secured drugs from Dinuzulu, whose effect would be to prevent European
bullets from entering the body. This curious belief was destined to
play a remarkable part during the rising. It seems to have originated
from the Basutos.
The belief that the bodies of the "rightly disposed" would be
impervious to bullets, would appear to have existed, not only before
the attack on the police at Mpanza, but also before the one at the
kraal of Mjongo.
If there was anything that went to confirm the belief in "bullets not
entering," it must have been the comparative absence of casualties
among the rebels: (_a_) at Mjongo's kraal; (_b_) when the Magistrate's
party was attacked; and (_c_) when the police were ambuscaded at
Mpanza. It may, however, be mentioned that Malaza was wounded at
Mpanza, though not to such an extent as to oblige him to retire.
Immediately after their attack, the rebels cut the telegraph line
between Greytown and Keate's drift.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 127: This name, in full, is uMpanza, not iMpanza or Impanza,
as sometimes written.]
[Footnote 128: Cf. Wat Tyler's, Jack Cade's, and Monmouth's Rebellions
in England.]
[Footnote 129: Zibebu's loyalty was never doubted for a moment. His
name is mentioned here only because of his exceptionally fine qualities
as a military commander.]
[Footnote 130: One often hears Bambata's people spoken of _a ba
seNgome_ = the Ngome people. The reason is this. At the base of Ngome,
a prominent little hill, three miles east of Mpanza valley, Mancinza
and previous Chiefs of this section of the tribe lived for two or more
generations.]
[Footnote 131: To _lobola_ is to deliver to a girl's father the cattle
or other property required by custom to be so handed over as part of
the marriage settlement, viz. _lobolo_. These cattle are not purchase
price or barter, but merely consideration or compensation for loss of
the girl's services, as well as a visible guarantee of intention on the
part of the bridegroom to treat his wife at all times fairly and justly
under the Zulu system of life.]
[Footnote 132: "The runner that took the duiker for his model." The
duiker is a small antelope.]
[Footnote 133: This farm, in 1881, belonged to the Swiss Mission
Society. It was bonded to the Standard Bank, when a rent of £1 per hut
was charged by the trustees. Later on, it was sold to Messrs. Theunis
Nel and Gabriel Botha.]
[Footnote 134: There is a standing rule that no Native may appear in a
European town unless clothed from neck to knee.]
[Footnote 135: Dilke.]
[Footnote 136: A week before, Clarke had been sent with a strong
force to make the arrest. On his reaching Greytown, arrangements were
made for a night raid on Bambata's kraal, but, owing to Chief Sibindi
informing the Secretary for Native Affairs that Bambata would probably
cause trouble if raided, Clarke was directed to refrain from executing
the warrant, although he had gone to the trouble of ascertaining that
the Chief was at his kraal and could have been secured with comparative
ease.]
[Footnote 137: The sending of Ngqengqengqe to summon Bambata and the
inciting of Bambata to rebel were emphatically denied by Dinuzulu.
Dinuzulu's connection with the Rebellion will be dealt with later.
One of Bambata's children died at Usutu during their stay there.]
[Footnote 138: Thong of cow or ox-hide.]
[Footnote 139: It was generally known Cakijana was one of Dinuzulu's
personal attendants.]
[Footnote 140: It is the custom for Zulus to shout their war-cry on
charging. "Usutu" was the one belonging to Dinuzulu's followers, he
having inherited it from his father Cetshwayo. Dinuzulu's principal
kraal, it will be remembered, bore the same name. Bambata's men had not
used this cry before the occasion in question.]
[Footnote 141: It is, however, fair to add that Mansel had had no time
to ascertain the enemy's strength, which, seeing the size of the tribe,
might have been anything between 150 and 600.]
[Footnote 142: It was not known until after the column got to camp that
this man was missing.]
[Footnote 143: He was known also by the names Sukabekuluma (_he who
goes off whilst they are still talking_); Dakwaukwesuta (_he who
becomes drunk on getting a full meal_); and Gwazakanjani (_how do you
stab?_). One of his praises was: _uSigilamikuba, ku vel'izindaba_ = The
one whose pranks give rise to matters for consideration.]
