[Footnote 183: Cd. 3027, p. 67.]
X.
MOBILIZATION OF ZULULAND FIELD FORCE.--MANSEL ENGAGES THE ENEMY AT BOBE.
The news that Sigananda had, with practically the whole of his tribe,
together with sections of two other adjoining tribes, espoused
Bambata's cause, commonly said at the time to have Dinuzulu's full
support, had hardly been made public before offers of substantial
assistance were received from the Cape Colony and the Transvaal. The
Prime Minister of the former telegraphed on the 17th April: "Extremely
sorry to hear of your further Native trouble; can we be of assistance,
you may depend on our ready help in anything that it is possible for us
to undertake." The reply was: "Many thanks for your telegram. Should
assistance be necessary, we shall not hesitate to ask your help."
On the 23rd April, the following message was received from the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal (Sir Richard Solomon, G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B.)[184]: "Please inform your Ministers that, with the High
Commissioner's warmest approval, Transvaal Government offers to send
to assistance of Government of Natal, whenever required, 500 Transvaal
Volunteers fully armed and equipped, and offers to maintain them while
in the field." To this the following reply was sent: "Ministers beg to
express their very grateful thanks for the most generous offer made
by the Transvaal Government, which they gladly accept. They beg me to
assure your Government that they highly appreciate the spirit which
has prompted this offer." On the 25th it was added: "The regiment we
have offered will be a mounted one, and will be kept up to its full
strength."
The Prime Minister, Cape Colony, wired again: "I have thought that
possibly a battery of six Maxim guns, fully equipped and manned by Cape
Mounted Riflemen, might be of service to you in the present campaign.
Government, Cape Colony, willing therefore to place these at your
disposal, fully manned, equipped and with pack saddles and mules, of
course free of all cost to your Government. Should you be short of
signallers, we can also supply them fully equipped. I merely make
these special suggestions as a part of my original offer of general
assistance." To this it was replied: "We are deeply grateful for the
repetition of your generous offer of assistance, but are advised that
at present we have sufficient forces in the field to deal with the
Rebellion in Zululand. We shall certainly avail ourselves of your offer
should the insurrection spread to other parts of the Colony."
On the 8th June, the Government, referring to the foregoing, asked
the Cape Government for a battery of six Maxim guns. Within a week,
the guns, fully manned and equipped, under the command of Captain M.
Humphery, C.M.R., together with twenty signallers, under Lieutenant R.
Stopford, C.M.R., were in Natal and proceeded at once to take the field.
The offer of the Transvaal having been accepted, it became necessary
for that Colony to issue a proclamation, in which, _inter alia_, it was
made known that, as it was "desirable in the interests of this Colony,
that a Volunteer Corps, formed under the Volunteer Corps Ordinance,
1904, should be called out for service in this Colony, and in the said
Colony of Natal," and as the Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal
had "accepted the service of certain persons desiring to be formed
into a Volunteer Corps," and such Corps had been lawfully formed and
designated the First Transvaal Mounted Rifles, therefore the said Corps
"shall be and is hereby required to serve within this Colony or in the
said Colony of Natal."
The formation of the corps, 500 strong, took effect as from 26th
April. It was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. William Frank
Barker,[185] with Captain Walter Jardine as Adjutant.
Great care was taken in the selection of the other officers,
non-commissioned officers and men. It was decided to accept volunteers
from several existing mounted volunteer corps, in order that each such
unit should participate in the campaign. The corps was accordingly
constituted as follows:
W.O.'s, N.C.O.'s
Officers. and Men
A Squadron, Imperial Light Horse 7 99
B " South African Light Horse 5 87
C " Johannesburg Mounted Rifles
and Scottish Horse 8 122
D " Northern, Eastern, and Western,
Mounted Rifles 5 82
Maxim gun, Searchlight, Transport and
Medical Detachments 4 15
Regimental Staff 4 5
-- --
33 410
Hon. Capt. J. Peet, J.M.R., was appointed Quarter-master, and Lieut. W.
Bruce, Western Mounted Rifles, Signalling Officer.
