KHARTOUM
In order to understand aright the events that suddenly intervened and
prevented General Gordon from fulfilling his engagement to the King of
the Belgians, it will be necessary to go back to the year 1882, and
briefly survey what occurred after that time. It will be remembered
that Gordon left the Soudan at the end of 1879, when the young Khedive
Tewfik was reigning in place of his father Ismail, who had been
compelled to resign. Tewfik unfortunately was not fit to rule, and
Egypt above all things wanted a man who was not a mere puppet. His
father, with all his faults, had great force of character, and made
himself respected in the kingdom. The son was as weak as the father was
strong, with the result that his rule soon became nominal. When weak
men get into such positions, there is great temptation for stronger
ones to rise up and seize the reins of government. It is unnecessary to
sketch the history of Arabi Pasha, or to recount in detail the
circumstances that brought him to the front. Enough for our purpose to
mention that his name, little known before, was suddenly associated
with a great military revolt, and that the powers of Europe took alarm
lest the Suez Canal should be blocked. But for that Canal, events in
Egypt might have taken a very different turn, and that country might
now have had, what it sorely needs, a strong man at the head of
affairs. England, having far more ships passing through the Canal than
all the rest of the world together, intervened. Our fleet attacked
Alexandria, and our troops under Lord Wolseley broke up the Egyptian
army at Tel-el-Kebir. From that time we have virtually been the rulers
of the ancient kingdom of Egypt, the Khedive being little more than a
puppet in our hands. He has all the social position and dignity of a
Khedive, without the trouble or responsibility of having to govern.
Unfortunately, soon after General Gordon relinquished the
Governor-Generalship of the Soudan, the Khedive, in spite of Gordon's
protest, appointed to the post about as bad a man as he could possibly
have selected. This was no other than Raouf Pasha, whom Gordon had
twice turned out of different appointments for playing the tyrant. No
sooner was he appointed than there was a revival of all the horrors of
cruel government, which Gordon had done so much to abolish. The
following are his own words in explanation of the origin of the
rebellion:--
"The movement is not religious, but an outbreak of despair. Three
times over I warned the late Khedive that it would be impossible to
govern the Soudan on the old system, after my appointment to the
Governor-Generalship. During the three years that I wielded full
powers in the Soudan, I taught the natives that they had a right to
exist. I waged war against the Turks and Circassians, who had
harried the population. I had taught them something of the meaning
of liberty and justice, and accustomed them to a higher ideal of
government than that with which they had previously been
acquainted. As soon as I had gone, the Turks and Circassians
returned in full force; the old Bashi-Bazouk system was
re-established; my old _employes_ were persecuted; and a population
which had begun to appreciate something like decent government was
flung back to suffer the vast excesses of Turkish rule. The
inevitable result followed; and thus it may be said that the egg of
the present rebellion was laid in the three years during which I
was allowed to govern the Soudan on other than Turkish principles."
There was a belief among the Mohammedans that the year 1882 would be an
eventful one for them. It closed the twelfth century of Mohammedanism,
and the popular expectation was that a Mahdi, or another prophet, would
arise to reform Islam, and to abolish the tyranny of the rich and
powerful. Predictions of this kind frequently bring about their own
accomplishment. Before the time stated, a man named Mohammed Achmet had
arisen, declaring that he was the long-looked-for Mahdi, and crowds
were flocking to his standard.[12] With a powerful governor, such as
Gordon, the movement would have been quickly stamped out; indeed, so
few abuses existed under his rule, that there was then no demand for
such a reformer. But with Raouf Pasha the case was reversed; not only
were there many abuses to be reformed, but there was a corresponding
want of ability to subdue such a movement. The Mahdi's forces grew
apace, for there existed plenty of material in the way of recruits.
Passing over smaller engagements in which the Egyptian troops met the
forces of the Mahdi, we come to one crowning disaster on the 5th
November 1883, when an Egyptian army, numbering something like 12,000
men, under the command of Colonel Hicks, a retired Indian officer, was
massacred on the road between Khartoum and El Obeid. No blame can be
attached to the commander on this occasion. Mr. Frank Power, the
_Times_ correspondent at Khartoum, writes of him as follows: "I pity
Hicks; he is an able, good, and energetic man, but he has to do with
wretched Egyptians, who take a pleasure in being incompetent, thwarting
one, delaying and lying." The unfortunate men who composed his army had
been dragged from their homes in chains, and many of them had never
learnt to fire a shot, or to ride a horse. Mr. Power predicted, before
the army left Khartoum, that fifty good men would rout the whole lot.
