THE SIEGE
One of the most remarkable characteristics of General Gordon was the
marvellous fertility of his resources. Knowing that there would be a
great deal of prejudice against employing Zebehr, he almost
simultaneously suggested an alternative scheme, which was that, as the
Egyptians could not govern the Soudan, and the English would not,
rather than let it fall into a state of anarchy it should be offered to
the Turks. There was much to be said for this suggestion. Turkey had
once ruled Egypt, and still exercised a suzerainty over it and all its
belongings, and if Egypt was not strong enough to rule itself and its
annexations, it only seemed fair that the suzerain power should
intervene to prevent its being grasped by an upstart like the Mahdi.
Besides, the Sultan of Turkey is the head of the Mohammedan religion,
and had therefore a special interest in suppressing the claims of a
False Prophet.
That the scheme was no hastily-formed one, which he would see fit to
change later on for something else, may be gathered from the fact that
Gordon adhered to it to the very last. Nor was it a scheme suggested by
the immediate difficulties of his position, for in the month of
October, when Lord Wolseley was on the way to relieve him, he writes:--
"Give the country to the Turks, when once you have come to
Khartoum, with one or two millions sterling (which you will have to
spend in three months' occupation up here if you delay), make
arrangements at once with the Porte for its Soudan cession, let
6000 Turks land at Suakim and march up to Berber, thence to
Khartoum; you can then retire at once before the hot weather comes
on....
"I do not advocate the keeping of the Soudan by us, it is a useless
possession, and we could not govern it, neither can Egypt (after
the late events). I am only discussing how to get out of it in
honour and in the cheapest way (we must remember we caused its
troubles), and that way is, either by some sort of provincial
government under Zubair, or by giving it to the Turks; it is simply
a question of getting out of it with decency. The Turks are the
best solution, though most expensive. _They would keep the Soudan_:
give them L2,000,000. The next best is Zubair, with L500,000 and
L100,000 a year for two years: he will keep the Soudan for a time
(in both cases slave trade will flourish), thus you will be quiet
in Egypt, and will be able to retreat in January 1885. If you do
not do this, then be prepared for a deal of worry and danger, and
your campaign will be entirely unprofitable and devoid of prestige,
for the day after you leave Khartoum the Mahdi will walk in and say
that he drove you out."
But the Government that had refused the assistance of Zebehr for fear
of public opinion at home, were equally decided not to allow the
assistance that might be obtained from the Turks, and this time, it
must be admitted, they had more reason on their side. There were
already too many complications connected with the government of Egypt
to make it prudent to admit another possible element of discord. Earl
Granville, the Foreign Secretary, therefore telegraphed as follows:--
"Gordon should be at once informed by several messengers ... that
we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other force for the
purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond the
scope of the commission he holds, and at variance with the pacific
policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan; that, if
with this knowledge, he continues at Khartoum, he should at once
state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues."
This dispatch shows how little the powers in England actually
understood the questions at issue, or the practical working of their
own instructions. Gordon had been asked to undertake the withdrawal of
the Egyptian garrisons, and civil employes. Having accepted this duty,
he goes out, and finding the Mahdi's forces stronger than was supposed
in this country, he sends home word that the task is a far more
complicated one than the authorities in England knew of, and he
suggests other methods. His suggestions are not accepted, and he is
asked why he continues at Khartoum, as if he could have left his duty
unperformed with honour to himself, or credit to his country.
Gordon was anxious to evacuate the country as quickly as possible; in
this he was quite at one with his employers; but, on the spot, and
knowing all the difficulties of the situation, he saw what they in the
distance could not see, that the evacuation was a practical
impossibility. The most distant garrison held by Egyptians was at
Senaar, and if Gordon could have got to that place, a feat which it is
more than doubtful if even he could have performed, it is perfectly
certain that with the wretched troops he would have had to command he
could not have safely escorted the host of the Egyptian employes thence
to Khartoum, while the whole intermediate country was in the hands of
the fanatical hordes owning allegiance to the Mahdi.
