THE FALL OF KHARTOUM
Fortunately for the public, as soon as Colonel Stewart left, Gordon
commenced, in addition to all his other duties, writing journals of
events at Khartoum, in which doubtless he recapitulated much of what
had been given in the Diary of Events he had sent with Stewart. On
September 21st, the General received authentic news that an expedition
was actually on its way to Khartoum. On September 30th he sent five
steamers to Metemmah to meet the advancing army, so that there should
be no delay on his part in rendering help. By the steamers he sent his
Journals made up to date, and it is from these that authentic
information is obtained. The despatch of these steamers to Metemmah was
a most unselfish act on his part; indeed, it is by no means certain
that their presence at Khartoum might not have prevented the crowning
disaster later on. He calculated that each steamer was worth to him at
least 2000 men, so that he practically reduced his force by something
like 10,000 men in order to assist the Relief Expedition. Since the
Nile had risen these vessels had considerably increased in utility, and
they had been most valuable in the defence of Khartoum. Each was well
provisioned, so that they would not have required to draw on the
slender resources of the garrison.
On November 5th Gordon says:--
"A curious thing has happened; my friend Kitchener sent up the
post; he wrapped the letters in some old newspapers (he gave me no
news in his letter), the old newspapers were thrown out into the
garden: there a clerk who knew some English found them blowing
about, and gave them to the apothecary of the hospital, who knows
English. The doctor found him reading them, saw date 15th
September, and secured them for me; they are like gold, as you may
imagine, since we have had no news since 24th February 1884! These
papers gave us far more information than any of your letters. Did
K. send them by accident or on purpose?"
In the newspaper appeared the following statement in the form of a
heading: "Lord Wolseley seen off at Victoria Station for the Gordon
Relief Expedition." To this Gordon appended, "_No! for the relief of
the Soudan garrisons_;" and he extracted another statement to the
following effect, "An official telegram received here from Wady Halfa
states that, owing to the unprecedented lowness of the Nile, no
confidence is felt in the practicability of hauling boats over the
cataracts till the end of September." General Gordon pasted this into
the Journal, and wrote opposite to it, "It was not a low Nile, it was
an average Nile, only you were _too late_"--a verdict which events
only too completely justified. It will be of interest to give here a
few brief extracts selected from Gordon's remarks regarding the Relief
Expedition:--
"If it is right to send up an expedition now, why was it not right
to send it up before?"
"We are a wonderful people; it was never our Government which made
us a great nation; our Government has been ever the drag on our
wheels."
"I am afraid to say what numbers have been killed through this
present policy, certainly some 80,000; and it is not over yet."
"I altogether decline the imputation that the projected expedition
has come to relieve me. It has come to save our national honour in
extricating the garrisons, &c., from a position in which our action
in Egypt had placed these garrisons. I was relief expedition No. I.
They are relief expedition No. II. As for myself I could make good
my retreat at any moment if I wished. Now realise what would happen
if this first relief expedition was to bolt and the steamers fall
into the hands of the Mahdi; this _second_ relief expedition (for
the honour of England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be
somewhat hampered. We, the _first_ and _second_, are equally
engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. Earle[15]
comes up to extricate garrisons and (I hope) succeeds. Earle does
not come to extricate me.... I am not the _rescued lamb_, and I
will not be."
[15] Gordon thought that General Earle was to be in command of
the whole force. As a matter of fact he was in command of the
brigade that was going by water the whole way to Khartoum. He was
killed on the way.
In spite of his great anxiety, and the worries through which he was
called to pass, Gordon never seemed to lose his sense of humour. There
are many amusing entries in his Journals, of which the following may be
taken as fair specimens:--
"A horse escaped from the Arabs, formerly belonging to Government.
It gave _no_ information; but from its action, may be supposed _not
to believe in the Mahdi_."
"It is really amusing to find (when one can scarcely call one's
life one's own) one's servant, _already_ with one wife (which most
men find is enough), coming and asking for three days' leave, in
order to take another wife. Yet such was the case, a few days ago,
with one of my servants."