VIII.
FLIGHT OF BAMBATA TO NKANDHLA FORESTS.--FIRST STEPS TAKEN TO COPE WITH
THE SITUATION.--ZULU CUSTOMS.
On the day following the ambuscade in the valley, Mansel moved his
camp from Botha's to Warwick's farm (Burrup's), _i.e._ on to high,
open ground, slightly nearer Greytown, and awaited reinforcements.
Bambata remained in Mpanza valley. He dispatched messengers forthwith
to each of the Chiefs Silwana, Sibindi and Gayede, calling on them
to render assistance; at the same time, he informed them he had been
to Dinuzulu, who had promised to co-operate as soon as the ball had
been set rolling. He warned them that, in case of refusal, they would
incur "the Prince's" displeasure, and draw an attack by the army the
latter was about to bring into the field. The two that went to Silwana
were promptly arrested by that Chief and conveyed to the Magistrate at
Weenen; Sibindi did likewise with the man sent to him.
Although Bambata was, through his mother, nearly related to Silwana, it
was the height of absurdity to think that the latter, the most powerful
Chief of Natal, whose grandfather had, in years gone by, formed a not
unworthy opponent of Tshaka himself, would risk his position and the
well-being of his tribe, by responding, at a moment's notice, to a
summons from a Chief like Bambata, even though accompanied by a threat
from the representative of the House that slew his father Gabangaye at
Isandhlwana in 1879.[144]
Finding he was not likely to obtain support locally, although general
sympathy in his cause was not wanting, Bambata decided, most probably
in accordance with a preconcerted plan, to move across the Tugela to
the famous Nkandhla forests, commonly known by the Natives as falling
within Chief Sigananda's ward. He declared he had been directed to do
this by Dinuzulu.
The rebel ringleader lost no time, owing to the following
developments: No sooner was the news of the Mpanza affair flashed to
Pietermaritzburg, than the Commandant re-mobilized the U.M.R., N.F.A.
(B Battery, four 15 pdrs.), a company of the D.L.I., with signallers,
and Greytown Reserves (120)--brigading these arms with the Natal Police
Field Force. Colonel Leuchars was placed in command and ordered to deal
with the situation. The artillery and D.L.I. referred to left Durban
at 7.30 a.m. on the 5th, and arrived at Greytown by 6.30 p.m. the same
day. The other corps mobilized with similar alacrity.
Leuchars moved out the following morning at 9 and, after joining the
N.P. and Nongqai at mid-day, remained in camp the rest of the day.
Bambata would naturally have received early information of the arrival
of these reinforcements.
After considering the position by the light of the intelligence
available, Leuchars decided to surround Mpanza valley at dawn on the
7th. His dispositions were as follows: N.P. and Z.N.P. to occupy a long
hill to the south-east and overlooking Marshall's hotel, the remainder
of the force to proceed to high ground to the west of Bambata's
position in Mpanza valley.
At 8 p.m., Leuchars moved out with the latter portion of the column. It
was, however, not until 2.30 a.m., after a nine-mile march, that the
position overlooking the valley on the west could be reached. Early
the same morning, Mansel proceeded with the police along the main road
towards Marshall's hotel, whilst Clarke, with a detachment, advanced
to a position on hills (on the south) overlooking Mpanza valley, and
midway between Leuchars and Mansel.
At 9 a.m. two guns opened fire on kraals in the valley at a range of
3,000 yards, the other two did likewise at 10.30 a.m. from a high
position on the north side of the valley. Clarke, in the meantime,
opened with a Maxim at other kraals about 1,200 to 1,500 yards off. Not
a Native, however, was to be seen.
The Reserves, under Chief Leader John Nel, who did not join Leuchars
till 9 a.m. that morning,[145] held ground on a spur to the north-west
of the valley, where a Native, evidently a spy, was shot as he tried to
escape over the wooded hills towards Mooi River.