The commencement of his march from Senaar to Khartoum would have been
the signal for a repetition of the horrors of the march of our
retreating army from Cabul to Jellalabad in 1842, the sole survivor of
which has been immortalised in Miss Elizabeth Thompson's (Lady Butler)
celebrated picture, the only difference being that the heat and sand of
the Soudan would have been substituted for the cold and snow of
Afghanistan. The Mahdi's forces would have at once occupied Senaar, and
spread reports to the effect that they had driven out the Egyptians,
while Gordon's party with very limited provisions would have been
exposed to incessant attacks during the whole of their journey. A
retreating army has always plenty of enemies; and it is doubtful if a
single survivor would have reached Khartoum.
On the other hand, if either of Gordon's suggestions had been accepted
and the country handed over to the Turks or to Zebehr, the towns at
both ends would have been held in force, and a suitable escort could
have been provided for the Egyptian employes. Gordon states his
position very fairly in the following brief telegram to Sir Evelyn
Baring:--
"You ask me to state cause and intentions in staying at Khartoum,
knowing Government means to abandon Soudan, and in answer I say, I
stay at Khartoum because Arabs have shut us up, and will not let us
out. I also add that if the road was opened the people would not
let me go, unless I gave them some government or took them with me,
which I could not do. No one would leave more willingly than I
would if it was possible."
There were some in authority who advocated leaving such a distant
garrison as Senaar to its fate, and wanted Gordon to retreat with the
Khartoum force only, picking up the Berber force on the way home.
Against this Gordon's generous heart revolted, and he was determined
that so long as he was Governor-General it should never be said that he
left his subordinates to perish. He thus telegraphs to Sir Evelyn
Baring:--
"Put yourself in my position, if you say 'rapid retreat, and leave
Senaar to its fate.' I will say, 'No, I would sooner die first,'
and will resign my commission, for I could not do it. If you say,
'Then you are no longer Governor-General,' then I am all right, and
all the responsibility is on you (for I could not be supposed, if
you turn me out of being Governor-General, to be obliged to aid
such a movement, which I think is disgraceful)."
Writing as late as October 24th, and assuming that Lord Wolseley had
conquered the country, he says:--
"I declare I do not see how we will get out of it (the Soudan) even
now; allow that you come to Khartoum, that you drive off the Arabs,
open the road to Senaar. What are you going to do? You will say,
'Take out those who wish to leave.' Well, you begin with Senaar,
and of course will have to fight all the way down. It will take
three months. During these three months, how are you to feed
Khartoum? for the moment you leave Senaar you leave your granary.
You get to Khartoum, you are face to face with 30,000 people who
will not leave, and who are hedging with the Mahdi; and with 3000
Shaggyeh all armed. You fight your way to Berber; another three
months, you have no food at Berber; then it will need another two
months to get to Dongola, which (seeing your policy) will be
hostile.
"It is indeed a terrible problem, and I wish I could see my way out
of it. Then you come into the hot months, and low Nile. This time
next year will not see you out of the Soudan with decency. Of
course you can go back now, but what was the use of your coming? I
will not allow that you came for me. You came for the garrisons of
the Soudan. Now, by the Turkish arrangement, if you act promptly,
you can get away quietly in January 1885."
Not only, however, did the British Government refuse to adopt either of
Gordon's alternative proposals, but they neglected until August 12th to
take any other measures for relieving the garrisons. Yet all the time
the gallant General felt that he had not a free hand, and could not
take independent action, for he writes in his journal:--
"Truly the indecision of our Government has been, from a military
point of view, a very great bore, for we never could act as if
independent; there was always the chance of their taking action,
which hampered us.... It is truly deplorable, the waste of men and
money on account of our indecision."
The mistake our Government made was the old one of endeavouring to
control details in distant countries from Downing Street, instead of
sending out the best man to the spot, and giving him more or less of a
free hand.
At last, on April 16th, Gordon telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring at
Cairo:--
"As far as I can understand, the situation is this: You state your
intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you
refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according to
circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can
suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire
to the Equator, and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning
the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, and Dongola, with the certainty
that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under
great difficulties, if you would retain peace in Egypt!"
