CONSIDERATION OF THE BRITISH DEMAND IN AMERICA.
Before the middle of December, news of the intense excitement which
prevailed in England reached the United States. About this time the New
York Tribune said: “England is almost beside herself, is the tenor of
the latest and most trustworthy private letters. They say that passion
has swept away reason in a manner to an extent unknown since 1831, and
that the national sympathy with the South developed by recent events
is startling.” It having been suggested that the president submit a
proposal to settle the matter by arbitration, the New York Journal of
Commerce said that if only an adjudication by a court of admiralty were
desired by the English government, it “could be easily accommodated
by a return of the prisoners on board of the Trent at the point of
capture, and then Captain Wilkes could fire a gun across her bow and
bring her into port according to law.”
On December the 18th, the messenger of the British government, who had
been sent from London with dispatches from his government relative to
the affair, reached Washington and reported to Lord Lyons. The nature
of the messages immediately became known by some means, and the entire
North was excited anew by the prospect of a double war, but still there
was a popular belief that the prisoners would not be surrendered, since
there appeared to be no reason for a reversal of the almost universal
verdict given at the time of the capture.
The momentous question everywhere was, “Will the government at
Washington concede the British demand and give up the men?” Everybody
wondered whether the angry growl of the British lion would have a
sensible effect upon Mr. Lincoln and the administration. “The press
took up the exciting theme, and, as usual, differed widely as to
the course the government should adopt. Meanwhile the keen-sighted
and adventurous began to talk of and to take steps toward the
preparation of cruisers to prey upon the shipping of England, and an
army of volunteers to meet the attack of the British army expected at
Canada was on the _tapis_. Stocks went down at home and abroad as the
warlike feeling in both countries went up, and to the public, war, for
a while, seemed imminent.”[1]
It was rumored that the prisoners would be given up by the
administration. Among those that denied it was the New York Herald,
which said it was only a “silly rumor” and that there “was not the
slightest truth in the report.”
The “silly rumor,” however, speedily became a matter of seriousness,
and, although not confirmed, it was universally believed, and was
discussed by the press and the people of the North. Public opinion
was everywhere strongly opposed to the course of action which rumor
said would be pursued by the government. Such a proceeding, it was
said, would be degrading to the nation, and was too humiliating to
be endured. The right of a nation to deal as it wishes with its own
citizens who are seeking to compass its destruction was confidently
affirmed, and, although the case seemed a desperate one in view of the
consequences which were almost certain to result from a refusal to
accede to the British demand, there was a strong sentiment in favor of
accepting what appeared to be the only alternative that remained to
the American people, namely, to engage in another war with England.
This opinion found favor with many public men, including prominent
congressmen.
While this rumor was being discussed by the press and the public,
Senator John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, made a speech in the United
States senate concerning the matter. After saying that the measure
involved more of good or evil to the country than anything that had
ever occurred before, he continued as follows: “To my mind a more fatal
act could not mark the history of this country--an act that would
surrender at once to the arbitrary demand of Great Britain all that
was won in the revolution, reduce us to the position of a second rate
power, and make us the vassal of Great Britain. I would go as far as
any reasonable man would go for peace, but not further. I would not
be unwilling to submit this subject to the arbitration of any of the
great powers of Europe, but I would not submit to the arbitrary, the
absolute demand of Great Britain, to surrender these men, and humble
our flag even to escape from a war with Great Britain. No man would
make more honorable concessions than I would to preserve the peace, but
sometimes peace is less honorable and more calamitous than war. The
administration which is now in power ought to know what the feeling of
the country is.”
Mr. Hale then referred to a conversation which he had just had with
Senator Lane, of Indiana, who had said that the state of Indiana had
then sixty thousand men in the field, and that she would double that
number in sixty days if a war with Great Britain were brought about.
“I have seen many gentlemen,” continued Mr. Hale, “and I have seen
none, not a man can be found, who is in favor of this surrender, for it
would humiliate us in the eyes of the world, irritate our own people
and subject us to their indignant scorn. If we are to have war with
Great Britain, it will not be because we refuse to surrender Messrs.
