[Footnote 279: There was no opportunity for Barker to obtain levies

from local tribes until the 7th. He was then joined by men of those of

Mdungazwe and Mahlube, who gave much assistance in seizing cattle and

locating rebels.]

[Footnote 280: The owner of this kraal, Kati, was a member of the Natal

Police. Kati did not fight at Insuze, but did so at Ponjwana (Sikota's

kraal), where he was killed.]

[Footnote 281: This _impi_ was found crouching, their faces towards the

drift, in a slight grassy depression at _D_, about 150 yards in rear of

the kraal from which the first attack had come. Although concealed from

the troops at the drift or police station, it became easily visible,

owing to there being no cover, as soon as men began to move towards its

right rear.]

[Footnote 282: This hill was between four and five miles from the camp,

and on the far side of, and about 1,000 yards from, Sikota's.]

[Footnote 283: _Vide_ plan.]

[Footnote 284: The regiment now, for the first time during the

Rebellion, operated under its O.C. As to its strength, see note 2, p.

191.

For the past and recent history of this fine regiment, the reader could

not do better than consult the following work: _The Natal Carbineers_,

1856 to 1911. Edited by Rev. John Stalker, M.A.--P. Davis & Sons,

Pietermaritzburg, Natal. 1912.]

[Footnote 285: Woolls-Sampson's, Mackay's and Leuchars' columns were

composed as follows: _Woolls-Sampson_--N.M.R., 300 (Murray-Smith);

N.D.M.R., 200 (Abraham); Z.M.R., 100 (James); and one squadron R.H.

(Cape), 85 (Simmons).

_Mackay_--N.C. Right Wing (Barker); Left Wing (Brandon), 560; L and Y,

150 (Peakman); N.R., 350 (Dick); N.F.A., two guns, A battery (Wilson),

two guns, B battery (Acutt), and two guns (pompoms), (Swain).

_Leuchars_--U.M.R., 270 (Newmarch); B.M.R., 160 (Arnott); N.C., D

squadron, 89 (Montgomery); N.F.A., two guns, C battery (Currie).]

[Footnote 286: At 3 a.m. on the 15th, a fire suddenly broke out at

the field hospital, Thring's Post, owing to a hurricane blowing about

fragments from a burning rubbish heap. The medical officer (Dr.

R. Milner Smyth) assisted by others, succeeded with considerable

difficulty, in rescuing the patients (one of them, the man referred to

in the text) from their burning tents.]

XVIII.

ACTION AT IZINSIMBA.--CONCLUDING

OPERATIONS.--DISBANDMENT.--COURTS-MARTIAL.--COST OF THE REBELLION.

It was clear from the outset that the _impis_ that attacked the convoy

at Macrae's on the 2nd July had come from Matshwili, Ntshingumuzi and

Ngobizembe's tribes. Of these, the leading spirit was undoubtedly

Matshwili[287] of the Mtetwa tribe. Intelligence went to show that a

force of some eight companies of the rebels, _i.e._ between 400 to

600 men, was concealed in his ward in deep ravines at Izinsimba, a

tributary of the Tugela. These rebels, although they had failed to

annihilate Campbell, were awaiting favourable developments in other

parts to amalgamate, or effectively co-operate, with the _impis_

of Meseni, Ndhlovu and others. Only by striking decisively was it

possible for McKenzie to break down the widespread disaffection in

Mapumulo, Lower Tugela and Ndwedwe divisions, all thickly inhabited by

uncivilized Natives.

As soon as the principal rebel force had been disposed of, attention

was turned to that of Matshwili. McKenzie decided to surround this

_impi_ in the same way that had been attempted in Umvoti valley. The

situation demanded celerity of action. With such crafty foes, action

within twenty-four hours or so might meet with success, when a couple

of days would result in absolute failure. The problem, however, was

not of such vast dimensions as that in Umvoti valley, but, in view

of the rugged country in which Matshwili's people lived, quickly

descending as it does into a far more difficult and thickly-wooded

district in the vicinity of the Tugela, it was necessary to cut off

retreat thereto before the enemy had conceived the possibility of such

movement taking place. Owing to the nature of the country, offering

innumerable facilities for escaping, McKenzie was especially careful in

the preparation of his plans.

The columns employed were those of Mackay, Woolls-Sampson and Leuchars.

They were composed as follows:

_Mackay's_--Right and Left Wings, N.C.; 2 guns, N.F.A. (Wilson).[288]

_Woolls-Sampson's_--4 squadrons, N.M.R. (Murray-Smith); 2 squadrons,

N.D.M.R. (Abraham); 1 squadron, Z.M.R. (Vanderplank); 2 guns, N.F.A.