But though Gordon saw that it was impossible to attempt an immediate
evacuation with something like 50,000 men, women, and children, he did
everything that lay within his power to get rid of as many refugees as
possible during the few weeks that he was in Khartoum before the means
of communication were cut off. The measures he took were described by
Colonel Duncan, M.P., at that time in command of a station on the Nile,
through which the refugees had to pass _en route_ to Egypt, in a
speech made some time afterwards, as follows:--
"Last year, after the arrival of General Gordon at Khartoum, I was
sent to the northern end of the Korosko desert to facilitate the
passage of the refugees from Khartoum to Egypt. It was then that I
realised the true nature of Gordon, who was not a mere sentimental
philanthropist, but a man of business as well as a man of courage.
At that time the telegraph wire between Khartoum and where I was
stationed was still uncut; and with marvellous monotony, I might
say, batch after batch of the sick and the injured, of women and
children, used to be sent by Gordon to me. They used to arrive in
an almost perfect state of comfort, with all the necessary papers
enabling me to disperse them among their different villages in
Egypt. One of the first messages the General sent to me was this,
'Do try and find a motherly European woman to receive these poor
women and children, for they have never been in Egypt yet before.'
With the regularity of clockwork over 2000 refugees arrived, all
the arrangements for their transport from Khartoum to Berber having
been made by Gordon.... Two thousand five hundred men, women, and
children were saved by the direct action and the direct humanity of
Gordon himself, long before the expedition set out for Khartoum."
It is evident that the impression among the three Englishmen at
Khartoum was, that the English Government had deserted Gordon, and
intended to leave him there to die. Both Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power
nobly decided that they would not forsake him in his hour of need, and
that, happen what might, they would remain with him.
Though plenty of skirmishes took place, there was no real fight that
might be dignified by the name of a battle till the middle of March.
Some 4000 of the Mahdi's force had cut off about 800 of Gordon's men at
a village called Halfaya, on the north of Khartoum, and, as the
detachment could not retreat, Gordon decided to attempt to relieve
them. By means of steamers he succeeded in extricating them from
danger, but he could not drive away the rebels who held Halfaya in
strong force.
On the 16th, therefore, he sent Colonel Stewart to attempt to dislodge
the enemy, and the following is his own description of what actually
occurred:--
"At 8 A.M. on the 16th, two steamers started for Halfaya.
Bashi-Bazouks and some regulars advanced across plain towards
rebels. At 10 A.M. the regulars were in square opposite centre
of rebels' position, and Bashi-Bazouks were extended in their line
to their right. The gun with regulars then opened fire. Very soon
after this a body of about sixty rebel horsemen charged down a
little to the right of centre of Bashi-Bazouks line. The latter
fired a volley, then turned and fled. The horsemen galloped towards
the square, which they immediately broke. The whole force then
retreated slowly towards the fort with their rifles shouldered. The
horsemen continued to ride along flanks, cutting off stragglers.
The men made no effort to stand, and the gun was abandoned with
sixty-three rounds and fifteen cases of reserve ammunition. The
rebels advanced, and retreat of our men was so rapid that the Arabs
on foot had no chance of attacking. Pursuit ceased about a mile
from stockade and the men rallied. We brought in the wounded.
Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and some
men even on camels, pursuing close to troops who, with arms
shouldered, plodded their way back."
The result of this, the first real battle, showed Gordon the
hopelessness of his position. Colonel Stewart was wounded, though not
very seriously, and Gordon saw that not only were his men cowards, but
they were treacherous as well. At one time the rebels were actually
retreating when two of Gordon's generals, Hassan and Seyid, by name,
actually rode after them and summoned them back. Need it be added that
an army, seeing itself thus betrayed by its own leaders, lost all heart
and bolted, leaving two valuable guns in the hands of their opponents.
It is satisfactory, however, to be able to record that both these
traitors were tried by court-martial and shot.
General Gordon made every effort to avoid further bloodshed by opening
negotiations with the Mahdi, and even going so far as to offer to make
him Sultan of Kordofan. The False Prophet briefly replied, "I am the
Mahdi," which was a polite way of saying that it would be beneath his
dignity to accept such a subordinate post. He, however, sent Gordon a
courteous letter, urging him to become a Mohammedan. As Gordon declined
this offer all negotiations between the two were closed.
* * *
Towards the end of April Gordon wrote that the Nile was beginning to
rise. It continues to rise during May, June, and July, and is so high
during the last-mentioned month that boats can pass the numerous
cataracts with comparative safety. This is the season of which an
expedition should have taken advantage for the Nile campaign.
