(_i.e._, to adjust, without giving in) and to assist others seemed,
unquestionably, to have gained greater resiliency and determination.
Whether this is a cause-or-effect reaction, however, might be a grey
area difficult to pinpoint precisely. In any event, glimpses of
Marines from behind the barbed wire indicated that steadfastness under
pressure, ingenuity, and outstanding leadership earned them the respect
of fellow prisoners as well as a place in Marine Corps history.
Even in a situation as inhospitable and hazardous as a POW camp, it is
not surprising that characteristic behavior and certain distinctive
personality traits tend to show through, no matter what. Captain
Fink, captured early in the war, endured unspeakable humiliations at
the hands of the North Koreans. Although he felt his morale was at
its lowest point at this time, and was not sure he could go on, he
was later responsible for providing a high degree of civility for
POWs confined to Camp 2. His most notable artistic and mechanical
achievement was probably the construction of an artificial leg[610]
for USAF Major Thomas D. Harrison. This prosthetic was so expertly
fashioned that its owner could play volley ball using his new limb!
Fink also built stethoscopes for POW doctors, using resonant wood and
tubing stolen from Chinese trucks. After a discussion with other POWs
on the need for a religious symbol in camp, the resourceful Marine
made a 22-inch crucifix, christened “Christ in Barbed Wire.”[611] His
efforts on behalf of religion earned him a 10-day sentence in the hole.
[610] A hollowed-out compartment of the leg was used to
hide written records on deaths, atrocities, and other
administrative data. Ultimately, the records were
brought back to the U.S. The Air Force officer was a
cousin, interestingly enough, of the chief Allied truce
negotiator, General Harrison. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 227,
and _Washington Post_, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 1.
[611] The crucifix was brought back to freedom by Camp 2 POWs
and later placed in the Father Kapaun High School, in
Wichita, Kansas. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 172.
Captain Arthur Wagner, VMF(N)-513, spent an unusually long six-month
tour at Pak’s during 1951. For new captives headed in that direction,
the word via USMC grapevine was that he “could be trusted.”[612]
Captain Wagner counselled other prisoners at Pak’s, helped chop wood,
draw water, cook, ease the burden of sick POWs, and resisted the
Communists at every turn.
[612] _Ibid._, p. 121.
Another member of the same squadron, Captain Flynn, had completed 59
combat missions against the enemy in North Korea before being shot
down in May 1952.[613] While captive, the veteran Marine fighter
pilot withstood intense interrogation, influenced others to suppress
CCF-inspired talks made by progressives, and strengthened morale by
planning a group escape. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a
mock court. Throughout it all, according to Master Sergeant Cain, the
POWs “owed much to Flynn who kept them amused.”[614] First Lieutenant
Robert J. Gillette’s “reactionary” attitude resulted in his being
placed in the hole on several occasions. Once, at No Name Valley, he
managed to scribble a novel on toilet paper which subsequently provided
some light moments for fellow prisoners. And First Lieutenant Felix L.
Ferranto, 1st. Signal Battalion, spent more than two years of his 33
months’ imprisonment in solitary confinement or isolated with small
units of “non-cooperative” POWs. The CCF pronounced him a “hopeless
capitalist, an organizer with an ‘unsincere attitude.’”[615]
[613] Parachuting from his burning plane after it was struck
by hostile AA fire, Captain Flynn duplicated an earlier
action from World War II. In July 1945 he had bailed out
of an aircraft similarly hit by fire while on a combat
patrol over Japan. Biog File, HRS, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC.
[614] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 185.
[615] _Ibid._, p. 122.
The type of amiable accommodation that could sometimes be made, without
compromising one’s standards, was once successfully demonstrated by
Captain Jack E. Perry, VMF-311 briefing officer. On a bombing run
his F9F fuel tank was hit, and he parachuted down. Seized almost
immediately by the Chinese, his captors “showed him bomb holes from
numerous strikes in the area, and they pointed out several wounded
soldiers. Then, as he describes it, ‘They laughed like hell.’ Although
Captain Perry failed to see anything funny, he laughed along with
them.’”[616]
[616] _Ibid._, p. 109.
Three Marines captured during the Korean War had suffered a similar
fate in World War II. Ironically, Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison,
of the Military Police Company; Warrant Officer Felix J. McCool, of
1st Service Battalion; and Master Sergeant Frederick J. Stumpges,
Headquarters Company, were all captured in the same 29 November 1950
action. Comparisons of treatment by the Communists and Japanese were
inevitable. A survivor of the Bataan Death March, Stumpges felt that
although the Japanese confinement was more difficult physically,
imprisonment in North Korea was a far worse mental ordeal. “They [the
Communists] were around all the time and you could never speak your
mind.”[617]
[617] _New York Times_, dtd 30 Aug 53, p. 2.
The other two Marines similarly thought that the Japanese were more
brutal but had more character. Harrison, captured at Wake Island, said
he admired them because “they really believed in their cause and were
loyal to it.”[618] The Chinese, on the other hand, he characterized as
employing “false friendship and deceit.”[619] McCool, who had spent 70
hours in a slimy, lice-infested hole for refusing to confess to a phony
charge of rape and pillage, knew that he “hated the Chinese Communists
far more than he had hated the Japanese.”[620]
[618] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 79.
[619] _Ibid._
[620] _Ibid._, p. 167.
Master Sergeant Cain had distinguished himself by flying little OE
reconnaissance planes 184 hours and had 76 combat missions in one
month. Just before his capture, Cain had paid for six months’ education
for nine Korean youngsters who lived near his air base. Because of his
graying hair and lack of rank insignia, Sergeant Cain was mistaken for
a senior officer. In fact, the Chinese insisted that he was Lieutenant
Colonel Cain, CO of VMF-121. His equal amount of insistence that he
was not a Marine officer, plus his refusal to reveal any significant
information, made him a particular nuisance to the CCF. He was
subjected to intensive interrogation sessions, confined to the hole,
and stood at attention for periods of five to eight hours. Describing
the occasion on which he thought it was all over, Sergeant Cain related
that he:
... was taken to a hillside, blindfolded, and placed in front of
a firing squad. He heard rifle bolts click. The commander of the
firing squad asked if he was ready to tell all.[621]
[621] _Ibid._, p. 186.
When the Marine sergeant replied that he was not going to talk, the
Chinese returned him to solitary confinement. Eventually, after
questioning him for 84 days, the CCF gave up trying to indoctrinate
him in the ways of Communism. Major Harris, senior officer of the Obul
complex, freely acknowledged that Sergeant Cain “assumed more than his
share of duties and responsibilities and set an example for all to
follow.”[622]
[622] _Ibid._, pp. 186–187.
_Marine Escape Attempts_[623]
[623] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Korean War casualty cards
from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, HQMC.
As the Korean War came to a close, assessments were being made of
America’s role in it. Operation BIG SWITCH swung into high gear and
national attention focused on the returning POWs and their experiences
in Communist camps. The widely-accepted statement was that no prisoners
had escaped. Even more discrediting was the prevailing belief that,
“worse, not a single American attempted to escape from captivity.”[624]
These reported facts are not borne out by the actual record.
[624] Leckie, _Conflict_, p. 389.
In May 1951, a group of 18 Marines and a U.S. Army interpreter found
their way back to American control through a combination of fortuitous
events and quick thinking. All of the Marines had been captured several
months earlier, in the 28 November-11 December period, the majority
on the night of 29–30 November. There were peculiar circumstances
connected with their escape. In early April, a group of nearly 60
UNC prisoners had been brought south by the enemy from the Majon-ni
area. Presumably they were to perform working details in the rear of
Communist front lines.
While a larger number of prisoners, both Army and Marine, were marched
westward to Pyoktong, First Lieutenant Frank E. Cold and a group of
17 enlisted were sent further south to the general Chorwon area, not
far from the 38th Parallel. In the meantime the Chinese launched their
spring counteroffensive on 22 April. It appears that, subsequently, the
Marines and Army interpreter, Corporal Saburo “Sam” Shimamura, who had
been attached to the 1st Marine Division, were told they would be taken
to the area in which the Marine division was operating and released
there.
The group was then trucked southeast to Chunchon, just below the
Parallel, under guard, and marched toward the vicinity of the front
lines. On 24 May, while in proximity to the main battle area, an
artillery preparation suddenly registered nearby. The CCF guards fled,
while the prisoners ran in the opposite direction, heading for high
ground where they successfully eluded the guards. For the rest of that
day and night the escapees quietly watched Communist troops retreat
past them. The next day, 25 May, the Marines fashioned make-shift air
panels from wallpaper they stripped from a ruined Korean house in the
area. They spelled out “POWS--19 RESCUE.” Their signal attracted the
attention of an Army observation pilot who radioed their position to an
Army reconnaissance unit.
Three Army tanks were dispatched and escorted the ex-prisoners to
safety. They entered friendly lines in the vicinity of Chunchon,
“the first and only group of prisoners to experience Communist
indoctrination and to reach freedom after a prolonged period of
internment.”[625] Two members of the unit[626] were of special
interest. One man was 56-year-old Master Sergeant Gust H. Dunis, who
had barely survived the brutal, frozen death march to Kanggye in late
December. The other was Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, previously
introduced as a unique two-time prisoner of war.
[625] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 84, reporting news stories in _The
Washington Post_, dtd 27 Aug 53, p. 7, and _Saturday
Evening Post_, 25 Aug 51, p. 109.
[626] Roster of this May 1951 escape group: 1stLt Cold,
H&S/3/7; MSgt Dunis, Military Police Co; SSgt Harrison,
MPCo; SSgt James B. Nash, MPCo; Sgt Charles W. Dickerson,
1stTkBn; Sgt Morris L. Estess, 1stSigBn; Sgt Paul M.
Manor, A/7 MT Bn; Cpl Clifford R. Hawkins, 1stTkBn; Cpl
Ernest E. Hayton, 1stTkBn; Cpl Frederick G. Halcomb,
11thMar; Cpl Leonard J. Maffioli, 1stTkBn; Cpl Theodore
R. Wheeler, 1stServBn; Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Hq,
1stDiv; PFC John A. Haring, 7thMar; PFC Theron L.
Hilburn, 1stTkBn; PFC Charles M. Kaylor, W/2/7; PFC
Paul J. Phillips, A/7 MTBn; and PFC Charles E. Quiring,
5thMar. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 260–263.
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 169702]
_Ice-Breaker at Work--Amphibian tractor of 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion destroys thick-crusted ice to prevent its backing up
against Spoonbill Bridge. Below, the 1st Engineer Battalion
maintenance shop in operation at Ascom City._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168178]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 16373]
_Captured Enemy Weapons--Various types of mortar and artillery
shells, machine guns, rifles, and a 60mm mortar are displayed at
1st Marine Division CP. Below, F9F Pantherjet fighter taxies down
runway for takeoff._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 346720]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170084]
_Outpost Defense--Inside view of one of the many sleeping
caves, which shelter two to four men, on Marine outpost Carson.
Below, COP Dagmar under artillery bombardment preceding enemy
diversionary ground attack on 26 March 1953._
[Illustration]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 17096]
_POW Exchange--Frontline Marines watch Army convoy bringing first
UN prisoners to Freedom Village in Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH.
_Below, NKPA and CCF delegation upon adjournment of first day’s
truce talks, April 1953._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170778]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170795 DOD Photo A 170766]
_Freedom Village--Marines of 1st Engineer Battalion raise
welcoming sign at entrance to camp. Rear Admiral John C. Daniel,
USN, senior delegate at truce talks, reports progress at press
conference. Below, KSC workers and Marine reroll barbed wire for
use at the front._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170106]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 13392]
_Ready to Strike--Ground crew loads rockets on “Devilcat” Corsair
in preparation for day’s mission. Below, protective screen of
M-46 dozer of 1st Tank Battalion is designed to explode 3.5-inch
rockets before they hit armored vehicle. The wire fence turns
with the turret._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170228]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171000]
_Evacuation from MLR--Improvised trolley rigged up by 2d
Battalion, 1st Marines, safely transfers Marine casualty. Below,
front view of first aid bunker, built on reverse slope, by 1st
Engineer Battalion personnel._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171077]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171351]
_Marine Relief--Advance party of the Turkish 3d Battalion arrives
at 3/7 CP to reconnoiter its new sector preparatory to relief
of 1st Marine Division, May 1953. Below, mine damage absorbed
by thermo boot. Its sturdy construction saved limb of wounded
Marine. Navy corpsman displays armored jacket worn by infantryman
who survived blast of 5 lbs. of TNT accidentally exploded at
close range._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 172596 DOD Photo A 16050]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171293 DOD Photo A 173207]
_Street Signs--Markers for the new Marine division CP at Camp
Casey await completion of road work. Casey is command post of 1st
MarDiv while in I Corps reserve. Marine tank fires in support
of Turkish Brigade during May attack. Below, 5th Marines slog
through flooded area on way back from day’s training._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173233]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173914]
_Defense of Boulder City--Men of 1st and 7th Marines receive
supplies during CCF assaults in July 1953 against Boulder City.
Below, aerial view of pock-marked terrain in front of Boulder
City as seen from HMR-161 helicopter._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173886]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174359]
_Cease-fire--1st Marines move off MLR on 28 July, following
cease-fire order. How Company marches to Camp Lee from position
at the front. Below, contemplative Marine surveys trench line
being filled in in accordance with armistice agreement._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173720]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174381]
_Operation_ BIG SWITCH_--Road map of route taken by repatriated
UN prisoners of war as convoy reaches radio check points.
Progress of convoy is immediately relayed to Freedom Village and
entered on map._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174586]
_UN Custodial Forces--Indian troops board Marine helicopter on
deck of USS Point Cruz. They are then flown to the buffer zone to
guard CCF and NKPA nonrepatriated POWs. Below, LtCol William G.