The Mahdi not only had upwards of 69,000 men on his side, but a large
proportion of them were fine plucky fellows, worthy of a better foe.
[12] One writer thus describes the Mahdi:--"Mohammed Achmet was a
native of Dongola, the son of a shipwright, formerly well known
there. From his early youth he was fond of meditation and
studying the Koran, rather than of working like his brothers; and
his tastes were encouraged. He became the disciple of a fakir, or
dervish, near Khartoum. In 1870 he took up his residence on an
island, where he gained reputation as a learned and devout man.
For a time he used this reputation only for selfish and sensual
ends. He took wives from among the Arabs, and thus made many
alliances, which he afterwards turned to account. After some
years he began to assume more ambitious claims, and declared
himself to be the true Mahdi."
Mr. Power says: "The last that was seen of poor old Hicks was his
taking his revolver in one hand, and his sword in the other; calling on
his soldiers to fix bayonets, and his staff to follow him, he spurred
at the head of his troops into the dense mass of naked Arabs, and
perished with all his men." They had fought for three days and nights
without a drop of water, the whole day under a scorching sun on a sandy
plain. Gordon writing to a friend says: "What a defeat Hicks's was! It
is terrible to think of over 12,000 men killed; the Arabs just prodded
them to death, where they lay dying of thirst, four days without water!
It is appalling. What a hecatomb to death!"
* * *
That victory changed everything. Nothing succeeds like success; the
Mahdi became the hero of the hour in the Soudan, and his forces, it was
supposed, at one time numbered something like 300,000 men. Here then
were all the elements ready for a new Mohammedan crusade, and
considering how much trouble the first Mohammedan crusade had given in
Europe, it was not to be wondered at that there was fear and trembling
in Egypt, the first country on the line of march of this huge fanatical
army, flushed with victory, believing their leader to be none other
than the long-expected reformer of Islam and conqueror of the world. A
hurriedly-scraped-together force, consisting mainly of gendarmerie, was
at once dispatched under Baker Pasha, _via_ Suakim, to relieve
Khartoum, and attack the Mahdi. This force was so completely smashed up
by Osman Digna within a few miles of Suakim that it had little effect
upon the campaign, except to show that Egyptian troops were absolutely
unfit to meet the forces of the Mahdi. If the tide of conquest was to
be rolled back it must be done by British troops. But England might
well ask what claim was there resting on her that she should give
valuable lives to be sacrificed, to say nothing of incurring the cost
of a fresh campaign, simply because the corrupt Egyptian Government was
too weak to rule its own territory?
When once it became clear that Egyptian troops could not hold the
Soudan, our Government rightly decided that the province must be given
up. Unfortunately, there were scattered about in different parts of
that immense territory various Egyptian officials and bodies of troops.
It was calculated that including the women and children their number
must have been about 30,000. We had practically broken up the Egyptian
army, and virtually become the rulers of the country, so we as a nation
had a certain amount of responsibility in the matter. The problem was
how to withdraw that enormous number of human beings from the Soudan
into Egypt. What appeared to be needed far more than troops was a man
with a head on his shoulders, acquainted with the country, familiar
with the people and their habits of thought, and possessing force of
character to stand against the turbulent elements that had to be dealt
with. No sooner were the difficulties of the position recognised in
England than an outcry arose that Gordon ought to be sent to undertake
the herculean task. Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, has given
credit to Sir Charles Wilson as the first to suggest sending Gordon, as
the only man competent to deal with all the difficulties of the
situation. Both Mr. Gladstone and Sir Charles Dilke asserted in public
that the English Cabinet advised the Egyptian Government that Gordon
was the best man to send, but that the Khedive's ministers did not
approve of this step. Sir Henry Gordon, in his biography states that
Sir Evelyn Baring, our representative in Egypt, does not even seem to
have consulted the Egyptian Government, but of his own accord declined
to accept Gordon. It is quite clear that Sir Evelyn Baring and General
Gordon were not the best of friends, for Gordon later on complains: "I
hear very little from Cairo. Baring only telegraphs officially." It
does not, however, much matter now who is to blame for the want of
wisdom in not recognising in time that Gordon was the man for the
occasion. That blunder, whosever fault it was, not only lost the Soudan
to Egypt, but caused the death of many of our brave soldiers, to say
nothing of Gordon himself. The Egyptian Government blundered on a
little longer, till it was too late, and then the request that Gordon
might be sent was telegraphed home.
