for Native Affairs summoning Bambata to attend at his office in
Pietermaritzburg. Two Native police were sent to say he was to take an
early train to Pietermaritzburg on the following morning (Saturday).
The messengers returned to say he had promised to comply on the Monday.
After the police had gone, Nhlonhlo intervened and would not allow
the Chief to keep the promise, for the reason that, having by that
time slept in the veld for three days with men under arms, he would
be looked on as already in revolt, and, therefore, as a criminal to
be put under arrest. Nhlonhlo and his _impi_ thereupon carried him
off to another kraal. On Tuesday, a further message was sent. After
some trouble, the messengers found him and delivered their message.
He told them to inform the Magistrate he was afraid of going to
Pietermaritzburg, as he had heard the European people had taken up arms
against him.
At this stage, Mr. C. Tatham, an attorney of Greytown, who had one
of Bambata's relations working for him, Bambata himself, moreover,
being his client, sent to the Chief to say that, if afraid of obeying
the summons, he was to send a particular man to him, when Tatham
himself would go and see Bambata and, after explaining the position,
conduct him to the authorities. Bambata was besought by his wiser
followers to seize the opportunity, which he said he would do. The man
referred to arrived, but found Tatham unwell. The latter then sent
word to say Bambata was to come by himself, and, if afraid, he was
to proceed direct to Tatham's residence, when he would be conducted
to the Magistrate's office. On hearing this, Nhlonhlo exclaimed: "He
won't go." In reply to a remark about the probability of Bambata
being released on payment of a fine, Nhlonhlo remarked: "I prefer he
should die in our own hands, rather than be shot by Europeans out of
our sight." Others tried to persuade the Chief, but, influenced by
Nhlonhlo, Bambata remarked: "I won't go. Some of you want me to be
killed by myself. When they kill me, it will not be until some of you
have been laid out." References to the action of the British Government
in regard to Cetshwayo and Langalibalele were unavailing, for Bambata
replied: "When each of these was captured, it was not until after some
of their people had been killed, therefore I too mean to resist."
"If you are tired of him" (_i.e._ Bambata), said Nhlonhlo to the
peace-makers, "give him over to us." After the wiser men had queried
whether Nhlonhlo had a fortress where Bambata could be hidden with
any good prospect of success, the people dispersed. Bambata was then
conducted to the forest-clad hill above the principal induna Mgombana's
kraal, and there concealed.
On the 3rd March, a final message was dispatched to the effect that,
if Bambata continued any longer to disobey the Supreme Chief's order,
he would have to take the consequences, whatever they might be. The
bearers, however, failed to see him, as the people refused to disclose
his whereabouts. The message was delivered to the Chief's brother
Funizwe.
Major W.J. Clarke, with a force of 170 Natal Police and a troop,
U.M.R. (Helpmakaar), made a surprise visit to Mpanza on the 9th, with
the object of arresting Bambata, but failed, as the man hid himself in
the dense bush about those parts as soon as he saw the force advancing.
Clarke, thereupon, returned to Pietermaritzburg.[136] In the meantime,
Bambata, feeling that Natal could not afford him protection, crossed
into Zululand on Sunday, the 11th March, boasting to his followers as
he left, that when they next set eyes on him he would be at the head of
an army. Nothing more was heard of him officially from the 11th until
the morning of the 3rd April.
During his absence, Magwababa and Funizwe (Bambata's full brother),
together with the more important men of the tribe, including the
firebrand, Nhlonhlo, were summoned to Pietermaritzburg, the object
being to appoint a successor to Bambata, who had been deposed as from
the 23rd February. It was decided Funizwe should succeed, but that, for
a year, Magwababa was to act as Chief.
But where was Bambata at this time? Subsequent inquiries show that,
when he left for Zululand, travelling on foot, he was accompanied by
his chief wife, three children, and a mat-bearer, also a young man,
Ngqengqengqe by name. Among other places, he slept at a relative's in
Nkandhla district; he then proceeded on to Dinuzulu's Usutu kraal by
easy stages, leaving his wife and children at a place some seven miles
away from there. He reached Usutu on Sunday, the 25th March.
Only long after the Insurrection was any account procurable of
these doings, particularly from the woman and children in question.
