THE FIRST EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDERATES FOR RECOGNITION ABROAD.
From the very moment when secession began to be contemplated by the
southern leaders, it was evident that they confidently expected foreign
aid, both moral and material, in their efforts to establish their
independence. A comparatively large and mutually profitable commerce
had been carried on for many years between the South and the nations
of western Europe. An exaggerated idea of the importance of this
trade had impressed itself upon the minds of the secession leaders.
They evidently believed that England would aid them in a war for
independence rather than sustain the loss and inconvenience which would
be caused by a destruction of the cotton trade.
While secession was under consideration, Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, United
States senator from Louisiana and afterward Confederate secretary of
state, addressed a letter to the British consul at New York in which
very strong bids were made for English aid and sympathy. Mr. Benjamin
gave it as his opinion that, under certain conditions, the southern
states might be induced to secede and resume their former allegiance
to the British crown as a dependent province.[1]
South Carolina was the first state to summon a secession convention,
and in the discussion which took place while that body was in session,
one of the delegates said: “We have it on high authority that the
representative of one of the imperial powers of Europe, in view of this
prospective separation from the Union, has made propositions in advance
for the establishment of such relations between it and the government
about to be established in this state as will insure to that power such
a supply of cotton for the future as an increasing demand for that
article will require.”[2]
After the secession of Georgia, Mr. Iverson, a United States senator
from that state, said in his farewell speech to the senate: “You may
have ships of war and we may have none. You may blockade our ports and
lock up our commerce. We can live, if need be, without commerce. But
when you shut out our cotton from the looms of Europe, we shall see
whether other nations will not have something to say and something to
do on that subject. Cotton is king, and it will find means to raise
your blockade and disperse your ships.”[3]
Senator John Slidell, of Louisiana, after the secession of his state,
made a speech in the senate before his withdrawal, in which he said:
“How long, think you, will the great powers of Europe permit you to
impede their free intercourse with their best customers for their
various fabrics and to stop the supplies of the great staple which is
the most important basis of their manufacturing industry, by a mere
paper blockade?”[4]
One of the first things done by the Confederate congress after its
organization at Montgomery in February, 1861, was to adopt resolutions
that steps be immediately taken to send agents abroad for the purpose
of presenting the cause of the new Confederacy to the governments of
Europe. Very soon, therefore, after Jefferson Davis was installed in
office, he appointed as foreign agents Messrs. William L. Yancey, of
Alabama; Dudley Mann, of Virginia; P. A. Rost, of Louisiana, and T.
Butler King, of Georgia. Early in March these gentlemen proceeded to
their destination by way of New Orleans and Havana. They were empowered
to secure the recognition of Confederate independence by European
nations and to conclude treaties of amity and commerce with them.
Yancey and Mann were to operate chiefly in England; Rost and King in
France, although other countries were to be visited.
None of these men appear to have possessed any ability as diplomatists.
Mr. Yancey was the leading spirit among them. He was a brilliant
and polished speaker, ready and dexterous in controversy, sarcastic
beyond expression, and extremely unscrupulous. He wrote a letter for
publication in June, 1859, in which he declared that the will of
the slave-holding states themselves and not the Federal government
should determine whether the African slave trade should be carried
on or not. He also added that the matter ought to be submitted to
that kind of a tribunal only and by its decision alone should the
southern people abide. He was one of the first men in the South to
counsel secession. At a speech made early in January, 1860, he said:
“But in the presidential contest a black Republican may be elected.
If this dire event should happen, in my opinion, the only hope for
safety for the South is a withdrawal from the Union before he shall
be inaugurated--before the sword and the treasury of the Federal
government shall be placed in the keeping of that party.” Mr. Mann was
only a dull statistician whose ability was very limited. Mr. King was
a typical southern planter, the owner of a large number of slaves. Mr.
Rost was a French adventurer who had drifted to Louisiana in early
life, married a wealthy woman, studied law and was elected to a place
on the bench of the supreme court of his state. All of these men had
been noted for craft and duplicity in the management of affairs in
their own limited spheres at home, but none of them possessed any of
the requisites of a real diplomat. They failed to obtain any official
recognition either for themselves or for their government.
Early in May, 1861, Mr. Dallas, the American minister at London, said
in a communication to Mr. Seward: “He (Lord Russell) told me that the
three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were here, that he
had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so unofficially.”[5]
Two days later his lordship received Messrs. Yancey, Rost and Mann in
an unofficial way and listened to their appeal for recognition. They
entered into an exhaustive discussion of the causes which led the
South to secede and presented the advantages for commerce which a
recognition of their independence would secure to England. They called
special attention to the fact that the Federal government levied a
high tariff on all imports, while the constitution of the Confederate
States entirely prohibited all protective duties. They said that about
three-fourths of the annual imports from England were bought by the
South. They also emphasized the fact that their constitution prohibited
the African slave trade.
Lord Russell replied that he did not then deem it expedient to
consider the question of recognition, that the Confederacy must first
demonstrate its ability to maintain its position as an independent
state, and that it must be shown in what manner relations were to be
maintained with foreign nations.
On August 14, 1861, the same commissioners addressed a long
communication to Lord Russell, in which extended reasons were given
for the immediate recognition of the Confederacy by her majesty’s
government. To this communication his lordship returned a reply that
was unsatisfactory to the Confederate agents.
