McKenzie made a reconnaissance to Macala, it having been reported
Bambata was there with 500 followers. Soon after starting, word was
brought by scouts to the effect that the enemy had vacated that
mountain and made off in the direction of Qudeni, some fifteen miles
further west, where there are many large and dense forests, similar,
in some respects, to those at Nkandhla. The reconnaissance was carried
out nevertheless; it proved long and unsuccessful. None of the enemy
were seen, though fresh traces of their occupation were come upon. A
few cattle and goats were captured, and kraals as well as war-huts
destroyed. The troops did not reach camp until late at night in
irregular, straggling order. The day had been a trying one. Owing to
the broken nature of the country, the men had been obliged to march
in single file. Although the sortie was unsuccessful from one point
of view, from that of acquiring accurate knowledge of the topography
of one of the enemy's principal rallying-points, it was valuable, and
proved of much service at a later date. The same remarks apply to the
Mome valley and surroundings, whose many features and peculiarities
could be and were carefully noted during such time as the combined
forces were camped near the grave.[196]
On the following day (22nd), six men arrived from Sigananda to signify
his wish to surrender, but as, being so old, it was more convenient for
him to do this at the magistracy, he asked permission to adopt that
course. McKenzie agreed, and thereupon decided to move to Nkandhla,
not, however, before dividing the troops into two columns so as to
better equalize them.[197]
The camping of so large a force at the grave for several days had the
effect of greatly diminishing the supplies on which the rebels were
depending. At most, if not all, of the kraals, pits were found, in
which, as customary with the people, large quantities of mealies and
corn were stored.[198] Much of the grain was taken to be consumed
either by the levies or the horses. The large herds of cattle,
moreover, which had just been captured soon destroyed such crops in the
neighbourhood as had not by that time been reaped.
Mansel remained at the grave with instructions to operate in that
locality, to continue to use up the enemy's supplies as much as
possible, and to see that he (the enemy) did not emerge at night from
the forest to draw on such supplies as might still be available. At
this particular juncture, the enemy's scouts were observable on all the
prominent heights. Reliable information, moreover, was received that
Bambata had gone to the Qudeni forests with some 300 to 400 followers.
McKenzie moved to Nomangci on the 23rd, part of the column marching viâ
Gcongco, and part viâ Sangofe and London's Kop. The steepness of the
ascent at Gcongco may be roughly estimated from the fact that, during
the climb, no less than four horses fell at different times; they
rolled down the incline, and were quite dead on reaching the bottom.
Fourteen other horses had also to be abandoned. McKenzie himself went
the same evening with a small escort to the magistracy, with the object
of accepting Sigananda's surrender there as agreed.
A troop of Royston's Horse, in command of Lieut. Percy Male, which had
been sent from the grave to Fort Yolland on the 22nd to escort an
ambulance waggon, returned on the 23rd, several hours after McKenzie's
column had left, and just as Mansel's was moving off in the direction
of Fort Yolland. After off-saddling close to the grave, the troop
proceeded on its journey to overtake McKenzie. "The party had not
gone more than a mile," says Male, "when about sixty Natives came out
of a small bush and attacked us in the rear without the slightest
provocation on our part. The time then was about 12.30 p.m. They did
not come any closer than 200 yards. I asked Capt. Sharpe to take our
seven spare horses on to Denga spur, about three miles from where we
were attacked and about a mile from the mouth of the Mome valley. I
remained behind with Sergt. Hepworth and three men to protect the rear.
We fought a small rear-guard action, which lasted until we got on to
the hill where the horses were waiting for us. When starting to go up
the hill, the enemy closed in on our rear, right and left flanks. There
were about 100 to 150 of them, but I could not see well. They kept up
a desultory fire from the cover of the bush on both sides of the ridge
I was going up. This firing continued until we had gained the top,
about 4.30 p.m. On reaching the top, the men and horses being very
'blown,' we found the Natives trying to cut us off from the column. I
posted two men on a kopje (one of them Tpr. T. Malone, subsequently
killed at Tate). These kept up a pretty hot fire until we had mounted
and advanced. After this, it was a case of galloping to get free. They
hung on to our rear for about three or four miles, _i.e._ until we had
sighted the rear-guard of the column (Z.M.R.)."
