JAMES MURRAY MASON AND JOHN SLIDELL--THE NATURE AND MERITS OF THEIR
MISSION.
The first agents of the South had spent seven months in Europe without
accomplishing anything. It became painfully evident to the Confederacy
that those who were then representing its interests abroad would
never be able to secure for it the much desired recognition of its
independence. Although disappointed at this failure, Mr. Davis was
not disheartened, but determined to try the effect of a second and
much more formal mission, in which the interests of the Confederate
government would be represented by men of much more ability and force
of character than those who had been sent in the first instance. The
new representatives were to be duly commissioned as “ambassadors” for
the Confederate States. Their proposed work abroad was thought to be
of vital importance to the interests of the Confederacy. After due
consideration of the matter, therefore, Messrs. James Murray Mason,
of Virginia, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, were selected for this
employment and credentials duly furnished them by which the former
was to represent the Confederate States in England, and the latter in
France.
Mr. James M. Mason was a Virginian whose name was historic. His family
had been distinguished in the history of his state from the earliest
colonial times, and Mr. Mason himself was a man of great personal mark,
possessing ability of the highest order. He had represented Virginia
in the United States senate for years prior to the secession of that
state. He had been chairman of the senate committee on foreign affairs
and was the author of the fugitive slave law. Indeed an examination of
his senatorial record shows that he never lost an opportunity to dilate
upon the fugitive slave question. The failure or refusal of citizens
of the free states to apprehend and return to their masters runaway
slaves that were constantly escaping from Virginia was to Mr. Mason a
grievance of unexampled proportions. On the first day that congress
convened again after the John Brown raid, Senator Mason introduced a
resolution of inquiry into the facts attending the invasion and seizure
of Harper’s Ferry, Virginia: “whether such invasion and seizure was
made under color of any organization intended to subvert the government
of any of the states of the Union; what was the character and extent of
such organization; and whether any citizens of the United States not
present were implicated therein or accessory thereto by contributions
of money, arms, munitions or otherwise; what was the character and
extent of the military equipment in the hands or under the control of
said armed band and where and how and when the same was obtained and
transported to the place so invaded.”[1] This resolution was evidently
intended to fix the responsibility for the John Brown raid where it
did not belong, viz., upon the Republican party in the northern states.
Mr. Mason was one of the first to advocate the secession of Virginia.
A powerful minority in that state opposed the movement, and it was
not without considerable opposition that the secessionists triumphed.
The convention called to consider the question of seceding passed an
ordinance withdrawing the state from the Union, provided the measure
be approved by the people of Virginia at a special election called
to decide the matter. Some ten days before the election Mr. Mason
published a letter which was widely circulated giving his views with
regard to the act of secession, which, he declared, “withdrew the state
of Virginia from the Union with all the consequences resulting from the
separation,” and nullified “all the constitution and laws of the United
States within its limits.” He thought Virginia could not afford to
reject the secession ordinance at the coming election, and said: “If it
be asked what those shall do who can not in conscience vote to separate
Virginia from the United States, the answer is simple and plain. Honor
and duty alike require that they should not vote on the question, and
if they retain such opinions they must leave the state.”[2] This was
meant to encourage intimidation of the loyal people throughout the
state, and the history of the time shows that such advice was not given
in vain.
Mr. John Slidell, of Louisiana, had also been known in public life
previous to the civil war. A native of New York, he had in early life
become a citizen of Louisiana, where he had married an accomplished
French Creole lady. He entered public life in 1842, being elected to
the house of representatives.
