Along the Marine front, three patrol contacts took place on the night

of 16–17 July. Two of them were grim reminders that despite the

promising look (and sound) of the peace talks, for those men lost the

toll of the war was as final and unremitting as it had been at any time

during the past three years of combat. The first was a routine maneuver

for a 5th Marines 13-man combat patrol that, at 2252, engaged an enemy

squad just north of outpost Hedy. After an eight-minute fire fight the

enemy withdrew, with two Chinese soldiers counted dead and one wounded

and no friendly casualties.

Not so lucky was a 2/5 reconnaissance patrol. At midnight, its 15

members encountered a band of 30 to 40 Chinese, deployed in a V-shaped

ambush in the Hill 90 area, an enemy stronghold two miles east of

Panmunjom. The Marines set up a base of fire, beating off the enemy

with their rifles, BARs, mortars, and bare fists. Reinforcements and

artillery fires were called in. The first relief unit was intercepted

by vicious mortar shelling which wounded the entire detail. A second

relief squad, also taken under mortar fire, continued the action in an

intense fire contest that lasted nearly two hours. In the meantime, the

direct support artillery battalion, 3/11, reinforced by 1/11, showered

280 rounds of countermortar on Chinese long-range machine guns and

mortars barking from the surrounding hills.

During the engagement the Chinese made several attempts to capture

prisoners. When the enemy finally began to withdraw, CCF casualties

were 10 known dead, an estimated 9 more dead, and 3 wounded. Seven

Marines were found to be missing after the Chinese broke contact. A 5th

Marines platoon that extensively screened the battalion front during

the hours of darkness on the 17th returned at 2210 with six bodies.

The third encounter took place not long after midnight in the 7th

Marines territory. This brief skirmish was also to have an unpleasant

aftermath and, inadvertently, fulfill the psywar broadcast of the

previous day that had warned Marines “not to go on patrols or be

killed.” As it was leaving the Ava Gate (250 yards northwest of the

outpost proper) at 0045, a 30-man combat patrol from Company A was

challenged on three sides by 40–50 CCF employing small arms, automatic

weapons, grenades, and mortars. After a 15-minute fire exchange, during

which the patrol lost communications with its MLR company, the enemy

withdrew. Six CCF had been counted dead, and 12 more estimated killed

or wounded.

Upon returning to the outpost, a muster of the men engaged in the

action showed four Marines were missing. A rescue squad recovered three

bodies. When, several hours later, daylight hampered movements of the

search party, 2/11 laid down a smoke screen to isolate the sector.

Between 0050 and 0455, its gunners also directed 529 rounds of close

support and countermortar fire on Chinese troops and active weapons

in the area. The recovery unit continued to sweep the area for the

last missing man until 0545 when it was decided that the search would

have to be terminated with negative results. Marine casualties from

the encounter were 3 killed, 1 missing, 19 wounded (evacuated), and 2

nonseriously wounded.

The following day patrol activity and enemy contacts quieted down.

Action shifted to the 1st KMC/RCT sector. Here, during the late hours

of the 18th, four Korean combat patrols brushed quickly and briefly

with Chinese squad and platoon units in light skirmishes of but a

few minutes duration. The Korean Marines killed 2 of the enemy and

estimated they accounted for 16 more.[499]

[499] _ROKMC Comments._

The only activity in the Marine right regimental sector occurred when

a 7th Marines 36-man combat patrol, on prowl the night of 17–18

July, advanced at 0112 as far as hand-grenade range of the Chinese

trenchline at Ungok. Undetected by the enemy, a patrol member fired a

white phosphorus rifle grenade squarely at the CCF machine gun that

was harassing the friendly MLR. The Marines then engaged 15 Chinese

defending the position in a brief 20-minute skirmish. Although two men

were wounded,[500] the Company C patrol members in a somewhat roguish

gesture as they left also planted a Marine Corps recruiting sign at

their FPOA (Farthest Point of Advance), facing the enemy.

[500] One, who died that morning, was squad leader Sergeant

Stephen C. Walter, posthumously presented the Navy Cross.

Also awarded the nation’s second highest combat medal

for extraordinary heroism in a patrol action on 16–17

July was Private First Class Roy L. Stewart, of the 5th

Marines.

_Marine Air Operations_[501]

[501] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 10, No.

5, Chap. 9, No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;

1stMarDiv PIR 924, dtd 10–11 Jul 53; 1st MAW, MAGs-12,

-33, VMAs-121, -212, -251, -323, VMF(N)-153, VMF-311

ComdDs, Jul 53; Field, _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF,

Korea_.

If the monsoon rains of July hung like a shroud over the infantryman,

they were an even more serious impediment to air operations of MAGs-12

and -33. There were 24 days of restricted flying when the weather at

home base or target area was recorded as marginal to non-operational.

On 12 full days air operations were cancelled entirely. Precipitation

for July rose to 7.38 inches, with 22 days of rain recorded throughout

the month. The generally unfavorable weather conditions not only

limited the normal support missions flown by 1st MAW but delayed the

arrival of VMA-251[502] en route from Japan to relieve VMA-323.

[502] Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Lieutenant Colonel Harold A.

Harwood) administratively joined MAG-12 on 6 July for

323, which had rotated back to MCAS, El Toro three days

earlier. Movement of -251 aircraft to Korea could not

take place, however, until 12 July. When VMA-323 (Major

Woten) departed, the famous “Death Rattlers” had the

distinction of being the Marine tactical (VMA/VMF) air

squadron in longest service during the Korean War. The

unit’s final combat mission on 2 July brought its total

Korean operations to 20,827 sorties and 48,677.2 hours.

On 6 August 1950, roaring up from the flight deck of the

USS _Badoeng Strait_, the VMA-323 Corsairs (then VMF-323)

had launched their opening blow against North Korean

installations, led by Major Arnold A. Lund, CO. The

initial Marine air offensive action of the Korean War had

been flown three days earlier by VMF-214. This unit was

reassigned to CONUS in November 1951, giving the Death

Rattlers the longest continuous service flight record.

Jul 53 ComdD, 1st MAW, p. 2; _USMC Ops Korea-Pusan_, v.

I, pp. 89–90, 98; VMF-214 Squadron History, HRB.

During July the wing’s nearly 300 aircraft (250 operational, 43

assigned to pool status in Korea) flew 2,688 combat sorties[503]

and 5,183.1 combat hours. The bulk of the sorties, 1,497, were CAS

operations flown for 19 different UNC divisions. Nearly 900 supported

the 12 ROK divisions involved in the heavy fighting on the central UNC

sector. Approximately 250 of the CAS sorties were for the 1st Marine

Division, with more than 200 being day or night MPQ drops and the rest,

daytime CAS runs. No night close support missions were conducted.

[503] Individual reports by the two groups result in a

slightly higher figure. MAG-12 recorded 2,001 combat

sorties (including more than 400 flown by carrier-based

VMA-332, not in the 1st MAW sortie rate). MAG-33 listed

945 sorties, or a combined group total of 2,946 for the

month. ComdDs Jul 53 MAG-12, p. C-1 and MAG-33, p. I.

When nearly a week of inclement weather finally lifted, Colonel Arthur

R. Stacy’s[504] MAG-33 pilots based at Pohang welcomed a brisk change

in the tempo of operations. In seven MPQ strikes on 11 July, they

hurled 13 tons of ordnance on Chinese fortifications north of the 7th

Marines sector. It was the wing’s first active day in support missions

for the 1st Marine Division, newly back on the line.

[504] Colonel Stacy was group commander until 24 July, when he

was detached for assignment to 1st MAW as Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-2. He was succeeded at MAG-33 by Colonel John

L. Smith.

During the interim period of 9–18 July, between the two Berlin outpost

attacks, F9F jet fighters from MAG-13 again carried out approximately

35 MPQ missions for the division. (MAG-12 attack planes, during this

time, were assigned to the flaming central Allied line.) Nearly 20 of

these were on a single day, 14 July, when VMFs-311 and -115 Panther

jets roared over enemy country from morning to sundown unleashing 25

tons north of the Marine troubled right regimental sector and 9 more

tons on hostile emplacements near the western end of the division line.

In middle and late July, however, the majority of missions by Marine

fliers bolstered UNC operations in the central part of the Allied front

where a major enemy counterthrust erupted. The peak operational day for

MAG-33 pilots during this period occurred 17 July when 40 interdiction

and MPQ missions (136 combat sorties) were executed for Army and ROK

divisions. The corresponding record day for Colonel Carney’s MAG-12

aviators was 19 July when 162 combat sorties were flown on heavy

destruction missions to support UNC action.

Marine exchange pilot Major John F. Bolt, of VMF-115, chalked up a

record of a different kind on 11 July. Attached to the Fifth Air Force

51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, he shot down his fifth and sixth MIG-15

(the previous four having been bagged since 16 May) to become the first

Marine jet ace in history. Major Bolt was leading a four-plane F-86

flight in the attack on four MIGs east of Sinuiju and required only

1,200 rounds of ammunition and five minutes to destroy the two enemy

jet fighters. Bolt thereby became the 37th jet ace of the Korean War.

Earlier in the month, Navy Lieutenant Guy P. Bordelon won a Silver Star

medal and gold star in lieu of a second Silver Star. Attending the K-6

ceremonies were General Megee and Admiral Clark, 1st Wing and Seventh

Fleet commanders. Bordelon, flying with the Marine Corsair night

fighters, had downed four of the harassing “Bedcheck Charlie” planes. A

member of VC-3 attached to MAG-12, Lieutenant Bordelon on 17 July made

his fifth night kill and was subsequently awarded the Navy Cross.

On the minus side, the 1st Marine Air Wing this last month of the war

suffered a higher rate of personnel losses on combat flights than in

any month since June 1952.[505] Captain Lote Thistlethwaite and Staff

Sergeant W. H. Westbrook, of VMF(N)-513, were killed in an air patrol

flight on 4 July. (Two nights earlier, the same squadron had lost a

Navy pilot and crewman on temporary duty with the night-fighters when

their F3D-2 similarly failed to return to Pyongtaek.) Another MAG-12

casualty was Captain Carl F. Barlow, of VMA-212, killed 13 July on a

prebriefed CAS mission when he crashed while flying instruments.

[505] Wing casualties for July 1953 were listed as three

killed, seven missing, and two wounded in action. Names

of enlisted crew members on flights are not always given

in air diaries, which accounts for the discrepancies.

On 17 July, Captain Robert I. Nordell, VMF-311, flying his third

mission that day, and wingman First Lieutenant Frank L. Keck, Jr.

were hit by intense automatic weapons fire while on an interdiction

flight. Their planes reportedly went down, at 2000, over the Sea of

Japan. After a four-day air and surface search conducted by JOC, they

were declared missing and subsequently reclassified killed in action.

Another MAG-33 pilot listed KIA was Major Thomas M. Sellers, VMF-115,

on exchange duty with the Air Force, shot down 20 July in a dogfight

after he had scored two MIG-15s. Two days earlier a VMO-6 pilot, First

Lieutenant Charles Marino, and his artillery spotter, First Lieutenant

William A. Frease, flying a flak suppression mission, were struck

by enemy fire and crashed with their ship in the 5th Marines center

regimental sector.

_Fall of the Berlins_[506]

[506] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section

is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;

_CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;

1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 933–934,

dtd 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMar ComdD, Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar,

11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11,

1stTkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar Preliminary Special Action

Report, period 8–27 Jul 53 in ComdD, Jul 53, hereafter

1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212

ComdDs, Jul 53.

Despite their preoccupation with other corps sectors on the central

front of the Eighth Army line, the Chinese had not forgotten about the

Berlin complex held by the Marines. On the night of 19–20 July,[507]

the enemy lunged against the two Marine outposts in reinforced

battalion strength to renew his attack launched 12 days earlier.

Beginning at 2200, heavy Chinese mortar and artillery fire struck the

two COPs and supporting MLR positions of the 3d Battalion, which had

advanced to the front on 13 July in relief of 2/7.[508] In the center

regimental sector, 5th Marines outposts Ingrid and Dagmar, and the line

companies were also engaged by small arms, mortar, and artillery fires.

An attempted probe at Dagmar was repulsed, aided by 3/11.

[507] The 19th of July, ironically, was the date that truce

negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final

agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff

officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details

of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the

demilitarized zone. USMA, _Korea_, p. 51.

[508] Company E and a detachment of the 81mm mortar platoon

from the 2d Battalion remained on line. They were

attached to the 3d Battalion when the sector command

changed.

Concentrating their main assault efforts on the Berlins, however, the

Chinese forces swarmed up the slopes of the outposts at 2230, with more

troops moving in from enemy positions on Jersey, Detroit, and Hill

139, some 700 yards north of Berlin. The Chinese struck first at East

Berlin, where 37 Marines were on duty, and then at Berlin, held by 44

men. Both positions were manned by First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Turner’s

Company I personnel and employed the maximum-size defenses which could

be effectively utilized on these terrain features.

By 2300 hostile forces were halfway up Berlin. Continuous volumes

of small arms and machine gun fire poured from the defending MLR

companies. Defensive boxes were fired by 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch

mortars. Eight Company C tanks augmented the close-in fires, with their

lethal direct-fire 90mm guns tearing into Chinese troops and weapons.

Within two hours after the initial thrust, the 11th Marines had fired

20 counterbattery and 31 countermortar missions. Artillerymen from 2/11

and 1/11 had expended 1,750 rounds. In addition, 4/11 had unleashed

124 of its 155mm medium projectiles. More countermortar fire came from

the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. Despite the heavy fire support,

by midnight the situation was in doubt and at 0146 the twin outposts

were officially declared under enemy control. Nearly 3,000 rounds of

incoming were estimated to have fallen on division positions by that

time, most of it in the 7th Marines sector.

During the early morning hours of the 20th, Marine tank guns and

continuous shelling by six[509] artillery battalions wreaked havoc

on Chinese hardware, reinforcing personnel, supply points, and

fortifications. Reserve units from 2/7 were placed on 30-minute

standby, with Companies D, E, and F already under 3/7 operational

control. Battalion Operation Order 20-53, issued at 0400 by Lieutenant

Colonel Jones, called for Easy and Dog to launch a two-company

counterattack at 0730 to restore Berlin and East Berlin respectively.

Incoming, meanwhile, continued heavy on the MLR; at 0520, Company I,

located to the rear of the contested outposts, reported receiving one

round per second.

[509] Three Marine, one TAFC, and two Army battalions.