The unit was mobilized on the 25th April, 1906. Notwithstanding
the fact that many difficulties had to be contended with,[186] the
T.M.R. left Johannesburg for Dundee, complete in every detail, on
the 26th. The mobilization had been carried out in a most effective
manner and with such speed by Colonel C.J. Briggs, Commandant of the
Transvaal Volunteers, Major M.C. Rowland, Controller and Paymaster,
also officers, n.c.o.'s and men connected with the supply of arms and
equipment, clothing, transport, pay, etc., as well as Major J.W.F.
Lamont, R.F.A., Chief Staff Officer, Transvaal Volunteers, that the
corps was obliged for several days to await orders at Dundee.
In addition to all the expenses being defrayed by the Transvaal
Government, the corps drew all supplies, except rations in the field,
from the Transvaal Volunteer Headquarters, Johannesburg.
* * * * *
The Natal Ministers received throughout the Rebellion the fullest
support, as well as sound practical advice, from the Governor (who
happened to be a Colonel in the Imperial army). Finding that the
situation at Nkandhla had assumed a much graver aspect by reason of
Sigananda's unexpected defection, they resolved to grapple with the
problem on lines commensurate with its scope and magnitude. The plan of
at once driving through the districts contiguous or adjacent to that
of Nkandhla was adopted. In carrying it out, the Northern District
Mounted Rifles were to advance from _Babanango_; Royston's Horse and
the Transvaal Mounted Rifles from _Empandhleni Magistracy_; and the
Natal Police Field Force, with a strong detachment of the Durban Light
Infantry, from _Fort Yolland_. The drifts over the Tugela were to be
guarded by the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, whilst a strong force of the
Natal Carbineers was to be stationed at Helpmakaar to keep a powerful
Chief Kula in check on the drive taking place.
The Active Militia were, at the same time, mobilized throughout Natal;
many of the units, however, remained at their respective headquarters
to keep the Natives in check during the proposed movements. The First
Reserves in various towns and districts were also mobilized, as it was
not impossible that the Natives, seeing so large a body of troops had
crossed into Zululand, might rise and attempt to massacre women and
children. Much of the intelligence received at this time was believed
to indicate that a _coup_ of that kind was being contemplated.
The moment had arrived when the possibility of a universal rising in
Zululand, as well as in Natal, had to be faced and provided against.
If one Chief, without specific grievance of his own, was ready to
associate himself with those who had taken up arms against the
Government, it was probable others would do the same on a fitting
opportunity arising. As for the rest of the Native population, it
seemed certain that an isolated Chief here and there would remain loyal
with his people, though the great bulk would watch events and go with
the tide whichever way it happened to flow. The Chief's personality,
however, was not the material factor, for, owing to various reasons
which need not be set forth here, his influence, in many cases, had
been so undermined, that members of his tribe remained loyal or not
to him as it happened to suit their individual fancy. The result was,
that although the majority, or even the whole tribe, decided to rebel,
the Chief would personally attach himself to the Government. Thus, the
mere fact of his professing to be loyal was no guarantee whatever that
the tribe would follow his example. Generally speaking, his influence
proved too weak to prevent a few and sometimes many of his best
fighting men from joining the rebels. This was the state of affairs in
many directions, especially in Zululand and the eastern parts of Natal,
and defections would have gone on to a greater extent than they did,
until every tribal unit had been 'hollowed out,' had not the Government
at this critical moment acted as vigorously and comprehensively as it
did.
Colonel (now Brigadier-General Sir Duncan) McKenzie, who had been in
command of the column that operated in the south-western portions of
Natal, was placed in command of the combined forces, including the
Transvaal Mounted Volunteers and the section of the Natal Police called
out for active service in Zululand. His appointment took effect on the
28th.
[Illustration:
COLONEL (now BRIGADIER-GENERAL) SIR DUNCAN McKENZIE, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
V.D.]
The composition and strength of the command, designated the "Zululand
Field Force," will be found in Appendices III. and IV. The troops under
Leuchars, who remained in Natal, appear in the same Appendices.
The position of Chief Staff Officer was conferred on Colonel Sir
A. Woolls-Sampson, K.C.B., of the Transvaal.[187] The other Staff
appointments were made by McKenzie from the force under his command.