Mr. Slidell represented Louisiana in the United States senate when
his state seceded from the Union. His withdrawal speech was bitter in
the extreme. The following is an extract from it: “We have no idea
that you will even attempt to invade our soil with your armies; but we
acknowledge your superiority on the sea, at present, in some degree
accidental, but in the main, natural and permanent, until we shall
have acquired better ports for our marine. You may, if you will it,
persist in considering us bound to you during your good pleasure;
you may deny the sacred and indefeasible right, we will not say of
secession, but of revolution--aye, of rebellion, if you choose so to
call our action--the right of every people to establish for itself
that form of government which it may, even in its folly, if such you
deem it, consider best calculated to secure its safety and promote its
welfare. You may ignore the principles of our immortal Declaration of
Independence; you may attempt to reduce us to subjection, or you may,
under color of enforcing your laws or collecting your revenue, blockade
our ports. This will be war and we shall meet it with different but
equally efficient weapons. We will not permit the consumption or
introduction of any of your manufactures; every sea will swarm with
our volunteer militia of the ocean, with the striped bunting floating
over their heads, for we do not mean to give up that flag without a
bloody struggle; it is ours as much as yours; and although for a time
more stars may shine on your banner, our children, if not we, will
rally under a constellation more numerous and more resplendent than
yours. You may smile at this as an impotent boast, at least for the
present, if not for the future, but, if we need ships and men for
privateering, we shall be amply supplied from the same sources as
now almost exclusively furnish the means for carrying on, with such
unexampled vigor, the African slave trade--New York and New England.
Your mercantile marine must either sail under foreign flags or rot at
your wharves.”
“You were,” continued Mr. Slidell, “with all the wealth and resources
of this great Confederacy, but a fourth or fifth rate naval power,
with capacities, it is true, for large, and in a just quarrel almost
indefinite expansion. What will you do when not merely emasculated by
the withdrawal of fifteen states, but warred upon by them with active
and inveterate hostility?”[3]
Perhaps enough has been said of these men to convey an adequate
idea of the character and motives of each of them. Both were ultra
secessionists, active, talented and with sufficient ability to do all
that could be done for their cause in Europe.
The object of the mission of Mason and Slidell to Europe was to secure,
if possible, the recognition of the independence of the Confederate
government by the respective states to which they were accredited;
to effect alliances or to conclude treaties of commerce or amity; to
procure the intervention of France and England, if their government
so desired; to neutralize and defeat any diplomatic measures of the
United States in Europe; to serve the financial and military needs of
the insurgent government by procuring foreign loans, securing munitions
of war, granting commissions, and, in short, to aid the Confederacy by
every means in their power.
The United States was most fortunate at this time in having all of her
foreign affairs in the hands of men who possessed more than ordinary
ability as diplomats. Mr. Seward had early anticipated the work of all
Confederate agents abroad and sent to each United States minister,
accredited to any country which he thought would be applied to by
insurgent missionaries, a carefully prepared letter of instructions
containing an outline of the arguments to be used in thwarting the
efforts of the southern representatives. The instructions given to Mr.
Adams were, perhaps, the most careful and extended of any.
Mr. Seward thought the agents of the Confederates would not appeal
to the magnanimity or justice of Great Britain, but rather to her
cupidity and caprice; that they would ask recognition as a measure of
retaliation against the Morrill tariff.
In response he thought it would be well to argue that every state has
a right to regard its own convenience only in framing its revenue
laws; that a recognition of the Confederacy would be equivalent to a
deliberate resolve on the part of her majesty’s government that the
American Union which had so long constituted a single prosperous nation
should be permanently dissolved and forever cease to exist; that the
excuse for so doing would be only a change in the American revenue
laws--a change that in its very nature could be only temporary and
ephemeral because of public sentiment in the United States which in
a brief time would probably demand a change; that as a retaliatory
measure recognition would be out of all proportion to the temporary
disadvantage created by the revenue law; that a magnanimous nation
which desired to retaliate could find other and more friendly remedies
for foreign legislation that was injurious without deliberately seeking
to destroy the offending nation. Mr. Seward thought that England should
not be in haste to assume that the Confederate States would offer
more liberal facilities for trade than the United States would be
disposed to concede; that it might be well to wait and see whether the
best terms of the South would be any more desirable than those which
the North could offer. Attention was also to be called to the fact
that absolute free trade had always existed among the several states
of the Union, which was in effect free trade throughout the largest
habitable part of North America; that during the entire national
period of American history, except brief intervals that did not affect
the result, constantly increasing liberality in commercial relations
with foreign nations had been the policy of the United States; that
these advances had been made necessarily, because with an increasing
liberality the Federal government had, at the same time, owing to