The loyal Chief Sibindi, who had been ordered on the 4th to guard the
border as well as the Tugela drifts, co-operated generally on the east
with his levy of about 1,000 men. His orders were to advance as far as
the Biggarsberg main road, about a mile from Bambata's hiding-place, as
soon as the guns opened fire.
A report came in about noon that Bambata had vacated his ward,
proceeded south-east on to the high veld, and then turned into Gayede's
ward. There being no confirmation of this, Leuchars continued the
operations. He subsequently withdrew to bivouack for the night at
Warwick's farm.[146]
On the following day (Sunday), Sibindi was sent back into the thorns,
supported by a squadron U.M.R. (100), under Major S. Carter, with
instructions to complete the bush driving. The Reserves occupied a
ridge north-west of Mpanza valley. Owing to Sibindi's men being too
tired, on reaching Marshall's hotel at 4 p.m., to go further that day,
Carter camped with him on an old mealie garden immediately behind
Marshall's. By 9 a.m. on the 9th, all the troops being in position,
Bambata's stronghold, about three miles north-west of Marshall's,
was surrounded. It was found vacated, with evidences about it of
quite recent occupation by a considerable force. The rough and very
thickly-wooded country in the neighbourhood of Mpanza was thoroughly
scoured in different directions on the 9th, 10th and other days; the
kraals of rebels were burnt and their stock seized. Many, who had,
in various ways, managed to hold aloof from the insurgents, were met
with. In consequence of being at their kraals within the area of
operations, notwithstanding warning to be outside, several narrowly
escaped being shot. The crops, not having quite matured, had not been
reaped. Those belonging to, and abandoned by, the rebels, were given to
the loyalists. The Reserves were demobilized on the 10th, whilst the
artillery and infantry withdrew to Greytown on the same day, followed
by the U.M.R. on the 11th.
The intelligence that Bambata had fled to Zululand had been fully
confirmed by the 10th. The advisability of pursuing the fugitives was
thereupon considered by Leuchars. Quick pursuit is undoubtedly in
accordance with Native tactics on such occasions, but Leuchars believed
it was part of the rebels' plans to decoy his force to Nkandhla and
thereby afford the remainder and larger portion of Bambata's tribe,
say, in combination with Silwana's people, an opportunity of attacking
Greytown and the many outlying European homesteads. Proof of the
possibility of such attack lay in the fact of Bambata's force having
concealed itself a few weeks previously in Layman's trees, on the day
other members of the tribe went to pay the poll tax in Greytown.
Leuchars, however, had other and broader grounds for advising against
troops being sent from Natal at this critical moment. To have withdrawn
a large portion of the Active Militia would have been to place all
civilized portions of the Colony in jeopardy, especially as no Imperial
troops were available. The Matabeles, it will be remembered, rose in
rebellion in 1896 when the greater portion of the Chartered Company's
forces were absent in connection with the Jameson Raid (December,
1895).[147]
The ways and means of dealing with the situation at Nkandhla were fully
considered by the Commandant and the Government, when it was decided to
employ irregular troops in Zululand, and so obviate as much as possible
the necessity of withdrawing the local Militia. Hence the Commandant's
instructions to Leuchars were to remain where he was.
Journeying due east, concealed by the dense bush and rugged hills
everywhere to be met with, Bambata, after emerging from the valleys,
passed through a farm gate, and, travelling a short distance along a
road, branched off to the left, making down through Chief Gayede's
location and along the lower part of the Dimane stream, a tributary of
the Tugela. He had about 150 men with him, including Magwababa (then a
prisoner), Mgombana, Cakijana and Moses. It was when he had well-nigh
reached the Tugela river that the guns above referred to were heard
by the party booming in the distance. Magwababa, on account of having
a bad knee, had, by that time, fallen into the rear. In addition to
tying him, the rebels had, with a stone, struck and bruised the inner
side of his knee, to prevent his running away. About noon on Saturday,
he succeeded in eluding his guards; he made his way direct to the
Krantzkop magistracy, and was shortly afterwards conveyed from there
to Greytown by post-cart. Although a list of the rebels with Bambata
had already been partially obtained, Magwababa helped to complete it,
besides giving other useful information.