The Marine assault was cancelled by I Corps a half hour before it was

scheduled to take place. A decision subsequently rendered from I Corps

directed that the positions not be retaken.[510]

[510] At a routine conference that same morning attended by

CG Eighth Army (General Taylor), CG I Corps (General

Clarke) and CG 1st Marine Division, the earlier decision

about not regaining the outposts was affirmed. General

Taylor maintained the positions “could never be held

should the Chinese decide to exert sufficient pressure

against them” and recommended instead that the sector

be organized on a wide front defense concept. Actually,

following the initial Berlins attack of 7–8 July, a

discussion about possible readjustment of the Marine

sector defense had been initiated by General Pate. A

staff study recommending that just such a “strongpoint”

concept (rather than the customary linear defense) be

adopted had been completed by Marine Division officials

on 15 July. I Corps staff members had concurred with the

study and it was awaiting consideration by CG, I Corps

when the Berlins were attacked for the second time on 19

July. _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, pp. 3–4.

Since the outposts were not to be recaptured,[511] efforts that day

were devoted to making the two hills as untenable as possible for

their new occupants. Heavy destruction missions by air, armor, and

artillery blasted CCF defenses throughout the day. Air observers were

on station from 0830 until after dark, with nine CAS missions conducted

by MAG-12 pilots from VMA-121 and -212. The day’s series of air strikes

on the Berlin-East Berlin positions (and Vegas weapons emplacements)

began at 1145 when a division of ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Harold

B. Penne’s[512] -121 hurled nine and a half tons of ordnance on enemy

bunkers and trenches at East Berlin.

[511] Commenting on this point, the I Corps commander noted:

“The outposts in front of the MLR had gradually lost

their value in my opinion because, between the MLR and

the outposts, minefields, tactical wire, etc. had made

their reinforcement and counterattacks very costly.”

Resupply was thus restricted to narrow paths on which

the CCF had zeroed in and “holding poor real estate

for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue

casualties.” Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA, ltr to Dir,

MCHist, HQMC, dtd 20 May 70.

[512] The new squadron commander had taken over 16 July from

Major Braun.

The artillery was having an active day, too. Six firing battalions had

sent more than 3,600 rounds crashing against the enemy by nightfall.

The 1st 4.5-inch rocketeers also contributed four ripples to the melee.

Heavy fire missions were requested and delivered by the Army 159th

Field Artillery Battalion (240mm howitzers) and 17th Field Artillery

Battalion (8-inch howitzers) using 11th Marines airborne spotters. The

precision fire on enemy positions, which the air spotters reported

to be “the most effective missions they had conducted in Korea”[513]

continued for several hours. By 1945 the big guns had demolished the

bunkers and all but 15 yards of trenchline at East Berlin. For their

part the Chinese had fired an estimated 4,900 rounds of mortar and

artillery against the 3d Battalion right hand sector in the 24-hour

period ending at 1800 on the 20th.

[513] BGen Manly L. Curry ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May

70, hereafter _Curry ltr_.

Armored vehicles, meanwhile, during 19–20 July had expended 200

rounds of HE and WP shells and 6,170 machine gun rounds.[514] Tank

searchlights had also effectively illuminated enemy positions on the

East Berlin hill. The tankers’ performance record included: 20 Chinese

bunkers and 2 57mm recoilless rifles destroyed; an estimated 30 enemy

soldiers killed; a dozen more firing apertures, caves, and trenchworks

substantially damaged.

[514] Tank and artillery ammunition allocations had been cut

50 percent the afternoon of the 19th, with a subsequent

reduction of normal destruction missions and elimination

of H&I fires. ComdDs Jul 53 1st TkBn, p. 3 and App. 2, p.

4 and 1/11, p. 5.

[Illustration:

MAP 30 K. White

7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

(Division Right)

LINEAR DEFENSE

19–20 July 1953]

Between noon and the last flight of the day, when a trio of AUs from

Lieutenant Colonel Wallace’s VMA-212 attacked a northern enemy mortar

and automatic weapons site, 35 aircraft had repeatedly streaked over

the Berlin territory and adjacent Chinese strongpoints. Strikes by

VMA-121 at 1145, 1320, 1525, 1625, 1700, 1750; and VMA-212 at 1413,

1849, and 1930 had released a combined total of 69½ tons of bombs and

6,500 rounds of 20mm ammunition on hostile locations.

The Chinese casualty toll during this renewed flareup in the fighting

on 19–20 July was conservatively placed by 3/7 at 75 killed and 300

wounded. It was further believed that “the enemy battalion was so

weakened and disorganized by the attacks that it was necessary for

the CCF to commit another battalion to hold the area captured.”[515]

Regimental reports indicated that 6 Marines had been killed, 56 listed

missing,[516] 86 wounded and evacuated, and 32 not seriously wounded.

[515] 3/7 ComdD, 20 Jul 53, p. 5. With respect to the number

of enemy casualties that night, battalion, regimental,

artillery support, and division command diaries given

differing accounts. Other figures cited are: 9 CCF

killed, between 234–284 estimated killed, and 630

estimated wounded.

[516] Subsequently, it was learned that of 56 Marines

unaccounted for at the time, 12 were actually captured.

They were returned after hostilities ended. Several men

from 1st Marines units under operational control of the

7th were also taken in this battle. MacDonald, _POW_, pp.

212, 268–269.

As a result of the critical tactical situation and number of casualties

suffered during the Berlins operation, the 7th Marines regimental

commander requested that units of the division reserve be placed under

his control to help check any further aggressive moves of the enemy.

For it now appeared that the Chinese might continue their thrust and

attempt to seize Hill 119 (directly south of Berlin and East Berlin) in

order to be in position to deny part of the Imjin River to UNC forces

after signing of the armistice.

While the lost outposts were being neutralized on the morning of

the 20th, the CO of the incoming 1st Marines, Colonel Nelson, also

ordered an immediate reorganization and strengthening of the MLR. This

employed the defense in depth concept, used by the British Commonwealth

Division in the sector adjacent to the Marines on the east. The wide

front defense concept was fully developed with one company occupying

a portion of the MLR to the rear of the Berlin complex, known as Hill

119 or more informally, Boulder City. Three companies organized the

high ground to the right rear of the MLR east to Hill 111, the limiting

point on the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions.

Three more companies fortified the Hill 126 area to the rear and left

of Berlin to its juncture with the western battalion sector held by

Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd’s 1/7. (See Maps 30 and 31.)

[Illustration:

MAP 31 K. WHITE

7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

Defense-in-depth

20–21 July 1953]

The afternoon of the 20th, 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Long) was

transferred to 7th Marines control and positioned in the center of

the regimental MLR, as the first step in the scheduled relief of the

7th, due off the line on 26 July. For the next three days the regiment

continued to develop the sector defense to the rear of the MLR.

Elements of the regimental reserve, 2/7, were employed to reinforce the

3/7 sector. Initially, on 20–21 July, F/2/7, under operational command

of 3/7, was assigned the mission of reinforcing Hill 119. Later a 2/1

platoon was also ordered to strengthen the position.

[Illustration:

MAP 32 K. WHITE

7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

Defense-in-depth

22–23 July 1953]

Incoming 1st Marines platoons and companies from the 2d and 3d

(Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Miller) Battalions augmented the forces at

the two critical Hill 119 and 111 locations. As it turned out, 1st

Marines personnel returning to the front from division reserve were to

see the last of the war’s heavy fighting in the course of their relief

of the 7th Marines. Ultimately, the regimental forward defense, instead

of being divided into two battalion sectors as before, now consisted

of three--a left, center, and right sector. By 23 July the depth

reorganization had been completed and these sectors were manned by 1/7,

2/1, and 3/7. (See Map 32.)

_Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July_[517]

[517] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv

ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, dtd 21–28 Jul 53;

1stMarDiv PIRs 935–941, dtd 21–27 Jul 53 and 942, dtd 7

Aug 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7,

3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 53;

1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -251,

VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_;

Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley,

_Korea, 1951–1953_; Martin Russ, _The Last Parallel: A

Marine’s War Journal_ (New York: Rinehart and Company,

1957); USMA, _Korea_.

Sightings of enemy troops for the next few days were light. A large

scale attack expected on the 21st by the 5th Marines at Hedy and Dagmar

failed to materialize. Instead, a token force of a dozen Chinese

dressed in burlap bags made a limited appearance at Hedy before

departing, minus three of its party, due to Marine sharp-shooting

skills. In the skies, MAG-33 fliers from VMF-115 and -311 had been

transferred by Fifth Air Force from exclusive missions for the central

and eastern UNC front (the IX, ROK II, and X Corps sectors) to join

VMA-121 in MPQ flights supporting the 1st Marine Division. During the

21–23 July period, despite layers of thick stratus clouds and rain that

turned off and on periodically like a water spigot, more than 15 radar

missions were executed by the three squadrons.[518] They unleashed a

gross 33-ton bomb load on CCF mortar and 76mm gun positions, supply

areas, CPs, bunkers, and trenches.

[518] One additional flight expending three 1,000-lb. bombs

was made 22 July by a single AD from replacement

squadron VMA-251. This was the unit’s first combat

sortie in support of the 1st Marine Division after its

indoctrination flights. VMA-251 also flew four MPQ

flights for the 7th Marines in the early hours of 24

July, the day the outposts were attacked again. VMA-251

ComdD, Jul 53.

The lull in ground fighting lasted until late on the 24th. Then, at

1930, a heavy preparation of 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars combined

with 76mm and 122mm artillery shells began to rain down on Boulder

City. Men of G/3/1, under command of First Lieutenant Oral R. Swigart,

Jr., were deployed at that time in a perimeter defense of the position

having that morning completed the relief of G/3/7.

Enemy troops were reported massing for an assault. One regiment located

by forward observers behind Hill 139, some 700 yards northwest of

Berlin, was taken under fire at 1940 by artillery and rocket ripple. At

2030, following their usual pattern of laying down a heavy mortar and

artillery barrage, the CCF began to probe the MLR at Hills 119 and 111

in the Marine right battalion sector. They hit first at Hill 111, the

far right anchor of the division line, currently held by 7th Marines

personnel. Then the CCF moved westward to Hill 119. Their choice of

time for the attack once again coincided with the relief of 7th Marines

units by the 1st Marines.[519] When the assault began, H/3/1 was moving

up to relieve H/3/7 at the easternmost point of the line in the Hill

111 vicinity, and Company I was preparing to relieve I/3/7, to its left.

[519] A similar incident had occurred on 7 July when the 7th

Marines was attacked while in the process of relieving a

regiment of the 25th Infantry. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p.

9-58.

The Communist troops temporarily penetrated Hill 111 positions. At

Boulder City, where the main force of the CCF two-battalion unit

had struck, they occupied a portion of the trenchline. Attempting to

exploit this gain, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted the Berlin Gate,

on the left flank of Company G’s position and the East Berlin Gate, to

its right. Marine units of the two regiments posted at the two citadel

hills were heavily supported by MLR mortar, artillery, and tank fires.

No artillery spotter or CAS flights were flown through the night, once

again due to weather conditions.

By 2120, the bulk of Chinese soldiers had begun to withdraw from Hill

111, this attack apparently being a diversionary effort. But the

enemy’s main thrust continued against the central Hill 119 position.

Here the close, heavy fighting raged on through the morning hours,

with enemy troops steadily reinforcing from the Jersey Ridge and

East Berlin, by way of the Berlin Gate, the best avenue of approach

to forward positions of Hill 119. At approximately 2100, the Chinese

hurled a second attack against Hill 119 in the strength of two

companies, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire. An hour

later hand-to-hand combat had developed all along the 700 yards of the

forward trenches. Company G men of the 1st Marines were down to half

their original number, ammunition was running low, and evacuation of

casualties was slowed by the fact that two of the eight corpsmen had

been killed and most of the rest were themselves casualties.

By midnight, the front, left, and right flanks of the perimeter had

been pushed back to the reverse slope of the hill and a 1st Marines

participant commented “... only a never-say-die resistance was keeping

the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position.”[520] At 0015,

the thinning ranks of G/3/1 Marines (now down to 25 percent effectives)

were cheered by the news that Company I men were about to reinforce

their position. This latter unit itself suffered 35 casualties while

moving into the rear area, when the Chinese intercepted a coded message

and shifted a substantial amount of their mortar and artillery fires to

the rear approaches of Hill 119.

[520] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” Aug 53, p. 4.

In response to the enemy bombardment, Marine artillery fires crashed

against the Chinese continuously from 2100 to midnight. Four ripples

were launched in support of the Hill 119 defenders. In one of the

regiment’s most intense counterbattery shoots on record, the 11th

Marines in three hours had fired 157 missions. By 2400, an estimated

6,000 to 8,000 hostile rounds had fallen in the division sector.

Meanwhile, the Chinese were also attempting to punch holes in the 5th

regimental sector. In a second-step operation, rather than striking

simultaneously as was customary, the enemy at 2115 had jabbed at

outposts Esther and Dagmar in the right battalion of the 5th Marines.

The reinforced Chinese company from the 408th Regiment quickly began to

concentrate its attention on Esther, outposted by Company H Marines.

During the heavy fighting both Marines and Chinese reinforced. By

early morning, the enemy had seized part of the front trenchline, but

the Marines controlled the rear trenches and reorganized the defense

under rifle platoon commander, Second Lieutenant William H. Bates.

The Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to isolate the position by heavy

shelling and patrolled vigorously between Esther and the MLR.

Marines replied with flamethrowers and heavy supporting fires from the

MLR, including machine guns, 81mm and 4.2-inch mortar boxes. Three

tanks--a section from the regimental antitank platoon and one from

Company A--neutralized enemy targets with 153 rounds to assist the 3d

and 2d Battalions. The 3/11 gunners supporting the 5th Marines also

hurled 3,886 rounds against the Chinese in breaking up the attack.

After several hours of strong resistance, the Chinese loosened their

grip, and at 0640 on the 25th, Esther was reported secured.

By this time an enemy battalion had been committed piecemeal at the

position. The action had developed into the heaviest encounter of the

month in the 5th Marines sector. During that night of 24–25 July, more

than 4,000 artillery and mortar rounds fell in the outpost vicinity;

total incoming for the regimental sector throughout July was recorded

at 8,413 rounds. Twelve Marines lost their lives in the battle, with 35

wounded and evacuated, and 63 suffering minor injuries. A total of 85

CCF were counted dead, 110 more estimated killed, and an estimated 250

wounded.

Back at the Berlin Complex area of the 7th Marines where the major

action centered, intense shelling, fire fights, and close hand-to-hand

combat continued through the early morning of the 25th. Chinese

infiltrators had broken through a substantial part of the trenchwork

on the forward slope of Boulder City. For a while they temporarily

occupied the rocky, shrub-grown hill crest as well.