His comments on the Mahdi are also amusing:--
"The Greek (refugee) who came in told the Greek Consul that the
Mahdi puts pepper under his nails, and when he receives visitors
then he touches his eyes and weeps copiously; that he eats a few
grains of dhoora openly, but in the interior of the house he has
fine feeding and drinks alcoholic drinks.... After this pepper
business! I think I shall drop any more trouble in writing him
letters, trying to convince or persuade him to reasonable measures.
I must confess that the pepper business has sickened me; I had
hitherto hoped I had to do with a regular fanatic, who believed in
his mission, but when one comes to pepper in the finger nails, it
is rather humiliating to have to succumb to him, and somehow I have
the belief that I shall not have to do so....
"One cannot help being amused at this pepper business. Those who
come in for pardon, come in on their knees, with a halter round
their neck. The Mahdi rises, having scratched his eyes and obtained
a copious flow of tears, and takes off the halter. As the
production of tears is generally considered the proof of sincerity,
I would recommend the Mahdi's receipt to Cabinet Ministers,
justifying some job."
It is not necessary to enumerate the number of encounters that took
place between Gordon's men and the Mahdists; he took little personal
part in these engagements. The fiery spirit of the young soldier, who
led his own troops in China, had not expended itself, but was kept in
subjection by a higher spirit. He knew that much was staked on his
life, and that the risk was too great. There was no one to succeed him;
his death meant defeat to his cause, and ruin to the country for which
he had done so much. Speaking generally, therefore, he did not expose
himself more than he could help. But though he avoided rashness in any
form, he was a good deal exposed to danger, and the palace in which he
lived was an object on which the enemy expended much of their
ammunition.
The Mahdi had kept himself as far from Gordon's reach as possible, by
remaining at Obeid, while his troops conducted the investment of
Khartoum. But when the new year of the Mohammedan Calendar commenced,
on October 21st, and the Mahdi had heard, through the capture of
Colonel Stewart's papers, of the difficulties that Gordon was in, he
appears to have mustered his courage and to have brought up 30,000 men
to intimidate Gordon. When called upon to surrender the following was
the reply that Gordon returned: "If you are the real Mahdi, dry up the
Nile and come over, and I will surrender." It is said that the Mahdi
took him literally, and lost 3000 men in an attempt to walk across the
Nile! Be that as it may, the Mahdi ordered an attack, which was
conducted with some vigour. It was resisted successfully by Gordon,
aided by his twelve steamers and 800 men, but the fighting must have
been severe, for it lasted for eight hours. The bursting of mines and
torpedoes carried more havoc into the ranks of the enemy than Gordon's
men did. Material things of this kind at least responded to the will of
him who organised them, and did not prove cowardly or treacherous.
The Mahdi then retreated to a more respectful distance, and, it is
said, hid himself in a cave, prophesying that there should be sixty
days of rest, and that then blood would flow like water. The real truth
of the matter is that the Mahdi's military advisers saw that there was
little use in attempting to capture Khartoum by direct assault. Having
full information from Stewart's papers that the food supply could not
last long, they prudently decided to starve out the garrison.
* * *
English officers have before now gone through trying sieges, as, for
instance, Lawrence and Havelock at Lucknow, and Sale at Jellalabad, but
it would be difficult in the whole of the military history of England
to find a case in which an officer was left single-handed to contend
with such frightful odds for so long a time. The siege lasted 317 days,
very nearly as long as the siege of Sebastopol. English officers have
usually had a few of their own countrymen, on whom they could rely and
with whom they could take counsel, to share their hardships. But Gordon
stood alone, and the troops he had were not only foreigners, but, with
a few exceptions, they were cowards, and he knew that very few of them
were really loyal to him. Nothing but his extraordinary personality
kept the force together. His opinion of these miserable troops is
frequently expressed in his Journals. The following passages are
examples:--
"_October 31st._--I have ever felt the greatest insecurity
respecting the lines, for I believe 100 determined men would carry
them with ease, if they made their attack on the Shaggyeh or
Bashi-Bazouk part.... The Cairo Turkish Bashi-Bazouks, the
Shaggyeh, and the Fellaheen soldiers, I will back against any
troops in the world for cowardice."
