THE BRITISH DEMAND.
It was well understood in England that Messrs. Mason and Slidell had
been commissioned to represent the Confederacy at London and Paris
respectively. The difficulties incident to their departure from a
blockaded port and the anxiety of the Federal government to prevent the
success of their mission were also well known.
An English writer, after giving a brief account of the escape of
the commissioners in a blockade-runner, says: “It was correctly
assumed that they would embark at Havana on the Trent, a West Indian
mail steamer, and travel in her to Europe; it was believed that the
government of the United States had issued orders for intercepting the
Trent and for capturing the envoys; and it was noticed that a Federal
man-of-war had arrived at Falmouth and after coaling had proceeded to
Southampton. Lord Russell laid these facts before the law officers, and
was advised that a United States man-of-war falling in with a British
mail steamer would have the right to board her, open her mail bags,
examine their contents, and, if the steamer should prove liable to
confiscation for carrying dispatches from the enemy, put a prize crew
on board and carry her to a port of the United States for adjudication.
In that case the law officers thought she might, and in their opinion
she ought to, disembark the passengers on the mail steamer at some
convenient port. But they added ‘she would have no right to remove
Messrs. Mason and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the
ship to pursue her voyage.’ A few days before the law officers gave
this opinion, the San Jacinto, an American war steamer, intercepted the
Trent and did the very thing which the law officers had advised she had
no right to do.”[1]
As soon as Commander Williams landed in England he was sent to London
in hot haste on a special train in order to report the circumstances
to the government without any delay. After arriving there he spent the
remainder of that day and part of the night at the British foreign
office making an official report to Premier Palmerston and the lords
commissioners of the admiralty.
The facts as reported by Commander Williams were immediately submitted
to the crown law officers, who, after a brief consideration of the
matter, reported that the seizure of the commissioners was entirely
illegal and not sanctioned by the law of nations.[2]
The case was then considered by the cabinet, and, on November 29, only
two days after the news of the boarding of the Trent and seizure of
the envoys had reached England, Lord Palmerston prepared a note to
the queen in which he formulated a statement of a demand to be made at
once upon the American government. He wrote to her majesty as follows:
“The general outline and tenor which appeared to meet the opinions of
the cabinet would be, that the Washington government should be told
that what has been done is a violation of international law and of the
rights of Great Britain, and that your majesty’s government trust that
the act will be disavowed and the prisoners set free and restored to
British protection, and that Lord Lyons should be instructed that, if
this demand is refused, he should retire from the United States.”[3]
A copy of the proposed dispatch to Lord Lyons was also forwarded to
her majesty, who, with Prince Albert, carefully examined it. Both were
profoundly impressed by the fact that the communication indicated a
crisis in the affairs of the two countries and that a speedy rupture
and war were not improbable. Illness and the serious character of this
new political question made it impossible for the prince to sleep
during the following night. Upon getting up, although scarcely able
to hold a pen while writing, he prepared a memorandum of the changes
which her majesty desired to have made in the dispatch to America.
The queen preferred that language should be used which was less harsh
and offensive in character than that contained in the first draft
of the note to the American government. In its uncorrected form the
draft of the note not only charged the violation of international law
but added an accusation of “wanton insult,” although the belief was
asserted that it was not intentional. Prince Albert’s memorandum,
corrected with the queen’s own hand, was returned, and the dispatch
which was subsequently forwarded to Lord Lyons shows that her majesty’s
suggestions were fully observed. This was the prince’s last political
writing. His illness grew worse and he died before the communication
which he and the queen had aided in preparing was answered by the
American government.
