D.L.I., to establish the garrison referred to with 35 D.L.I. (mounted
infantry), 145 D.L.I. and one N.F.A. gun. At 11 a.m. on the 2nd,
however, Campbell, then on the Zululand side, received a wire from
Woolls-Sampson ordering him to come on at once to Thring's Post with
a convoy of twenty-two waggons of supplies, it being imperative for
these to reach Thring's Post the same night. By double-spanning (no
punt being available, as the water was too low), the waggons were
got across, and at 1 p.m. the convoy, consisting of 70 D.L.I., one
N.F.A. gun (Beningfield), 50 Z.M.R. (Flindt), and some 15 N.D.M.R.,
moved forward. When about a mile from Mr. Hulett's house at Bulwer, a
Native was seen on the road. As he appeared suspicious, he was made to
accompany the convoy. Questioned as to the whereabouts of the enemy,
who, it seemed, from a subsequent telegram from Woolls-Sampson, was
lurking in the vicinity, the man denied all knowledge of it, though
later on said he had heard it might assemble where the springs of two
streams were but a few yards apart. A short halt was made at Bulwer
and, just after sunset,[273] the convoy pushed on.
In the ordinary course, the best plan, with an enemy close at hand,
would have been to lager at Bulwer. It was owing entirely to the
stringency of the orders that an advance was made at that late hour.
All were warned to be ready in case of attack. Bayonets were fixed and
flankers thrown out. With darkness rapidly coming on, the flankers,
for fear of being cut off, were not more than thirty yards off the
road. Four mounted men of the advanced guard, consisting of a troop
Z.M.R., under Capt. D.J.C. Hulley, marched along the road. A couple
on the right and another couple on the left did the flanking, whilst
seven were in the road in immediate rear of the front four. Behind,
with an interval of about fifty yards, came 70 D.L.I. (with a Maxim
gun), N.F.A. gun, an ambulance, and 22 waggons. A number of N.D.M.R.
were riding on the vehicles. Z.M.R. (35) formed the rear-guard with two
Rexer guns. The Native referred to was now noticed staring frequently
to the right.
Owing to the likelihood of attack, the men marched as compactly as
possible. The worst spot was undoubtedly the long cutting a mile after
leaving Bulwer; nothing, however, was seen or heard of the enemy at
that point. The little column next moved slowly across the low ridge
between the end of the cutting and a small zinc store, known as
Macrae's, on a knoll. The small clump of trees between the road and
the store could be seen on the horizon ahead. The country about this
part is rugged, though the three or four valleys in the vicinity, if
steep, are, just there, small and not deeper than 100 feet. The road
was hard and in good condition. After passing the store (at a distance
of thirty yards), it is practically level and easy-going the whole way
to Thring's Post.
The convoy moved along well, at an average speed of two and a half
miles an hour (the usual pace for oxen on good roads). As, after
leaving the cutting, danger of attack did not appear so imminent, Capt.
Robert Armstrong, N.M.R., was sent on by himself to select a suitable
bivouac. The advanced guard now went up the slight incline to the left
of the store. When passing, a black dog that was following Hulley
stood, and, ruffling its hair, began to growl and bark in the direction
of the plantation on the right. Seeing this, Hulley became suspicious;
the same instant, noticing a mass of armed Natives springing up from
among the trees[274] (the sound they made being similar to the rising
of a flock of guinea-fowl), he shouted a warning. The guard swung
their horses round and began to fall back on the main body in rear as
the rebels, some 300 strong, dashed forward from both sides of the
road,[275] crying "Usutu! Usutu!" and using their knobsticks as well as
assegais. Armstrong, by this time some 200 yards ahead, finding himself
cut off, galloped back through the enemy, knocking down two or three,
and using his revolver freely as he did so; notwithstanding the heavy
fusillade then going on towards him, he succeeded in reaching the main
body on the right without mishap. Steady and well-directed volleys were
poured into the advancing enemy. He did not assume his characteristic
formation, probably owing to the nature of the ground, but moved along
the road _en masse_ and with great dash. The distance from the store to
the head of the column was barely eighty yards. The hot and effective
fire, however, including case from the 15-pounder, stopped the
advance, and caused the rebels to break to rear and right of the store.
Two minutes after the attack had failed, reinforcements having, in the
meantime, moved up from the rebels' rear, another attack came, slightly
to the left of where the first had taken place. This was well met by
rifle fire and case, and resulted in a second and speedy retreat.