"_November 17th._--I certainly lay claim to having commanded, more
often than any other man, cowardly troops, but this experience of
1884 beats all past experiences; the worst of the matter is that
you cannot believe one word the officers say."
On November 2nd he writes: "Six weeks' consumption! and then the sponge
must be thrown up." Fortunately, he discovered on November 11th that a
robbery by some corrupt Egyptian officials had been going on, and that
2-1/2 million lbs. of biscuit--worth L9000 at any time, but at least
L26,000 during the siege--had been stolen. The recovery of this helped
him to hold out a little longer. On December 13th he writes:--
"We have in hand 1,796,000 rounds Remington ammunition; 540 rounds
Krupp; 6000 rounds mountain gun ammunition; L140 in specie; L18,000
in paper in treasury! L60,000 in town in paper; 110,000 okes of
biscuits; 700 ard ebs of dhoora....
"We are going to send down the _Bordeen_ the day after to-morrow,
and with her I shall send this Journal. _If some effort is not made
before ten days' time the town will fall._"
The following day, December 14th, was the last as far as his ability to
communicate with the outer world was concerned. Though he held on for
nearly six weeks longer, nothing is known accurately after the
_Bordeen_ left Khartoum. Writing to the commander of the approaching
Expeditionary Force, he says:--
"I send down the steamer _Bordeen_ to-morrow, with vol. vi. of my
private journal, containing account of the events in Khartoum from
November 5 to December 14. The state of affairs is such that one
cannot foresee further than five to seven days, after which the
town may at any time fall. I have done all in my power to hold out,
but I own I consider the position is extremely critical, almost
desperate; and I say this without any feeling of bitterness with
respect to Her Majesty's Government, but merely as a matter of
fact. Should the town fall, it will be questionable whether it will
be worth the while of Her Majesty's Government to continue its
expedition; for it is certain that the fall of Khartoum will ensure
that of Kassala and Senaar."
Another letter of the same date was received by Sir Gerald Graham in
Cairo, saying: "Farewell. You will never hear from me again. I fear
there will be treachery in the garrison, and all will be over by
Christmas." The following message, addressed to a friend in Cairo, and
also dated December 14, was received only on February 24: "All is up. I
expect a catastrophe in ten days' time. It would not have been so if
our people had kept me better informed as to their intentions. My
adieux to all." He also wrote to his sister:--
"This may be the last letter you will receive from me, for we are
on our last legs, owing to the delay of the expedition. However,
God rules all, and, as He will rule to His glory and our welfare,
His will be done. I fear, owing to circumstances, that my affairs
pecuniarily are not over-bright....--Your affectionate brother,
"C. G. GORDON.
"_P.S._--I am quite happy, thank God, and like Lawrence, I have
'_tried_ to do my duty.'"
It has already been mentioned that August 12th was the day when the
English Government yielded to the pressure of public opinion and gave
orders to commence the building of the boats which were to convey the
troops to relieve Khartoum. It is unnecessary to follow in detail the
history of that force. Suffice it to say that the commander, Lord
Wolseley, received at Korti a message from General Gordon, dated 14th
December 1884, "Come quickly, come together; do not leave Berber behind
you." But the verbal message which the messenger delivered was far
worse, "Famine was in Khartoum; the Arabs knew it: there was not a
moment to be lost."
At once, Sir Herbert Stewart, with a small force, was sent to dash
through the desert from Korti to Metemmah. He, Colonel Burnaby, and
several other brave men, fell on that famous march, for the enemy at
two points warmly disputed their passage. The loss in these conflicts,
at Abu Klea on the 17th, and at Metemmah on the 19th, was appalling for
the Arabs, but such victories often repeated would soon have done for
the conquerors. The entire force reached Gubat on the Nile on January
20th, and there they found the four steamers which Gordon had sent
down. Originally there were five steamers, but one had been sunk. The
six journals were handed over to Sir Charles Wilson, who, by right of
seniority, had taken command on the death of Sir Herbert Stewart. A
note was also given to Sir Charles, which had been brought by a
messenger from Khartoum, to the following effect: "Khartoum all right,
could hold out for years.--C. G. Gordon, 29th December 1884."