According to their evidence, this young man, Ngqengqengqe, had been
sent from Usutu kraal by Dinuzulu's minor induna to summon Bambata,
as Dinuzulu desired to see him. Bambata had several interviews with
Dinuzulu, being treated by the latter in a markedly hospitable manner.
Accommodation in a special establishment a few yards from the kraal
and Dinuzulu's own apartments, was provided. His wife and children
were brought the next day to Usutu and there concealed. Dinuzulu, says
Bambata's wife, through his principal induna, Mankulumana, gave Bambata
instructions to go back to Natal, commit an act of rebellion and then
flee to Nkandhla forests, where Dinuzulu's men would join him. Bambata
was, at the same time, given a Mauser rifle and some ammunition. After
spending four days at Usutu, he started on his return journey, leaving
his wife and children at Dinuzulu's kraal. And there they continued to
be concealed for fourteen months.[137] Two young men were sent back
with Bambata to Natal, one being Cakijana (son of Gezindaka), who soon
began to play an important part. Bambata, accompanied by these two,
called at a kraal of Chief Matshana (son of Mondise) on Friday, the
30th March, but was refused admission. He left the same afternoon for
Ngubevu drift (on the Tugela), having first assured himself that it was
not being watched by police.
About 7 a.m. on Tuesday, 3rd April, it was reported to the Magistrate
that Bambata was back in Mpanza valley (as a matter of fact he had got
back on the 31st March), and that he and an _impi_ he had raised had
captured the acting Chief Magwababa on the preceding evening; that they
had surprised Magwababa in his hut, treated him with violence, and,
tying him with a reim,[138] had marched him off towards that portion
of the tribe that lies furthest from Greytown, and in the vicinity
of Marshall's hotel. The foregoing tale had been brought to a farmer
(Mr. Botha) at 3 a.m. by Magwababa's own wife who, from what she saw,
supposed her husband must by then be dead.
Afterwards it was discovered that the assailants had, on seizing
Magwababa, jeered at him in these terms: "Where are your white friends
now? We acknowledge, not a Natal king, but a black one."
In addition to arresting Magwababa, attempting to secure Funizwe
(who escaped through having slept in the field because afraid of
his brother), Bambata, assisted by his principal induna, Mgombana,
and other men, went about commandeering the young men, threatening
immediate death on failure to comply. The commandeering was carried on
throughout the whole of Monday night (2nd). That such "club law" had to
be adopted, shows that Bambata felt it difficult to get members of the
tribe to join, although some were only too eager to do so. His tribe,
for the most part, was against rebelling, and could be forced into
doing so only by the adoption of violent methods. But for the presence
of Cakijana, the reputed emissary from Dinuzulu, and who in the name of
Dinuzulu urged all to rise,[139] Bambata must have failed to dragoon as
many as he did.
The result of the report was that the Magistrate deemed it necessary
to proceed to Mpanza to investigate. He was accompanied by a clerk, a
civilian, Inspector J.E. Rose and two troopers of the Natal Police,
and a Native guide. They went along the main road as far as Mpanza
(Marshall's) hotel when, unaware that their movements were being
watched, they proceeded up Mpanza valley in the direction of Varty's
house in search of Magwababa's captors. Whilst looking for a drift
to cross the Mpanza, which passes the hotel about three-quarters of
a mile lower down, they were suddenly surprised by a body of men,
under the command of Bambata himself, fully armed with assegais and
some guns. Bambata's party immediately opened fire at short range at
the Inspector, who, with a couple of men, was leading. A few shots
were returned, when one of the enemy was wounded. The _impi_ had
behaved in a deliberate and cold-blooded manner, well-knowing the
party was composed of Government officials. One would have thought the
smallness of the party was enough to have guaranteed its safety. It
would probably have made a considerable difference had it been even
smaller and unarmed. Evidently the temper of the people had greatly
changed. When the men were sent with Clarke to arrest Bambata, he fled
to Zululand. Now, when another, though smaller party, appears on the
scene, he, without warning, opens fire upon them. Clearly something had
occurred during the visit to Zululand to embolden him to break out into
open rebellion. The Magistrate's party, on going into Mpanza valley,
did so in no aggressive spirit, not even to attempt arrest, but solely
to find out what had become of the acting Chief, as it was their duty
to do. They could not, under the circumstances, do otherwise than make
their way back to the hotel (on the main road) as best they could,
through the thick thorn bush that lay between. The three ladies in the
hotel, Mesdames Hunter, Marshall and Borham (and son), warned of their
danger, proceeded to effect an escape as speedily as they could. This
was done with the assistance of the police.