Mason and Slidell; that is a mere pretense. If war shall come it will
be because Great Britain has determined to force war upon us. They
would humiliate us first and fight us afterwards. If we are to be
humiliated I prefer to take it after a war, and not before. It is true,
war would be a sacrifice to the people. I think I see its horrors, its
disasters, its carnage, its blood, and its desolation, but, sir, let
war come; let your cities be battered down, your armies be scattered,
your fields barren, to preserve untarnished the national honor; a
regenerating spirit among your people will restore your armies, and
rebuild your cities and make fruitful your fields. * * * I pray that
this administration will not surrender our national honor. I tell them
that hundreds and thousands will rush to the battlefield, and bare
their breasts to its perils rather than submit to degradation.
* * * * *
“But if we are to have war--I do not say that we shall--it will not
be without its advantages. It will be a war that can not be carried
on without fighting, and if we only understand our true position, we
can proclaim to every man who speaks the English language on God’s
footstool, the cause for which we are fighting; and this appeal will
reach the hearts of millions of Englishmen, Irishmen and Frenchmen.
“We have heard, Mr. President, some fears expressed that Louis Napoleon
is taking sides with England, and that we are to contend with the
combined energies of both France and England. I do not believe it. I
believe if Louis Napoleon harbors one single sentiment, if his action
is guided by one single principle, if he has one single feeling that is
predominant over all others, it is to have a fair field to retrieve the
disastrous issue of Waterloo. And besides, sir, all over this country,
throughout Canada, and in Ireland, there are hundreds and thousands and
hundreds of thousands of true-hearted Irishmen who have long prayed
for an opportunity to retaliate upon England for the wrongs which for
centuries that government has inflicted upon their fatherland. If we
know our own position and our own strength--I refer to the strength of
principle--there will be nothing to be afraid of in this contest. If
war must come, let it come; but I tell you, and I do not pretend to
be a prophet, I think the slightest sagacity in public councils will
sustain me in the position that if England enters upon this war, she
will enter upon one of more than doubtful contingency.”[2]
On December 16, in anticipation of the action of the government, Mr.
Vallandigham, of Ohio, introduced into the House of Representatives
a long preamble reciting the facts concerning the capture of the
commissioners by Captain Wilkes, and the subsequent approval of his act
by the secretary of the navy and by the popular branch of congress.
To this was appended a resolution affirming it to be the sense of the
house, “That it is the duty of the president to now firmly maintain the
stand thus taken, approving and adopting the act of Captain Wilkes,
in spite of any menace or demand of the British government, and that
this house pledges its full support to him in upholding now the honor
and vindicating the courage of the government and people of the United
States against a foreign power.” By a vote of one hundred and nine
to sixteen the resolution was referred to the committee on foreign
affairs, Mr. Vallandigham and his friends voting with the minority.[3]
A prominent public man who at that time was holding the position of
minister to one of the European courts thought that “men and money
should be sent into Ireland, India and all of the British dominions all
over the world, to stir up revolt. Our cause is just, and vengeance
will sooner or later overtake that perfidious aristocracy.”
The press throughout the North commented very freely upon the
situation while the British demand was being considered. In general
the newspapers did not sanction the proposed course of the government
and their belligerent tone plainly indicated that they, too, favored
a settlement of the controversy by a resort to arms. The Cincinnati
Commercial said: “If war with England can with honor be avoided, we
must avoid it; but if a peremptory demand for the release of Mason and
Slidell has been made we do not see how it can be honorably complied
with.”
“If we must fight we should pattern after England and hasten
preparations on every side, on a scale commensurate with the danger,
and with the celerity becoming action in so dreadful an emergency.
One of the first things to be done would be the withdrawing from the
southern coast of our fleets and armies, for, if exposed as at present,
they would be annihilated in a month after the British commenced
hostilities. We should also withdraw the outposts at Fortress Monroe,
and provide that place with ample stores of provisions and ammunition
that it might laugh a siege to scorn. The defense of our coast would
also demand the utmost resources of the endangered communities and the
supervision and assistance of the government.”
