June, and crossed the Tugela at Middle Drift on the same day. On the
29th, leaving his ox-transport to ascend Krantzkop mountain during
the afternoon and following morning, he reached Elandskop at noon.
Unable to march before noon on the 30th, because of the transport, the
column nevertheless succeeded in arriving at Thring's Post early on
the 2nd July, _i.e._ a few hours after Woolls-Sampson had come in from
Zululand. He was thereupon joined by C squadron, N.C. (which had, for
about five weeks, served as bodyguard to O.C. Troops), as well as by
squadron D of the same regiment.[284]
Thus, between 27th June (day of the action at Peyana) and the 2nd July,
the situation in Mapumulo division had so far changed that, instead of
less than 200 troops being in the district, there were over 2,500 at
Thring's Post, and 500 with Barker at Esidumbini.
In addition to the steps taken to cope with the situation in that part
of the Colony, and to Mansel being posted in the neighbourhood of
Isiwasamanqe in Zululand, Dick was ordered to proceed with the N.R.
direct to Mapumulo, leaving half a company to garrison Krantzkop,
whilst the detachment of N.R.R., then at Krantzkop, was ordered to
Greytown.
The Chief Leader at Krantzkop got orders to mobilize at once the First,
Second and Third Reserves.
The detachment of D.L.I. at Pomeroy was sent to Ndwedwe viâ Verulam.
The posts at Fort Wales and Sibindi in Umsinga division were evacuated,
the N.R.R., up to then garrisoning those places, moving to Pomeroy to
replace the D.L.I.
The detachment of D.L.I. at Melmoth proceeded to Eshowe and from there,
with as many others of the D.L.I. as could be spared by O.C. Eshowe,
went to join their regiment at Bond's Drift.
Whilst camped at Otimati, Mackay decided to send a Native spy to
Meseni's principal kraal with the object of finding out as much as
he could about the movements, strength and intentions of the enemy.
Nkantolo, the man in question, left at 4 a.m. on the 2nd. He rejoined
Mackay's column at Thring's Post at 9 p.m. the same day, to report
that, disguised as a rebel, he had been to the principal kraal
Mtandeni, where he learnt that a vast _impi_ had been mobilized and
was camped in the immediate vicinity of the kraal; and that portions
of the force were already out guarding parts of the valley where it
was supposed the troops might attempt to enter. He heard of the fight
that had already taken place that day with Barker at Insuze, and that,
with a view of checking the latter's advance--it being already known
his column was a small one--an _impi_ had been sent towards Esidumbini
to lie in ambush on the road to be travelled. The same man also
ascertained that, on the preceding Sunday afternoon (1st), a European
who was passing through the district on a bicycle from Mapumulo towards
the coast, had been captured by the rebels, brought to Mtandeni, and
there murdered and mutilated.
On this intelligence being brought to the notice of Colonel McKenzie,
he decided at once to inform Barker of his danger. It was accordingly
arranged that Nkantolo, notwithstanding that he had already walked
some twenty-five miles that day, should take a despatch to Barker
warning him not to leave Esidumbini before dawn, which, according
to instructions previously issued to that officer by McKenzie, it
was necessary for him to do. In view, however, of the fact that the
distance from Thring's Post to Esidumbini by the most direct route
is not less than twenty miles, the task, in spite of the Native's
assurances to the contrary, appeared a greater one than he could
possibly perform, especially as, seeing the intervening country was
under arms, it was imperative to use a still longer route to avoid
contact with the enemy. When Nkantolo, having travelled through the
night, was approaching his destination, he heard the fire at Ponjwana
and, afraid of being mistaken by Barker's force for a rebel, decided
to make another detour to Esidumbini. After reaching that place and
reporting himself, he at once followed the route taken by Barker,
passing over the battle-field at Ponjwana, and delivering his message
about noon in the neighbourhood of Umvoti Drift. Thus, between 4 a.m.
on the 2nd and noon on the 3rd, a distance of not less than sixty miles
had been covered by the messenger. This is but an illustration of what
many Zulus are capable of doing. Such extraordinary mobility is but
one of the factors that has to be taken into account in a war between
Europeans and Natives.
Reference has already been made to the general plan of converging on
Meseni's valley, and the attempt made by Barker to carry out his share
of that plan.