It was at first generally believed that this document was but one of
many sent out in order to deceive the enemy, but it is now thought that
his real object was not to deceive the enemy, who knew only too well
the actual state of affairs, so much as to get them to let his
messengers pass, if caught by them, and that then the messengers could
deliver a _viva voce_ message, and tell the appalling truth.
Sir Charles Wilson, with two officers and a small detachment of
Englishmen belonging to the Sussex regiment (late 35th), started on the
morning of the 24th for Khartoum in two of Gordon's steamers. The delay
that occurred between the arrival of the English force at Gubat, and
the start up the river for Khartoum, has been freely criticised by the
press. The journey from Gubat to Khartoum being entirely by water, Lord
Charles Beresford, a well-known naval officer, had been attached to
Stewart's force, with orders "at once to take over and man any steamer
or steamers that were either there or in the vicinity," and to "use
every means in his power to get one or more of the steamers into an
efficient state." Unfortunately, the British force that reached the
Nile was in a very different condition from that which left Korti in
such high spirits. Rapid marching and hard fighting had demanded a
heavy penalty, and the death-roll and sick-list were very high; among
others, Lord Charles Beresford himself was on the latter.
The whole force under Sir Charles Wilson did not equal a battalion of
infantry on its war strength, and it included a large percentage of
sick and wounded to be looked after. In addition to this, reports came
into camp that large bodies of Arabs were advancing from the north as
well as from the south, with the object of annihilating the force. The
commander, therefore, had an anxious time of it, and was compelled to
undertake a reconnaissance to ascertain the truth of the rumours, and
to make all sorts of preparations for defending his little camp with
its sick and wounded against any sudden onslaught. He was unconscious
of the fact that time was so pressing, and that instead of his camp
being attacked, it would be Khartoum, where Gordon had for so long held
out against overwhelming odds. Thus the valuable hours of the 21st,
22nd, and 23rd glided away, all too rapidly.
Even when Wilson's force was ready to start, Lord Charles Beresford was
not able to accompany it, and Sir Charles had to go without him. The
distance to Khartoum was about 100 miles, but it was not until January
28th that the steamers got clear of the Sixth Cataract, which was about
half-way between Gubat and Khartoum. For about a dozen miles large
boulders and rocks caused delay and danger. No sooner had the steamers
got clear of these obstacles than all eyes were strained to catch sight
of the Egyptian flag floating over Khartoum. The steamers made rapid
progress in the open water, and as the distance was reduced, the square
roof of the palace where Gordon had resided came into view. But there
was no Egyptian flag flying from it, and the reception accorded to the
relieving force, although a warm one, was not such as Gordon would have
given. His eyes had often been strained looking to the quarter whence
he thought his grateful countrymen would surely send aid, but he had
looked in vain. Now, when the tardy help was at hand, it received no
welcome from him, for just two days before, on January 26th, he had
yielded up his heroic spirit. From every side the Mahdists poured shot
and shell upon Sir Charles Wilson and his little band; and it was
matter for grateful surprise that they escaped the fate of him whom,
too late, they had come to rescue. They approached within eight hundred
yards of the city, and then, convinced that it had fallen, retreated to
a safer position, from which they could institute inquiries as to the
fate of the gallant hero, hoping, yet hardly daring to hope, that his
life might have been spared.
It is not necessary to follow further in detail the history of Sir
Charles Wilson's party, the narrow escape they had from being
treacherously run on to a rock, and the way in which they were
gallantly rescued by Lord Charles Beresford, who by February 1st was
sufficiently recovered to enable him to take command of another of
Gordon's steamers, and relieve the would-be relievers. There followed
at least six days of suspense, as the accounts brought in by natives
were very conflicting, but by the 11th of February it was known in
England that a consensus of evidence pointed to the fact that the noble
hero of Khartoum had been killed at his post.