(Acutt); detachments of D.L.I. and N.R.

_Leuchars'_--3 squadrons, U.M.R. (Newmarch); 2 squadrons, B.M.R.

(Arnott); 1 squadron, N.C. (Montgomery); L. and Y. (Peakman); 2 guns,

N.F.A. (Currie).

Mansel, as will presently be seen, also co-operated on the north-east.

McKenzie, with Mackay's column, left Thring's Post at 3 a.m. on the

8th, and advanced towards Izinsimba from the west. With a good moon,

the first part of the march was comparatively easy. The ground,

moreover, was fairly level. Matshwili's principal kraal was approached

by two squadrons N.C. (dismounted), led by McKenzie, and then smartly,

though quietly, surrounded by men with fixed bayonets before dawn,

in the hope of arresting the Chief. The place, however, was found to

be deserted. Mackay was directed at once to occupy a small, narrow

ridge immediately overlooking Izinsimba (right bank), on which was a

small mission station, and, in addition, to throw forward along the

same ridge a strong force to hold ground on the immediate west of

Woolls-Sampson's position.

By this time, Woolls-Sampson had already taken up the position assigned

him further down the Izinsimba. He had left Thring's Post at 2.30 a.m.

and proceeded by road to Macrae's store, where he turned off sharp

to the left and descended a long ridge to take up a position on the

Izinsimba, about a mile and a half below Matshwili's principal kraals.

The N.M.R. took the advance. Rattray was sent with squadron B to get

astride of the stream, about fifty yards below where a tributary (which

springs immediately east of Macrae's store) enters it. Ground was

accordingly held to the extent of about fifty yards on either side.

Murray-Smith, with the rest of N.M.R., remained for the time being at

the base of the ridge the troops had come down, covering the entrance

to Indaka spruit. The remainder of the troops supported some 200 yards

in rear. All these positions were reached before daybreak.

Leuchars, who had marched at 3 a.m. to link up and co-operate with

Woolls-Sampson on the opposite or left side of the Izinsimba, got

generally into position by daybreak.

The converging on the valley by the three columns from different

directions was accomplished in a highly creditable, and, indeed,

remarkably simultaneous and accurate manner, owing chiefly to the

excellence of the plan and the orders issued for carrying it into

execution.

About 120 yards to the right front of Rattray's position, and in the

same valley, was a square Native hut, from which nearly a dozen Natives

soon rushed up the stream into thick bush. These, however, were not

fired at, owing to the advisability of reserving the ammunition for

the main body, which, it was supposed, would attempt to force its way

through later. Presently some thirty of the enemy, probably alarmed

by the noise of the approaching artillery, tried to break through the

cordon, but were driven back with loss.

Finding that touch had been satisfactorily established by Mackay with

Woolls-Sampson on the right flank, and Leuchars on the left, McKenzie

caused a small forest on Leuchars' side of the stream, and under

high ground lined by his men, to be searched by Wilson's guns, using

shrapnel.

One squadron, N.C., lined the ridge on the right of Izinsimba, another

was posted higher up the stream, whilst, as has been seen, a strong

force was holding the ridge on Woolls-Sampson's left flank.

By now, Woolls-Sampson had moved down the greater part of his

column (dismounted) to block the Izinsimba valley more effectually,

preparatory to driving up the stream, in which direction it was then

evident the enemy was concealed and in force. After making such

dispositions as were necessary, the drive began.

Leuchars did not take part in the earlier movements that occurred

near where the Indaka and Imbuyana streams enter the Izinsimba. What

happened with his column was this: Arnott, with B.M.R. (two squadrons),

and N.C. (D squadron), had been directed to occupy ground immediately

opposite that held by Woolls-Sampson. Arnott's guide mistook the path,

which resulted in his pushing too far down the Izinsimba, _i.e._ about

800 yards below Woolls-Sampson. Such position was reached at dawn. The

error, however, proved advantageous, as the troops were just in time

to prevent the escape of about 150 rebels who were between N.M.R. and

B.M.R. They were driven up the Izinsimba and dealt with later.

As, by this time (10.30 a.m.), it was clear that a considerable

portion, if not the whole of Matshwili's _impi_ had been completely

surrounded, McKenzie ordered the principal valley to be driven

downwards towards Woolls-Sampson, whose men (N.M.R. and N.D.M.R.),

then out of sight in the irregularly-shaped and bushy valley, were

already slowly and cautiously driving upwards.[289] The former troops

(_i.e._ those driving downwards) consisted of portions of Mackay's and

Leuchars' columns acting in combination, notably N.C. and L. and Y.

