arrival of Mehlokazulu's and other men, should not return to Nkandhla
to continue tactics up till then comparatively successful, a start was
made for the Mome between 6 and 7 p.m. on the 9th. The men, leaving in
batches, marched in the loosest order. When close to Tate, they got
reliable intelligence that Barker was still near Insuze river, although
his waggons had gone off to Fort Yolland. Ndabaningi believed the
news, but Mehlokazulu ridiculed it, retorting that the informants were
partial to Europeans and purposely wished to mislead.
Mangati, with four companies, moved at once up the Mome gorge
and bivouacked near the waterfall. Owing to sheer obstinacy on
Mehlokazulu's part, the main _impi_ camped at the mouth of the gorge
instead of moving further in with Mangati. It was, moreover, owing to
him that intelligence brought about 3.30 a.m., three hours before the
action began, by a little boy to the effect that some waggons were
approaching was ignored--these 'waggons,' as it happened, being the two
15-pounders and ammunition waggons. In reply, Mehlokazulu described
the intelligence as rubbish, for he had himself seen from Macala every
waggon belonging to Barker's column trek off towards Fort Yolland.
Thus, this vaunted leader, chiefly on account of personal fatigue, did
his side the greatest possible disservice, forfeiting his own life in
addition.
After hearing the little boy's story, Ndabaningi detached himself with
a section of the rebels and followed Mangati, leaving Mehlokazulu and
Bambata with the bulk of the _impi_ behind.
The aggregate force that came from Macala would have been anything
between 1,200 to 1,500 strong. Of these, probably not more than 1,000
were in action, if so many.
Had the whole body entered the stronghold unperceived, the plan was to
rest a day, then begin attacking the surrounding Chiefs and looting
their stock. These Chiefs, although members of their tribes had become
rebels, had themselves refrained from joining. It was, therefore,
supposed that, on conclusion of hostilities, they would visit their
displeasure on those who had rebelled. Consequently, the intention
was to deal vigorously with and kill off these half-hearted men;
such were the tactics of Tshaka, for, after killing the leaders, the
ordinary people, it was found, flocked to the 'conqueror.' The policy,
furthermore, was to lie in wait for small parties of the Government
forces near, but especially _in_, the forests, and massacre them
before reinforcements could arrive, as, indeed, had almost happened at
Manzipambana.
The reader will naturally wonder what became of the newly-appointed
commanders, Macala and Mganu. Macala thought it wiser to push into
the gorge. He joined Mangati and Ndabaningi, leaving the headstrong
Mehlokazulu and Bambata to look after themselves. Mganu, however,
remained.
On Bambata and Mehlokazulu's suspicions being aroused, scouts were sent
out to examine the ridge on the west, occupied by part of Barker's
force. These returned a few minutes before the Maxim opened to report
troops were really there. The _impi_ was speedily roused and formed
into an _umkumbi_, that is, the 'circle' Barker had seen. Bambata then
completely lost his head, so much so that Mganu, in the absence of
Macala, was called on to take general command. He immediately gave such
orders as appeared necessary to meet the situation. His own regiment,
Mavalana, was told to charge at Barker in one direction, and the others
to do likewise in another. But before the men (already arranged in
companies) could move forward (not _backward_ as McKay and Forbes had
believed), the Maxim began--not from the ridge suspected by the rebels,
but from a different one. What followed at this stage has already been
related. It remains to add that, when it became a case of _sauve qui
peut_, the majority turned and made over the neck in rear as hard as
they could. It flashed across the minds of those familiar with that
part of the country that Dobo was a snare; that being the case, there
was nothing for it but to run the gauntlet towards the waterfall. This,
as has been seen, many accordingly did.
And so, as far as the ordinary rebel could see, the great storm that
was to come turned out to be nothing more than a thunder of artillery
and hail of bullets, brought on by that very race against whom the
mysterious command had been specially directed. Truly, the manner in
which Dinuzulu had directed the elements left much to be desired.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 230: This word is dissyllabic, and pronounced 'maw-me' (the
'e' being as in 'met').]
[Footnote 231: Owing to the insanitary state of his camp (the site
having recently been used by three columns), Barker got permission from
McKenzie to move about three miles to the south-east of the grave, and
out of sight of Macala. This had occurred on the afternoon of the 8th.
On the same day, all the supply waggons (empty) trekked back to Fort
Yolland. Little did Barker suppose that this lucky move would make the
enemy believe the column had vanished as well.]
