interview took place between Leuchars and the Chief. The latter was
delighted to see a European force, as he was afraid lest the rebels,
led by his sons--who wished him out of the way--should attack him. He
was, therefore, sorry to learn the column would be in that part only
a day or so, leaving him to protect himself as best he could in the
absence of his loyal young men. These, in response to the Government's
call, had gone off to assist at Nkandhla.
Guides were now furnished by the Chief, when the force moved to
Mpukunyoni hill, reaching there at 12.30 p.m. After off-saddling for
an hour at another of Matshana's kraals, the troops divided into
three sections and proceeded to different positions on the long ridge
opposite to, and immediately north of, Mpukunyoni. One of these bodies
surprised a party of ten armed rebels driving cattle towards Faku's
ward, nearly the whole of whose people were already in open rebellion.
A troop, under Lieut. H.E.G. Fannin, was dismounted and sent to a
small, wooded valley into which these rebels had fled. The valley was
driven, with the result that eight Natives were killed and the cattle
captured.
The other portions of the force had, in the meantime, gone off to the
north-east into Faku's ward, where they burnt a number of kraals.
At 4.30 p.m. Sibindi joined Leuchars with about 1,100 men.
It now became necessary to select a site on which to bivouack for the
night. The only water available was a little stream called Burobo,
which flows from east to west, and about a mile from Mpukunyoni.
Between the stream and Mpukunyoni the country is intersected by
_dongas_ which run from the base of the hill to open on to different
parts of the stream. With the object of being near water, Leuchars
selected an old mealie garden between two of the _dongas_ referred to,
and only 200 yards from the stream. This spot was by no means a good
one for defensive purposes, being in the midst of broken and somewhat
bush-covered country, with high tambookie grass, and commanded by high
ground in several directions, especially on the immediate north. In
other respects the ground was favourable for a Zulu army to operate
in. The 'chest' could form up and advance unseen up a _donga_ in one
direction, whilst somewhat similar advantages were available for each
of the 'horns.' From a soldier's point of view, therefore, the site
was somewhat questionable. There was, indeed, safer ground higher up
nearer the hill, but Leuchars was a diplomat as well as a soldier, and,
with a lengthy experience in Natal, he thoroughly understood the Native
character. He knew that manœuvring in itself would have little or no
effect on the rebels. As at Nkandhla, a collision was essential, but to
bring it about, it was necessary to give the enemy a fancied advantage.
The bivouac took the form of a square, each side of which was 120
yards long. Two squadrons U.M.R. (Headquarters and City) occupied the
eastern face; one squadron U.M.R. (Noodsberg) and one squadron U.D.R.
the southern; and Sibindi the other two faces. Sibindi's men were
particularly adapted for night work, having magnificent eyesight, and a
keen sense of hearing.
The squadron which had been operating on the north-east, returned at
6 p.m. to report having observed an _impi_, about the same size as
Sibindi's, moving towards Mpukunyoni from high hills on the north-east.
This force, Leuchars concluded, was moving away from Mackay. It was,
however, too late then to operate against it.
Soon after the men had settled down for the night, a man arrived from
Matshana ka Mondise to warn Leuchars to be particularly careful as the
enemy was near by, and to point out that, in his opinion, the column
had bivouacked in a dangerous locality.
Every precaution was taken to safeguard the square against surprise.
Sentries and pickets were directed to be extra vigilant. During the
night, which was a bitterly cold one, two false alarms occurred, one at
10.30 p.m., the other about 2 a.m., both caused by young sentries of
Sibindi's levy. The alacrity with which every man sprang to his place,
without the least confusion, was highly satisfactory.
At 4.30 a.m. all stood to arms. Half an hour later, a troop under
Lieut. J.H.C. Nuss was sent out, with orders to reconnoitre in the
direction in which the _impi_ had been seen the previous evening. If it
was not in sight, he was to go to a suitable hill and try and get into
communication with Mackay by heliograph.
About 6 a.m., however, Nuss and his troop, after firing a couple
of shots by way of alarm, rode back to report that the enemy was
approaching in force and was close at hand. As he spoke, the latter
could be heard shouting their war-cry "Usutu" as they advanced. In
a few moments, a dark mass could be observed in the half-light of
early dawn,[216] streaming rapidly over a small neck some 700 yards
north-east of the square. They moved at once into the bed of the stream
where, it so happened, the cattle seized by Leuchars on the preceding
day had been left for the night. A smaller force (left 'horn') could,
about the same time, be seen sweeping along the foot of Mpukunyoni in
rear of the bivouac, as if to attack from the _donga_ on the west.
