Pietermaritzburg and Empandhleni (Nkandhla), had already behaved with
insolence and defiance, particularly at Mapumulo, where the Government
had been openly defied by Natives in large numbers when attempting
to collect the poll tax. And yet, not only had the tax been imposed
on all Europeans and Asiatics, but a very liberal concession had been
made exclusively to Natives, viz. that those already liable for the hut
tax would be exempt altogether from paying poll tax. This, in itself,
was evidence of a desire to be fair and reasonable. Notwithstanding
this the Natives, as shown by numerous records, generally assumed
an attitude of disrespect and defiance. In so doing, they acted
hastily and recklessly, owing largely, no doubt, to the difficulty
of understanding the exact effect of the law. It was enough that it
was extra taxation, and appeared to put a premium on the already
increasing independence of youths. No allowance whatever was made
for the _bona-fide_ straits the Government was in for the want of
revenue, nor yet for the fact that the additional burden would not,
after all, exceed one shilling per head per annum on the total Native
population.[101] Chiefs, aided and abetted by their adherents, made
attempts to combine against the Government. At Mid-Illovo, European
farmers felt obliged to go into lager, whilst others prepared to do
the same at such places as Highflats, Ixopo and Richmond. It will, no
doubt, be conceded that defiance in any community calls for firm and
prompt action by those in authority; not less necessary is it when
savages, known to be warlike and impulsive, have to be dealt with.
Then the anonymous order, purporting to have come from some Native of
high position, requiring the killing of pigs, white fowls, etc., and
the discarding of utensils of European manufacture, could have had
no other significance than that the Natives in general should unite
against the white man's government. Such interpretation is patent to
anyone. There was, moreover, abundant evidence that this propaganda had
been widely spread. Messengers are known to have proceeded to different
parts of the Transvaal and even to the neighbourhood of Salisbury,
Rhodesia, preaching sedition wherever they went. In Natal the order had
already been complied with by many people. Numerous instances occurred
in the thickly populated belt of country between Krantzkop, Mapumulo
and Stanger, especially on the Tugela side of that line. Others were
not wanting in other parts of the Colony, such as Ixopo, Mid-Illovo,
Weenen, etc. Not only had animals been either killed or sold at
absurdly low figures,[102] but European utensils, _e.g._ pots, had
been destroyed or thrown away. If some Natives had already manifested
disaffection, only time and want of effective control by the Government
were needed for others to do the same.
Thus the atmosphere, by the time of the outbreak, had become so
charged with an unmistakably rebellious spirit, and with reports that
the tribes generally were out of the control of their Chiefs, that
it required but a successful outbreak or two, in places not readily
accessible to European troops, to set the whole affair ablaze. And, in
any such event, not only the peace of Natal, but of other portions of
South Africa, would have been endangered. There is no getting away from
this conclusion, because it follows directly from the widely prevalent
facts above referred to. Clearly, the position was abnormal, and, being
abnormal, it called for extraordinary action.
It was whilst these evidences of unrest and loudly and disrespectfully
expressed dissatisfaction existed that the Magistrate of Umgeni
division proceeded to carry out the new law. For any Magistrate to have
refrained, from fear of outbreak, from collecting the poll tax, after
giving proper notice, would have been the height of weakness, of which
Natives, in such mood as they then were in, would not have been slow
to take advantage. And yet when the Magistrate[103] proceeded in a
normal manner to collect the tax, another section of the same tribe,
on its own initiative, marched under arms and in open defiance of the
law to await at a convenient spot an opportunity of throwing themselves
on to and murdering the Magistrate. Being discovered, they returned to
their kraals, well-knowing that, as they had broken the law, warrants
would be issued for their arrest. Although unprovoked in any way,
they continued to carry their weapons in defiance of law and order.