The drives, which were through rough and rocky country, took about

three hours to complete. Two or three of the small, precipitous ravines

opening into the main valley, especially on the right side of the

stream, were also driven. During the drives, numerous armed rebels were

come upon in various parts. These made the best use they could of their

assegais and shields. There was plenty of cover, bushes as well as

rocks, but before long the enemy realized that he had been completely

hemmed in. He continued to fight to the last, though at considerable

disadvantage, because of having broken up into small groups. The

"Usutu" war-cry was used whenever any lot made up their minds to charge

or hurl their assegais.

Mansel left Ngudwini camp at midnight with 146 N.P.; two guns, N.F.A.;

and 100 N.N.C. (Commander F. Hoare). His force co-operated generally

at Izinsimba. It crossed the Tugela, drove the thorn country near

the river, captured 100 cattle belonging to rebels, and returned to

Ngudwini during the afternoon.

The operations at Izinsimba proved very successful. The enemy's losses

amounted to 547 killed, including Matshwili, his son, his principal

induna, Dabulumbimbi,[290] Mahlanga,[291] a Native Christian preacher

(who, though carrying a Bible and hymn-book, was fully armed), as

well as many of those who had taken part in the attack on Campbell's

convoy six days before. The rebels' camp, consisting of many temporary

war-huts, evidently hastily vacated, was found in a bend of the stream

under a lot of shady trees.

It was already late in the afternoon when the forces withdrew, after a

heavy day's work, to the base at Thring's Post.

L. and Y. (Peakman), who, as part of Leuchars' column, took part in

the drives, were of much assistance. The L. and Y. infantry deserve a

special word of praise. Not only did they march out a distance of

ten miles, but besides driving the valleys through the greater part of

the day, walked all the way back to camp the same evening without a

single man falling out.

[Illustration: IZINSIMBA AND MACRAE'S STORE

Dispositions in each case are at the beginning of the action.]

With the decisive blows at Mome, Umvoti valley, Insuze and Izinsimba,

the one following the other in quick succession, and each involving

the rebels in severe losses, cessation of hostilities and restoration

of peace became possible far sooner, and with much less bloodshed,

than would otherwise have been the case. But, before this desirable

consummation could be reached, a little more work remained to be done.

Ndhlovu's district had not been invaded. This was the tribe that had

murdered Sangreid and Powell, had attempted to murder Robbins and Knox,

and, apart from looting the stores at Thring's Post and Otimati, as

well as a herd of cattle from the former place, had fought the N.M.R.

at Otimati. After allowing the troops to rest on the 9th, McKenzie

accordingly arranged a combined move on this ward for the morning

of the 10th, intelligence going to show that Ndhlovu's _impi_ lay

concealed in the Mati valley.

In pursuance of the plan, Leuchars, whose column now consisted of

U.M.R., N.M.R. and L. and Y., left at dusk on the 9th for Allan's

store viâ the magistracy at Mapumulo. Woolls-Sampson, whose column

now included B.M.R. (Arnott), in lieu of N.M.R., made for Hlungwini

Drift (Tugela). Both columns were to be at the mouth of the Mati by

the following dawn. Mansel got orders to move up the Tugela and assist

on the Zululand side. Again, accompanying Mackay's column, McKenzie,

leaving shortly before 3 a.m., entered the rebels' district by a more

direct route than did the other columns. The N.R. accompanied Mackay,

though, being infantry, started half an hour earlier.

Woolls-Sampson's column traversed extremely difficult and thorny

country. It proceeded to where the Mati joins the Tugela and close

to Isiwasezimbuzi mountain. Although a thick mist added to the

difficulties of the march, the force was in position at the appointed

time.[292]

Leuchars, after bivouacking at Mapumulo, left that place at 3 a.m. As

with the other columns, strict silence was observed during the march

and no lights struck. By daylight, the force had occupied positions

round Allan's store. Subsequently, Capt. W.J. Gallwey was sent down

Masiwele valley with a squadron, whilst another squadron, under Capt.

E. Simkins, crossed the Masiwele stream and moved along a high ridge

on the north. Leuchars, in the meantime, took the main body down Mati

valley, where it had been arranged Gallwey and Simkins should meet him.

When about three miles from the Tugela, touch was got with the columns

of Woolls-Sampson, Mackay and Mansel. None of the enemy, however, were

met with, though a spoor leading in a northerly direction into the next

ward was found.

