was placed under operational control of the Seoul-based Fifth Air
Force.[703] Echelons of FAF air command and control initially slowed
operational orders anywhere from 4 to 36 hours. Simplified interservice
communications and command liaison between 1st MAW and FAF helped
improve the situation. With a verbal agreement, on 1 December, for CG,
1st MAW to receive full control over X Corps area aircraft, problems
eased substantially. To a large degree the close coordination of Marine
aviation and ground forces during the Chosin campaign was due to the
use of flexible, simplified, and fast battle-tested Marine Corps-Navy
CAS techniques and to having increased the number of pilot FACs from
one to two per battalion.
[703] Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency
for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation
units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine
Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st
ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Except for the
formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air
Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated
under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the
Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came
under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and
the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board
Rpt, v. I, p. IV-B-9, 14.
The Marine movement south from Hagaru was protected by one of the
greatest concentrations of aircraft during the entire war. Twenty-four
CAS aircraft covered the breakout column, while attack planes assaulted
enemy forces in adjacent ridge approaches. Marine planes on station at
Yonpo (south of the Hamhung-Hungnam axis) and carrier-based VMF-323
flew some 130 sorties daily. Another 100 attack sorties were flown
daily by Navy carrier-based planes, while FAF flew interdiction
missions beyond the bombline. Marine Panther jets of VMF-311, operating
with the Air Force from the Pusan area, got into the action at Yonpo.
It was also at this time that an airborne TADC (tactical air direction
center) was first improvised when the radio jeeps moving south with
the column had communication failures. For six days, a VMR-152 R5D
transport orbited 2,000 to 4,000 feet above the Marine units to control
air support between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni as a flying radio nerve
center.
From late November to early December, as the division battled its way
from Chosin to Hamhung, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft evacuated
more than 5,000 Marine, Army, and ROK casualties. And during the most
critical period, the little OY spotter planes and HO3S-1 helicopters
from VMO-6 provided the only physical contact between units separated
by enemy action. Marine tactical squadrons in these three early major
offensives of the war, from 3 August to 14 December, flew 7,822
sorties, 5,305 of them CAS for the battered UNC ground units.
From 1951–1953, 1st MAW pilots and planes came under direct control of
FAF. They alternated between principal missions of interdiction raids
to harass and destroy Communist supply lines north of the battlefront,
general support sorties outside the bombline, and CAS flights to
support infantry forces threatened by enemy penetration. Typical of FAF
focus on massive aerial assaults were the following assignments that
Marine flyers participated in:
In January 1951 (prior to Operation KILLER), the 1st MAW
undertook a series of interdiction raids against the Communist
supply net located in the Korean waist between the 38th and 39th
Parallels, to disrupt the CCF transport-truck system.
On 9 May 1951, 75 1st MAW Corsairs and Panther jets were part of
the 300-plane raid staged by FAF against Communist airfields at
Sinuiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu.
Operation STRANGLE, a major Fifth Air Force all-out interdiction
effort to cripple the enemy supply life line, was undertaken 20 May.
When the Chinese Communist spring offensive broke shortly thereafter,
MAG-12 Corsairs and -33 Panther jets delivered maximum support to the
MLR regiments, the 1st and 7th Marines. When the truce talks began
in Kaesong, in July 1951, 1st MAW planes and the radar searches of
MACG-2 stood guard. Batteries of the Marine 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion,
attached to the wing, were also alerted to keep under surveillance the
approaches to key military ports.
New tactical developments pioneered by 1st MAW during the Korean War
advanced the UNC air effort and added to the 1st MAW reputation for
versatility. Several major steps forward were taken toward Marine
aviation’s primary goal of providing real operational 24-hour CAS,
regardless of foul weather conditions. The new MPQ-14 radar-controlled
bombing equipment, developed between 1946 and 1950, was employed by
MASRT-1, as a device to control night fighter sorties of a general
support nature flown by day attack aircraft. By means of height-finding
and directional radars, it enabled a pilot to leave his base, drop a
bomb load on target, and return to home field without ever having seen
the ground. It offered major practical improvement in blind bombing
methods. MPQ was limited, however, in its use in sudden, moving battle
situations because of some of its sophisticated, hand-built ABC
components. A real tactical breakthrough in night CAS came in April
1953 when VMF(N)-513 and the VMO-6 spotter planes evolved the new
searchlight beam control system which made possible 24-hour coverage
for 1st Marine Division ground units.
In other innovations, it will be remembered that the Air Force in late
1952 had requested escort by VMF(N)-513’s new two-place jet-intruder
F3D Skyknights on Air Force B-29 night bombing missions. During a
four-month period from 1952–1953, the Marine night fighters downed
one enemy plane or more a month while escorting the B-29s. Once the
F3Ds began their night escort role, Air Force bomber losses became
negligible.
A unique capability of the long-range, jet-intruder night-fighter
was that the F3D carried a radar operator who replaced the ground
controller, thereby extending air-defense radar range to the aircraft.
It could thus operate independently and effectively at great distance
from its base. Without GCI (ground control intercept) aid, VMF(N)-513
direct escort to bombers at night was so successful that the squadron’s
planes were used as exclusive escort of the Bomber Command B-29s. In
November 1952, the Marine squadron’s two night kills were the first
ever recorded by airborne intercept radar-equipped jet fighters. At the
end of the war, Skyknights and -513 pilots (flying F3Ds as well as the
earlier F7Fs) had destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other Marine
or Navy day or night fighter plane. Tactics employed by VMF(N)-513
were original in concept and required a high-level of training and
individual pilot-AIO (airborne intercept operator) proficiency. It was
noted that:
The enthusiasm with which this Marine aid to the Air Force has
been received by FEAF Bomber Command indicates that VMF(N)-513
had successfully adapted its equipment and personnel to a
mission usually associated with Air Force operations, making an
important contribution to interservice cooperation, but even more
important, to tactical progress in the night escort of bomber
formations.[704]
[704] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-82.
An operation somewhat in reverse of the nightfighters was that of
VMJ-1, the Marine photographic squadron, which had its own Air Force
escort. Formerly the Wing Photo Unit, VMJ-1 was commissioned in
February 1952 and flew a total of 5,025 combat flights. Under FAF
operational control until late in the war, the squadron’s 550-mph
F2H-2P twin-jet Banshees flew unarmed deep into enemy country--even
as far as the MIG-guarded Yalu--photographing positions, airfields,
power plants, and other targets. An escort plane flew cover while the
photo ship took pictures. Photo missions to the Suiho Reservoir were
rated so important that “24 Air Force F-86 jets flew an umbrella.”[705]
Introduction of the squadron’s jet Banshee early in 1952 was a major
step in improved aerial photography. The Banshee was the superior
photographic aircraft in the combat theater, because of its new
advanced-design view finder and operating range.
[705] “1st MAW in Korea,” _op. cit._, Part II, Jun 57, p. 23.
Coverage from VMJ-1’s gross wartime output of 793,012 feet of processed
prints was equal to a continuous photographic strip six and half times
around the earth at the equator. The Marine photo squadron contributed
a third to the entire UN photo reconnaissance effort and at times flew
as much as 50 percent of all FAF intelligence missions.
