from all troops east and west, including the two 15-pounders and Colt
gun--the whole forming almost a semi-circle of flame in the gloomy,
early dawn. The consternation among the rebels was such as, for a few
moments, to paralyze action; they rushed wildly to and fro, throwing
down coats, tin cans, equipment, etc. and seeking shelter in the
greatest disorder, anywhere and everywhere. Large numbers dashed
through the neck in the hope of escaping to their original destination,
only to be met, first by well-directed fire of the men posted
immediately above that part on the east, and, where these failed,
by that of men (also on the east), detached from Fairlie and pushed
forward still nearer the Dobo forest. Thus those fortunate in escaping
the hail of bullets at the mouth had to continue to run the gauntlet
for another 200 or 300 yards over rugged country. The day of reckoning
had come, and come with a vengeance. Some, by sheer perseverance and
good luck, succeeded in reaching the forest immediately below the
waterfall, where they were, of course, safe; but, on this retreat
being completely cut off by McKenzie, as will presently be seen, the
fugitives found themselves forced to enter the then only available
shelter, namely the Dobo forest; but to proceed thither was no better
than jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. That forest was
nothing less than a huge trap, capable of being completely surrounded
and driven at leisure. Moreover, in attempting to gain entrance
thereto, more than one sharp encounter took place with the Nongqai,
levies, and supporting European troops.
At 7.5 a.m. the "cease fire" was sounded, when the troops were directed
to leave the ridges and drive down the slopes, as well as over the
area and along the stream in the immediate vicinity of the bivouac,
also between the neck and Dobo. Much of the ground was covered with
shrubs, long grass or rushes, and, here and there, the banks of the
stream were hollowed out through the action of the water. In carrying
out the movement, several cases occurred of individual rebels feigning
death, when, on being more closely examined, they suddenly jumped up
and attacked, either by seizing their assailant's rifle, or lunging at
him with an up-till-then carefully concealed assegai.
Having described how Barker (who happened to be nearest the enemy)
carried out the instructions he had received from McKenzie, it is
necessary now to see what action was being simultaneously taken by
the latter. The infantry and artillery were moved from Nomangci at 3
a.m. and the mounted troops at 3.30 a.m. to co-operate with Barker
by descending both ridges overlooking Mome gorge, with the principal
object of cutting the enemy off from the stronghold on fleeing from
Barker below.[235] The western side was occupied by N.C. (C squad),
Z.M.R. (about 100), N.D.M.R. (about 100), R.H. (about 450), D.L.I.
(about 140), N.F.A. (one 15-pounder), two pompoms, a Maxim detachment,
and a Native levy. The eastern side was held by the Natal Rangers (with
Maxim guns), under Lieut.-Col. J. Dick.[236]
As part of McKenzie's plan was to effect the capture of Sigananda,
he dismounted the Z.M.R. and marched them and the D.L.I. in single
file, together with the Native levy, down to the large forest known
as Mvalasango (on the west of the waterfall), in which Sigananda was
said to be, with the object of driving it. The men were lining the
edge of this forest, extremely dense and steep at that part, and
awaiting the order to move forward into the bush, under Lieut.-Col.
J.R. Royston, when the loud and simultaneous fire already referred to
burst from Barker's Maxim, artillery and rifles, about 2,500 yards
further down. The first thought that flashed across McKenzie's mind
was that Barker had trapped the rebels at the mouth whilst they were
marching to enter. If such surmise were true, it became necessary
at once to prevent fugitives from retreating towards Tate gorge and
Macala. With this object in view, the troops were recalled and the
order given to mount, the intention being to move down into the Insuze
valley by way of Gcongco ridge which, as will be remembered, had been
used on the occasion of the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave.
These movements, although extremely difficult in the mist and dark,
were carried out with great rapidity and dash, but resulted only in
the troops being presently wheeled to a position lower down the gorge
than the one just vacated. McKenzie came to the decision to right
about wheel whilst on the gallop, owing to seeing that the flash from
the fire of Barker's 15-pounders, 1,400 feet below, was directed up
the Mome instead of westwards as at first anticipated. To return to
hold ground half-way between top and bottom of the gorge and 300 yards
from the edge of Dobo, was a matter of but a few moments. On this
hurried rush back, a solitary armed rebel was come upon and shot whilst
attempting to escape in the mist.