"A few shots," says McKenzie,[199] "were fired by the Z.M.R. at the
enemy when the top of the hill was reached. It has been, I understand,
suggested that the fact of the Z.M.R., having fired these few shots,
upset the enemy's idea of surrender, but this is manifestly incorrect,
having in view the fact that the troop of Royston's Horse was fired
at from almost the time when they passed the site of my old camp at
Cetshwayo's grave, which was some considerable time before the shots
were fired by the Z.M.R. Personally, I was satisfied that the incident
did not in any way affect the non-surrender.[200] At the time, large
bodies of rebels could be seen moving about on the hills singing what
was reported to be their war-songs. This view was confirmed later on
by Ndabaningi, who, when he eventually surrendered, was asked by me
why they had not surrendered on the first occasion. He stated the
tribe had agreed that they had not had enough fighting, and did not
consider themselves beaten ... they therefore resolved to continue the
Rebellion."
Although McKenzie had withdrawn to Nomangci, there were no indications
of Sigananda surrendering. The negotiations, which had been going on
since the 19th, thereupon fell through.
* * * * *
To enable the troops to grapple more satisfactorily with the situation
at Nkandhla, the Government decided, on the 10th May, to form an
irregular infantry corps, 800 strong, subsequently known as the "Natal
Rangers." On application being made to recruit half the battalion in
the Transvaal, with the assistance of the permanent Volunteer staff
of that Colony, the Transvaal Government, in acceding to the request,
generously offered four companies of volunteers with Maxim, Signalling
and Medical detachments under their own officers, fully armed and
equipped, provided that Natal took over the arms and equipment, and
paid and rationed the men. The offer was gratefully accepted. The
Right Half of the battalion was accordingly formed in Johannesburg,
and the Left in Durban. Lieut.-Col. J. Dick, D.L.I., was placed in
command.[201] The Right and Left Halves, having received orders to
proceed at once to Nkandhla, united at Nqutu on the 30th May, and
reached Nomangci on the 4th June.
On the 24th May, Major Murray-Smith arrived at Empandhleni (1.30 p.m.)
with his column, escorting a convoy of fifty-one waggons. This column,
which had left Dundee on the 19th and travelled viâ Vant's drift, Nqutu
and Nondweni, was made up as follows: N.M.R., 160; N.C., 100; N.R.R.,
100, and details. At Nqutu, it was ascertained that Mehlokazulu had
armed and joined Bambata. The intelligence was confirmed at Nondweni.
Murray-Smith was ordered to return with all speed with the empty
waggons to Dundee, and from thence, viâ Tugela Ferry, to join the
Umvoti Field Force at Greytown. Squadron A, N.C., under Capt. G.R.
Richards, was detached; it became bodyguard to the O.C. Troops.
Murray-Smith left Empandhleni on the 26th, travelling by the route
taken on the forward journey. On arrival at 8 p.m. on the 28th at Nqutu
magistracy, it was reported that Mehlokazulu intended to attack the
village and convoy the same night. It is difficult to understand how
such scare arose, for the Chief was known to have proceeded to Qudeni,
whilst a strong column under Mackay was by then at Isandhlwana, within
striking distance of his ward. The convoy reached Dundee on the 30th.
Leaving the N.R.R. at Dundee, and details at Helpmakaar, the N.M.R.,
instead of joining Leuchars viâ Tugela Ferry, proceeded by rail to
Greytown, reaching that place on the 2nd June, and the Umvoti Field
Force on the 3rd at Spitzkop.
To return to Nkandhla. When he received intelligence to the effect
that a number of rebels were in hiding in a small, though dense,
forest at Ensingabantu, near Qudeni, at which place there was a small
store, McKenzie planned a night march, on the 24th, with the object of
surrounding the forest before daylight the following morning. Guided by
Sergt. E. Titlestad, Z.M.R., the force[202] left at dusk. It proceeded
by a narrow footpath along the extraordinarily steep sides of the
Devil's Gorge, where a false step might easily have resulted in man
or animal being precipitated forthwith into the Insuze, 1,000 feet
below. A pack-horse, indeed, carrying ammunition did miss its footing,
when it instantly rolled headlong into the vast, yawning gulf below.