Nubar Pasha, who was the first to invite Gordon to Egypt many years
before, was now the first to see that he ought to be sent for. This
astute minister had only just come into office, and within eight days
he got Sir Evelyn Baring to telegraph to England for Gordon. There can
be little question now that the fatal delay of a single month sealed
the fate of the Soudan. Hicks Pasha's force was annihilated in November
1883, but it was not till January 11, 1884, that General Gordon
received a telegram from his old friend and comrade, Lord Wolseley,
urging him to come to town at once for consultation, and though he did
not lose a single day he did not reach Cairo till January 24th. By that
time he ought to have been at Khartoum.
Before proceeding further, it may be well to say that so little was
General Gordon known at this time by his countrymen, that a country
gentleman, who was a magistrate and a deputy-lieutenant in
Pembrokeshire, a county in which Gordon had formerly been stationed,
remarked, on seeing the fact mentioned in the paper that "Chinese
Gordon" was going out. "I see the Government have just sent a Chinaman
to the Soudan. What can they mean by sending a native of that country
to such a place?" This story, which is mentioned by Sir William Butler,
is quite characteristic of the ignorance that prevailed about the
Khartoum hero, previous to his being selected as the one man who could
save Egypt from its troubles, and our Government from an awkward
position.
In a letter to his brother, dated 17th January, Gordon says, "I saw
King Leopold to-day; he is furious." It must have been a great trial to
that kind-hearted monarch to have all his philanthropic plans thus
upset, and he made Gordon promise that he would, if spared, go to the
Congo when the Soudan was settled. So hard up for money was Gordon at
this time that he had to borrow from the king enough to pay for his
journey to London. Fortunately it occurred to Lord Wolseley to ask
Gordon, a few hours before he was to start by the evening mail, if he
had sufficient money. Gordon had none, and as the banks had closed his
lordship had some amusing adventures going about to raise L200, which
he did by borrowing small sums. As far as Gordon was concerned, his
lordship might have saved himself the trouble, as L100 of the amount
was generously bestowed by him on Mahomet, his old blind secretary at
Cairo.
The _Pall Mall Gazette_, which was the first journal to advocate
sending Gordon to the Soudan, and which first published his views on
that country, was represented at Charing Cross when the gallant General
was starting, and described the scene as a very unusual and interesting
one. Lord Wolseley carried the General's portmanteau; Lord Granville,
the Foreign Secretary, took his ticket; and the Duke of Cambridge held
open the door. Considering how little Gordon cared about grandees, it
is amusing to note that he was waited on in a way that many
tuft-hunters would envy.
Writing before he had actually started, he said: "I am averse to the
loss of a single life, and will endeavour to prevent any happening _if
I go_. I have a Bank, and on that I can draw; He is richer than the
Khedive, and knows more of the country than any one; I will trust Him
to help me out of money or any other difficulties." Again he writes,
when at sea, 21st January: "If people ask after me, tell them they can
greatly help me with their prayers, not for my earthly success, but
that my mission may be for God's glory, the welfare of the poor and
wretched, and, for me, what He wills, above all for a humble heart."
And to his friend Prebendary Barnes, he says: "You and I are equally
exposed to the attacks of the enemy--me not a bit more than you are."