Near the Tugela Rand, and about ten miles from Krantzkop, the
fugitives, about noon, came to a store in charge of one John Jenner.
Their behaviour was orderly. After the main body had passed the store,
which it did forthwith, one who appeared to be an induna, purchased
a pair of long stockings, a white handkerchief, also two bottles of
lemonade. A few, who were in rear, stayed about fifteen minutes, when
they moved on after the others in the direction of the Tugela. It was
noticed that the men, who were not known by the storekeeper to be from
Mpanza, had eight or ten guns of various kinds, whilst others carried
shields and assegais. Two only were mounted. A number had white ostrich
feathers stuck in their hair. They had pushed on quickly, because
afraid of being overtaken.
Proceeding down the Dimane by footpaths, they crossed the Tugela into
Chief Mpumela's ward by the Mtambo drift, probably less frequented by
Europeans than any between the junction of the Tugela with the Buffalo
and Middle Drift. It is about equidistant from the only two drifts
possible for wheeled transport in that section of the river, being
not less than fifteen miles from each, and in a mountainous, rocky,
unsurveyed and unknown region. The party crossed whilst Leuchars'
artillery was still engaged firing at various targets in Mpanza valley.
Thus Leuchars did not get the report of Bambata's alleged escape until
after the latter had entered Zululand!
Bambata went at once to Ntshelela's kraal,[148] where he demanded a
beast, threatening to drive the whole herd home and help himself unless
the owner complied. The latter selected a young animal; but Bambata,
dissatisfied with what he considered the man's niggardly disposition,
immediately chose one of the largest; this he then shot on the spot.
The flesh was partaken of by the fugitives who, late the same afternoon
(7th), passed on to the kraal of Mangati, another son of Godide.
Mangati gave them a goat.
After passing the night at Mangati's, the party pushed on, early on
Sunday morning, viâ certain kraals, to that of Simoyi in the mouth of
Mome gorge, on the edge of the Nkandhla forests, and within a mile of
the ancient and redoubtable stronghold.[149] The journey from Mpanza to
the Mome, forty to fifty miles, for the most part over extremely rugged
country, had been performed within about thirty-six hours, including
rests. And so the torch that had been lit in Natal, with surprisingly
small loss to the insurgents, was swiftly carried with audacity and
success into a district whose people had no cause whatever of grievance
against the Government peculiar to themselves.
Sigananda's people had, indeed, as recently as the preceding January,
expostulated with the Magistrate in a violent and disrespectful
manner because required to pay the poll tax. They were brought to
trial, but discharged with a caution.[150] Difficulty had also been
experienced in procuring (as had previously been done from time to
time) a few labourers for the Public Works department. The Magistrate
had been obliged to inflict a small fine on the Chief's principal son,
Ndabaningi, for neglecting to obey a summons. As regards Sigananda
himself, it was found that, on account of his great age, he was no
longer capable of satisfactorily managing the tribe. The Commissioner
for Native Affairs (Mr., now Sir, Charles Saunders, K.C.M.G.),
accordingly visited Empandhleni on the 2nd April and discussed the
position with Ndabaningi, who represented the Chief, and the indunas,
when the meeting concurred with the Commissioner in thinking that
Ndabaningi should be authorized to act on behalf of his father. "I told
the indunas," says Mr. Saunders, "that there was no objection on my
part to recommending Ndabaningi's appointment, but before submitting
such a recommendation for the consideration of Government, it was
necessary that the question be considered by Sigananda and the heads
of the tribe who, if they were of the same opinion, should make a
formal representation in this respect to me at Eshowe on my return from
the Usutu kraal, whence I was then proceeding."[151]
When F.E. van Rooyen, Chief Leader of the Krantzkop Reserves, heard on
the 6th that Leuchars proposed operating at Mpanza on the following
day, he arranged with about twenty of his men, not then mobilized
and but few of them armed, to go and watch the operations. They left
an hour before dawn. Just after sunrise, they ascertained that a
body of Natives had been seen the same morning making towards the
Dimane stream. On further investigation, it transpired that the party