There being reason to suppose a third would follow, Campbell drew the
men up in half-moon formation across the road, the convex side facing
the store. The 15-pounder was placed in the centre of the road, the
rear-guard was brought up, and the N.D.M.R. directed to fire right and
left as necessity arose.
As anticipated, the third attack came, some twenty minutes after the
second. It was from the same quarter, and was delivered after darkness
had set in. It met with no better luck than the others. During this
attack, one of the three Rexer guns was brought into action.[276]
Two hundred yards beyond the store, a road branched off to the left.
At this point, a second _impi_, also about 300 strong, had at first
lain in waiting, its object evidently being to allow the convoy to
get between both _impis_, when it would have been attacked front and
rear. The plan failed on account of the foremost body being prematurely
forced to take action.
The rebel forces were composed of men of Matshwili's and Ntshingumuzi's
tribes, under the indunas Dabulumbimbi and Mvukazi respectively.
Mahlanga also accompanied Ntshingumuzi's men as second in command. He
remained in rear whilst urging others to charge.
During the engagement, forty rebels were killed and others wounded.
Tpr. G. Coll, Z.M.R., was seriously wounded with assegais. He received
every attention from Major Campbell, M.D., C.M. (Edin.), but afterwards
succumbed to his injuries at Thring's Post.
The dog which had been the first to detect the enemy, and practically
saved the column, was accidentally shot by its own side when trying to
get back.
The column bivouacked for the night where it had been engaged. Apart
from the proximity of the enemy and the darkness, it was impossible
to move, because waggons and oxen, owing to Native drivers and
voorloopers having run away, had either capsized or become considerably
disorganized. Thring's Post was reached at mid-day on the 3rd without
further incident.
The smart manner in which these attacks were met and repelled reflects
the greatest credit on Campbell and his men, who were not only ambushed
at dusk by an enemy far outnumbering them, but were considerably
encumbered by slow transport, which had already come some nineteen
of the twenty-eight miles to be done that day. Even the 15-pounder
was being drawn by oxen. Having regard to the enemy's most determined
charges, only remarkable promptitude and resourcefulness on the part
of the officer in command turned a threatened calamity into a decisive
victory.
But other and even more important developments were occurring almost
simultaneously not many miles away. To these we must now hasten to draw
the reader's attention.
The last we saw of Barker was his departure from Krantzkop to take up
a position at Esidumbini. His force then consisted of four squadrons
T.M.R. His orders were to reach Esidumbini as soon as possible and
be on high ground overlooking Umvoti Drift at Gaillard's store by
daybreak, 3rd July, to co-operate with three other columns from
Mapumulo, Thring's Post and Glendale in a general converging movement
on Meseni's ward, where, it was known, the rebels had assembled in
great force.
A delay occurred at Dalton from 9 a.m. (30th) until 2 p.m., owing
to Barker having to wait for supplies. These had to come from
Pietermaritzburg and Greytown by rail. He resolved to push forward at 2
p.m., with thirteen waggons, though still somewhat short of supplies.
During the same afternoon, he was joined by the guns that had been sent
after him.
About 8 p.m., a message came from Chief Leader H. Ehlers, in command
of the New Hanover Reserves (70), to say he was in lager at Little
Noodsberg Hall, and that intelligence had come in to the effect that
he was to be attacked at daybreak on the 1st July by an _impi_ that
had been seen during the afternoon on the Great Noodsberg.[277]
Barker immediately decided to march to the Hall with three squadrons
(each about 100 strong), leaving the fourth as escort to the guns and
transport. The Hall was reached at midnight. Everything there was
quiet. When daylight appeared, the expected attack was not made. Barker
then left for the Great Noodsberg, where he waited till 11 a.m. for
the rest of the column to come up. That night the column bivouacked on
the Great Noodsberg. A number of scouts had been noticed during the
day, all of whom retired suspiciously to the front of the column as it
advanced.