Throughout the war the four attack squadrons of MAG-12 (VMAs-212, -251,
-121; and -332 at the end of the war) had dumped seemingly endless bomb
loads on CCF installations, while MAG-33’s two jet-fighter squadrons
(VMF-115 and -311) had provided the Marine exchange pilots who scoured
the lower side of the Yalu with the Air Force F-86s on fighter sweeps.
During Korea the Marine CVE/CVL squadrons (VMAs-214, -233, -312, and
-251) flew more than 25,000 sorties, experimenting with improved
techniques for carrier landings. The carrier qualification program of
Marine air units, a regular part of their training, also proved its
value in combat. In the earliest days of the war, VMF-214 and -323[706]
had operated from two CVEs based off the south coast of Korea, thereby
providing close support to the brigade and other Eighth Army elements
at a time when all shore-based aircraft were forced to operate from
Japan.
[706] With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons
were subsequently redesignated as attack units.
In other tactical refinements, the 1st MAW had employed an airborne
tactical air control center in combat for the first time. In July
1952, when the static ground situation led to a build-up of enemy flak
along the front lines that interfered with effective CAS delivery,
the 11th Marines had instituted a flak suppression program in front
of the division sector. Later that year, CG Eighth Army had ordered a
similar program used by all other Eighth Army commands. By December,
apparently because of lack of success with their own methods, EUSAK
had adopted the system developed by the Marine artillery regiment. The
antiaircraft program, together with a reduction in the number of runs
per aircraft per mission,[707] had measurably decreased casualties
for CAS missions conducted within artillery range. During 1952–1953
this loss rate for pilots and planes had dropped by a third, with no
corresponding reduction in the sortie rate.
[707] In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting
pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction
missions and two passes on CAS flights.
Stabilized warfare and enemy AA build-up had also led to an increasing
use of enemy radars. Passive electronics countermeasures (ECM) were
instituted by FAF. This program was enhanced in September 1952 by the
commissioning of VMC-1 (Marine Composite Squadron 1), administratively
assigned to MACG-2. The squadron possessed the only Fifth Air Force
ECM capability to locate enemy radars and was the primary source of
ECM intercept equipment in FAF squadrons for early warning and radar
control monitoring. Throughout the duration of hostilities, VMC-1
remained the only Navy-Marine unit in the Korean theater with ECM as
its prime function.
For its combat action, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was awarded two
Korean Presidential Unit Citations and the Army Distinguished Unit
Citation for the Wonsan operation. Wing pilots were responsible for
downing 35 enemy planes, including the first night kill made by a
United Nations aircraft. Participation of the 1st MAW in the war could
also be measured in a different way. On the inevitable red side of the
ledger: 258 air Marines had been killed (including 65 MIA and presumed
dead) and 174 WIA. A total of 436 aircraft were also lost in combat or
operational accidents.
From the command level, Korean operations marked the first time the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing had functioned for an extended period as a
component in a broad, unified command structure such as FAF. Despite
the weak links initially inherent in such a situation, the command
structure did work. Marine-Navy and Air Force-Army differing aerial
doctrines and tactics of close tactical air support, however, were
never fully reconciled. The Marine wing made a notable contribution
in providing really effective close, speedy tactical support during
the sudden fluid battle situation that erupted in mid-July 1953.
Simplified Marine TACP control, request procedures, and fast radio net
system enabled 1st MAW pilots to reach the target area quickly. During
this final month of the war--and indicative of the enormous amount of
coordination involved in the FAF administrative apparatus--1st MAW
planes flew 1,500 CAS sorties for the 19 different EUSAK frontline
divisions.
CG, 1st MAW noted in General Order No. 153 issued the last day of the
war, that “the Wing’s association with the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air
Force and the Seventh U.S. Fleet in combined operations had been a
professionally broadening experience--teaching tolerance, teamwork, and
flexibility of operations.”[708]
[708] MajGen V. E. Megee, GO 153, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoted in 1st
MAW, Part II, _op. cit._, p. 26.
Besides the FAF interdiction work and support missions for frontline
units, new 1st MAW tactics and equipment had diversified the wing’s
skills and capabilities in its primary role of providing CAS for Marine
ground units. Of new tactical air support developments in the Korean
action none had a more revolutionary effect than those created by the
helicopter--which dramatically reshaped battlefield logistics and
pointed the way to a new era in Marine Corps air-ground teamwork.
_Helicopter_[709]
[709] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9,
No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; _USMC Board Rpt_, v.
I; Generals’ _Summary_; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I-IV,
_passim_; Montross, _SkyCav_.
A promising newcomer on the Marine aviation scene was the helicopter,
whose tactical employment in Korea was to far exceed all expectations.
A few helicopters had been used experimentally in the European and
Pacific theaters toward the end of World War II, too late to evaluate
their performance. But it was the Marine Corps, beginning in 1947,
that had pioneered the development of combat techniques utilizing the
rotor-driven aircraft as a means of enhancing its capability for the
amphibious assault. When the Korean incident erupted in June 1950,
the Marine Corps was in a position to assign four HO3S-1 Sikorsky
two-place helicopters and flight personnel from its Quantico test unit,
HMX-1, together with fixed-wing planes and pilots to form the brigade
observation squadron, VMO-6. These Marines had the distinction of
being the first helicopter pilots of any U.S. service to be formed into
a unit for overseas duty.
Further, the Marine Corps also had 31 months’ experience with the
strange looking, pot-bellied, ungainly aircraft in diverse battlefield
tasks. These included casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, wire-laying,
liaison, and administrative missions. But promising test exercises at
Quantico and Camp Lejeune were hardly enough. The real test would come
at the front. There, the helicopter’s military value would reflect and
“depend to a large extent on how well the Marine Corps had worked out
combat doctrines and techniques where none had existed before.”[710]
[710] Montross, _SkyCav_, p. 108.
Landing with the brigade in August 1950, the choppers performed
invaluable service from the earliest days of Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, and
the Reservoir. During the most critical phase of the Chosin operation,
the helicopters provided the only liaison between isolated commands.
Wire-laying by air was first employed by VMO-6 during the second battle
of the Naktong River, in September 1950. The ground had changed hands
several times and control was uncertain. Using makeshift communication
rigs, VMO-6 pilots unreeled telephone wire at a mile a minute. This
method of putting telephone lines across Korean mountains became
routine through the rest of the war, and Marine choppers strung miles
of lines in rain and wind with the enemy blasting away at them. Wire
was laid over terrain in a matter of hours where it would have taken
men on foot weeks--if it could have been done.
Perhaps the greatest innovation of VMO-6, however, was its night
casualty evacuation techniques first employed at Pusan. Darting in and
out at treetop level around the Korean mountains, the light, easily
maneuverable craft could land on a tiny patch of earth to evacuate
injured men or bring in supplies. Once, during the early part of the
war, when the aeronautical pioneer Igor Sikorsky was asked how his
revolutionary vehicles were performing in combat, Mr. Sikorsky, bowing
from the waist in his Old World manner, replied:
Thank you. Our things go very well in Korea. The helicopter has
already saved the lives of several thousands of our boys in Korea
and the score is still mounting.[711]
[711] _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 10 (Oct 55), p. 61
quoting Eugene E. Wilson, _Wings of the Dawn_ (Hartford,
Conn.: Connecticut Printers, Inc., 1955).