Thrash receives naval aviator wings upon his release at Freedom
Village from MajGen Vernon E. Megee, CG, 1st MAW._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349140]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173860]
_Dismantling the MLR--KSCs, under Marine supervision, load and
carry lumber from torn-down bunkers to new sector. Below, guard
shack at entrance to 1/1 CP show results of flood waters, August
1952. Road approach to Spoonbill Bridge completely submerged by
annual summer rains, in July 1953._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164548 DOD Photo A 173282]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349563]
_Shore-to-Ship Operation--F3D is hauled aboard ship after being
ferried by four DUKWs, as 1st MAW redeploys from Korea to Japan
in June 1956. Below, 1st Marine Division in Korea functions as
security force. Marine DMZ policemen inspect enemy positions,
February 1955._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366097]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366210]
_Mission Completed--1st Marine Division equipment and records at
dockside prior to loading for division’s return to the States.
Below, 1st Marines march across Freedom Gate Bridge on their way
to Ascom City and thence home to U.S., March 1955._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366127]
An additional four enlisted Marines returned to military control after
a brief period of capture. Corporal William S. Blair, B/1/7, and PFC
Bernard W. Insco, D/2/11, were taken prisoner on 24 April 1951 while
the 1st Marine Division was operating as a component of IX Corps.
Although originally sent north to a POW camp, both were released on 12
May by the enemy after less than a month’s captivity. Another pair of
lucky Marines were PFC Richard R. Grindle and Corporal Harold J. Kidd,
both of B/1/7. Seized on 11 May in patrol actions, they were the only
Marines captured in ground fighting that month, and escaped to return
to the division four days later.
At least six escape attempts are known to have been made by Marine
POWs, and another elaborate plan late in the war was foiled before it
got under way. The incidents follow:
#1. In the early winter months of 1951, Sergeant Donald M.
Griffith, F/2/5, became increasingly upset by the filth, steady
attrition of POWs, and semi-starvation diet at The Valley. He
vowed to escape. Late one night he pretended to go to the latrine
and finding the guard asleep, instead hurried down the path
leading out of the valley. He walked until dawn, then found a
hut where he hid among a pile of rice bags for some much-needed
sleep. Later, he knocked at a hut, asking for food. While he ate,
however, his genial host’s son was out contacting a military
patrol which even then was on Griffith’s trail.
A group of Communist soldiers closed in to recapture him. As
early punishment, Griffith’s shoe pacs were taken from him and
he was forced to walk back to the Valley in his threadbare ski
socks. Returned to the camp, the Marine sergeant was beaten
across the face. He was also directed to walk up a nearby hill
and for three successive times a rifle bullet tearing by his head
barely missed him. Later he learned that plans of his escape were
leaked to the CCF by an informer, thus triggering an early search.
#2. In May 1951, Captain Bryon H. Beswick, VMF-323, was a member
of a large POW column being marched north. Although still
suffering severe burns on his face, hands, and leg incurred
while bailing out of his plane that had caught fire, Beswick and
four others attempted to outwit their guards while on the march.
All the would-be escapees were placed in solitary confinement.
#3. Shortly after his capture in July 1951, PFC Alfred P. Graham,
Jr., H/3/5, was interned temporarily at what appeared to be a
divisional headquarters. One afternoon when the guards seemed
slack, Graham and another Marine sneaked off. Ultimately they
approached a farmhouse to get food and there stumbled into a half
dozen Koreans who took them into custody. The two Marines were
beaten with a submachine gun and their hands were bound behind
their back with communications wire. On their forced reappearance
at the original site of escape, a Korean officer beat and
interrogated them for three days.
#4. A short-lived escape attempt at Pak’s Palace, not long after
his capture in October 1951, had earned Lieutenant Gillette
a solitary confinement tour. Arriving at Officers’ camp in
Pi-chong-ni the following spring, the former VMF(N)-513 squadron
member and a South African air force pilot laid plans for a
mutual escape. Gillette deliberately set himself on a course of
reduced rations to prepare himself for the coming feat. When the
two men made their break, they were shot at but managed to safely
clear the camp.
The first night out the other pilot so badly injured himself in
a fall that Gillette had to leave him and go on alone. Although
the apparent escape route lay to the west, nearer the coast, the
Marine chose to go east across rugged mountains that offered
little in the way of cover, concealment, or food. His unorthodox
planning nearly paid off. “Whereas most escapees were recaptured
within hours, or at best within days, Lieutenant Gillette was
free for several weeks before the Communists found him halfway
across Korea.”[627] One Royal Marine described the attempt as
“the finest and most determined one he knew of.”[628]
[627] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 169.
[628] _Ibid._
#5. In July 1952, three Marine officers were involved in an abortive
escape attempt at Camp 2. They were Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, Major
McLaughlin, and Second Lieutenant Richard L. Sill, 1st 90mm AAA
Gun Battalion. When detected outside of camp they were able to get
back inside the compound, but the Chinese did identify Lieutenant
Still. His escape attempt earned him a three-month sentence in the
hole from which he later “emerged unbothered and steeled against the
Communists.”[629]
[629] _Ibid._, p. 170.
#6. Captain Martelli escaped from the Camp 2 compound in September
1952. Retaken 10 days later, he was put in the same hole for two
months. On release from the confinement, he was visibly upset by the
experience, but quickly recovered. As a matter of interest, Martelli,
like the other men whose exploits are recounted here, returned home in
Operation BIG SWITCH.
#7. In the spring of 1953 a group of 30 officers, including two British
Marines, at Camp 2 organized classes in mathematics, physics, and
survival lectures. Conferences on escape and evasion techniques were
held and the men formed escape groups. The teams drew straws to pick
priorities for escape, and each one presented its plan to a senior body
for approval. On 1 July, with support of the other teams, the first
group went over the fence surrounding their house. Their freedom was
brief, however, and the camp guard doubled. When rumors of armistice
began circulating, further escape plans were cancelled. Clandestine
prisoner escape committees--although unsuccessful in terms of actual
results achieved--had existed at various camps. Second Lieutenant
Rowland M. Murphy had been a member of such an organization at Obul.
Major McLaughlin had assumed similar responsibilities at Camp 5, in
1951, and later at Camp 2 served on the secret all-UNC prisoners
escape committee and senior officers’ organization within Camp 2. In
early 1953 Major Harris became senior officer at the Camp 2 Annex. He
organized Spanish classes as a facade for having a regular meeting
place to announce policy and issue orders. Maps of North Korea were
prepared for use in escape attempts and counter-Chinese political
indoctrination was disseminated.
The Camp 2 officers performed another useful service. As rumor leaked
out of the impending truce, they drafted a policy guide on POW behavior
that was secretly circulated to other camps. UNC prisoners were
directed to refrain from any appearance of fraternizing with the enemy,
or acts of exuberance or violence. Specifically, they were reminded
not to show any great enthusiasm upon their release, to prevent
the Communist cameras on the scene from recording this as another
propaganda victory.
_Evaluation and Aftermath_[630]
[630] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 “CMC
Statements on Korean POWs”; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv,
HQMC; MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_; Elliot
Harris, _The “UnAmerican” Weapon--Psychological Warfare_
(New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie,
_Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.
With but a few exceptions, circumstances indicated that capture of most
Marines was unavoidable. Theoretically, it can be argued that several
seized in bunkers might have avoided captivity had they been occupying
fighting-holes instead. On the other hand, they might just as readily
have become statistics on a KIA list, instead, by falling victim to
preparatory fire that preceded the enemy’s main assault.
As Marine historian, then-Major, MacDonald has noted:
A shadow fell over American POWs in the aftermath of the Korean
War. Courts-martial and other official inquiries revealed that
a small segment of the Americans captured by the Communists
had been guilty of behavior ranging from questionable to
treasonable.[631]
[631] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 3.
Both the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War
and the United States Congress, which investigated the entire POW
issue, returned favorable verdicts for Marine POW conduct. The U.S.
Senate report summarized its findings:
The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the
Colombians as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted
upon them by the Communists and did not cooperate or collaborate
with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and
credit.[632]
[632] _Ibid._, p. 237.
In commenting on prisoner attitudes and activities that seemed
to account for those men who became “survival types”, an Army
psychiatrist, Major William F. Mayer, observed:
The Marines were a statistically significant group from the
standpoint of size, something over two hundred; the only thing
I can say about them is that more of them survived than we. I
think this is a function of discipline and morale and esprit; and
the attitude in the Marine Corps I expressed a little while ago,
that if something happens to me, these jokers will take care of
me.[633]
[633] _Ibid._, pp. 236–237, address to U.S. Army Chaplain
School, 1957.
In the nature of self-judgment, Sergeant Griffith referred to “that
certain ‘something’ that seems to weld men together prevailed
more among the Marine POWs than it did with the other captured UN
Troops.”[634] The Marine with probably more experience as a POW than
anyone else, Sergeant Harrison, noted that “without USMC training I
would never have lived through several tight spots. I am not talking
strictly about physical training as I am mental conditioning. It is
something that causes you to think ... about what the other guy will
think or how it [your action] might affect or endanger them.”[635]
[634] _Ibid._, p. 88.
[635] _Ibid._, p. 238.
A senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, who headed
POW units at Camp 2 and 5 between his tours of solitary confinement,
declared:
I was extremely proud of the conduct of U.S. Marine Corps
personnel with whom I came in contact during my period of
confinement. Their esprit de corps was perhaps the highest of
any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States during this
period.[636]
[636] _Ibid._, p. 220.
And Navy Chief Duane Thorin, a former inmate of the Camp 2 annex,
who later inspired the character of the helicopter pilot in James A.
Michener’s _The Bridges of Toko-ri_, pointed out:
The Navy and Marine Corps POWs were generally excellent.
The Marines who left something to be desired were more than
compensated for by the majority of them.[637]
[637] _Ibid._, p. 223.
Another view was offered by a prominent neurologist and consultant
to the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee, Dr. Harold G. Wolff.
After investigating the performance of American POWs in Korea, Dr.
Wolff concluded they had not “behaved much differently from other men
in other armies and places” but that Americans had been made to appear
much worse “by the enemy’s propaganda devices and our own initial
ineptitude in countering the Communist propaganda.”[638]
[638] _Ibid._, p. 237.
As a postscript to the POW story, five Marines received awards, on 11
January 1954, for their exceptionally meritorious conduct while serving
as prisoners of the Communists in Korea. They were:
Lieutenant Colonel Thrash--awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a
second Legion of Merit;
Major McLaughlin--awarded the Legion of Merit;
Major Harris--also awarded the Legion of Merit;
Captain Flynn--awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal; and
Master Sergeant Cain--awarded a Letter of Commendation with
Ribbon.
On the negative side, one enlisted Marine was disciplined for his
cooperation with the enemy in writing a pro-Communist magazine article.
A Court of Inquiry, convened in March 1954, did not recommend a
court-martial for the 45-year-old pilot, Colonel Schwable. After a
month-long review of circumstances involved in the case, the court
opined that he had resisted Communist pressure and torture “to the
limit of his ability before giving in.”[639] Its final judgment was
that Schwable--a Naval Academy graduate, veteran of 20 years’ military
service, and distinguished WW II night-fighter pilot and squadron
CO--not be subjected to disciplinary action. At the same time the court
held that his future usefulness as a Marine officer was “seriously
impaired” by his conduct as a war prisoner.
[639] _Ibid._, p. 233.
On a larger scale, 192 Americans were found guilty of misconduct
against fellow prisoners or various degrees of collaboration with the
enemy. None of these was a Marine. In comparison with some 22,000
Communists who refused repatriation, 21 U.S. and 1 British prisoner
succumbed to CCF brainwashing tactics. Twelve of the Americans have
since returned to the U.S., apparently disenchanted with the Communist
version of “people’s democracy” after getting a closer look at it.
Investigations later showed that “only a handful of the POWs in Korea
were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation.
Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the [Geneva
Convention] ‘absolute’, name, rank, serial number, and date of birth
restriction.”[640] Although giving false or misleading information was
a common occurrence in POW camps, such testimony was usually quickly
detected. American military authorities, drawing up a revised Code of
Conduct (1955) subsequently recommended against making untruthful
statements. Further, even though several Marines seemed to have
suffered none the worse for giving false information, in at least one
case a prisoner’s own situation was weakened by enemy detection of his
lie and increasing pressure was brought against him.
[640] _Ibid._, p. 230.
It was found too, that in every group of prisoners there were always
gradations of those more cooperative with the enemy (“progressives”)
and those who offered open or passive resistance (“reactionaries”).
One Korean War analyst, in seeking the final explanation of what POW
tactics succeeded best against a dedicated enemy, cited the Turkish
“chain of command that was never broken” and which helped to mold
them together. He noted the “permissive” culture and background
of Americans where freedom of choice and individual decisions are
basic tenets. Despite the effect of military indoctrination and
discipline, this concept of individualism and freedom appeared to be so
strongly engrained that unless there was a corresponding emphasis on
responsibility and strong beliefs it tended to weaken a man when his
action and values were put to a prolonged test--as in the POW compound.
The analyst concluded:
Only an extremely cohesive group, with tight leadership and great
spiritual strengths, coupled with inner toughness and concern for
one another, could have survived the shocks visited upon their
minds and bodies.... They [the Turks] remained united against the
enemy, and they survived.[641]
[641] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, pp. 541–542.
This judgement, to a large degree, tells the Marine POW story.