* * *
On January 24th he reached Cairo, where a good deal of excitement
prevailed. Gordon apparently took it all very calmly. He had to remain
a couple of days, and during that time had a stormy interview with
Zebehr, who accused him of the murder of his son. Gordon's reply was
practically that had full justice been done, Zebehr too would have paid
the death penalty. Though he had such a short time at Cairo, he found
opportunity to interest himself in the affairs of a poor lad, the son
of a native pastor of the Church Missionary Society at Jaffa. The boy
had been in a telegraph office at Jaffa, but had been unjustly
dismissed. He went to Cairo for employment, and got into the telegraph
office. General Gordon had not forgotten him, and went to call on the
young fellow, who was of course in quite a subordinate position, and
must have been not a little astonished at the visit of a man upon whom,
at that time, the eyes of the whole civilised world were turned. "How
is your mother?" was the first question Gordon put, the woman having
been unwell when he was in Palestine. He then spoke to the head of the
department, with the result that the boy's position was improved
considerably. Writing from Khartoum, Gordon said: "I saw two pleasant
things at Cairo--Baring's and Wood's chicks;[13] and I heard one
pleasant thing--Mrs. Amos wanted me to see her lambs."
[13] Sir Evelyn Baring, the British representative, and Sir
Evelyn Wood, the commander-in-chief.
General Gordon had brought with him from England a very able staff
officer, Colonel Stewart, of the 11th Hussars, who knew Egypt well.
Having done all that was necessary in the way of interviewing officials
at Cairo, the two proceeded together on January 26th, reaching Korosko
on February 1st, at which point they took to their camels, and dashed
into the Nubian Desert. All sorts of alarming rumours reached England
as to Gordon's fate during this hazardous ride, but on February 13th he
reached Berber in safety, and we heard that he had reached Khartoum on
the 18th. Mr. Power, the _Times_ correspondent, writing from Khartoum
on January 24th, said: "I hear that Chinese Gordon is coming up. They
could not have a better man. He, though severe, was greatly loved
during the five years he spent up here." Again Mr. Power writes: "Just
got a telegram from Mr. Bell, the _Times_ agent for Egypt, to say,
'Gordon leaves Cairo to-night, and will be in Khartoum in eighteen
days.' The shortest time on record is twenty-four days; but Gordon
(sword and Bible) travels like a whirlwind. No Arab of the desert
could, when he was up here, vie with him in endurance on camel back;"
and yet again, on February 9th, "I don't believe the fellows in Lucknow
looked more anxiously for Colin Campbell than we look for Gordon." The
same pen described the scene he created on arrival, and the speech he
made. Thousands of the people crowded to kiss his hands and feet,
calling him the "Sultan of the Soudan."
"His speech to the people was received with enthusiasm. He said, 'I
come without soldiers, but with God on my side, to redress the
evils of the Soudan. I will not fight with any weapons but justice.
There shall be no more Bashi-Bazouks.' It is now believed that he
will relieve the Bahr-Gazelle garrisons without firing a shot.
Since they heard that he was coming the aspect of the people has so
changed that there are no longer any fears of disturbance in the
town. They say that he is giving them more than even the Mahdi
could give. He is sending out proclamations in all directions. Such
is the influence of one man, that there are no longer any fears for
the garrison or people of Khartoum."
General Gordon immediately reduced the taxation of the people by one
half, and directed Colonel Stewart to examine into the case of each
person in prison. It was found that some prisoners had been awaiting
trial for months and some even for years, one poor woman having been
detained for fifteen years for a paltry offence committed when a child.
As many as possible were released, only the worst cases being detained.
One poor old Sheikh had to be carried into Gordon's presence, the
ex-governor of Khartoum having bastinadoed him so severely on the feet
that the flesh had all gone, and only the sinews and bones were
showing. Gordon was so indignant at this that he telegraphed to Cairo
to have L50 stopped out of the pay of Hussein Pasha Cheri, and handed
to his victim by way of compensation for such brutal treatment. He had
a collection made of kourbashes and other instruments of torture, and
had them all destroyed in a bonfire.
Writing on February 22nd, Gordon says:--
"I have all my old servants back, and it is like old times again. I
have not minced matters with the Pashas; it was useless to do so.
We have thousands of petitions daily. I have ordered an Arabic
text, 'God rules the hearts of all men,' to be put up over my
throne, to which I can refer when people come to me in fear....
There is, of course, a very mixed sort of feeling here about the
evacuation of the Soudan; the civil employes do not desire it, for
the half taxes will cause their pay to be diminished by half, and
the _personnel_ reduced."
