérique devant l’Europe.
5. London Quarterly Review, No. 221.
6. Seward, William H.: Works of, Vol. V.
7. Weed, Thurlow: Life of, Vol. II.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] London Quarterly Review, No. 221, p. 273.
[2] See his “L’Amérique devant l’Europe.” Chapter on the Trent case.
[3] See Thurlow Weed’s account of this matter. Life of Weed. Vol. II,
pp. 346-7.