CHAPTER XI
While Guns Cool
_The Postwar Transition--Control of the DMZ and the Military Police
Company--Organization of New Defense Positions--Postwar Employment of
Marine Units in_ FECOM
_The Postwar Transition_[642]
[642] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9,
10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type “C”
Rpt--Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder
#3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records
currently retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland,
Md.); 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; 1stMar Hist
of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3
(contains brief histories of 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, AT Co/1,
4.2-inch MortCo/1); 5thMar Hist of Def of “D” Sector,
27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3; 5thMar Hist, same period,
Folder #4 (brief histories of 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, AT Co/5,
4.2-inch MortCo/5, DMZ Police Co/5), dtd 26 Dec 53;
7thMar Hist of Defense, 27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54 (brief
histories 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, AT Co/7, 4.2-inch MortCo/7),
Folder #5; 1stMarDiv-Type “C” Rpt--Defense of “C” Div
Sect, 27 Jul-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among
others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st Engr Bn, 1st MT
Bn, 7th MT Bn, 1st KMC Regt, 2d KMC Regt).
Terms of the Armistice Agreement required EUSAK components, including
the 1st Marine Division, to carry out a number of major tasks in the
months following the end of active hostilities. As stipulated by the
cease-fire, UNC troops all along the front withdrew to a new main
battle position (MBP) south of the main line of resistance. A military
demarcation line (MDL) was established between enemy and friendly
positions, corresponding to the end-of-war battle lines. Each side
pulled back 2,000 yards from this MDL, with the combined 4,000-yard
buffer strip on both sides being known as the demilitarized zone.(DMZ).
A continuous double-strand barbed wire fence, known as the No-Pass
Fence, or No-Pass Line, was erected 200 yards below the southern
boundary of the DMZ by infantry units manning the MLR at the time of
the cease-fire. Appropriate marking signs, in Chinese, Korean, and
English, were placed at regular intervals along the fence, prohibiting
unauthorized entry into the Demilitarized Zone.
Strict requirements by I Corps enjoined that the “fence on the southern
boundary of the DMZ must present a continuous unbroken line except for
gates and where it crosses large streams.”[643] Beginning late on 27
July 1953, the 1st Marine Division’s modified mission became that of
withdrawal to and organization of the post-armistice MBP, establishment
of the No-Pass Line, and defense of the new position in readiness for
any possible resumption of hostilities by the enemy.
[643] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 2 Aug 53.
Division officers, from commanding general to platoon leader level,
repeatedly emphasized that the armistice agreement was only a cessation
of active fighting. As such, it could be violated by the enemy at any
time. The armistice was not a peace, but had simply paved the way for a
political conference. As the UNC commander, General Mark W. Clark, had
stated, the 27 July document was merely “a military agreement between
opposing commanders to cease fire and to permit the opposing sides to
arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict.”[644] Since many felt
the cease-fire might be only temporary and not necessarily a permanent
peace, all hands showed an attitude of skepticism and watchful waiting.
There was little disposition or time for celebration. The response of
many men to the complete lack of noise across the front was one of
simple restlessness and expectancy.
[644] 1stMarDiv ComdD Aug 53, App. VII, Annex E to
IMARD-00-10-53, p. 2.
From the 7th Marines just engaged in the vicious Boulder City battle,
the reaction
... was one of disbelief and caution. Extensive movements of the
enemy during the night of 27 July only bolstered the feeling
of wariness and suspicion. Only after dawn broke on 28 July,
without any shots being fired, did the realism [reality] of the
truce become apparent, followed by a wide-spread sensation of
relief.[645]
[645] 7thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #5.
A 5th Marines representative noted:
The fact that negotiations had been going on for some time with
numerous false alarms dulled the edge for most people, and a
prior announcement that the agreement would be signed took most
of the steam away from the actual culmination of the fighting ...
in effect [the cease-fire] meant “we’re giving you ten dollars
but don’t spend it for we might take it back.”[646]
[646] Co H Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (2), CO 3/5
ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder
#4.
The view expressed by a Korean regimental commander was that:
Many of the officers and men were relieved to see the fighting
cease; others, particularly among the officers, would rather have
seen the fighting continue until the country could be united.
However, the officers and men accepted the cease-fire as a
military order and acted accordingly.[647]
[647] 1st KMC Regt Rpt, dtd 7 Apr 54, p. 1, in 1stMarDiv Type
“C” Rpt, Folder #6.
Division MLR units on 27 July had been the 1st KMC, the 5th Marines,
and 1st Marines in the left, center, and right regimental sectors,
respectively. With the pullback of the division to new defensive
positions, the 5th Marines--the infantry regiment that had not been
heavily engaged in recent combat--was assigned the mission of defending
the forward general outpost (GOP) line across the division front. In
addition, the 5th Marines, or Northern Regiment as it came to be called
since it was the only one remaining north of the Imjin River, was also
charged with police duties and security of the UNC part of the DMZ
located in the division sector.
Marine regiments, battalions, and companies began withdrawing from the
DMZ to move to their new MBP early on the morning of 28 July, less than
24 hours after the signing of the Korean armistice. To some extent, the
relocation of units was facilitated by the fact that the forward part
of the division sector had been defended by the three MLR regiments.
Since the lateral boundaries, initially, would remain the same, the
three 5th Marines battalions were to occupy positions held by the three
line regiments. Orders called for 2/5 to occupy the left regimental
sector previously held by the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat
Team; 1/5 to man the 5th Marines center sector; and 3/5 to assume the
right regimental sector.
Whereas 5th Marines battalions were directed to occupy their new
positions by D+84 hours (or 2200, 30 July), other units in some cases
were not required to pull out of their respective positions until
positions by D+108 hours (2000, 1 August). This was done to insure
that no portion of the division front was left unmanned during this
very critical period. It did, however, force small units to make two
moves and “in one instance, a battalion and a regimental headquarters
were occupying the same area.”[648] Because of the need to move almost
immediately, only a hasty physical reconnaissance was made. Small unit
leaders were not always familiar with the area and this gave rise, in
some instances, to confusion about exact unit boundaries. This resulted
in a later relocation of several units.
[648] 5thMar Hist, dtd 26 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
For the first 72 hours after the armistice, Marines were engaged in
a maximum effort to tear down installations, salvage fortification
materials, and physically move out of the Demilitarized Zone.
Infantry units were responsible for this destruction and salvage work
within assigned sectors, with 1st Engineer Battalion assistance and
supervision, as available. For the nearly 50 Marine infantry companies
and attached KMC units, the order of priorities for those first three
days generally appears to have been:
(1) Recovery of ordnance and removal to company supply dumps;
(2) Removal of all combat equipment to supply dumps; and
(3) Destruction of field fortifications and salvage of all bunker
timbers and other building materials from the old MLR sector.
Specifications of the initial armistice agreement, as originally
drawn up in August 1952, had called for a complete withdrawal of all
military personnel, supplies, and equipment from the DMZ within 72
hours after the cease-fire. Destruction of all fortifications within
the DMZ likewise was to be accomplished within this 72-hour deadline.
It subsequently became evident, however, that it would be impossible to
complete the entire job of dismantling and salvaging MLR fortifications
within a three-day period. In mid-June 1953, CinCUNC had advised major
commands that Communist and UNC negotiators had agreed to extend
the original 72 hours to an additional 45-day period, or until 13
September.[649]
[649] Other modifications and deadline extensions included:
(a) withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and
equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the
38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b)
Personnel and equipment to be evacuated from Korea only
through those ports of entry specified in the armistice
agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from
CinCUNC to CG, AFFE, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and
others, dtd 17 Jun 53.
Division order 1MARD-OP-11-53, issued at 1600 on 27 July, clearly
stated that all “removable materials”[650] would be taken out of
the DMZ within the immediate 72-hour period following the effective
date of the armistice (2200, 27 July). The end-of-war order further
directed that division personnel would “locate and list all valuable
materials which should be salvaged but cannot be moved during this
prescribed time ... an additional period of 45 days, after the initial
72-hour period, will be used to complete salvage operations within the
Demilitarized Zone under the supervision of the Military Armistice
Commission....”[651]
[650] 1stMarDiv Folder “Withdrawal to and Organization of Post
Armistice MBP 1MARD-OP-11-53-July 1953,” dtd 27 Jul 53.
[651] _Ibid._
From top to lower echelons, however, a breakdown in communications
seems to have taken place in the maze of post-truce orders. At the pick
and shovel level, initial instructions were sometimes to the effect of:
Salvage everything possible in the 72 hours we have to get out of
here. If unable to salvage; then destroy.... No word was passed
that there would be a period following the truce in which we
could conduct a thorough salvage operation. Had this information
been available, a more systematic process could have been
devised....[652]
[652] Co H Rpt, _op. cit._, p. 1, 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
One regiment commented “that early directives from higher authorities
did not clearly establish the relative priority for salvage
operations.”[653] More specifically, 1/7 related:
[653] 7thMar Hist, dtd 28 Jan 54, p. 5, Folder #5.
Periodically, messages would be received stressing certain
items of salvage as critical. This required revision of working
schedules and shifting of men to other jobs ... if all salvageable
material had been designated as critical at the commencement
of salvage operations, the work could have been completed more
expeditiously....[654]
[654] 1/7 Hist, in 7thMar Hist, p. 4, Folder #5.
A 5th Marines observer commented on the confusion in these words:
It is evident, however, that in dissemination to some of the
lower echelons, pertinent information was either ignored or
improperly passed ... some Company Commanders were under the
impression that the entire job of dismantling and salvaging was
to be completed in 72 hours. The result of this misconception was
that in some areas bunkers were filled in with earth and then
later had to be evacuated [excavated] in order to salvage the
materials.[655]
[655] 5thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #4.
Initial salvage operations were conducted from 28–30 July. Trenchlines
were filled in; tank slots dozed under; bunkers torn down and usable
timbers carried to salvage collecting points.
Beginning on 28 July, 1st Marines line units on the division right
flank came under operational control of the 5th Marines, with their new
mission being to “man an outpost line on the most formidable ground
south of the southern boundary of the newly planned Demilitarized
Zone in the MLR regimental sector.”[656] Movement to the new outpost
positions was under way by 29 July.
[656] 1/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #3.
As the Marine units moved south to establish their new outpost
positions in previously undeveloped areas, the limited engineering
equipment available for simultaneously dismantling bunkers and
constructing new camps tended to slow the latter job. Personnel of 1/1,
which had utilized 124 vehicles for the transfer, were among those
housed in widely scattered areas for several days during the moving and
setting up of new camps. Torrential rains, of several days’ duration,
which had engulfed the division’s transport operations on so many
occasions in the past, caused the new campsites to turn into a muddy
quagmire. Men of 2/5, during part of the relocation period, lived in
shelter tents until regular tentage became available.
A short moratorium on salvage activities took place between 31 July-3
August while the details for entry into the DMZ were being settled.
Marine division salvage efforts encompassed an area extending from the
MLR to the sector rear, in the vicinity of the KANSAS Line, as far as
the Imjin River. Work in the areas south of the DMZ did not begin, in
most cases, until after 13 September, and fortifications of secondary
defense lines were left in place.
All salvage materials removed from the DMZ were placed in battalion
and regimental dumps where they would be readily available for use
in building the new battle positions. Recovery of ammunition was
accomplished in some sectors early on the 28th. At the far right flank
of the division line, the scene of the Marines’ final action in the
Korean War, salvage efforts took on an additional task. Most of the
first day was allotted to recovery of the dead at Hills 119 and 111 and
the removal of their bodies to rear areas.
Although the enemy had policed in front of Marine lines on the night
of 27–28 July, at first light the CCF indicated the desire to recover
their dead from Marine positions. Enemy parties were thus permitted to
temporarily enter 3/1 lines to retrieve these bodies. This procedure
provoked some consternation and renewed vigilance by Marine personnel
upon “seeing the enemy moving around within a stone’s throw of our
front lines so soon after his determined attacks.”[657]
[657] 3/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
As soon as the Marines’ own corresponding unhappy task was completed,
ammunition was removed to supply dumps, a laborious task not finished
in the 1st Marines sector until noon on 29 July. The fierce fighting
that had started after dark on 24 July and lasted until the morning
of the ceasefire also accounted for the large amount of salvageable
items found in the area including M-1 rifles, helmets, armored vests,
and quantities of blood serum. All ordnance, equipment, and building
materials were separated into stockpiles of good or nonrepairable
items. Ammunition in excess of a one-half a basic JAMESTOWN fire unit
(a unit of fire is the amount of ammunition a weapon will use in a day
of combat), was placed in company and battalion dumps for collection by
regimental ordnance teams.
On occasion, salvage of friendly ammunition was made more difficult
because COP stockpiles struck by enemy mortar fire contained both
damaged and live, usable ammunition mixed together. Although 1st
Engineer Battalion ordnance disposal teams covered the positions
thoroughly, unexploded mortar and artillery rounds were often unearthed
by Marines filling in the old trenches, knocking down bunkers, or
recovering wire. Anti-personnel mines forward of the protective wire
prevented full salvage operations in some cases.
Three Marine combat outposts required special attention. These were
Bunker Hill and Esther, in the central part of the MLR, and Ava, in
the right sector. Although occupied by Marines at the time of the
cease-fire, the COPs fell north of the MDL and thus became inaccessible
for salvage after the initial 72-hour period. The positions were
reduced and materials salvaged in the allotted time.
During the first night, Marines of 3/5 (originally the right battalion,
center sector) removed more than 11 truckloads of ammunition. Outposts
Hedy and Bunker offered a particular problem due to the distance from
the MLR and nearest road. As described by some veterans of 24-hour work
crews, the trail to Bunker was “particularly tortuous and made the
packing of first the ammunition and later the fortification materials a
physical ordeal.”[658]
[658] Co I Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (3), CO 3/5
ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder
#4.