[Footnote 232: Some fifteen miles of difficult country had been
traversed. The feat was a noteworthy one; it had called for courage and
daring, and well deserved the Distinguished Conduct Medal afterwards
awarded to each of the men.]
[Footnote 233: The mouth of Tate gorge is about a mile west of the
mouth of Mome gorge, and is on the route along which, as hinted in
McKenzie's despatch, the enemy would probably travel. In Barker's view,
it was just possible the enemy, although bound for Mome, would proceed
thither through Tate. It will be seen later, McKenzie, notwithstanding
his written instructions, entertained similar suspicions.]
[Footnote 234: This is the hill referred to on p. 246.]
[Footnote 235: Orders were given for the searchlight to be kept
flashing throughout the night, to give the enemy the impression that
the troops were quietly resting on Nomangci--a ruse that exactly served
its purpose.]
[Footnote 236: F company (Capt. Forsbrook) was, however, at Mangeni. It
joined the regiment on the 14th June.]
[Footnote 237: It so happened that a squadron of R.H., which, for a few
minutes had gone astray during the gallop on top, had already been made
by Major A.W. Fraser to occupy a portion of the position in question,
and so prevent escapes then already beginning to occur.]
[Footnote 238: The battalion moved in line of companies, searching the
bush-covered gullies _en route_; a number of rebels was come upon. A
and H companies lined the river, whilst parties of D, E and G lined one
of the sides of Dobo bush as it was being driven. The work done by the
regiment, especially B and C companies, was very useful.]
[Footnote 239: It is believed by some that this man escaped.]
[Footnote 240: Cd. 3888, p. 185.]
XV.
STATE OF AFFAIRS AT UMSINGA.--OPERATIONS BY MURRAY-SMITH'S
COLUMN.--FURTHER OPERATIONS BY UMVOTI FIELD FORCE AND MACKAY'S COLUMN.
Although Nkandhla had been selected by the rebel leaders as their
_terrain_, that was not to say outbreaks would not occur in other parts
of the Colony as well. Indeed, one of the objects of making Sigananda's
stronghold the principal rallying-point was to encourage overt acts
of rebellion in other parts from knowledge of the fact that, so long
as the fastness was held, it was available as a general headquarters
and place of refuge. As an illustration of this, the disaffected men
of Ngobizembe's tribe who, after being punished in the middle of March
by Leuchars--being by themselves powerless to resist the troops--made
off from Mapumulo and joined Bambata at Nkandhla. Mehlokazulu and
other Chiefs, as has already been seen, broke from Nqutu and adjoining
districts to do the same. The principle upon which all these men acted
seems to have been that, where local confederates were not strong
enough to offer resistance on the spot, either from want of numbers
or suitable fastnesses, they would move to Nkandhla, but where the
prospects were not unfavourable, as at Umsinga and Mapumulo, each with
a teeming Native, and sparse European, population, they would resolve
to try their chances there and then, in the hope that, by creating
additional and widely-separated areas of disturbance, the difficulties
of the troops would be increased, when other tribes would follow one
or other of the alternatives referred to, always with the ulterior
motive of causing the country to rise _en bloc_.
In view of the importance of Umsinga and Mapumulo, both districts being
within forty to forty-five miles of Nkandhla by such routes as Native
pedestrians ordinarily travel, it is well to understand the position at
those places.
In Umsinga district there were, in 1906, ten tribes, by far the largest
being that of Kula. The total huts owned by members of his tribe was
upwards of 4,500.[241] The huts (in the same district) of the other
nine tribes together did not amount to 4,000. To so great an extent did
Kula over-shadow the other Chiefs, that it is unnecessary to make more
than passing reference to the latter.
Kula was a young man, grandson of Ngoza, once famous throughout Natal
and Zululand as Sir Theophilus Shepstone's principal induna. Ngoza,
after serving in a position of trust and responsibility for many years,
was appointed Chief over a tract of country vacated in 1858 by a Chief
Matshana[242] to escape arrest. The ward was 450 square miles in
extent, almost the whole falling within one magisterial division.