As a matter of fact, though unknown to the party at the time, the
rebels did not pursue, otherwise one or more must have been overtaken.
They made their way as rapidly as possible to the Police Station,
Keate's drift (on the Mooi River), reaching the post the same afternoon.
Some time after the party had gone off, a number of the insurgents
proceeded to the hotel and, breaking into the canteen and cellar,
helped themselves freely to the large supply of liquor they found there.
After representing the state of affairs to the Commandant, Colonel
Leuchars, whose Mapumulo command had, of course, by this time
demobilized, proceeded on his own responsibility, in the absence of
the Magistrate, to arrange for the defence of Greytown. The necessary
organization was effected the same evening with the assistance of the
Town Commandant (Major Menne). All available men of the U.M.R. were
mobilized; patrols were sent out in different directions, and the
local First Reserves put on to guard the approaches to the town. The
action taken was at once confirmed by the Commandant.
Such Natal Police as were available, including the four officers, 100
non-commissioned officers and men who had the day previous been to
Richmond to carry out the executions referred to, were immediately
ordered to Greytown, not, however, receiving instructions until late
in the afternoon. On arrival at Greytown by train at about 8 a.m., the
force was joined by a detachment, raising the strength to six officers,
166 non-commissioned officers and men, under the command of Lieut.-Col.
G. Mansel, C.M.G., Chief Commissioner. The force marched from Greytown
about 10.30 a.m. and camped on Botha's farm (adjoining Burrup's), six
or seven miles from and above Mpanza valley. The idea was there to
await developments. Leuchars was, the same day, appointed to command
all troops in the district; this, of course, brought Mansel's force
under his orders.
Intelligence was received by Mansel the same afternoon by wire from
Keate's drift, to the effect that the European men and women, who had
taken refuge there, were unable to proceed through Mpanza valley to
Greytown, owing to insufficiency of escort. On account of the hostile
attitude assumed by Bambata, whose fastnesses were not more than seven
or eight miles from Keate's drift, the position of the ladies was
considered to be unsafe. Mansel accordingly decided, without, however,
submitting the matter for instructions, to bring in the fugitives.
Shortly before 3 p.m. a column, consisting of five officers and 146
non-commissioned officers and men, left for the purpose. A few men,
together with some Nongqai (Zululand Native Police), were left in
charge of the camp.
The force, with Mansel in command, not having seen anything of the
enemy, although it had passed through Mpanza valley, arrived at the
drift at 4.30 p.m. It left again at 6.15, escorting the ladies and
child. The latter travelled in an open carriage drawn by two horses.
The police detachment at Keate's drift continued to hold the post
under Sub-Inspector Ottley. Mpanza hotel was reached just after sunset.
A short halt was made, when the column continued its march along the
road. There was an advanced guard of twenty-six men. The carriage
occupied a position in the centre of the main body. Every precaution
was taken. Connecting files were posted between the guard and main
body (about 150 yards apart), but, in Mpanza valley and for some miles
further on, the nature of the country was such that flankers could not
be thrown out, not even five yards on either side of the road. The
density of the bush about that part is remarkable. The trees, though
not more than twenty feet high, are so closely intermingled, some of
thorn, others of cactus variety, as to make it difficult for a man
to make his way through, even on foot. Add to this, a three-strand
wire fence running five yards from the road on either side--the road
itself not being more than thirty feet wide--and the predicament the
column would be in, in the event of attack at night, can better be
imagined than described. The worst is what actually did happen. After
the force had marched barely a mile from the hotel, and just as the
advanced guard, under Major O. Dimmick, 100 to 150 yards ahead of the
main body, was passing through the worst section of the forest along
the route, and one of the nastiest spots to be found either in Natal
or Zululand--the time being about 8 p.m.--a sudden and determined
rush was made by the savages at the right rear of the guard. As they
rushed, they simultaneously shouted, at the top of their voices, their
newly-adopted war-cry "Usutu!"[140] Almost instantly the rest of the
right flank of the guard was attacked. Every horse took fright, and,
although each man was marching with his rifle drawn, it was impossible
to use it. The attack had come from the higher side of the road, where
the whole of the enemy, about 150 in number, were in hiding, the spot
being beside a huge solitary rock at the foot of a steep, bush-covered
hill, known by the Natives as Hlenyane. The enemy's object was
evidently to cut the advanced guard off the main body.
