and 100 N.R.R.[246] under Murray-Smith, to escort a convoy of fifty-one
waggons (supplies, etc.), from Dundee to Nkandhla. Leaving on the 17th,
the escort, strengthened at Vant's Drift by 100 N.C. under Richards,
arrived at Nkandhla viâ Nqutu, Nondweni and Owen's store, on the 24th.
On the following day, the escort, less the N.C.--detached to become
bodyguard to Colonel McKenzie--was ordered to return with the empty
waggons to Dundee and join the Umvoti Field Force (then under command
of Major W.J.S. Newmarch, U.M.R.) at Greytown, and do so viâ Tugela
Ferry. Murray-Smith left Nkandhla on the 26th and, returning viâ Nqutu,
reached Dundee on the 30th.
The night the escort reached Nqutu (28th May), an absurd scare arose
out of a belief that Mehlokazulu intended attacking the village the
same night. The Basutos had, in consequence, mobilized and taken refuge
at the gaol. As, at this time, Mackay was camped sixteen miles away at
Isandhlwana, it is difficult to understand how the scare arose.
On arriving at Dundee, Murray-Smith got orders from Leuchars to proceed
_by rail_ to Greytown, leaving N.R.R. at Dundee. He accordingly
entrained on the 1st June, reached Greytown 6 a.m. on the following
day, and joined the U.F.F. at Spitzkop on the 3rd, temporarily taking
command.
Shortly after, Mackay moved into Nqutu district, Zululand (27th May),
to co-operate with Leuchars. Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton was appointed to
command at Helpmakaar.
On being appointed (29th May), to the command of all troops south of
Tugela and in Nqutu district, Zululand, _i.e._ the whole of Natal
plus Nqutu, Leuchars, as has been seen, visited Helpmakaar to direct
operations from there. He arrived at that place on the 2nd June to
find that 1,000 of Chief Silwana's men had suddenly, and without
reference to the Commandant of Militia, or to himself, been called
out by the Minister for Native Affairs, with orders to be at Pomeroy
on the 3rd. Efforts were at once made to secure a European leader. The
men displayed no enthusiasm whatever and were barely civil. Although
called out under the authority of the Native Code as an ordinary levy,
they asked to be armed with rifles and supplied with blankets. The
applications could not be entertained. Warnings were received that
the levy was not to be trusted. It was freely stated that Silwana had
forbidden the men to cross into Zululand. At Gordon Memorial mission
station they looted a European house. On a false alarm occurring one
night, a number of the younger men sprang to arms with the war-cry,
"Usutu!" Under these circumstances, Leuchars decided to send them
back to Weenen. Urgent requests, however, came from Government and
the Magistrate of Weenen to give them a trial. Mr. G.A. Jackson, who
knew the people, was accordingly appointed to lead them. The order
to return to their homes was withdrawn. They were told Jackson would
take them next day (7th) to a locality where a number of returned
rebels of Manuka's section was in hiding. As there was a tribal feud
of long standing between Silwana's and Kula's people, it was thought
the levy would have undertaken the duty with alacrity. Jackson went to
Helpmakaar to arrange for supplies. On getting back to Pomeroy next
morning to lead the levy on, he found no less than 600 had deserted
during the night. Although about 100 of those remaining volunteered to
go forward, they were carried away by the majority, who, packing up
their bundles, made for their homes. After expressing regret at the
behaviour of their men, the indunas proceeded to do likewise.[247]
By way of facilitating control of the forces in Umsinga and Nqutu
districts, those under Mackay, less the Reserves sent back to
Helpmakaar, were separated from the Helpmakaar Field Force and formed
into a distinct column, with instructions to confine their operations
to the basin of the Buffalo and the north-west portion of Qudeni
mountain. Mackay's column then consisted of the N.C., Right and Left
Wings; N.R., one company; N.F.A., one battery (six guns); and N.N.H.,
one squadron.
The Mapumulo garrison was detached from the U.F.F. and became a
separate column under Sparks, with authority to turn out 200 from each
of two loyal tribes to assist in searching for and arresting returned
rebels of Ngobizembe's tribe.
The H.F.F. was now made up of the garrisons of Pomeroy, Fort
Murray-Smith,[248] Helpmakaar, Paddafontein and Dundee. Wales was
appointed to command vice Weighton, who had been ordered to take over
court-martial duties.