The instructions to Woolls-Sampson were to proceed to Mapumulo and,
picking up there the N.M.R. and a detachment of C.M.R. Maxims, to make
a night march to a kopje overlooking the drift (Gaillard's), where the
Mapumulo-Esidumbini road crosses the Umvoti. He was to arrive at that
spot before dawn, and there co-operate with the columns of Mackay on
the left and Barker on the right.
Mackay was to proceed viâ Hlonono Mission Station, close to the scene
of Arnott's recent action, towards Meseni's principal kraal, and there
co-operate with Woolls-Sampson on the right and Leuchars on the left.
Leuchars[285] was to move after dark into Glendale valley, along the
main road from Kearsney. He was then to bivouack for the night, and
move sufficiently early on the 3rd to co-operate with Mackay and
Barker.
From all reports that had been received, it appeared the main force
of the rebels was concentrated at Meseni's Mtandeni kraal, hence the
nominal objective of each of the columns was this kraal. They converged
thereon, roughly speaking, from the four points of the compass.
McKenzie gave the column commanders clearly to understand that the
movements of the different columns were to be of an encircling nature,
with the object of hemming the enemy in, and it was with that object in
view that they were to co-operate with one another as much as possible.
Colonel McKenzie, who was accompanied by the Acting Commandant,
attached himself to Mackay's column. This force reached Hlonono Mission
Station just as day broke. As the troops were proceeding down a ridge,
a party of rebels was surprised in a thorn valley on the right. This
valley was swept through by the Natal Carbineers, one squadron being
sent to a ridge on the right of the valley. The main body passed
down the quickly-descending ridges towards Meseni's kraal, hurriedly
searching the country as they went.
On Mackay's column reaching Mtandeni, the kraal was found completely
deserted. Two separate camps of temporary war-huts had been erected
within 300 yards of the kraal at the rear, capable of accommodating
1,500 men. Many signs of recent occupation were observed, such as bones
of cattle that had been slaughtered, pots, etc. The kraal had evidently
been hurriedly vacated, as numerous articles, such as dishes, mats,
spoons, ornaments, etc., etc., were found lying about in the huts. A
search was made for the European said to have been murdered. A bicycle
with satchel attached, containing articles of clothing evidently
belonging to the deceased, was found. Later on, under a tree, 150 yards
from the kraal, the corpse of the murdered man was also come upon.
The body had been horribly mutilated. The head had been cut off and
removed; and the whole of the intestines, heart, lungs, liver, stomach,
etc., extracted. The right hand, cut off at the wrist, was missing,
whilst the pad or sole of one of the feet had also been cut away and
removed.
The body was shortly after identified as that of Mr. Oliver Edward
Veal, of the Public Works Department, who had left Pietermaritzburg
in the hope of seeing a friend attached to Colonel McKenzie's staff.
Deceased left Pietermaritzburg for Greytown by train on the 30th June,
and from thence viâ Krantzkop to Mapumulo on a bicycle. At the latter
place, he was warned of the danger of entering Meseni's ward but,
having already come further than he had intended, he decided to go on
to Tongaat and catch the train back to Pietermaritzburg on the Sunday.
He was quite unarmed. He, moreover, not being a combatant, was in
mufti. A party of rebels caught him half a mile from Gaillard's Drift
and triumphantly conveyed him to Mtandeni. Meseni was informed of what
had happened. He ordered Veal to be conveyed back to Mapumulo, but the
large force there congregated was in no mood to carry out the order.
Macabacaba, the fighting induna, not only ignored his Chief's orders,
but identified himself with those who clamoured for Veal's being put
to death. The rebels accused the latter of being a spy. Had he been
able to speak Zulu, he might have been able to clear himself of the
charge. As it was, Meseni concluded he was not a spy; it was on that
account he gave the order he did. That the Chief's order should have
been ignored shows that he had practically lost control of the tribe.
Instead, however, of actively interfering, he allowed the rebels to do
what they wished. And so this perfectly innocent young man, actuated by
no other motive whatever than that of getting back to duty as speedily
as possible, was struck, stabbed, and fearfully mutilated in the manner
already described. The principal motive of the murder was, no doubt, to
enable the local war-doctor to obtain parts of the body for doctoring
the impi and rendering it so terrible to its opponents as to ensure
victory on a conflict occurring.
There is no truth in the rumour that the sole of deceased's foot was
removed whilst he was still alive, and that he was then compelled to
walk. Zulus are undoubtedly barbarous in certain respects, but to say
that the above took place is a libel. If proof be wanted, we have it
in the fact that the foot was closely examined on the body being found,
when no trace whatever of dirt attaching thereto was detected.