When Mr. Seward learned, through Mr. Dallas’s communication, of Lord
Russell’s proposed unofficial reception of the commissioners, he took
very strong grounds against it. In a letter to Mr. Adams, who had in
the meantime succeeded Mr. Dallas as minister to England, Mr. Seward
said: “The president regrets that Mr. Dallas did not protest against
the proposed unofficial intercourse between the British government and
the missionaries of the insurgents. Intercourse of any kind with the
so-called commissioners is liable to be construed as a recognition of
the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none
the less hurtful to us for being called unofficial, and it might be
even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what
points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is
useless and meaningless, if it is not expected to ripen into official
intercourse, and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether
the proposed unofficial intercourse has as yet actually begun. Your
antecedent instructions are deemed explicit enough, and it is hoped
that you have not misunderstood them. You will in any event desist from
all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official, with the
British government so long as it shall continue intercourse of either
kind with the domestic enemies of this country. When intercourse shall
have been arrested for this cause, you will communicate with this
department and receive further instructions.”[6]
In response to a complimentary toast offered at a dinner of the
Fishmonger’s Society in London early in November, 1861, Mr. Yancey,
acting as spokesman for the Confederate agents, said: “In defense of
their liberties and sovereign independence, the Confederate States and
people are united and resolute. They are invaded by a power numbering
twenty millions, yet for eight months has the Confederate government
successfully resisted, aye, repelled invasion along a military frontier
of a thousand miles. Though cut off by blockade from all foreign trade,
their internal resources have been adequate to the equipment and
maintenance in the field of an army of over 250,000 troops. Can all
this be and yet these six millions of whites be divided? The idea is
preposterous.
“They can maintain their independence intact by their own strength. As
to their recognition by the powers of the world, that of course they
desire. They are a people, a nation, exhibiting elements of power which
few states of the world possess. But they have no reason to complain,
nor do they feel aggrieved because these great powers see fit to
defer their formal recognition and reception into the great family of
nations. However they may differ from them as to the period when their
recognition shall take place, they fully understand that such action is
purely a question to be determined by those countries each for itself
and with reference to its own interests and views of public policy.”[7]
Strenuous efforts were made to secure recognition in other European
countries, especially in France. Mr. King’s operations were
confined chiefly to that country. In June, 1861, he addressed a
long communication to the French minister of commerce in which the
commercial claims of the Confederacy to direct relations with Europe
were set forth. It was in the form of a pamphlet printed in French and
addressed to the minister of commerce. The real intent, however, was
to prepare a document for universal circulation in Europe in order to
gain friendship and sympathy for the southern cause, especially among
the wealthier classes of manufacturers and merchants. Neither sound
logic nor honest argument were exhibited in this address. Facts and
figures were woven together in such a way as to appear like a complete
argument of justification, and it doubtless made many friends for the
South among those whose information was not broad enough to enable
them to see its fallacies and ingenious falsehoods. Mr. King practiced
whatever of duplicity he thought would be of advantage to himself and
his cause. Thus, he acted while in Europe as a commissioner from the
state of Georgia, yet it has been proved conclusively from captured
correspondence of his that he was a sort of general assistant to the
whole band of Confederate agents abroad.
Concerning the labors of these representatives, Jefferson Davis has
said: “Our efforts for the recognition of the Confederate States by the
European powers, in 1861, served to make us better known abroad, to
awaken a kindly feeling in our favor, and cause a respectful regard for
the effort we were making to maintain the independence of the states
which Great Britain had recognized, and her people knew to be our
birthright.”[8]
It was well, perhaps, for the peace of Europe in 1861, and certainly
most fortunate for the interests of the northern states, that the
sophistries of the southerners did not induce any European nation
to recognize the independence of the Confederate States, and open a
direct communication with them. This would have been an interference in
American domestic affairs which the Federal government would not have
tolerated even though it had led to a war between the United States
and the recognizing power. Mr. Seward meant as much when he said that
if England determined to recognize, she might as well prepare to enter
into an alliance with the insurgents. Indeed, it is highly probable
that one of the chief motives which induced the Confederate government
to seek recognition abroad with such persistance and determination was
a hope that the United States would become involved in a foreign war as
a consequence. It was doubtless thought that such a result would enable
them to form a foreign alliance--a measure which would have greatly
improved their prospects for independence.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. American Annual Cyclopedia, 1861.
2. Congressional Globe: Part I, 2d Session 36th Congress.
3. Davis, Jefferson: The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government.
4. Diplomatic Correspondence with Great Britain, 1861.
5. Draper, J. W.: History of the American Civil War.
6. Foote’s War of the Rebellion.
7. London Globe, Nov. 12, 1861.
8. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America.
9. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion.
10. Senate Ex. Doc.: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. I.
11. Victor, O. J.: History of the Southern Rebellion.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. II, pp. 313-314.
[2] Draper’s Civil War in America, Vol. II, p. 501.
[3] Congressional Globe, Jan. 28, 1861.
[4] Congressional Globe, Feb. 4, 1861.
[5] Mr. Dallas to Mr. Seward, May 2, 1861.
[6] Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, May 21, 1861.
[7] London Globe, Nov. 12, 1861.
[8] Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. I, p. 469.