manner. Absence of plan has already been noticed. This omission, with
the enemy known to be massed in the vicinity of Cetshwayo's grave,
was evidently an error of judgment. Conducted as the reconnaissance
presumably was with the object of acquiring information, it actually
obtained none that was not already known. Although two days' rations
were carried, no decision was come to as to where the column should
camp for the night. This involved taking heavily-laden infantry over
abnormally long and difficult tracts of country, so much so that it
was owing only to their sterling qualities and perseverance that
they were able to march as they did. When the first attack had been
repulsed, there was an oversight in not pursuing and severely punishing
the rebels. Had this been done, it might have had something of the
demoralizing effect that the Mome had later on.
All units and ranks behaved with much gallantry, repelling attacks that
might easily have proved calamitous.
The principal meed of praise must be awarded to the N.M.R., M. Inf.,
D.L.I., and last, though not least, the Nongqai, owing to whose
coolness and steadiness, the first and principal success was mainly due.
When Blamey and his troop were obliged to fall back, a number of the
horses would not let the men mount, consequently with the enemy in hot
pursuit 100 yards away, they had to make off on foot. "My horse," says
Blamey, "would not let me put my foot in the stirrup, so I vaulted into
the saddle. On turning the horse round, two rebels threw their assegais
at me. I shot one and then galloped off." He had not gone far, however,
before he came across Corpl. Acutt on foot, whose rifle had jammed. The
man managed to fire and then took to his heels, the leading rebel five
to ten yards in rear. Whilst on the gallop, Blamey, catching Acutt up,
offered him his stirrup-leather to hold on to; instead of seizing it,
the man put up his arm, asking for help. On this, Blamey, dropping his
revolver, grabbed the arm and, dragging the man over the saddle with
much difficulty, rejoined the troop at _E_.
The casualties were: Among the rebels, sixty to seventy killed, with
many wounded; among the troops, none killed; one N.M.R. slightly
wounded; one Z.N.P. severely wounded and another wounded. Seven horses
were also wounded.
Mfungelwa's men took no part in the fighting, though they captured 300
cattle and many goats, besides destroying several rebel kraals.
The _impi_ that first attacked at _F_ was made up of Mavalana,
Hayelwengwenya, Felapakati, and Mbokodwebomvu regiments, the
first-named being the youngest and of an average age of 20 to 23.
It was Mavalana that led and threatened most at _E_. The body that
advanced up the Nkunzana and threatened the rear-guard, was under the
personal command of Bambata. The eighteen who had guns were commanded
by Ndabaningi, Sigananda's principal son, who, though considerately
wearing a white shirt, escaped being hit. All the enemy's shooting was
bad. Those seen near the hill Nkolotshana late in the afternoon, were
merely elderly men who had congregated from various kraals. Altogether
about 1,000 of the enemy were seen during the day.
Inconclusive and unsatisfactory as the foregoing proceedings were from
a military point of view, the engagement proved remarkably decisive
from that of the rebels. The reason for this is not hard to guess, viz.
the clear demonstration that had been given of the utter inefficacy
of Bambata's and his doctors' drugs! _The bullets had entered_, and
entered wherever and whatever they had hit. The main success of the
Bobe fight accordingly lay in dispelling, possibly for ever, in so far
as Natal and Zululand Natives are concerned, the extraordinary delusion
already described.
In consequence of the numerous casualties, many Native women came
the following morning to where the rebel forces had collected near
Cetshwayo's grave to demand, of those who had declared European bullets
would do no injury, restoration of their missing sons, husbands, and
sweethearts. If anything ever made Bambata wince, these women's simple
and unanswerable application did. At the same meeting, one of the older
men asked pointedly why Bambata and his men had not engaged in the
fight. Why had he stood by when a section of the forces attacked? The
speaker went on, in heated manner, to propose that the notorious leader
should be arrested and handed over to the Europeans forthwith; if that
were inexpedient, then let him be given over to the rebels themselves
to put to death. "He has deceived us by declaring bullets would not
hurt us."
Finding himself thus suddenly unpopular, with his prestige gone, and
even in danger of losing his life, Bambata rode off, an hour or two
later, with Cakijana to Macala, saying not a word to anyone, not even
to his own followers.
* * * * *
On the same day, Vanderplank came in touch with the enemy in Manyane
valley, a few miles south-west of Ntingwe, when two were killed, thirty
cattle seized and a number of kraals destroyed.