By 7 a.m. on the 2nd (Monday), having been joined by the New Hanover
Reserves on the preceding afternoon, the column was again on the
move.[278] After travelling about a mile and a half, the advanced guard
(B squadron, T.M.R.), came upon an _impi_ some 300 strong, concealed on
both sides of the road in a wattle plantation (site of the Newspaper
Mission Station), which had been thinned out, but had a lot of scrub
about it. Steps were now taken to drive the place, with the result
that many armed Natives, particularly near their small church, where
it had evidently been intended to lie in ambush for the troops, were
discovered and shot. Scarcely any other portion of the column, except
the advanced guard, came into action. As the enemy retreated, he was
pursued by the advanced guard and two troops of A squadron, T.M.R. The
operations lasted about twenty minutes. After the fighting was over,
the plantation was again, but more thoroughly, driven. About sixty
rebels were killed.
At 9.30 a.m., the column moved along easy slopes towards Insuze river,
the advanced guard being increased to two squadrons. The strength of
the column now was four squadrons, T.M.R. (400); two Maxims and one
Colt gun (25); two guns, 15-pounders, N.F.A. (25); and the Reserves
(70). There were no Native levies.[279] Many Natives were observed on
high ground to the right and left fronts.
After passing Butler's store, about a thousand yards from Insuze
Drift, Barker, seeing the place was a suitable one for watering,
decided to halt. The column accordingly began to pull out on to level
ground immediately across and to the right of the drift. The guard,
under Lieut. H.S. Liddle, went forward to establish itself on a long
grassy ridge, parallel with the river at that part. This ridge rises
to a height of 60 ft. above the drift and increases gradually to 80,
100 and 150, as it extends further to left and right fronts. On the
immediate right of the small neck through which the road passes over
the ridge, was a police station, consisting of two or three small
buildings. Three or four Native kraals were also to be seen on the
ridge to the left of the road. With the object of protecting the column
against surprise, the guard occupied ground (_C_), some thirty yards
to the right of the station. A troop was sent to kopje _F_, whilst a
section (four men), under Sergt.-Major S.L. Neville, was sent to _B_,
_i.e._ within fifteen or twenty yards of the kraal--round which grew
a thick, bushy fence.[280] Here three of the men dismounted and were
just handing over their horses, with the object of searching that and
the other kraals, before occupying a kopje near by, when an _impi_,
some 500 strong, sprang from behind the nearest kraal and hedge, and
charged round both sides of the kraal at the men, shouting the usual
war-cry as they did so. The latter, having no time to fire, mounted
and retired to the guard, wheeling slightly to the right, to avoid
masking the fire. The enemy continued their charge. The troops at the
drift, as well as the guard, opened a hot fire as they ran. In the
meantime, another _impi_, as strong as the first, began to appear from
a bush some forty yards to the guard's right rear. The bush, showing
but slightly on top, extended down a steep incline on the far side of
the ridge. At this moment, Barker, who was watering his horse when the
charge began, galloped to the troops at the police station. Whilst six
men were told off to check this latter charge, others were engaged with
the _impi_ rushing down from the kraal. It was all a matter of seconds.
The guard stood their ground and opened smartly with magazine fire.
Notwithstanding the cross-fire, flank and front, that was being poured
into them by the men near the drift, some of whom had lined the left
bank below the drift, whilst others were on higher ground in rear, the
_impi_ succeeded in getting within a very few yards of the guard. The
leader did not fall until within six. On his falling, the remainder
broke and ran down the slopes on the far side, looking from the drift.
When the action was at its height, Barker, whose horse was wounded with
an assegai, instinctively perceived that the critical point was the one
to which he had just ridden. He at once sent for reinforcements. Such
men as were immediately available dashed up. Neither of the two guns at
the drift came into action. Had case been promptly fired at those who
came from the kraal, it must have proved very destructive at a range
of 400 yards. A few seconds later, however, it became impossible to
open, owing to the guns being masked by the reinforcements that sprang
forward from the drift to the ridge.
A and B squadrons, as well as two troops of D, were sent in pursuit of
the now flying enemy. The two 15-pounders were placed at the kraal from
which one of the _impis_ had been in hiding, whilst the Maxims and Colt
gun took up positions on the ridge between the police station and the
bush.
The rebels retired in a northerly direction, down Insuze valley. They
were hotly pursued by the troops, who rode along the ridges. The field
guns fired about twenty rounds with great effect at ranges varying
from 600 to 1,800 yards, but were eventually forced to cease fire, on
account of the pursuing squadrons too closely approaching the enemy.
The machine guns, too, did excellent work.
