MANZIPAMBANA.--ENEMY DECIDES TO MOVE IN FORCE TO MOME.
Hitherto McKenzie's efforts to come into conflict with the enemy
had met with comparatively little success, and this in spite of the
fact that the Zululand Field Force had been over three weeks on the
spot. Ever since the force arrived, the men had, indeed, been kept
particularly busy. Reconnaissances had been carried out time after time
in Insuze valley and at Nkandhla by McKenzie, and in the neighbourhood
of Macala and Qudeni by Barker, four columns had made a converging
movement on Cetshwayo's grave (the enemy's headquarters), then had come
Sigananda's negotiations for surrender, the reconnaissance to Macala,
followed by further activity in the directions of Tate, Mome and Komo.
In the course of the operations, many rebels had been come across, but
as they were nearly always in small parties, it was impossible for
those unacquainted with the peculiar conditions to repress feelings of
disappointment with the results that had been achieved by the end of
May, especially as intelligence went to show that Bambata and Company
were at the head of at least 1,000 men, and that these numbers were
constantly increasing. Where was this ever-vanishing _impi_? What was
the best way of making it fight? That was the problem McKenzie was
called on to solve. He had not merely to be ready to fight when it
suited him to do so, but to hunt for the rebels and make them fight,
however much in favour of the latter locality and time might happen
to be. His difficulties were, therefore, primarily and, indeed, almost
entirely of a strategical character. He, of course, knew of the rebels'
perpetually shifting from one place to another on purpose to avoid
a conflict, and, at the same time, of always being on the alert to
take advantage of detached sections of the troops. That such were
their methods had of itself required time to ascertain. The methods
were novel. There was nothing of that kind during the Zulu War.[219]
Sometimes the enemy would be at Nkandhla, at others at Macala. At each
of these places there were dense forests and rocky hiding-places. The
intervening country, moreover, was exceedingly rough, but so well known
to the rebels that they could travel over it by night with the greatest
ease. In these circumstances, in addition to robbing them of all food
supplies to be found about Nkandhla, the O.C. came to the conclusion
that the only policy was to drive the forests in as thorough and
systematic a manner as possible. But to carry this out effectively with
the men at his disposal was out of the question. That, at any rate,
was the view of General Stephenson and other competent authorities.
Hence he was compelled to adopt procedure which he felt might easily
fail in actually cornering the enemy. However, in order that the best
might be done, he decided to undertake and persevere with the drives.
These it was necessary to carry out section by section, as it was quite
impracticable, owing to their magnitude and interconnection, to attempt
the whole of the forests in one day. If the enemy's strategy was to
keep shifting about, the troops could at least help him to shift about
a little more, and perhaps rather more than he had intended to do.
* * * * *
Whilst the troops, after operating at Tate gorge, were taking a
much-needed rest on the 31st May, Mansel and Barker were summoned to
Nomangci. Colonel McKenzie then proceeded with these and other officers
to the heights above Mome valley, where the proposed drives were to
begin, and explained the plans he had in mind for the following day.
On the 1st June, all the troops moved out at an early hour. When
daylight appeared, Gun Hill had already been occupied by two
15-pounders, N.F.A., and two pompoms. The valley was heavily shelled
and searched in every direction from above, as well as by Mansel from
below, but without much result. The men then proceeded on foot with
the Native levies to drive both sides and bottom of the valley in the
following order: McKenzie's worked down the western slopes, whilst
Mansel's ascended the ridge on the east as far as Esipongweni peak,
near Sigananda's kraal, Enhlweni, and then down towards the river bed.
McKenzie's men, consisting of 400 R.H., 150 Z.M.R., 140 D.L.I., 100
N.P., and 100 Nongqai, or about 900 in all,[220] with about the same
number of Native levies, moved in single file down an open ridge
along the north edge of Esigqumeni forest and in the direction of
the waterfall. On entering the forest, the Nongqai and levies were
distributed along the line of troops. When the head of the column had
got within a few yards of the Mome stream, "files right" was given,
which brought the troops into line formation facing down the stream
and towards the stronghold. The shelling from Gun Hill began when the
head of the column was about half-way down, and continued until it had
reached the Mome. Mansel's guns shelled the same forests from the mouth
of the valley. Many of the shells burst over the troops, whilst others
did so at the proper place. The column halted whilst Eziwojeni forest
was being shelled. During the shelling, which lasted nearly an hour,
one of R.H. was grazed across the forehead by one of the bullets of a
shrapnel shell, whilst one of the levies was struck by a shell on the
leg and seriously wounded. The troops remained in line formation until
the right flank was in position.