Alive to the importance of swift movement, McKenzie dashed down the
side of the gorge at a pace that excited at once the surprise and envy
of his men. These could but follow to the best of their ability. He
grasped the situation in an instant--his eye for country is proverbial.
He saw that the main line of retreat, the disposition of forces then
being what it was, must necessarily be up the Dobo, to the top of the
ridge (down whose eastern slopes that forest grew), and from thence
into as precipitous though narrower a ravine on the west. Stringent
orders were thereupon given for that particular topmost part to be
effectively guarded by Royston's Horse, who were, moreover, ordered
to connect with Barker's left. So important did McKenzie deem this,
and rightly so, that a staff officer was at once sent to see that the
order he had already sent by another staff officer was, as a matter
of fact, being properly executed.[237] His next act, as essential as
the other, was to push troops down to check the rebels already making
along the river banks towards the waterfall and the large dense forests
in that neighbourhood. Detachments of the Z.M.R., N.D.M.R. and R.H.,
having once more dismounted, accordingly ran down to the Mome and there
effectually cut off such fugitives as had not already made good their
escape, compelling them to find refuge, though only for a time as it
happened, in the pear-shaped or Dobo bush. At the same time, the N.C.
Maxim (Sergt. Ross), was smartly got down to a suitable position and
greatly assisted in preventing the enemy's escape.
The Rangers had originally been directed to hold the upper eastern
ridge of the Mome and get in touch with Fairlie. On leaving Nomangci
camp at 3 a.m., they were obliged to traverse a large section of forest
along narrow paths, where they were delayed owing to the guides for
a time losing their way, so much so, that when the action started,
the men had barely emerged from the forest at the left rear of the
waterfall. On hearing the fire, however, they pushed forward at a brisk
pace to occupy the ground assigned them.
When the action was at its height, they were required to move down
and assist men of N.C., Z.M.R., R.H. and other corps in cutting off
the retreat. The necessary orders, however, could not be conveyed, as
there was insufficient sunshine to use the heliograph. The semaphore
was tried, but also proved unsuccessful. It is, however, doubtful, if,
had the men come down, they would have been in time to be of material
assistance.
After running down to check escapes along the banks of the Mome, the
detachments of Z.M.R., N.D.M.R., N.C. and R.H. that had assembled
there, when it was evident the fugitives had been cut off, were
reinforced and then directed by McKenzie to drive, under the command of
Lieut.-Col. Royston, down the Mome through the scrub and bush towards
the lower part of Dobo. In the course of this drive, the notorious
ringleader, Mehlokazulu, one of the men who started the Zulu War, was
shot. He was wearing a new pair of riding trousers, shirt, socks and
overcoat, whilst a pair of new tanned boots was being carried for him
by one of his servants.
About 9 a.m. Barker got into communication with McKenzie by semaphore,
when he received orders to move his guns to the ridge in immediate rear
of the enemy's bivouac (where the neck referred to was), and to search
Dobo thoroughly with shrapnel. The forest was accordingly shelled from
top to bottom. The enemy, realizing that he had been caught in a trap,
could do nothing else than conceal himself as effectually as possible
among the numerous boulders, crevices and other hiding-places to be
found there. The troops at the bottom, including Nongqai and levies,
now began to drive the bush upwards. They had not proceeded many yards
before Colonel McKenzie directed them to withdraw, climb the western
face of the gorge immediately north of Dobo, and, joined on top by
N.D.M.R., R.H., D.L.I. and B and C companies N.R. (which battalion had
been ordered to come down from the opposite side of the gorge)[238] to
drive downwards towards the Mome. The reason for operating in this way
was because, by advancing upwards, the troops were at a disadvantage,
as the rebels, most of whom still retained possession of their
assegais, would have been able to throw with effect at men climbing
under the greatest difficulties up so steep an incline.
It was already 2 p.m. when the drivers, purposely as numerous as
possible, were in position. N.R., R.H., and D.L.I. took the left,
N.D.M.R. the centre, with Nongqai and levies on the right. The rate of
progress, owing to the exceptionally steep and rugged area, and to the
enemy having concealed himself in various and most ingenious ways, was
very slow. Steps, too, had to be taken to see that the line advanced
in as uniform a manner as possible to prevent accidents. Occasionally
Nongqai or levies on the right, more used to such movements than
Europeans, got ahead, when they had to be halted to allow the rest
to move up. With the constant interruptions that occurred, it is
surprising the drive was conducted as well as it was.