* * *
Probably it will never be accurately known either how Khartoum fell
into the hands of the Mahdi, or how the gallant defender actually met
his fate. There have been many wild rumours regarding both events, but
it is probable that the most authentic account is that obtained by
Colonel Kitchener, who of all men was most likely to be well informed,
for not only was his experience of the Arabs great, but he had personal
opportunities of examining witnesses. He thinks that the ordinary food
supply at Khartoum was quite exhausted by the 1st January 1885, and
that on the 6th the General issued a proclamation, offering to any of
the inhabitants who liked free permission to leave the town and go to
the Mahdi. Great numbers availed themselves of this permission, and
Gordon wrote letters to the Mahdi, requesting him to protect and feed
these poor Moslem people, as he had for the last nine months. In this
way the population of the city was reduced to about 14,000 out of the
34,000 inhabitants who were there in September. About the 18th of
January, a sortie was made which resulted in desperate fighting, and a
large number of the Mahdi's troops and about 200 of Gordon's men were
killed. Colonel Kitchener says:--
"The state of the garrison was then desperate for want of food; all
the donkeys, dogs, cats, rats, &c., had been eaten; a small ration
of grain was issued daily to the troops, and a sort of bread was
made from pounded palm-tree fibre.
"On the 23rd General Gordon had a stormy interview with Farag Pasha
[the commander of his black troops]. An eye-witness states that it
was owing to Gordon having passed a fort on the White Nile which
was under Farag Pasha's charge, and found to be inadequately
protected. Gordon is said to have struck Farag Pasha on this
occasion. It seems probable to me that at this interview Farag
Pasha proposed to Gordon to surrender the town, and stated the
terms the Mahdi had offered, declaring in his opinion that they
should be accepted. Farag Pasha left the palace in a great rage,
refusing the repeated attempts of other officers to effect a
reconciliation between him and Gordon. On the following day (24th)
General Gordon held a council of the notables at the palace. The
question of the surrender of the town was then discussed, and
General Gordon declared, whatever the council decided, he would
never surrender the town. I think it very probable that on this
occasion General Gordon brought Farag Pasha's action and proposals
before the council, and it appears that some in the council were of
Farag Pasha's opinion, that the town could resist no longer, and
should be surrendered on the terms offered by the Mahdi. General
Gordon would not, however, listen to this proposal.
"On the 25th Gordon was slightly ill, and as it was Sunday, he did
not appear in public. He had, however, several interviews with
leading men of the town, and evidently knew that the end was
near.... On the night of the 25th many of the famished troops left
their posts on the fortifications in search of food in the town.
Some of the troops were also too weak, from want of nourishment, to
go to their posts."
Meanwhile news had reached the Mahdists of their terrible defeat at Abu
Klea, and also rumours that the English had taken Metemmah. Reports
which have quite recently arrived from Egypt say that the Mahdi,
alarmed at the approach of English troops, had already packed up his
goods and chattels and was about to beat a retreat. There was a meeting
of all the Emirs in the camp of the Mahdi, and, with one exception, all
were in favour of abandoning the siege. A single Emir, however, said,
"Let us make one more attempt. Let us fire 101 guns and proclaim a
great victory over the advancing English army, and then make one more
attempt on Khartoum. If we fail we shall be no worse off than we are
now, for we can only retreat, but if we succeed we shall be able to
defy the approaching British." Unfortunately for us the advice of the
Emir was taken, and the British expedition, which was so near
succeeding, failed by forty-eight hours to gain its object. The Mahdist
attack took place at 3.30 A.M. on Monday, January 26th, and was only
too successful. With regard to the report that the fall of Khartoum was
due to foul play on the part of Farag Pasha, Colonel Kitchener says:
"The accusations of treachery have all been vague, and are, to my mind,
the outcome of mere supposition. In my opinion Khartoum fell from
sudden assault, when the garrison was too exhausted by privation to
make proper resistance!" Whether Farag Pasha was guilty or not is not
definitely known, but it is certain that he was taken prisoner, and
three days after the fall of the town was brought up to show where the
wealth was hidden. As there was none he could not reveal it, so he was
killed in the market-place at Omdurman. The Mahdi's troops massacred
4000 persons, and after they had been engaged for six hours in thus
wreaking their vengeance, the Mahdi sent over to stop them, and a
systematic method was adopted of searching for loot. As the Mahdi had
bribed his men by promises of untold wealth, and they were
disappointed, a large number deserted his cause, and afterwards
actually fought against him.