Whilst waiting for the order to advance, one of General Stephenson's
staff officers (who was with one or two others), when in the act of
taking a photograph, was fired at by a rebel at a distance of about
twenty yards. The charge, evidently one of slugs, luckily struck
no one. One of the officers immediately fired three times with his
revolver in the direction the shot had come from. This caused a little
confusion, as some of the men, believing the enemy to be near, also
began firing ahead. Just before resuming the advance, three volleys
were fired in the direction to be traversed in order to clear the way.
The left flank kept as close to the Mome as possible. Progress was slow
on account of the abnormally steep and difficult nature of the ground.
Just above the thick forest at the bottom of the waterfall, orders
were given to the troops in the higher portions of the forest to wheel
gradually to the left and in the direction of the forest below, it
being at the time thought that a number of rebels had gathered there
to make a stand. In consequence of this, a section on the extreme left
flank lost touch, but continued to move downwards. A number of other
men in different parts of the line also temporarily lost touch.
In the meantime, on the opposite or eastern side of the valley, the
T.M.R. had gradually worked their way up and co-operated generally in
accordance with the plan. "A troop (T.M.R.), in the advance, occupied
a kopje and sent ten of the men up the ridge to round up cattle, which
they succeeded in doing. In retiring, a sniper on their left flank,
concealed in the bush, shot Tpr. Steyn, who some days afterwards died
from the effects of the wound. Three of his comrades immediately
went to his assistance and carried him along, whilst two men went in
advance and the remaining four protected the rear. The retirement was
conducted with coolness and precision, and both General Stephenson and
Colonel McKenzie, who witnessed the movement from Gun Hill, openly
expressed their approval of the men's conduct."[221] After the forests
in the immediate vicinity of the waterfall had been driven, the troops
withdrew.
As a result of the operations, a considerable number of women and
children emerged from the forest. They carried white flags. They were
directed to a place of safety during the operations and subsequently
returned to the bush. Much pains was taken, without success, to
discover Sigananda's whereabouts. Only three rebels were killed;
twenty-four surrendered to the troops. Traces of recent extensive
occupation were, however, found. Information received at the time went
to show that the enemy had vacated the gorge on the preceding day.
About 300 cattle and many goats were captured. Sigananda's Enhlweni
kraal was destroyed. Two men (including Steyn) of the T.M.R. were
wounded by snipers.
Mpikwa, one of Sigananda's principal indunas, surrendered at the
magistracy during the day with seventy-six men of the same tribe. Among
these was a brother of Sigananda. All declared they were opposed to
their Chief's conduct and, had, therefore, refrained from participating
in the Rebellion.
On the 2nd June, McKenzie moved his camp to the east and further up
the Mome stream, with the object of making an extensive drive to the
east through the heart of the Nkandhla forests (Dukuza), as well as
over Bomvana ridge where large numbers of cattle had been repeatedly
seen and in which direction Sigananda's _impi_ was then said to be.
The Z.M.R. and N.C. were left to occupy the camp until dark when, with
their fires alight, they were to withdraw, so as to lead the enemy
to suppose the locality was still being occupied. A 15-pounder and a
pompom, moreover, supported by the Z.M.R., continued to shell the upper
portions of Mome gorge until dusk, with the view of keeping the enemy
from entering the bush that had been driven that day.
Since McKenzie's departure from Insuze valley on the 23rd May, Mansel's
column, when not actually engaged in a combined movement with that of
McKenzie, had operated within a radius of five or six miles of the
grave and succeeded in capturing considerable quantities of cattle,
goats, etc., besides doing other useful work.