After the columns had got into their respective positions, McKenzie

directed them to drive forward simultaneously to the junction of the

Mati and Masiwele streams. The country each column operated in was

exceedingly rugged. Vast portions of it were covered with thorn and

other varieties of trees, growing so closely together in places that

it was impossible for horsemen to do otherwise than proceed in single

file along narrow, stony footpaths, across which fallen trees and

other obstacles were frequently found. Not a single rebel was seen

throughout the day. The movement, though within ten days of the general

concentration at Thring's Post, had come too late. The wily rebels, no

doubt aware of what had happened at Izinsimba, had slipped, under cover

of the dense forests, some ten miles or so up the river.

The troops, having bivouacked for the night on the Mati, continued the

operations during the following day, but met with no better success.

Leuchars and Woolls-Sampson then withdrew to Mapumulo, and Mackay to

Thring's Post. The infantry, including D.L.I., returned to Thring's

Post viâ Isiwasezimbuzi (_the goats' precipice_).

On the day in question, Mansel left Ngudwini with 146 N.P.; 100 N.N.C.

(Hoare); 2 guns, N.F.A.; and 100 Nongqai (Fairlie), and, crossing the

Tugela, met and co-operated with McKenzie in Mati valley. Recrossing

the Tugela, his force bivouacked for the night near the drift.

In regard to the operations of the 10th and 11th, Colonel McKenzie

remarked: "Some column commanders used their guns whilst a heavy fog

was hanging over the valley. There was apparently no need for this,

but, thinking they were in touch with the enemy, it had the effect of

hastening the movement, which might have been the means of allowing the

enemy to escape, for, naturally, the country traversed was not searched

so thoroughly as it otherwise would have been."[293]

In consequence of the operations in Umvoti valley and at Izinsimba,

finding their _impis_ altogether unable to stand against the troops

as had at first seemed possible,[294] Meseni and Ndhlovu decided to

quit their wards and take refuge in Zululand with a few headmen. News

of the flight was speedily obtained by O.C. Troops and telegraphed to

the Commissioner at Eshowe. The refugees were placed under arrest by

the loyal Chief Hatshi, near Entumeni forest, and conveyed to Eshowe.

McKenzie ordered that they should be sent under escort to Mapumulo.

They accordingly reached Thring's Post on the 13th, and Mapumulo

magistracy on the following day. To the latter place McKenzie at the

same time transferred his headquarters.

With the surrender of these two men, and the death of Matshwili, there

was every reason for supposing that the Rebellion was at an end in that

part, if not throughout the whole Colony. In the absence of disturbing

intelligence from any other district, the latter assumption presently

proved to be correct.

Immediately Meseni and Ndhlovu arrived at Mapumulo, the advisability of

proclaiming a general armistice was considered. Although it was known

that small bands of rebels still existed in the Tugela valley, between

Krantzkop and Izinsimba, notably under the leadership of Sambela, a

relation of the expatriated Chief Ngobizembe, McKenzie felt the time

had arrived when an opportunity of surrendering should be afforded to

all who cared to avail themselves thereof. It was with the object of

discussing the situation from this and other aspects, that the Minister

of Justice and Defence (Mr., now Sir, Thomas Watt) and the Commandant

of Militia (Colonel Bru-de-Wold)[295] visited McKenzie at Mapumulo on

the 14th. Orders were thereupon issued that all further operations were

to be suspended. Column commanders were, at the same time, instructed

to use every endeavour to induce outstanding rebels to come in. One of

the means adopted with success was to use the services of those who had

surrendered, on seeing whom many still at large became satisfied that

the opportunity given was _bona-fide_.

The Krantzkop, Durban, New Hanover and Umvoti Reserves were

demobilized, as also the N.N.C. and N.F.A. The Durban Reserves (under

Chief Leader N. Chiazzari, D.S.O.) had for some time been doing good

work at Thring's Post.

On the 16th, Leuchars' column went to relieve Barker's at Esidumbini,

when the latter, after an exceptionally fine record in the field, both

at Nkandhla and in Natal, was permitted to return to the Transvaal.

Since the 3rd, when, after successfully invading Umvoti valley, Barker

had returned to Esidumbini, his column, still including the New Hanover

Reserves, had been far from idle. The country was thoroughly scoured

in all directions within a radius of ten to fifteen miles of the camp,

notably the wards of Chiefs Njubanjuba, Xegwana and Swaimana. Between

the 4th and 14th, seventeen rebels had been killed, 233 prisoners

captured (including sixty-three suspects), and over 1,000 head of

cattle taken. When the order to return to the Transvaal was received,

Barker was still engaged sending out small patrols, seizing stock, and

accepting surrenders in different directions.