At Hedy the extreme proximity of CCF and Marine lines posed an
additional difficulty. On the afternoon of the 28th, an interval of 20
yards separated the two; by the following day the enemy had completed
his work in the area and was never again that close. Operations here
were also somewhat delayed “by an influx of visitors: newspapermen and
newsreel cameramen all interested in the great numbers of enemy visible
to our front engaged in the same tasks that we were.”[659]
[659] _Ibid._
Dismantling bunkers was the single biggest problem of the entire
salvage program. This operation began at dawn on the 28th and was
not completed until the second week of September. Ultimately, more
than 500 bunkers were reclaimed from MLR materials and installed in
the new division position. Most of the bunkers were built of 12x12
timbers, buried deep in the ground, fastened together with 10- to
16-inch spikes. Infantry organic tools and equipment were inadequate
to dismember bunkers so constructed. Crowbars, picks, shovels, pinch
bars, and sledge hammers were all in short supply. Engineer equipment
and other tools were not stockpiled in sufficient quantity to buttress
a demolition program of such magnitude.
In places where the terrain permitted operation of bulldozers, their
use drastically shortened the time spent uncovering bunkers. Where
these had been emplaced on reverse slope positions of steep hills,
however, the timbers had to be removed by hand. The latter was the
generally prevailing situation.
Not surprisingly, throughout the demolition program “basic equipment
was usually the Marine himself and his ingenuity.”[660] Effective
on-the-spot, problem-solving was seen in the many “jury-rigged” levers
or prybars fashioned from timbers and crowbars from scrap steel. The
“Korean Sling Method,” with heavy rope and carrying poles, was often
used to move heavy timbers. Trucks equipped with winches and wreckers
were effective for this purpose. Dozer tanks were also used, but only
after having their guns removed as required by the armistice agreement.
Division engineers experimented at some length with three different
ways to pull apart the larger 12x20 bunkers, in which the cross beams
were secured to columns with two-feet spikes. The least technical
approach which involved “winching the bunkers out of their positions
and bouncing them down a steep slope until they broke apart proved the
most successful and the quickest method.”[661]
[660] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #4.
[661] 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6.
Besides the lack of engineering tools, limited motor transport
facilities and manpower shortages also created difficulties. Heavy
commitments across the front, with virtually every division unit
displacing to a new location, resulted in a shortage of trucks that
slowed both salvage and logistics operations. Assignment of personnel
to around-the-clock shifts during the critical initial 72-hour
period and use of lighting trailers produced maximum results from
the available equipment. Company G, 3/5 reported that its men were
allowed “ten minute breaks every hour and, because of the heat, they
were given from 1200 to 1500 hours for sleep and worked all through
the darkness.”[662] During this three-day period alone, the 1st
Tank Battalion transported 275 tons of ammunition and fortification
material, or a total of 111 loads in 2½-ton trucks.
[662] Co G Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (1), CO 3/5
ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder
#4.
At this time, the restrictive provisions of the truce agreement led
to a problem involving the use of heavy engineer vehicles. After 3
August, it was difficult to bring into the DMZ any hauling or motorized
gear that could be construed as “combat equipment.” The 2½-ton trucks,
however, continued to be employed for much of the motor transport
operations.
By 0930 on 1 August, the 1st Marine Division had completed its
withdrawal and manned the new MBP south of the DMZ. The 5th Marines
continued its mission as the northern outpost regiment. South of the
Imjin, the 7th Marines occupied the right regimental sector; the 1st
KMC moved into the center of the MBP; and the 1st Marines became the
division reserve.
Between 3 August-13 September, each rifle company sent daily working
parties into the DMZ to excavate those sectors occupied by Marine
units on 27 July. Depending on available transportation, the size
of the working parties varied from 25 to 100 men. These shortages
were alleviated, to some extent, by KSC (Korean Service Corps)
personnel.[663] The heavy-duty, “pure drudgery without glamour,”
monotonous tasks performed in tropical weather, 103 degree-plus
temperatures and high humidity, caused one Marine infantryman to
comment ruefully:
[663] KSC units were deactivated shortly thereafter. Following
a EUSAK order in August to begin discontinuing use of the
Korean laborers, the number of KSC workers was reduced.
By the end of October, the 103d KSC Regiment attached to
the division had been completely disbanded.
Close officer supervision proved to be absolutely necessary due
to the nature of the work, which made the maintenance of interest
and enthusiasm in the average individual, very difficult.[664]
[664] 1/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
In another 5th Marines unit the motivation gap was partially solved by
“use of a graph posted on the bulletin board showing the money value
of materials salvaged each day, with the exhortation to better the
previous day’s total.”[665]
[665] 4.2-inch Mort Co/5, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
Throughout the month of August and until 13 September, destruction
of MLR positions and removal of materials took place concurrently
with organization of defensive positions in the new sector. After the
initial three-day period and its top priority of physical withdrawal
of troops from the DMZ, division tactical requirements called for
completion of the MBP as rapidly as possible. This now became the first
priority. New company perimeter defense sites, battalion blocking
positions, coordinated fire plans in event of attack, counterattack
orders, and evacuation routes were mapped out. Construction began
immediately. By 5 August, the new battalion camps had begun to take
form and work on the blocking positions was in progress. Marine units,
like other UNC forces, had to be prepared at all times for any act of
enemy aggression. Whether the Communists would continue to respect the
cease-fire agreement or not remained an open question.
Stockpiling, meanwhile, had been accomplished at company, battalion,
and regimental dumps. All materials were stacked by size to facilitate
reissue during construction of new positions. As much as 90 percent of
the materials salvaged were usable in the new fortification. Although
a certain amount of inter-battalion exchange took place, battalion
stocks--with the exception of sandbags--were usually adequate to
provide sufficient fortification materials for the rebuilding. For 5th
Marines units that had the least distance to relocate, timbers moved
from the old MLR in the morning were sometimes emplaced in the new
defensive positions by late afternoon. Helicopters, as well as trucks,
were used extensively to move stockpiles from company and battalion
areas to rear regimental supply dumps.
Division MLR supplies salvaged by the 5th Marines represented:
T/E material 12 tons
Signal equipment (wire) 2,000 miles
Engineer items
barbed wire 2,850 rolls
concertina 340 rolls
pickets, 6-foot 11,000
pickets, 3-foot 8,000
sandbags 339,000
timbers (from 3×8 to 12×12) 150,000 linear feet
Total tonnage 2,000 short tons
The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines estimated that wire rolls, sandbags,
timbers, and other materiel “recovered by this battalion and assisting
units was valued at approximately $150,000.”[666]
[666] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 3, Folder #4.
By early September, the 1st Marine Division work priority once again
had reverted from camp construction to salvage operations. It had
become apparent that another maximum effort period would be necessary
if all salvageable materials were to be removed from the DMZ no later
than the 13 September deadline reaffirmed by I Corps on 2 September.
During this last phase of salvage work, participating battalions
again came under operational control of the 5th Marines. Elements of
the 1st and 11th Marines, neither of which at that time had a sector
of responsibility for salvage, as well as KMC troops, augmented the
organic units. One battalion alone, 1/1, detailed 400 men in work
parties. At 2130, on 13 September, the division completed its salvage
mission in the Demilitarized Zone, thus meeting the specified time
limit. Under terms of the armistice agreement, after 13 September all
personnel were prohibited from entering the Korean Demilitarized Zone.
The only exceptions were members of the DMZ police companies of the
Allied and Communist sides and other persons specifically authorized
passage by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).
_Control of the DMZ and the Military Police Company_[667]
[667] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53;
Demilitarized Zone Police Co Rpt, dtd 18 Dec 53, in
5thMar Hist, Folder #4; MSgt Paul Sarokin, “DMZ Marines,”
_Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54), hereafter Sarokin,
“DMZ Marines.”
Since the late July signing of the armistice, one of the missions of
the 5th Marines GOP regiment had been the marking, control of entry,
and policing of the DMZ. At the time the No-Pass Fence was constructed,
roadblocks, called “crossing stations” were located at each route
leading into the DMZ. Initially, 21 crossing stations were opened
across the regimental front. When it later became apparent that not
all of these security points would be needed, some were closed and the
roads barricaded. Each crossing station was manned by a minimum of
two sentries who insured that no weapons were carried into the DMZ.
Along the fence itself, signs printed in three languages prohibited
unauthorized entry into the southern boundary of the DMZ. On roads and
trails approaching the southern boundary fence, additional signs placed
200 yards from the fence warned of the proximity to this southern end
of the military zone. Air panels and engineer tape also marked the DMZ.
After 31 July, entry into the DMZ was limited to those persons holding
a valid pass, issued under the auspices of the Military Armistice
Commission. Authority was also delegated to CG, U.S. I Corps to issue
passes for the I Corps sector. With salvage operations requiring a
large number of passes, authority was further delegated to the CO,
5th Marines, to issue permits for the regimental sector, good only
for unarmed[668] working parties engaged in salvage operations. The
regimental S-2 established a pass control center, and anyone desiring
to enter the DMZ made application through that office. Each pass
contained the bearer’s name, rank, service number, organization,
number of personnel and vehicles in the working party, and reason for
entry.
[668] With the exception of the DMZ Police, all persons
entering the DMZ for salvage were required to check their
weapons at the zone entry.
Security procedures also required that a log book of all zone entries
and exits be kept by crossing station guards. This information was
ultimately telephoned or radioed to higher echelons. At battalion and
regimental levels a master log or “status board” indicated the number
of people, vehicles, passes, and pass identification numbers present
in the DMZ at all times. As the salvage program reached its height
in August and early September, just the “issuance and recording of
passes and the checking of the working parties into the zone became a
major operation.”[669] Between 4 August-13 September, a total of 3,523
vehicle passes and an unknown number of personnel permits were issued.
With the ending of salvage operations on 13 September, the Marine
regiment no longer issued DMZ passes, although I Corps continued to
authorize MAC personnel entry permits.
[669] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
A stipulation set by the armistice agreement was that both the
Communist and UNC sides police their respective sections of the DMZ
with “civil police,” not to exceed 1,000 in the zone at any one time
across the entire front. With further allocation of police personnel
to army and I Corps units, the number of 1st Marine Division police on
duty within the DMZ at any one time was originally set at 50. Since
no civilian police were available to either side, requirements were
modified so that a specially designated military unit, in lieu of civil
police, could be employed and the original quota enlarged if this
became feasible.
Due to the delicate political aspect of the DMZ as well as the
non-repatriated POWs in the custody of Indian forces, security measures
were of utmost importance. The Marine division activated a new unit,
the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company at 0800 on 4
September. The new unit, charged with maintaining security throughout
the 1st Marine Division sector, became operational three days later.
Commanding officer was Captain Samuel G. Goich, formerly of F/2/7. Each
regiment from the division furnished 25 enlisted men and 1 officer to
form the company, including standby personnel. On 21 September, the
DMZ Police Company was attached to the 5th Marines. Police Company
personnel were required to have had at least three months’ Korean
service, a General Classification Test score of at least 95, a minimum
height of 5 feet 10 inches, and were “selected for physical stature
and mental capacity required in coping with the delicate situation
existing within the Demilitarized Zone.”[670] The average DMZ company
member was said to know “map-reading on an officer level, first aid,
radio, and understand the fine print of the cease-fire agreement like a
striped-trouser diplomat.”[671]
[670] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 53, p. 2.
[671] Sarokin, “DMZ Marines,” p. 23.
The mission of the Marine provisional police company as set up by the
truce agreement was to furnish military police escort for special
personnel visiting the DMZ and to apprehend truce violators or enemy
line crossers. Visitors who rated a military escort were members of
MAC, Joint Observer Teams, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
personnel,[672] NNSC inspection teams or agency assistants, or other
VIPs authorized to enter the UN half by the Military Armistice
Commission.
[672] The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervised all
phases of implementation of the armistice. It consisted
of the Secretariat and 20 neutral nations inspection
teams staffed by personnel from Sweden, Switzerland,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Six Marine DMZ military policemen, each armed with a .45 caliber pistol
and M-1 rifle, accompanied UN joint observer teams to the demarcation
line, midpoint between enemy and friendly boundaries, but did not
cross the MDL. I Corps orders directed that military police were to be
“responsible for the safety of the United Nations members of the team
and, when meetings are held south of the demarcation line, they will be
responsible for the safety of the CCF members of the team as well.”[673]
[673] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 1 Aug 53, msg CG I U.S. Corps to
addees, dtd 31 Jul 53.
Major tasks performed by the 104-man company operating within the
2,000-yard wide, 28-mile-long zone were:
To maintain surveillance over civilians within the UN half of the
DMZ;
To apprehend and deliver to the Division Provost Marshal any line
crossers encountered who did not possess an authorized pass,
regardless of the direction from which such persons entered the
DMZ; and
To provide check points on known routes through the zone and
observation posts, especially during the hours of reduced
visibility, and telephone all suspicious incidents to Regimental
S-2.
DMZ Police Company personnel operated in motorized patrol teams and
traveled the entire division sector in radio or cargo jeeps. One
platoon was kept on a standby basis at camp to serve as a mobile
reserve in the event of an emergency. The roving patrols submitted
reports of all incidents, which were then compiled in a company report.
A copy was submitted to the S-2, the Northern Regiment, and 1st Marine
Division G-2.
UNC security measures at all times were strict and uncompromising in
the Korean DMZ buffer zone. This included the salvage period, the
BIG SWITCH prisoner exchange that took place within the division
sector at Freedom Village from 5 August-6 September, and the lengthy
nonrepatriate POW settlement that extended through January 1954. In
places where the military demarcation line was not marked on the ground
or clearly recognizable, the conservative ruling was to stay at least
500 yards south of its estimated location. This applied both to body
recovery and salvage operations. The No-Fly line was scrupulously
verified.