The prince’s memorandum, as corrected by the queen and returned by her
to the ministry, was as follows: “The queen returns these important
drafts which upon the whole she approves, but she can not help
feeling that the main draft--that for communication to the American
government--is somewhat meagre. She would have liked to have seen
the expression of a hope that the American captain did not act under
instructions, or, if he did that he misapprehended--that the United
States government must be fully aware that the British government
could not allow its flag to be insulted and the security of its mail
communications to be placed in jeopardy, and her majesty’s government
are unwilling to believe that the United States government intended
wantonly to put an insult upon this country, and to add to their many
distressing complications by forcing a question of dispute upon us; and
that we are, therefore, glad to believe that upon a full consideration
of the circumstances of the undoubted breach of international law
committed, they would spontaneously offer such redress as alone
would satisfy this country, viz., the restoration of the unfortunate
passengers and a suitable apology.”[4]
Having received this memorandum from the queen, Earl Russell
immediately prepared dispatches for Lord Lyons at Washington
instructing his lordship to make certain demands of the American
government and ordering him what to do in case they were refused. The
text of the one containing the demands to be made was as follows:
“FOREIGN OFFICE, Nov. 30, 1861.
“MY LORD--Intelligence of a very grave nature has reached her
majesty’s government.
“This intelligence was conveyed officially to the knowledge of
the admiralty by Commander Williams, agent for mails on board the
contract steamer Trent.
“It appears from the letter of Commander Williams, dated ‘Royal Mail
Contract Packet Trent, at sea, November 9,’ that the Trent left
Havana on the 7th instant, with her majesty’s mails for England,
having on board numerous passengers. Commander Williams states that
shortly after noon, on the 8th, a steamer having the appearance of a
man-of-war, but not showing colors, was observed ahead. On nearing
her, at 1:15 P. M., she fired a round shot from her pivot-gun across
the bows of the Trent and showed American colors. While the Trent was
approaching her slowly, the American vessel discharged a shell across
the bows of the Trent exploding half a cable’s length ahead of her.
The Trent then stopped, and an officer with a large armed guard of
marines boarded her. The officer demanded a list of the passengers,
and, compliance with this demand being refused, the officer said he
had orders to arrest Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis,
and that he had sure information of their being passengers in the
Trent. While some parley was going on upon this matter, Mr. Slidell
stepped forward and told the American officer that the four persons
he had named were then standing before him. The commander of the
Trent and Commander Williams protested against the act of taking
by force out of the Trent these four passengers, then under the
protection of the British flag. But the San Jacinto was at that
time only two hundred yards from the Trent, her ship’s company at
quarters, her ports open and tompions out. Resistance was therefore
out of the question and the four gentlemen before named were forcibly
taken out of the ship. A further demand was made that the commander
of the Trent should proceed on board the San Jacinto, but he said he
would not go unless forcibly compelled likewise, and this demand was
not insisted upon.
“It thus appears that certain individuals have been forcibly taken
from on board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while
such vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage--an act of
violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of
international law.
“Her majesty’s government, bearing in mind the friendly relations
which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United
States, are willing to believe that the United States naval officer
who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any
authority from his government, or that if he conceived himself to
be so authorized he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had
received. For the government of the United States must be fully aware
that the British government could not allow such an affront to the
national honor to pass without full reparation, and her majesty’s
government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate
intention of the government of the United States unnecessarily to
force into discussion between the two governments a question of so
grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation
would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling.
“Her majesty’s government, therefore, trust that when this matter
shall have been brought under the consideration of the government
of the United States that government will, of its own accord, offer
to the British government such redress as alone could satisfy the
British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and
their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be
placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the
aggression which has been committed.
“Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose
them to him.
“You are at liberty to read this dispatch to the secretary of state,
and, if he shall desire it, you will give him a copy of it.
I am, etc., RUSSELL.”
It will be noticed that this communication is in all respects a model
of brevity, precision and clearness. The matter to be considered
is directly approached and all facts of whatever kind that are not
absolutely necessary to his lordship’s view of the case are omitted.
The citizenship of the captured persons is not even hinted at, nor is
anything said about the nature of their mission. No use is made of the
term “confederate” or “rebel.” There is no discussion of the principles
of international law bearing upon the case, no reference to texts or
precedents, no statement of the rights of belligerents among themselves
or their relations to neutral nations. The fact that a great civil war
was then raging in the United States, and that the hostile sections of
the country were then in belligerent attitudes toward each other is
nowhere mentioned in the paper. It is denuded of almost every statement
that one would expect to find in such a diplomatic communication.