A swift-moving counterattack launched at 0130 by 1st Marines from

Companies G and I, led by Captain Louis J. Sartor, of I/3/1, began to

restore the proper balance to the situation. At 0330 the MLR had been

reestablished and the Marines had the controlling hand. By 0530 the

Hill 119 area was secured, with four new platoons from Companies E of

the 7th and 1st Marines aiding the defense. Scattered groups of Chinese

still clung to the forward slopes, and others vainly tried to reinforce

by the Berlin-to-Hill 119 left flank trenchline.

Direct fire from the four M-46s on position at Boulder City[521] had

helped disperse hostile troop concentrations. The tanks had also played

a major communication role. Although surrounded by enemy forces during

the peak of the fighting, two of the armored vehicles were still able

to radio timely tactical information to higher echelons. This Company

C quartet, plus another vehicle from the 7th Marines antitank unit,

between the time of the enemy assault to 0600 when it stabilized, had

pumped 109 HE, 8 marking shells, and 20,750 .30 caliber machine gun

bullets into opposition forces.[522] Five tanks from the 1st Marines

AT company located to the west of the Berlin site meted out further

punishment to enemy soldiers, gun pits, and trenches.

[521] One participant remarked: “I think the Boulder City

action ... is the classic example of where the Army system

worked well. The tanks were generally given credit for

saving the position, and I seriously doubt our ability to

have done the job under the previous system which would

have required the tanks to move to the scene after the

action had begun.” _Post ltr._

[522] In retaliation, between 2200 and 0600, the four tanks at

Hill 119 drew 2,200 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery.

Sporadic fighting and heavy incoming (at the rate of 60–70 rounds per

minute for 10 minutes duration) also rained down on eastern Hill 111

in the early hours of the 25th. Assault teams with flamethrowers and

3.5-inch rocket launchers completed the job of clearing the enemy out

of Marine bunkers.

Altogether the Communists had committed 3,000 troops across the Marine

division front during the night of 24–25 July. Between 2200 and 0400,

a total of 23,725 rounds had been fired by the 11th Marines and 10

battalions under its operational control in the division sector. This

included batteries from the 25th Division Artillery, I Corps Artillery,

and 1st Commonwealth Division Artillery.[523] The artillery outgoing

represented 7,057 rounds to assist the 5th Marines at outpost Esther

and 16,668 in defense of Boulder City.

[523] The British were not hampered by any ammunition

restrictions at this time. The excellent liaison between

the 11th Marines and Commonwealth Division Artillery

resulted in a humorous incident. After the battle of

24–25 July, a young British artillery officer arrived

at a Marine regimental CP. He identified himself as

being from the unit that had provided artillery support

to the Marines the previous night, for which he was

profusely thanked. Before his astonished audience he then

unrolled an impressive scroll. This proved to be a bill

enumerating the various types and amounts of projectiles

fired and specifying the cost in pounds sterling. When

he felt the Marine staff was properly flabbergasted, he

grinned and conceded waggishly: “But I am authorized to

settle for two bottles of your best whiskey!” _Curry ltr._

On the morning of 25 July, the Chinese at 0820 again assaulted Hill

119 in company strength. Marine mortar and artillery fire repulsed the

attack, with heavy enemy losses. See-saw action continued for most of

the rest of the day on the position. No major infantry attempt was

made at Hill 111. Intense hostile shelling was reported here at 1100,

however, when the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, still in operational

control of the area, began receiving 125 to 150 rounds per minute. The

last of the Chinese marauders were forced off the forward slope at

Boulder City at 1335. For some welcomed hours both Marine positions

remained quiet. A conservative estimate by 3/7 of the toll for the

enemy’s efforts were 75 CCF killed and 425 wounded.

Air support that morning was provided by 32 of the sleek, hard-hitting

F9Fs from VMF-115 and -311. Working in tandem over Chinese terrain

directly north of the right regimental sector, the two squadrons,

between 0616 and 1036, flew nine MPQ missions. In the aerial assault,

they bombarded the enemy with more than 32 tons of explosives.

Twelve Marine tanks had a workout, expending 480 HE and 33 WP shells

and 21,300 rounds of machine gun ammunition in direct fire missions.

The traditional inequity of battlefront luck was plainly demonstrated

between a section (two) of armored vehicles near the Hill 111 company

CP and a trio located at Boulder City. It was practically a standoff

for the former. Together they were able to fire only 71 high explosive

shells, drawing a return of 1,000 rounds of CCF 60mm mortar and 122mm

cannon shells. Blazing guns of the three tanks in the Hill 119 area,

meanwhile, during the 24-hour firing period had sent 158 HE, 10 WP,

and 17,295 bullets to destroy hostile weapons and installations and

received but 120 mortar and another 120 rounds of artillery fire.

The 11th Marines were also busy as heavy firing continued on Chinese

policing parties and those enemy batteries actively shelling MLR

positions. By late afternoon, 13,500 rounds of Chinese mortar and

artillery had crashed against the 7th Marines right sector--the highest

rate of incoming for any 24-hour period during the entire Berlin

action. For its part, the regiment and its medium and heavy support

units completed 216 counterbattery missions and sent 36,794 rounds of

outgoing into Chinese defenses between 2200 on 24 July and 1600 on the

25th.

Meanwhile, during 25 July, Colonel Nelson’s men continued with their

relief of the 7th Marines. At 1100 Major Robert D. Thurston, S-3 of

3/1, assumed command of Hill 119 and reorganized the embattled Company

G and Company I personnel, 1st Marines. That night, at 1940, E/2/1 and

F/2/7 effected the relief of the composite George-Item men. At the

eastern Hill 111 Company H, 1st Marines had assisted Company H, 7th

Marines during the day in clearing the trenchworks of the enemy; then

at 1815, the 1st Marines unit completed its relief of H/3/7 and took

over responsibility for the MLR right company sector. Not long after,

beginning at 2130, 1st and 7th Marines at the critical Hill 119 complex

were attacked by two enemy companies. MLR fire support plus artillery

and tank guns lashed at the enemy and he withdrew. Between 0130 and

0300 the Chinese again probed Hills 111 and 119, gaining small parts of

the trenchline before being driven out by superior Marine firepower.

Marine casualties were 19 killed and 125 wounded. The CCF had suffered

30 known dead, an estimated 84 killed, and 310 estimated wounded.

With dawn on the 26th came the first real quiet the battlefield had

known for two days. Small enemy groups tried to reinforce by way of the

Berlin trenchline, only to be stopped by Marine riflemen and machine

gunners. Hostile incoming continued spasmodically. At 1330 the 1st

Marines assumed operational control of the right regimental sector,

as scheduled, and of the remaining 7th Marines units still in the

area.[524] By this time Marine casualties since 24 July numbered 43

killed and 316 wounded.

[524] Seventh Marines units were Companies D and E, and

elements of the 4.2-inch Mortar Company.

That night the Communists, knowing the armistice was near and that

time was running out for seizing the Boulder City objective, made

their final attempts at the strongpoint. Again they attacked at 2130.

Defending 1st Marines were now under Captain Esmond E. Harper, CO

of E/2/1, who had assumed command when Major Thurston was seriously

wounded and evacuated. They fought off the Chinese platoon-size drive

when the enemy advanced from Berlin to the wire at Hill 119. Shortly

after midnight another Chinese platoon returned to Hill 119 in the last

skirmish for the territory, but Marine small arms and artillery handily

sent it home. At 0045, a CCF platoon nosed about the Hill 111 area for

an hour and twenty minutes. Again the Marines discouraged these last

faltering enemy efforts. Action at both hills ceased and what was to

become the concluding ground action for the 1st Marine Division in

Korea had ended.

Despite impressive tenacity and determination, the Chinese Communist

attacks throughout most of July on the two Berlin outposts and Hills

119 and 111 achieved no real gain. Their repetitive assaults on

strongly-defended Boulder City up until the last day of the war was an

attempt to place the Marines (and the United Nations Command) in as

unfavorable a position as possible when the armistice agreement was

signed. While talking at Panmunjom, the Communists pressed hungrily on

the battlefront for as much critical terrain as they could get under

their control before the final ceasefire line was established.

Had the enemy succeeded in his assaults on the two hill defenses after

his earlier seizure of the Berlins, under terms of the agreement UNC

forces would have been forced to withdraw southward to a point where

they no longer had free access to all of the Imjin River. If the

Chinese had taken Boulder City this would have also provided the CCF

a major high ground position (Hill 126) with direct observation into

Marine rear areas and important supply routes.

From the standpoint of casualties, the last month of the Korean War

was a costly one, with 181 infantry Marines killed in action and

total losses of 1,611 men.[525] This was the highest rate for any

month during 1953. It was second only to the October 1952 outpost

battles[526] for any month during the year the 1st Marine Division

defended the line in West Korea. The closing days of the war produced

the last action for which Marines were awarded the Navy Cross. These

Marines were Second Lieutenant Bates, H/3/5; First Lieutenant Swigart,

G/3/1; Second Lieutenant Theodore J. Lutz, Jr., H/3/1; and Sergeant

Robert J. Raymond, F/2/7, who was mortally wounded.

[525] Casualty breakdown: 181 killed, 86 missing, 862 wounded

and evacuated, 474 wounded (not evacuated), and 10

non-battle deaths.

[526] During this period 186 Marines were killed and 1,798

listed as casualties.

The 7th and 1st Marines, as the two regiments involved during July in

the Berlin sector defense, sustained high monthly losses: 804 and 594,

respectively. Forty-eight men from the 7th Marines and 70 from the

1st Marines were killed in action. In contrast, the 5th Marines which

witnessed little frontline action during the month (except for a sharp

one-night clash at Outpost Esther), suffered total monthly casualties

of 150 men, of whom 26 lost their lives. Chinese losses were also high:

405 counted killed, 761 estimated killed, 1,988 estimated wounded, 1

prisoner, or 3,155 for the month of July.

In their unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Marines from their MLR

positions the Chinese had pounded the right regimental flank with

approximately 22,200 artillery and mortar shells during the last 24–27

July battle. In reply, 11th Marines gunners and supporting units had

expended a total of 64,187 rounds against CCF strongpoints. The enemy’s

increased counterbattery capabilities in July, noted by division

intelligence, also received particular attention from the artillerymen.

A record number of 345 counterbattery missions were conducted during

the period by Marine and Army cannoneers.

More than 46,000 rounds of outgoing had been fired by the Chinese in

their repeated attempts of 7–9, 19–20, and 24–27 July to seize the

Berlin posts and key MLR terrain. Operations during this final month,

as the 2/11 commander was to point out later, on numerous occasions had

verified the wisdom of leaving “direct support artillery battalions in

place during frequent changes of frontline infantry units.”[527]

[527] Col Gordon H. West ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 1 Jul

70, hereafter _West ltr_.

Armored support throughout the 24–27 July period consisted of more than

30 tanks (Company C, AT Company elements of the 1st and 7th Marines, a

section of flames, and Company D platoon) on line or in reserve. Marine

tankers used a record 1,287 shells and 54,845 bullets against the CCF,

while drawing 4,845 rounds of enemy mixed mortar and artillery.

The enemy’s attack on Marine MLR positions, beginning 24 July,

constituted the major action in the I Corps sector the final 10 days

of the war. During this period the Chinese probed I Corps positions 25

times (8 in the Marine, 5 in the 1st Commonwealth, 6 in the 1st ROK,

and 6 in the 7th Infantry Division sectors).

In other parts of the Eighth Army line, the last large-scale action

had broken out east of the Marine sector beginning 13 July when major

elements of six Chinese Communist divisions penetrated a ROK unit to

the right of the IX Corps. As the division’s right and center fell

back, units withdrew into the zones of the IX and ROK II Corps on the

east. General Taylor directed that a new MLR be established south of

the Kumsong River, and a counterattack 17–20 July by three II Corps

divisions attained this objective.

Since the armistice agreement was imminent, no attempt was made

to restore the original line. The Chinese had achieved temporary

success[528] but at heavy cost. Eighth Army officials estimated that

CCF casualties in July reached 72,000 men, with more than 25,000 of

these dead. The enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions of

the five Chinese armies committed in attacks upon the II and IX Corps

sectors.

[528] Minor realignments of the military line of demarcation

were made in the center sector to include a few miles

of territory gained by the Communists in their massive

July offensive there. Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 292;

Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 640; Leckie, _Conflict_, p.

385.

_The Last Day of the War_[529]

[529] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section

is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;

1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 26–28 Jul

53; 1stMarDiv PIR 941, dtd 27 Jul 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul

53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 4/11

ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; HRS Log Sheet, dtd

21 Aug 67 (n.t., about Korean War Casualties, prepared

on request for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC); Leckie,

_Conflict_; Capt C. A. Robinson and Sgt D. L. Cellers,

“Land of the Morning Calm,” _Midwest Reporter_ (Jul 68).

Representatives of the Communist Forces and the United Nations Command

signed the armistice agreement that marked the end of the Korean War

in Panmunjom at 1000 on Monday, 27 July 1953. The cease-fire, ending

two years of often fruitless and hostile truce negotiations, became

effective at 2200 that night. After three years, one month, and two

days the so-called police action in Korea had come to a halt.

Actually, final agreement on the armistice had been expected since

late June. By mid-July it was considered imminent, even though the

CCF during these waning days of the war had launched several major

counteroffensives against ROK troops defending the central part of the

Eighth Army line as well as the Marines in the western I Corps sector.

With the final resolution of hostilities at 1000, a flash message

went out immediately to the 26,000 Marines of General Pate’s division

directing that there be “no celebration firing related in any way to

the advent of the armistice.”[530] Fraternization or communication with

the enemy was expressly forbidden. Personnel were reminded that firing

of all weapons was to be “restricted to the minimum justified by the

tactical situation.”[531] No defensive firing was to take place after

2145 unless the Marines were actually attacked by enemy infantry. Each

frontline company was authorized to fire one white star cluster at

2200, signalling the cease fire.

[530] Msg 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoting Cease Fire

and Armistice Agreement, IUS-OP-9-53.

[531] _Ibid._

The signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July thus ended 36 months

of war for the Marines in Korea. On that date, the 1st Marine Division

initiated plans for its withdrawal to defensive positions south of the

Imjin River. One regiment, the 5th Marines, was left north of the river

to man the general outpost line across the entire division front. A

transition was made at this time from the customary wide-front linear

defense to a defense in depth, similar to that employed in the July

Boulder City battle.