Instead of surrendering or running away, as other offenders would have
done, they banded themselves together[104] when the police appeared
on the scene, and went into hiding. And when the police proceeded to
make arrests, they resisted and murdered them. Why? Not because of any
grievance against the Government peculiar to themselves, but one which
they supposed had, by then, become common to the whole Black House.[105]
There were, however, other considerations. The Natal Police Field
Force, about 100 strong, had some weeks before been divided into two.
One detachment was sent on important duty to Zululand and the other to
Mapumulo--an isolated district carrying a particularly large Native
population, where, it will be remembered, the Magistrate had been
openly defied. Owing to this fact, no ordinary police were available to
deal with the Trewirgie affair. To have engaged for this duty special
constables, many of whom would probably have been unable either to ride
or to shoot, would have been almost as great folly as to have sent them
out on foot armed with batons. But legal machinery to enrol even such
auxiliaries was wanting. If, then, firearms were necessary, it was
surely better to employ a disciplined force than put them into the
hands of men who did not know how to use them.
The necessity for immediate concentration of a force at Trewirgie
was obvious. To have delayed, say for 36 hours, would have been to
court appalling disaster. Zulus are known to be precipitate in action
when once the war-cry has been sounded from the hill-tops and the
beacon-fires lit. Every battle of the Zulu War testified to their
energy, rapidity and true martial instincts. The fact that the first
blow had been struck in a cause common to a million others, already
impatient to emulate the heroic deeds of their fellows, still further
lessened any chances of delay on their part. Here is the language of
one of them, uttered on the 13th February to friends within a couple
of miles of Richmond: "You are cowards, sitting still when there's
fighting on. I have a following of my own. Let us combine and kill
the whites round about here."[106] Had the rebels got away with the
renown of having attacked and defeated the police with loss, without
overwhelming action being swiftly taken, the Rebellion must have spread
in an alarming manner. That, at any rate, is the opinion of all persons
on the spot best entitled to express it, men with life-long experience
of those parts, including the Natives themselves.
The alternative, that of calling out the Militia in support of the
police, assuming these to have been available, would certainly have
been proper in the case of any ordinary riot, disturbance of the peace,
or other emergency, but this was no ordinary outbreak, nor was it at
all likely to confine itself to the locality in which it had occurred.
Outbreaks of a more serious character, such as the one in question,
were intended by the legislature to be dealt with by a Permanent
Militia Force, provision for establishing which was included in the
law. Such force, it was enacted, might be ordered out to any part of
the Colony, "to act therein, either in aid of, or as the police force
... and when so acting every member of the Permanent Militia Force
shall have the same authority as constables and otherwise."[107] This
force, owing to the want of the necessary financial provision, had
never been created. If, however, regular police had been employed,
there would have been no one available to relieve them at their various
posts. In this connection, it must be stated that, as the disaffection
was general, it was obviously impossible to withdraw the police from
the various out-stations.
Under all these circumstances, the Governor had no difficulty in
deciding (_a_) "that men were in armed resistance to the authority
of the Crown"; (_b_) "that such armed resistance could not be dealt
with by the Military, acting merely in aid of the civil power in the
ordinary manner"; (_c_) "that such armed resistance could not be
promptly and effectively suppressed otherwise than by subjecting the
inhabitants of the disturbed district to direct military control, and
by inflicting summary punishment upon offenders against the peace."[108]
But, although of opinion that martial law was necessary, care was at
the same time taken by the Government to provide for all criminal and
civil cases pending in the various courts being proceeded with and
determined in the ordinary way; where failure or inability to exercise
jurisdiction occurred, the proceedings were to be suspended until
withdrawal or amendment of the proclamation.[109]
The extension of martial law over the whole Colony instead of only
the district in which the revolt had occurred,--to which, indeed, the
Governor had at first wished to limit it,--arose solely out of the
unrest and disaffection being so widespread. Alarming rumours were
constantly being received from all quarters, showing that the entire
Native population was more or less disaffected and that outbreaks
of rebellion were possible anywhere and at any moment. As for the
Ministers being panic-stricken, there was not only no sign of this
at any time, but they, throughout the whole course of the Rebellion,
enjoyed the fullest confidence of the public as well as of the
Governor. The latter, on more than one occasion, called the attention
of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the cool and collected
way in which they were grappling with the situation.