With the advent of the helicopter, as little as 43 minutes elapsed
between the time a Marine was hit and the time he was on board the USS
_Repose_ or other hospital ships. Later on when the Marine transport
copters arrived in Korea, HMR-161 pilots felt a new record had been
set when only 30 minutes[712] intervened between the time a frontline
Marine was hit and delivered to a hospital facility 17 miles from the
zone of action. The _Consolation_ had been outfitted with a helicopter
loading platform in July 1951, and eventually all hospital ships had
such landing platforms. In Korea the flying ambulances could make the
trip from rear area aid station to ship in five minutes and unload the
wounded and clear the deck in 45 seconds flat.
[712] By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary
of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital
ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use
when he commented, “I went aboard the _Samaritan_, where
Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the
casualties from the day and night before.” Capt Clifford
P. Morehouse, _The Iwo Jima Campaign_, (Washington:
HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139.
Throughout the war nearly 10,000 wounded Marines were evacuated by
helicopter; more than 1,000 such missions were carried out at night.
Records indicate that VMO-6 flew out 7,067 casualties and that another
2,748 medical evacuations were made by HMR-161, for which the task
ranked as a secondary mission. Although these humanitarian gains were
important, major tactical innovations made by the helicopter were even
more significant.
In the fall of 1951, HMR-161 successfully executed the first combat
troop resupply mission in history. At this time while the division
was deployed in the jagged razorback-ridge Punchbowl area, “a glimpse
of future warfare was provided when Marine helicopter lifts on a
company scale led to the lift of an entire battalion and its organic
equipment.”[713] Arriving in Korea on 31 August, the squadron had a
complement of 15 new 10-place HRS-1 transport vehicles, with cruising
speed of 60–85 knots. Developed specifically to meet Marine Corps
combat requirements, the HRS marked a new era in Marine airborne
support to ground troops. Both VMO-6 and HMR-161 came under operational
control of the division. (With 1st Division and Wing headquarters
separated geographically by more than 200 miles, it was particularly
expedient to have the two squadrons under division control.)
[713] HistBr outline, p. 4.
The first step toward using the rotor-blade aircraft in the mission
most closely related to the USMC basic helicopter concept--that
of transporting troops and supplies by vertical envelopment--was
accomplished 13 September 1951. In Operation WINDMILL I, HRS choppers
carried out the first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply operation
in history. A lift of one day’s supplies was made to 2/1 in the Soyang
River vicinity. A total of 28 flights were executed in overall time of
2½ hours (a total flight time of 14.1 hours) to transport 18,848 pounds
of gear and 74 Marines a distance of seven miles.
HMR-161 first applied the Corps’ new concept of vertical envelopment
on 21 September when, despite heavy fog, it transported 224 fully
equipped Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the reserve area
to the MLR. This was the first helicopter lift of a combat unit in
history. Company-size troop lifts inevitably led to more complicated
battalion-size transfers. In the 11 November Operation SWITCH, HMR-161
effected the relief of a frontline battalion, involving the lift of
nearly 2,000 troops. Twelve of the 3½-ton aircraft made 262 flights in
overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours flight time).
The tactical and logistical possibilities of the multi-purpose rotor
craft attracted considerable attention. So impressed, in fact, were
Eighth Army officers by the mobility and utility displayed by Marine
helicopters that in November 1951 General Ridgway had asked the Army
to provide four Army helicopter transport battalions, each with 280
helicopters. Korea, Ridgway said, had “conclusively demonstrated that
the Army vitally needed helicopters,”[714] and he recommended that the
typical field army of the future have 10 helicopter transportation
battalions.
[714] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 533–534.
Ridgway was thereby renewing requests for helicopters made in the
early days of the war by both the Army (through General MacArthur)
and the Air Force (by General Barcus). But the UNC Commander’s
enthusiasm, although understandable, turned out to be the undoing
for substantial Army use of the rotary-blade aircraft in Korea. The
scale of operations[715] envisioned by Ridgway unwittingly led to a
“jurisdictional controversy”[716] about possible duplication of aerial
functions not reconciled by the two services until a year later.
Although both services had helicopters in limited use, “hostilities
were in their last stages before either the Army or the Air Force
began to receive the cargo helicopters which they had put on order in
1950 and 1951.”[717]
[715] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 184, comments: “In order to
insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway]
suggested that procurement be started on a scale
that would permit manufacturers to expand production
immediately.”
[716] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 534.
[717] _Ibid._
A successful three-day Army regimental supply exercise in May 1953 and
a combat maneuver the following month in which the choppers formed an
air bridge to a heavily attacked, isolated ROK unit caused General
Taylor, then CG, EUSAK, to observe: “The cargo helicopter, employed
in mass, can extend the tactical mobility of the Army far beyond
its normal capability.” He strongly recommended that the Army make
“ample provisions for the full exploitation of the helicopter in the
future.”[718]
[718] _Ibid._, p. 535.
Pioneering developments by the Marine Corps had, of course, continued
meanwhile. Logistical operations had grown increasingly complex and
diversified. In Operation HAYLIFT II, 23–27 February 1953, Marine
helicopters set an all time cargo-carrying record when they lifted
1,612,306 pounds of cargo to completely supply two JAMESTOWN regiments
with daily requirements for the five-day period. This represented a
total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the operation. The
record day’s lift was 200 tons, whereas plans had called for lifting
a maximum 130 tons per day. Experience gained during the operation
indicated that similar tactical maneuvers in warmer weather would be
even more successful when troop fuel oil requirements were reduced.
Other Marine innovations by HMR-161 included supplying ammunition
from the rear area ASP to the MLR and redeployment of 1st 4.5-inch
Rocket Battery personnel and guns from one firing area to another.
And although VMO-6 executed most of the mercy missions, the transport
squadron performed an unusual assignment in July 1952. Flood conditions
throughout Korea brought an urgent request from the Army for use of
HMR-161. On 30 July, the Marine squadron evacuated 1,172 Army troops
from their positions in the Chunchon area where they had been trapped
by the heavy rains.
With a new tactical exercise held nearly every month, HMR-161
operations that once had rated world-wide headlines were now
practically routine. VTOL-style battalion troop lifts were no longer
novel and regimental resupply operations were becoming almost standard
practice. In both relocation of units and logistical support, combat
helicopters had provided high mobility and reasonable speed. They
had introduced a new infantry technique of “hit and run” tactics.
The transport helicopter squadron had proved most effective when
employed in major tactical movements and not when used piecemeal on
minor missions. Marine Corps wartime use of the new aerial vehicle had
clearly proven that helicopters had become a necessary and integral
component of the modern-day balanced military force.
_FMF and Readiness Posture_[719]
[719] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav),
1951–1955; _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5,
Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6. Chaps. 9, 10; _USMC Board Rpt_, vs.