[Illustration:

MAP 33 K. WHITE

EIGHTH ARMY FRONT

27 JULY 1953]

Briefly, the armistice agreement decreed that both UNC and Communist

forces:

Cease fire 12 hours (at 2200, 27 July) after signing of agreement;

Withdraw all military forces, supplies, and equipment from the

demilitarized zone (2,000 yards from line of contact) within 72

hours after effective time of ceasefire;

Locate and list all fortifications and minefields in the DMZ

within 72 hours, to be dismantled during a subsequent salvage

period;

Replace combat personnel and supplies on a one-for-one basis, to

prevent any build-up; and

Begin repatriation of all POWs, with exchange to be completed

within two months.

The 1st Marine Division began that afternoon to close out its existing

MLR[532] and withdraw to its designated post-armistice main battle

position located two kilometers to the south, in the vicinity of the

KANSAS Line. This tactical withdrawal was to be completed no later than

2200 on 30 July.

[532] See Map 33 for Eighth Army dispositions on the last day

of the war.

By early afternoon the three infantry regiments had been ordered to

furnish mine teams to mark, remove, and clear minefields. For units of

the 1st and 7th Marines deployed at the Boulder Hill Outpost--quiet

only since 0300 that morning--the cease-fire news understandably

carried a “let’s see” reaction as the men “waited cautiously throughout

the day in their fortifications for the White Star Cluster which would

signify the end ...”[533] Convincing the men at shell-pocked Boulder

City that a cease-fire was to take place within a few hours would have

been a difficult task that day, however, even for the Commandant.

[533] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” p. 5.

The Marine infantrymen who had been the target of the last heavy

Communist attacks of the war might well have had a special sense of

realism about the end of hostilities. Between the skirmish with Chinese

attacking units in the early hours of the 27th and mine accidents, a

total of 46 Marines had been wounded and removed from duty that last

day of the war and 2 others declared missing in action.

For the more free-wheeling artillerymen of the 11th Marines, that

final day was one of fairly normal operations. During the day, 40

counterbattery missions had been fired, the majority in reply to

Communist batteries that came alive at dusk.[534] A total of 102

countermortar missions were also completed, bringing the total outgoing

that last month to 75,910 rounds. Action of the regiment continued

until 2135, just ten minutes before the preliminary cease-fire which

preceded the official cease-fire at 2200.

[534] The CO of the direct support artillery battalion in the

defense of Boulder City, recalled that “on the evening

of the 27th, with the Armistice only hours away, 2/11

received heavy Chinese artillery fire apparently directed

at the batteries. Of the many rounds ... 80% were duds and

no damage was done. Numerous time fuzed shells detonated

hundreds of meters above ground. We figured that they

were using up old rounds to keep from hauling them back

north.” _West ltr._

For the 7,035 Marine officers and men on duty with General Megee’s 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing, the day was also an active one. That final day of

the war Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Pantherjets from the wing mounted 222

sorties and blasted the enemy with 354 tons of high explosives along

the front. Banshees from VMJ-1 flew 15 reconnaissance sorties during

the day for priority photographs of enemy airfields and railroads.

Last Marine jet pilot in action was Captain William I. Armagost of

VMF-311. He smashed a Communist supply point with four 500-pounders, at

1835, declaring his flight felt “just like the last winning play of a

football game.”[535]

[535] 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53 (Folder 3), CTF-91 msg to ComNavFE,

dtd 27 Jul 53.

The wing closed out its share of the Korean War 35 minutes before

the cease-fire. A VMA-251 aviator, Captain William J. Foster, Jr.,

dropped three 2,000-pound bombs at 2125 in support of UN troops. The

distinction of flying this final Marine mission over the bombline had

gone, fittingly, to the wing’s newly-arrived “Black Patch” squadron.

At sea, U.S. and British warships ended the 17-month naval siege by

shelling Wonsan for the last time, and at 2200 the ships in the harbor

turned on their lights. In compliance with the terms of the armistice,

full evacuation of the WCIDU and ECIDU islands north of the 38th

Parallel started at 2200. Island defense forces off both coasts at this

time began a systematic destruction of their fortifications as they

prepared to move south.

As early as 2100 Marine line units reported seeing Chinese soldiers

forward of their own positions, policing their areas. An hour later

large groups of enemy were observed along the division sector. Some

“waved lighted candles, flashlights, and banners while others removed

their dead and wounded, and apparently looked for souvenirs.”[536]

A few attempts were made by the Chinese to fraternize. One group

approached a Marine listening post and asked for water and wanted to

talk. Others hung up gift bags at the base of outpost Ava and shouted,

“How are you? Come on over and let’s have a party,” while the Marines

stared at them in silence.[537] The last hostile incoming in the 1st

Marine Division sector was reported at 2152 when five rounds of 82mm

mortar landed on a Korean outpost, COP Camel.

[536] 1stMarDiv, ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2. One Marine officer, Major

General Louis Metzger, who at the time was Executive

Officer, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, recalled how voices

of the Chinese Communists’ singing and cheering drifted

across the Han River that night. “It was an eerie

thing ... and very depressing.” MajGen Louis Metzger

comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter _Metzger

comments_.

[537] 1stMarDiv ComdD, _op. cit._, and Rees, _Korea_, p. 434.

Marines on line that night warily scanned the darkness in front of

their trenches. Slowly at first, then with increasing rapidity the

white star cluster shells began to burst over positions all along the

line. Thousands of flares illuminated the sky and craggy hills along

the 155-mile front, from the Yellow Sea to Sea of Japan. The war in

Korea was over. Of the men from the one Marine Division and air wing

committed in Korea during the three-year conflict, 4,262 had been

killed in battle. An additional 26,038 Marines were wounded. No fewer

than 42 Marines would receive the Nation’s highest combat decoration,

the Medal of Honor, for outstanding valor--26 of them posthumously.

CHAPTER X

Return of the Prisoners of War

_Operation_ BIG SWITCH--_Circumstances of Capture--The Communist POW

Camps--CCF “Lenient Policy” and Indoctrination Attempts--The Germ

Warfare Issue--Problems and Performance of Marine POWs--Marine Escape

Attempts--Evaluation and Aftermath_

_Operation_ BIG SWITCH[538]

[538] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section

is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9,

10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv G-3

Jnls, Jul-Aug 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 11thMar,

MAG-33 ComdDs, Jul 53; HRS Subject File VE23.2.S8

“CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File #1

“Prisoners of War--Korea--General”; HRS Subject Files

“Prisoners of War--Korea--News Clippings, folders #1,

#2, #3”; Korea War casualty cards from Statistical

Unit, Casualty Section, Personal Affairs Br, Code DNA,

HQMC; MacDonald, _POW_; Berger, _Korea Knot_; Clark,

_Danube to Yalu_; T. R. Fehrenbach, _This Kind of War--A

Study in Unpreparedness_ (New York: The Macmillan Co.,

1963), hereafter Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, quoted with

permission of the publisher; Field, _NavOps, Korea_;

Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_;

USMA, _Korea_; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “Big Switch,”

_Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53), hereafter

Heinecke, “Big Switch”; _Life_ Magazine, Jul-Aug 53

issues; _New York Times_, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53; _Washington

Post_, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53.

Between August 1950, the month that the first Marine was taken prisoner

and July 1953, when 18 Marine infantrymen were captured in final rushes

by the CCF, a total of 221 U.S. Marines became POWs.[539] The majority

of them--nearly 90 percent--ultimately returned. After the conclusion

of hostilities, Marine POWs were among the UNC fighting men returned in

Operation BIG SWITCH.

[539] Marine Corps prisoners, including their unit designations

and date of release (or death), are listed in MacDonald,

_POW_, pp. 249–273.

The new mission of the 1st Marine Division, with the cease-fire,

called for organization of the Post Armistice Battle Positions and

establishment of a No-Pass Line approximately 200 yards south of the

Demilitarized Zone boundary. In addition to maintaining a defensive

readiness posture for full-scale operations if hostilities resumed,

the Marine division was charged with control of the Munsan-ni area

and assisting in repatriation of prisoners of war. Obviously, since

the Panmunjom release point for receiving the POWs was located in the

Marine zone of action, the division--as in the earlier LITTLE SWITCH

prisoner exchange--would play a major part in the final repatriation.

With the armistice and ending of the war expected almost daily, the

Munsan-ni Provisional Command was activated and reorganized in June.

Once again, the 1st Marine Division was responsible for the United

Nations Personnel and Medical Processing Unit, organized along lines

similar to those used during the preliminary exchange. The division

inspector, Colonel Albert F. Metze, was designated Processing Unit

Commander. Sections under his direction were staffed by Marine and

naval personnel. The normal command structure was reinforced by special

engineer, medical, interpreter, food service, chaplain, security,

signal, supply, and motor transport teams. Planning for the project,

like all military operations, was thorough and continuous.

As in April, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command assumed responsibility

for handling the UN repatriation at Panmunjom as well as supervision of

the receiving and processing of ROKA personnel. Brigadier General Ralph

M. Osborne, USA, was placed in charge of the command, with headquarters

at the United Nations Base Camp. The RCT landing exercise for the

1st Marines, scheduled in July, was cancelled because of shipping

commitments for Operation BIG SWITCH, as the Navy Amphibious Force

readied itself for the repatriation of prisoners. By the end of July,

the 1st Marine Division was supporting “approximately 42,400 troops

with Class I [rations] and 48,600 with Class III [petroleum products]

due to the influx of units and personnel participating in Operation BIG

SWITCH.”[540]

[540] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-134.

Several days before the exchange, however, it became evident that the

old site of the Gate to Freedom used in the April exchange would have

to be abandoned. It was found inadequate to handle the larger number of

returning prisoners--approximately 400 daily--to be processed in the

new month-long operation. The new site, Freedom Village, near Munsan-ni

contained an old Army warehouse which was renovated by the 1st Division

engineers and transformed into the 11th Evacuation Hospital where the

UN Medical and Processing Unit was located. Members of the division

Military Police Company provided security for the exchange area.

Marines from practically every unit of the division were assigned

duties at the United Nations Processing Center. As General Clark, UNC

Commander later recalled:

Preparations for Big Switch were necessarily elaborate. At Munsan

we had a huge warehouse stocked high with clothing, blankets,

medical equipment and other supplies for the returning POWs. At

Freedom Village nearby we had a complete hospital unit ready. It

was one of the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) which had

done such magnificent work close to the front through most of the

war.[541]

[541] Clarke, _Danube to Yalu_, pp. 298–299.

On 5 August, the first day of BIG SWITCH, Colonel Metze took a final

look around the processing center. Readiness of this camp was his

responsibility. If anyone had real understanding of a prisoner’s

relieved and yet shaken reaction to new freedom it was this Marine

Colonel. Chosen by the United Nations Command to build and direct the

enlarged Freedom Village, Colonel Metze himself had been a prisoner of

war in World War II. He knew from personal experience how men should be

treated and what should be done for them early in their new freedom.

For many, this was after nearly three long years in Communist prison

camps. That morning, as described by an observer:

Members of his [Colonel Metze’s] command stood by their cubicles,

awaiting the first signal. The 129 enlisted Marines, corpsmen,

doctors and other UN personnel had held a dress rehearsal only

the day before. Everything was ready.[542]

[542] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 44.

Fifteen miles northwest another group of Marines assigned to the

Provisional Command Receipt and Control section waited almost in the

shadow of the famous “peace pagoda” at Panmunjom. UNC receiving teams,

each headed by a Marine Corps major, “watched the road to the north for

the first sign of a dust cloud which would herald the approach of the

Communist convoy.”[543] The United Nations POWs had been assembled at

Kaesong and held there in several groups, preparatory to the return.

The exchange agreement had specified that the repatriation would

begin at 0900. Precisely at 0855 the Communist convoy, led by three

Russian-made jeeps, each carrying one CCF and two _NKPA_ officers,

moved out from the Communist side of the peace corridor. Trucks and

ambulances followed the jeeps.

[543] _Ibid._

As they approached the exchange site, “a Marine officer bellowed the

familiar naval command, ‘Marines, man your stations!’”[544] Rosters

of the UNC prisoners in the trucks and ambulances were then presented

to the Marine team captains who checked the lists. As they called the

names, “thin, wan, but smiling men shuffled from the trucks to the

medical tents.”[545]

[544] _Ibid._, p. 45.

[545] _Ibid._

Official receipt of the POWs at Panmunjom was by the Munsan-ni

Provisional Command Receipt and Control Officer, assisted by 35

officers and enlisted men from the 1st Marine Division. After their

screening by medical officers, UN returnees not in need of immediate

medical aid were transferred by ambulance to Freedom Village at

Munsan-ni for further processing. Helicopter priority went to litter

patients too weak to travel by ambulance. POWs requiring prompt

treatment were loaded aboard the HMR-161 carriers and flown to the 11th

Evacuation Hospital at Freedom Village.

Seriously injured men were transferred directly to the Inchon hospital

ships for embarkation to the United States, or were air-evacuated to

Japan. South Korean repatriates were processed and went their way to

freedom through nearby Liberty Village, the ROK counterpart of Freedom

Village. A huge map was used to check progress of the POW convoys en

route from Panmunjom to Freedom Village. The departure of ambulances

and helicopters from Panmunjom was radioed ahead to Freedom Village,

where medical personnel and vehicles lined the landing mat.

At Munsan-ni, the newly-freed men received a more thorough physical

exam and the rest of their processing. Here they were again screened

by medical officers to determine their physical condition. Able-bodied

POWs were escorted to the personnel data section where necessary

administrative details were recorded and their military records

brought up to date. Those medically cleared were available for press

interviews. New clothing issue, individually tailored, probably as much

as anything emphasized to a prisoner that his particular Korean War was

over. And nearly all of them found news[546] awaiting them in letters

from home. When all basic details were completed, returnees went into

the recreation and refreshment section. Commonplace iced tea, coffee,

ice cream (the favorite), milk, sandwiches, cigarettes, and the latest

periodicals were luxuries. In their weakened condition, the POWs could

be served only light fare; the big steaks would come later.

[546] For at least two Marines their return home was news in

itself. Captain Paul L. Martelli, VMF-323, had been

reported KIA. First Lieutenant Robert J. O’Shea, of

division headquarters, the son of Marine Brigadier

General George J. O’Shea (Ret), had also been thought

dead by his family. He had been reported missing in July

1951 and had not been carried on the official POW list

released the following December.

The first Marine and fifth man in the processing line on the initial

day, 5 August, was Private First Class Alfred P. Graham, Jr., of H/3/5.