Between the 6th and 16th May, Mansel's column remained at Fort Yolland,
erecting entanglements or otherwise fortifying the lager.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 184: Now High Commissioner for South Africa in London.]
[Footnote 185: Lieut.-Col. Barker, then in command of the South African
Light Horse, had previously served in the 1st Battalion 60th Regiment
(King's Royal Rifles) and 2nd Battalion Royal Sussex. At the beginning
of the Anglo-Boer War, he enlisted in the South African Light Horse
and took part in the Relief of Ladysmith. He was afterwards engaged in
operations in the northern districts of Natal and east of Pretoria. He
rose from the rank of Trooper to that of Major in the one campaign, and
was mentioned by his commanding officer no less than thirteen times for
conspicuous gallantry and capable handling of troops. He was awarded
the D.S.O., also Queen's medal with six clasps, and the King's with
two.]
[Footnote 186: _E.g._ as service was voluntary, many who wished to
enlist were unable to obtain leave from their employers; others, again,
who had volunteered were obliged to withdraw on their anticipated leave
being refused.]
[Footnote 187: Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson (Honorary Colonel in the
Army) served throughout the South African War, 1899-1902; was engaged
in operations in Natal, 1899, including action at Elandslaagte, where
he was severely wounded. Mentioned in despatches, _London Gazette_,
8th February and 15th November, 1901, and 17th January and 25th March,
1902. Granted honorary rank of Colonel in the Army. Queen's medal with
four clasps. King's medal with two clasps. Knighted (K.C.B.).
The _Official Army List_, 1911, Wyman & Sons, Ltd., Fetter Lane,
London, E.C.]
[Footnote 188: It was, at the date in question, disposed as
follows:--At _Dundee_--Transvaal Mounted Rifles, 500 (Lieut.-Col. W.F.
Barker); Royston's Horse, 550 (Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston); section,
Natal Field Artillery (two pompoms), 25; half a company of Durban
Light Infantry, 55; detachments of Medical, Veterinary, Signalling and
Service Corps. At _Ntingwe_--Zululand Mounted Rifles, 90 (Major W.A.
Vanderplank); Northern District Mounted Rifles, 150 (Major J. Abraham).
At _Komo Hill_ (Fort Yolland)--Natal Naval Corps, 106 (Commander F.
Hoare); section, Natal Field Artillery, 35 (two 15-pounders); Natal
Police, 200 (Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel); Zululand Native Police, 90 (Major
C. Fairlie). At _Eshowe_--Two companies, Durban Light Infantry, 210 (25
mounted) (Major J. Nicol). At _Gingindhlovu_--Half a company, Durban
Light Infantry, 55.]
XI.
CONVERGING MOVEMENT ON CETSHWAYO'S GRAVE.--NEGOTIATIONS FOR
SIGANANDA'S SURRENDER.--FURTHER OPERATIONS, NKANDHLA.--TATE GORGE.
The force that arrived at Empandhleni with McKenzie on the 8th
May rested on the 9th. Intelligence, at this time, went to show
that Bambata, with his own adherents and a few others, had gone to
Macala.[189] After enquiring into the position, McKenzie realized the
impossibility of starving the rebels out "by sitting quietly on the
hills and allowing them to collect provisions everywhere at night." He
considered it necessary to operate at once, and to begin by destroying
all their kraals and supplies.
At 4 a.m. on the 10th, the T.M.R., under Barker, left for Ntingwe, to
strengthen that important strategical post. The country to be traversed
was exceptionally rough, especially at Mdunduzeli ridge. The result
was that the waggons, much too heavily laden, could not reach their
destination the same day. With even the lightest loads, a journey of
thirty-five to forty miles with ox transport over country such as this
was obviously impossible. Two squadrons were detached the same day
and pushed forward to reinforce Vanderplank, who anticipated attack
at Ntingwe. It required the whole of the 11th for the transport to
ascend the ridge referred to, some five miles long. At 12.30 a.m.,
12th, messengers arrived at Ntingwe from Capt. C.E. Ligertwood, who
had bivouacked with the transport on top of Mdunduzeli, to say the
enemy was concealed in force in a forest close by, evidently with the
intention of attacking at daylight. The two squadrons referred to
immediately saddled up and returned, reaching Ligertwood about 3.30
a.m. Everything was quiet and in order. Half-a-dozen waggons had,
however, capsized. That day the waggons got on to Kombe forest. Shortly
after daybreak on the 13th, Tpr. H.C. Maw, I.L.H. squadron, went in
search of his horse. When near the edge of a bush, he was sniped
from within it and mortally wounded. The troops immediately lined
a ridge running parallel and volleyed three or four times into the
forest; nothing, however, could be seen of the enemy. The whole force,
including the transport, reached Ntingwe about mid-day on the same day.