Alleged violations charged by the CCF/NKPA were checked out with
the Marine ground observation posts set up in August to record all
movements of fixed-wing (reconnaissance) and rotary aircraft in the
area. Helicopters were allowed to fly in the DMZ but no closer than the
500 yard limit from the MDL. Helicopters operating forward of CPs of
5th Marines units having sector responsibility were required to obtain
clearance from the ground unit concerned for each flight. Medical
evacuation copters, generally, were exempted from this restriction and
authorized a standing clearance.
Commitments for the DMZ Police Company increased substantially with
arrival of the nonrepatriated POWs at their camp in the DMZ corridor
west of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines area. The Communist “explainers,”
as well as Polish and Czech members of the neutral Nations Commission,
had to be escorted while in the UN half of the DMZ. This required that
a 24-hour checkpoint and escort cadre be established in the zone. As
the number of enemy sightings, a daily occurrence in the DMZ, continued
to increase, the size of the police patrols increased correspondingly.
A typical example was related by a member of the police company:
It was common practice of the Communists to have a group of
their men, supposedly their DMZ Police, walk up to the Military
Demarcation Line and either stand close to it or step across.
When one of our patrols approached in superior numbers to
attempt to apprehend them, the Communists would immediately
reinforce with more men. This made it necessary to have our
patrols at sufficient strength that they could protect themselves
from being kidnapped.[674]
[674] Demilitarized Zone Police Co/5 rpt, p. 4, in 5thMar Hist,
Folder #4, _op. cit._
As these requirements for security increased, the original complement
of approximately 5 officers and 99 men became inadequate to patrol
the DMZ. By late October the T/O strength of the 1st Provisional
Demilitarized Zone Police Company had been increased to 6 officers and
314 men. Authorization for the number of police personnel on duty in
the DMZ had similarly been augmented from 50 to 175.
During the September salvage operations, five Marines in the DMZ were
taken into custody by the Chinese Communists. Charged with being in
unauthorized territory and violating terms of the armistice agreement,
they were later returned to United Nations jurisdiction.
_Organization of New Defense Positions_[675]
[675] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type
“C” Rpt Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder
#3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records
retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMar
Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder
#3 (contains brief histories of individual units); 5thMar
Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, in
Folders #3 and #4; 7thMar Hist of Defense of “D” Sector,
27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54, in Folder #5; 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt
Defense of “C” Div Sect, 27 July-31 Dec 53, Folder #6
(containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn,
1st EngrBn, 1stMTBn, 7th MTBn, 1st KMC Rgt, 2d KMC Rgt).
Upon withdrawal from the demilitarized zone and organization of the
MBP, the Eighth Army established its plan for defense on a wide front.
This was based on the organization of strongpoints disposed in depth,
with planned counterattacks by mobile reserves.
As it had during active hostilities, the 1st Marine Division in the
post-armistice period continued as one of the four UNC divisions
manning the general outpost and MBP in the U.S. I Corps sector.
Immediately east of the division was its long-time neighbor, the 1st
Commonwealth Division. Still further east in I Corps were the 1st ROK
and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.
Since 1 August, the Marine division had continued to outpost the most
favorable terrain in its sector below the southern boundary of the
DMZ. The division manned the No-Pass Line and prepared its defenses
to resume full scale military operations, if necessary. The Munsan-ni
Provisional Command, composed of the Marine-Navy-Army personnel
responsible for implementing the final prisoner exchange, was also
headquartered in the 1st Marine Division sector.
The strongpoint organization of the division’s main battle position
was accomplished by the deployment of the 5th Marines at the general
outpost line of resistance (or OPLR, a term and concept not in use
since April 1952). The outpost defense concept embodied a number
of forward positions, lightly held in actual numbers of men but
strongly defended in numbers of automatic weapons and firepower.
(This capability was possible due to the excess number of automatic
weapons on hand, above normal T/E allowances, which previously had
been required by MLR defenses.) In the organization of the positions,
emphasis was placed on construction of bunkered observation posts, the
emplacement of automatic weapons with flanking fires, and clearing of
fields of fire for these weapons.
Basically, the general concept of OPLR defense was to establish
mutually supporting defensive positions across the front, as well as to
develop additional defense in depth positions whose strength increased
from front to rear. The positions thus formed successive defense lines,
from the southern DMZ boundary--the new Marine division front--south
to the KANSAS Line, the Main Battle Position. (These defense lines
were the old secondary defensive lines of WYOMING, KANSAS, and KANSAS
SWITCH.) The KMC, 1st Marines, 7th Marines, and other units located
in the KANSAS vicinity engaged in bunker construction and trench
improvement. Battalion fire plans coordinated the organic, attached,
and supporting weapons. Construction of the new positions and
development of the KANSAS Line would be a continuing process throughout
the rest of the year.
The 1st Marines received the assignment of developing the blocking
positions, most of these battalion-sized strongpoints. As in the past,
division support units continued to be located in the old rear supply
areas south of the Imjin. In early August the division had stationed
the 7th Marines in the right sector; the 1st KMC in the center; and
the 1st Marines, to the south of the KMC sector. The 11th Marines,
to the rear of the 7th Marines, had displaced its artillery, relaid,
and was prepared to fire in support of the general outpost and MBP.
(Map 35.) Additional artillery battalions included I Corps and army
units. Essentially these were the positions held until early October
when, during a period of political unrest resulting from the prisoner
exchange, the 1st Marines relieved the 1st KMC/RCT in the center
sector (which held the southern approaches to Freedom Bridge and the
nonrepatriate war compound). The Korean unit then relocated to blocking
positions and assumed the mission of reserve regiment.
[Illustration:
MAP 35 K. WHITE
E. WILSON
1st MARINE DIVISION
POST-ARMISTICE MAIN BATTLE POSITION
30 SEPTEMBER 1953]
Marine support units--motor transport, tank, service, medical, aerial
liaison (VMO/HMR)--were in the same general rear area, as was the
headquarters of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. The Marine Division
CP continued to be located at Yongji-ri, although construction of a
new site further south at Chormyon was due to be completed by engineer
personnel on 1 October. The division railhead and truckhead remained,
respectively, at Munsan-ni and Ascom City. To the left of the KMC
sector was the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Still further west,
separated from other units by the Han River, was the Kimpo Provisional
Regiment, in its former wartime sector.
As the division OPLR regiment, the 5th Marines held a line 36,000 yards
in length--about 21 miles--roughly corresponding to the front manned
by three regiments during the war. The OPLR sector included the entire
area in the divisional zone of responsibility north of the Imjin.
Boundaries of the 5th Marines territory were the southern DMZ truce
line on the west and north, the Samichon River to the east, and that
major water barrier, the curving Imjin River, to the rear.
After establishment of the DMZ, the division occupied unfavorable low
ground poorly suited to the defense and inferior to that held by the
enemy--continuing the same situation that had existed during the period
of stabilized combat operations in West Korea. Almost without exception
the southern boundary of the DMZ prohibited the Marines from moving
onto the commanding terrain, as the No-Pass Line was behind or along
the reverse slopes of the high ground. On the other hand, in most cases
the CCF had the advantage of having forward slope positions as well as
the crests plus most of the commanding terrain in the area.
Communist territory in the northern DMZ sector included the former
strongholds of Yoke, Bunker Hill, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, East
Berlin and Warsaw. Within the Marine division postwar area were the
Panmunjom Corridor and outposts Marilyn, Kate, the Boulder City hills,
and the Hook. Much of the terrain between the major hill positions
along the 5th Marines regimental front and the Imjin River consisted of
low-rolling hills rising abruptly out of the rice paddies.
Construction of new positions and the defense system of the 5th
Marines was based on several assumptions about enemy capabilities,
made by G-2 and the new regimental CO, Colonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins,
who had assumed command on 2 August. These were: that in the event
of resumption of hostilities by the CCF the enemy would use his jet
fighters and bombers in support of operations; that he would continue
to have numerical superiority in artillery; and that the northern
outpost regiment would have no reinforcement or surface resupply from
units south of the Imjin.
The defense plan for the forward part of the 5th Marines sector in
event of a resumption of hostilities called for furnishing patrols
equipped with radios and FO teams to occupy Hills 155, 229, and 181.
(Hill 155 was directly south of the DMZ in the 2/5 left battalion
sector; Hills 229 and 181 were, respectively, just inside and just
outside the southern boundary of the truce line in the center 1/5
sector.) From these three elevations the patrols would then have the
mission of bringing down artillery fire on enemy concentrations and
relaying communications about the situation to the friendly main attack
force. Other critical hill masses in the OPLR regimental sector were
Hill 126 (in the 3/5 eastern battalion sector, just inside the Marine
side of the DMZ) and Hill 163, in the Hook area. The latter hill was
not as suitable for defense since it was located south of the military
demarcation line and was thus less accessible.
These hill masses so completely dominated the major enemy approaches
through the division sector to the Imjin, the lower river crossing
sites and bridges, that their occupation by Marine personnel was
considered essential in the event of any attack. Hill 229, adjacent to
the Chan-dang corridor and part of the 229-181 axis, was considered the
most critical terrain feature in the entire northern section.
Key areas to the rear of the 5th Marines’ sector were the two operating
bridges (Freedom in 2/5 territory and Libby on the 3/5 right) and the
two interior crossing sites (Honker and Spoonbill). All provided access
to the Imjin and division support units deployed on the south side of
the river. In the event of threatened hostile attack, the Northern
Regiment was under orders to destroy the bridges to prevent their use
by the enemy on any attempted advance to the rear.
Strong perimeter defenses, called “Bridgehead Positions” were to be
built by 5th Marines’ battalions. Two were to protect the two bridges
and a third, to include both ferry sites. Between the forward defended
localities and the rear bridgehead positions, alternate and secondary
sites were organized to create mutually supporting defenses in depth.
The bridgeheads were a combination of linear and strongpoint defense,
capable of withstanding severe pressure.
Organization of the defensive positions in the 5th Marine sector
was complicated both by peculiarities of the terrain and political
restrictions due to proximity of the DMZ. In addition to the regiment’s
excess frontage, the demilitarized zone immediately to the front
precluded use of either aerial or motorized reconnaissance for early
warning. Security measures for the OPLR were less than ideal. Neither
proper patrols nor a covering force in front of the OPLR was possible;
the best that could be done was to maintain patrols along the friendly
side of the No-Pass Line.
As the regimental left battalion pointed out: “Location of the DMZ and
the No-Pass Line made the trace of the OPLR follow an artificial and
arbitrary line rather than that of the best terrain.”[676] The most
critical terrain feature in the sector, Hill 155, was located just
outside the southern boundary of the DMZ. Although its possession was
essential to successful defense of the OPLR and the bridgehead defense
positions being developed to the interior and rear of the battalion
sector, Hill 155 could not be occupied because of the armistice
agreement. The solution to the problem was simply to occupy the best
ground adjacent to the No-Pass Line.
[676] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
Placement of automatic weapons was a factor of great importance in
organizing the defensive positions. In order to accomplish the mission
of an OPLR, weapons had to be situated to bring the enemy under fire at
maximum ranges. Accordingly, machine guns and other weapons were placed
on high ground well to the front. Some Marines commented that:
Many individuals having the MLR concept in mind insisted that
weapons should be located forward on low ground to provide
grazing fire. A period of education was required. For the same
reason, it was necessary to place 81mm mortar and 4.2-inch mortar
positions further forward than they would normally be in support
of the MLR.[677]
[677] _Ibid._
The problem of establishing depth to the defensive positions was never
solved to the satisfaction of everyone. This was due primarily to the
extended front which necessitated using more units for support elements
than would normally be done. This situation was partly alleviated by
establishing some unit defensive sectors further to the rear in the
company areas.
Another difficulty was the inadequate allocation of ammunition:
one-half JAMESTOWN load on position, and another half-load available
at the regimental dump. The JAMESTOWN load unit had been developed for
use in a stabilized defense situation where automatic weapons were
aimed as the enemy came in close proximity to the MLR. On the other
hand, OPLR machine guns and weapons were required to open up at maximum
ranges and might well be fired for extended periods of time. It was
calculated that A4 machine guns firing at medium rate (75 rpm) would
expend the one-half JAMESTOWN load in 22 minutes, while an A1 machine
gun at medium rate (125 rpm) would exhaust the same load in 13 minutes.
A partial improvement was obtained by moving the ammunition loads from
regimental to battalion dumps although the basic problem of limited
allocation--shared also by rear infantry regiments--continued to exist.
An unique situation that had confronted the 2d Battalion and at times
the adjoining 1st Battalion stemmed from the large numbers of Army
engineer personnel building the nonrepatriate POW camp in the DMZ
immediately west of the 2/5 sector. During August and the first part of
September, the area in front of 2/5 had been used as a base camp for
5,000–7,000 construction personnel. Although their area was crowded
with these additional units, the Marine battalions could not exercise
any control over them. The Marines were still responsible for security
of the sector, however. Presence of as many as 22,000 nonrepatriate
CCF and NKPA prisoners as well as the Indian custodial forces further
complicated the matter. It was noted that:
At the same time the Army engineers were building the camp, the
prisoners were situated in the middle of the 2/5 area and the MSR
to Panmunjom led completely across the battalion position into
the 1/5 sector [and thence] into the DMZ. Upon completion of the
camp, the engineers withdrew from the area but as they withdrew
the 5,500 troops of the Custodial Forces India were brought in
to guard the nonrepatriate prisoners. With the arrival of the
prisoners, the number of personnel in the regiment’s sector
of responsibility rose to 28,000–30,000. Thus, the problem of
having a GOP mission and at the same time having never less than
5,000 and as many as 30,000 friendly, neutral, and/or prisoner
personnel in front of our most forward defended localities was
always present.[678]
[678] 5thMar Hist, pp. 6–7, Folder #3.