Another force, evidently the right 'horn,' detaching itself from the
'chest,' came down the stream to engage the north side of the square.
The attack opened at 6.15 a.m. on the eastern face, by the enemy
causing the cattle, which they had driven ahead of them, to rush wildly
at the square on emerging from the _donga_ referred to. The order was
thereupon given to fire, when, at the first volley, fifteen of the
cattle fell within 15 or 20 yards of the troops. Two or three of those
rebels who were advancing under cover of the cattle were also killed.
This had the effect of checking the enemy's rush for a time. The rebels
then proceeded to encircle the square, keeping well under the excellent
available cover. Repeated attempts were made to rush at the bivouac
through the open ground between it and the _dongas_, but, on each
occasion, the attack was overwhelmed by steady, well-directed fire.
The fight had by now assumed practically all the characteristics
peculiar to South African warfare. There were the Militia Reserves,
the majority of them Dutchmen, their horses already saddled, prepared,
in accordance with the practice of their forefathers, on being too
hardly pressed, to mount and retire to the next ridge and again contend
against overwhelming odds. There, too, were the Active Militia, most
of them the descendants of Scotchmen or Englishmen, who, true to the
custom of _their_ ancestors, had, with saddles planted on the ground,
taken shelter behind them, having come to stay and fight to the bitter
end.
The enemy, again, delivered his attack in true Zulu style. The 'horns'
had deployed from the 'chest' to right and left in the ancient orthodox
manner with the idea of encircling, closing in on, and eventually
massacring, their opponents to a man. Sibindi and his men, too, were
there, though only at a later stage did they get a chance of exhibiting
the martial instincts of their tribe.
Whilst the various attacks were in progress, the leaders urging the men
to close in, it was observed that the enemy had approached to within 80
yards of Sibindi's men, causing the latter to become a little nervous.
It was accordingly considered necessary for all sides of the square to
be held by riflemen. To do this, some were withdrawn from other parts,
and the sides of the square reduced by about 20 yards. The movement,
which took place about 6.45 a.m., was carried out with the utmost
coolness, enabling the enemy to be opposed at every point with heavy,
effective fire.
During the whole of this time, there had been an incessant fire from
two or three men who were armed with modern weapons and concealed on
the long high ridge on the north. They were between 700 and 800 yards
from the square. This fire caused a considerable number of casualties,
including Tpr. H. Steele, U.D.R., killed; Tprs. S. Mackenzie and P.
Braithwaite, U.D.R., wounded; sub-Leader T.J. van Rooyen, Krantzkop
Reserves, wounded (three places); twenty-one men of Sibindi's levy,
wounded--three of them succumbing to their injuries within three hours.
There were also many narrow escapes, and casualties among the horses.
All but three of the casualties among the men were caused by Mauser
bullets.
The whole of the cover on the ridge in question was carefully searched
by picked marksmen. Later on a man, reported to be Faku's induna, was
found dead there. The principal sniper, however, escaped, a man named
Magadise.
Up to 7.30 a.m., Sibindi's men had remained practically inactive. When
superseded by the riflemen, they had withdrawn into the square. They
did not, however, like quitting the cover afforded by the grass. They
then quietly abided the issue, sustaining the many casualties referred
to whilst conforming to methods of warfare which must have appeared to
them strange. When, however, the enemy's attacks became less vigorous,
they realized that their turn to pursue must shortly arrive. The order
came. In about five minutes, Sibindi got his men to charge. This they
did strictly in accordance with the custom of their forefathers,
shouting their tribal war-cry "Undi! Undi" as they bounded forth to
deal destruction to their flying foes.
Many rebels escaped viâ the waterfall and down the great valley on the
west of the square. Others were pursued up the ridge, and in numerous
other directions. The levy alone succeeded in killing thirteen at the
waterfall.
A squadron was sent in pursuit of those that had attacked from the
_donga_ on the west and then retreated round Mpukunyoni. Troops were,
moreover, sent in pursuit to the north-east. One of these discovered
the enemy's blankets, etc., at a kraal about one and a half miles off.
The things has been left there just prior to attacking.
The dead were counted in th scrub and _dongas_ immediately round the
lager, fifty-seven bodies being found, exclusive of those killed by
Sibindi's men. The aggregate was probably not less than a hundred.
Among the slain was Babazeleni, Faku's chief induna and principal
commander of the _impi_.