The killing of this fine young fellow, loved by all who knew him, only
shows what Natives were still capable of during the Rebellion, and how
necessary it was to guard against members of any regiment becoming
detached and wandering about in the enemy's country.
Another point is that whereas the rebel Chiefs generally protected
civilians as far as they could, such protection could not be relied
on, especially in the case of Meseni who, though present, was unable
or did not care to assert his authority. In spite of all professions
by the ringleaders that European non-combatants, including women and
children, would not be molested, there was no guarantee whatever that
a time would not arise when indiscriminate massacres would take place.
Thus, the only way of checking these possible catastrophes was to do as
McKenzie did, viz. so punish the rebels as to show them that rebellion,
even in incipient forms, would be stamped out with the utmost severity.
Had Chiefs been able to exercise effective control, especially when the
passions of their people were aroused, a corresponding modification
might have been introduced by European officers in dealing with the
situation, but with instances as revolting as the one described, no
other course was left than to suppress the tendencies in the sternest
manner.
Meseni's kraal was burnt and Veal's remains buried close to where they
were found.
McKenzie moved to an elevated position about a mile from Mtandeni, from
where he generally directed the operations.
Woolls-Sampson, after leaving Mapumulo at 2 a.m. on the 2nd, advanced
due south towards Wome kopje, overlooking Gaillard's Drift. Difficulty
was experienced, when compelled to leave the road, through his not
having a proper guide. A party of rebel scouts was surprised just
before dawn--half a dozen of them were shot and two captured. The
night-march was otherwise without incident. As soon as it got light,
about forty of the enemy were observed on top of a steep hill,
Mpumulwana, about a mile from Wome. There were other signs that the
enemy was concentrating there--the beginning of exceedingly broken
country, covered with thorn trees. Woolls-Sampson sent B squadron
N.M.R., dismounted, under Rattray, to dislodge the rebels. After going
half-way up the steep hill in close order with bayonets fixed, Rattray
sent Tpr. Le Mesurier on horseback to draw the enemy. The squadron
followed close in rear. Le Mesurier rode practically up to the enemy,
whom he found to be 300 to 400 strong. He then turned and galloped down
the incline. The rebels, armed with shields and assegais, at once began
to charge. As they appeared over the brow, they were met by the fire of
Rattray's men. Instead of continuing, they drew back to the crest from
whence they had come, and there once more concealed themselves as best
they could.
Woolls-Sampson now sent the N.D.M.R. (under Abraham) at the gallop,
with Z.M.R. and R.H., to a hill on the enemy's right flank, which
commanded the rear of the hill occupied by the enemy. N.D.M.R. opened
fire from right rear when the rebels, seeing they might be surrounded,
retreated down the slopes in their rear towards the Umvoti river. As
they made off, they were closely pursued by Rattray. Many were shot in
the pursuit, especially by the Maxims. The remainder of the force was
brought up, when the bush was driven to the river.
The troops were halted some 300 yards from Mpumulwana. 'A' squadron,
N.M.R., was now sent to cover the right flank, as well as endeavour to
bring fire to bear on the part of the hill occupied by the enemy. In
the meantime, C squadron went forward to support Rattray.
When the N.D.M.R., after operating on a ridge almost parallel to that
on which the main body was, reached the base of a conical hill, still
nearer Wome, on their left front, a separate and considerable body of
Natives charged on to them from the top. The attack was immediately
met and the rebels, having no opportunity to form up, hid themselves,
after suffering severe loss, in scrub, dongas, etc. Whilst crossing
some mealie-fields which appeared to be clear of rebels, Abraham and
Lieut. H.G. James, Z.M.R., who were riding together with a few men,
were suddenly attacked by rebels, up till then carefully concealed.
Both officers used their revolvers with effect at close quarters.
In the operations about Mpumulwana and Wome, 102 of the enemy were
killed.
It so happened that many of the rebels who escaped from Woolls-Sampson
came in the direction of Mackay's column, when, later in the morning,
very heavy losses were inflicted on them by the Carbineers in the scrub
and thorns on both sides of the river--especially on the left bank.
Woolls-Sampson moved the whole of his force to the river, but although
at once getting in touch with Mackay, he failed to do so with Barker,
whose delay was, of course, accounted for by his having been engaged
with other _impis_ at Ponjwana, as already related.