Camp construction and development of the new positions south of the
river continued at a furious pace from August through early October.
Since the new camp sites were in civilian populated areas, “it was
necessary to secure real estate clearance before they could be
occupied or improved.”[679] After clearance was obtained on 29 July,
division engineers immediately began work on five separate camps.
These camp building activities and reconnaissance of assigned blocking
positions continued until 10 August. At this time, construction began
on the major blocking positions, so organized and developed as to be
self-sustaining for several days. Whether squad, platoon, or company,
all positions were organized using a perimeter type defense and were
mutually supporting laterally and in depth. Connecting trenches,
bunkers, ammunition holes, and tank slots were also built.
[679] 1st EngrBn Rpt, Operations during 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, dtd
19 Apr 53, p. 4, Folder #6.
By early October, construction of the blocking positions was completed
by the 1st Marines despite the fierce summer heat, the numerous rock
formations in the area that were difficult to dig out with limited
tools and demolitions, and the shortage of personnel due to units
participating in the new series of division MARLEX exercises, resumed
in October. Within three months, the Marine division had thus largely
completed building of a solid defense in its new main battle position.
The importance of maintaining combat readiness for any renewed
hostility on the part of the enemy demanded continuing vigilance at all
times.
Defense specifications throughout the 5th Marines northern general
outpost sector called for some 1,560 individual fighting positions,
400 automatic weapons sites, 8 bunkered infantry OPs, 30 bunkered
CPs, 15,400 yards of trenchlines, and 70,000 yards of protective
and tactical wire. In construction of the MBP, all bunkers were so
blended and camouflaged with the natural terrain that they were almost
impossible to be seen.
To the division rear, the location of recoilless rifle positions, FDC
bunkers, and tank slots in the blocking positions and bridgeheads was
the major priority. In the antimechanized defense plan, tanks covered
likely avenues of approach into the general outpost area and also
overlooked critical river crossing sites. Wherever possible old firing
positions which had been previously prepared to support the secondary
lines WYOMING and KANSAS were utilized. By the end of the year, 204
tank firing positions had been emplaced throughout the Marine division
sector.
Three rehearsals for the occupation of the main battle position were
held by the 1st Marine Division in September. All division units,
both combat and service, participated in these exercises. Tactical
units were required to occupy the MBP and be fully prepared for combat
on four hours’ notice; service units were to provide additional
local security required for the elimination of enemy infiltrators or
guerrilla agents. Divisional and I Corps test exercises indicated
that three hours were necessary to man the MBP during daylight and
approximately three and one half hours at night.
_Postwar Employment of Marine Units in_ FECOM[680]
[680] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10; AnlRpt
CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug 54; AnlRpt CMC
to SecNav for FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55; 1st MAW ComdDs,
Aug-Sep 53; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MSgt Roy E.
Heinecke, “Four Star Visit,” _Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 1
(Jan 54).
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Post-Armistice Plan, as part of Fifth
Air Force operations, was effective at 2200, on 27 July. Its purpose,
basically, was to insure that wing elements carried out provisions of
the armistice and yet continued to maintain a high level of combat
readiness in the uneasy truce period.
Two major operational restrictions had been imposed on the UNC air
force by the armistice. The first was establishment of the “No-Fly
Line” south of the Allied southern boundary of the DMZ. Any flight
beyond that point had to be authorized by JOC and a barrier patrol was
maintained by FAF to apprehend any violators of the truce provisions.
The 1st MAW contribution to this aerial security team was night patrols
performed by F3D-2s from VMF(N)-513 and radar-configured AD aircraft
from VMC-1 (later, by the new VMA-251 squadron).
The second post-truce restriction, which affected wing logistic
movements, limited the entry and departure of all Korean air traffic
to five airfields. These aerial ports were K-2, K-8, K-9, K-14, and
K-18. (K-16 was later added.) Neither K-3, the east coast home field of
MAG-33 nor K-6, located just inland from the west coast and the site of
MAG-12 operations, was included. All Marine traffic landed either at
K-9 or K-2 for inventory, a procedure which subsequently developed into
a bottleneck, and caused supply delays due to the substantial reduction
in payload made to accommodate the necessary extra fuel due to greater
overland distances between airfields. When the CG, 1st MAW requested
that K-3 be made a port of entry to avoid the difficulties involved in
use of the two FAF fields, ComNavFE disapproved the request with the
following rationale:
ComNavFE feels that to ask for designation of K-3 as an
additional port of entry would be politically inadvisable. It
would provide the Communists with a basis for a propaganda claim
that the United Nations were attempting to further delay an
armistice agreement. Should the Communists propose an additional
port of entry for their side, COMNAVFE states the UN Military
Armistice Commission will offer designation of K-3 as a _quid pro
quo_.[681]
[681] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 6, p. 10-74.
Removal from Korea to Japan of operational combat aircraft for routine
maintenance runs and their return thus had to be made through the same
port of exit and reentry. Inspections were conducted by the USAF combat
aircraft control officer at the port.
The post-truce 1st MAW mission, in part, comprised the following:
... to maintain assigned forces in a state of combat
readiness, provide for security of assigned forces, areas,
and installations; observe the conditions of the Armistice
Agreement; support other elements of the United Nations Command
as required; be prepared to counter any attempt on the part
of the enemy to resume active hostilities; continue current
missions other than combat; insure that 1st MAW personnel and
combat material are not increased beyond the level present at
the instant of the effective time of the Armistice Agreement;
submit reports on 1st MAW personnel and controlled items of Wing
equipment entering or leaving Korea; be prepared to disperse
air units within or from Korea as necessary to provide maximum
security during an Armistice....[682]
[682] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #1, p. 1.
The strict interpretation of replacing combat aircraft, armored
vehicles, weapons, and ammunition that were destroyed, worn out, or
used up during the period of armistice was, of course, due to the
sensitive political considerations. It was felt that replacement of
combat equipment by UNC forces:
... would result in the Communists adopting the same liberal
interpretation which is undesirable since it will lessen the
control of combat material in North Korea and could permit
them to replace phenomenal unauthorized quantities of material
damaged, destroyed, worn out or used up prior to the effective
date of the Armistice Agreement.[683]
[683] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #2, msg ComNavFE to all
units, dtd 16 Aug 53.
In August, postwar procedures were mapped out for 1st MAW personnel,
as part of the overall quota limitations prescribed by FECOM (Far
East Command) through FEAF and FAF echelons. A 1st MAW headquarters
section, designated as 1st MAW, rear echelon, was established at Itami
AFB, Japan, two hours’ flight from Korea. All incoming or outgoing
aviation personnel on permanent change of station orders were to report
to the rear echelon, 1st MAW. Announcement of Marine Corps plans to
initiate future postwar rotation on a stretch-out basis (for both air
and ground personnel) was also made in August. Preliminary plans called
for changing the current 11-month combat tour in Korea to 14 months by
March 1954, and possibly 16-month tours by July 1954, if extension of
Korean service proved necessary. As with division personnel, monthly
cumulative arrivals were not to exceed the number of departing aviation
Marines. The quota set by FEAF for 1st MAW rotation for the month of
August was 600, compared to the Marine division quota of 3,000 for
ground personnel.
With the 1st Marine Division engaged for an unknown length of time
in its postwar mission as an occupation force and 1st MAW units
continuing to operate under FAF in Korea, new Marine ground and
air units were assigned to the Far East theater shortly after the
conclusion of Korean hostilities. On 23 July, the 3d Marine Division,
together with supporting air units, was readied for deployment from
Camp Pendleton to Japan the following month. On 13 August the division
CP was opened afloat and units proceeded to Japan between 16–30 August.
The mission of this division and the two major air units, MAGs-11
and -16, was to maintain a high state of readiness in the Far East
Command and to assist in the air defense of Japan. As explained by the
Commandant, their redeployment was accomplished “in order to provide
the amphibious capability which is an important element of national
strategy in that predominantly maritime theater.”[684]
[684] AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug. 54, p. II-2.
The new Marine units thus joined in the Pacific, the 1st Provisional
Marine Air-Ground Task Force[685] that had been activated in Kaneohe,
Hawaii in January of 1953. Commanded by Brigadier General James P.
Risely, it was to include a headquarters company, reinforced regiment,
and reinforced aircraft group. The special task force was designated
as a hard-hitting, air-ground team that could respond immediately as a
force-in-readiness to any emergency in the Pacific area.
[685] The Task Force was subsequently redesignated as the 1st
Marine Brigade, FMF, in May 1956.
Commanded by Major General Robert H. Pepper, the 21,100-man 3d Marine
Division was called the “Three-Dimensional Division,” in reference
to its training in airborne, amphibious, and atomic warfare. Within
six months, its components were to stretch from Kobe to Tokyo, with
division headquarters and the 9th Marines at Gifu, the 4th Marines at
Nara, and other units at Otsu.
New Marine air units, which included Marine Transport Squadron 253
and Marine Observation Squadron 2, as well as MAGs-11 and -16, all
came under 1st MAW operational control. Commanded by Colonel John
D. Harshberger, the all-jet MAG-11, formerly based at Edenton,
N.C., arrived at NAS Atsugi on 10 September. It comprised three F9F
squadrons, VMFs-222, -224, and -314. Also at Atsugi, the Marine Corps
aerial gateway to Japan, was the new transport squadron, VMR-253,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carl J. Fleps, which reported in to
CG, 1st MAW, on 16 August. Following numerous FMFPac requests for
additional air transport capability, the Commandant had authorized
transfer of the squadron from El Toro to assist the veteran wartime
carrier VMR-152 in the enormous postwar airlift program.
Flying new R4Q Fairchild Packets, which could carry 42 troops, the
squadron from August to May 1954 logged more than 5,000,000 passenger
miles in transporting Marine replacements for the 1st and 3d Marine
Divisions. Additional air capability was provided by Marine Helicopter
Transport Group 16 (at Hanshin AFB) under Colonel Harold J. Mitchener,
with its two HRS-2 (HMR-162, HMR-163) and service squadrons (MAMs-16,
MABS-16) and VMO-2, commanded by Major William G. MacLean (based at
Itami). Both units reported to 1st MAW and FECOM on 13 August.
Major command changes within the 1st MAW that month were: Brigadier
General Verne J. McCaul, vice Brigadier General Alexander W. Kreiser,
Jr. as ACG, 1st MAW, effective 16 August; and Colonel William F.
Hausman, vice Colonel Carney, CO, MAG-12, on 8 August. (The new MAG-33
CO, Colonel Smith, had succeeded Colonel Stacy in late July.)
In the immediate post-armistice period, extensive training programs
were instituted by MAGs-12 and -33 to maintain high operational
efficiency. Marine aircraft remained on JOC alert as required by the
Fifth Air Force and flew training missions scheduled by 1st MAW and
FAF. These consisted of practice strikes against heavily-defended
targets, practice CAS for Eighth Army units, GCI (ground control
intercept) flights under MGCIS-3 control, and bombing practice using
the Naktong Bombing Range. Other training sorties were scheduled
in reconnaissance navigation, weather penetration, determining
fuel bingos,[686] target location and identification, air defense
patrolling, and coordination of tactical procedures in the target area.
The training schedules provided a well-balanced indoctrination program
for new squadron flight leaders, pilots, radar operators, and other
crew members arriving in Korea on the postwar personnel drafts.
[686] A fuel bingo is the amount of fuel needed by a pilot to
reach home base plus enough additional fuel to divert to
an alternate airfield.
A new work day schedule of 0700–1500 implemented in August made more
time available for athletics, swimming, studying, and R&R (Rest &
Recreation). That same month the MAG-12 softball team won the Fifth Air
Force “All Korea” softball championship. Following this achievement,
the team left for Japan to compete in the FAF “Far East” softball
tournament which included teams from all the major Pacific bases.
Subsequently, the K-6 players “disguised in Air Force uniforms, went
onward and upward to become FEAF champions in September.”[687] MAG-33
pilots, meanwhile, participated in Operation SPYGLASS, a FAF training
exercise in August and Operation BACK DOOR, the following month.
Both emphasized interception flying and work with GCI squadrons. As
“aggressors,” the Pohang-based airmen made simulated attacks on South
Korean targets “defended” by Air Force and other land-based Marine
units. In October, MAG-33 pilots flew CAS missions for the 1st Marine
Division training problem, MARLEX IV, a battalion landing exercise
staged by 1/7 on Tokchok-to Island. Beginning that month a new
procedure was inaugurated by MAG-33 and the recently-arrived MAG-11.
Every week, four MAG-11 pilots came to Korea for a week of orientation
flying with a MAG-33 squadron to gain a better picture of typical
flying conditions in the Korean theater.
[687] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, pp. 456–457.
Early in 1955 the 1st Marine Division, which had been in the Korean
front lines almost continuously since September 1950, returned to
Camp Pendleton. Redeployment by echelons began in February. By June,
all units had returned to CONUS. The transfer from Korean occupation
duty was effected in order that the division’s “valuable capability
as a highly trained amphibious force in readiness may be fully
realized.”[688] Now under Major General Merrill B. Twining,[689] the
division had been a part of Eighth Army occupying postwar defense
positions in Korea until its relief on 17–18 March 1955 by the U.S.
24th Infantry Division.
[688] AnlRpt of CMC to SecNav FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55, p. 3,
quoting statement made by SecDef in Dec 54 on forthcoming
departure of 1stMarDiv from FECOM.
[689] Postwar commanders of 1stMarDiv to date had been Major
General Robert H. Pepper, who succeeded General Pate, and
served from 12 May 54–22 Jul 54; Major General Robert
E. Hogaboom, 23 Jul 54–17 Jan 55; and General Twining,
beginning 18 Jan 55.