Although too weak to enter the press room, the 21-year-old repatriate

told newsmen later in Tokyo of being fed a diet of cracked corn during

his prison camp stay and of being forced to carry firewood 11 miles

each day. The second Marine returned that day, and the 34th man to

enter Freedom Village, was Sergeant Robert J. Coffee, of the 1st Signal

Battalion. Captured in November 1950, he had been wounded just before

being taken prisoner and had received little medical treatment. Like

other returnees, Coffee stated that the treatment had been very poor

while he was in the hands of the North Koreans but that it had improved

somewhat after he was turned over to the Chinese.

Third and last Marine to come through the line was Private First

Class Pedron E. Aviles, previously with the Reconnaissance Company

of Headquarters Battalion. Knocked unconscious with a rifle butt

while battling the enemy on a patrol on 7 December 1952, he regained

consciousness to find himself a prisoner of the CCF.

On the second day, three more USMC infantrymen traveled that final

road to freedom. They were Private First Class Francis E. Kohus, Jr.,

of A/1/7; Corporal Gethern Kennedy, Jr., I/3/1; and Private First

Class Bernard R. Hollinger, H/3/5. Like the preceding three, their

stories bore a similar pattern: usually they had been captured only

after having been wounded or clubbed unconscious. As with other UNC

prisoners being released daily, they told of the physical cruelty of

their North Korean captors and the mental strain under the Chinese.

Observers noted that many of the men released this second day were in

much poorer physical condition than the initial returnees. In fact, one

ROK prisoner was found to have died in an ambulance while en route to

Liberty Village.

Mostly the repatriates asked questions about their old outfits: “Do you

know if any of the other guys on the outpost got back off the hill?”

and “Did we finally take the damn thing?” “Where’s the 24th Division

now?”[547]

[547] HRB Subject File: “#1, ‘Prisoners Of War--Korea--General,’”

HQMC Div Info release, n.d., n.t.

Technical Sergeant Richard E. Arnold was one of the two Marine combat

correspondents at Freedom Village during BIG SWITCH. He described his

impressions of the returning men--in some cases, coming home after 30

months’ confinement in North Korean POW camps, and others, as little as

30 days:

All are relieved and some a little afraid ... It’s their

first hour of freedom, and most tell you that they can still

hardly believe it’s true. Some are visibly shaken, some are

confused--and all are overwhelmed at the thought of being free

men once again.[548]

[548] _Ibid._

As in prison life everywhere, the POWs told of the hated stool pigeons,

the so-called “progressives.” These were the captives who accepted (or

appeared to accept) the Communist teachings and who, in turn, were

treated better than the “reactionary” prisoners who resisted the enemy

“forced feeding” indoctrination. Continued the Marine correspondent:

They don’t talk much. When they do, it’s ... mainly of

progressives and reactionaries--the two social groups of prisoner

life under the rule of Communism, the poor chow and medical care,

and of the desire to fight Communism again.

When you ask, they tell you of atrocities committed during

the early years of the war with a bitterness of men who have

helplessly watched their friends and buddies die. Of forced

marches, the bitter cold, and the endless political lectures they

were forced to attend.[549]

[549] _Ibid._

One of the last--possibly _the last_--Marine captured by the Chinese

was Private First Class Richard D. Johnson, of G/3/1. The 20-year-old

machine gunner had been in the final battle of the war, the Boulder

City defense, and was taken 25 July, just two days before the signing

of the truce. Private First Class Johnson was returned the 19th day of

the exchange. Another Marine seized in that same action was Private

First Class Leonard E. Steege, H/3/7. As he entered the gate, he

momentarily shook up Corporal James E. Maddell, a military policeman

on duty at Freedom Village. Maddell said the last time he saw Steege

was during the fighting for the outpost. “He was a dead Marine then,”

Maddel said, “but I guess it was just a case of mistaken identity.”[550]

[550] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 48.

Captain Jesse V. Booker of Headquarters Squadron 1, the first Marine

POW of the war, who had been captured on 7 August 1950, was also one

of the earliest MAW personnel released. Booker and First Lieutenant

Richard Bell, VMF-311, were returned to UNC jurisdiction on 27 August,

the first Marine aviators to be sent back.

In addition to the regular issue of Marine utilities, gold naval

aviator’s wings, donated by 1st MAW fliers, were pinned on the chests

of returning pilots by Wing General Megee and Division General Pate.

Also welcoming Marine returnees at Freedom Village were Brigadier

General Verne J. McCaul, the new Assistant Wing Commander; General

Burger, ADC; and Colonel Metze, who also “found time during the busy

days to greet and talk with every Marine and Navy Corpsman who passed

through.”[551] Among those dignitaries[552] present for the occasion

were General Taylor, EUSAK CG; General Clarke, I Corps Commander;

Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens; and various U.S. senators.

[551] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 53, App. VI, p. 12.

[552] As the exchange got underway, General Mark Clark was on a

trip to the U.S. Unable to greet the returning prisoners,

as he had at LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC Commander had a

welcoming letter waiting for each repatriate. A booklet

especially prepared for returning POWs which contained a

quick fill-in on world news and sports events they may

have missed as prisoners was also given each returnee.

_Washington Post_, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 3.

During August enlisted POWs were recovered in large numbers.

Officers, generally, did not arrive at Kaesong--the first step to

Panmunjom--until about 21 August. After that date they were gradually

returned to friendly control.

Even as late as 26 August there was considerable concern over the

fate of hundreds of Allied officers not yet repatriated. Some early

returning officers told of colonels, majors and captains who had been

sentenced up to ten years for forming “reactionary groups” in camp. One

field grade officer had been sentenced to a long prison term on the

eve of the armistice.[553] A similar thing nearly happened to Captain

John P. Flynn, VMF(N)-513, long a thorn in the side of his Communist

captors. Like a number of UNC airmen falsely charged with waging germ

warfare, he vigorously denounced these allegations. “Even as late as

the end of August the Marine was threatened with nonrepatriation, and

his experience formed the basis for an episode in the novel _A Ride to

Panmunjom_.”[554]

[553] HRS Subject File: “#1. “PRISONERS OF

WAR--Korea--General,” _Washington News_ article, dtd 26

Aug 53 from Panmunjom, “Officers’ Fate Worries Army,” by

Jim G. Lucas.

[554] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 225.

Between 5 August-6 September, 3,597 U.S. servicemen were returned

during Operation BIG SWITCH, including 129 ground and 28 air Marines.

This 157 figure represents a total of 42 officers and 115 enlisted

repatriated during this second and final POW exchange. Of the 27 Naval

personnel freed, at least 6 were hospital corpsmen serving with the 1st

Marine Division when they were taken. Counting the 157 Marines released

in Operation BIG SWITCH and the 15 wounded POWs sent back in April, a

total of 172 division and wing Marines were returned in the two POW

exchanges.

Although the switch took place over a five-week period, 38 Marines,

or 24 percent, were not released until late in the proceedings, in

September. As one author noted, “It was Communist policy to hold the

‘reactionaries’ ... to the last.”[555]

[555] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, p. 651.

Two of the best-known Marine “reactionaries” who had openly defied

their Communist jailers during their entire period of captivity,

were then-Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash, a VMA-121 pilot, and

then-Major John N. McLaughlin, taken POW in November 1950. McLaughlin

was released on 1 September and Thrash on 5 September in a group of 275

Americans returned, the largest number for any single day’s transfer

since the exchange began. The most famous U.S. prisoner held by the

Communists was Major General William F. Dean. Formerly commander of the

U.S. Army 24th Division, he had been captured in August 1950 after the

fall of Taejon.

Ever since Operation BIG SWITCH got under way, every returnee had

been asked if he had seen or heard of General Dean. None had. Many UN

officers felt--uneasily--that he would probably be the last officer to

be sent back. In fact, he emerged from imprisonment on 4 September “to

be greeted with cheers at Freedom Village.”[556] Major Walter R. Harris

and the most senior Marine captured during the war, Colonel Frank H.

Schwable, later to be the central figure in a Court of Inquiry, were

among the last nine Marines returned on 6 September, the final day

of the switch. And so, one by one, the last 160 American POWs passed

through Panmunjom. All were men marked by the enemy as “war criminals.”

[556] _Life_ Magazine, v. 35, no. 11 (15 Sep 53), p. 42.

One Army sergeant, who freely admitted he could “never adequately

describe how he felt when he knew he was going home”[557] recalled

those final moments as a newly-freed prisoner:

[557] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, p. 651.

At 1100 his truck pulled up at Panmunjom, the last convoy of

American POWs to be exchanged. A huge, moustached Marine master

sergeant walked up beside the truck, called out: “I will call

out your last name. You will answer with your first name, middle

initial, and Army serial number ...”

“Schlichter!”

Schlichter [Charles B., Sgt.], barked out his response, and

stepped down.

“Sergeant,” the big Marine said gravely, “glad to have you home.”

“Fella, you don’t know how glad _I_ am,” Schlichter said.[558]

[558] _Ibid._

In the preliminary prisoner exchange, the week-long “LITTLE SWITCH”

in April 1953, all of the returned Marine personnel were men who had

been wounded at the time of their capture. They were recently-captured

POWs, deliberately segregated by the enemy from early captives. All of

these home-coming Marines had been captured since May 1952. Generally

speaking, they had all been fairly well-treated.

During Operation BIG SWITCH, by contrast, 41 Marines were repatriated

who had spent nearly three years as Communist prisoners of war. The

majority of USMC returnees in this second exchange, however--a total of

91--had been captured relatively recently, in 1952 and 1953, and 25 had

been held since 1951.

Throughout Operation BIG SWITCH, the Allied Command transferred a total

of 75,799 prisoners (70,159 NKPA and 5,640 CCF) seeking repatriation.

The Communist returned 12,757 POWs. In addition to the 3,597 Americans,

this total represented 1,312 other UNC troops (including 947 Britons,

228 Turks, and small numbers of Filipinos, Australians, and Canadians)

and 7,848 South Koreans.

The BIG SWITCH exchange went relatively smoothly, marred for a while

only by the unruly behavior of some Communist diehard POWs. In a manner

reminiscent of their earlier camp riots, the Communist POWs put on

a blatant propaganda show for the benefit of world newsreel cameras.

As the train carrying CCF and North Korean prisoners moved into the

Panmunjom exchange point, enemy POWs noisily shouted Communist slogans,

defiantly waved Communist flags, and hurled insults at UN forces.

Some POWs stripped off their [U.S. provided] uniforms, “tossing them

contemptuously to the ground.”[559] Others spat in the faces of U.S.

supervising officers, threw their shoes at jeep windshields, and sang

in Korean and Chinese “We will return in the Fall.”[560]

[559] _Life_ Magazine, v. 35, no. 7 (17 Aug 53), p. 22.

[560] _Metzger comments._

Marine division and wing elements were designated responsible for

the security of nonrepatriated enemy POWs. By terms of the armistice

agreement, these were held by UNC custodial forces from India. In

commenting on the airlift operations, performed largely by HMR-161, the

UNC Commander noted:

We had to go to great lengths to live up to our pledge to Syngman

Rhee that no Indian troops would set foot on South Korean soil.

Therefore, we set up an airlift operation which carried more than

six thousand Indians from the decks of our carriers off Inchon by

helicopter to the Demilitarized Zone. It was a major undertaking

which just about wore out our helicopter fleet in Korea.[561]

[561] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 299.

One of the recommendations made by military officials after the April

LITTLE SWITCH exchange was that all interrogation of returning POWs

be done either in America or on board ship en route home, rather than

in Tokyo. This system was followed and worked out well. The POWs

boarded ships at Inchon, following their clearance at Freedom Village.

Interrogation teams, in most cases, completed this major part of their

repatriation processing before docking at San Francisco. Two weeks

of recuperation, good food and rest aboard ship enabled many POWs to

arrive home in far better shape for reunion with their families than

they had been in when received initially at Panmunjom.

As in LITTLE SWITCH, Marine and Navy personnel were processed by

members of the Intelligence Department of Commander, Naval Forces

Far East, augmented by officers from other Marine staffs. Marine

officers who conducted the shipboard interrogations again included

Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, ComNavFE liaison officer, as well as

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Wood, Major Stewart C. Barber, and First

Lieutenant Robert A. Whalen. All returning POWs were queried in depth

by counterintelligence personnel about enemy treatment and atrocities,

questionable acts committed by that small proportion of our own men

whose conduct was reprehensible, and routine military matters. A

security dossier was prepared on each prisoner, and all data about

him went into his file case. The LITTLE SWITCH reports had indicated

earlier--and this was subsequently confirmed--that some U.S. servicemen

were definitely marked for further detailed questioning and scrutiny.

_Circumstances of Capture_[562]

[562] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section

is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE 23.2.S8 “CMC

Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File:

“Korea--Korean War--General”; MacDonald, _POW_; Montross,

Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--East-Central Front_,

v. IV; Matthew B. Ridgway, _The Korean War_ (Garden City:

Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Ridgway, _Korean

War_; Heinecke, “Big Switch.”

As the Commandant, General Shepherd, was to testify later during an

investigation, “the prisoner of war question had never been a major

problem [in the Marine Corps] due to the extremely limited number of

Marines taken prisoner.”[563] As one returnee at BIG SWITCH bluntly

put it: “You fought until they reached you with a bullet or a rifle

butt--that was the end.”[564]

[563] HRS Subject File: “VE 23.2.S8--CMC Statements on Korean

POWs,” CMC Statement dtd 14 Apr 54, p. 2.

[564] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 58.

Of the 221 U.S. Marines captured during the Korean War, more than

half--121--were seized after 20 September 1951. For the Marine Corps

this date marked the time when “warfare of position replaced a warfare

of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the conflict in

Korea.”[565] Both in the X Corps sector in eastern Korea where the

1st Marine Division was located at that time, as well as later on the

Korean western front, the Marine Corps was denied its traditional

aggressive fighting role. The Marines (along with the rest of the UNC

forces) ceased offensive operations, were reduced to making limited

attacks, and were under order from higher echelons to “firm up the

existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it.”[566]

[565] Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p.

201.

[566] _Ibid._

The mission of the Marine division thereby evolved into “an aggressive

defense of their sector of responsibility” as records duly phrased it.

On a larger scale, the nature of the Korean War, from about November

1951 on, reverted to that of July and August,[567] characterized

primarily by minor patrol clashes and small unit struggles for key

outpost positions. This became the pattern for the remainder of the

war. It changed only when the decreed mission of an “active defense

of its sector” by a UNC unit became this in fact. Normal defense

then escalated into sharp, vigorous fighting to retain friendly key

ground positions being attacked by the enemy. One American writer, in

a discussion of the British defense in depth concept (adopted by the

Marine Corps late in the war), went so far as to blame heavy Marine

casualties in Korea on EUSAK’s outpost system.[568]

[567] In July 1951, fighting had quieted down all along the

UNC front, as a result of truce talks initiated by the

Communists. This conveniently provided the enemy, at that

time hard-pressed, a much-needed breathing spell. The

lull in ground fighting continued until late August when

the truce negotiations were suspended.