Now, as to Leuchars. At daybreak, after entering Glendale valley, the
column worked up the river. At a place where the Umvoti flows close
to a precipitous and thickly-wooded slope, the road was found well
barricaded with trees. The removal of the obstruction delayed the
advance for about fifteen minutes. On the edge of some cane-fields,
a few Natives were seen running into a densely-wooded valley on the
right. Two shells were fired at them. Leuchars ascertained from Indians
living there that the rebels were in the habit of secreting themselves
in the cane, and that they were there then. It, therefore, became
necessary to proceed with caution and to take the column off the road
and through a field of young cane. Further delay arose through an
ambulance waggon capsizing.
On the mill being reached, it was found that a store had been burnt and
a house looted.
Leuchars' principal difficulties, however, arose after the road came
to an end beyond the mill, when the guns and ambulance were obliged to
proceed along trackless country, for the most part covered with thorn
bush.
It was 2.30 p.m. when he sighted Mackay's column on a knoll near Umvoti
river.
After his action at Ponjwana, Barker resumed his march at 9 a.m., and
arrived at Gaillard's store, Umvoti Drift, shortly before noon. His
progress through the intervening thorn country was retarded somewhat
owing to being occasionally threatened by the enemy, though without
any serious attempt to come to close quarters. After conferring with
McKenzie, he moved back to Esidumbini, reaching his camp at 7.30 p.m.
after an uneventful march.
In the afternoon, Mackay's, Woolls-Sampson's and Leuchars' columns
proceeded to high ground on the road, about 1,000 yards from Gaillard's
Drift (left side), and close to the spot where, two days before, Veal
had been caught. Here the combined forces bivouacked for the night.
The total number of rebels killed by the columns during the day was
444, and about 400 cattle were captured.
On the following day (4th July), McKenzie decided to remain in Umvoti
valley and to continue the sweeping operations generally in a northerly
direction. Leuchars operated on the left, Mackay in the centre and
Woolls-Sampson on Mackay's right. Each column traversed exceedingly
rugged country during the day, but practically none of the enemy
were met with in any force. All the rebels had apparently dispersed.
Mackay proceeded viâ Misi hill into Swaimana's ward where, owing to
not having vacated their kraals as instructed to do, two brothers of
Swaimana--loyalists--were unfortunately shot in the belief that they
were rebels.
Nineteen rebels were killed and a large quantity of stock captured
during the day.
The columns--searching the country as they went--returned to Thring's
Post on the 5th.
Attached to the Natal Carbineers was Lance-Corporal V.J.W.
Christopher. When in the neighbourhood of Hlonono Mission Station, he
went to a kraal to make investigations. As he entered the place, a
rebel, who had armed and concealed himself behind a fence, immediately
pounced upon and stabbed him and his horse to death. The body was
removed and buried at Ladysmith.
Although the combined operations in Umvoti valley, on account of
Barker having been opposed at Ponjwana and Leuchars having to bring
his guns and ambulance along rough and roadless country, did not
achieve McKenzie's principal object, viz. establishing a cordon round
Meseni's entire force, they were nevertheless successful in stamping
out rebellion in that part. As late as the evening of the 2nd, all
reports had gone to show that some 6,000 to 7,000 Natives were under
arms in Umvoti valley. But, as the result of the vigorous operations
of the 3rd, 4th and 5th, the rebel forces, defeated in action at two
points, had entirely vanished. And, with their kraals destroyed and
stock captured, no opportunity was allowed them to reorganize with any
prospect of success.
The _terrain_ here, though difficult to operate in, differed greatly
from that at Nkandhla in having no strongholds of any importance.
Had the valley been dealt with piece-meal, it is more than probable
hostilities would have been kept up longer than they were, and been
accompanied with far greater loss of life to the rebels than actually
took place. Although the punishment was not as severe as it might have
been, it was heavy enough to show Natives the futility of taking up
arms against organized European troops. The swoop on Meseni's valley
from four widely-separated points was a fine conception, and, although
not as effective as it might have been, and was intended by McKenzie
to be, the rebels saw enough to realize that an octopus had come down
upon them from the surrounding heights, against whose powerful and
far-reaching tentacles their own efforts were puny and feeble in the
extreme. The reader may remember that a Zulu dreads nothing so much
as being surrounded or hemmed in. The very effort to do this on the
3rd no doubt caused many of them to be afflicted with nightmare, for
that was the day on which, as they say, "every hill was covered with
European troops, which, moving closer and closer, threatened and meted
out destruction on every side."