Further proof was given by the Transvaal at this juncture of an
earnest desire to assist Natal in her trouble. That patriotic
and well-known organization, the Lancaster and York Association,
Johannesburg, conceived the idea of offering Natal the services of
150 men (twenty-five of them mounted). On approaching the President,
Mr. (now Sir) Abe Bailey, K.C.M.G., the latter not only approved the
proposal, but undertook to defray all expenses of equipment, clothing,
saddlery, etc.--excepting only salaries and food supplies--out of
his own pocket. This generous offer was most gratefully accepted by
the Natal Government. So enthusiastically did Mr. Joe Bell, Mr. W.
Beachy-Head and other members of the Association take the matter up,
ably assisted by the Staff of the Transvaal Volunteer Headquarters,
that after beginning to enrol on the 1st June, the corps, under the
command of Lieut.-Col. Thomas Peakman, C.M.G., with Capt. G.H. Helbert,
as Adjutant, actually presented itself for inspection at 3 p.m. on the
3rd,[249] and, moving off by train at 5.15 p.m., reached Dundee at
9.30 a.m. on the following day, prepared for any service that might be
required.
The greatest pains had been taken to select only the most efficient
out of the 1,500 applications handed in. The rapidity with which the
men were enrolled, clothed, equipped and entrained was as surprising
to the people of Johannesburg as it was to the Colony of Natal. The L
and Y, or 'Rosebuds,' as the corps was more familiarly styled, were
directed to attach themselves to Mackay's column. This they did at
Mangeni on the 9th June. Peakman was appointed second in command of the
column, and he and his contingent remained with it until the end of the
operations in Zululand.
* * * * *
Intelligence was received by McKenzie (at Nomangci) on the 9th June of
the presence of a strong rebel force at Kotongweni mountain (_i.e._
close to the Tugela, above Watton's Drift). This was probably the force
whose expedition was referred to on p. 315, although the expedition
there dealt with was confined to the neighbourhood of Watton's Drift.
McKenzie ordered the U.F.F. to make a night march on 12th and, crossing
next morning near Ngubevu Drift, to work down Mfongozi valley, where a
column from Nkandhla would be ready to co-operate. Leuchars thereupon
re-mobilized the 1st and 2nd Krantzkop Reserves, instructing van Rooyen
to march down the Dimane valley to the Tugela and prevent the enemy
from breaking into Natal from Kotongweni, on their being pressed on
the Zululand side. The O.C. Helpmakaar, moreover, was directed to
co-operate on the north-west by moving a force of Reserves, N.R.R. and
D.L.I. to look out at the Buffalo for any of the enemy who might be
returning to their homes in that direction. It was at this time (10th),
it will be remembered, that the Mome action took place.
The U.F.F., joined by Sibindi, who had again voluntarily mobilized his
men, crossed at Ngubevu and proceeded to Mfongozi valley, where touch
was got with Mackay, but, in spite of constant efforts, communication
could not be opened up with the column from Nkandhla until 11 a.m.
on the following day. Leuchars operated in Mfongozi valley both on
the 13th and 14th, capturing many cattle. After he had conferred with
Colonel McKenzie, a decision was come to for both columns to operate
at Kotongweni on the following day. Five hundred of Sibindi's men
accordingly went down Mfongozi river to the Tugela, whilst McKenzie
operated from the top of the mountain. The operations, however, proved
unsuccessful.
The O.C. Troops now directed Leuchars to return to Broeder's Hoek,
about twelve miles from Krantzkop magistracy, keeping his own force in
the vicinity of Kombe forest. Mackay was instructed to remain on Qudeni
mountain during a three days' armistice which was proclaimed at the
same time, to afford rebels an opportunity of surrendering. Captive
women were utilized to make the proclamation known to those who were in
hiding.
The U.F.F. marched viâ Ngubevu to Broeder's Hoek. The Reserves at
Helpmakaar were demobilized on 16th and 17th June, with exception of
those of Umsinga, who were retained as garrison at Helpmakaar lager,
it being still unsafe for the women and children who had taken refuge
there to return to their farms.
With the object of relieving some of the men of Mackay's force, two
squadrons B.M.R. and one squadron N.C.(D), were mobilized, and sent
under Arnott to Dundee on the 18th.[250] Major Moe proceeded, at the
same time, with the whole of the N.N.H. to Pomeroy, in order to bring
rebels of Kula's tribe to book, also escort to Pomeroy Chief Makafula
of Nqutu district whom Mackay had been directed to arrest. The arrest,
however, was not made, as Mackay, who had been in close touch with the
Chief, had good grounds for believing he was not disloyal, as supposed
to be the case by those at a distance. In this view, Mackay was
supported by the Magistrate.