The Commissioner for Native Affairs was appointed Political Agent, with
authority to represent and act for the Governor and Supreme Chief under
martial law in all political matters that might have to be dealt with
summarily in Zululand. He was empowered to enquire into the conduct of
Chiefs, tribes or Natives who had received and harboured Bambata, or
otherwise assisted him, or committed crimes requiring to be summarily
disposed of, with the object of suppressing the Rebellion, and to award
such punishment as was fitting, provided that all cases, in which
sentence in excess of two years' imprisonment was passed, were referred
to the Governor for confirmation.
McKenzie proceeded to Dundee on the 30th, and assumed command of his
force on the following morning.[188]
The column at Dundee left that place on the morning of the 3rd May,
with a convoy of 150 ox-waggons loaded with provisions. The route
followed was Laffnie's Drift, Nqutu, Fort Louis and Itala. As the roads
and drifts were poor, progress was slow. Wherever a halt was made
for the night a square lager was formed by means of the waggons. The
country traversed was found almost deserted. Newly-made assegais were
discovered at a few kraals in Zululand. The magistracy at Empandhleni
was reached on the 8th.
* * * * *
Whilst this column was on the march, developments of an important
nature were occurring on the south-eastern side of the Nkandhla
forests, resulting in the first serious encounter with the enemy's
forces, then, as has been seen, made up of men of Bambata, Sigananda,
Ndube, and Mpumela's tribes. By this time, a number of men of other
tribes had also joined.
When Mansel reached Fort Yolland on the 29th April (11 a.m.), he found
Capt. W. Alexander, D.L.I., had already come in from Eshowe with a
convoy of waggons escorted by a company of D.L.I. and a troop of N.M.R.
The convoy had narrowly escaped an ambuscade, no doubt devised by the
raiders from Nkandhla to be referred to later.
It so happened that Chief Ndube, after having turned his men out to
capture Bambata as directed by the Magistrate, and after subsequently
receiving an order from Mr. Saunders prohibiting entry of Sigananda's
ward until Mansel had arrived to take charge of the operations, lost
many members of his tribe by their becoming rebels, primarily, it would
seem, to ensure their stock from being looted by Bambata. Bambata and
his allies were, at the time, held in check by nothing whatsoever.
They were able to raid and range about over wide expanses of country
occupied by people as loyal as could be expected. These raids had
already taken place in Ndube's ward, followed by others in those of
Makubalo and Mfungelwa. Ndube's men, therefore, were obliged to face
the alternative, either of being killed outright and losing their
stock whilst remaining loyal to a Government which had, up till then,
been unable to give them support, or to join the rebels and, at any
rate for the time being, save everything. It is not surprising the
latter alternative was seized by many. Terrorization of this kind is
one of the principal, though not sufficiently considered reasons, why
Bambata was able so speedily to mass together the formidable force he
did. With his men melting away hourly, Ndube perceived he could no
longer remain loyal without serious risk to his own life and property.
He reported what had happened to Leuchars at Krantzkop, and asked for
advice. Leuchars told him to move off with his cattle and the loyal
portion of the tribe if he felt in danger. He accordingly fled to
Eshowe with a number of followers on the night of the 22nd, whilst
some of the women took refuge in Natal, near the Tugela. Many of his
people drove their stock into Mfungelwa's ward, which adjoins that of
Ndube on the east. These cattle and others belonging to Mfungelwa's
people were what Sigananda and Bambata's men raided on the night of the
28th and following morning. A number of the owners, who happened to be
dissociated from the Ndube-ites, followed the raiders back to Nkandhla
and pleaded for the restoration of their stock. In many cases, the
applications were granted, the cattle being returned after a forfeit of
one large beast per herd had been levied, "owing to its having set foot
on ground in the hallowed vicinity of the grave." The decision to raid
at that moment was probably precipitated by knowledge of the fact that
Mansel was moving to Fort Yolland.