After reaching a point about three-quarters of the way down, it
was seen the Nongqai had again swung round in advance and partly
overlapped. If their being in advance had been dangerous when higher
up, it was more so now where the bush, narrowing as it approached
the Mome, was only 250 yards across instead of 1,200. All this
time, independent firing had been going on in various directions
and many rebels were killed. Fairlie, who led the Nongqai, fearing
accidents, decided to withdraw, leaving the rest of the bush to be
completed by such troops as remained. He directed the "assembly" to
be sounded. The effect of this unfortunate mistake was that, not
only did all the Nongqai begin to leave, but also all the European
troops and Native levy (though not so fast), for, hearing the call,
the majority naturally supposed it had been ordered by the general
officer commanding. Had the "assembly" not been sounded, the rest of
the bush--only a small portion remained--must have been as thoroughly
driven as that already done, with the result that many rebels, who
had continually slipped further and further to the bottom end as they
heard the drivers advancing, would not have escaped as they did. For
all anyone knew at the time, Bambata and other important rebels were
among those who escaped. When the bugle sounded, it was already late
(4.30 p.m.), though not so late as those engaged supposed, nor too late
for the drive to be completed. Exactly how many rebels escaped at that
particular spot it is impossible to say. A hundred would probably be
beyond the mark.
After withdrawing from Mvalasango forest, in which it was supposed
Sigananda was concealed, McKenzie could not, of course, take steps
to drive it that day. Even supposing Sigananda was there, which, as a
matter of fact, was not the case--information subsequently obtained
proved he was in the small gorge immediately on the west of Mome--the
futility of driving increased every moment after withdrawing to cut off
the enemy. Sigananda, on hearing the fire at the mouth (supposing him
to have been in the gorge), would naturally have retreated further into
his stronghold, and to one or other of its innumerable recesses where,
after the delay of say an hour or two, it would have been utterly
impossible, even for the total forces engaged, to have found him, had
they been withdrawn from all parts of the field to undertake the search.
Among the slain were Mtele[239] of Umsinga division uncle of Chief
Kula, who will be dealt with at length in Chapter XV.; Nondubela
(_alias_ Mavukutu), a Chief also of Umsinga division and an associate
of Mehlokazulu; Paula and Moses, the Christian teachers who had joined
Bambata at Mpanza; and the rebel protagonist Bambata himself.
The death of Bambata occurred as follows: Some time after those who
fled into Dobo had passed in, and shortly before the shelling thereof,
a solitary unarmed man, with but a shirt on, was seen making his way
up the Mome stream, walking in the water. The first to notice him
was a Native loyalist, some sixty yards away on the left bank of
the Mome. Behind the man in the shirt, however, on the right bank,
and only ten yards off, was another loyalist. The man in the water
perceived the Native sixty yards off, but not the one in rear. Seeing
the more distant man rushing to attack him, he left the water, but no
sooner did he mount the right bank, than the one in rear, seizing the
opportunity, darted forward and planted his long-bladed assegai in the
rebel's body. This happened just as that part, where Dobo abuts on
the Mome, had been reached. The loyalist, a powerfully built fellow,
endeavoured to withdraw the weapon, the only one he had, with the
object of again stabbing his far-from-dead foe. But, having thrust
too hard, the assegai had got so bent that it could not be extricated.
The unfortunate victim had by this time fallen. Presently, the man who
had first observed him, crossed the stream and, raising his assegai,
attempted to thrust at the half-prostrate form. Quick as lightning, the
latter--never uttering a sound--clutched the assegai with both hands
before it had struck him, and violently struggled for its possession.
It seemed he must succeed, notwithstanding two were against him. He
fought with the valour of despair. By this time, however, a Nongqai,
also on the left bank, had noticed what was afoot. Coming up quickly,
he raised his rifle and shot the rebel through the head. And there,
after further unsuccessful efforts to withdraw the assegai, the corpse
was left to lie. None of those present bothered themselves with
deceased's identity. As the establishment of such identity did not take
place until a couple of days afterwards, and then only under special
circumstances, the rest of the story must be reserved for its proper
place.