About the same time the Detroit Free Press said that “The threatened
attitude of our affairs with England has once more called the attention
of the public to our national defenses in the northern states. So far
as the lakes are concerned, it would be impossible for England and
Canada to offer any resistance, for our mercantile marine--much of
which can be used temporarily until ships of war can be constructed--is
more than a hundred fold more than theirs. We have more than a hundred
ships where England and Canada have one, and our sailors upon these
inland seas are in the same proportion. Under these circumstances it
would be idle to expend any large sums of money, if war was probable,
in fortifying our harbors or roadsteads. It is hardly possible to
conceive of such a state of things to occur when we should not command
the lakes absolutely. But to keep this ascendency the states bordering
on the lakes should have large arsenals or depots of ammunition ready
for instant use. If we had rifled cannon we could fit out a hundred
gun-boats, which would command every harbor in the lakes in thirty
days. We have the small steamers, but we have not the guns, the shot,
the shell and other ammunition necessary to use the vessels to the best
advantage.”
Another very well known newspaper said: “We can only hope that those at
the head of the government may be equal to the emergency and that they
will maintain the honor of the nation at whatever sacrifice.”[4]
On December 12, the Cincinnati Gazette discussed the probabilities of a
war with England and the true motive of that country for engaging in a
contest with the United States: “National consciences are easily bent
to suit their own interests. The possessions and the wars of England in
every part of the world show this virtue in her to an eminent degree.
She is now suffering great distress from our war, and has apprehensions
of greater, as the winter advances. Therefore she supposes she has
nothing additional to suffer by a war, and that by opening a market for
her goods, and releasing the cotton supply, she will have immediate
relief and a return to prosperity; while with her immense fleet she
believes the job will be an easy one, and will not cause her any great
additional expense. England believes it her interest to interfere, and
her interest is her most reliable motive, as it is of all nations.”
On December 19, John W. Forney, who was, at that time, one of the best
informed newspaper correspondents in the United States, discussed
the situation in a contribution to the Philadelphia Press. He said:
“England knows she is strong. This is our hour of weakness and she
may make it her opportunity to strike. She can now be arrogant and
insulting, for now her arrogance and insult can not be resented. The
northern coast is exposed to her large and powerful navy; our towns
are not fortified, and she may bring desolation upon our people and
our manufacturing interests. All this she knows. Her armaments are
large and well appointed; her army has been increased almost to a war
footing; she is prepared to throw large bodies of troops into the
eastern and northern portion of our republic; Canada is filled with
armed men, and the frontiers of Canada are simply so many garrisons.
Our commerce is at her mercy. In the Mexican gulf there is a large
British fleet, which could render our newly gained strongholds on the
southern coast untenable, and accomplish the destruction of the brave
men at Port Royal, Hatteras and Santa Rosa Island. She may break our
blockade and entirely nullify our expeditionary operations. With the
Potomac virtually blockaded, and an immense army under Beauregard in
our rear, Washington would probably fall. With the Chesapeake Bay open
to any navy that may choose to enter; with a disloyal population in
Maryland, with enemies along the Virginia and Atlantic coasts, England
could precipitate a fearful series of disasters, and, perhaps, with
the aid of the southern armies, turn the bloody tide of war upon the
northern states.
“It may be in view of all these grave considerations, and the sad
necessities of the case, that in order to avoid a war which could
only end in our discomfiture, the administration may be compelled to
concede the demands of England, and, perhaps, release Messrs. Mason and
Slidell. God forbid, but in a crisis like this we must adapt ourselves
to stern circumstances and yield every feeling of pride to maintain
our existence. If this contingency should ever arrive--and I am only
speculating upon a disagreeable possibility--then let us swear--not
only to ourselves, but to our children who come after us--to repay this
greedy and insolent power with the retribution of a just and fearful
vengeance. If England, in our time of distress, makes herself our foe,
and offers to become our assassin, we will treat her as a foe when we
can do so untrammeled and unmenaced by another enemy.”
Mr. Seward evidently did not take so gloomy a view of the situation.
About a month later, in a private letter in which was discussed the
probability of English interference, he gave it as his opinion that
“whatever nation makes war against us, or forces itself into a war,
will find out that we can and shall suppress rebellion and defeat
invaders besides. The courage and determination of the American people
are aroused for any needful effort--any national sacrifices.”[5]
News of the English demand and its consideration at Washington was
quickly received throughout the South where it caused great rejoicing.