The truth is that, with such a personnel at the head of affairs,
together with Sir Henry McCallum, the Colony was extremely fortunate.
There is no question that it was owing largely to their able and firm
administration that an insurrection, which, at one time, threatened to
become universal, was suppressed as speedily and effectually as it was.
As soon as the employment of the Militia had become legally possible,
orders to mobilize were issued to the Right Wing of the Natal
Carbineers and to one Battery of the Natal Field Artillery; the
Commandant of Militia was, at the same time, authorized to issue
requisitions on all persons "to furnish such animals, vehicles and
other necessary things as may be demanded from them for military use."
When, however, reports of threatened risings, with demands for military
assistance, were, about the same time, constantly received from
Magistrates and others in various parts of the Colony, the Government
resolved to mobilize a stronger force than at first intended, and this
notwithstanding that later intelligence went to show that the rest of
the tribe to which the Trewirgie rebels belonged was loyal. The force,
therefore, that mobilized and proceeded from different points on the
10th to concentrate at Thornville Junction, Elandskop and Richmond,
consisted of Right and Left Wings, Natal Carbineers (under Major A.C.
Townsend and Lieut.-Col. D.W. Mackay, respectively) 675; two sections,
C Battery, Natal Field Artillery (Capt. W.S. Bigby); one company, Natal
Royal Regiment (Lieut.-Col. A.W. Matterson); two squadrons, Border
Mounted Rifles (Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott);[110] one squadron, Natal Police
Field Force (Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel, C.M.G.); and detachments, Natal
Medical, Natal Telegraph, and Natal Service, Corps.
Colonel, now Brigadier-General, Sir Duncan McKenzie, C.B., K.C.M.G.,
J.P., V.D., of the Natal Carbineers, was placed in command.[111]
General authority to administer martial law was, moreover, delegated to
him by the Commandant.[112]
The rapidity with which mobilization and concentration were carried
out could not have been surpassed. That fact alone testifies to the
excellence and splendid efficiency of the Militia organization. In the
case of the B.M.R., orders to mobilize were received at 11 a.m. on the
10th. By 8 p.m. on Sunday the 11th, although having had to march over
thirty miles in heavy rain, the regiment, "mobilizing forward," had
reached Elandskop, the destination assigned.
The disposition of the forces on the 11th was:
_Thornville Junction._ Staff; Right Wing, Natal Carbineers; Natal
Police. _Elandskop._ Left Wing, Natal Carbineers; Border Mounted
Rifles (Troops D-H). _Richmond._ One squadron (D), Natal Carbineers; C
Battery, Natal Field Artillery; Natal Royal Regiment.
The object of this disposition was to enable a converging movement
to take place, from the three points named, on the farm Trewirgie. A
simultaneous advance, with exception of the Artillery and Infantry
(which remained at Richmond), was accordingly made on the 12th, the
intervening country being searched as much as possible _en route_. On
the afternoon of the same day, the troops having completed the drive,
combined on the farm Trewirgie, in the immediate vicinity of the scene
of outbreak. The brigade then formed was nearly 1,000 strong.
Chief Mveli had, in the meantime, been instructed to co-operate.
McKenzie placed on his shoulders the responsibility of finding the
rebels, then evidently hiding in the neighbouring forests. The result
was that, on the 13th and succeeding days, Mveli, with some 300 of his
men, rendered very valuable assistance. The Enon forest, some 1,200
acres in extent, was driven, whilst the kraal and crops belonging to
Mjongo were destroyed.