Maw died the following morning at Ntingwe, where he was buried.
McKenzie, with the remainder of the troops, including Mackay's, made a
reconnaissance in force at 4.30 a.m. on the 10th to the top of Nomangci
ridge, overlooking Mome gorge. Some thirty mounted Native scouts were
sent ahead under a European officer. A few of these, on reaching the
summit, were fired at by rebels from a stone shelter at the top of a
kopje on the left. After the troops (N.C.) had come up and a couple of
volleys had been fired at the shelter, the enemy vacated it and fled
into a forest close by. An examination was now made of the country
round about Green Hill, whereupon the force moved along Nomangci ridge
and the northern edges of the forest to the vicinity of Sisusa peak.
Here the scouts, among whom was Chief Sitshitshili, a splendid specimen
of a brave and loyal Zulu,[190] proceeded to lower ground on the south
where some rebel kraals were burnt and stock captured. On withdrawing
in the early afternoon, McKenzie left three squadrons of Carbineers
concealed close to the kopje referred to, in the hope of surprising the
enemy. The ruse, however, proved unsuccessful.
On the following day, Mackay, with about 420 men (chiefly N.C.), left
for Helpmakaar with a convoy of 138 empty ox-waggons. The Carbineers
were ordered back as it was possible an outbreak might any day occur
in the northern portions of Natal. Nevertheless, having already done
useful work at Nkandhla, they were very disappointed at having to leave
that part, especially as fighting appeared to be imminent.
On the 12th, McKenzie made a reconnaissance to Insuze valley on the
south-west of the magistracy.[191] In the course of the day, a large
number of women and children were met with, but no information could be
obtained from them as to the rebels' movements. After being questioned,
they were allowed to return to their relations.
Another reconnaissance was made to Dhlabe on the western side of Mome
on the 14th. The rebels indulged in a good deal of ineffective sniping
from the forest. A few 15-pounder and pompom shells were fired into
the Mome valley. The force camped for the night at the site of the old
magistracy.
On the same day, three of Barker's squadrons reconnoitred along the
base of Macala, with the object of trying to draw the enemy, who had
been observed in force at that mountain. Bambata himself was reported
to be there. This intelligence was proved later to have been correct.
The rest of the force at Ntingwe co-operated with McKenzie's in
destroying rebel kraals in the intervening district and capturing stock.
The destruction of these and other kraals, which, as explained in a
previous chapter, are invariably of wattles, grass and poles, and
therefore easily constructed, was imperative as, being numerous, they
afforded shelter and food to the enemy. But for the adoption of such
tactics, and the seizure of stock, especially in the vicinity of the
great forests at Nkandhla and Qudeni, and other considerable ones at
Kombe, Ensingabantu, Macala, etc., the campaign must have been unduly
prolonged and resulted in far greater suffering to Natives at large
than actually occurred.
The most humane method in dealing with savages is one which has for
its object cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible date.
To achieve this end, much must necessarily take place which appears
offensive to civilized people at a distance, but which not less
civilized persons on the spot know to be imperative. Difference of
opinion on these matters is very marked and very regrettable, but it
is useless endeavouring to justify tactics to those ignorant, often
absurdly ignorant, of the elementary conditions under which any given
war with savages has to be fought. That is not war which studiously
avoids incommoding the enemy in any way. If there be obloquy, it must,
therefore, be suffered to remain on the side of common-sense.
Next morning (15th) Barker, leaving sufficient men to guard the camp,
moved to a position near Dhlolwana, about six miles to the south-west
of Ntingwe and three from Macala. Whilst engaged burning kraals, he
had a brush with about 500 rebels, who followed up on his returning
to camp, four of them being killed. It would seem Barker lost an
opportunity here of inflicting a heavy blow on the enemy. At the same
time, it must be remembered he was playing a waiting game which, had
he planned a countermove--as he certainly might have done on this
occasion--might have been spoilt.
On the 16th, a few men were sent to decoy the enemy; he, however,
refused to be drawn. McKenzie then heliographed Barker to take part
early on the 17th with himself and Mansel in a large converging
movement towards the enemy's headquarters at Cetshwayo's grave.