The southern newspapers of December 21 are filled with expressions
of delight at the prospect of a war between England and the United
States. In the South it was believed that such a war would overcome the
power of the Federal navy, bring upon the North and easily secure the
independence of the Southern Confederacy. Virginia orators proclaimed
at Richmond “that the key of the blockade had been lost in the trough
of the Atlantic.”[6] It was said by southern leaders that the only
condition of war was that the North should maintain the position
already assumed. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, seems to have exhibited
much enthusiasm, for he said in a public address that his own nightly
prayers were offered to God that upon this occasion “Lincoln’s backbone
might not give way.”
Still an ominous silence prevailed at Washington. “The leading
statesmen, senators and members of congress, clergymen and delegates
from peace societies, newspaper reporters, speculators in the funds
and many other lesser men, openly or surreptitiously, worked heaven
and earth to ascertain the intentions of the president, but in vain.
Lincoln and Seward smiled calmly at the questioners and evaded a
reply.”[7]
To one inquirer who seemed unusually anxious Mr. Lincoln replied by
telling a story. “Your question reminds me,” said he, “of an incident
which occurred out west. Two roughs were playing cards for high
stakes, when one of them, suspecting his adversary of foul play,
straightway drew his bowie-knife from his belt and pinned the hand of
the other player upon the table, exclaiming: ‘If you haven’t got the
ace of spades under your palm, I’ll apologize.’”[8]
To persons who expressed a fear that public sentiment might become so
strongly in favor of war that that course would have to be determined
upon, and that such a proceeding would be fatal to the country, Mr.
Lincoln replied by telling a characteristic story. He said: “My father
had a neighbor from whom he was only separated by a fence. On each side
of that fence there were two savage dogs, who kept running backward
and forward along the barrier all day, barking and snapping at each
other. One day they came to a large opening recently made in the fence.
Perhaps you think they took advantage of this to devour each other?
Not at all; scarcely had they seen the gap, when they both ran back,
each with their tails between their legs. These two dogs are fair
representatives of America and England.”[9]
The language of Earl Russell’s demand and Lord Lyons’s manner of
presenting it were in themselves sufficiently courteous. This feature
of it would be worthy of commendation, if there were nothing else to
be considered in connection with it. The United States government was
to be allowed no opportunity for a full statement of the facts or to
present its own views of the right to make the capture. Behind the
demand was the instruction to Lord Lyons to leave Washington within
a week in the event of the failure of the Federal government to
comply with the British terms; there were the extensive preparations
in England for war; there was the hurrying of several thousand troops
into Canada and the hasty fortification of the frontier of that
province, and lastly the evasive answer Lord Lyons should return, if
he were asked what would be the consequences of a refusal to surrender
the prisoners. These things all foretold with unmistakable clearness
what the consequence would be, if any attempt were made by the United
States to maintain the seizure on the principles of international law
as determined even by British precedents and practice. It meant simply
instant war--a struggle in which England would be actuated by motives
of selfish policy in a much greater degree than by the principle that
she was pretending to uphold and defend. The weavers of Lancashire at
that time were beginning to suffer from a cotton famine, and there
was much impatience from that quarter on account of the continuance
of the civil war in America. It was a struggle in which England had
everything to gain so far as her industrial and material interests were
concerned, for it meant an abundant supply of cotton for Lancashire and
the addition of millions of customers to British markets with all the
advantages which that would confer. To the United States, on the other
hand, such a war meant the loss of everything--the transfer of the
Federal armies to the northern frontier, the raising of the blockade,
the ravaging of unprotected coasts, the bombardment and blockade
of sea coast cities, a probable invasion of the northern states by
British troops from Canada, and last but not least an alliance between
England and the Confederacy--a move which would probably result
in establishing the independence of the latter and the permanent
disseverance of the Union. It was necessary to bear all of these things
in mind while considering the British demand.