The Poll Tax Act and regulations were promulgated to the Natives of
Umsinga in September, 1905, visits being paid by the Magistrate to
four centres for the purpose. The announcement was well received. The
only matter commented on by the Natives was that young men and boys
(over 18) were held liable for the tax, instead of their fathers, as
in the case of the hut tax. It was thought this would promote greater
independence than was already being exhibited towards parents, and,
at the same time, lead to youths retaining their earnings, instead
of handing them over to their fathers or guardians, as up till then
customary, on the plea of having to meet obligations of their own
towards the State.
Kula and the smallest local Chief, Nondubela, soon began to influence
their respective people against paying the tax. Their intrigues were
extended to other Chiefs near them, both in Natal and Zululand. Early
in December (1905), the same two tribes began to prepare for rebellion.
Supplies of assegais, shields and _tshokobezi_ badges were obtained.
The young men of all the Umsinga Chiefs were called on to pay the poll
tax subsequently to 20th January, though payment, it was explained,
might be made at any time between then and 31st May. Only one of the
Chiefs made earnest and successful endeavours to induce his men to pay,
viz. Tulwana, a man who had always been conspicuous for his loyalty to
the Government. Nondubela instructed his men not to pay, nor did any
do so until after the Rebellion had broken out and several reverses
had been sustained by the rebels. Kula advised his tribe to pay a few
pounds, and so throw dust in the eyes of the Government. £98 out of
£1,500 is all that was paid by his people.
In February, two of the same man's tribe, constables at Tugela Ferry,
were charged and convicted of conspiring to murder the European police
at that place and seize their arms and ammunition. The conspiracy was
exposed by one of Chief Sibindi's men--a fellow constable.
Kula, a man of intemperate habits, had for long been a source of
annoyance. In 1898, he openly organized his tribe into regiments. He
was reproved for so doing by the Supreme Chief. Between 1898 and May,
1906, he was repeatedly fined, either for refusing or neglecting to
supply labourers for the Public Works Department. In January, he was
warned by the U.S.N.A. to be more careful. "The Government," this
officer said to him, "is lenient, but will not put up with annoyance
such as this for ever." In July, 1905, the Governor (Sir Henry
McCallum) paid a visit to Pomeroy. The Chiefs were summoned to greet
him. Kula arrived with a mounted cavalcade and deliberately galloped
past the King's representative without saluting. For this gross
disrespect he was cautioned by His Excellency in person.
On the 4th March, 1906, about fifty men of the tribe residing at Elands
Kraal, under headman Mabulawo, openly took up arms. This caused all
European farmers in the neighbourhood to flee precipitately from their
homes. The _impi_ continued under arms and defied the local police,
with the result that thirty-six of the Police Field Force, under
Sub-Inspector C.R. Ottley, were sent to Umsinga to restore order.
Ottley, however, deemed it inadvisable to attempt more with so small a
force than camp near the court-house. On the 23rd, Kula held a large
beer-drink at his kraal within two miles of the magistracy. An armed
force was there assembled, it was said, for the purpose of killing the
police and court officials. On the night fixed for the massacre, Kula,
it seems, got drunk, when some of the more loyal headmen of the tribe
bound him up, thereby preventing him from carrying his supposed threat
into execution.
After these proceedings had been reported, Kula was summoned to
Pietermaritzburg by the Supreme Chief. He at first hesitated about
complying, but, on being pressed by his headmen, obeyed. Upon being
questioned at headquarters by the Minister for Native Affairs, he
denied everything that had occurred, but, in the face of irrefutable
evidence, was ordered to arrest Mabulawo and all who had been or
were still under arms. Twelve days later, the headman was brought
to the Magistrate, unaccompanied, however, by any of those who had
armed. On the 23rd April, a large _impi_ was organized to release
Mabulawo. The latter was now driven off in Dr. Keith Murray's trap to
Pietermaritzburg. When the _impi_ heard of this, and of the fact that
thirty of the Umsinga Reserves had been mobilized and posted at the
magistracy, they withdrew to their kraals.
Ever since the 4th March, the affairs of the district had been going
from bad to worse. Europeans and loyal Natives were assaulted by
disaffected Natives with impunity, so much so that the police were
directed to desist from attending beer-drinks in uniform, and not to
arrest any Native in the presence of others. By this time, Kula's
tribe had virtually become master of the district, doing whatever
appeared right in its own eyes.