Merely to cross the drift at the bottom took three hours on that cold,
dark and memorable night. Ntingwe was reached at 2 a.m. "Although
a misty morning," says McKenzie, "the movement of surrounding the
position was most accurately carried out, and when day broke, and the
mist had lifted, the bush in which the rebels had been reported to be
located was completely surrounded by a cordon of troops. Unfortunately,
however, the enemy were not there, and although the bush and adjacent
country were thoroughly searched, none of them could be found, although
there was every trace of recent occupation of the ground."[203]
The same day, Inspector Dimmick, with 105 N.P., made a reconnaissance
in the direction of Komo and Fort Yolland.
Returning to Nomangci on the 27th by the waggon road viâ Calverley's
store, McKenzie, as a preliminary to attacking the rebels known to be
concealed in the Nkandhla forests, moved the following day a few miles
to the high and comparatively flat country at Dhlabe.
Although the campaign was being conducted without the direct assistance
of the Imperial Government, the mother-country did not permit the
proceedings to go on without taking a special interest therein.
Major-General T.E. Stephenson, C.B., Commanding the Transvaal District,
was deputed to witness some, at any rate, of the operations. He arrived
at Nomangci, with his staff officer and aide-de-camp, on the 27th,
when, as Colonel McKenzie's guest, several opportunities occurred,
during the three weeks he was in the district, of observing what took
place.
Early on the 29th May, there being ground for supposing a body of
rebels lay concealed in the Tate valley, McKenzie took his force
out to drive such valley. Some idea has already been given of the
Nkandhla forests which, it was shown, are more or less connected and
distributed over extremely rough and precipitous country. Although
there are two forests in the Tate valley, they are generally regarded
as not covered by the name Nkandhla, even though barely two miles from
the nearest ones at the Mome. The gorge is even more remarkable in
some respects than the Mome; it is narrower, and its sides, especially
the eastern, are steeper; they are, moreover, studded with enormous
boulders, and where the forests do not extend, they are covered with
dense shrubs and undergrowth. The fastness does not continue beyond one
and a quarter miles from where the Tate stream enters the Insuze, but
throughout that distance, when artillery is wanting, can be defended
with the greatest ease. On the day in question, notwithstanding that
the natural difficulties appeared insurmountable, it was found that
stockades had been erected, whilst the caves, too, had been blocked and
loop-holed by the rebels in a surprisingly cunning and effective manner.
The Z.M.R., under Vanderplank, with Native levies, under London, moved
down the western side of the valley; the rest of the column, _i.e._
a portion of R.H., with the squadron N.C., lined and drove down the
eastern slopes to the stream at the bottom of the gorge. Two guns and
pompoms were placed on Gun Hill to cover transport and the D.L.I.,
who formed the rear-guard. Mansel had been directed to co-operate by
moving to block the mouth of the valley. These orders, however, were
misunderstood; for he went to the Mome two miles away and proceeded to
drive up that gorge for the rest of the day.
Colonel McKenzie, in order to conduct the operations better, took up a
position on a large rock overhanging the eastern side of the gorge. It
was from this place that he and Colonel Royston soon shot two rebels
who, appearing below, were about to throw their assegais at them.
After the troops had begun to descend, about 600 cattle were seen
being driven on the left slopes of the valley as if to escape. London,
Hopkins, Walsh and Sergt. Waugh, all of Royston's Horse, who were with
the levies, leaving the Z.M.R. on higher ground, pushed on to do work
at the bottom that had been intended for Mansel. Lieut. H.T. James
moved with eight Z.M.R. to a spot about three-quarters of the way down.
On London and the others getting to the river, a ringed Native, who
had hurled an assegai at one of the levies, was immediately shot. Some
fifty temporary war-huts were found in an open glade, also five rebels.
The huts were burnt, though later on. After the party had worked about
ten yards up the river with some sixty levies, eight rebels sprang
from behind a large boulder and ran off. It had evidently been their
intention to way-lay the invaders, but, realizing that discretion was
the better part of valour, made off up the stream, when three were
shot. On the boulder referred to being reached, a number of rebels
charged the party, shouting "Usutu! Usutu!" Just at that point the Tate
makes a peculiar bend, the right bank being precipitous. Round this
the enemy, about seventy, rushed forward, and threw their assegais.