Owing especially to the prompt and energetic assistance of a local
farmer (Mr. Gibson), the hiding-places of two of the rebels were
ascertained, when both were captured. They were tried on the 13th by
a drumhead court-martial and, on its being clearly proved they had
participated in the murder of the police, were sentenced to be shot.
The sentence was carried out forthwith on a peak overlooking Enon
forest, and in the presence of Mveli and his men.
The shooting of these men created a deep impression. News of the
incident, which was regarded as just and proper by every loyal Native,
spread at once far and wide. Rebelliously disposed Natives realized
that the troops had come into the field to adopt stern measures, and
put a check on their behaviour accordingly.
As, by this time, everything appeared to be quiet in the district, the
column moved on to Richmond on the 14th.
The troops would not have withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Byrnetown
had it not been clear that the best method to adopt with the remaining
rebels was to continue to hold Mveli responsible for their capture.
As a matter of fact, Mveli and the majority of his tribe were loyal.
Apart from this, they had a motive of their own and, therefore, needed
no urging. This motive was, of course, to avenge themselves in some
way on the Ethiopians, with whom they had the deep-seated, ten-years'
difference dealt with at the beginning of the chapter. A further reason
for imposing the onus was that the rebels were concealed in a part
of the country with which the whole of Mveli's tribe were intimately
acquainted. That McKenzie was right in the action he took will be seen
further on.
An Inspector of Native Locations (Thomas Fayle) was, about this
time, killed at his house, some three miles from Henley, probably by
lightning. The death was regarded by some as a murder, connected in
some way with the outbreak, seeing it occurred but a few days after the
attack on the police, and only a short distance from Trewirgie.
Other intelligence that was received went to show that people living
in Richmond division, under a headman, Mamba, but belonging to Chief
Miskofeli, under the belief that an attempt was to be made to arrest
their Chief, responded to some extent to a call to arms circulated on
the night of the 12th. On the following day, certain headmen passed
Thedden, the residence of Mr. W. Nicholson, but, finding him absent,
used some expressions regarding him which were interpreted at the trial
later on to signify an intention to have killed him had he been at home.
Owing to the disrespect that had recently been shown by Natives to the
Magistrate of Richmond when explaining the poll tax at Mid-Illovo,
the Minister for Native Affairs (The Hon. H.D. Winter) caused another
meeting to be convened at the same place to afford himself an
opportunity of addressing the Chiefs on the same subject. It was fixed
for the 13th. On the day previous, it transpired that some of Tilonko's
people had taken up arms either to offer resistance or act in some more
daring and even aggressive manner. The probabilities are that they felt
their Chief was about to be arrested and intended resisting, if any
such attempt were made. Needless to say, the idea had never entered
the mind of the Government. Notwithstanding this intelligence, having
made the appointment, Mr. Winter proceeded to keep it, and this in
spite of warning as to the risks he was apparently running. On arrival
at Mid-Illovo, accompanied by Mr. S.O. Samuelson, Under Secretary for
Native Affairs, he found that three Chiefs and a large gathering of
Natives had already assembled. The European inhabitants of that part
were in a lager, which consisted of wire entanglements erected round a
church. The Chiefs, with six men each, were directed to enter a larger
wire-fence enclosure, within which the church and lager stood, leaving
the rest of their followers seated along the road a short distance off.
After Mr. Winter had taken them to account, one by one, for unruly
behaviour to the Magistrate, and one of them for having resorted to
certain practices of a treasonable character, and had further fully
explained the poll tax, they asked for a day to be named on which the
tax could be paid by those liable therefor. The matter was thereupon
referred to the Magistrate, who met with no further difficulty. It
was in respect of this and other occurrences incidental to the tours
made by Mr. Winter to different parts of Natal and Zululand at this
critical time that the Governor referred to him as having "behaved with
conspicuous calmness and courage," an opinion shared by others as well.