From Mr. Power's interesting correspondence we get pleasant little
peeps at the private life of the great hero:--
"Gordon is a most lovable character--quiet, mild, gentle and
strong; he is so humble too. The way he pats you on the shoulder
when he says, 'Look here, dear fellow, now what would you advise?'
would make you love him. When he goes out of doors there are always
crowds of Arab men and women at the gate to kiss his feet, and
twice to-day the furious women, wishing to lift his feet to kiss
them, threw him over. He likes my going so much amongst the
natives, for not to do so is a mortal sin in his eyes.... It is
wonderful that one man could have such an influence on 200,000
people. Numbers of women flock here every day to ask him to touch
their children to cure them; they call him the 'Father and the
Saviour of the Soudan.' He has found me badly up in Thomas a
Kempis, which he reads every day, and has given me an 'Imitation of
Christ.' He is indeed, I believe, the greatest and best man of this
century....
"I like Gordon more and more every day; he has a most lovable
manner and disposition, and is so kind to me. He is glad if you
show the smallest desire to help him in his great trouble. How one
man could have dared to attempt his task, I wonder. One day of his
work and bother would kill another man, yet he is so cheerful at
breakfast, lunch, and dinner; but I know he suffers fearfully from
low spirits. I hear him walking up and down his room all night (it
is next to mine). It is only his great piety carries him through.
He and I agree in a great many religious views."
Mr. Power being an Irishman and a Roman Catholic, while General Gordon
was a Scotchman and a member of the Church of England, such testimony
speaks volumes for the General as well as for the writer. There can be
little doubt that General Gordon had not known the brave young Irishman
long, before he had cast over him that fascinating spell which
invariably attracted and charmed young men. Cowper tells us that--
"Truth embodied in a tale,
Shall entrance find at lowliest doors."
Might not the poet have added that truth embodied in a life shall be
even more efficacious in obtaining an entrance? Power's life was cut
short before he had an opportunity of doing much in the world, but the
little that he was permitted to do shows us that he too was made of
that stuff which produces heroes; and as long as our country has such
men in reserve to fall back upon in times of emergency, there need be
no fear of her not being able to maintain her supremacy among nations.
How unwavering was Gordon's faith in the providence of God, even in the
midst of difficulties that would have appalled most men, is shown by
the following letter:--
"_February 27, 1884._--I have sent Stewart off to scour the river
White Nile, and another expedition to push back the rebels on the
Blue Nile. With Stewart has also gone Power, the British Consul and
_Times_ correspondent, so I am left alone in the vast palace of
which you have a photograph, but not alone, for I feel great
confidence in my Saviour's presence.
"The peculiar pain, which comes from the excessive anxiety one
cannot help being in for these people, comes back to me at times. I
think that our Lord, sitting over Jerusalem, is ruling all things
to the glory of His kingdom, and cannot wish things were different
than they are, for, if I did so, then I wish _my will_ not _His_ to
be done. The Soudan is a ruin, and, humanly speaking, there is no
hope. Either I must believe He does all things in mercy and love,
or else I disbelieve His existence; there is no half-way in the
matter. What holes do I not put myself into! And for what? So mixed
are my ideas. I believe ambition put me here in this ruin; however,
I trust and stay myself on the fact that not one sparrow falls to
the ground without our Lord's permission; also that enough for the
day is the evil. 'God provideth by the way, strength sufficient for
the day.'
"_March 1, 1884._--We are all right at present, and I have hope,
but certainly things are not in a good way; humanly speaking,
Baker's defeat at Suakim has been a great disaster, and now it has
its effects up here. 'It is nothing to our God to help with many or
with few,' and I now take my worries more quietly than before, for
all things are ruled by Him for His glory, and it is rebellion to
murmur against His will. Excuse a long letter."[14]
[14] This letter of 27th February and 1st March has been
presented to the Trustees of the British Museum, and is now
exhibited in the Manuscript Department.
It may be well at this point to consider the position of General Gordon
in his official relationship to the Egyptian and English Governments,
for it is impossible to understand subsequent events accurately,
without a proper apprehension of the exact state of affairs. When
Gordon was first sent out, his instructions were merely "to report to
Her Majesty's Government on the military situation in the Soudan, and
on the measures which it might be deemed advisable to take for the
security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that
country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum,
&c., &c." Added, however, to these instructions was an insignificant
clause to which no one at the time attached much importance, and which
ran as follows, "You will consider yourself authorised and instructed
to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to
intrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring."