In addition to its official mission in the Eighth Army line, the 1st
Marine Division had conducted an active small-unit amphibious training
program during its postwar Korea duty. All but two of its infantry
battalions had carried out assault landings on Tokchok-to, off the
Korean west coast south of Inchon, prior to its departure for the
United States. The 3d Marine Division had also conducted an active
training program, with numerous small-unit exercises and regimental
landings staged at Iwo Jima and Okinawa as part of its continuous
readiness conditioning.
For Marine air personnel, their official departure from Korea following
the 1st MAW wartime assignment there, came the next year. Beginning in
June 1956, initial units of the Marine aircraft wing were withdrawn
from Korea and relocated at NAS Iwakuni, Japan. Plans called for the
wing, then under Brigadier General Samuel S. Jack[690] and occupying
bases in both Korea and Japan, to be permanently headquartered at
Iwakuni and revert to CinCPacFlt control. The wing remained on station
in the Far East as a component of postwar United States defense
strength in that area.
[690] CGs, 1st MAW, in the immediate post-armistice period
were: Major General Megee, until 4 Dec 53; Major General
Albert D. Cooley, 5 Dec 53–25 Mar 54; Brigadier General
McCaul, 26 May 54–24 Aug 54; Brigadier General Marion L.
Dawson, 25 Aug 54–24 Sep 55; and Brigadier General Jack,
25 Sep 55–30 Jun 56.
The prewar Fifth Air Force and Eighth U.S. Army commands, under which
Marine Corps air and ground units had functioned during the Korean
War, were permanently deployed in the Far East as operative military
echelons. EUSAK-FAF transferred from its wartime JOC location at Seoul
to Osan-ni in January 1954 and in September of that year relocated to
Nagoya, Japan. Eighth Army headquarters remained at Seoul.
CHAPTER XII
Korean Reflection
_Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean War: Ground, Air,
Helicopter--FMF and Readiness Posture--Problems Peculiar to the Korean
War--Korean Lessons_
_Marine Corps Role and Contribution to the Korean War: Ground_[691]
[691] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports
of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter _Rpt
of SecDef_; _PacFlt EvalRpts_, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No.
5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board
Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps
Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec
50), vs. I and II, hereafter _USMC Board Rpt_, held in
James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va; A
Summary of the General Officers’ Conference, HQMC, 19–21
Aug 53, hereafter _Generals’ Summary_, at Breckinridge
Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of
USMC Action in Korean War; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I, II,
III, IV, _passim_; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_;
Robert D. Heinl, Jr., _Soldiers of the Sea: The United
States Marine Corps, 1775–1962_ (Annapolis, Md.: United
States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, _Soldiers
of Sea_; Release “1st Marine Division ‘The Old Breed’”
from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release “Outline
of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in
Korea,” HistBr, G-3 Div, HRS Folder; _CheVron_, MCRD, San
Diego, Calif., V. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, “From
Camp Pendleton to Inchon--18 Years Later, LtGen E. A.
Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in
Korea,” Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter _CheVron_.
Ground operations of the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War can
be divided into six periods. These are the Pusan Perimeter defense
(August-September 1950), Inchon-Seoul assault (September-October 1950),
the Chosin Reservoir campaign (October-December 1950), East-Central
Korea (January 1951-March 1952), West Korea (March 1952-July 1953), and
the post-armistice period (July 1953-February 1955).
Marine Corps traditional concepts of readiness and fast, effective
deployment were never better illustrated than in the hectic weeks
following 25 June 1950. The NKPA invasion of South Korea came at a
time when U.S. military forces were in the final stages of a cutback
to peacetime size. Ships and planes were being “mothballed”; personnel
of all the Armed Services were being reduced in number to the lowest
possible effective manpower levels.
From the peak of its six-division, five-wing wartime strength of
475,600 in 1944–1945, the Marine Corps at the outbreak of the Korean
emergency had only two skeletal divisions and two air wings. There
were but 74,279 Marines on active duty, 97 percent of the Marine Corps
authorized strength. Although a ceiling of 100,000 had been established
for the Corps by law, it was a period of tight purse strings for all
defense components. Fiscal austerity in the post-World War II period
had whittled Corps numbers from 85,000 in FY 1947 to what was projected
at 67,000 by the end of FY 1950.
This critically reduced strength found the normal Marine triangular
infantry organization cut back to two companies per battalion, two
battalions per regiment, and two regiments per division. The 1st Marine
Division, at Camp Pendleton, and 2d Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune,
were structured along the regular peacetime T/O of 10,232 USMC/USN vice
the wartime minimum T/O of 22,355. No Marine units of any size were
located in the Far East.
Despite its lean numbers in late June 1950, the Marine Corps once
again would be in the forefront of American military response to the
Communist aggression 6,000 miles across the Pacific. As hard-pressed
South Korean forces and understrength U.S. occupation troops from Japan
attempted to halt the Communist invaders, General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, on 2 July, requested the JCS to send immediately a Marine
RCT with supporting air to the Far East. On 7 July, the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade was formed at Camp Pendleton from units of the 1st
Division. Major components of the brigade--a balanced force of ground,
service, and aviation elements--were the 5th Marines and MAG-33. Five
days later, the 6,534-man brigade had mounted out from San Diego to
answer the CinCFE plea for Marines to help turn the Communist tide
engulfing Korea.
The brigade buttressed the faltering UNC defense in the Pusan
Perimeter. Employed as a mobile reserve it helped prevent three enemy
breakthroughs--at Chinju and the two Naktong River battles. On 7
August, a month after its activation, the brigade launched an attack
toward Chinju. The Marine brigade was the first unit sent from CONUS
to see combat in what was then considered a short-term police action.
Later, in leading the way to destruction of an enemy bridgehead at the
Naktong, the Marine brigade gave the defending Eighth Army its first
victory against the NKPA in the Korean conflict.
Even before the brigade had been dispatched to the Far East, as the
Korean situation continued to deteriorate, MacArthur had requested the
JCS to expand the brigade to a full war-strength division. Between
10–21 July MacArthur, now CinCUNC, had made three separate requests
for a Marine division. This persistence was reinforced by his growing
determination to conduct a tactical amphibious operation to the rear of
the overextended NKPA lines and thereby seize the initiative from the
enemy.
In the States, meanwhile, authorization was received to bring the badly
understrength 1st and 2d Marine Divisions up to full 22,000-man war
levels. By stripping posts and stations, reassignment and rerouting
of units, and callup of additional reserve personnel, major elements
of the 1st Marine Division were on their way to Korea by mid-August.
Timing was critical in order to meet the projected D-Day target date of
15 September.
Pulled out of the Pusan line on 12 September, the brigade was absorbed
by the newly arrived 1st Marine Division in preparation for the coming
Inchon invasion. As the brigade commander, Lieutenant General Edward A.
Craig, USMC, later reminisced:
Although the 1st Provisional Brigade and the 1st MarDiv had never
actually trained or worked together, they still combined and
executed a successful landing. To me, this simply emphasized the
fine training and techniques laid down for amphibious landings by
the Marines.[692]
[692] _CheVron_, pp. 4–5.
Organized as a unit less than four months, the brigade left behind it
a reputation for mobility, effectiveness, and rapid deployment in the
face of national emergency. Although Marine air and ground forces had
operated together since 1919 in Haiti, formation of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade “marked the first time that the air and ground elements,
task organized under a single commander, had engaged in combat.”[693]
[693] _Ibid._ Even though Marine air and ground forces had
on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air
support in the early days was considered a subsidiary
rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of
Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not
fully employed before the end of hostilities.
In the brilliant Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, Major General
Oliver P. Smith’s 1st Division Marines led the X Corps attack in the
first major counterstroke by United Nations forces on Communist-held
territory. This maneuver was closely timed against enormous odds
of personnel, logistics, and hydrography (tidal fluctuations of 31
feet) which made 15 September the only suitable assault date until
mid-October. When outlined in earlier planning sessions by General
MacArthur, the mammoth difficulties of the operation had been so
unsettling that the designated Attack Force Commander for the landing,
Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, expressed the view that “the best I can
say is that Inchon is not impossible.”[694]
[694] Quoted in _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle
was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet.
Despite all the difficulties, the landing at Inchon and recapture of
Seoul, the South Korean Capital, and its adjacent Kimpo airfield by the
Marines was a stunning tactical blow by the UNC that broke the backbone
of the North Korean People’s Army 1950 offensive. The 1st Marine
Division, in its successfully executed amphibious landing, had offered
UNC forces an opportunity to defeat the enemy decisively before a
Siberian-like Korean winter set in. Accomplished under the most adverse
weather and geographic conditions, the assault proved anew the decisive
power of amphibious forces employed at a critical time and place. This
capability and readiness of the Marine Corps had totally reversed the
military situation, and a battered enemy was on the run. The subsequent
routing of the NKPA divisions in the Inchon-Seoul campaign by X Corps
and the Eighth U.S. Army forces would have led to an early UN victory
had not the Chinese Communists intervened to support their Korean
counterparts. The operation had validated Far East Commander General
MacArthur’s early premise that:
... air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that
nothing short of the intervention of U.S. ground forces could
give any assurance of stopping the Communists and of later
regaining the lost ground.[695]
[695] _Ibid._, p. 3.
The Inchon operation, moreover, had been planned in record
time--approximately 20 days. This was one of the shortest periods
ever allotted to a major amphibious assault, involving the planning,
assembly of shipping, and mounting out of a combined force of 29,000
Marines and support personnel.
With the Inchon-Seoul operation ended, the 1st Marine Division
(including the 7th Marines which had reached Inchon in time for the
liberation of Seoul) reembarked on 12 October for deployment to the
east coast of Korea. A new military operation was envisioned north of
the 38th Parallel against Pyongyang, the North Korean Capital. As part
of the drive, X Corps was to make an amphibious envelopment on the east
coast, in the area of the enemy-held port of Wonsan. From here X Corps
would advance westward toward Pyongyang, to link up with Eighth Army
troops and trap NKPA forces withdrawing from the south.
While the Marines were en route to the objective, word was received
that ROK troops had overrun Wonsan and were pushing north. The revised
X Corps plan of operation called for a three-pronged attack towards the
Yalu. The Marine division would advance on the left, the U.S. Army 7th
Division in the center, and 1st ROK Division on the right flank. This
drive to the north and subsequent action at the Chosin Reservoir would
rank as one of the most rigorous campaigns in the entire history of the
Marine Corps.
Fighting as part of EUSAK, by this time fanned out throughout North
Korea, the 1st Marine Division did not meet the expected NKPA
resistance. Instead, large-scale Chinese Communist Forces had entered
the war. As X Corps swept north toward the Yalu River in November 1950,
the Marines became the first United States troops to defeat the Chinese
Communists in battle. At Sudong, after four days of savage fighting,
the Marine RCT-7 so badly crippled major elements of the 124th CCF
Division that it was never again committed as an organic unit.
When the Chinese forces struck in full force at the Chosin Reservoir,
X Corps units were forced back. Elements of a nine-division assault
force, the CCF 9th Army Group, which had been sent into Korea with
the specific mission of annihilating the 1st Marine Division, began
to attack. On 27 November, the Chinese directed a massive frontal
assault against 5th and 7th Marines positions at Yudam-ni, west of the
reservoir. Another CCF division, moving up from the south, cut the MSR
held by the 1st Marines so that the division at Yudam-ni, west of the
reservoir, was completely encircled by Communist forces. Many experts
considered the 1st Marine Division as lost. Others thought the only
way to save it was to airlift it out, leaving its equipment behind.
Instead, the Marines seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path
through CCF units blocking a route to Hagaru. The division battled its
way out in 20-degree-below-zero weather 78 miles over icy, winding
mountain roads from the reservoir to the Hamhung-Hungnam area where, on
15 December, it redeployed to South Korea.
Integrated ground and air action enabled the 10,000 Marines and
attached 4,000 Army-Royal Marine troops to break out of the entrapment
and move south. During 13 tortuous days the Marines had withstood
hostile strength representing elements of six to eight CCF divisions.
The major result, from the military view, was that the Marine division
properly evacuated its dead and wounded, brought out all operable
equipment, and completed the retrograde movement with tactical
integrity.
Not only had the Chinese (with a total of 60,000 men in assault or
reserve) failed to accomplish their mission, destruction of the
division, but the Marine defenders had dealt a savage blow to the enemy
in return. POW debriefings later revealed that assault units of the CCF
9th Army Group had been rendered so militarily ineffective that nearly
three months were required for its replacement, re-equipment, and
reorganization.
Early in 1951, the 1st Marine Division was reassigned to IX Corps for
Operation KILLER, a limited offensive ordered by the EUSAK Commander,
General Matthew B. Ridgway. In Operation RIPPER, in March, the division
led another IX Corps advance as it drove toward the 38th Parallel on
the east-central front. When the Chinese struck back with their spring
offensive on 22 April, the Marines were transferred to operational
control of X Corps and counterattacked to restore the UNC defensive
position in the far eastern sector. During May and June, the 1st Marine
Division continued to punish the enemy in the Punchbowl area of eastern
Korea, driving the CCF back to Yanggu and the Soyang River corridor.
Activity all along the UNC front came to an uncertain halt in July 1951
when Allied and Communist negotiators met at Kaesong for truce talks
initiated by the enemy. In August the MLR flared into action again, and
the Marine Division was engaged in new counterthrusts in the Punchbowl
area. Fighting during the next three weeks involved the division in
some of its hardest offensive operations in Korea. It also developed
that this would be the last offensive for the Marines. In November
1951, as a result of the truce talks and possibility of ending
hostilities, General Ridgway, now UNC Commander, ordered the Eighth
Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the
front.