[Illustration: MOME
Dispositions are at beginning of action; for subsequent ones, see
Reference and text
Scale
0 500 1000 2000 3000 yards
REFERENCE
A = _Colonel McKenzie's position during action_
B = _Where N.C., N.D.M.R, and R.H. prevented escape of rebels_
C, D, E = _Positions N.C., D.L.I., N.D.M.R. respectively, at 7.30 a.m._
F = _Squadron, R.H., 8 a.m._
G = _Barker's 15-pdrs., 8 a.m._
H _to_ J = _Barker's force was operating at 8 a.m. between these points_
K = _Bambata killed here_
L _to_ M = _Line held by N.R., 8 a.m._
N = _Mehlokazulu killed here_
_Enemy; after being repulsed
at G, fled to forest near waterfall,
also to Dobo (pear-shaped) forest_]
When the last troops (among them the D.L.I. and the Native levy) had
emerged from Dobo, orders were given for the columns to march back to
their respective camps. Needless to say the infantry that had taken
part in the last drive, were thoroughly exhausted by the time they got
back. For them, indeed, the day had been particularly long and arduous.
It is only to be expected that the enemy's losses were severe. The
total, however, as has been proved by subsequent enquiry, was not
so great as believed by some. The estimates were at first fixed at
anything between five and six hundred. Taking into consideration the
accounts given by rebels, by members of various units that took part,
and others likely to know, it would appear the number was about five
hundred. The losses amongst McKenzie's troops, including Barker, were
small. Capt. S.C. Macfarlane (D.S.O.), T.M.R., was killed (probably
by his own side, through his pushing further forward in the early
dawn than directed to do). Lieut. C. Marsden, R.H., and Tpr. F.H.
Glover (I.L.H.), T.M.R., were mortally wounded, and eight other
Europeans wounded. Sergt. Mahashahasha, Z.N.P. (Nongqai), and members
of the levies were also wounded. This great disparity in losses of
the opposing forces is, of course, accounted for by the fact that the
rebels were taken at a disadvantage. It is only natural that heavy
losses would have resulted on well-armed troops waylaying the enemy
as was done on the day in question. The rebels knew perfectly well
what the result of clashing with European troops would be (this from
lessons drawn especially from the Zulu War), even where the ground
was not particularly favourable to either side. They had still to
experience the effects where, with greatly inferior weapons, they were
tactically at serious disadvantage. Such contingency they were, of
course, aware _might_ occur. No doubt, looking on their opponents as
slow and ponderous, they thought it would never arise. It is, however,
the unlikely that occurs in war. There is no question that the end they
kept constantly in mind was in some way or another to secure tactical
advantages over detached sections of European troops similar to that
obtained over themselves by the latter on the 10th of June, when, it
is needless to add, they would have administered punishment even more
severe and relentless than was meted out to them then.
To be shot down or stabbed in battle is regarded by Natives as the
natural consequence of war, and, when an advantage has been obtained,
they are surprised if it be not used to the greatest effect. It
is difficult to describe the contempt with which the warlike Zulu
regards what we are pleased to style magnanimity--the magnanimity, for
instance, of Gladstone in 1881, with certain victory in view, and the
magnanimity of restoring Cetshwayo to Zululand in 1883. They reason
thus: Two peoples are at war; one must defeat the other, and the best
way is to do so in a thorough-going way. Nothing, they hold, is so
effective and lesson-serving as wholesale slaughter. Anything else
is to pander to future trouble and misery. When the blow has to be
struck, let each strike and strike severely. To spare an enemy during
continuance of hostilities is fatal. As well spare flames doing their
best to burn down a kraal.