1-11; _Generals’ Summary_; Brochure titled “Historical
Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
1941–1950 (Preliminary),” held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of
Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br.,
HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization
of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict,
1950–1951_ (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.),
hereafter Giusti, _Mobilization, MCR_; _USMC Ops Korea_,
vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, _The Marine Corps
Reserve--A History, 1916–1966_ (Washington: Division of
Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, “Men of Color,”
issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, _Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957_
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961).
The flexibility and readiness capability inherent in the Marine Corps
FMF structure was a strong undergirding factor in its swift response to
the Korean crisis. As noted, in June 1950 the Marine Corps had 74,279
officers and men on active duty. Its Fleet Marine Force, consisting of
FMFPac and FMFLant, numbered 27,656. The 11,853 personnel of FMFPac
included 7,779 men in General Smith’s 1st Marine Division at Camp
Pendleton and 3,733 in General Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El
Toro. On the East Coast, FMFLant numbered 15,803 with approximately
8,973 Marines in the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and 5,297 air
personnel attached to the 2d Wing at Cherry Point.
Outbreak of Korean hostilities thus presented the Marine Corps with
the tasks of organizing and deploying for combat first a brigade and
then a full war-strength reinforced division, each with supporting
aviation elements. Despite the low strength to which FMFPac had shrunk
due to stringent national defense economy measures, the heavy demands
placed upon it were met. Both missions were accomplished quickly and
effectively. In fact, “few achievements in the long history of the
Marine Corps can equal what was achieved in the 11 weeks which elapsed
between the outbreak of the Korean War and the amphibious assault of
the 1st Marine Division at Inchon.”[720]
[720] Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac,
1941–1950, p. 49.
As early as 2 July, CinCFE MacArthur had requested that a Marine
RCT-air unit be dispatched to the Far East. On 7 July the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade was activated; on 12–14 July it embarked.
With departure of the brigade, personnel shortages within the 1st
Division and 1st Wing became acute. The division was reduced to 3,459,
less than a RCT; and the wing to 2,300. Meanwhile, as the increasing
demand had continued for a Marine Division deployed to Korea, it
became equally apparent that if the Marine Corps were to fulfill this
requirement of deploying a full-strength division to Korea,[721] its
reservists would have to be called up to alleviate these shortages.
[721] With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv,
even “had they been combined into a single unit, its
numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one
war-strength division.” Giusti, _Mobilization_, MCR, p. 9.
Manpower potential of the Marine Corps Reserve was 128,959, nearly
twice that of the regular establishment. In June 1950, the Organized
Marine Corps Reserve (Ground) numbered 1,879 officers and 31,648
enlisted personnel being trained in 138 OMCR units of battalion size
or less. Membership of the ground reserve was approximately 76 percent
of its authorized strength. At the same time the Organized Reserve
(Aviation) consisted of 30 fighter and 12 ground control intercept
squadrons attached to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command organized
at Glenview, Ill. in 1946. These MARTCOM squadrons numbered 1,588
officers and 4,753 enlisted, or approximately 95 percent of authorized
strength. In addition to nearly 40,000 members of the OMCR, the Marine
Volunteer (nondrill, nonpay status) Reserve carried approximately
90,000 on its rolls.
A warning notice went out on 19 July from the Commandant, General
Cates, to District Directors that the OMCR would shortly be ordered
to active duty; later that same day mobilization of the Reserve was
authorized by President Truman, with Congressional sanction. On 20
July, the first 22 ground units, with nearly 5,000 men, were ordered to
active duty on a schedule that took into account the unit’s state of
readiness, proximity to its initial duty station, and facilities there
for handling the personnel overload.
Less than a month after hostilities began in Korea, key infantry,
artillery, and engineer units of the OMCR had been ordered to extended
active duty. On 31 July, West Coast ground reserve units from Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and Phoenix were the first to report
in to Camp Pendleton for augmentation into the 1st Marine Division. The
following day their opposite numbers from the East Coast units arrived
at Camp Lejeune. By 11 September, all of the organized ground units had
reported for duty and the OMCR (Ground) had ceased to exist.
While the organized ground reserve was being mobilized, the first
of the 42 MARTCOM fighter and intercept squadrons began arriving at
El Toro. Personnel of six reserve VMF and three MGCI squadrons were
ordered to duty on 23 July as replacements in the 1st MAW which had
furnished units and men for the MAG-33 component of the brigade.
Commenting on the success with which the Marine Corps achieved this
expansion, the Secretary of Defense was to note later:
The speed with which this mobilization was effected was an
important factor in the rapid buildup of the First Marine
Division, the first units of which sailed for the Far East in
July 1950.[722]
[722] Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187.
As late as 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed MacArthur
that a Marine division could not be sent before November or even
December. Finally, on 25 July, the CinCUNC’s third request for the
division was approved. It would, however, be a division minus one RCT,
and the Joint Chiefs were “adamant in their decision that MacArthur
must wait until autumn or even winter for his third RCT.”[723]
[723] _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 23.
The JCS also directed on 25 July that the Marine Corps build its
division (less one RCT) to full war strength. The date of 10–15
August was set for its departure to the Far East. Among the many
steps taken in the mobilization schedule, the JCS directed that the
Camp Lejeune-based 2d Marine Division be expanded immediately to war
strength.
Fleshing out personnel--against short-fuzed manpower and time
factors--for the 1st Marine Division and Wing, due to embark in
mid-August, a month after the brigade had left, was a round-the-clock
operation for all hands. Between 25 July-5 August, the Marine Corps
provided personnel for the expanded Division/Wing by:
transfer of FMFLant-selected, 2d Division/Wing air and ground
units, of 6,800 men, to FMFPac;
transfer of 3,600 regular Marines from 105 posts and stations
throughout the U.S.;
mobilization of 2,900 from early OMCR ground and air units; and
utilization of two replacement drafts, number 900, intended for
the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.
Expansion of the 1st Marine Division was in two phases, bringing the
division (less one RCT) up to war strength and then organizing its
third reinforced infantry regiment, the 7th Marines. With the cadre
of 3,459 men in the division after the brigade left and the influx of
regulars and reservists, the 1st Division embarked for Korea between
10 and 24 August. It had reached wartime strength (less one RCT) on 15
August, just 27 days after beginning its buildup from a peacetime T/O.
As it had approached war strength, the Division CG, General Smith, was
directed by CMC ltr of 4 August to activate a third RCT and prepare it
for departure to Korea no later than 1 September.
While mounting out, the division transferred approximately 1,000 of
its rear echelon to be used in the buildup of the 7th Marines. The
6th Marines of the 2d Division provided the base for building this
new regiment. (Approximately 800 Marines of 3/6 were reassigned from
Mediterranean duty and ordered to the Far East, via the Suez Canal,
to join the 7th Marines upon its arrival there.) By drawing men from
widely scattered sources, it was possible to activate the 7th Marines
on 17 August. Departure of this regiment on 1 September was thus far in
advance of the late fall or winter target date originally set by the
JCS.
With all OMCR ground units called up and absorbed into the 1st and 2d
Divisions, and air squadrons being mobilized on a slower schedule (due
to less-urgent combat needs for air personnel in the early war stage),
the Marine Corps dealt with its remaining body of reserve strength.