Owing to the narrowness of the road, the way it was hemmed in by the
bush on either side, and the darkness--there being but half-moon, with
clouds about--the guard succeeded, only with great difficulty and after
considerable delay, in making their way back to the main body. As it
was, the leading section was completely cut off, and, with three horses
wounded, made its way on to the camp as best it could.
The tactics of the enemy were evidently to deal first with the horse,
then with the man, after bringing the latter on to a level with
himself. Sergt. E.T.N. Brown, Lce.-Sergt. J.C.G.Harrison, and Tprs.
A.H. Aston and J.P. Greenwood were killed outright, whilst four were
wounded (one of them dangerously). Three horses were killed, and nine
wounded. All these had been stabbed, except two--shot through the
neck. When the attack started, the main body moved up, dismounted,
and volleyed into the bush on either side. Except for those who came
on to the road, it was quite impossible to see the enemy, although
at the outset they could not have been more than five to ten yards
off the road. They were in possession of several firearms, but, owing
to the heavy fire of the police, were obliged to retire in different
directions. It was afterwards ascertained they withdrew by dragging
themselves along their stomachs through the undergrowth, done to avoid
being hit.
During the action there were several acts of bravery. Among those who
behaved with conspicuous gallantry were Dimmick and Trooper O. Folker.
Trumpeter C. Milton, who was severely wounded, must have been killed
but for their carrying him out of danger, with much difficulty and at
great risk to themselves.
[Illustration: MPANZA
Sketch Plan
_Showing attack on Magistrate's party (3{rd}) and ambuscade (4{th}
April)_]
The following account by Dimmick will be read with interest:
"When the rebels started their attack, they volleyed into us; as
they did so, the majority, with assegais, sprang on to the road to
stab, or throw where that was impossible. The attack was directed more
at the rear of the guard than at its front and, for a moment or two,
more at the horse than the man. The practically simultaneous wounding
of many horses caused them, as well as the others, to plunge about.
During the resulting confusion, the guard, as the attack was being
delivered, was pressed forward. I suddenly heard Trumpeter Milton on
my left cry out. He had been struck in the back by, I believe, a flung
assegai. He bumped up against me and lay across his wallet. I held on
to him in the best way I could with my left hand, calling out to the
men to steady down. I went forward with him a distance of about 100
yards, shouting to my men as I did so, when, by the faint light of the
moon, I saw Hodge and Emanuel on foot in the road, the latter having
been knocked off his horse by a knobstick striking him on the forehead.
A few yards further on I saw Folker, Guest and others coming back
mounted. Folker made for me at once and took Milton up on to the front
of his saddle, whilst Guest considerably assisted Emanuel. I told the
men, about eight or ten of them, to bunch together, when we began to
work our way back. The enemy at this time was in the bush on both sides
of the road, being briskly fired at by the main body."
After the rebels, who were commanded by Bambata in person, assisted by
his chief induna and Cakijana, had been beaten off, the action having
lasted five to ten minutes, the wounded were placed in the carriage
(promptly given up by the ladies), and the column moved on.
An advanced guard was dispensed with. The men were all dismounted and
made to march in single file with fixed bayonets on each side of the
road, horses and vehicle inside. Three of the dead were, at short
intervals, picked up in the road and put into the carriage.
For a mile or two there was occasional firing into the bush to keep
off the enemy, who, it was supposed, might be following. They shouted
obscene epithets at the police from a distance. The camp was not
reached till about midnight. As a matter of fact, the rebels, afraid of
being hit, did not follow, notwithstanding that one man was heard to
shout out from a hill "_Bapakati!_" (They are hemmed in!)