An amusing incident occurred about this time. Mfungelwa had been
directed that, should Bambata be seen attempting a further raid, all it
was necessary to do was to raise a white flag on a hill near his kraal,
a couple of miles from, and within view of, the camp. This would be
taken as an alarm, when assistance would be rendered. On the following
Wednesday, the flag was observed hoisted early in the morning. The
whole force, numbering 350, stood to arms and moved out at a smart pace
to engage the enemy. Upon coming up to the flag and clamouring for
particulars as to the whereabouts of the raiders, Mfungelwa quietly
replied that there was no enemy--in setting up the flag, he had done so
merely as an experiment, it appearing desirable to rehearse the part he
had to play in case of actual necessity!
The rebel scouts exposed themselves daily on Komo hill, some five miles
to the north-west; from this point, the movements of the troops at Fort
Yolland were easily perceivable. A reconnaissance was accordingly made
to Mfanefile's store at Maqonga, some three miles south of Komo, when
general information as to the rebels and the country they were in was
obtained.
By way of checking the enemy's encroachments, Mansel decided to make
another reconnaissance, this time in force and towards Komo.
He moved out at 6 a.m. on the 5th, each man taking two days' rations
and 150 rounds of ammunition. Komo was reached at 9 a.m. After an
hour's halt, Mansel decided to descend, viâ Sibudeni peak, into the
valley lying to the immediate south of the Nkandhla forests. This
valley, or rather series of valleys, was known to be in the occupation
of the enemy; such area (including the grave) being, indeed, their
headquarters.
As the intention was simply to make a reconnaissance, it was deemed
unnecessary for it to be governed by any definite, pre-conceived plan.
Hence the commanding officer, when he started from Komo, did not issue
instructions as to what his objective was. Thus the men were marched
through parts of the forest at Sibudeni and into the valley to a point
within three or four miles of the rebel headquarters, without any
clear conception as to what was to be done on getting within striking
distance. The movement, as will presently be seen, proved an extremely
hazardous one.
The strength of the force and its order of march, on leaving Komo, was:
30 Mounted Infantry, D.L.I., with 20 N.M.R. (Major S.G. Campbell); 86
Nongqai (Z.N.P.) (Major C. Fairlie); 200 Natal Police; 80 Natal Naval
Corps (Commander F. Hoare); 80 D.L.I. (Capt. R.L. Goulding), and a levy
of about 400 men, armed with shields and assegais (Chief Mfungelwa).
Total: 410 Europeans, 86 Zululand Native Police, 400 Native Contingent.
Of the Europeans, 250 were mounted, 160 unmounted; the Native forces
were almost entirely unmounted.
Passing Sibudeni store (looted, it will be remembered, some days
previously by the rebels), the road entered a small portion of the
forests. Here fresh meat was discovered, with signs of a fire near
by. Three or four assegais, too, with small rags attached containing
medicine of some sort, were seen, stuck in the ground by the rebels in
accordance with their superstitious ideas.
Progress now became slow, owing to occasional sniping by rebels
concealed in the bush. Those who were riding dismounted and proceeded
in half-sections, each man leading his horse. The Nongqai extended a
few yards into the forest on either side. The infantry, after fixing
bayonets, marched in single file on either edge of the track, officers
in the centre. By the time the open country that forms the summit
of a ridge called Bobe was reached, the infantry, owing to the heat
and absence of water, were beginning to show signs of fatigue. After
a halt, to give the rear time to close up, the force descended by a
footpath into the valley referred to, moving in single file.
The head of the column, keeping the footpath, passed on through neck
marked _C_ on the plan to knolls _D_ and _E_. Another halt of about
half an hour was made on the western slope of _E_.
During the interval, thirty mounted men were sent to burn a kraal
(Mlibo's) a few yards off on the left. Lieut. A.H.G. Blamey, with a
few N.M.R., then advanced to knoll _F_ to reconnoitre. The time was
about 3 p.m. Moving up the eastern incline, and when about 350 yards
from the base of _E_, the scouts came upon about 300 rebels lying perdu
among the weeds and grass of an old garden, a hundred yards to the
right of the path. They were not seen until they simultaneously rose
to charge. As they got up, they shouted "Usutu! Usutu!" at the top of
their voices, and dashed at the scouts who, after quickly dismounting
and firing a few shots, fell back to the rest of the guard and Nongqai
at _E_ as best they could. At the first shot, the Nongqai immediately
lined themselves in regular order on the right, along a contour of
_E_ about half-way down the hill, and, with the N.M.R. and mounted
infantry--the latter having galloped up from the kraal they were
burning on hearing the fire and ranged themselves on the left--opened
a heavy fusillade on the enemy as he came rushing through a hail of
bullets, the bullets which up till that moment he believed would not
'enter.' Each ran stoopingly with shield before his face, as if trying
to ward off the bullets, whilst a _tshokobezi_ badge tossed wildly
about his head. They came on with great dash, directing their attack
mainly at the left front of the position. It was at that point that
most of them fell. In one or two instances, the Nongqai, who behaved
with conspicuous coolness and pluck, were obliged to resort to their
bayonets.