Colonel Woolls-Sampson at this stage received orders to proceed to
Pietermaritzburg to confer with the Acting Commandant (Major-General
Sir John Dartnell, K.C.B.)[222] and the Government. Major C.N.H.
Rodwell, N.C., now assumed the duties of Chief Staff Officer, with the
local rank of Lieut.-Colonel.
McKenzie left with his forces at 7 a.m. on the 3rd June, with the
object of making an extensive drive in an easterly direction. Mansel,
with N.P. and T.M.R., proceeded from his camp to the vicinity of Komo
Hill. The guns and pompoms took up positions covering the general
advance of the former column. Colonel McKenzie, accompanied by General
Stephenson and his bodyguard of N.C., moved round open ground on the
north to a position some three miles in a direct line from Bomvana
ridge. The Z.M.R. occupied a kopje about one mile west of where it was
proposed the drive should cease. Here they were subsequently joined by
the O.C. Troops and General Stephenson, N.C. being strengthened by a
troop temporarily detached from the Z.M.R.
R.H., D.L.I., and N.D.M.R., together with the Native levies, after
crossing the head of the Mome valley, lined up along the edge of the
bush, where instructions were given to the officers to drive the bush
in line, with one European to every three levies, thus 1 *** 1 *** 1
*** 1. The objective pointed out was a knoll, which could be seen over
the bush and beside the Nkandhla-Eshowe road. The N.D.M.R. took the
left, D.L.I. the centre, and R.H. the right. As regards R.H., A and
D squadrons were on the left, C in the centre, E and B on the right.
Royston himself was on the right.
The idea was that, on the march through the bush, R.H. were to join
forces with Mansel's men, who would move on the right from Cetshwayo's
grave, whilst the left of the line was protected by McKenzie and the
men posted near him on the open tops of the overlooking ridges.
After proceeding through the forest for about two miles over extremely
broken country, the centre of the R.H. section of the line found that
the spruit Royston had directed the right of the line to rest on was
joined by another flowing down from the left front.
On C squadron, in command of Capt. E.G. Clerk, reaching the spruit
referred to, a number of tracks of Natives were observed, so fresh
as to appear to have been caused but a few minutes before. Following
these, the men, still in fair line, came in contact with a party
of thirty to forty rebels. A number of these were killed as they
endeavoured to escape. Shortly after, it was discovered that touch
had been completely lost with the two squadrons on the left, and that
Royston with B and E had swung away more to the right and were at that
time on the far side of a very high and narrow kopje. Four rebels were
chased by men of C up this hill and would have escaped altogether had
not the attention of men on the hill been attracted. The latter moved
along the crest and shot the fugitives. Corporal Alexander, C squadron,
killed later in the day, did some very accurate shooting at some
Natives who were, as they thought, securely hidden on their side of the
same kopje, sniping at members of C squadron in the valley below. These
were shot by him at a range of about 500 yards.