Whilst contemplating a demonstration in Silwana's location by Mackay's
column from the Umsinga side, and by the U.F.F. from that of Greytown,
Leuchars received a wire from O.C. Mapumulo reporting that his convoy
had been attacked on the morning of the 19th at Oglesby's store,
near Otimati, when one man had been killed and another wounded. He
thereupon caused his forces to concentrate at Mapumulo as speedily as
possible.
Before describing the position at Mapumulo, a thickly-populated
district which now became the principal focus of rebellion, it will be
necessary to take up the threads once more at Nkandhla and narrate what
happened between the action at Mome gorge (10th) and the outbreak at
Mapumulo just referred to.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 241: Giving, roughly, a population of 18,000 souls, or about
2,500 fighting men.]
[Footnote 242: The man referred to frequently in this history as
Matshana ka Mondise.]
[Footnote 243: Kula's uncle, Mtele, with the portion of the tribe that
rebelled with him, formed part of the force that attacked Leuchars at
Mpukunyoni.]
[Footnote 244: It was made up of 200 N.C., Right Wing (Major A.C.
Townsend); 160 N.M.R. (Capt. P.M. Rattray); N.F.A. (four guns) (Major
C. Wilson); 55 N.R.R. (Lieut. A. McKenzie); and departmental details.
When _en route_ to Helpmakaar, it was joined by the following Reserves:
80 Newcastle (Chief Leader Adendorff); 200 Estcourt (Chief Leader A.F.
Henderson, C.M.G.); 55 Dundee (Chief Leader D.C. Uys).]
[Footnote 245: His and Murray-Smith's men met near the Buffalo and
moved back together to the latter's camp.]
[Footnote 246: N.R.R. were relieved at Pomeroy on the 16th by D.L.I.
(100) (Capt. W.P.M. Henderson), the latter having arrived at Helpmakaar
on the preceding day from Dundee with a convoy of supplies.]
[Footnote 247: Report, Colonel G. Leuchars, C.M.G., 23rd Nov. 1906.]
[Footnote 248: That is, the lager, consisting chiefly of wire
entanglements, erected about two miles from Helpmakaar.]
[Footnote 249: By the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South
Africa.]
[Footnote 250: Only, as will appear later, to proceed at once to
Stanger.]
XVI.
CONCLUDING OPERATIONS, NKANDHLA.--VISIT OF DINUZULU'S INDUNAS TO
PIETERMARITZBURG.--POSITION AT MAPUMULO.--ACTIONS AT OTIMATI AND
PEYANA (HLONONO).
Reference was made towards the close of the preceding chapter to a
combined move by Leuchars, Mackay and a column from Nkandhla in the
direction of Kotongweni on the 15th June. The object was to drive
the enemy with his stock from Qudeni mountain into the valley of the
Mfongozi river. The Nkandhla column, commanded by McKenzie, consisted
of the 'divisional troops' shown at the foot of the page.[251]
The transport and N.F.A. (pompoms), with an escort of N.R. (three
companies, A, D and E, Major Boyd-Wilson), proceeded on the 12th viâ
Nkandhla and Ensingabantu to Ntingwe. On the same day, the remainder
of the divisional troops and R.H. (temporarily detached from Royston's
Brigade), visited and thoroughly searched Ofeni gorge and ridge _en
route_. Ofeni[252] is a remarkable chasm, about five miles to the
south of Empandhleni. A small stream that rises there and descends
rapidly to the Insuze, has the same name. The sides of the chasm, which
are over 300 feet in height, are linked together by means of a tiny,
natural bridge but a few feet in width. Makahleleka, one of Sigananda's
many and more important sons, was declared to be in hiding at this
uncanny place. The search, however, resulted in practically no rebels
being found. The troops afterwards proceeded to Titlestad's store, at
Ntingwe, where they bivouacked for the night.
Although the foregoing movement was carried out expressly with the
object of co-operating on the 13th with Leuchars and Mackay, then near
Kotongweni and Qudeni respectively, the plan, in so far as McKenzie
was concerned, was disturbed through receipt of intelligence to the
effect that Bambata, Cakijana and Mangati had taken refuge in the bush
at Macala. To surround the mountain by daybreak on the 13th then, of
course, became the immediate object. Barker was ordered to co-operate.