consisted of Bambata's people. The Magistrate, on being advised, wired
the information to headquarters. Van Rooyen volunteered, if reinforced,
to follow up and contain the rebels. The offer was accepted, and
support promised. He was accordingly instructed to mobilize. At 9.30
a.m. on the 8th, the fifty-four men that had come in, left and,
crossing the Tugela at Watton's drift, were not long in finding
unmistakable traces of the fugitives. It seemed at first as if they had
made for the Qudeni forests.[152] Van Rooyen went on to Ntingwe store,
actually crossing, without knowing it, the route that had been taken
the day before by Bambata. He at once communicated his intelligence to
the Magistrate, Empandhleni, and, leaving Ntingwe at 2 a.m. on the 9th,
reached Empandhleni with his men at 6 a.m. Shortly after his arrival,
word came that Bambata was encamped at the Mome gorge. By this time,
about thirty of the Z.M.R. had mobilized and were at Empandhleni. Van
Rooyen proposed that the rebels should be at once attacked. To this
course, the commanding officer (Major W.A. Vanderplank), who arrived
in the evening, would not agree, on the ground that the local Chiefs
had not been ordered to arm. Van Rooyen made other efforts in the
direction of aggressive action by European troops, but, meeting with no
success, left with his men on the morning of the 10th to protect the
European families at Krantzkop against a possible rising in that part
of the country.
After serving under Leuchars from the 5th to 7th, Mansel decided to
detach himself and to follow Bambata. His strength then was 175 N.P.
and 77 Nongqai. He advised Leuchars of what he was doing, but asked
approval of action which, as a matter of fact, had already been taken
before the commanding officer had sanctioned it. But, although getting
away from Leuchars as quickly as Van Rooyen did from Krantzkop, Mansel
did not reach Empandhleni until at least three and a half days after
the former, although the distances travelled were about the same. One
of the reasons for this delay was that he had waggons with him. These,
on getting near Fort Yolland, branched off and made for Empandhleni
viâ Eshowe and Melmoth, leaving Mansel, with the main portion of the
force, to go on direct to Empandhleni. As, at this time, there was
no reason whatever for anticipating attack along the route selected
for the waggons, it is difficult to understand why the entire column
should have been kept back as escort to the waggons, instead of pushing
forward to contain the enemy.
By midnight on the 7th, instructions had been sent from Eshowe to the
Magistrates concerned to warn all Chiefs of Nkandhla, Eshowe and Nqutu
districts to arrest the fugitives should they enter any of their wards.
Immediately the Nkandhla Magistrate (Mr. B. Colenbrander) heard, as he
did on Sunday, the 8th, that the rebels had entered his district--at
first he supposed they were making for Qudeni forests--he sent word by
Native runners to the Chiefs likely to be concerned, notably Mpumela,
Ndube and Mbuzo, directing them to arm and arrest the law-breakers,
then correctly said to be at or near a mountain called Kotongweni. Each
complied the same day, but, before they had learnt what Bambata's real
destination was, the latter had left Kotongweni, passed from kraal
to kraal in the manner described, entered the ward of another Chief,
Sigananda, and taken refuge in his notorious stronghold. The Magistrate
was instructed by the Commissioner the same afternoon "to arm all the
Natives in his district to assist in capturing Bambata," and to direct
the tribes nearest the magistracy to protect that place during the
night. The latter order was complied with.
It may be of interest to indicate what was spontaneously done by
Natives through whose kraals or lands the strange body of men passed on
their way to the Mome.
Ntshelela at once reported the fact to the Magistrate. Mangati, and
two other kraal-owners, although all men of rank, took no such action,
but, associating themselves with others, merely sent a report to the
Chief (Sigananda). They, moreover, at once adopted a friendly attitude
towards the rebels, notwithstanding that the latter bore indications of
their recent conflict with the police--they carried a number of guns,
two or three of which had manifestly belonged to Europeans, and even
wore the helmet of a European trooper. They had also the moustache of
the unfortunate man whose body had not at once been recovered, cut off
and carried to induce others to take up arms against the white man.