Mr. Seward evidently did not expect England to take such a serious
stand in regard to the matter. It had been his belief that the British
government would not want the prisoners.[10] He said on a later
occasion that Lord Lyons’s communication was “our first knowledge that
the British government proposed to make it a question of insult and so
of war.”[11]
Nothing is known of the first private conferences between Secretary
Seward and the president concerning this matter. It is more than
probable, however, in the light of subsequent events, that Mr. Lincoln
foresaw the inevitable at once and hoped only for some method of
escape from the difficulty, without dishonor to the country or loss of
any indirect advantage to the United States which might result from
a compliance with the British demand. He saw, too, the necessity of
making the compliance in such a way that it would be as agreeable as
possible to public opinion throughout the country, which was decidedly
opposed to the surrender of the commissioners. A cabinet meeting was
appointed for December 24, at which it was expected to consider the
demand for the surrender of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. The date of
this meeting was afterward postponed, on account of urgent domestic
affairs, until December 25. It is to be presumed that Mr. Lincoln
gave the matter much earnest consideration during the interval. He
prepared an experimental draft of a dispatch in answer to the one which
had been submitted by Lord Lyons. In his proposed answer Mr. Lincoln
acknowledged the receipt of his lordship’s dispatch, and said that
redress would be due and cheerfully made to England, if the facts as
stated in the British demand were all that bore upon the case. But
such, he said, was not the case; the British side of the matter only
had been presented and the record was incomplete. An unwillingness
to express an opinion was then asserted, inasmuch as the Federal
government had no assurance that its views would be heard or considered
by her majesty’s government. It was then stated that no insult to
the British flag had been intended, neither was it desired to force
any embarrassing question into discussion. Both of these facts were
evident, it was stated, because the seizure had been made without any
instructions whatever from the United States government. The difficulty
incident to a complete undoing of Captain Wilkes’s act, unless it were
wrong or very questionable, was then mentioned and an inquiry made as
to whether the British government would consider the American side
of the question, including the fact of existing insurrection in the
United States; the neutral attitude of England toward the belligerents;
the American citizenship and the traitorous mission of the captured
persons; the British captain’s knowledge of these things when the
commissioners embarked at Havana; the place where the capture was made,
and the bearing of international law and precedent upon the case. It
was then stated that, if the foregoing facts together with any others
pertinent to either side of the case could be submitted, the Federal
government would, if England were willing, cheerfully submit the whole
affair to a peaceable arbitration and would abide the result. The last
paragraph of the proposed dispatch provided that no redress should
exceed in kind and amount that which was already demanded and that the
award should constitute the basis of a rule for the determination of
similar cases between the two nations in future.
When the cabinet meeting to consider the matter was finally held Mr.
Lincoln’s proposed dispatch was not discussed, neither was any similar
proceeding urged. More than half of the days of grace had elapsed and
something must be done quickly else a foreign war would be added to
the domestic one. However desirable arbitration may have been it was
precluded by the nature of the demand of England.
The principal discussion seems to have been devoted to a proposed
dispatch of Secretary Seward by the terms of which the commissioners
were to be surrendered. There may have been some miscellaneous talk
and a discussion of current rumors. Senator Sumner, chairman of the
senate committee on foreign relations, was invited in. One day was not
found sufficient for the consideration of this important matter, and
the session was therefore continued on the following day. Mr. Seward’s
proposed dispatch upon which the surrender was based could not be fully
discussed at one session, as the paper appears to have been prepared
solely by the secretary of state without the assistance of either Mr.
Lincoln or any of his cabinet officers. Of the debate and the various
opinions, we have some record in the subsequent writings of the
different persons who were present.
From the published extracts taken from the diary of Attorney-General
Bates, it appears that there was a full and frank discussion of the
paper of Mr. Seward. All of the members of the cabinet were impressed
with the extraordinary gravity of the situation as probably the fate
of the nation depended on the result of their deliberations. Mr. Bates
himself urged the surrender. Waiving the legal right about which
there was much doubt, he favored compliance with the British demand
on account of the necessity of the case. The country could not afford
to have a war with England, he thought, as that would be to give up
hope of subduing the insurrection; it would ruin trade, bankrupt the
treasury, and bring other calamities. President Lincoln and the other
members were slow to acknowledge these truths.
Mr. Welles has said: “The president was from the first willing to make
concession. Mr. Blair advocated it. Mr. Seward was at the beginning
opposed to any idea of concession which involved giving up the
emissaries, but yielded at once and with dexterity to the peremptory
demand of Great Britain.”[12] In another place Mr. Welles says: “Mr.