A third _impi_, also about 500 strong, which up till then had taken
no part whatever in the engagement, was accidentally come upon by A
squadron (Lieut. R.V. Saner).[281] The attack made by about fifty of
this _impi_ was promptly and effectively repelled, whereupon the rebels
joined the others in a general retreat.
At a distance of three or four miles from the scene of action, about
thirty fugitives got into a narrow valley (through which the pursuing A
squadron had to pass), evidently to lie in ambush. They were, however,
seen, and dispersed with loss. Still another _impi_ was observed by the
same squadron about a mile to the left, composed apparently of men who
had not been engaged at all. They did not, however, come into action.
Two troops of C squadron were ordered to turn out the rebels who
were hiding in the long grass and rushes in a valley between the gun
position, near the police station, and the pursuing squadrons.
By 11 a.m., the squadrons, having by that time pursued the enemy
for four or five miles, were recalled, as a number of rebels had
shown themselves on both flanks near the police station. The troops
reassembled by about 1.30 p.m., when they off-saddled for an hour on
different parts of the ridge.
The casualties were Tpr. Robert Knight, D squadron, T.M.R., killed;
Tprs. Simcox and Tobin, A squadron, T.M.R., wounded. The enemy's losses
amounted to about 400.
A local Native Chief, Mahlube, who was with Barker's column when the
foregoing action was fought, although many of his tribe had joined the
rebels, expressed the following opinion: "My belief is that the enemy
intended disputing the drift with the troops as they were watering
their horses. The T.M.R. saved themselves by their courageous stand.
Had they betrayed the slightest weakness, they would have fared badly,
for I could see the enemy were reckless and did not care what happened."
The march to Esidumbini was resumed at a quarter to three. A camp was
formed at that place on its being reached two hours later. The night
passed without incident.
The demeanour of the local and apparently neutral Natives was
unsatisfactory. They were very reticent and pretended to know nothing
whatever of the intentions of the enemy. They professed to be ignorant
of the _impis_ that had attacked but a few miles away at Insuze. One of
the Chiefs, Njubanjuba, living on high ground, must have seen the fight
and could have given valuable information had he chosen. He maintained
a sullen and insolent attitude all the time the column was in the
district. It was in view of these facts that Barker decided not to
leave camp until after daybreak, a decision which, as it happened, was
one McKenzie had also come to, in consequence of information obtained
by him on the night of the 2nd that the rebels proposed to attack
Barker at dawn on the 3rd.
When the column started (7 a.m.), one squadron, T.M.R., and the New
Hanover Reserves being left to guard the camp, it proceeded along the
Mapumulo road towards the high ground overlooking Umvoti Drift.
[Illustration: INSUZE
_Dispositions at the beginning of the action_
Scale: 6 inches = 1 mile. Contours Vert. Int. = 20 feet
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 _yards_
REFERENCE
A = _First attacking impi_
B = _Pickets_
C = _Two troops, T.M.R._
D = _Impi; out of sight at drift_
E = _Where part of enemy gathered
when about to retreat_
F = _Hill to which pickets were sent_
G = _Police Station_
H = _Six men posted here to check
impi in bush_
J = _Butler's store_
K = _Position of 15-pdrs. during enemy's
retreat. Maxims and Colt gun
were then between G and L_
(arrow) = _Direction of enemy's retreat_
(crescent) = _Enemy_
(blank) = _Waggon_
(lines) = _Swamp, with long grass and
rushes_
(dots)= _Kraal_]
On the march, a number of Natives was seen on a ridge at Sikota's kraal
in the neighbourhood of a prominent detached hill Ponjwana.[282] Word
was passed on to the advanced guard, A squadron (78), who, however,
had already perceived the rebels' movements. As further attack was
imminent, the main body was kept within two to three hundred yards of
the advanced guard. About three miles from Esidumbini Mission Station,
the Mapumulo road passes over two well-defined hills about a thousand
yards apart, and connected by a hog-backed neck. The country on either
side of the road is steep and thickly covered with thorn bush. As the
road approaches Sikota's kraal from the hog-backed hill, the ground
rises immediately on the left to about fifty feet above the road, such
elevation extending for about 200 yards, when the road enters and
ascends open ground for another 200 yards. It is about a hundred and
twenty yards from the road at this point that the kraal referred to was
situated. On the immediate right of the road is a dense, precipitous
bush, 100 yards broad at the top and extending some 400 yards down into
an enormous, steep, and wooded valley. On the left of the road where
Sikota's kraal was, and opposite that kraal, is a patch of open, high
ground extending some two or three hundred yards, and about a hundred
and fifty broad. To the west of this, the country falls away into
another great valley, similar to the one already referred to. At the
front, again looking from the road where it is nearest the kraal, the
ground slopes gently to the front and right front, but more sharply to
the left, where the trees grow more closely together.