Bulk orders went out beginning 15 August to the Volunteer Reserve, and
by the end of the year 58,480 men and women in this category were on
active duty. More than 80 percent of the volunteer reservists on Marine
Corps rolls served during the Korean War.
Attesting to the impact of events in Korea is the fact that “following
the epic withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Chosin Reservoir, the
number of new enlistments into the active Volunteer Reserve jumped from
877 in December to 3,477 in January.”[724]
[724] Giusti, _op. cit._, p. 36.
Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been
accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September. A previous
estimate had shown an expected 80 percent availability of ground
reserve on M-Day; the actual mobilization figure was 90 percent.
Of 33,528 OMCR ordered to active duty, a total of 30,183 (1,550
officers/28,633 enlisted) reported. Marine aviation also expanded
rapidly. By January 1951, 32 organized reserve air units (20 of the
30 existing VMFs and all 12 MGCIs) had been activated and by October
of that year all of the reserve squadrons had been called to active
duty. Of the 6,341 organized air reservists, 5,240 received orders;
4,893, or 93.4 percent, reported in. In contrast to the ground reserve,
air units had been recalled on a staggered or partial mobilization
schedule, a matter which was later to receive Congressional attention
(and ultimately to set a new trend) when the Nation’s entire Korean War
mobilization procedures were reviewed and subsequently revised.
Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were
reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps
units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent. Between July 1950
and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and
veterans, saw active duty with the Marine Corps.
Throughout the war the Marine Corps effected approximately 34
replacement drafts and another 31 rotation drafts. Ground Marines
served an average tour of 13 months overseas (although actual time
attached to the division was about 10½ months). The collapse of North
Korean forces after the Inchon-Seoul operation and the unopposed
landing at Wonsan had pointed to an early end of the Korean conflict.
Massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, however, changed
the prospect of a short war to a long one and made it necessary to
implement a rotation and release policy. By March 1951, HQMC had
worked out a preliminary phaseout program for reserve personnel (based
on the various categories and length of service prior to recall) which
was put into effect in June 1951.
During 1952 and up until July 1953, approximately 500 officers and
15,500 enlisted men joined the 1st Marine Division in Korea every six
months. Individual monthly replacement drafts generally ranged from
1,900 to 2,500, depending on the combat situation and other personnel
needs within the Marine Corps. Monthly rotation drafts of Marines
assigned to the States or other duty stations from Korea were usually
somewhat smaller than their corresponding incoming numbers. Ranks and
MOS of replacement personnel to the end of the war, however, did not
always meet the needs of the division. Specialty training conducted
by the 1st Marine Division in Korea helped remedy most of the worst
deficiencies.
During the latter half of 1952 and throughout 1953, tours for Marine
pilots/combat air crews averaged 9 months, and for aviation ground
officer/enlisted personnel, 12 months. Following a detailed HQMC
study of the advantages of tactical unit as opposed to individual
pilot rotation, a new squadron replacement policy was instituted.
This procedure assured standard precombat training of all pilots[725]
and development of a team spirit prior to the squadron’s arrival in
the combat theater. Previously this had not been possible with the
continuing turnover of 1st MAW personnel under the individual release
system. Despite plans during 1952–1953 for replacement and rotation of
squadrons as an entity, this did not come about until late in the war
when carrier squadron VMA-312 was replaced by VMA-332 in June 1953.
With the end of hostilities, tours were extended to approximately 14
months for both aviation and ground Marines.
[725] Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III
volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate
recent precombat flying experience, had presented a
serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job
training for pilots in the VMO-6 fixed-wing section.
As another measure to improve squadron operational
proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the
individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a
100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953.
This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units,
with the exception of VMF(N)-513 pilots who were rotated
after 60 missions.
Buildup of Marine Corps personnel during the Korean War from the June
1950 base of 74,279 is seen in the following strength figures:
June 1951 192,620 Marines on active duty
June 1952 231,967 Marines on active duty
June 1953 249,219 Marines on active duty
Altogether, an estimated 424,000 Marines served during the period of
hostilities. The war also witnessed a sizable increase in the number of
Negro Marines on active duty. This figure grew from 2 officers/1,965
enlisted in 1950 to 19 officers/14,468 enlisted by 1953. Marine
officials commented on their fine combat performance, including that
of many outstanding NCOs. In line with the changing climate of events
and legislation,[726] the Korean War marked the first time that Negro
personnel were fully integrated into the military services, in contrast
to the segregated units before and during World War II.
[726] Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces
continued to expand as a result of the President’s 1948
Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity.
The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European
Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial
integration of combat units, followed by similar programs
for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun
1952), p. 21.
Peak strength of the Marine Corps during the Korean emergency occurred
on 30 September 1953, when 261,343 were on duty. At the end of the war,
33,107 Marines (26,072 division, 7,035 wing) were stationed in Korea.
The time of peak deployed strength in Korea during 1950–1953 appears to
have been April 1953, when Marines of the 1st Division/Wing numbered
35,306.[727]
[727] For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW
ComdDs, Apr 53 and _PacFlt Eval Rpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p.
9-54, Chap. 10, p. 10-29. Also, _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5,
Chap. 8, p. 8-33 and No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-26.
While the Korean War was still in progress, Congress passed new
legislation to remedy certain shortcomings that had become apparent
during the emergency, particularly the Nation’s recent experience
with partial mobilization. These new laws affected the size of the
FMF structure of the Marine Corps, its active-duty strength, and its
reserve component.
Public Law 416, enacted 28 June 1952, represented several major
advances for the Marine Corps. It authorized an increase of Marine
Corps strength to a minimum of three combat divisions and three wings;
raised the ceiling of regular active-duty personnel to 400,000 (except
for normal expansion in a national emergency or war); and provided
for the Commandant to sit as co-equal member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff[728] on matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps. In
reaffirming the role of Marine Corps in the seizure and defense of
advanced naval bases, as well as land operations incident to naval
campaigns, the law also cited the corollary Marine Corps mission of
“performing such other duties as the President may direct.” Commenting
on Public Law 416, the Commandant observed: “Our views are considered.
Our interests are protected. The entire Marine Corps has benefited
greatly by these gains.”[729] General Shepherd further noted that the
new legislation “expresses clearly the intent that the Marine Corps
shall be maintained as a ready fighting force prepared to move promptly
in time of peace or war to areas of trouble. It recognizes that in the
future there may be a series of continuing international crises--each
short of all-out war, but each requiring our nation ... to move shock
forces into action on the shortest of notice.”[730]
[728] Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at
the JCS level by the SecNav or CNO.
[729] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 1.
[730] Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, _op. cit._, p. 70.
The two new laws affecting the future training and composition of
the Marine Corps and other services were: (1) the Universal Military
Training and Service Act (UMT&S), as amended, approved 19 June 1951;
and (2) the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (Public Law 476), approved
9 July 1952. Basically, the two laws sought to establish a sounder
mobilization base and were complementary in nature. The Armed Forces
Reserve Act of 1952 implemented a new mobilization concept: either
a partial or total callup of the Nation’s reserve forces. In the
past, the M-Day target had been geared to a total war only. A limited
war, resulting in a partial, Korean-type mobilization, had not been
envisioned. The 1952 act thereby provided greater flexibility for
dealing with both contingencies and also consolidated much of the
existing legislation affecting reserve forces.