The Egyptian Government decided to make Gordon Governor-General of the
Soudan, and the Khedive gave into his hands all the absolute power that
he himself possessed; this appointment was sanctioned by the British
Government, and officially communicated to Gordon by Sir E. Baring. In
view of this appointment, most readers will concur in the opinion of
Mr. Egmont Hake, the editor of Gordon's Journals, that "it is as unfair
as it is illogical to talk about General Gordon having exceeded the
instructions conveyed to him by Her Majesty's Government." The real
truth is that it was impossible for Gordon to exceed his instructions.
He himself again and again contended that while it was open to the
Khedive to cancel the appointment, until that was done he was
absolutely master of the situation, to do as he thought best for the
good of the country.
It must not, however, be supposed that General Gordon availed himself
of a flaw in his instructions to carry out a policy of his own. On the
contrary, he clearly understood from the British Government that
evacuation was what was required, and that all the Egyptian employes
must be given a chance of leaving the Soudan if possible. From
beginning to end this was the one thing he held out as the object at
which he aimed. All the suggestions he put forward were made with this
end in view, and he never swerved from it. He was in reality more true
to the instructions he received than were those who issued them. No
sooner had he got into the country, and grasped the actual state of
affairs, than he saw that things were looking very serious. The
interval between Hicks's defeat and his own arrival had been too
prolonged. People who might have been loyal had lost heart and gone
over to the Mahdi. Added to this, Gordon had himself made public the
fact that the country was to be evacuated, so all who intended to
remain behind saw that their best policy was to throw in their lot with
the Mahdi. Gordon blamed himself sometimes for having made known the
intentions of the Government, but it is questionable if such an
important fact could have been long kept secret. At all events, when he
openly promulgated it as Governor-General, he thought, and many thought
with him, that he was taking the line most likely to lead to a peaceful
solution.
* * *
General Gordon did not take long to make up his mind, and soon after
his arrival in Khartoum he astonished the English people by two steps
he took. The first was the issue of a proclamation announcing that the
institution of slavery was not to be interfered with in any way; the
second was an application that his old enemy, Zebehr Rahama, the great
slave-dealer, should be sent up to govern the Soudan. At first sight
Gordon's action was amazing; but when it is more carefully examined in
the light of facts, it cannot be blamed. To take the proclamation
first, it must be apparent to any one that when it was decided that the
Soudan was to be given up, and that thenceforth neither Egypt nor
England should interfere in its internal affairs, it would have been
ridiculous to go on talking about the abolition of slavery. Gordon had
to face a fanatical body of Mohammedans who, rightly or wrongly, looked
upon slavery as a religious institution. The feeling of the country was
strongly in favour of slavery, and if the country was to be left to
itself slavery would continue to exist. Gordon did but make a virtue of
a necessity, and announce that henceforth outsiders would not interfere
in the matter. Thus he took the wind out of the sails of the Mahdi and
his party, who could not say that they were fighting on behalf of one
of their religious institutions.
The proposal to the English Government that Zebehr should be made ruler
of the Soudan, was, as Mr. Hake truly says, "one of those daring
strokes of policy which made his tactics unlike those of other men."
The telegram reached England on February 18, and must at first have
caused some of the Cabinet Ministers to think that Gordon had lost his
head. The last that they had heard on the subject of Gordon's
relationship with Zebehr, was the suggestion of the former that the
latter should be sent as a prisoner to Cyprus, to get him out of Egypt,
where he thought he might give trouble. No wonder, then, if the
ministers were astonished to hear that their representative had changed
his mind so completely as to propose that instead of being imprisoned
in Cyprus, his enemy should be sent to govern the Soudan!
Those who have followed Gordon's tactics closely will not wonder so
much at the proposal. Indeed it seems to have been a part of his creed
to utilise his enemies, and thus if possible to turn them into friends.