These were badly aimed, no doubt owing to the demoralizing effect
caused by London's firing "loopers" from a shot-gun at a distance of
fifteen to twenty yards. The attack did not last more than a minute,
after which the rebels disappeared behind the bend. A few feeble
attempts at attack were next made by fifteen to twenty at a time. It
was noticed "Usutu! Usutu!" was shouted a few seconds before actually
charging, thereby giving the impression that the enemy wanted to stir
up courage, forgetting that shouting gave warning of their intention.
In the meantime, Lieuts. Shepstone and Richardson, also with levies,
were engaged in the rear. Rebels who had evaded the foremost party were
prevented by them from escaping towards the Insuze.
Intelligence was at this stage received of the presence of a large
_impi_ further up the ravine. London, feeling he was not strong enough,
sent to Vanderplank for reinforcements and awaited a reply. Word came
back at 2 p.m. to the effect that those engaged below were to withdraw
and return to camp. An unsuccessful appeal for help was also made to
nine or ten Z.M.R. who happened to be within reach. Efforts to make the
main body of R.H. hear were futile, owing to these men being too high
up, consequently the party had the mortification of having to withdraw
with the enemy in its immediate front.
Tpr. T. Malone, R.H., was shot about 2 p.m. through the neck by a rebel
who was below him. The rebel was killed and the Martini-Henry rifle he
had was recovered.
During the day, over forty of the enemy were killed, and over 400
cattle, besides many goats, seized. Had Mansel's column combined
in the operations, they must have proved much more successful. The
moral effect of these operations was, nevertheless, very great, for,
as subsequently remarked by the enemy, they realized they had no
stronghold or retreat that could be regarded as secure when attacked by
McKenzie's men.
The troops camped that night close to and east of London's Kop. During
the evening, news was brought that the waggon of a Mr. Davis, who
had been authorized to keep a dry canteen, had been looted by rebels
in the main Nkandhla forest. It seems the vehicle had been unable to
keep up with the transport belonging to the column. It followed as
best it could, but being late, and the column out of sight, the owner
decided to leave it to its fate. The waggon, in charge of its Native
driver, continued along the road through a portion of the forest. It
was captured shortly after and driven into the forest, the driver and
voorlooper being taken prisoners. The Z.M.R. investigated the matter on
the following morning. Responsibility for the loss fell wholly on the
owner, who had been duly warned of the risks he was running.
Early on the 30th, accompanied by the guns and pompoms, McKenzie made
a further reconnaissance of the Mome valley from the heights on the
immediate west. At noon, the whole of the Tate valley was thoroughly
driven. R.H. and D.L.I. (under Lieut.-Col. Royston) took part in the
drive, the former being, of course, dismounted. The N.C. proceeded to
the west side of the gorge to prevent rebels escaping in that direction
towards Macala. The Native levies (under London) also took part. They
drove up the valley from its mouth as far as the other troops, which
had entered higher up and worked down the stream. Twenty-one rebels
were killed; the operations, which were of a very arduous nature, much
of the climbing having to be done up and down exceedingly steep and
rocky places, lasted the whole day. Notwithstanding the difficulties,
as great as any that could have been encountered in the Mome valley,
every man performed the work required of him in an eminently
satisfactory manner.
The bodies of eighteen of those killed the day before were found in one
cave, and twelve in another, dragged thither by their relatives. Two
instruments of strange workmanship and evidently regarded as 'firearms'
were also found. They were made of wood and cartridge cases, the latter
telescoped slightly into one another, with bands of metal ingeniously
bound round where the joins occurred. One of these curios--they were
nothing more--had two barrels, the other one.
* * * * *
By this time, the Government, having realized the necessity of
appointing an officer in supreme command of all the forces in Zululand
and Natal, with the object of ensuring effective combination over the
large areas occupied and traversed by the enemy, decided to appoint
McKenzie to the position. The appointment took effect on the 30th May.
Nor was it too soon that the step was taken. Although Leuchars had done
his best to co-operate, notably on the day of the general converging
movement on the grave (17th), his efforts, through his not having
received earlier notice, were not as effective as they might have been.