Leuchars, then at Middle Drift, was invited to co-operate on the south.
During the night, Sub-Overseer Walters, in charge of a road party, was
murdered in a tent at his camp by Natives at Mbiza stream, about eight
miles north of Empandhleni. The murderers were arrested within a couple
of days.
McKenzie had decided on the general movement referred to because of
the main body of the enemy being camped at the grave and having with
them large herds of cattle. The route to this spot was more difficult
for the troops on Nomangci than for those at Fort Yolland or Ntingwe.
The one selected was viâ Gcongco, Gcongco being an abnormally steep
spur abutting on the Insuze, barely a mile from the Mome stream.[192]
Owing to lack of intelligence as to the precise nature of the spur,
there was, at starting, some doubt as to whether the troops, especially
mounted men, would be able to descend it with safety. Barker was
directed to proceed down the Msukane neck and along the Insuze valley.
Mansel, who was to bring transport, was to bivouack at Mfanefile's
store at Maqonga hill on the 16th, and move forward on 17th viâ Mkalazi
and Insuze valleys. The time fixed for the columns to arrive at the
grave was 11 a.m.
The descent of Gcongco was accomplished without accident, whereupon
McKenzie,[193] seeing Barker coming down the valley, and noticing that
his own force would strike the road before Barker could get up, did not
trouble about his rear-guard, beyond sending back a D.L.I. Maxim as
support, when the enemy was slightly engaged and Pte. Williams wounded.
The main body thereupon made straight for the grave. A large number of
cattle and goats were captured by London's levies near Tate gorge.
Barker, who had left Ntingwe at 3 a.m., proceeded through the neck
referred to and along a bridle path in single file. The enemy, as day
broke, was seen descending Macala heights, streaming on to high ground
on Barker's right flank. Recognizing the disadvantages the column must
be under if attacked, an effort was made as speedily as possible to
reach more open country. Shortly after the advanced guard and main body
had come on to open ground, the rear-guard, consisting of the N.D.M.R.,
was attacked from Macala. The guard, in command of Abraham, assisted
by a squadron sent back from the main body, succeeded in driving off
the enemy, who made no further attempt to follow. About six rebels were
killed. One of the officers, Lieut. H. Wilkins, N.D.M.R., was wounded
in the arm with an assegai whilst crossing a drift. Barker reached the
grave about 11.30 a.m.
Had intimation of the intended combined movement reached him earlier,
Leuchars might, in conjunction with Barker, have made an effective raid
through the Macala hills and got in touch with the other columns. As
it was, he crossed at Hot Springs at 10 a.m. and moved in a northerly
direction on to a high ridge running eastwards from Macala, where a
column near the grave (McKenzie's), and another near Komo (Mansel's),
were sighted. Owing to a mishap, Leuchars' signallers had not reached
him, so it was impossible to reply to the heliograph flashing from the
first-mentioned column. A few rebels were observed making along the
ridges towards Macala; these were chased in a dashing manner by the
Reserves. From 150 to 200 rebels were then observed congregated on a
knoll (Simakade) towards which the Reserves, who had become scattered,
were making; the U.M.R. were thereupon pushed forward at a hand gallop,
when the enemy fled to the bush at Macala, eight being killed and
others wounded.
One of those wounded by the Reserves was no other than the notorious
emissary from Dinuzulu, Cakijana, the man who, as alleged, had been
sent from Usutu to Mpanza to help Bambata start the Rebellion. Cakijana
had formed one of the party that emerged from Macala bush the same
morning and attacked Barker's rear-guard all the way from Umzilingwana
stream to that of Lugada, near the Tate gorge. Repulsed by Barker,
they made towards Nomtulwa hill with the view of joining those who had
remained behind with Mangati; but on getting to the hill they came upon
Leuchars' Reserves, who at once made for them, as above described. They
succeeded in joining Mangati, who, seeing the Reserves scattered and
unsupported, contemplated attack. The plan was, however, frustrated by
the main body of the U.M.R. moving smartly up, upon which Mangati and
his men disappeared over the slopes to the west. Cakijana, dressed in
khaki tunic and breeches, with leather gaiters and helmet, ran in the
direction of Masolosolo stream. He was quite tired out, having shortly
before given over his rifle to another, when he was fired at and struck
in the calf of the left leg--a flesh wound.
Mansel's column was late in coming up, owing to difficulties with the
transport. Neither McKenzie nor Barker had brought any transport.