He was to take up positions on the south, whilst McKenzie would do
likewise in other directions. When dawn broke and the latter's troops
were in the positions assigned, Barker was found exactly where it was
desired he should be, _i.e._ at the lower end of Macala bush. The
fastness, which lay in a bush at the top of the mountain, consisted of
great masses of rock lying one on top of the other in such a way as to
form, below the surface of the ground, a network of dark passages, the
one communicating with the other. Only with the greatest difficulty
could people who had taken refuge there be found and, when this
occurred, the searchers, on account of the irregular formation of the
labyrinth and its narrow passages, ran serious risks when dealing with
a desperate enemy, especially one who had reduced the length of his
assegai to enable it to be used with the best effect. A Native levy
which had accompanied the column, was instructed to drive the bush,
whilst being supported by the troops. During this operation, a rebel,
who was concealed under the rocks, stabbed one of the levy in the leg.
On the drive, which was partially successful, coming to an end, the
underground passages were entered and thoroughly searched by the N.C.,
with the result that a number of other rebels was killed. It afterwards
transpired that these Natives, when at first they had found themselves
surprised by the troops, ran to the rock 'warren,' never dreaming
"people with boots on," as they put it, would venture to explore so
dark and perplexing a spot. The principal object of the quest, however,
was not attained, though Bambata's witch-doctor, Malaza, was among the
slain. Some 450 cattle were captured during the day. McKenzie withdrew
to Ntingwe, and Barker to near Cetshwayo's grave.
Whilst the foregoing operations were in progress, the Z.M.R., under
Vanderplank, proceeded to the hill Jokwana, west of Macala, to get in
touch with Leuchars and Mackay, and to advise the former of what was
taking place at Macala. He was, moreover, to co-operate as well as he
could in carrying out the original plan. Owing, however, to the haze,
communication could not be established.
On the day following, 14th June, McKenzie moved up towards Kombe
forest, where he succeeded in getting into communication with Leuchars.
A drive of the combined forces through the valley that lay between
them was accordingly arranged and took place the same day, but without
result. Colonels McKenzie and Leuchars met, when further combined
operations were arranged to take place on the 15th at Kotongweni,
where Mangati and Cakijana were then alleged to be hiding in caves.
On the departure of the O.C. Troops from Nomangci, Lieut.-Col. J.S.
Wylie, D.L.I., was placed in charge of the camp. Hedges, Calverley
and Titlestad were, at the same time, instructed to try and locate
Sigananda, with a view to bringing about his capture or surrender. One
or other of these alternatives appeared imminent. As a result of the
untiring and well-directed efforts of these officers, not only was
the rebel leader's whereabouts discovered, but, on his being persuaded
to surrender, he did so forthwith, not, however, to Wylie, but to an
officer of lower rank. The latter's action, with Wylie in camp, was
inexcusable, and his acceptance of the surrender irregular and invalid,
as, of course, the only person competent to announce the terms of
surrender was the O.C. Troops. Unfortunately, the last-named did not
receive a notification as to what had happened until twenty-four hours
later. He decided that the surrender was to be unconditional and be
accompanied with those of all the Chief's people, together with their
arms. To this Sigananda agreed. On the 16th, he was conveyed by the
balance of R.H. at Nomangci to Empandhleni.
Boyd-Wilson, by making a creditable forced march with the transport,
succeeded in joining McKenzie at Kombe on the 14th.
The combined operations at Kotongweni (15th) proved disappointing. In
the neighbourhood of the camp, however, where the bushes were searched
by N.R., thirteen rebels were shot, whilst a large quantity of goods,
probably looted from European stores in the vicinity, was discovered.
Owing to Mackay not having got in touch with McKenzie on the 13th, his
column was unable to take part in the operations.
In the meantime, reliable intelligence had reached Nomangci of Bambata
having been killed during the action at Mome. Because of a rumour
circulated on the day of the action that he had escaped with a wound,
it obviously became necessary to take the greatest pains in securing
identification. Two of his tribe, who had been brought from Greytown
in April in anticipation of difficulty in connection with matters
of identification, happened to be still at Empandhleni. These were
conducted on the 13th to the spot where the body was lying, namely, at
the very bottom of the gorge, within half a dozen yards of the right
bank of the Mome, and just where the Dobo or 'pear-shaped' forest abuts
on the stream. Although the inspection took place five days after
death, the features, by reason of the extreme cold in the gorge at
that time of year--mid-winter--were remarkably well preserved. The two
Native informants, who were intimately acquainted with Bambata, had
no difficulty in recognizing the body as that of their Chief. Such
peculiarities as had been described _beforehand_ by these and other
relatives and acquaintances as characteristic of Bambata, were found
about the body--tallying exactly. Among them were: a gap between the
two middle upper teeth; slight beard, rather under, than on the front
of, the chin; a scar immediately below one eye, and another on the
cheek opposite; a high instep. As, however, the officer in charge
wished to put the matter beyond all doubt, and as to carry a corpse
already five days old up the sides of a gorge, about whose steepness so
much has already been written, was out of the question, he directed the
head to be removed and brought instead. As a result of this, decisive
corroborative evidence was secured. This must have been wanting had
timidity been permitted to usurp the ordinary dictates of common sense.