On intelligence being brought in at 2 p.m. on the 6th that Meseni was
in hiding a short distance off, three squadrons hurriedly left Thring's
Post, only, however, to find, after proceeding a couple of miles,
that the place was at least nine miles from camp, and required a much
larger force to deal with. The troops accordingly returned to camp.
Orders were issued the same night that all mounted troops of Leuchars',
Woolls-Sampson's and Mackay's columns were to move out at 3.30 a.m. on
the 7th in the direction of Glendale. Fortunately there was a bright
moon.
Woolls-Sampson's men took the right. After making a long detour, they,
approaching on the west, reached the appointed rendezvous, Mzonono
gorge, shortly after daybreak, and got into touch with Mackay, who had
moved to the east side from the north. Leuchars was to have closed the
bottom end from the south-east, but he arrived late, owing to having
been conducted along the wrong road. McKenzie, who was with Mackay's
column, caused the bush in the gorge to be driven, but without result.
Woolls-Sampson's and Mackay's men subsequently went to the top of hills
overlooking the Kearsney sugar plantations and searched some caves near
there. Leuchars, in the meantime, drove a valley on the east. During
the day, thirteen prisoners were taken and six rebels killed. Tpr.
Reed, N.C., accidentally shot himself through one of his lungs, but the
injury luckily did not prove fatal.
The troops returned the same afternoon to Thring's Post, without having
been able to ascertain the Chief's whereabouts.[286]
With the object of dispersing a body of rebels, said to be between
Spitzkop and Riet valley, Barker was instructed to move his column
towards the upper portion of Umhlali river. A company N.R., was, at
the same time, detached from Royston's column (which had just reached
Dundee), and ordered to proceed by rail to join Barker.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 269: Sometimes called Hlonono, after the name of a Native
who, until recently, lived some two miles from the scene.]
[Footnote 270: This distinguished officer, who had assumed office on
the 2nd June, arrived at Krantzkop on the 29th. His services were,
briefly, as follows: Indian Mutiny, 1857-8; Bhootan Expedition,
1865; Zulu War, 1879; Boer War, 1881; and Boer War, 1899-1902, being
frequently mentioned in despatches and awarded the King's and Queen's
medals with clasps. He was knighted (K.C.B.) and granted the honorary
rank of Major-General in the Army on the conclusion of the last Boer
War.]
[Footnote 271: When directed to arrest Bejana near Empangeni, Barker
moved towards Eshowe with three squadrons, T.M.R. On getting to
Entumeni, however, his orders were cancelled, when he proceeded to
Middle Drift, reaching there on the 23rd June. By this time, he had
become practically detached from Mansel's column, then making towards
Ngudwini.]
[Footnote 272: _i.e._ Ngudwini, near Isiwasamanqe, Eshowe district.]
[Footnote 273: The sun set at 5.10 p.m.]
[Footnote 274: There was no undergrowth of any kind.]
[Footnote 275: On the left of the road, the enemy had been concealed at
the head of a small valley. _Vide_ map and inset.]
[Footnote 276: A brief report on this gun, which was first used at
Peyana, will be found on p. 419.]
[Footnote 277: The New Hanover Reserves assembled at Noodsberg Hall,
by direction of the Acting Commandant, on the 27th June. On the 28th,
a patrol visited the Swedish mission station (Rev. J.F. Ljungquist),
under the Great Noodsberg, when a small body of the enemy was seen on
the top of the mountains. Mdungazwe reported that the rebels were doing
their best to incite people of his and other tribes to rise. As word
had come in that Butler's store had been looted at Insuze, the whole of
the Reserves, including Messrs. W. Dickens, M. Jackson, J.H. Culverwell
and H. Jacobson, left to visit the place, but, on discovering a party
of the enemy driving some thirty cattle near the Newspaper Mission
Station, two miles from Butler's, the project was abandoned after
capturing the cattle. The rebels now assembled in larger numbers at
Newspaper, and rumours of an intended attack on the Hall were freely
circulated. It was at this stage that Ehlers got into touch with Barker
at Dalton.]
[Footnote 278: On moving from the Hall to rejoin his column, Barker
left the Reserves where they were, but when he received warning a few
hours later of a possibility of his being attacked by strong bodies of
the enemy, he ordered them to attach themselves to his column.]