The losses sustained by the Reserves were attributed by Leuchars to
their having saddled up when the alarm was given, and stood on their
line with the bridles over their arms. The saddled horses naturally
afforded a good target for the snipers.
The wounded were attended to by Dr. C.H. Crass, N.M.C., who, with three
members of the Signalling Corps as assistants, performed his duties
during the action and afterwards in an eminently satisfactory manner.
The attacking rebels proved to be only about 800 strong. They were
composed of Faku's and Mtele's tribes, with some from Makafula and
Mehlokazulu. A number of them were Christians. One of these, as was
proved from a pocket-book found on him, was a certificated preacher of
the Gordon Memorial Mission, Natal.
Owing to several of the wounded having to be carried on improvised
stretchers, to there being no sign of Mackay, and to the enemy having
been seen at Qudeni on the 27th, Leuchars resolved to return to
Ngubevu, though by a different route, namely viâ Ngqulu, the Buffalo
valley and Sibindi's location.
[Illustration: MPUKUNYONI
Dispositions are at moment _impi_ appeared on the neck near A
Scale: 4 inches = 1 mile. Contours Ver. Int. = 30 ft.
REFERENCE
A = _Position of the cattle_
B = _Where first attack began_
C = _Point of subsequent attack. Enemy advanced to C under cover of donga_
D = _Point of another attack,--from the river bed_
E _and_ F = _Enemy's snipers; most destructive was at E_
G = _Waterfall; many escaped here_
H = _Where enemy stopped before attacking. Clothing left at the two trees
near by_
J = _Leuchars' square_
K = _Where Nuss was when he caught sight of_ impi
crescent = _Enemy_ .__.__ _Lines of enemy's advance_]
The return journey began at 10.30 a.m., but proved most arduous
on account of the wounded having to be carried by relays of U.M.R.,
the Reserves, and Sibindi's levy. After the column had gone three or
four miles, gun fire could be heard, and shells were seen bursting on
Hlazakazi Mountain, about eight or nine miles to the north in a direct
line.[217]
A halt was called at the Buffalo at 3 p.m., after which the column
moved on to the Copper Syndicate Works on Umsinga Mountain, where
Steele was buried.
In consequence of having stabbed and killed a number of the enemy,
Sibindi's men, on the march back, carried their assegais, as customary
on such occasions, with the blades upwards. On getting to the Buffalo,
they bound certain green rushes round their heads, and otherwise
doctored and cleansed themselves.
The column moved further up the same mountain and, at 7 p.m.,
bivouacked for the night at the kraal of Sikota, one of Sibindi's
indunas.[218]
At 11 a.m. on the same day, Leuchars sent a message to Lieut. M.W.
Bennett, N.F.A., who was in charge of the camp at Ngubevu, directing
him to send bread for the troops, also medical comforts and stretchers
for the wounded. These reached the column about 3 a.m. on the 29th.
The march was resumed at 7 a.m. on the following morning, the camp at
Ngubevu being reached at 1 p.m.
The Krantzkop Reserves were now sent back to Krantzkop, with orders for
the Second and Third Krantzkop Reserves to demobilize.
* * * * *
At the moment Leuchars was dealing the enemy a heavy blow at Mpukunyoni
(28th), Mackay was operating in difficult country about Malakata and
Hlazakazi mountains, some fifteen and eleven miles respectively from
Mpukunyoni in a direct line.
Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton, N.C., on Mackay's departure, was sent to take
command at Helpmakaar. He directed Mackay to return; the order was,
however, countermanded by Leuchars, who, as has already been observed,
was put in command of all the forces in Natal. Mackay was thereupon
instructed to continue to operate in Nqutu and western portions of
Nkandhla divisions as an independent column.
Between the 28th May and 10th June, Mackay operated between Isandhlwana
and Madhlozi mountain. On the 28th, a reconnaissance was made in the
direction of a well-watered valley of vast extent known as Mangeni,
in which some 2,000 head of cattle and many goats were discovered,
evidently placed there by Natives for safety. Mehlokazulu and two or
three followers were observed on the east side of the valley hurriedly
escaping towards Qudeni. It being too late to seize the stock, steps
were taken early the following morning to collect and bring it to camp.
On other days, special pains were taken in the wards of Makafula, Faku
and other Chiefs to ascertain promptly the kraals of rebels, especially
such as had joined the force that attacked Leuchars at Mpukunyoni.