Unfortunately the greatest empire of the world was at this time ruled
by a disunited Cabinet, and party conflicts were going on at home.
There may be much to be said in favour of party government, but there
can be no question that to it is due the disgrace of England in the
eyes of the whole civilised world, for having sent one of her bravest
heroes into the heart of a hostile country in Africa, and then left him
to perish. The blame in the matter is often cast solely upon the
Liberals. Those who are not political partisans must see that this is
not a fair way of stating the truth. The government in office was a
Liberal one, but it cannot be said that it is a part of their programme
to leave English heroes to perish. Lord Palmerston, the old Whig
leader, would have been the first to denounce such a policy. The fact
is, the fault was not due to either party as such, but to the party
form of government that unfortunately prevails in this country. The
opposite party might have fallen into the same mistake, had they been
in the same position. The Government was afraid to split up its
supporters by engaging in another war so soon after the Egyptian and
Suakim campaigns. But, be the cause what it may, the fact remains that
much valuable time was lost, in spite of Lord Wolseley's remonstrances,
who said with truth--
"Remember, we can command many things, but all the gold of England
will not affect the rise and fall of the Nile, or the duration of
the hot and cold seasons in Egypt. Time is a most important element
in this question, and it will be indeed an indelible disgrace if we
allow the most generous, patriotic, and gallant of our public
servants to die of want, or fall into the hands of a cruel enemy,
because we would not hold out our hands to save him."
Public opinion at last grew too strong for the Government, and orders
were given on August 12th to commence making the boats that were to
convey the troops up the river Nile. The official report of the
campaign states that there were only 104 vessels on the Nile that were
able to pass the cataracts on the upper part of the river, so that
boats of some sort had to be taken out. From August 12th till the final
disaster took place no reasonable time was lost, but it takes time to
transport a large army over such obstacles as had to be surmounted. It
has been truly said that the campaign of the Nile was far more a
conflict with Nature than with man. We might, however, have overcome
Nature had we only taken the field earlier in the day.
* * *
When Gordon realised how thoroughly the enemy had invested Khartoum,
and that all supplies from outside were cut off, he wisely decided to
reduce the number of persons inside the beleaguered city. There were,
it was estimated, something like 10,000 who were in sympathy with the
enemy, and who not only ate food, which was most valuable, but were a
source of weakness to the defenders. Consequently the General gave them
permission to go over to the enemy, which they did with alacrity. He
was after all only acting on the sensible advice he gave the leader of
the Taipings in China, who was retaining a large force of white men
against their wills in the city of Soo-chow, of whom Gordon's rival,
Burgevine, was one (see page 60). The Khartoum general gained
considerably more than the enemy by this bold yet humane stroke of
policy, as he got rid of 10,000 traitors, who would have very soon
demoralised his whole force.
The greater the difficulties became the nobler Gordon's character
appears. No sooner was he absolutely cut off from the outer world than
he fell back on his boundless fertility of resources, and showed
himself to be at the same time a skilful general, a brave soldier, a
far-seeing statesman, and a clever financier. The defences of the town
were attended to, and the whole place so well covered with obstacles
and mines, that it might have been defended for years, had the food
supply only held out. Cartridges were manufactured on an enormous
scale; the General calculated that over half a million were fired away
during four months of the siege. Eight steamers, which were nothing
more than ordinary vessels, similar to the "Penny Steamers" on the
Thames, were armour-plated, and made to act as miniature men-of-war,
new ones were built, old ones were fitted up and adapted, and landsmen
were trained to take them into action. "Our steamers," Gordon said,
"are blinded and bullet proof, and do splendid work, for you see they
cannot run away, and must go into action." The food supply, such as it
was, was regulated so that nothing should be wasted, and paper money
was issued, redeemable in six months. So great was the faith of the
inhabitants in Gordon's ultimate success that L2500 worth of this paper
money was in circulation by the end of April, and L26,000 worth was
issued before the end of July. In addition, the merchants advanced to
him upwards of L50,000.