It was, of course, of the utmost importance to prove that the principal
ringleader in a serious rebellion, a man then still believed by many
of his followers to possess supernatural powers, was really dead. Care
was taken to keep the head in a decent manner until the plain and
necessary object, solely on account of which it had been removed, was
served. At no time whilst it was in charge of the troops, was there the
slightest act of disrespect towards it or the deceased's memory. It was
not exposed to public view, but kept by one of the medical officers in
a manner the most proper under the circumstances. It was, moreover,
impossible for anyone to see it without permission, which, again,
was withheld, except for the necessary purpose of identification. In
addition to the two Natives referred to, three others, viz. a prisoner
who had come from Natal with Bambata, and two men of Sigananda's tribe
who knew Bambata well, were sent by the Acting Magistrate to see the
head; this they at once recognized as Bambata's.
As soon as identification had been completed, the head was taken back
to the gorge and there buried along with the body.[253]
After the finding of Bambata's body and the surrender of Sigananda,
General Stephenson, who had witnessed the operations at Nkandhla
for nearly three weeks, left with his staff for the Transvaal, viâ
Pietermaritzburg.
Before proceeding with his chief staff officer and bodyguard to
Empandhleni on the 16th, McKenzie, convinced that the Rebellion was
then practically over, allowed the levies to return to their homes for
three days. During this period, he gave out, all operations would be
suspended, to afford those in hiding an opportunity of surrendering.
The levies were accordingly told to try and induce rebels of their
respective tribes to come in. Sigananda was, at the same time, directed
to send messengers to members of his and Ndube's tribes who had
rebelled, by way of bringing about speedy and general surrenders. Among
those who were successful in this connection was Sergt. E. Titlestad,
of the Intelligence Department, and for long a storekeeper at Ntingwe.
Proceeding to Qudeni forest he, in a couple of days, managed to induce
284 men to return with him to camp. McKenzie's column, then taken
command of by Royston, moved to Ndikwe stream, north-east of and below
Ensingabantu store.
With the Rebellion in Zululand at an end, nothing remained but to clear
the country in the direction of Qudeni, Mfongozi and towards Nqutu,
that is, to receive surrenders or make arrests where rebels, generally
the most culpable, were unwilling to come in. Woolls-Sampson, having
returned from his visit to Pietermaritzburg,[254] was, on the 20th,
given command of a column.[255] He was instructed to form a depôt at
Ensingabantu and to operate in that part of the country.
It was at this stage that news of the outbreak at Mapumulo on the 19th
was received. In addition to instructing Leuchars to push forward the
U.F.F. to the scene of disturbance, Mansel was ordered by the O.C.
Troops to camp at Middle Drift, from which place patrols were to be
thrown out in all directions, particularly up and down Tugela valley,
so as to intercept movements towards Zululand of rebels then stated to
be collecting on the right bank of the Tugela, between Middle Drift and
Bond's Drift.
Mackay and Royston proceeded, in the meantime, to clear country in the
vicinity of their respective camps. On the 22nd, two squadrons N.C.,
with the mounted section, L and Y, and a Native levy, left on a patrol
in the direction of the Buffalo river. Very difficult country was
traversed. A remarkable gorge, known as Emlola-mazembe (_where axes
are ground_), was come upon in a small and peculiarly-secluded valley,
through which the Gubazi stream passes. At the lower end of the valley,
the stream runs through a huge cleft, the stone walls of which are
about 150 feet high and only about 12 feet apart at the top. The cleft
extends some 100 or so yards before the water flows from a large dark
pool at this uncanny spot into another valley beyond. No wonder that
such place had, until that very day, been occupied by rebels.
A notable arrest was made about this time near Empandhleni, viz.
Bekuzulu, brother of the late Mehlokazulu. This man, who was a rebel,
was being harboured at a kraal. The head of the kraal was, of course,
also arrested.