The infantry corps, D.L.I, and N.R.R., were demobilized on the 16th,

and the New Hanover Reserves on the 17th, whilst the Z.M.R. were sent

to relieve at Krantzkop. When, on the 14th, McKenzie moved his camp to

a spot near Mapumulo, N.R. (two companies) were left to occupy Thring's

Post.

By the 22nd July, a very considerable number of rebels had

surrendered to the various columns, but, as some were still at large,

notwithstanding special pains taken to induce them to come in,

Woolls-Sampson got orders to demonstrate in the vicinity of Riet valley

on the coast, between Glendale and Chaka's Kraal.[296] Leuchars, at the

same time, moved towards Tongaat, and Mackay into Ntshingumuzi's ward,

near Bulwer, afterwards to Otimati. In each case, column commanders

were instructed to use every effort to induce rebels outstanding in

those parts to surrender, and not to resort to aggressive measures.

The doctors who were in Mackay's column (Capt. J.E. Briscoe and Lieut.

W. Black) dressed the wounds of a number of rebels that were met

with in different places. In consequence of these tactics, many more

surrendered.

Sambela, the man above referred to, was arrested on the 18th near

Umhlatuze river in Zululand, whilst Meseni's 'fighting induna,'

Macabacaba, who was primarily responsible for Veal's murder, was

secured in Ndwedwe district about the same time.

McKenzie was summoned to Pietermaritzburg on the 24th. He returned to

Stanger on the 28th, when a general order was issued for all Militia

corps still in the field to demobilize on the 30th.

Before concluding the account of the operations, it is necessary to

consider briefly what Mansel's and Royston's columns had been doing in

Zululand, since the general concentration at Thring's Post.

When, on the 29th June, Woolls-Sampson was ordered to proceed to Bond's

Drift and then to Thring's Post, the N.P., 147, who had been attached

to his column since 20th, were, it will be remembered, left at Ngudwini

to form part of Mansel's force. Mansel had left Fort Yolland on the 3rd

July, with N.F.A., 35 (two guns); N.N.C., 140, and Nongqai, 130, and

assumed command at Ngudwini on the same day. Patrols were daily sent by

him down and up the Tugela to prevent rebels crossing into Zululand.

When the three columns at Thring's Post made a combined move in

Matshwili's ward on 8th, and in Ndhlovu's and Ngobizembe's on 10th and

11th, he, as has been seen, co-operated from the Zululand side. On the

13th, his column moved to Isiwasamanqe, from which position a constant

watch was kept along the river. N.N.C. and N.F.A. left Mansel on the

16th to demobilize in Durban. The column moved on the 21st and reached

Bond's Drift on the 23rd. On Mansel leaving (24th), Lieut.-Col. W.J.

Clarke took over the command. The force demobilized in Pietermaritzburg

on the 3rd August.

Royston's column, consisting of R.H., D.L.I. (including Mounted

Infantry) and N.F.A. (two guns), moved to Ndikwe stream on the 20th

June, and to Ensingabantu on the 21st. On the same day, the D.L.I.

(including M.I.) left to join Woolls-Sampson at Nkandhla. The column

was, however, joined by four companies N.R. (Boyd-Wilson). N.F.A. (two

guns) were detached and returned to Empandhleni on the 23rd. After

establishing a garrison at Ensingabantu with one company N.R. (Capt.

J.J. Whitehead), to guard the supplies, Royston left that place and, on

the 24th, proceeded on a two days' drive to Macala mountain, down to

the Tugela, and from thence to Mfongozi valley.

On the 27th, a force of 250 mounted men demonstrated down Mfongozi

valley, towards Tugela and Qudeni mountain, returning to Ensingabantu

for supplies. The column now went over Qudeni, towards the junction of

Tugela and Buffalo rivers. The country between Hlatikulu forest and

the Buffalo was driven, after which the force rested at Mangeni. The

Mangeni district was next driven towards the Buffalo, about 1,500 head

of cattle belonging to Chief Matshana ka Mondise being seized.[297] The

column then went on to bivouack at Isandhlwana.

Mehlokazulu's ward was now traversed by the column. All prisoners,

cattle, sheep and goats that had been seized were handed over to the

Magistrate, Nqutu. The force moved to Vant's Drift, where waggons from

Dundee had to be awaited, as no transport from Zululand was allowed

to cross into Natal owing to East Coast Fever restrictions. Dundee

was reached on the 7th July. The column ceased to exist on the 19th.

Royston entrained with his regiment for Pietermaritzburg on the 29th.

A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriation · 第 34 / 51 段