It so happened the Magistrate (Mr. A.E. Harrington) was collecting
hut tax at Keate's Drift when Mr. Cross and party were fired on by
Bambata and others in Mpanza valley (3rd April). Chiefs Silwana and
Sibindi were ordered to arm and prevent the rebel Chief from crossing
into their wards. As soon as the message reached Sibindi, he did all
he could to assist, in fact most of his tribe in Umsinga division were
mobilized within two hours. Silwana's response was half-hearted. About
11 p.m. the same day, Ottley and twenty men arrived at the drift from
Pomeroy, six hours after hearing of Bambata's outbreak. The Magistrate,
Umsinga, proceeded the next day (4th) to collect taxes at Tugela Ferry,
where, however, but few paid.
The unrest among the Umsinga Natives now became more accentuated.
Mtele, Kula's uncle and principal induna at Elands Kraal, mobilized the
whole of the people under his charge. Nondubela joined him. The indunas
of that portion of Ngqambuzana's tribe, which was in Umsinga division,
were reported by the Chief as intending to cross into Zululand and
join the rebels. All the Europeans of the district went into lager at
Helpmakaar, excepting the court officials. The Umsinga Reserves were
joined by those of Dundee, Newcastle and Weenen early in May, together
with a composite Militia force under Major W. Murray-Smith, N.M.R.
Kula reported by messengers on the 4th May that Mtele was in open
rebellion. Harrington, in reply, remarked that he had two months
previously told Kula a portion of his tribe was in rebellion, but this
had been denied; "he sends only now to tell me what I knew two months
ago." Before receipt of this message, Kula had openly declared that he
would never come to the court again.
In consequence of a large number of Natives being expected at the
magistracy to pay taxes, a squadron N.M.R. (Capt. P.M. Rattray,
D.S.O.), with a few Reserves under Chief Leader D.C. Uys, was sent
there from Helpmakaar at 6.30 a.m. on the 8th, pending arrival the
same day of Lieut. G.R. Richards, M.L.A., and a squadron (100) N.C.
Kula, probably because he saw troops proceeding to the magistracy,
deemed it prudent to visit it too. Accompanied by a dozen of his
leading men, he arrived shortly before 11 a.m. Almost simultaneously,
Richards rode in with his men. Harrington conferred with the latter,
Rattray and Uys. He pointed out the degree to which Kula was implicated
in the Rebellion, and suggested the man should be removed from the
district. Richards, then in charge of the post, though not senior
officer, decided, with the concurrence of the other officers, to
transfer the Chief to make the statement he had already made respecting
disloyalty in his tribe to the Officer Commanding at Helpmakaar. Kula
was informed of the decision. A few minutes later, he was required
to proceed with Rattray and his men to Helpmakaar. Six headmen were
allowed to accompany the Chief. On arrival at Helpmakaar, Kula was
closely examined by Lieut.-Col. A.T.G. Wales, who, in his turn,
resolved to keep him in custody pending receipt of orders from the
Government.
The Government was naturally placed in an awkward position by these
unexpected and unusual proceedings. Richards, of course, had made no
actual arrest, and, in referring the question of the advisability of
Kula's continued presence in the district to the officer at Helpmakaar,
had done so because the point at issue appeared to be one not for him
but for some higher authority to decide. The Commandant was surprised
at Richards' action, and could he at once have got into communication
with the responsible officers, the probabilities are that Kula would
not have been either arrested or detained, as everything pointed to
his committing himself sooner or later, when he would have been either
captured or shot as a rebel.
Under the circumstances, in view of the then greatly disturbed
condition of the country, the Government caused the Chief to be
conveyed on the 9th from Helpmakaar to Pietermaritzburg, where he was
detained, though not in custody.
Those best competent to judge, firmly believe the arrest or enforced
removal of this important Chief at that particular moment checked the
spread of rebellion in those parts. This, indeed, was subsequently
realized by the Government. Thus, though there was irregularity
in the way in which Kula was removed, the step was justified by
peace being maintained at a time when a rising was imminent in the
thickly-populated district over which he had control.[243]
Kula's brother, Manuka, tried to usurp control of the tribe after the
former's departure. On such endeavour being detected, he was promptly
placed under arrest.
* * * * *
Simultaneously with the dispatch of the Zululand Field Force to
Nkandhla (1st May), squadron A (with the Sydenham troop of B), N.M.R.