The most contradictory reports have been circulated as to the manner in
which General Gordon met his fate, and although it would be impossible
to allude to all, it may not be out of place to refer to one which has
been very widely accepted. It is to the effect that the General,
hearing that the city had been betrayed, put on his uniform and rushed
out, sword in hand, to die as a soldier. Narratives which have a
dramatic element are always easily accepted. Dramatic effect was,
however, the last thing our gallant hero thought of at any time, and
still less on such an occasion as this. As a matter of fact he had not
a stitch of uniform in Khartoum, and, considering his Chinese
experience, it is very unlikely that he would have drawn his sword,
even if he had possessed one, which he certainly did not. One person
who recognised Gordon after his death says that he was dressed in light
clothes. Colonel Kitchener quotes the only person who claimed to be an
eye-witness of his death, who says:--
"On hearing the noise, I got my master's donkey, and went with him
to the palace. Muhamed Bey Mustapha, with my master, Ibrahim Bey
Rushdi, and about twenty cavasses, then went with Gordon towards
the house of the Austrian Consul Hansall, near the church, when we
met some rebels in an open place near the outer gate of the palace.
Gordon Pasha was walking in front leading the party. The rebels
fired a volley, and Gordon was killed at once; nine of the
cavasses, Ibrahim Bey Rushdi, and Muhamed Bey Mustapha were killed;
the rest ran away."
Whether Gordon's death was intended by the Mahdi or was entirely an
accident is not known. Colonel Kitchener says that the Mahdi professed
to be very angry when he heard that Gordon was killed, but the Colonel
thinks that had he expressed himself strongly on the subject
beforehand, this calamity would never have taken place. This, however,
is very doubtful; a rushing host of victorious soldiers, firing wildly
in every direction, are never very discriminating; of course many of
them did not know Gordon personally, and the brave General was not the
man to make himself conspicuous by any distinguishing garb. Though
Colonel Kitchener is perhaps rather hard on the Mahdi in this respect,
he is probably correct in thinking that "the want of discipline in the
Mahdi's camp made it dangerous for him to keep as a prisoner a man whom
all the black troops liked better than himself, and in favour of whom,
on a revulsion of feeling, a successful revolt might take place in his
own camp. Moreover, if Gordon was dead, he calculated (and rightly) the
English would retire and leave him in peace." How Gordon was actually
killed, and whether it was the intention of the Mahdi that he should be
"accidentally" disposed of, is open to dispute. There can, however, be
no question that he was slain, for his dead body was recognised. Well
might Colonel Kitchener say, "Never was a garrison so nearly rescued,
never was a commander so sincerely lamented." As far back as October
13th General Gordon had written:--
"It is, of course, on the cards that Khartoum is taken under the
nose of the Expeditionary Force, which will be _just too late_.
"The Expeditionary Force will perhaps think it necessary to retake
it; but that will be of no use, and will cause loss of life
uselessly on both sides. It had far better return, with its tail
between its legs.... England was made by adventurers, not by its
Government, and I believe it will only hold its place by
adventurers."
The Government decided to take Gordon's advice, and, to save further
bloodshed, withdrew the Relief Expedition. Wady Halfa, Korosko, and
Assouan, were held with some force, in case the Mahdi's adherents
should seek to follow up their victory. The death of the Mahdi,
however, and the defeat of his followers at the end of 1885, have
together helped to crush the Mahdist movement, and Egypt has been left
unmolested.