Seward should receive credit for the dexterous and skillful dispatch
which he prepared on his change of position. It exhibits his readiness
and peculiar tact and talent to extricate himself from and to pass over
difficulties.”[13]
In private correspondence Mr. Seward afterward said of the matter: “The
consideration of the Trent case was crowded out by pressing domestic
affairs until Christmas day. It was considered on my presentation of
it on the 25th and 26th of December. The government when it took the
subject up had no idea of the grounds upon which it would explain its
action nor did it believe that it would concede the case. Yet it was
heartily unanimous in the actual result after two days examination in
favor of the release. Remember that in a council like ours there are
some strong wills to be reconciled.”[14]
Secretary Chase recorded his own opinion as he gave it in the
discussion. He thought it was too much for the English government to
expect of the United States on that occasion, and that she ought to
overlook the little wrong. He believed that Great Britain did not fully
understand all of the circumstances as did the United States, and if
she did, the surrender of the commissioners would not be expected. If
the conditions were reversed the Federal government would accept the
explanations of the English government, and allow their rebels to be
retained, and he could not help believing that Great Britain would do
likewise were the case fully understood. He continued to discuss the
subject as follows: “But we can not afford delays. While the matter
hangs in uncertainty the public mind will remain disquieted, our
commerce will suffer serious harm, our action against the rebels must
be greatly hindered, and the restoration of our prosperity--largely
identified with that of all nations--must be delayed. Better, then, to
make now the sacrifice of feeling involved in the surrender of these
rebels, than even avoid it by the delays which explanations must
occasion. I give my adhesion, therefore, to the conclusion at which the
secretary of state has arrived. It is gall and wormwood to me. Rather
than consent to the liberation of these men I would rather sacrifice
everything I possess. But I am consoled by the reflection that, while
nothing but severest retribution is due to them, the surrender, under
existing circumstances, is but simply doing right--simply proving
faithful to our own ideas and traditions under strong temptations to
violate them--simply giving to England and the world the most signal
proof that the American nation will not under any circumstances,
for the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, commit even a
technical wrong against neutrals.”[15]
The main reason for hesitation was doubtless the fear of public opinion
in the North. It was certain that a surrender of the commissioners
would bring the displeasure of the people upon the government, which
would be accused of having timidly submitted to the unjust demands
of England. Statesmen greatly dislike to act under what appears to
be menace or dictation from a foreign power. The cabinet discussion
ended, however, as has been stated already by two of the members, in
a unanimous agreement upon the letter of reply which the secretary
of state had prepared. This communication proposed a surrender upon
diplomatic reasons which were apparently a triumph of the American
principle.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. Congressional Globe: Pt. I, 2d Sess., 37th Cong.
2. Diary of Events, Moore’s Rebellion Record, Vol. III.
3. Magazine of American History, March, 1886, and June, 1886.
4. McPherson’s Political History of the Rebellion, p. 343.
5. Nicolay and Hay: Life of Lincoln, Vol. V.
6. Paris, Comte de: The Civil War in America.
7. Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause.
8. Principal American Newspapers, December, 1861.
9. Southern Law Review, Vol. VIII.
10. Weed, Thurlow: Life of, Vol. II.
11. Welles, Gideon: Lincoln and Seward.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] C. K. Tuckerman in Magazine of American History, June, 1886.
[2] Congressional Globe, Dec. 26, 1861.
[3] Mr. Vallandigham’s sincerity may well be doubted. His purpose was
probably to embarrass the government.
[4] Indianapolis Sentinel, Dec. 7, 1861.
[5] Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. II, p. 410.
[6] Pollard, p. 196.
[7] Tuckerman, Magazine American History, June, 1886.
[8] Magazine of American History, June, 1886.
[9] Comte de Paris, Civil War in America, pp. 470-1.
[10] Welles’s Lincoln and Seward, p. 186.
[11] Seward to Weed, March 7, 1862.
[12] Lincoln and Seward by Gideon Welles, I, p. 188.
[13] Ibid, p. 185.
[14] Seward to Weed, Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. II, p. 409.
[15] Warden’s Life of Chase, pp. 393-394.