As the column came along the hog's back, it became a little "crushed
up," whereupon the advanced guard cantered forward a little way to the
knoll on which Ngembudi's kraal stood.[283] At this point, a section
was marching some thirty to sixty yards ahead along the road, whilst
half a dozen scouts moved out to their positions on the right and left
fronts, owing to the ground there lending itself to better deployment.
No sooner, however, was the top of the knoll reached at _A_ than the
enemy, some three to four hundred strong, was observed 150 yards to the
right front, that is, some way down an incline, but not concealed from
view of the leading section. The scouts fell back to the troop in rear,
which, at the same time, advanced to a point in sight of the enemy and
immediately lined across the road.
Fire was opened at the rebels then swiftly charging, with uplifted
shields, like a hive of bees upset, over somewhat uneven ground. Some
of the guard at first fired from the saddle, aiming rather at the
oncoming mass than at particular individuals.
The men, ordered to dismount, handed over their horses to be held, and,
dropping quickly on one knee, opened a hot and rapid fire. The charge
was direct and determined. Some of the enemy came to within ten feet of
the rifles when, their centre by that time blown out by the first-class
marksmen that happened to be among the troops, they swerved off to
right and left. Those going to the right were in the act of passing
between the flank and the kraal, when C squadron was moved smartly to
the right, only to come to so close quarters with the strong force then
at and about the kraal as to be obliged to fall back to hold the line
_B_ indicated on the plan. Barker had, in the meantime, moved up from
the main body, some 200-300 yards in rear at the moment of attack,
and addressed himself to the situation on the right, then the most
critical. At the same time, the left flank being threatened, support
was also pushed forward there. This caused the rebels opposite that
flank to retreat to west and down the steep inclines.
After the main fire had been turned towards the _impi_ at the kraal,
that _impi_ was also repulsed, when it forthwith precipitated itself
into the dense bush on the immediate east of the kraal, and from thence
down the great, steep valleys and ravines which were near at hand.
[Illustration: PONJWANA
(SIKOTA'S KRAAL)
SKETCH PLAN
Dispositions at the beginning of the action
Scale: 6 inches approximately = 1 mile
0 100 200 300 400 _yards_
REFERENCE
A = _Where scouts first caught
sight of impi at D_
B = _Line held by troops when
pressed on right flank_
C = _Ngembudi's kraal_
D = _Impi that attacked first_
(dashes) = _T.M.R. scouts_
(crescent)= _The enemy_
(arrow)= _Lines of enemy's retreat_]
Just as the situation in front was becoming critical, that is, about
the end of the first charge, another and different body of the enemy,
about 200 strong, charged down on the rear-guard from that part of the
hog's back which rises fifty feet above the road on the left, whilst
yet another, though smaller _impi_, attacked from the right rear.
The scouts that were in rear galloped up to the last two troops which,
turning left and right about as the position required, proceeded to
pour in a hot fire at the charging enemy, then some 100-150 yards away.
The rushes were stopped, whereupon the rebels broke and fled down the
valley on the right, to join those who had already fled from the kraal
into the valley on that side.
When the attacks had been beaten off, Barker at once sent A and B
squadrons in pursuit, but, owing to the extremely broken nature of the
ground and to the extensive thorn-bush, the majority of the rebels
escaped. It was impossible for the 15-pounders, particularly during
the retreat, to be used with effect. During the engagement, Capt. J.T.
Mitchell was wounded. About 100 of the enemy were killed.
* * * * *
Whilst Barker's column was thus brilliantly holding its own, each time
against an _impi_ larger than itself, a large European force was being
concentrated with surprising rapidity at Thring's Post, the place
selected by McKenzie as his general base of operations.
Arnott, leaving Otimati at 2 p.m. on the 1st, reached Thring's Post the
same afternoon.
After explaining the situation to the Acting Commandant and McKenzie,
and discussing the future plan of campaign, Leuchars left Elandskop
with the U.F.F. on the 29th and reached Thring's Post on the 1st.