The stock belonging to them was thereupon seized and, after returning
what was proved to belong to loyalists--done on the advice of a
specially-appointed Board--the balance was sent forward to Dundee to be
sold by public auction.
Whilst Mackay was encamped at Mangeni, information was received to the
effect that Mehlokazulu, Mtele and other rebel leaders, had, two weeks
prior to attacking Leuchars, assembled their men at a kraal overlooking
Mangeni and there had them formally doctored for war. As, however, the
kraal in question was within view of Helpmakaar, although hardly less
than twenty-five miles away, it was deemed unsafe for the ceremonies to
take place in its immediate vicinity, for fear lest the European troops
stationed there, then 800 strong, should, by means of field-glasses and
what not, see what was being done! A spot close by, but well out of
sight, was accordingly chosen, and there the ceremonies were performed
on orthodox lines, two head of cattle being killed for the _impi_.
There were two doctors. The principal one was Magadise, afterwards, as
has been seen, one of the snipers at Mpukunyoni. It was here, too, that
Mehlokazulu declared his policy to be to wait and see what the white
people intended doing. He would not, he said, go forward and assume the
offensive, but wait to be attacked, when a stubborn resistance would be
offered. After being doctored, the bulk of the forces were accordingly
told to return to their kraals and await further orders. This advice
was publicly approved by Babazeleni, the man of Faku's tribe who
commanded and was killed at Mpukunyoni. It was about this time, too,
that the small store, a mile from the kraal where the doctoring took
place, was burnt to the ground.
Among the Chiefs who attended the above gathering was Makafula. He
went because his ward had been chosen by Mehlokazulu as a convenient
rallying-point for the insurgents in that part of the country. He
was much afraid of the notorious Chief, who might have caused him to
be attacked and exterminated forthwith had he held back. Mackay, it
will be remembered, did not leave Empandhleni for Helpmakaar, viâ
Nondweni, till the 11th May, which was just about the day that the
above doctoring took place. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose
that Makafula temporarily identified himself with the rebels solely
because of there being no European troops in the vicinity to which
he could have gone for protection. His act would, nevertheless, have
been regarded as treasonable had not the Chief immediately dispatched
a messenger to the local magistrate, Mr. Hignett, to report exactly
what he had done, and by what reasons he had been actuated in so doing.
"Acting on my advice," says the Magistrate (who had presided over the
district for over six years), "though desirous of retiring from his
ward, he (Makafula) remained at his post at great personal risk, and,
under the pretence of interesting himself in the rebel designs, acted
as an informant." Predicaments of this kind frequently occurred in
various parts of the Colony, and, too impatient to personally inquire
into the circumstances, commanding officers sometimes concluded that
sedition had been committed, when the act had sprung from motives
entirely dissociated from a spirit of disloyalty. When rebellion breaks
out it is, of course, difficult to weigh and consider evidence that is
at all involved, the impulse being to assume from even the most trivial
indications that the worst has happened, and, therefore, that the most
severe punishment must be meted out at once to fit the supposed crime.
Among the Chiefs who afforded Mackay assistance in the way of scouts
was the Basuto Mayime. His people had been settled in the country
ever since the Zulu War, having been granted land in consideration of
notable services rendered by them during that campaign.
Mackay's operations at this time were confined to those parts of
Nqutu district that abutted on the Buffalo river. He operated in, and
thoroughly patrolled, such parts as Isandhlwana, Malakata, Hlazakazi
and Mangeni. Steps were taken to ascertain all kraals from which
Natives had deserted to join the rebels, whereupon their stock was
seized and confiscated. Owing to these measures, which included the
destruction of Mehlokazulu's most important kraal, Mackay assisted
materially in causing the situation at Nkandhla to mature, besides
restraining many from rebelling through fear of their stock being
looted by the enemy. But for such activity, Mehlokazulu, for instance,
would not have amalgamated his forces with those of Bambata as soon as
he did. Mackay, in fact, compelled the foregoing, Mtele, Nondubela and
other leaders, with their followers, to act with greater precipitation
than it was in their interest to do. Had more time been allowed, it is
more than likely that a far greater _impi_ would have been raised in
Nqutu district than the one that actually went forward to Nkandhla.
If, again, Mehlokazulu had been afforded the opportunity, it is not
improbable he would have resorted to tactics similar to those adopted
by Bambata and Sigananda towards seemingly neutral or half-hearted
tribes, _i.e._ dragooned them, by seizure of stock, etc., into taking
up arms against the Government.