Members of the reserve were newly designated by different categories
of M-Day priority: ready, standby, and retired reserve. These
varying degrees of availability for callup reflected training status
(OMCR/volunteer), length of prior service, and related factors (i.e.,
men with the least service were designated for first callup, or the
“Ready” category.) Previously, they were all equally subject for recall
in an emergency, regardless of prior service.
The 1952 act and its new provisions thereby distinguished between a
future national emergency and an all-out war. Theoretically, at least,
a national emergency could be proclaimed by the President, calling for
a partial mobilization, as in Korea. A declaration of war by Congress,
as in World War II, would call for total mobilization. Thus the Marine
Corps Reserve was newly earmarked for either a partial or total
mobilization.
Under UMT&S, a military service obligation of eight years was
established for all young men under age 26 entering the armed forces
(whether by enlistment, draft, appointment, or reserve) after 19 June
1951. The act also authorized drafting of male citizens for two-year
active duty periods. This new system of eight-year obligors provided
the post-Korean MCR with a stable body of personnel who had received
their basic training but still had a reserve obligation.
Also as a result of the Korean mobilization, the Organized Marine
Corps Reserve troop list was modified in order to provide a manpower
pool for additional elements of the regular establishment. Supply,
service, and security units were added to provide more of an FMF type
of augmentation than that furnished by reserve units in the past.
Reestablishment of the OMCR began in October 1951, when the first group
of recalled reservists were released from Korean duty. Plans called for
a larger reserve and more comprehensive training. Ground units were to
be increased from 138 to approximately 255, with the air squadrons to
number 42. The Volunteer Reserve was similarly to be strengthened by
stricter requirements for participation.
Traditionally the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve, since 1916,
had been defined as “providing trained personnel for integration into
the Marine Corps in time of national emergency.” The strengthened MCR
program as a result of Korea and the new laws led to a more serious
reappraisal of its role. In looking to its post-Korea future, the
Marine Corps planned a revitalized training program that would now
“assist in extending the ‘force-in-readiness’ concept to the Marine
Corps Reserve.”[731] More than ever before, the Marine Corps sought to
make its reserve a mirror-image of the regular establishment.
[731] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 96.
_Problems Peculiar to the Korean War_[732]
[732] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No.
5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; _USMC Board
Rpt_ vs. I-II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin
No. 5-53, “Lessons Learned,” dtd 10 Jun 53, hereafter
_Lessons Learned 5-53_; _Generals’ Summary_; Futrell,
_USAF, Korea_; Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_.
The undeclared war of Communist China against United Nations forces
resulted in major changes in high-level policy and strategy that
affected military tactics for the rest of the war. In an attempt to
prevent escalation of Korean hostilities into an all-out nuclear war,
the decision was made that U.N. forces, both ground and air, would not
strike enemy bases in Chinese territory. After the beginning of truce
negotiations in July 1951, the mission of Allied ground forces was
changed from initiating offensive operations to one of maintaining an
active defense of the MLR across Korea. The basic strategy became one
of containment and prevention of any further enemy gains south of the
38th Parallel. It involved attempting to inflict maximum losses on the
enemy while attempting to minimize those of the UNC. Militarily, these
restrictions removed the possibility of winning a decisive victory.
For the next two years, fighting seesawed back and forth across the
parallel.
Static and defensive warfare thus characterized the greater part of
the Korean War. During this period, the Marine division performed
a land war mission similar to other Eighth Army components while
Marine aviation squadrons flew under control of Fifth Air Force. Both
the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faced tactical
restrictions that resulted from the strategic policies governing
the overall role of EUSAK and FAF. Problem areas arose from the
limited nature of this particular war. These involved not only the
shift in the UNC strategy from an offensive posture to a defensive
(“active defense”) concept, but also from the paralyzing effect of the
protracted truce negotiations on battlefield tactics.
For nearly two years (16 months in West Korea and 5 months earlier
while in IX Corps on the East-Central front), the Marine division
assumed an unaccustomed defensive role. Such a sustained, basically
non-win position was hardly morale-building to the average Marine
unable to see personally any yardage gained, any progress made in his
particular war. Not surprisingly, such a passive battle assignment
did result in a temporary loss of amphibious skills on the part of
both individual Marines and the division. End-of-war evaluations noted
that “long and indecisive defensive situations such as existed in
Korea do little to foster the offensive spirit so long traditional
with the Marine Corps and certainly tend to detract from the immediate
amphibious readiness required of a Marine Division.”[733]
[733] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-2.
Prior to its tour of duty as I Corps reserve in mid-1953, the 1st
Marine Division had noted that it would “require intensive training
and reequipping for a period of at least 60 days” upon release from
active combat in order to “reach a desirable standard of amphibious
readiness.”[734] Rigorous MARLEX and RCT exercises initiated in June
1952 after the division had moved to the western coastal sector off
the Yellow Sea and expanded during its I Corps reserve period, were
important steps in rectifying this skill attrition. This was, of
course, in addition to the continuous training schedule in offensive
and defensive warfare maintained by the division for the battalions and
regiment periodically in regular reserve status.
[734] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the
division’s ground readiness was rated as excellent; a
conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious
readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated
a 30-day training period would bring the division to
complete amphibious readiness. _Generals’ Summary_, p. 53.
Outpost warfare in West Korea was characterized by overextended MLR
frontage. The more than 60,000 yards held by the division while in the
I Corps sector resulted in a thinly-held line which invited penetration
and encirclement. “Normal” frontage for an infantry division in defense
with two regiments on line was considered by U.S. Army doctrine to be
8–9,000 yards. Even with four MLR regiments (two Marine, 1st KMC/RCT,
and KPR) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on line (the third
Marine regiment in reserve with a counterattack mission), this was
a very lengthy sector. It was further complicated by the Han River
obstacle on the left flank and the Imjin River to the rear of the
sector that separated Marine frontline troops from rear support and
reserve units.
Infantry battalions thus occupied “extremely wide fronts, as a
rule 3,500 to 5,000 yards,” while individual rifle companies were
assigned anywhere from “1,200 to 1,700 yards of the MLR to occupy and
defend.”[735] Prior to the battle of the Hook in October 1952, one of
the major engagements on the western front, the 7th Marines at the far
right end of the division sector had emplaced all three battalions on
line, rather than the customary procedure of two on line and the third
in reserve. There was little other choice, for the regimental sector
exceeded 10,000 yards, “more properly the frontage for a division
rather than a regiment.”[736]
[735] _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 19.
[736] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 107.
During a 100 percent watch, at least theoretically, a Marine could
be spaced at intervals about every 10 to 15 yards along the MLR. A
night 50 percent watch--with personnel of rifle platoons assigned to
COPs, listening posts, combat patrols, repair of fortifications, and
the KSC nightly supply trains--not infrequently spread personnel to a
point where the MLR was dangerously thin, often with 50 yards between
men.[737] Such an over-wide lineal deployment dissipated defensive
strength and made mutually supporting fires difficult.