In China he frequently enlisted hundreds of prisoners of war, converted
them into staunchest allies, and led them to victory against their old
comrades. He now wanted to apply in the case of Zebehr the principles
he had found so effective elsewhere. So long as he did not see his way
to utilising this king of slave-hunters, he desired to have him kept
out of the way, but when his brilliant genius saw a way of turning his
old foe into a friend, he asked for his services. Unfortunately, Gordon
was not in the position of a Napoleon: he was hampered in the carrying
out of his brilliant designs by those at home, who had neither his
knowledge nor his capacity.
With regard to the proposed appointment of the great slave-hunter to be
King of the Soudan, opinions even now differ greatly. Lord Wolseley,
Sir Evelyn Baring, and most well-informed people are agreed that the
recommendation ought to have been acted upon, and that its adoption
would have been the means of saving many valuable lives, including
Gordon's, and of placing the Soudan under an authoritative government,
which it has not yet obtained. But the English Cabinet felt that public
opinion would be strongly opposed to such a step, and therefore they
would not sanction it.
When Gordon left Cairo for Khartoum he thought that the best plan for
the Soudan, when the Egyptian Government withdrew, would be to replace
it by the heirs of the petty Sultans, who had been deprived of their
power when the Soudan was annexed by Mehemet Ali. But when he saw the
real state of affairs, he felt that these disunited kinglets would not
be strong enough to resist the power of the Mahdi. As for the Mahdi, he
was too much of a religious fanatic to have the government of the
Soudan put into his hands. He was ambitious as well as fanatical; his
object was to overrun the whole world. Directly he ceased to be a
conqueror, his people would cease to believe in his Divine mission, and
he would lose his power. At that time he possessed great power, and
Gordon felt that there must be a still more powerful man set up. There
was only one such man alive, and he was a prisoner at Cairo. The
argument against Zebehr was that he had been an inveterate slave-hunter,
and that to put him into supreme power would be to give him unlimited
means of gratifying his vices. Against this it must be urged that under
the Mahdi's rule the kidnapping of slaves would be just as cruelly
carried on as under that of Zebehr. Also that with Zebehr, being a
prisoner, it would be possible to make certain stipulations on the
subject of slave-hunting. Moreover, it was Gordon's intention
eventually to annex, for the Congo State, the great slave-hunting
district, and to rule that himself, so that Zebehr could not interfere.
Apart from these arguments, Gordon did not believe that Zebehr loved
slave-hunting for its own sake, but rather for the wealth and position
it gave him. He believed that if Zebehr were made Sultan of the Soudan,
his ambitious nature would be satisfied, and he would cease to hunt
slaves, the _raison d'etre_ for such an occupation being gone.
There can be no question that Zebehr was a most able man, a born ruler
and leader of men. He was an inveterate enemy of Gordon's, and at the
meeting which took place between Gordon and Zebehr at Cairo, when the
former was _en route_ to Khartoum, lookers-on considered that on no
account ought these two men ever to be in the Soudan together.
It was, however, one of Gordon's characteristics, and a great charm in
his nature, that he was not only forgiving, but that he never allowed
personal feeling to affect his judgment. He thought only of what was
good for the Soudan, and he was convinced that the only way to restore
law and order there was to place Zebehr in power. One of the faults of
our system of party government is that the Cabinet does not consider so
much what is right in the abstract, as what will most affect the public
mind. The national hatred of slavery is, in England, rightly very
strong; but circumstances alter cases. The Cabinet could not face
public opinion, although the public were at that time ill-informed, and
ignorant of many important elements in the case, and they consequently
refused to let Zebehr go.
Public opinion in England is generally in the right when the public
have been properly informed, and have had time to form an opinion. But
it is not to be expected that the first impressions, formed by a large
mass of people who have not been supplied with full information, are
very reliable. We ought therefore always to have a government in office
strong enough to resist, if need be, the first impression of public
opinion, but willing to yield when the public have thoroughly made up
their minds. The government in office at that time were not united
among themselves, and consequently were weak, and afraid to face the
public. As a result, Gordon's policy was not carried out, and he fell a
victim. The Soudan is still without a settled government, and the
problem how it should be governed is as far as ever from being solved.
As for slavery, that institution alone has gained by the weak policy of
those who were afraid to send up the old slave-hunter to govern the
unfortunate Soudan.