As far as could be seen, in addition to assegais, shields and
knobsticks, the enemy had about a dozen guns.
The ladies, after giving up the carriage, walked most of the way back
to camp, a distance of about six miles.
Reviewing the two foregoing incidents, it is, in the first place,
difficult to understand why the first expedition took place in the way
it did. In view of Bambata's attitude, firstly, on the 22nd February,
in connection with the poll tax; secondly, his refusal to attend at
headquarters when summoned, and quitting Natal for Zululand; and,
thirdly, his arresting Magwababa, who had just been formally appointed
as his acting successor, it seems as if the occasion was one which
required far stronger action than that which was taken. In arresting
Magwababa, Bambata did not do so out of personal spite, although the
relations between the two had for long been strained, but because,
supported by Dinuzulu, he was determined, if possible, to bring about a
general rebellion.
When the Chief Commissioner arrived on the scene, he knew Bambata
and his men were under arms; he knew that, after the attack on the
Magistrate's party, Bambata did not pursue, otherwise one or more of
the fugitives must have been killed. Moreover, there was no good ground
for suspecting an attack on the Keate's drift station. As it was, the
European residents referred to in the wire on which Mansel acted were
perfectly safe where they were, especially as Bambata had, at the most,
no more than 150 to 200 men, while the station was protected by about
twenty rifles.[141]
There thus being no immediate necessity for removing the "European
residents," it would seem the column should not have been marched
off merely to relieve an unthreatened post at the imminent risk of
being attacked on a road it was impossible to defend in the dark. The
situation certainly called for immediate action, not, it would seem,
in the direction of relieving Keate's drift, but of getting within
striking distance of the enemy and, after ascertaining his probable
strength and position, attacking him. It is, however, easy to be wise
after the event.
In going to Keate's drift, the mistakes were made of returning the same
day after an apparently unavoidably late start, and of returning by
the way that was used on the forward journey. It is a maxim in Native
warfare not to come back by the way one goes out. In this case, just
because it was impossible to do otherwise than return to camp by the
road (except by making a long detour), it would, no doubt, have been
wiser to have adopted the precaution of doing so in the day-time. As
there was an advanced guard when the column proceeded to the drift, the
enemy, of course, knew the kind of formation to look out for.
The body of Sergeant Brown was not recovered until some days
later,[142] when it was seen lying on its back at right angles across,
and in the middle of, the road where the fight had been. It had been
purposely put there by the rebels, and had about it no fewer than
twenty-seven assegai wounds. The whole of the moustache and upper lip
had been cut off and carried away, as also the left forearm. A deep
incision, in the form of a cross, had also been made for some purpose
at the side of the left biceps. Deceased's helmet, too, had been taken,
as also his boots, tunic and breeches, whilst the way in which the
stomach and intestines had been ripped open, showed those present that
they were at war with savages indeed.
The horrible mutilation of this poor fellow's body was, however, not
done from sheer wantonness, but for a particular object, viz. to obtain
pieces of the flesh for medicinal purposes. This practice, so revolting
from a civilized person's point of view, is one usually followed
by Zulus and other South African races. Indeed, according to their
superstitions, to act thus is an indispensable accompaniment of warfare.
On an inspection being made at the scene of the ambuscade, it was
noticed the bottom strands of the wire fence had been lifted to the top
one, and there tied. This had been done in several places, evidently
to enable the enemy to pass through quickly, whilst, at the same time,
sufficient to check horses.
An incident of the attack was that not only Aston but his dog was
killed, both almost on the same spot. Another feature was that not one
of the enemy was killed, though, as was afterwards ascertained, ten or
twelve were wounded. Such a result, as it happened, carried with it
mysterious significance in so far as the Natives were concerned. To
this attention must now be drawn.
Attached to Bambata's force, were three persons of importance, viz.:
Cakijana, Moses, and Malaza. The first was commonly understood to be an
emissary from Dinuzulu. He it was who had come specially to foment the
Rebellion;[143] the second had, for some years, carried on Christian
mission work within the tribe--during the Rebellion he acted as a
kind of "chaplain to the forces"; Malaza was the war-doctor, quite
indispensable, according to Native ideas, on such occasions.