The Reserves attached to Mackay's column were ordered, on the 5th June,
to demobilize at Helpmakaar. The excellent services rendered by the
men whilst in the field were suitably acknowledged by the Commanding
Officer.
When McKenzie was appointed to take supreme command in Natal and
Zululand (30th May), Leuchars was instructed to continue to command all
troops in Natal as well as those in Nqutu district, though in future
under McKenzie.
After placing Newmarch in temporary command of the U.F.F., with Capt.
W.N. Angus as staff officer, Leuchars proceeded with Carter viâ
Greytown to Helpmakaar to direct operations from that point.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 205: By this time, Van Rooyen and his men had got back from
Zululand.]
[Footnote 206: In consequence of Bambata's and Sigananda's _impis'_
raiding tactics. Many cattle were at the same time driven into Natal.]
[Footnote 207: Two of Gayede's sons were killed in the action at Bobe.]
[Footnote 208: The strength and disposition of Leuchars' forces,
at 3rd May, was as follows: At _Mazongwane_ (high up Inadi
River)--U.M.R., 192; N.F.A., 37; N.M.C., 3; N.V.C., 2; N.T.C., 6.
At _Greytown_--N.R.R., 44; N.S.C., 6; U.M.R., 7; Reserves, 81. At
_Krantzkop_--N.R.R., 58; Reserves, 81; U.M.R., 5; N.S.C., 1. At
_Keate's Drift_--U.M.R., 31. At _Mapumulo_--U.M.R., 20.]
[Footnote 209: These springs are in the bed of the Tugela River, some
nine miles from Krantzkop.]
[Footnote 210: His force was composed as follows: U.M.R., 150; 1st
Umvoti Reserves, 40; 2nd Umvoti Reserves, 30; Krantzkop Reserves, 50;
N.F.A., two guns; N.R.R., 50; and 25 men of Sibindi's levy.]
[Footnote 211: Reports had been received as far back as the 19th
ult. of messengers having come to Mtele from Mehlokazulu and Faku
in Zululand asking him to co-operate. On his agreeing, Mehlokazulu
instructed Kula through Mtele "to wait until fighting had commenced in
earnest in Zululand, when he was to attack Pomeroy and then proceed
against Greytown."]
[Footnote 212: When at Nondweni, a small party visited the spot where
the Prince Imperial and others were killed during the Zulu War. The
memorial cairn and graveyard, in charge of a Native headman, were found
to be in good order.]
[Footnote 213: An account of the position and occurrences at Umsinga
will be found in Chapter XV.]
[Footnote 214: It will be seen in Chapter XV., that a column (under
Murray-Smith) was posted at Fort Murray-Smith, a couple of miles from
Helpmakaar, simultaneously with the departure of the Zululand Field
Force for Nkandhla from Dundee on the 1st May.]
[Footnote 215: Mackay was not advised, as the only means of
communication, a telephone, was eighteen miles away.]
[Footnote 216: The sun rose, on the day in question, at about 6.45 a.m.]
[Footnote 217: Mackay camped at Isandhlwana on the night of the 27th.
He operated at Malakata on the morning of the 28th, and at Hlazakazi at
1.30 p.m. on the same day.]
[Footnote 218: On Sibindi's levy getting within about three miles of
the kraal of Nyoniyezwe, the minor for whom Sibindi was acting, they
started to sing their ancient, tribal war-song. Up to that moment, the
women had been in hiding in various places, owing to uncertainty as to
whether the _impi_ they had, two or three hours before, seen descending
to the Buffalo from the direction of Mpukunyoni, was the enemy, or men
of their own tribe. The sun had, in the meantime, set, and it had begun
to get dark. On recognizing the old familiar song, and realizing that
their men were returning triumphant, they forthwith emerged from their
respective hiding-places and kraals, and, one and all, wherever, on the
bush-covered mountain, they happened to be, accorded their heroes so
weird and fantastic a greeting as will not quickly be forgotten by the
European troops who had the privilege of hearing and witnessing it. At
least sixty to seventy women, faces smeared with light-coloured clay,
and carrying little hand-brooms, with leaves bound round their ankles,
approached the advancing column, shrieking at the top of their voices
as they ran about: "_Ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki,--Kuhle kwetu!_"
(Oh! joy in our homes!) The oft-repeated cries were heard in all
directions. Not only did this serve as a welcome to the warriors, but
as an alarm to all of the tribe who were too far off to hear the famous
war-song.]
XIII.