After what remained of C had moved on, six _amadhlangala_ (war-huts)
beside the spruit were destroyed. Here a quantity of goods looted from
Davis's waggon on the 29th May was found. About a mile and a half
further on, the men emerged, about 1.30 p.m., on to an open ridge,
where some forty-five men of the squadrons on C's right, together with
some Native levies, were come upon. Here Clerk found instructions had
just come from Colonel McKenzie through Colonel W.S. Shepstone to move
on, as Royston, with the remainder of the right wing, was said to be
in advance on the right. There was, however, ground for doubting the
intelligence, as firing could be faintly heard away on the right and
slightly to the rear. At this time, it was not known to C where the
R.H. squadrons on the left, much less the D.L.I. and the N.D.M.R.,
had got to. After a few minutes' halt, Clerk gave the word to move
forward. London, supported by Lieuts. Fryer and Midgley and others of
R.H. were put on the right, with the main body of levies, whilst Clerk,
supported by Lieut. Stewart and Sergt.-Major Webber, took the extreme
left. Lieut. Shepstone, who was with a portion of the levies and some
of R.H. on the left, soon completely detached himself. Many Native
footprints were seen; indeed, there was every sign of a large body of
the enemy being close in advance. Six cattle that were come upon was a
further indication. "I passed the word down the line," says Clerk,[223]
"to keep a sharp look-out, explaining that I knew we were close on the
enemy. At this time, a number of the levies had moved from their proper
position and were bunched up near me, close on my right. The nearest
European was Corpl. Alexander, about ten yards off on my right. Hawkins
was next to him, then Holmes, Flynn, Corpl. Woolnough (A squad),
Act.-Sergt. Fraser, Harding, Wilkinson, Bouck, Nesbit and others. After
passing the word of warning, we moved about 200 yards and had just
crossed a small _donga_, when I thought I noticed something move on
my left. On searching the bush, we failed to find anybody, though we
noticed that the Natives' tracks were very numerous and fresh. We moved
forward till the left was about twenty yards across the _donga_, the
right not having yet crossed it, when a Native stepped out of a thick
bush, between forty to fifty paces away on our left front. He was armed
with, I think, a breech-loader. He fired the charge, striking close
to the third man's feet (Hawkins). This appeared to be the signal,
as immediately on the report, the forest on our left and left front
seemed to be alive with the enemy. It looked like an overturned hive
more than anything else. They must have been lying down till the shot
was fired. They yelled 'Usutu!' and something like 'Zuzu!' and charged
at us, one horn swinging round on our left and the other towards our
right and breaking. I turned to call to the men, only to find that
the Native levies were running for their lives, not directly back
the way we had come, but down the line, straight down to our right.
This served to break our line a lot and create a gap between the 7th
and 8th men. Seeing that there was no chance of making a stand where
we were, I shouted to the men to move back and rally in the _donga_
lower down. Knowing that unless the centre were checked in some way,
the enemy would cut us up before we could get back to the _donga_, I
emptied my carbine (magazine) into the main lot at about twenty yards
distance and about seventy from where I was afterwards lying. This
served to check them for a minute or two and I took advantage of it to
run after the men. While doing so, I slipped another cartridge into
the breech of my carbine and had just succeeded in doing so, when I
ran into another lot of the enemy who had charged between the _donga_
and myself (_i.e._ between where I first fired on the enemy and the
position at which we rallied), as if to partly surround the party in
the _donga_. I thereupon fired five shots at them with my revolver
as I ran towards my men. The enemy broke, and left, as I thought, a
clear line to the _donga_, where I could hear Fraser's voice calling
out, 'Here we are, Sir!' Just then a Native rose from the low bush in
front of me, _i.e._ between me and where I heard Fraser's voice. He
had a stabbing-assegai and some sort of weapon--it seemed like an old
muzzle-loading gun. He raised the assegai, but as he did so, I snapped
at him the last shot in my revolver and he fell. As he fell, another
Native appeared suddenly on my left--I think he had been behind a
small tree. He was within stabbing distance before I noticed him, my
attention having been engaged with the other man. I had no time to aim
my carbine, merely being able to swing it up and parry his thrust. I
narrowly escaped being wounded, for the assegai just grazed the right
eyelid (I thought my eye was out, as the blood flowed over my cheek
and almost blinded me). Catching my foot in something I fell, but the
slope of the ground being very steep, I succeeded in throwing myself
right over. I turned over purposely and, in so doing, again faced my
adversary. Swinging my carbine forward, I pulled the trigger, not,
however, with the ordinary finger, for which there was no time, but
with my little finger which happened to be in position at that instant.