His lordship contents himself with a statement of the main facts in
Commander Williams’s official report, after which he presents simply
the naked idea of four individuals having been forcibly taken from a
British ship which was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage from one
neutral port to another, on the high seas and not within the municipal
jurisdiction of the United States. The simple act of doing this
constitutes a violation of the law of nations, and is “an affront to
the British flag.” The only measure of redress which will atone for the
act is then dictated by Lord Russell, and that is the complete undoing
of Captain Wilkes’s act by liberating “the four gentlemen,” delivering
them to Lord Lyons so that they might be placed again under British
protection, and apologizing for what had been done.
On the same day that the foregoing dispatch was prepared, Earl Russell
also addressed a second communication to Lord Lyons. It was a private
letter in which the intentions of the British government could be
easily read between the lines. It meant either reparation or an
alternative of a very serious character. The following is the body of
the letter: “In my previous dispatch of this date I have instructed you
by command of her majesty, to make certain demands of the government
of the United States.
“Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful
matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay
not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is
given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with
the demands of her majesty’s government, your lordship is instructed
to leave Washington with all the members of your legation and repair
immediately to London. If, however, you should be of the opinion that
the requirements of her majesty’s government are substantially complied
with, you may report the facts to her majesty’s government for their
consideration and remain at your post until you receive further orders.
“You will communicate with Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne immediately upon
receiving the answer of the American government, and you will send him
a copy of that answer, together with such observations as you may think
fit to make.
“You will also give all the information in your power to the governors
of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Jamaica, Bermuda and such other
of her majesty’s possessions as may be within your reach.”
The indecent haste and manifest unfairness of the whole proceeding,
as well as the bombast and implied threats toward the United States
contained in the private note, seem to have slightly impressed even
the Earl Russell, for on the same day he addressed a second private
note to Lord Lyons as follows: “My wish would be that at your first
interview with Mr. Seward you should not take my dispatch with you, but
should prepare him for it and ask him to settle it with the president
and cabinet what course they will pursue. The next time you should
bring my dispatch and read it to him fully. If he asks what will be
the consequence of his refusing compliance I think you should say that
you wish to leave him and the president quite free to take their own
course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace.”
This last diplomatic note clearly reveals the motives and policy of the
British government in the whole proceeding. It was publicly to browbeat
and menace the United States by a parade of their military power and
a threat of war, and, at the same time, privately to pave the way for
getting out of the difficulty without a resort to arms.
The messenger of the British government arrived in Washington and
delivered Earl Russell’s dispatches to Lord Lyons on December 18.
On the afternoon of the 19th, in accordance with his instructions,
his lordship waited on Mr. Seward at the department of state and
acquainted him in general terms with the nature of Earl Russell’s
dispatch demanding reparation, adding at the same time that he hoped
the government of the United States would of its own accord offer the
desired reparation, and that it was to facilitate such an arrangement
that he had come without any sort of written demand.
Mr. Seward received this communication seriously but without
manifesting dissatisfaction. He then made some inquiries concerning
the exact character of the dispatch and requested that he be given
until the next day to consider the matter and to communicate with the
president. On the day after, he said that he would be prepared to give
an opinion concerning the matters presented to him at that interview.
When Lord Lyons made his next call upon Mr. Seward he brought with
him, and formally read to the secretary, the dispatch containing Earl
Russell’s demand.
Only seven days’ grace were allowed from the time when the matter was
first presented. Two of these had now gone, and if the demand were
complied with, it must be done with promptness, otherwise the doors of
the British legation would be closed and diplomatic relations between
the two countries suspended.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. British Annual Register, 1861.
2. Martin, Theodore: Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. V.
3. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion.
4. Nicolay and Hay: Life of Lincoln.
5. Southern Law Review, Vol. VIII.
6. Walpole, Spencer: Life of Lord John Russell.
7. The Union and Confederate Navies, official records of, Series I,
Vol. I.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Spencer Walpole’s Life of John Russell, Vol. II, pp. 344-5.
[2] The authority for this statement is a letter from the Rt. Hon. Earl
of Kimberly, her majesty’s secretary for foreign affairs, in response
to an inquiry addressed to him by the author.
[3] Martin’s Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. V, p. 420.
[4] Martin’s Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. V, p. 422.