Curious incidents sometimes occur on the eve of momentous events, but
escape narration because irrelevant to the issue. An exception must be
made on the present occasion, for the story will at least surprise any
Zulu that happens to hear it. "As we were marching at a walk on the
night in question," says Barker, "and when about two miles to the south
of Cetshwayo's grave, I and my Adjutant (Capt. W. Jardine) leading, I
noticed in our path a black cat. I called Jardine's attention to it,
jocularly supposing it to be a sign of luck ahead. It was moonlight,
and before the mist had come on. The cat, black all over, was evidently
tame. It led the way towards the Mome. I afterwards forgot and lost
sight of it. On our way back after the fight, coming along last, as I
wanted to see all our men out, the same cat entered my path and came
along. Again I lost sight of it, but next morning found it lying on or
near my pillow. After this, it remained in camp and became a regimental
favourite. I subsequently took it to the Transvaal."
The chapter will conclude with a brief survey of what took place among
the rebels themselves between the converging movement on Cetshwayo's
grave (17th May), and their collapse at Mome.
Not satisfied that the order to rebel had emanated from Dinuzulu, as
declared to be the case by Cakijana and Bambata, seeing the promised
reinforcements had not arrived, Mangati resolved to visit Usutu and
learn the truth from Dinuzulu himself. Bambata decided to accompany
him, but Cakijana, owing to the wound he had received, could not
go. The two, accompanied by two other mounted men, rode off on the
20th. Interviews took place, probably on 24th (Queen's birthday), and
25th, between them and Dinuzulu. The latter denied having started or
authorized the Rebellion, emphasizing he had merely said to Bambata:
"If you people want to fight, why do you not all unite and fight the
whites?" He said, again, to Mangati: "If you people desire to fight,
go and do so, it is not my doing. Go and join Mehlokazulu. I hear he
also has joined the rebels. After joining him, go and join Sigananda,
and, if necessary, go on fighting till you get to Natal.... Sigananda's
messengers are here now to report that the white people have burnt my
father's grave and are unearthing my father's bones. I tell you now, go
and join Mehlokazulu and do what he tells you."[240] After spending two
days at Usutu, where they were fed and hospitably treated by the man
who, but five weeks before, had sent the loyal and reassuring statement
printed on p. 214, and beginning: "I am not surprised that the Natal
Government should have doubt as to my loyalty.... I can only say I am
perfectly loyal and am most anxious to give proof of this...." the
rebel ringleaders departed with a blessing from that 'loyal' and 'much
maligned' Chief, to use their best endeavours to overthrow the white
man's rule.
By the time Mangati and Bambata had got back to the area of
hostilities, Leuchars had fought his action at Mpukunyoni (28th).
Mehlokazulu and other leaders from the north-west moved to Nkonyeni
forest, near Kombe. After the fight at Manzipambana (3rd June), the
greater portion of the Nkandhla rebels collected at Macala. Bambata,
leaving Macala with his tribesmen, got into touch with Mehlokazulu,
and returned with him and them on the 7th to mass at Macala. Here, the
combined forces were informed by Mangati that he had just returned from
Dinuzulu whose wish it was that Macala--"a man with a temper"--should
take supreme command, and Mganu command the regiment Mavalana. Under
this arrangement, Bambata and Mangati assumed the title of 'princes.'
Finding the _impi_ had, for the most part, gone to Macala, Sigananda
sent word to Bambata to return at once, as, having started a rebellion
in his (Sigananda's) ward, it was unfair to desert, leaving him to cope
as best he could with the enraged Europeans. Bambata had deceived them
once by declaring the white man's bullets would not 'enter,' was he
going to do so again by throwing over the original plan of adopting
Nkandhla as the principal rallying-ground? The reply was that the
forces would return at once.
It was now resolved by the leaders to further increase their numbers if
possible. A large force accordingly proceeded on the 7th to the Tugela,
near Watton's store, where Mangati alone paid a visit to a son of Chief
Gayede to induce him, as diplomatically as he could, to join them. The
son explained his father was ill and unable to join, being a mere "dog
of the Government." The primary object of the expedition was to put
Gayede and another adjoining Chief, Hlangabeza, to death, whereupon
their people would probably espouse the cause of the rebels. These
irregular and hazardous proceedings were strongly disapproved by Macala
and others. These men, therefore, refrained from accompanying the force.
After visiting Watton's store, the _impi_ bivouacked in Zululand, close
to the river. It was mid-day before they were again astir. A couple of
Native police from Krantzkop were soon observed on the opposite bank.
They began shouting at the rebels. Cakijana dismounted, dropped on his
knee, and shot one of them dead, after which the force moved back to
Macala.