In view of the fact that, as daily arriving information showed,
disaffection was not confined to Trewirgie or Mid-Illovo, it became
necessary for McKenzie's force to demonstrate in other directions,
especially on the south of the Umkomanzi and towards Ixopo. At the same
time, the Government was most anxious that the troops should be kept
well in hand, and not to put the people to more inconvenience than
was absolutely necessary. To this end, on the 17th, the Commandant of
Militia instructed McKenzie in the following terms: "On Monday next,
the 19th instant, you will march with all your mounted men and one
or two sections of artillery from Richmond to Springvale, crossing
Umkomanzi by the Josephine bridge, thence to Highflats, and thence
to Ixopo. From Ixopo you will proceed to Mabedhlana, thence to Bulwer
and Elandskop.... You will send two men with a message to Miskofeli
and other Chiefs on your route before your forces approach their
neighbourhood, assuring them that they need fear nothing from the
column.... You will take care that nothing is done by your force to
provoke an outbreak on the part of the Natives. If Miskofeli does not
come and pay his respects to you ... you will take this as a sign of
fear, or as indicating that he is not as loyal to the Government as he
professes to be; you will, however, take no action until you have gone
on and given some of the smaller Chiefs an opportunity of coming to see
you...."
These instructions were carried out to the letter, except that, instead
of proceeding from Ixopo to Bulwer and Elandskop, it became necessary
for the column to demonstrate in the direction of the south coast.
Leaving the Natal Royal Regiment to garrison Richmond,[113] with
Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton as officer in command of the post, McKenzie
moved off at 9 a.m. on the 19th with the rest of the force. He crossed
the Umkomanzi river and camped in the neighbourhood of the farm
Waterfall. The next day the march was continued through the heart of
Miskofeli's ward to Springvale. Owing to the country being hilly, and
the roads difficult, the guns and waggons stuck fast several times.
At Springvale, Miskofeli, who was a man of about 25 years of age and
head of a powerful tribe, came with a small following to pay his
respects.[114] This satisfactory result was brought about through the
efforts of a well-known local resident, Mr. Garland, whose services the
Officer Commanding was fortunately able to secure.[115]
From Springvale, the column went to Highflats, where intelligence
was received that Miskofeli and three other Chiefs of that part had
originally arranged, and to some extent prepared, to break out in
rebellion on the 18th, but, on hearing that troops had arrived in
Richmond and were ready to advance, their plans were upset.
On the 22nd, the force pushed on to Stuartstown.[116] At this village
it remained until the 13th March. The route traversed between the 19th
and 22nd had, on purpose, been through, or close to, areas largely
occupied by Natives.[117]
During such time as the troops were at Stuartstown, a number of
courts-martial were held (beginning on the 3rd and ending on the 12th).
As many as three sat at one time. These included the trial of the
induna Mamba, whose people had recently taken up arms. On Miskofeli,
a fine of 100 head of cattle was imposed by McKenzie, on account of
the offence committed by himself and his tribe. Armed parties of the
tribe had been reported as roaming about the country, whilst Miskofeli
himself had prepared for trouble by causing his wives and property to
be concealed in precipices and other inaccessible country.
In view of the fact that this man's tribe was intimately connected
with another in East Griqualand, the Governor requested the Government
of the Cape Colony, in the event of force having to be used, to prevent
Natives of the Cape Colony from entering Natal viâ Union Bridge
(Umzimkulu) to assist their relatives. The Cape Ministers took steps at
once in the direction indicated.
The Government, as already seen in Colonel Bru-de-Wold's instructions,
had intended that a demonstration should also be made in the direction
of Bulwer, but as order had been quickly restored there, as well as at
Elandskop, the Commandant decided to keep McKenzie at Stuartstown, with
a view to the column being employed along the coast between Isipingo
and Port Shepstone, particularly at Dumisa and Umtwalume. The Natives
there had recently got out of control of their respective Chiefs, or
else the Chiefs themselves were pretending to comply with orders,
whilst inciting their men to act with defiance.