The war of fire and movement had turned into one of positional warfare,
a defensive posture by UN forces that would continue for the last 21
months of the three-year conflict. Throughout the winter of 1951–1952,
the Marines conducted vigorous patrol activities in their sector of X
Corps. Although it was a lackluster period of trench warfare for the
average infantryman, major tactical innovations were being pioneered by
the division with its use of the transport helicopter for logistical
and resupply missions.
In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division was transferred from the eastern
X Corps line 140 miles west to strengthen the far end of the Eighth
Army MLR in the I Corps sector. The division was relocated in the
path of the enemy’s invasion route to Seoul, where weak defenses in
the Kimpo coastal area had threatened the security of the UNC front.
Here the division’s four infantry regiments (including the 1st Korean
Marine Corps RCT) held nearly 35 miles of front line in the critical
Panmunjom-Munsan area. The demilitarized route for the United Nations
negotiators led through the Marine lines. It was the most active sector
of the UN front for the next 16 months. This key position guarded the
best routes of advance from North Korea to Seoul and indicated the high
regard in which General James A. Van Fleet, EUSAK commander, held the
Marines.
West Korean terrain was rugged, hilly, and friendly to the CCF who had
the advantage of high ground positions as well as considerably more
manpower. Although cast in an unaccustomed defensive warfare role,
rather than a true attack mission, the Marines repelled an almost
continuous series of enemy probes. While truce talks went on at nearby
Panmunjom, fighting as furious as at any time earlier in the war
flared up intermittently as the CCF tried to gain additional terrain
for bargaining purposes. During 1952–1953, the Marine division beat
off determined CCF limited objective attacks on Bunker Hill, the Hook,
Vegas, and Boulder City outposts up until--literally--the final day of
the war, 27 July 1953.
In reviewing Marine actions during this period, the Secretary of the
Navy commented:
Marines in Korea have established an enviable record of success
in carrying out their assigned missions. The First Marine
Division began its third year in Korea holding an active sector
of the United Nations front guarding the enemy’s invasion route
to Seoul. It was frequently subjected to fanatical Chinese
attacks supported by intensive artillery fire. Some of the
heaviest fighting during the year took place along the front
held by this Division. Enemy attacks were well coordinated and
numerically strong. Continued patrol activity to keep the enemy
off balance frequently resulted in bitter hand-to-hand fighting
with numerous casualties on both sides.[696]
[696] Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 185.
This type of prolonged static warfare gave little real satisfaction
to Marines accustomed to waging a war of movement and a more tangible
“mission accomplished.” The year of positional warfare in western Korea
was costly, too. Total U.S. casualties in the Korean War numbered
approximately 137,000 men killed, missing, or wounded. The Marine
Corps toll was 30,544. Of this number, 4,262 were KIA, an additional
244 were listed as non-battle deaths, and 26,038 were wounded. During
this last part of the war, Marine casualties (both ground and air)
totaled 13,087, plus an additional 2,529 for the attached 1st KMC/RCT.
Astonishingly, 1,586 Marines or 39.6 percent[697] of the infantry
Marines killed in the entire war were victims of the “static,” outpost
warfare in the west. Another 11,244 were listed WIA during this
period--representing 43.9 percent of the total number of ground Marines
wounded during the three years of conflict.
[697] See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only;
air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties
of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were
KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952-July 1953 period
cited above.
* * * * *
Conditions varied widely during the 1950–1952 and 1952–1953 periods of
the war. The enemy’s improved capability in artillery during the latter
period of positional warfare largely accounts for the high casualty
rate at this time. It has been noted that:
Prior to February 1952, with a warfare of mobility prevailing,
the enemy was inferior in artillery, the causative agent of most
personnel losses. Afterwards, during the outpost warfare of
western Korea, the front remained more or less static, and the
Chinese Reds had as much artillery support as the Marines.[698]
[698] Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 6 (Jun 55), p. 16.
It might be valid to question the use of Marine Corps specialists
in amphibious warfare in an Army-type conventional land war. The
protracted land campaign that characterized the latter stages of
the Korean conflict actually was waged for the majority of the war
period--from September 1951 to July 1953, or nearly two years. In terms
of economy of manpower it could be considered an inefficient, though
not ineffective use of Marines. On the other hand, the history of
warfare down through the ages makes it repeatedly clear that a nation
fights the pitched battle against its opponent with the arsenal of
weapons and personnel at hand.
As an Eighth U.S. Army component (attached variously to the X, IX,
and I Corps), the 1st Marine Division (one of nearly 20 divisions
representing U.S. Army, British Commonwealth, and ROK troops) performed
its assigned mission--to repulse and punish the enemy. It contributed
heavily to maintaining the integrity of the EUSAK front and was
considered one of the two crack EUSAK divisions--the other being the
Marines’ neighbor to the right, the British Commonwealth Division. With
the attached KMCs, the 1st Marine Division, moreover, was also the
biggest and strongest division in EUSAK.
Most importantly, fast deployment of the Marine division had made
possible the brilliant tactical maneuver at Inchon. Many military
experts, following World War II, had envisioned future conflicts only
in terms of atomic warfare and massive strategic air assaults. Even the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “had predicted publicly, hardly
six months before, that the world would never again see a large-scale
amphibious landing.”[699] In contradiction to new atomic-age tactics,
however, the United Nations commander in September 1950 had turned the
tide of the battle by his use of a conventional maneuver--envelopment
by amphibious assault. The performance of the Marine Corps was thus
responsible, in part, for changing post-Korean War military doctrine
from total reliance on new tactics and weaponry to a more balanced
concept that combined both sophisticated innovations and viable,
established procedures.
[699] Statement by Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, as quoted by Gen
G. C. Thomas, Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. and RAdm A. A. Ageton,
_The Marine Officer’s Guide_ (Annapolis: United States
Naval Institute, 1956), p. 130.
Although unemployed in its primary amphibious role after late 1950, the
1st Marine Division had originally been positioned on the eastern front
because of this capability. It was the UN commander’s desire to have
EUSAK’s only amphibious trained and equipped division near the coast
in the event that an amphibious maneuver was required for offensive or
defensive purposes. Again, in the division’s 1952 move to the western
coastal front in the Kimpo area, this fighting capability was a major
consideration.
To a large extent, U.S. forces in Korea fought the early part of
the Korean War with weapons from the preceding war--only five years
removed. Three tactical innovations employed by the Marine Corps during
the Korean War were highly successful and largely adopted by the other
services. These were the thermal boot, individual body armor, and the
helicopter. All were first combat tested in 1951.
Frostbite casualties during the first winter in Korea resulting
from inadequate footwear made it necessary to provide combat troops
with specially insulated footgear. The new thermal boot virtually
eliminated frostbite for both Marine infantrymen and aviators. Armored
utility jackets had been developed toward the end of World War II but
were not actually battle tested. The Marine Corps had renewed the
experimentation in 1947. First combat use of the plastic, light-weight
body armor was made in July 1951 by Marines while fighting in the
Punchbowl and Inje areas of X Corps. Improvements were made to the
prototypes and by the following summer the Marine Corps, following a
request made by the Army Quartermaster General, furnished some 4,000
vests to frontline Army troops. By 1953 the 1st Marine Division had
received its authorized quota of 24,000 vests and new lower torso body
armor had also been put into production.
Medical experts reported that the effectiveness of enemy low-velocity
missile weapons striking a man wearing body armor was reduced from
30–80 percent. Chest and abdominal wounds decreased from 90–95 percent
after issuance of the armored vests. Overall battle casualties
were estimated to have been cut by 30 percent. By the time of the
cease-fire, the protection offered by the Marine body armor had been
extended to some 93,000 Marine and Army wearers. Hardly anywhere could
the U.S. taxpayer or fighting man have found a better buy for the
money: mass production had reduced the per unit cost of the Marine
armored vest to just $37.50.
_Air_[700]
[700] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5,
Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; _USMC Board Rpts_, vs. 1-11;
_Generals’ Summary_; AnlRpt SecNav 1952–1953; _USMC Ops
Korea_ vs. I-IV, _passim_; Monograph, _A Brief History of
Marine Corps Aviation_, (HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960);
Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Sherrod, _Marine
Aviation_; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka,
“1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The
Acid Test,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 5 (May
57), pp. 22–27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D.
Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the
Armistice,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun
57), pp. 22–26; Brochure, Change of Command Ceremonies,
11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW
folder, HRB ref. file.
On 3 August 1950, eight VMF-214 Corsairs led by squadron executive
officer, Major Robert P. Keller, catapulted from the deck of the USS
_Sicily_ to launch the first Marine air strikes in the Korean action.
From then until 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
flew 127,496 combat sorties in the Korean War, considerably in excess
of the 80,000-odd sorties for all Marine aviation during World War II.
Of this Korean number nearly a third, more than 39,500, represented the
Marine Corps close air support specialty, even though 1st MAW pilots
were heavily engaged in other assignments from Fifth Air Force. These
included interdiction, general support, air defense patrols, air rescue
operations, photo and armed reconnaissance, and related tasks to insure
Allied air superiority.
With the outbreak of Korean hostilities, Stateside Marine air units
were alerted for combat duty by 5 July. At Major General Field Harris’
1st MAW headquarters, El Toro, MAG-33 elements were quickly readied
for deployment to Japanese bases and thence to Korea. Commanded by
Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, MAG-33 comprised Headquarters and
Service Squadron 33, fighter squadrons VMF-214 and -323, an echelon of
nightfighters from VMF(N)-513, two radar units (Marine Ground Control
Intercept Squadron 1 and Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2), plus
the observation squadron, VMO-6. Forward elements were quickly on their
way, arriving in Japan on 19 July, while the rear echelon reached the
Korean Theater on 31 July. Twenty R5Ds from Marine Transport Squadrons
152 and 352 were already providing logistical support for Pacific lift
operations.
After practicing some last minute carrier landing approaches, the
fighter pilots got into combat almost at once. Following -214 into the
war, VMF-323 started operations on 6 August, flying from USS _Badoeng
Strait_ in support of the Pusan ground defenders. When the brigade
mounted out on 7 August on its drive to Chinju, the two MAG-33 carrier
squadrons were there with their 5-inch HVARs, napalm, 100- to 500-pound
bombs, and 20mm cannon. VMF(N)-513 began its regularly-scheduled night
tours over the Korean perimeter that same date, lashing at enemy supply
and transportation centers in the Sachon-Chinju area of southern Korea.
VMO-6 had already started evacuating casualties from the Pusan area
three days earlier.
Many Army ground commanders witnessed the Marine system of close air
support for the first time during the Pusan fighting. After the second
Naktong battle, when air strikes had silenced enemy guns and 300 troops
near Obong-ni, the commander of the 23rd Regiment to the right of the
brigade wrote General Ridgway in Washington:
Infantry and artillery is a good team, but only by adding
adequate and efficient air support can we succeed without
devastating losses ... The Marines on our left were a sight to
behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours,
but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it
like artillery. It was, ‘Hey, Joe, this is Smitty, knock the
left of that ridge in from Item Company.’ They had it _day and
night_.[701]
[701] Quoted in Andrew Geer, _The New Breed--The Story of the
U.S. Marines in Korea_ (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1952), pp. 94–95, quoted with permission of the publisher.
And while Marine, Army, and Navy staffs were completing plans for the
forthcoming Inchon assault, MAG-33’s little aerial Photo Unit (part of
Headquarters Squadron) took a series of reconnaissance photographs of
the landing beaches in preparation for the closely coordinated maneuver.
During Inchon-Seoul operations, MAG-33 was joined by three MAG-12
fighter squadrons: VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542. After the
capture of Kimpo airfield, 212’s “Devilcats” and 542’s nightfighters
transferred from Itami to Kimpo. Flying out of 2d MAW headquarters,
Cherry Point, N.C., on 18 August, the Devilcats had climaxed a hurried
dash halfway around the world to get into action. The squadron flew
its first combat mission from Kimpo a month after its departure from
the East Coast. While the MAG-12 land-based squadrons and the carrier
pilots functioned as the division’s flying artillery, MGCIS-1 set up a
radar warning system and MTACS-2 established a Tactical Air Direction
Center to direct all aircraft in the X Corps zone of action.
With the conclusion of the Inchon operation on 8 October, VMF-312
and VMF(N)-542 remained at Kimpo. Other Marine squadrons (VMF-212,
VMF(N)-513, VMO-6, HqSq-12, and carrier-based VMF-323) shifted to the
Korean east coast in readiness for the Wonsan landing and subsequent
deployment north of the Marine infantry regiments. Wing elements began
arriving at the port city’s airfield on 13 October. Division Marines,
meanwhile, on board ship in the Wonsan harbor while more than 3,000
expertly laid Communist mines were being removed, did not land until 26
October. For the men who fought the vertical war in Korea, it was “one
of the rare times in the air-ground association, the 1st MAW had landed
ahead of the 1st Marine Division. The aviators didn’t miss putting up a
big sign-board “_Welcome, 1st Division!_”[702]
[702] LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in
Korea,” Part I, _Marine Corps Gazette_, May 1957, p. 45.
As 30 CCF divisions slammed into UNC forces all across the fighting
front in late November to change the nature of ground operations (and
the future of the war), so did the onset of the first Korean winter
test 1st MAW aerial skills and ingenuity. Low hanging ceilings, icing
conditions, and three-inch snows on the carrier decks were common
operating hazards. For the shore-based pilots, the bad weather often
caused changed flight plans as they were forced to land at alternate
fields or on Navy carriers. Nonetheless, Marine RD4s flew up to the
southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, at Hagaru, to air-drop ammunition
and supplies and evacuate casualties from the entrapment. Logistical
support to this tiny frozen makeshift air strip was also provided by
Air Force C-47s and C-119s. Later on, during the first step of the
grinding movement south, Air Force pilots paradropped a sectionalized
steel bridge vitally needed at Koto-ri to replace a destroyed span over
a chasm.