Finding themselves beaten at the first rush, they broke, large numbers
making down the steep and slightly wooded watercourses on either side
of the kraal marked "Manyunda." Another section disappeared down the
northern slopes that converge at _F_, where they concealed themselves,
in the vicinity of Nkunzana river. A number were shot as they ran,
especially on the south-western slopes.
The Natal Police, when the action began, were quickly pushed up to
support at _D_, about 300 yards from _E_, from where a heavy and
effective fire proceeded for the few moments the enemy was visible. The
Navals and the D.L.I. came forward on hearing the fire. The former, at
the time, were on the Bobe side of the neck leading to _D_, _i.e._ at
_B_, some few yards up the incline. From such position, a Maxim they
had with them opened at long range, proving effective. The D.L.I.,
still further up Bobe at _A_, being rear-guard, did not come into
action at this stage.
[Illustration:
BOBE
Scale of yards
0 100 200 400 600 800
REFERENCE
A, B, C, &c., see text
_Footpath_ _Native kraal_
_Route taken by troops_
_Nkandla forests lie on immediate
right and right front of the map_]
After the rebels had dispersed, the column moved forward and began to
close up about 300 yards west of _F_. Suddenly another body of rebels,
about 400 strong, was seen moving up the Nkunzana, as if making
for the rear of the rear-guard, and therefore attempting a belated
encircling movement. Possibly Mansel's extraordinarily long column and
its abnormally slow progress, was the reason why the enemy's attack on
the rear-guard failed as it did. The front _impi_ had come into action
before the rear one (owing to the very high ground Mansel's rear-guard
was still descending) could attempt the usual enveloping tactics. As
this body reached a kraal on the north side of Bobe, it was joined
by a company that had been scouting for some days on Nomangci and
which, hearing the fire, had come unsolicited to help. The _impi_ then
advanced towards the rear-guard (D.L.I.). Not many minutes before, the
officer in charge of the guard had had occasion to send Mfungelwa and
his force to capture stock and burn kraals on the left, consequently he
was under the impression the Natives he saw were the Native contingent,
until, examining with field-glasses, he noticed that none wore the
usual Turkey-red and calico badge. The enemy was thereupon fired into
by the guard and N.N.C.; without charging, although firing a few shots,
he broke and disappeared down the slopes up which he had just come.
The column again moved on, only to turn sharp left to cross the Halambu
still further below. The enemy followed. The rear-guard was now
supported by mounted men, who, firing on the _impi_ in the direction
of _F_, were themselves fired on from the Nkunzana by eighteen rebels
stationed at that point. After pretending to move on to join the column
at Halambu, the mounted men suddenly returned and, finding the rebels
in force in the open at short range, shot down a number. Still another
section showed themselves near Nkolotshane hill, about two miles off to
the south-west. They opened ineffectively at long range.
It was now late in the afternoon. Owing to the exhausted condition of
the men, the desirability of camping on the left side of Halambu was
considered, but, because of the long, dry tambookie grass thereabout,
which could easily have been set alight, and to most of the ammunition
being spent, Mansel decided to make for Fort Yolland.
Needless to say, the return march, with the infantry in so exhausted
a condition, was extremely difficult. Nor was this to be wondered at.
They had already walked twenty miles over rough country, in heavy order.
The enemy dogged the troops for miles, constantly sniping at them in
the moonlight: nor did he desist until the main road near Mfanefile's
store had been fairly reached. Some of the infantry did not get to camp
until midnight.