[568] HRS Subject file “Korea--Korean War--General,” article

_Washington Times-Herald_, dtd 20 Aug 53, by Walter

Simmons, p. 27.

Approximately half of the 100 Marines taken prisoner by September

1951--43--had fallen into enemy hands during the last two days

of November 1950. They had been part of the ill-fated Task Force

Drysdale,[569] a composite Royal Marine-USMC-Army convoy that was

ambushed by the Chinese en route to the Chosin Reservoir. These facts

are relevant to a better understanding of the Commandant’s statement

that, traditionally, few Marines become prisoners of war.

[569] For further details of this action, see MacDonald,

_POW_, pp. 33–43; Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops

Korea--Chosin_, v. III, pp. 140–141, 225–235; and Reese,

_Korea_, p. 162.

Overall, the survival rate for Marines taken captive during the

Korean War was 87.8 percent. Even for the worst year, 1950, when NKPA

treatment was more ruthless and brutal than the CCF (and in any event,

for those men longest-held), the Marine survival rate was 75 percent.

Marine Corps statistics show that of 221 Marines captured, 194 (43

officers, 151 enlisted) returned, and 27 or 12.2 percent died.[570]

Only a few Marines were afflicted with “give-up-itis,” the malady

that struck countless POWs and took a heavy toll of lives. Included

among these 194 returnees were the 172 men from the two POW exchanges,

as previously noted; plus a group of 18 Marines captured in 1950 who

escaped and rejoined USMC units in May 1951; two enlisted men who

escaped less than a week after being taken; and two others released by

the enemy after less than a month’s captivity.

[570] Records indicate that 3 officers and 18 enlisted died

while in captivity. Three officers and 3 enlisted POWs

were also presumed to have died. MacDonald, _POW_, pp.

257–259.

In a pure statistical oddity, the survival percentage for both Marine

officers and enlisted (as well as the overall return rate) turned out

to be the same: 87 percent.

Without going into an analysis here of the possible relevant factors,

it is interesting to note that 62 percent of all U.S. captured military

personnel returned after the Korean War and that roughly 38 percent

died while imprisoned.[571] During World War II, the death rate for

U.S. prisoners held by the Axis powers was approximately 11 percent.

[571] The number of American servicemen returned was

approximately 4,428 of 7,190 captured during the war.

_Encyclopaedia Britannica_, 1966 edition, “Prisoners

of War--Korean War,” p. 519B. Earlier DOD “Tentative

Final Report of U.S. Battle Casualties in the Korean

War,” cited by MacDonald, _POW_, p. 230, indicated 7,140

Americans were captured, 4,418 recovered, and 2,701 died.

Either way, the percentages remain the same.

Circumstances accounting for the capture of Marines during the Korean

War were, as in every war, an occupational hazard. In most cases,

prisoners were taken in one of two situations. One occurred when

overwhelming numbers of hostile forces suddenly surrounded and overran

a small outpost, and either killed or captured a high proportion of its

defenders. The second resulted from the well-known increasing accuracy

of CCF antiaircraft fire. Halfway through the war it began to take its

toll of 1st MAW pilots with similarly predictable results: either death

or capture. Simple mischance and the human error of confused directions

caused at least two ground Marines to blunder into enemy territory.[572]

[572] A similar mishap had dire consequences for Major

General Dean of the Army. Cut off from his unit, he

was attempting to return to the U.S. line. Lacking a

compass he walked to the southwest--and thereby into NKPA

hands--instead of the southeast where U.S. troops were

then heavily engaged in the fierce battle of the Pusan

Perimeter.

A brief review of the Korean War, chronologically, illustrates how

some of the men of the 1st Marine Division wound up as prisoners. In

the first week of August 1950, leading elements of the 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade and the 1st MAW air squadrons arrived in Korea. Soon

thereafter the Marine Corps was in the thick of these early-moving

offensives: at the Pusan Perimeter; the September Inchon-Seoul

amphibious landings; Fox Hill at Toktong Pass, Yudam-ni, the Task Force

Drysdale operation, all in November; and the October-December Chosin

Reservoir campaign, including the two-day movement from Hagaru to

Koto-ri in early December. Marine infantry, military police, tankers,

motor transport personnel, and artillerymen were listed MIA in these

operations.

Altogether, 79 Marines were captured during the first year. November

1950, when 58 Marines were lost to the enemy, would rank as the most

costly month of the entire war in terms of Marines seized in combat.

The first air POW, Captain Booker, was shot down 7 August while flying

a reconnaissance mission from the USS _Valley Forge_. (This was the

same date that infantrymen of the Marine Provisional Brigade saw their

initial heavy fighting in what was then considered only a “police

action.”) Captain Booker was to remain the only Marine pilot in enemy

hands until April 1951.

One ground Marine captured during the hectic days of August 1950

escaped before ever becoming listed as a casualty. Although Private

First Class Richard E. Barnett thus does not technically qualify as a

POW statistic, he still holds the distinction of being both one of the

first Marine captives and one of the few to escape.[573]

[573] A radio-jeep driver, Private First Class Barnett, was

returning to his unit when he made a wrong turn and,

instead, came upon a group of North Koreans. The enemy

fired and halted the vehicle, quickly taking Barnett

prisoner. Beaten, searched, and interrogated, the Marine

was placed in a heavily-guarded cellar. For several days

he was given only a few crackers to eat. On the third

night, unaccountably, the Koreans took him along on an

attack. As they neared the objective, Barnett noticed

that all but one of his NKPA guards had gotten ahead of

him. He deliberately fell, throwing a rock in the face

of the nearby guard, and raced for safety. Successfully

eluding his captors, Private First Class Barnett later

rejoined his own forces. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 8–10.

Few Marines were taken during 1951. Of the 31 seized throughout the

entire year, 13 were from the division and 18 from the wing. The

Marines were engaged in antiguerrilla activities until late February

when a general advance was ordered by U.S. IX and X Corps to deny

positions to the enemy. The 1st Marine Division was committed near

Wonju, as part of the IX Corps. A second offensive, Operation RIPPER,

was launched in March, and for the next six weeks small inroads were

made against CCF forces. Relieved in the Hongchon area the next month

by elements of the U.S. 2d and 7th Divisions, the Marines continued to

operate as part of the IX Corps. Their mission was to secure objectives

north of the 38th Parallel. On 21 April the 1st Marine Division

launched its attack, on IX Corps order, encountering moderate to

heavy resistance. Throughout the first half of 1951, only five Marine

infantrymen were captured.

Truce negotiations, as earlier noted, began at Kaesong on 10 July

1951 and ground fighting slowed. When the Communists broke off the

truce sessions in late August General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander,

ordered an offensive by the X Corps to seize the entire Punchbowl.

Along with other X Corps divisions, the Marines attacked on 31

August. They secured initial objectives, and then moved north to the

Soyang River to seize additional designated objectives. Following the

bitter action in the Punchbowl area, the Marines were involved in

consolidating and improving their defenses.

As the battle lines became comparatively stabilized in 1951, the enemy

began to develop his AA defenses to peak efficiency. Marine pilots

engaged in CAS, observation, interdiction, and armed reconnaissance

missions began to encounter accurate and intense ground fire.[574]

Aircraft losses increased, and with them, the number of USMC aviators

who fell into enemy hands. More than half of the Marine POWs taken

during the year--18 of 31--were on 1st MAW station lists. Captive

airmen represented VMF-323, VMF(N)-513, Hedron MAG-33 (Headquarters

Squadron 33), VMO-6, VMF-312, VMF-311, and VMA-121.

[574] One Marine who had conducted volunteer AAA reconnaissance

missions over North Korea was Lieutenant Colonel Charles

W. May, CO of the 1st 90mm AAAGunBn. In December 1951

he was lost in such a mission--the same flight in which

Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, of VMA-121, was captured.

MajGen A. F. Binney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd

14 Sep 66.

The year 1952, like 1950, saw a large number of Marines taken into

hostile custody--a total of 70. As the year began, CCF and UNC ground

forces had settled down to a bunker warfare system often compared to

the trench warfare of World War I. Air activity remained much as it

had the preceding year. Air losses decreased, however, with only 11

pilots becoming POWs, in contrast to the 59 infantry Marines captured.

In March, the 1st Marine Division moved from the X Corps zone of

action on the east-central front to the I Corps western coastal flank.

Here the Marines encountered “steadily increasing aggressiveness as

the enemy launched larger and more frequent attacks against outpost

positions.”[575] Probes, patrol actions, and aggressive defense of the

MLR and its outposts took their toll.

[575] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 139.

Enemy pressure reached its height in October, when 41 Marine

infantrymen were seized, the second highest number taken in any month

during the war. In the COPs Detroit and Frisco defense of 6–7 October,

the 7th Marines listed 22 MIA, of whom 13 became POWs, practically all

of them being wounded prior to capture. On 26 October, the Communists

lunged at 7th Marines COPs Ronson and Warsaw, adjacent to the main

battle position, the Hook. In the ensuing action, 27 Marines were

“marched, carried, or dragged off the hill and taken into the Chinese

lines.”[576] Surprisingly, all 27 were recovered alive in the prisoner

exchanges the following year.

[576] _Ibid._, p. 149.

Of the 11 Marine airmen who became statistics on a POW list in 1952, 4

were shot down in an ill-fated 10-day period beginning 6 May. Again,

all-too-accurate hostile AA fire was the villain. In similar incidents

during the year, two Marines engaged in “good Samaritan” aerial

activities became POWs for their efforts. In February, First Lieutenant

Kenneth W. Henry, an AO assigned to the Marine detachment aboard the

light cruiser USS _Manchester_, and Lieutenant Edwin C. Moore, USN,

whirled off in the cruiser’s HO3S to attempt rescue of a downed Navy

fighter pilot, Ensign Marvin Broomhead. In the bright early afternoon,

as Henry was maneuvering the helicopter sling, their ship suddenly

crashed--apparently from enemy machine gun fire intended for a combat

air patrol operating in the vicinity. Two of the three men--Broomhead

and Henry--were injured, but managed to drag themselves to a hidden

position and waited to be rescued. Instead, they were discovered

shortly before midnight by a Chinese patrol.

A similar mishap occurred on 16 May to First Lieutenant Duke Williams,

Jr., of VMF-212. Searching for a crashed pilot, his plane was struck by

AA and he managed to jump. His parachute blossomed down into the midst

of 15 waiting Koreans who had gathered to take him prisoner.

During the last seven months of hostilities in Korea, from January-July

1953, 41 Marines were captured. These included a VMO-6 pilot and air

observer in the little OE-1 spotting planes shot down in two separate

incidents, plus 39 ground Marines trapped in the vicious outpost

struggles of March and July. Except for two Marines who died, the rest

were freed a few months after their capture during Operation BIG SWITCH.

Summarizing it another way, of the 221 Marines captured during the

three-year conflict:

-- 49 were officers and 172 enlisted;

-- 190 were ground personnel and 31 aviators;

-- of the 190 ground troops, 19 were officers and 171 enlisted;

-- of the 31 aviators, 30 were officer pilots and 1 was enlisted.

The 7th Marines, which was the unit on line at the time of several

major CCF attacks, had the highest number of POWs in the division.

A total of 70 men, or 59.3 percent[577] of the 118 infantry Marines

taken, were from the 7th. The record during this 1950–1953 period for

the others is as follows: 1st Marines, 15 POWs; 5th Marines, 33; and

the division artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, 14. Six pilots from

Marine Fighter Squadron 312 found themselves unwilling guests in North

Korea. Four other units--VMO-6, VMF-323, VMF-311, and VMF(N)-513--each

had five members who served out the rest of the war as POWs.

[577] Recapitulation of facts from MacDonald, _POW_, pp.

260–269 and _passim_.

_The Communist POW Camps_[578]

[578] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section

is derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Montross, Kuokka,

and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--East-Central Front_, v. IV;

Barclay, _Commonwealth_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_;

Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.

The Communist POW camp system, under Chinese direction, began in late

December 1950. Marines captured in November and December, along with

U.S. Army troops, British Commandos, and other Allied personnel,

were forced-marched north to Kanggye, not far from the Manchurian

border.[579] In the bitter cold, while winter howled through North

Korea, the column of prisoners limped its way to its final destination,

arriving the day after Christmas. Several of the group, including

Marines, perished during the four-day march--victims of malnutrition,

untreated combat wounds, pneumonia, the stinging, freezing wind,

and subzero temperatures. Usually, “the Communists moved them [the

prisoners] by night, because they feared the United Nations air power

which ... ranged over the whole of North Korea.”[580]

[579] Although some American prisoners were taken in the summer

of 1950, it was not until the late autumn that large

numbers of men taken in several major engagements created

a need for a permanent prison-camp system. Rees, _Korea_,

p. 330.

[580] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, pp. 423–424.

During the first three months of 1951, a network of POW camps was

developed along the southern shores of the Yalu River. Occupants of

the forlorn villages were evacuated, and newly captured UNC prisoners

moved in. The main camp operation at this time was in the Kanggye area.

This was a temporary indoctrination center established in October

1950 before the development of regular POW camps. (For various CCF

camp locations, see Map 34.) Ultimately a group of a half dozen or so

permanent camps were developed northeast of Sinuiju, along a 75-mile

stretch of the Yalu.

By early 1951, Major McLaughlin, a captured Marine staff officer

previously attached to X Corps, was senior officer among the Kanggye

prisoners which included a heterogeneous collection of U.S. 7th

Division soldiers, U.S. Marines, 18 Royal Marine Commandos, and Navy

hospitalmen. UN personnel were scattered throughout several farmhouses,

with no attempt made to segregate the enlisted and officers. The

Chinese designated prisoner squads of 8–12 men, depending on the size

of the room to which they were assigned. CCF-appointed squad leaders

were those prisoners who appeared more cooperative.

In direct opposition to orders, Major McLaughlin set about establishing

communication between the small scattered POW groups, despite

ever-present surveillance. He tried to achieve effective control of

the POWs so that a united front of resistance against the enemy could

be maintained. At mass indoctrination meetings, held regularly every

few days, the Marine officer issued instructions to enlisted personnel

through five Marine noncommissioned officers. As one ex-prisoner

recalled, the “cold, smoke-filled barn was the locale for wide-spread

exchange of information between the many little groups.”[581] Daily

routine at Kanggye stressed study and political indoctrination. Squad

leaders were responsible for lectures and discussions on assigned

topics in Marxian dialectical materialism. The curriculum was more

intense than most college courses. On the other hand, physical

treatment of inmates--except for chronic malnutrition and grossly

inadequate medical care--at Kanggye was less brutal than at most of the

other prisoner compounds.