The shot struck the man in the chest and he fell forward past me on my
left about seven yards from the east edge of the _donga_. I remarked
that this man had bound round his forehead a broad band of Turkey-red,
as well as a stiff peak of red over the centre of the forehead.[224]
The first of the other two had a narrow strip of red cloth round his
forehead. I also noticed that a great number of the remainder of the
enemy had Turkey-red round their heads. Recovering my footing, I ran
down and leaped into the _donga_, where I found Fraser, Woolnough,
Alexander, Holmes, Flynn and Hawkins. The rebels seemed to surround us
immediately and I had succeeded in firing only about two shots when
Alexander staggered forward crying out, 'Oh, my God, pull this out,
pull this out!' referring to an assegai which had been driven into the
middle of his back. Someone pulled the assegai out and he sank down and
died immediately. This assegai had been thrown from a distance of about
ten yards up the _donga_ by one of the enemy who was there. Almost
immediately afterwards, Hawkins staggered forward and sank against the
east bank just on my right, with two assegais in his back. He remained
in a crouching position and, from the peculiar sound, I knew his lung
had been injured. Once he cried to someone to shoot him and put him out
of his misery. Just as he fell, I felt a shock through my left upper
arm, which caused my hand to lose its power; owing to this, I dropped
my carbine. Stooping quickly to pick it up, I found that my left hand
was useless and that I could not grasp anything. The little finger only
retained its normal power. I seated myself on a root which was jutting
slightly out of the bank and, raising the carbine with my right hand,
succeeded in loading it by gripping it between my knees. I then fired
it by lifting it with the right hand and pulling the trigger with the
little finger of my left. I continued doing this until loss of blood
compelled me to abandon the carbine in favour of my revolver, which I
had to load in the same way, _i.e._ between my knees.
"Shortly after I was wounded, I heard Holmes say, 'Ah! I've got it!';
he went on to explain that a bullet had gone through his thigh. He,
however, continued firing, merely relieving himself by leaning against
a tree which grew from the bank of the _donga_. Woolnough had already
been wounded in the ankle, and was lying close by the bank on the
eastern side of the _donga_. Flynn had blood streaming from wounds on
the face, but Fraser, though in a very exposed position (with a white
shirt on), suffered no injury whatever. All this time we were crying:
'Rally here, Royston's,' thinking it possible that the men further down
the _donga_ might succeed in forcing their way to us, or that Colonel
Royston might be within hearing and come to our assistance. I also
shouted out, 'Give it to them, boys!' intending that the enemy should
hear, as I supposed a few of them might know English. I knew that the
men lower down were busily engaged from the firing I could hear, and
occasionally I could hear Sergt.-Major Webber's voice encouraging our
men.
"The Natives had made two charges when, as I was aiming at one up the
_donga_, about twenty yards off, a thrown assegai penetrated my right
forearm.
"We were by this time getting very weak from loss of blood, and, as
our fighting strength was four only, viz. Fraser, Holmes, Flynn and
myself, things were looking very serious. I personally felt very weak
but, after drinking some water from Flynn's water-bottle, I revived in
time to assist in repelling the third charge. We succeeded in driving
them back again, but I knew that unless help arrived soon, we would
be overcome and, speaking to Fraser and Flynn, said if they succeeded
in getting out to tell the Colonel that we had left our mark on
the enemy. A minute or so later, Holmes said, 'Look out, they're
preparing to rush again.' I, at that moment, was loading my revolver
with the last six cartridges I had. I succeeded in getting five in, but
dropped the sixth. I fired two shots at some Natives in the _donga_,
twenty to thirty yards up. Holmes fired at them at the same time. They
both dropped, I am certain Holmes killed one, but am not sure of the
other. At this moment, shouting and shooting attracted our attention,
and to our relief we saw other members of the regiment coming to our
assistance, amongst the first being Lieuts. Male, Jones, and Oswald,
then Colonel Royston a second or two later, he having stopped to
bandage levy-leader W.H.E. Hopkins, who had been shot on the side of
the head when running by the side of Colonel Royston in advance of the
relieving party."
[Illustration: MANZIPAMBANA
Action at its height
Scale in Yards (approximate)
--------------------------------------------------
0 10 20 30 40 50 100 150 200
Reference
A to B & at L _Positions of enemy before attack._
C to D } _Sections of line of drivers before attack._
G " H } _Line broken owing to rough ground._
J " K }
E _Nine cattle here, left by enemy as bait._
F _Position of small group, Native levy, before attack._
_Troops (C Squadron, R.H., Capt. E.G. Clerk)._]
The foregoing account is necessarily confined to what took place in
Clerk's immediate vicinity. The following particulars, taken from
others who were engaged, are intended to supplement Clerk's graphic
narrative.