controlling causes, continually augmented its revenues and the whole
country had increased its productions; and finally that it was quite
evident that no different course would be followed in the future. It
was also to be noted that the Confederate States might not be able to
continue for any length of time the proposed commercial liberality
which they proffered as an equivalent for recognition, since such
liberality implied that peace must continuously exist and that trade
relations would not be disturbed. If war rather than peace should
mark the existence of the new government, there would be very strong
temptations to levy an import duty since that would be one of their
chief means of raising much needed revenue. It was further affirmed
that only a limited examination of commercial statistics was sufficient
to show that while the chief American exports to European countries
were staples of the Confederate States, yet a very large proportion
of the fabrics and products from abroad which were consumed in those
states were obtained and must continue to be obtained not from Europe
but from the northern states of America, and that the chief consumption
of European goods imported into the United States took place in the
same northern states; that the great features of that commerce could
not be modified by the action of either the Confederate congress or the
British parliament, since its composite character was due to the great
variety of soils and climates of a continent, as well as the various
institutions, customs and dispositions of the numerous communities
living upon it. Mr. Seward was also of opinion that the Morrill tariff
would not diminish the amount of English goods consumed in the United
States, since the American people were active, energetic, industrious,
inventive and not penurious, and they were engaged in developing a
practically new continent of unlimited natural resources. This in his
opinion caused both individual and public wealth to increase daily,
and with such increase grew the habit of liberal if not profuse
expenditure--results which no revenue legislation could change other
than to vary the character and not the amount and value of foreign
imports.
Mr. Adams was also advised to say that Great Britain was committed to a
policy of industry and peace rather than of ambition and war; that such
a policy had undoubtedly brought the best results to her as a nation;
and that continued success in this career required peace throughout the
civilized world and especially on this continent. “Recognition by her
of the so-called Confederate States,” continued Mr. Seward, “would be
intervention and war in this country. Permanent dismemberment of the
American Union in consequence of that intervention would be perpetual
war--civil war. The new Confederacy which Great Britain would have
aided into existence would, like any other new state, seek to expand
itself northward, westward and southward. What part of the continent or
of the adjacent islands would be expected to remain in peace? President
Lincoln would not for a moment believe that upon consideration of mere
financial gain that government could be induced to lend its aid to a
revolution designed to overthrow the institutions of this country and
involving ultimately the destruction of the liberties of the American
people.”
Another point to be noted was that recognition of the independence of a
new state was the highest possible exercise of sovereign power, because
it might result in establishing the new nation among the powers of
earth--a result often fraught with grave consequences to other nations
and to the peace of the world; that such a use of sovereign power
should be made with greater prudence and caution in American than in
European affairs, since its effects could not fail to be more serious.
That principle of international law was also invoked which regards
nations as moral persons, bound so to act toward each other that not
only the least injury but the most good-will be done. It was held that
this great principle of international law would be reduced to the
merest abstraction, too refined for an enlightened nation to practice,
if recognition were granted to the Confederacy.
Lastly, Mr. Adams was instructed to remind the British government
that the empire over which it ruled was made up of an aggregation of
divers communities covering a large portion of the earth and including
one-fifth of its total population; that many of its possessions were
held by ties no stronger than those which held together the Federal
Union; that a time would come when the strength of those bonds would be
put to a severe test by insurrection or otherwise; and to conclude by
asking whether it would be wise on that occasion to set so dangerous
a precedent or to pursue such a course as might invoke the future
retaliation of a powerful state.
Such were the arguments as they were outlined for the use of Mr. Adams
in answering the expected appeal of the Confederate agents for the
recognition of their government. They afford a thorough analysis of the
whole matter. Every possible argument for recognition is fairly stated,
fully discussed, and a logical conclusion reached. They are amply
sufficient to convince any candid mind that not a single valid reason
existed for recognizing the Confederacy, and that the mission of Mason
and Slidell deserved only failure.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. Appleton’s Cyclopedia of American Biography.
2. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress.
3. Congressional Globe: Part 1, 1st Session 36th Congress and Part 1,
2d Session 36th Congress.
4. Dana’s Wheaton’s International Law, note, pp. 653-6.
5. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861.
6. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America.
7. Senate Ex. Doc.: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. I.
8. Winchester Virginian, May 16, 1861.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Congressional Globe, Dec., 1859.
[2] Letter to the Winchester Virginian, May 16, 1861.
[3] Congressional Globe, Feb. 4, 1861.