[737] Lessons Learned, _op. cit_.
Division artillery, too, was thinly positioned across the wide sector,
making it difficult to execute counterbattery missions. This led to
development of the innovative counter-counterbattery program (or
“roving guns”) devised by the 11th Marines in May 1952 to deliberately
mislead the CCF as to the strength and location of divisional
artillery; the situation resulted as well in the reinforcement of the
four Marine artillery battalions by heavier I Corps 155mm and 8-inch
howitzers. The static situation in the prolonged land campaign also
led to the growth of large, semi-permanent type camps which somewhat
hampered traditional Marine mobility. Organizations had additional
personnel and equipment above T/O and T/E because of the peculiar
defense requirements of the sustained battle situation.
The lack of depth in the defense did not provide for receiving the
shock of a determined enemy attack, particularly since the normal
OPLR had been withdrawn to strengthen the overextended MLR in April
1952, shortly after the division’s arrival in West Korea. Ultimately,
as we have seen, this main line of resistance concept was modified
and rather than a long thin trenchline the Marine division employed a
defense-in-depth concept using a series of strongpoints, as in Boulder
City and the organization of the postwar main battle position. In
contrast to the Marine situation (and that of most other divisions
in the EUSAK line), the CCF confronting the 1st Marine Division
beyond No-Man’s-Land deployed their forces in great depth, boasted
unlimited manpower, and employed an elastic type of defense on mutually
supporting key terrain features. The enemy had also developed an
artillery capability that was numerically superior to ours. And they
held high ground positions that overlooked virtually the entire Marine
front.
As in World War II, Korean operations provided another instance in
which various military services and components were coordinated by
joint commands: EUSAK for the ground defense and FAF for air. These
massive operational command structures accomplished the desired
goals. On lower level echelons, however, some policies tended to
be so restrictive that they precluded normal combat initiative and
aggressiveness. The net result was thus to allow the enemy to maintain
the tactical initiative while, in effect, hampering UNC counter-defense
measures.
New directives issued by I Corps in late 1952, for example, changed the
corps policy of large-scale raids for prisoners, previously encouraged
in the spring of 1952, which affected infantry raids and patrol
activities for the rest of the war. Plans for all raids, company size
or larger, required both I Corps and EUSAK approval, and were to be
submitted 10 days prior to planned execution. Complete patrol plans
for even platoon-size operations had to be submitted at least 24 hours
in advance. Although the reason for the new policy stemmed from a
desire to minimize casualties during the prolonged stalemate, negative
effects of such a lead-time factor were quickly apparent. Battalion or
regimental commanders frequently were unable to capitalize on targets
of opportunity that developed or changes in local conditions, such as
weather or troop deployment, to gain maximum effectiveness from the
operation.
Directives covering offensive maneuvers that could be taken on local
initiative were so restrictive that “any independent action below the
level of the Division Commander became practically nonexistent.”[738]
Similarly, counterattack plans to retake previously considered major
COPs were countermanded, on several occasions, by corps or army higher
echelons shortly before jump-off time with the reason given that the
action was not worth the cost of further UNC casualties or possible
jeopardy to the fragile peace negotiations.
[738] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-84.
Allied offensive capability was further restricted by various EUSAK and
I Corps orders issued during the protracted period of truce talks. Many
directives had as their well-intentioned rationale the desire not to
upset the precarious balance in UNC-Communist negotiations by providing
the enemy further opportunities for exploitative propaganda victories.
The actual record shows, however, that the Communists were never at a
loss to conjure up and capitalize on fabricated “events” that suited
their purpose--whether charging UNC aircraft had violated the Kaesong
neutrality strip, that American fliers were engaging in germ warfare,
or deliberately instigating POW camp disruptions and breakouts.
Neutrality restrictions[739] on supporting arms within the entire
Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan-ni area further complicated the UNC tactical
situation and hampered both offensive and defensive operations of the
1st Marine Division. This was particularly true of the center Marine
regimental sector which was bisected by the Panmunjom corridor and the
no-fire lines. The truce talk neutral zone restrictions prevented the
Marines in this area from massing their artillery fires on a desirable
scale and also, at times, interfered with proper CAS delivery forward
of the MLR. The numerous and sometimes conflicting “no-fly, no-fire”
restricting lines stemmed from original agreements made between UNC
and Communist representatives in 1951. Subsequently, however, the
prohibitions against firing any type of weapon in the area were
modified from time to time and added to by FAF, EUSAK, and I Corps,
“each time adding to the frustration of the local commanders.”[740]
[739] Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile
circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius
forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and
another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and
various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped
leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda
shell leaflets.
[740] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, 9-78.
The double-standard effect of the neutrality restrictions became
readily apparent, however. The CCF artfully used this area, by means
of his tactics of “creeping” toward the Allied MLR, as a supply and
reserve buildup location. The enemy emplaced artillery, assembled
troops, and even used the neutral territory for equipment buildups,
including tanks, in the Kaesong vicinity.[741] Thus the restrictive
lines gave the enemy an opportunity to maneuver within an approximate
12 square-mile area, all within effective artillery range and outside
of the Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, but UNC units were
powerless to take any action.
[741] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-37.
Intelligence operations, during the latter stages of the war, were
not considered optimum--for either the division or wing. While dug in
on the western end of I Corps, the Marine information effort had been
“seriously hampered by the lack of prisoners of war.”[742] Only 94 CCF
had been captured by the division during the period, compared with more
than 2,000 prisoners taken earlier on the East-Central front.[743]
This deficiency was attributed to the “static defensive situation, the
reluctance of the Chinese to surrender and the heavy volume of fire
placed on our reconnaissance patrols.”[744]
[742] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39.
[743] Between December 1950-July 1953, the 1st Marine Division
took 2,445 _NKPA/CCF_, with an additional 656 enemy
seized by its attached 1st KMC/RCT, or a total of
3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters
Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three
infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An
additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division
in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G-1 Folder, Aug 53
(Box 4), “Personnel Periodic Rpt. No. 94,” dtd 15–31 Aug
53; _USMC Board Rpt_, v. I, p. II-B-46.
[744] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39.
In the air, photo reconnaissance results were not rated entirely
satisfactory as a source of current information by either air or ground
Marines. The command channels in effect designated the Air Force as
responsible agent for control and coordination of all photo missions
in Korea. Requests for photographic missions thus were relayed on to
FAF and flown by its Reconnaissance Wing or the Marines’ own VMJ-1
squadron. The system produced relatively good vertical coverage with
photos available in about 10 days. Special requests for immediate
coverage on areas of local importance, however, customarily were either
not flown or “delayed to the point where they were of no value”[745]
because the tactical situation had been changed.
[745] _Ibid._
Delays were due to the shortage of photographic aircraft throughout
FAF and the limited provision in T/Os for photo interpretation.