[581] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 63.

[Illustration:

MAP 34 K. White

POW CAMPS IN WHICH MARINES WERE HELD]

Interrogations went hand-in-hand with indoctrination. Prisoners were

grilled regularly on order of battle, close air support, naval gunfire

methods, UN aircraft, weapons, unit locations, and other tactical

information. The Chinese were even more interested in the life

histories and biographical data of their captives. POWs were required

to answer “economic questionnaires” and at frequent intervals compelled

to write elaborate self-criticisms of their political attitudes and

class backgrounds. The CCF were satisfied only when prisoners--whose

original truthful answers had been rejected--revised their own family

status and income statistics downward. POWs, being interrogated, often

found the Chinese arguing with them over such far-away matters as the

prisoner’s parents or his own family annual income and social level.

In March 1951, after an indoctrination period of about eight weeks, the

Kanggye POWs were transferred, and the camp itself was later abandoned.

The officers were relocated at Camp 5, Pyoktong, while the majority

continued the march westward to the newly opened Camp 1, at Chongsong.

Despite its numerical designation as Camp 5, the Pyoktong compound had

been organized two months earlier and was the first of the permanent

CCF centers. It became the headquarters of the entire prison-camp

system. Approximately 2,000 UNC prisoners were interned here by the

early part of the year. They were housed in native huts. New inmates

arrived regularly from temporary collection centers in the south, where

they had been held for months. Sometimes they were marched to the Yalu

during the Korean winter while still wearing their summer fatigues.

Pyoktong offered little chance for escape. The compound, situated on a

barren peninsula that jutted out into the Yalu Reservoir, was so secure

that the Communists did not even surround it with barbed wire or employ

searchlights. It was hemmed in on three sides by fast water currents,

while the one exit from the peninsula was closely guarded.

Conditions were far more severe here than at Kanggye. A starvation diet

and complete lack of medical care quickly had their inevitable effect.

Pneumonia, dysentery, and malnutrition were rampant. The basic diet of

boiled corn or millet resulted in associated deficiency diseases, such

as beriberi and pellagra. Between 20 and 30 prisoners died daily. Many

experts, nonetheless, felt that “if the Chinese during the winter of

1950–51 killed their prisoners by deliberate neglect, the North Koreans

who had handled the captives before they became primarily a Chinese

responsibility killed them by calculated brutality.”[582]

[582] Rees, _Korea_, p. 330.

Although now junior to some Army and Air Force officers, Major

McLaughlin was elected by his fellow officer-prisoners to represent

them. Recognized by the Chinese as a staunch non-cooperative and

dedicated trouble-maker, the enemy concentrated their pressure on the

Marine officer--and he was subjected to intimidation, maltreatment, and

threats of death.

As they had at Kanggye, the CCF attempted to organize progressive

groups to write peace appeals, propaganda leaflets, and articles

condemning the United States for the war. Typically, progressive

POWs (usually weaker, less resilient members) who went along with

the Communist propaganda conditioning, received better rations and

treatment. Rugged resisters, on the other hand, could dependably expect

to stand a considerable amount of solitary confinement, usually in an

unspeakably foul, vermin-infested “hole.” Here a POW was forced to

remain in a debilitating, crouched position usually 56 hours or more.

Throughout the war a good many Marines were to know this particular

enemy treatment. One Marine artilleryman, Second Lieutenant Roland L.

McDaniel, tied to a Korean POW in the hole for 10 days, emerged with

pneumonia and tuberculosis.

In addition to the POW compounds at Pyoktong and Chongsong, other sites

where Marines were held were Camp 3, at Changsong (nearby and with a

nearly identical name to Camp 1), primarily for enlisted personnel, and

at “The Valley.” This was a temporary medical processing center in the

Kanggye area. Marine inmates here were often confined to a pig pen.

Largely because of the filthy conditions of this camp, the death rate

quickly earned the Valley the opprobrious name of Death Valley.

Another cluster of POW camps was located further south. These were

primarily run by the North Koreans, and were transit camps where

prisoners were collected and interrogated before being moved north

by truck or on foot to the permanent establishments. Among them were

collection centers at Kung Dong and Chorwon, and Camp 10, south of the

North Korean Capital Pyongyang. The latter was also known variously

as the Mining Camp, the Gold Mine, or Bean Camp--this due to its

prevailing diet. At this southernmost Communist camp, POWs were

required to dig coal in the nearby mine shafts. Loads of coal were then

hauled in small hand carts over icy roads to the camp, a task made more

difficult by the prisoners’ skimpy mealtime fare.

The most notorious of all the camps, however, was Pak’s Palace,[583]

the interrogation center near Pyongyang. POWs also called it Pak’s

Death Palace for its chief interrogator, a sadistic North Korean

officer, Major Pak. Captain Martelli, a F4U fighter pilot from VMF-323

shot down in April 1951, was the first Marine processed through Pak’s,

where POWs were continuously threatened and beaten with little or no

provocation. Another Marine aviator, Captain Gerald Fink, VMF-312,

upon being asked during interrogation here why he had come to Korea

won a sentence of several days solitary confinement in the hole for

his forthright answer: “to kill Communists.” Second Lieutenant Carl

R. Lindquist, also of VMF-312, was the only one of 18 Marine officers

captured in 1951 not processed through Pak’s before being sent north.

[583] The Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners

of War later adjudged Pak’s to have been “the worst camp

endured by American POWs in Korea.” MacDonald, _POW_, p.

104.

Gradually the Chinese developed the policy of segregating officer and

enlisted personnel. Commenting on this procedure, one British observer

offered the following:

By this means the lower ranks were deprived of their leaders

and for a short time this had a depressing, and generally bad,

effect. It was not long, however, before the natural leaders

among the rank and file asserted themselves. The standard of

leadership naturally varied in different compounds; but in all

there was some organization and in some it was highly efficient.

It was ... the policy of the Chinese ... to discourage the

emergence of thrustful leaders.... Consequently, clandestine

rather than open leadership was usual.[584]

[584] Barclay, _Commonwealth_, p. 190.

By midyear, noncommissioned officers were also separated from the

enlisted men, in an attempt to better control prisoners. In October

of 1951 another one of the Yalu River Camps was set up. This was Camp

2, at Pi-chong-ni, which thereafter served as the main officers camp.

The next month a POW column of nearly 50 men, including 6 Marines, left

Kung Dong for these northern camps on a death march that covered 225

miles in two weeks. During the excruciating march, prisoners had been

forced to strip naked and wade across the Chongsong River, a procedure

which caused several deaths and cases of frostbite. One British

participant, however, recalled that the “Marines banded together during

the terrible march, and the Royal Marines were drawn close to the U.S.

Marines.”[585]

[585] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 127.

In December 1951 the Communist and UNC forces exchanged lists of

captured personnel. The list of 3,198 American POWs (total UNC: 11,559)

revealed that 61 Marines were in enemy hands. Nine others, captured

late in the year, were still in temporary collection points and thus

not listed. Although Marines represented only a small portion of the

total POWs, they were present in most of the nearly dozen regular camps

or collection points then in existence. In any event the 1951 POW

list[586] gave a picture of the growing Communist camp system.

[586] Negotiations broke down at this point. No other list was

offered by Communist officials until the first exchange

of wounded POWs, 17 months later, in the April 1953

LITTLE SWITCH operation. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks,

_USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p. 223.

As 1951 was drawing to an end, the Camp 2 commandant, a fanatical

Communist named Ding, ordered UNC prisoners to prepare and send

a New Year’s greeting to the commander of the CCF, General Peng

Teh-huai. Senior UN officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, USAF,

was determined that the prisoners would not sign the spurious holiday

message. Major McLaughlin voluntarily organized Marine resistance, and

senior officers of other nationality groups followed suit. No greetings

were sent. As usually happened, an informer reported the organized

resistance and furnished names of the reactionary leaders. The

following month, the six ranking officers were sentenced to solitary

confinement, ranging from three to six months, for their “subversive

activities.”

The episode marked the first really organized resistance to the

Chinese. “Although the principals were subjected to months of solitary

confinement, coercion, torture, and very limited rations during the

bitterly cold months of early 1952, their joint effort laid the

foundation for comparatively effective resistance within Camp 2 during

the remainder of the war.”[587]

[587] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 138.

In January 1952, Major McLaughlin and the other five officers were

removed to begin their long tours of solitary confinement. Although the

remaining Marine officers at Pi-chong-ni had “formed a tightly knit

group and consulted among themselves on every major issue,”[588] the

atmosphere within the camp itself became highly charged and strained.

Suspicion of informers and opportunists was rampant. The officers at

Camp 2 were generally agreed that Marine Lieutenant Colonel Thrash,

who arrived in June, was largely responsible for restoring discipline.

He issued an all-inclusive order about camp behavior for all personnel

which read, in part:

[588] _Ibid._, p. 164.

Study of Communist propaganda would not be countenanced. If study

was forced on them, POWs were to offer passive resistance and no

arguments.

If prisoners were subject to trial or punishment they were to

involve no one but themselves.

There would be no letters written using any titles or return

address which might prove beneficial to the Communists for

propaganda value.[589]

[589] _Ibid._, pp. 165–166.

Expectedly, it was not long before Lieutenant Colonel Thrash’s efforts

to influence and organize his fellow officers outraged CCF officials.

In September he was removed from the compound, charged with “Criminal

Acts and Hostile Attitude against the Chinese People’s Volunteers.”

The Marine airman spent the next eight months in solitary. Here he

was subjected to constant interrogation, harassment, and duress. On

one occasion he was bound, severely beaten, and thrown outside half

naked in sub-zero weather. Shock of the severe temperature rendered

him unconscious, and he nearly died. Throughout his eight-month ordeal

there were demands that he cooperate with the “lenient” Chinese upon

his return to the compound.

During 1952, the Communists developed the system of keeping

newly-captured Marines (and other UNC troops) apart from those taken

prior to January 1952 who had suffered more brutal treatment. Beginning

in August, noncommissioned officers were also segregated. They were

removed from Chongsong (Camp 1) and taken further north along the Yalu

to the “Sergeants Camp” (Camp 4) at Wiwon. Although a few Marines had

been interned at the Camp 2 Annex, at Obul, from late 1951 on, they

were not sent there in any sizable number until mid-1952.

Adjacent to a steeply-walled valley, the Obul camp was also known as

“No Name Valley.” Although the inmates of the annex were aware of

other POWs in the main compound and throughout the valley, they were

under heavy guard to prevent contact between the groups. An Air Force

officer, the senior member, and Major Harris, the ranking Marine,

went about organizing the prisoners in a military manner. In order to

exchange information, notes were hidden under rocks at common bathing

points or latrines. Messages were baked in bread by POWs on kitchen

detail, and songs were loudly sung to convey information. Hospitalized

POWs, meanwhile, were held at the Pyoktong (Camp 5) hospital or, in the

southern sector, at a second hospital a few miles north of Pyongyang.

Other locations where prisoners were confined in 1952 were “Pike’s

Peak,” also in the same general southern area, and the Manpo Camp on

the Yalu.

For POWs incarcerated behind the bamboo curtain, 1952 marked several

other developments. It was the year that American airmen began to

receive special grilling and threats from their Communist captors. This

was in connection with the germ warfare hoax, to be discussed later.

It was also the year that Marine POWs at Pi-chong-ni (Camp 2) observed

their own traditional 10 November Marine Corps birthday ceremony.

Eggs, sugar, and flour were stolen for a cake surreptitiously baked

and suitably decorated with the Marine Corps globe and anchor. Another

group accomplished the task of bootlegging rice wine. When the special

date arrived, the Marine officers toasted the President, Commandant,

and Marine Corps and spiritedly sang the National Anthem and Marine

Corps hymn. One of the invited guests, Quartermaster Sergeant James Day

of the Royal Marines, later recalled the reaction of other prisoners:

Firstly some were apprehensive in case of trouble with the

Chinese, and its always consequent rash of gaol [jail] victims.

Some thought it a little childish, and not worth the trouble

of interrupting the daily routine of the place. And I feel

that quite a lot were rather envious that the small band of

USMC should be able to get together and do this sort of thing

quite seriously, quite sincerely, and with no thought of any

consequence.[590]

[590] _Ibid._, p. 190.

This same month the Chinese staged a “Prisoner of War Command Olympics”

at Pyoktong. Although most Marines opposed the idea of participation

in the event, because of its inevitable propaganda exploitation by

the CCF, the decision rendered by the senior UN officer was that POW

athletes would be represented. Much improved quality food was served

for the occasion, Communist photographers were everywhere, and a CCF

propaganda brochure (with articles written by POW turncoats) was later

distributed in Geneva purportedly to show the healthy recreational

activities available to UNC prisoners. An Air force pilot, in

describing the performance of Major McLaughlin, noted that “his skill

as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by

the enemy’s propaganda.”[591]

[591] _Ibid._, p. 195.

More important, he defied the guards by deliberately circulating

among the enlisted men (often younger, impressionable, less mature

individuals) to point out lies in enemy propaganda tactics designed to

slander the U.S. government and its leaders. The Marine officer also

collected names of American POWs held in isolated places who it was

suspected the enemy might attempt to hold as hostages at the end of the

war--possibly as a bargaining tool for the granting of a seat to Red

China in the UN.

During the last year of the war although a number of prisoners were

still being captured in some of the most savage attacks unleashed by

the enemy, the lot of the average POW had improved. More attention

was being paid to the former pitiful medical care. The men were more

warmly clad, even though still huddled into filthy, crowded huts. And

the monotonous poor chow had improved. Most POWs, although carefully

kept from learning developments of the outside world, naturally

suspected that some reason lay behind the changes. And so there was:

the Communists had no desire to repatriate skeletonized prisoners.

_CCF “Lenient Policy” and Indoctrination Attempts_[592]

[592] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Barclay, _Commonwealth_;

Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_;

Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.

As early in the war as July 1951, the CCF was seeking propaganda

benefits out of its so-called “lenient” policy toward captured

United Nations personnel. Basically, this could be described as

“calculated leniency in return for cooperation, harassment in return

for neutrality, and brutality in return for resistance.”[593] Others

have characterized the CCF psychological techniques of indoctrination

as monotonous and single-minded “repetition, harassment and

humiliation.”[594]

[593] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 61. One former Marine POW commented:

“The ‘lenient policy’ applied to the ‘liberated

soldiers,’ who had supposedly been ‘liberated’ from the

American capitalists by the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

Unless a prisoner accepted this absurd concept, he was a

‘war criminal’ and subject to being treated as such. The

North Vietnamese use this same characterization (‘war

criminal’) in reference to U.S. POWs when queried by

U.S. representatives at the Paris talks.” MajGen John N.

McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 17 Jul 70.

[594] Rees, _Korea_, p. 337.

In some respects, it is true that the Chinese treatment of prisoners

appeared to be more humane than that of the North Koreans. The latter

freely used physical cruelty and torture, to the point of being

barbaric.[595] Sometimes it appeared that Allied POWs did not receive

any harsher treatment from the CCF than did local civilian prisoners.

[595] There were, for example, instances when POW columns were

being marched north and the NKPA treatment was so rough

that “Chinese guards intervened to protect the prisoners

from the North Koreans.” MacDonald, _POW_, p. 43.

Whereas the NKPA regularly resorted to physical brutality, the Chinese

“introduced a more insidious form of cruelty.”[596] Although they

used physical violence less often, it was usually more purposeful and

combined with deliberate mental pressure. CCF officials announced that

treatment of captives would be “fair and lenient,” but that wrongdoers

would be publicly punished. Usually this CCF punishment took the form

of less drastic methods--solitary confinement, prolonged interrogation,

and a reduced diet. Even under this decreed lenient policy, however, no

relief parcels were delivered to POWs, nor were any neutral observers

ever allowed to inspect the prison camps.

[596] _Ibid._, p. 60.

In any event, the Chinese were considerably more effective than

the NKPA in their intelligence activities. Often their skilled

interrogators were officers who spoke excellent English. Occasionally,

they had even attended such U.S. schools as the University of Chicago

and had considerable insight into American psychology, customs, and

values--even slang. Interrogation sessions usually employed recording

devices and sometimes were further equipped with one-way mirrors. One

Marine, subjected to frequent interrogation, was kept awake by the

Chinese who slapped his face and blew smoke in his eyes.

From early 1951 to the end of the war UNC prisoners were subjected to

a systematic attempt at mass conversion to Communism. This intensive

indoctrination effort--like the riots of Communist prisoners in Allied

POW camps and the CCF germ warfare fabrications--was designed to gain

a propaganda advantage. From highest-ranking officer to lowly private,

no one was immune to this thought-reform process. General Dean,

prize Communist captive, who was subject to three years of intense

Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, upon his release commented wryly, “I’m

an authority now on the history of the Communist Party and much of its

doctrine.”[597]

[597] Rees, _Korea_, p. 334.

English-speaking POWs, both American and British, particularly became

the target for Communist thought-control conditioning. Many experts

have discussed glowingly the superb example and iron discipline--both

on the battlefield and in POW camp--displayed by the Turkish soldiers.

This is true, and their outstanding performance is to their credit

as a national group. The fact remains, however, that the Turks were

long-term professional soldiers. Usually they were left alone by

the Communists who neither spoke their language nor needed them for

propaganda purposes. As a rule all non-American troops of the United

Nations received better treatment than American and British personnel.

The basic tenet of the Communist party line was that this aggressive

war against the peace-loving people of Korea had been caused by

American imperialists seeking additional foreign markets. All UNC

soldiers were, therefore, by simple definition war criminals who

deserved no better treatment than death. But as most UN soldiers

were misguided and misled by their capitalist rulers they would “not

be shot if they admitted their mistakes and showed themselves to be

progressive”[598] by becoming properly indoctrinated.

[598] _Ibid._, p. 335.

Often, the thought-reform processing started long before prisoners

reached their permanent camps, while they were under initial

interrogation in the transit collection center. Captain Samuel J.

Davies, Anglican Chaplain of the British Gloucestershire Regiment,[599]

noted that lecture subjects presented to his officer group at one

North Korean temporary collection center included:

Corruption of the UN by the American warmongers;

The Chinese Peoples’ right to Formosa;

The Stockholm Peace Appeal;

Progress in Peoples’ China;

Churchill, tool of the Truman-MacArthur-Dulles Fascist clique;

The Soviet Union heads the World Peace Camp.[600]

[599] Davies was the only one of the four captured UNC

chaplains who survived the war. During his imprisonment,

he visited hospitalized POWs at the makeshift hospital

near Camp 2 and held weekly community services. Another

well-remembered chaplain was Captain Emil J. Kapaun,

Chaplains Corps, USA. The Catholic priest stole food

and sneaked into the enlisted compounds at Camp 5 to

distribute it. His heroic behavior and selfless interest

in his fellow-men were an inspiration to fellow POWs.

MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 77, 136.

[600] Rees, _Korea_, p. 336.

Systematically the enemy ground away at theory and practice of

Communism, with its superiority to American democracy. From emphasis on

the Korean War as imperialist aggression, the programmed thinking then

dealt with shortcomings of western countries (particularly Southern

lynchings, poor treatment of Negroes, and colonialism) to the idyllic

socialism in people’s democracies where “everyone is equal.” “Together

with the emotional pressures involved, this dramatic presentation of

Marxism-Leninism to prisoners who often not only failed to comprehend

why they had fought in Korea, but even the rudiments of democracy

itself, was bound to have some sort of effect.”[601]

[601] _Ibid._, p. 337.

Compulsory lectures and discussions often went on until 2200. Together

with the unceasing indoctrination efforts, the CCF attempted to

maintain complete control over every aspect of POW life. Each camp was

divided into POW companies (ranging from 60 to 300 men), platoons, and

squads. Squad leaders, appointed by the Chinese, reported regularly

to authorities the opinions of men in their group. “Converted”

progressives were responsible for much of the internal policing.

Every prisoner with reactionary tendencies was isolated. The varied

pressures of hunger, fear, constant threats of torture, coercion,

nonrepatriation, anxiety, and guilt[602] were used to break him down.

[602] Some analysts have pointed out that the Lenient Policy

with its “emphasis on confession and repentance, and

its propaganda exploitation” closely resembled POW

indoctrination tactics developed by the Russians with

their German prisoners in World War II. Rees, _Korea_, p.

338.

In an attempt to convert the Marines and other prisoners to their

own beliefs, the Communists prohibited the use of the term “prisoner

of war.” Instead they used the phrase “newly liberated friends” and

insisted the POWs do likewise. They also denounced religion as a

superstition and device for controlling people’s minds. Curiously, POWs

were often permitted to retain whatever religious articles they had on

them when captured, so that Bibles, rosaries, etc., were available for

squad groups that sought to hold informal religious discussions and

readings. Such religious expression was, of course, strictly forbidden.

It might be noted here that Marines, as a group, did not appear to be

any more or less interested in religious services than other POWs.

By mid-1952 the compulsory lectures were considered a failure, and the

emphasis shifted to “voluntary” study groups led by progressives. More

insidious methods of indoctrination were being used--books, papers,

and articles written by camp progressives. Personal interrogation and

indoctrination had proved it could have a more powerful effect than

attempts at mass conversion. Then, too, the Chinese had by this time

perfected another propaganda tool that admirably suited their purposes.

It was to have even still more effective, far reaching results.

_The Germ Warfare Issue_[603]

[603] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of

War_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.

Besides their routine interrogations and indoctrinations, by 1952

the Communists had found a new angle to exploit. This was to have

strong repercussions on the treatment of some captured personnel. And,

ultimately, it was to affect American public reaction to the entire

Korean War and to shake the nation’s confidence in some of its fighting

men who became POWs.

The germ warfare issue developed from an incident in January 1952

when the Communists shot down a U.S. Air Force B-26 bomber. Several

months later, in May, the enemy propaganda campaign moved into high

gear when the navigator and pilot both purportedly confessed that they

took part in a raid in which germ bombs were dropped on North Korean

towns. After the CCF successfully extracted false confessions from the

two USAF officers, the enemy exposed both prisoners to a select group

of Oriental medical specialists and newspapermen. The two Americans

apparently performed according to plan, and a relentless flood of

Communist propaganda was unleashed on the world.

While the allegation of bacteriological warfare was not new in the

Korean War, it was not until 1952 that the Chinese successfully

exploited it. After suffering their first reverses in Korea in

September 1950, the Communists charged that Americans were waging germ

warfare. Even after they regained the tactical initiative in late 1950

they continued their campaign of vilification. In early 1951, while

the UNC battled epidemics of smallpox, typhus, and amoebic dysentery

prevalent among the civil population and within the POW camps, the CCF

branded medical efforts to curb the diseases as experiments in germ

warfare. A formal complaint was made by the CCF to the United Nations

in May 1951; thereafter, the germ warfare charges lay dormant for the

rest of the year.

The effect of the two airmen’s “confessions” in 1952 was far-reaching.

From that time until the end of hostilities “captured aviators of

all services were subjected to a degree of pressure and coercion

previously unknown by prisoners of war. Prior to the turn of the year

aviation and ground personnel received relatively the same treatment in

Communists’ hands. After January 1952, aviators were singled out for a

special brand of treatment designed to wring bacteriological warfare

confessions from them.”[604] North Korean officials joined the CCF

spokesmen in loudly denouncing American bacteriological attacks. As the

campaign gained momentum, an elaborate, cleverly-concocted “War Crimes

Exhibit” was set up in Peiping in May. Similar displays were later on

view at the UNC officers’ camp at Pi-chong-ni, including hand-written

and sound-recorded confessions by the two American pilots, as well as a

convincing array of photos depicting the lethal “bomb containers.”

[604] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 175.

All the while air personnel were being put under acute stress to

confess alleged war crimes. Captured Marine aviation personnel

encountered this new subject in their interrogations. Lieutenant

Henry, captured in February, was asked about germ warfare. Major

Judson C. Richardson, of VMF(N)-513, during interrogations at Pak’s

was told he would never leave Korea when he denied that the U.S. was

waging bacteriological warfare. Master Sergeant John T. Cain, VMO-6,

a well-known Marine enlisted pilot whose plane was shot down in July

1952, was questioned, confined to the hole, and taken before a firing

squad when he refused to acknowledge American participation. Captain

Flynn was also subjected to intensive and brutal interrogation by

North Korean and Chinese Communist Air Force personnel who sought a

confession. Others were to meet similar pressure and be questioned

until their nerves shrieked.

On 8 July 1952, the first of a chain of events occurred that was

to link the Marine Corps with the spurious bacteriological warfare

propaganda. Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 1st MAW Chief of Staff and

Major Roy H. Bley, wing ordnance officer, were struck by Communist

ground fire while making a reconnaissance flight. The enemy had little

difficulty in compiling Colonel Schwable’s biography. Although he

repeatedly maintained he had just arrived in Korea and had not yet

received an assignment, he was in uniform with insignia and full

personal identification. A Department of Defense press release issued

two days later gave considerable data, correctly identifying him as the

Marine Wing Chief of Staff. The Chinese knew they had a prize.

Two weeks after his capture, the colonel was taken to an interrogation

center where he remained in solitary confinement until December.

He quickly became aware of CCF intentions to utilize him for their

propaganda mill. He was interrogated relentlessly, badgered, accused

of being a war criminal, fed a near-starvation diet, denied proper

latrine privileges, refused medical and dental attention, and subjected

to extremes of temperature. Ultimately the discomfort, almost constant

diarrhea, extreme pain from being forced to sit in unnatural positions,

fatigue, and naked threats wore him down. At the same time he was

also convinced that had he continued to resist Communist demands for

a confession the enemy would have affixed his forged signature to a

document to achieve their ends. He later commented:

In making my most difficult decision to seek the only way out, my

primary consideration was that I would be of greater value to my

country in exposing this hideous means of slanderous propaganda

than I would be by sacrificing my life through non-submission or

remaining a prisoner of the Chinese Communists for life, a matter

over which they left me no doubt.[605]

[605] _Ibid._, p. 180.

General Dean, held in solitary confinement for much of his three years’

captivity, stated the greatest problem facing a prisoner of war is

“maintaining his judgment--he has no one on whom he can try out his

ideas before turning them into decisions.”[606] Possibly this was also

Colonel Schwable’s problem. Many drafts of his confession were made

before the Chinese were satisfied that specific details reinforced the

information earlier obtained in other prisoners’ false statements.

The confession that finally evolved in December cleverly combined

factual order of battle data and technical terminology to create a

most convincing lie. It was more sophisticated than efforts of earlier

captives and was, unquestionably, damaging.

[606] _Ibid._, p. 182.

_Problems and Performance of Marine POWs_[607]

[607] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section

is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10;

MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_.

Problems faced by Marine and other UNC prisoners ranged from the

fundamentals of sheer survival to more abstract questions involving

honor and duty that have less sharply defined interpretations. Was it,

for instance, a prisoner’s duty to overtly resist the enemy at all

costs and on all possible occasions? Or was an attitude of passive

resistance that created less hostility and attention better in the long

run? Were such passive techniques liable to render a POW unable to

continue making fine distinctions in his conduct and behavior so that

he unwittingly went over the line to become a collaborator with the

enemy? What about a ranking POW’s responsibility of leadership?

In a practical, day-in, day-out way, every prisoner had to decide for

himself as to how actively or passively he would resist the enemy. In

a number of cases Marine (and other Allied) POWs gave deliberately

false or misleading information in response to threats, coercion,

or maltreatment. Three Marines at Pak’s regularly held counsel “to

determine their courses of action and to coordinate their false

stories.”[608] Captain Fink’s list of ships, all sunk in World Wars I

and II, was similar to the story told by an Air Force officer of the

new B-108 bomber (three B-36s).

[608] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 121.

Not infrequently a POW faced threats of death, reduced rations, still

worse medical care, solitary, or physical beatings and torture if he

failed to make some response to questions. Major Richardson finally

wrote untruthful answers to five questions about the Navy, although his

NKPA interrogators told him his lies were detected. Master Sergeant

Cain authored a fanciful report about the Fleet Logistic Wing, an

organization about which he knew nothing, not too surprisingly since

it did not exist. He later admitted, however, that he felt he’d “made

a mistake at that time [his first interrogation] by lying about

inconsequential things.”[609]

[609] _Ibid._, p. 185.

Expressed in simplistic terms, a spirit of cohesion and of group

identity seemed to be the key factor in--to use a bromide that is

particularly apt here--separating the men from the boys. Even when

avowed reactionary leaders were removed to serve one of their many

solitary tours, there seems little doubt that their example served to

instill a spirit of resistance (either open or underground) in fellow

POWs. This was particularly true when the leadership gap was filled by

the next senior man and the chain of command remained unbroken.