(about 110), under Lieut.-Col. H. Sparks, V.D., were detailed for
Mapumulo, whilst the remainder of the regiment (160) proceeded viâ
Dundee to Helpmakaar, under Major W. Murray-Smith. A force,[244] under
the command of Murray-Smith (with Capt. G.T. Hurst as Staff Officer),
left Dundee for Helpmakaar on the 5th. It reached its destination on
the 6th, but moved on the 7th to a new site two miles off, where a
strong lager of wire entanglements was speedily erected.
It was from the foregoing column that the detachments proceeded to
garrison Pomeroy, as already noticed in connection with Kula's removal.
Patrols, too, were sent out in various directions. These obtained
intelligence in confirmation of Mtele and Nondubela being in open
rebellion.
When Wales left for Pietermaritzburg on duty (11th), Murray-Smith
took over the command. Finding the Natives referred to were actually
in rebellion, Murray-Smith decided to attack and prevent them from
inducing others to take up arms. An armed body of 200 to 300 was
discovered at a kraal in a valley some four or five miles from the
camp. As, however, the Commandant's instructions were that the column
should simply proceed to Helpmakaar and, having fortified itself, await
Mackay's arrival, it became necessary for permission to assume the
offensive to be obtained. This Colonel Bru-de-Wold, after carefully
considering the situation, gave in a few hours by telephone.
On the following day (12th May), Rattray was accordingly detailed to
take command of the mounted troops, viz. 60 to 80 N.C. (Lieut. P.W.
Stride); 60 to 80 N.M.R.; about 150 Newcastle, Ladysmith, Dundee and
Estcourt Reserves; and 8 Umsinga Reserves under Chief Leader A. Müller,
the latter being guides and scouts.
Leaving camp before daybreak, the force moved towards Elands Kraal,
some ten miles away. About 9 a.m., the scouts got in touch with the
enemy and exchanged a few shots. Rattray, close at hand, pushed on at a
gallop up a hill and attacked Mtele's _impi_, about 150 to 200 strong,
the latter partly concealed in bushes. The _impi_, making neither
charge nor stand, was forthwith driven into an adjoining valley,
through which they were promptly pursued by N.C. and N.M.R. as far
as the Buffalo (about two miles), as well as in other directions. On
reaching the river, the Natives scattered more than they had already
done, some crossing into Zululand, whilst others concealed themselves
in as extraordinarily rough country on the Natal side.
The Reserves, with a Maxim (N.M.R.), took ground where the enemy had
first been seen. From such position, a continuous fire was kept up,
which proved very effective in breaking down any opposition that might
have been offered in such extremely rugged and out-of-the-way country.
The main force with Murray-Smith had, in the meantime, occupied high
ground overlooking the Elands Kraal settlement and the Buffalo valley.
Here the N.F.A., supporting and covering Rattray, opened and kept up
a shrapnel fire on groups of retreating Natives. Such, however, was
ineffective on account of the long range.
The whole action, including pursuit, lasted about two hours. The troops
suffered no casualties; of the rebels, twenty-nine were killed, eight
prisoners were taken, and thirty cattle captured.
On an examination of the scene being made, two camps of war-huts
were found (about a mile apart). Food and clothing belonging to the
insurgents were discovered at the back of the hill on which they were
first sighted.
Two days later, Murray-Smith took a force (including N.C. at Pomeroy,
then having been relieved by N.R.R.) to Nondubela's kraal, at a hill
called Nqoro, near Buffel's Hoek, but the rebels, on the alert in
consequence of the action at Elands Kraal, escaped to Zululand. It was
on the same day that Mackay crossed into Natal at Rorke's Drift.[245]
Had it been possible for him to co-operate, Nondubela and his force
might not have escaped as cheaply as they did. As it was, Murray-Smith
went with a section of his force to Rorke's Drift, then down the right
bank of the Buffalo, whilst another section, under Rattray, proceeded
by road viâ Elands Kraal valley, and, after crossing Mazabeko stream,
converged with the main body on Nqoro bill (below Fugitives' Drift).
On this occasion, all kraals that were come across belonging to rebels
were destroyed. Over forty miles were covered during the day. The
feature of the day's operations, however, was the splendid performance
of the guns (N.F.A.) under Wilson, which travelled a distance of not
less than forty miles.
In addition to _tshokobezi_ badges, it was noticed that strips of white
goat-skin, about an inch broad and tied round the neck, were used by
Natives of these parts to indicate being in rebellion. The prisoners,
as well as the killed, were found wearing them.
As soon as Mackay arrived, he took command and operated as already
described in Chapter XII.