For six long weary months General Gordon held out at Khartoum. Till the
9th of September he had at all events the companionship of his two
brave countrymen, Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power. But for the remaining
months of the siege he was deprived of even this comfort, and had to
stand at the post of duty single-handed, as far as his own countrymen
were concerned. On the 26th August the authorities at Cairo received a
telegram from Gordon to the effect that now that the Nile had risen,
and the way from Khartoum to Dongola was opened for a steamer, he
intended to attack Berber and capture it, and thence to despatch
Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power to Dongola. His object was to publish to
the outside world the real facts of the terrible position at Khartoum,
and to enable Colonel Stewart to urge on the authorities the necessity
of at once despatching troops to the rescue; for he had not received
any notification that a few days before this time--namely, on August
12th--the Government had decided to send an expedition for his relief.
Colonel Stewart brought Gordon's Diary of Events up to the date of his
starting, and was accompanied by Mr. Power, M. Herbin, the French
Consul, and about fifty soldiers. They went in the _Abbas_, a small
paddle-boat drawing only two feet of water. The following remark is
made in Gordon's Journals in reference to the departure of Colonel
Stewart in this vessel:--
"Stewart said he would go if I would exonerate him from deserting
me. I said, 'You do not desert me. I--I cannot go, but if you go
you do me a great service.' I then wrote him an _official_. He
wanted me to write him an order. I said, 'No, for though I fear not
responsibility, I will not put you in any danger which I am not in
myself.' I wrote then a letter couched thus: '_Abbas_ is going
down. You say you are willing to go in her if I think you can do so
with honour. You can go in honour, for you can do nothing here, and
if you go you do me service in telegraphing my views.'"
The _Abbas_ started together with two other steamers on the night of
September 9th, and having shelled Berber proceeded on her way to
Dongola, the two other vessels returning. On the 18th the _Abbas_
struck on a rock. When Colonel Stewart saw that further progress was
hopeless, he spiked the guns and threw them, with the ammunition, into
the river. He then went on shore to arrange for the purchase of some
camels to take his party on to Dongola. He was accompanied to the house
of a blind man, named Fakri Etman, by Power and the French Consul. The
Sheikh Suleiman Wad Gamr was present and invited them on shore, only
insisting that the soldiers must not come armed for fear of frightening
the people. To this Colonel Stewart agreed, and was the only one who
was armed, he carrying a small revolver. Suleiman accepted from Colonel
Stewart a sword and a dress as gifts. When Stewart and his party were
in the house, Suleiman came outside and made some signs to his people,
who were hanging about in large numbers. Immediately they divided into
two parties, one proceeding to the house, the other to the steamer's
crew landed on the bank, and the whole were massacred. News has
recently reached Cairo to the effect that the perpetrator of this
cold-blooded and treacherous murder has at last paid the penalty of his
crime, being slain in a conflict with Saleh Bey. All the official
documents that Gordon had sent for the British authorities fell into
the hands of the Mahdi, giving him the most exact information as to the
supply of ammunition and food within the walls of Khartoum. These
documents were at once sent to the Mahdi, and it is generally supposed
that at this present moment they are lying in the Fort at Omdurman,
outside Khartoum.
The loss of the _Abbas_ was a cause of great grief to General Gordon,
and again and again he refers to it. Writing on November 5th he says:--
"I cannot get out of my head the _Abbas_ catastrophe; that the
_Abbas_ (with her 970 bullet marks on her, her gun, and her
parapets, which were bullet proof) could be captured by force seems
impossible; that she ran upon a rock seems unlikely, for she had
her sides defended by buffers, sunk one foot in water. I also
warned them against ever anchoring by the bank, also to take wood
from isolated spots; in fact as far as human foresight goes, I did
all my possible.... You will notice the number of Greeks (on
board). They were a bodyguard I ordered and paid highly, to prevent
any treachery on the part of the crew. Thus the question of
treachery was duly weighed by me, and guarded against, as far as I
could--both on the part of the crew, and on the part of the
inhabitants--and I told them to anchor mid-stream, and not to take
wood except in isolated spots."
One can only echo the words of Mr. Egmont Hake: "It is impossible to
read this without a feeling of admiration for the thorough way in which
General Gordon examined into the minutest details of everything
himself. Every precaution human foresight could conceive he took to
ensure the safety of the _Abbas_ and her crew; having done this, her
fate was in higher hands than his."