Had Mansel deployed at Bobe, it would have considerably assisted the
enveloping movement, and prevented a number of the enemy from escaping
into the forests. By 4 p.m. all the columns had joined hands. They
bivouacked for the night near the grave, not far from the junction of
the Nkunzana and Insuze rivers.
The result of the day's operations was somewhat disappointing. The
enemy's losses, however, must have been heavier than the twelve
actually seen dead, especially in the engagement with Barker's
rear-guard.
About 800 head of cattle and 1,500 goats were captured, besides the 150
cattle driven off by Leuchars' column. Many kraals belonging to the
insurgents were burnt, including a large number of temporary war-huts
near the grave. "A gale of wind," says McKenzie, "was blowing at the
time, and the grass on the fringe of Cetshwayo's grave caught alight,
but no damage was done to the trees of the plantation surrounding
the grave. It was an unavoidable incident. Most stringent orders,
which I am pleased to say were strictly carried out, were issued to
all columns to prevent the desecration in any way of the grave. The
matter was at once reported to Mr. Saunders, so that the true facts
could be conveyed to Dinuzulu."[194] The Commissioner advised Dinuzulu
accordingly.
McKenzie's column, with those of Barker and Mansel, formed a combined
camp a few hundred yards south of the grave and on the site of what
had, for a month, been the enemy's recognized headquarters. The
strength of the camp was about 1,700 (mostly mounted men), exclusive of
about 2,000 Natives (levies).
Leuchars' force moved back down a steep ridge that led towards the
Tugela at Ndundumeni, and immediately below Macala, where it bivouacked
(Zululand side). At 7.30 p.m., however, the column crossed and
bivouacked in Natal. Leuchars gave strict orders for all camp fires to
be left burning, whilst no lights were to be struck when on the march.
The crossing of an unknown drift on a pitch dark night was carried out
without mishap.
A force made up of N.P. (200), T.M.R. (3 squadrons) and R.H. (2
squadrons) was sent by McKenzie on the 18th to operate on the east side
of the grave near Bobe, there being reason for supposing a section
of the enemy was concealed in that neighbourhood. The information,
however, proved incorrect. The supposed enemy turned out to be women
and children who, owing to the difficulties of obtaining food in the
forest, were making for the kraals of relatives and others near the
Tugela who had not up to that time taken up arms.
Native women were a source of much inconvenience throughout the
campaign. They not only urged their menfolk to rebel and kept them
supplied with food as well as they could, but, taking advantage of the
protection afforded their sex, frequently conveyed intelligence to the
enemy as to the movements of the troops.
On the same day twenty-one rebels, members of Sigananda's and Tulwana's
tribes, surrendered at the magistracy.
With the intention of attacking the redoubtable Mome stronghold, the
whole force, excepting the men in charge of the camp, marched for the
purpose, on the 19th, but had hardly moved out when a spy, previously
sent out, brought intelligence to the effect that, whilst desirous of
surrendering, the rebels refrained from doing so through a sense of
fear. The spy, with a white flag, was thereupon directed to inform
the enemy that the O.C. Troops was prepared to meet their emissaries
half-way up an indicated hill should they really wish to surrender.
Upon the spy returning to the hill in question, McKenzie, accompanied
by three of his staff, proceeded to the proposed rendezvous. After
waiting there a considerable time, the spy, who had again been sent
back, returned with two indunas from Sigananda's heir Ndabaningi, who
said the people generally were desirous of surrendering. The men were
told that surrender was to be unconditional. They then asked for time
to find, and deliver McKenzie's message to, Ndabaningi. The receiving
of the surrender was fixed for 9 a.m. on the following morning. After
this, the troops returned to camp.
It was not until 11 a.m. on the 20th that the spy came back with
information that Ndabaningi was engaged gathering together the various
members of the tribe to discuss the situation. Extension of time until
sunset of the same day was then granted to enable the discussion to
take place, notwithstanding that the _bona fides_ of those negotiating
was already being regarded by McKenzie with suspicion. The same
evening, two indunas from Ndabaningi were escorted to the camp, only,
however, to apply for further time within which to make the necessary
arrangements. The request was once more acceded to, it being again
impressed on the emissaries that surrender was to be unconditional.
They were further advised that, whilst all operations would be
suspended as regards themselves, the Officer Commanding could not
permit the negotiations to stand in the way of contemplated operations
in other districts, or against Bambata, who, at that moment, was
alleged to be in occupation of Macala.