There were instances of lack of combination in other directions. As
regards Mackay, the Commandant of Militia had intended he should remain
at Helpmakaar, to keep in check the large tribes of that part known
to be disaffected. Owing to misunderstanding, however, arising out of
communicating through the telephone over a long distance, Mackay had
moved to operate down the left bank of the Buffalo in Zululand,[204]
that being the side on which, from his recent experience, he considered
his efforts would prove most useful--not so much to engage the enemy,
as to force him to concentrate at Nkandhla. Whether this view was
right or not, the fact of Mackay's leaving the position assigned him,
revealed weakness in the arrangements, which, it was considered, would
be best remedied by investing an officer in the field with power to
immediately control the actions of every column.
Having already begun to deal with the problem at Nkandhla, McKenzie
decided to remain where he was and personally direct the operations at
that place. Leuchars, who had hitherto so ably conducted them in Natal,
was accordingly requested to continue as he had been doing, until
McKenzie, having accomplished what was necessary at Nkandhla, was free
to undertake immediate supervision elsewhere.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 189: This mountain, which has a forest on its western,
steep and rocky face, was soon to become one of the rebels' principal
rallying-points.]
[Footnote 190: Foully murdered later, as will be seen, because of his
loyalty.]
[Footnote 191: His force included a levy of about 450 loyal Natives,
called out by the C.N.A.]
[Footnote 192: This particular spur is famous in Zulu history as being
that down which Tshaka led his army about 1823, when pursued by his
most formidable rival Zwide. In going down Gcongco, however, Tshaka was
merely _pretending_ to flee, and, the spur being abnormally steep, made
it appear all the more probable that his retirement was genuine flight,
instead of a stroke of genius by a master in tactics. After continuing
to fly for some distance, he suddenly rounded on his pursuers, and,
taking them at a great disadvantage, practically annihilated them.]
[Footnote 193: His force on this occasion was: Five squadrons, R.H.
(Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston); 60 D.L.I. (Major G.J. Molyneux), and some
600 Natives (Lieut. W.H. London). Each man carried three days' rations.
The artillery was sent to Empandhleni with regimental transport,
escorted by D.L.I. Mr. B. Colenbrander, the local Magistrate, with an
excellent knowledge of the affairs of his district, also accompanied
the column.]
[Footnote 194: Report. Colonel D. McKenzie. September, 1906. The state
of the grave in 1906 is described on p. 210.]
[Footnote 195: 200 N.D.M.R., 100 Z.M.R., 128 N.P., 540 T.M.R., 300
R.H., 30 M.I., D.L.I. = 1,298, also 100 Nongqai and 1,500 Natives
(levies).]
[Footnote 196: On the occasion of the reconnaissance to Macala, the
O.C. Troops, noticing a small kopje at the mouth of Mome gorge, on
which guns could be placed to shell the gorge, caused a sketch to be
prepared and subsequently handed to Barker.]
[Footnote 197: The columns as re-formed were as follows: _Under
McKenzie's direct command_--Northern District Mounted Rifles, Zululand
Mounted Rifles, Royston's Horse, Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders
and two pompoms), Durban Light Infantry (two companies). _Under
Mansel's command_--Natal Naval Corps, Transvaal Mounted Rifles, Natal
Police (Field Force), Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders), Nongqai
(Zululand Native Police).]
[Footnote 198: Particularly was this the case at Ezigqileni, the
principal kraal of the care-taker of Cetshwayo's grave. This small
kraal (close to the Nkunzana river), a few hundred yards from the
grave, contained no fewer than nineteen large grain pits, that is,
about five times as many as the average for a kraal of that size.]
[Footnote 199: Report. September, 1906.]
[Footnote 200: It will presently be seen that Sigananda did not come
in, at any rate, not on the day he had said he would do so.]
[Footnote 201: Among the other officers were: Major A.B. Boyd-Wilson,
second in command; Lieut.-Col. J.J. Furze, T.L.I. (temporarily assuming
the rank of Major), commanding Right Half; and Captain O. Schuller,
T.L.I., Adjutant.]
[Footnote 202: Consisting of 100 N.C. (this squadron--under Capt. G.R.
Richards--is the one that arrived with Murray-Smith on the 24th), 100
Z.M.R., 300 R.H., 120 N.D.M.R., 20 T.M.R., 25 M.I., D.L.I., and 300
Natives.]
[Footnote 203: Report. September, 1906.]
[Footnote 204: His column then consisted of the whole of N.C., Right
and Left Wings (excepting D squadron); a section, N.F.A.; and the
Estcourt, Ladysmith, Dundee, and Newcastle Reserves.