Intelligence of air-strike targets (particularly post-strike) was
consistently mediocre. Oblique photos of frontline positions took an
average of three-four days to be processed and sometimes longer. As
an expedient, aerial observers began to shoot their own vertical and
oblique photos with hand-held cameras slung over the side of a VMO-6
plane.
Probably the most serious problem of all, from the Marine Corps point
of view, was that during much of the Korean War Marine air-ground
components, trained to work as a team, were to a large extent
precluded from operating together. The separate missions of the wing
and division reflected, on a smaller scale, the divergent UNC air and
ground doctrine and tactics. After the early moving battles, Korean
hostilities had settled down to a protracted land war in which ground
and air tactical commands did not operate jointly and were never
coordinated to deal a truly devastating blow to the enemy. Since the
Korean War was a limited one most of the fighting was confined to the
stabilized front across Korea. Both air and naval forces were viewed
largely as supporting arms for the ground operation.
Due to political-military considerations, UNC tactical air power had
been, in effect, handcuffed so that its use would not appear “overly
aggressive” and threaten an enlargement of the Korean hostilities into
a nuclear armageddon of World War III.[746] Since the earliest days of
the war, a strict embargo had been placed on any bombing of Chinese
rear supply areas or industrial complexes although it was obvious that
much of the enemy’s logistical strength lay beyond the Manchurian
border.
[746] Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against
full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the
desire to employ “humanitarian” standards in the UNC war
effort. Following WW II there had been wide criticism
of the “moral wrong of massed air bombardment” as well
as employment of the atomic bomb by the U. S. to hasten
the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid
needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be
directed against purely military targets. Futrell, _USAF
Korea_, p. 41.
Air efforts were concentrated largely on nuisance or harassing raids
within North Korea and close air support efforts of various types,
rather than a systematic destruction of the enemy’s primary supply
installation’s. Some ranking officers had informally interpreted
official Washington policy as “Don’t employ airpower so that the
enemy will get mad and won’t sign the armistice.”[747] Indeed, it was
not until after the Communists had rejected what the UNC called its
“final truce package,” in April 1952, that it was decided to exert
greater pressure against the Communists. The list of approved aerial
targets was then enlarged to include North Korean hydroelectric power
facilities, previously exempted from air attack.
[747] _Ibid._, p. 402.
From late 1950 until early 1953, Marine air squadrons were assigned
directly by FAF, with CG, 1st MAW, having virtually no tactical control
over his own units. Marine Corps aerial doctrine traditionally employed
close air support of ground operations as the primary role of its air
arm. FEAF and FAF, however, in their interpretation of employment of
tactical air power directed FAF maximum efforts toward interdiction
missions, sometimes even to the expense of immediate CAS needs.[748]
As Far East Air Forces stated late in 1951, “when required, close air
support of United Nations Army forces may take precedence over other
FEAF programs.”[749] Interdiction, general support, and close support
missions were the normal order of priorities flown by _FEAF_-FAF.
[748] Comments Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 430–431: “Despite
the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air
Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction
attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission
in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely
dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for
the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-_FAF_
in November 1951] placed on close support.” One of
those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st
Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in
the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described
the Marine division’s air support as unsatisfactory and
stated his division had “taken unnecessary casualties
because its air support had not been adequate or timely.”
Average elapsed time between the division’s CAS requests
and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly
two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had
been filled within 30 minutes.
[749] _Ibid._, p. 432.
Operation STRANGLE, the 10-month, all-out, air interdiction campaign
during 1951–1952 originally had as its objective the destruction of
the North Korean road-rail network. The interdiction program had
been defined at first as a move to “paralyze enemy transportation in
the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel and the front
lines.”[750] and later somewhat more conservatively as a measure to so
“disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication ... that he will be unable
to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces ... or to mount a
sustained offensive himself.”[751]
[750] _Ibid._, p. 296.
[751] _Ibid._, pp. 435–436.
Despite more than 87,552 interdiction sorties flown during the period,
CinCFE daily intelligence summaries showed that aerial harassment of
the CCF had not hindered their defensive efforts. Instead, by the
summer of 1952 the enemy had “actually doubled in troop strength,
reinforced their artillery strength to equal that of the UN forces,
developed a tremendous AA capability, and established the capability
for launching a general offensive.”[752] With UNC air and sea
superiority, the Chinese Communists had still succeeded in keeping
their main supply route open. Rail track cuts were being repaired in
as little as 36 hours. And the CCF was employing more fire power than
ever: in May 1952, some 102,000 rounds fell against UNC positions
compared to only 8,000 the previous July.
[752] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-58.
Even the retiring UNC Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, admitted
before Congressional representatives in 1952 that the enemy had greater
offensive potential than ever before, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet,
Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, declared flatly: “The interdiction
program was a failure ... It did _not_ interdict.”[753] USAF spokesmen
felt it had attained its limited purpose but opined: “Seen abstractly,
the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and
preventive rather than offensive and positive.”[754] In early 1952, CG,
FAF, General Everest, recognizing that his pilots “had been so long
engaged in interdiction attacks that they were losing their skills in
close support”[755] inaugurated a new system. Beginning in March all
fighter-bomber squadrons were to be rotated on weekly close-support
missions.
[753] Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_, p. 270.
[754] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 437–438.
[755] _Ibid._, p. 434.
Actually, the skies had begun to clear for Marine aviation operational
difficulties by the latter half of 1952. A better understanding had
developed between both high-level officials and the working day-to-day
liaison operations at JOC CG, 1st MAW had “established his position
so firmly he was able to guide establishment of the policies which
governed his operations merely by expressing his desires to CG 5th
AF.”[756] The battle for Bunker Hill in August 1952 had marked
excellent cooperation between Eighth Army and FAF, with the 1st Marine
Division receiving air priority for two days. In any event, matters
were substantially improved from late 1951-early 1952 when, during a
12-month period, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv had plummeted to
the incredibly low figure of 1,956[757] or 15.8 percent of the wing’s
total 12,372 CAS sorties during FY 1952 (1Jul51–30Jun52).
[756] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-45.
[757] By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for
1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50
percent; for FY 1953, the _figure_ was 4,912 of total
14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. _Generals’ Summary_,
Chart C, following p. 58.
Commenting on this unhappy period for both air and infantry Marines,
Lieutenant General Richard C. Mangrum, USMC (Retired), who was CO,
MAG-12 during part of the STRANGLE operations, said “for the rest of
1951 and well into 1952 the major effort of my Group and of MAG-33 was
devoted to cutting the rail lines in North Korea. Without success, of
course. Little by little we were able to increase the percentages of
effort devoted to close support of the troops.”[758] And by the last
six months of the war the bulk of all CAS missions received by the
division were flown by 1st MAW aircraft, in contrast to earlier periods
when a third or half of the division’s sorties were Marine-flown. As
the last Korean War Wing CG noted, despite basic differences between
Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy concept and tactics, ultimately
“the commanders of the Fifth Air Force in actual daily practice
decentralized control to a marked degree.”[759]
[758] Quoted in Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_, p. 647.
[759] MajGen V. E. Megee, “Tactical Air Support of Ground
Forces,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55),
p. 17.
Throughout the war, however, a lack of standardized terms and
differences in request procedures continued to exist. (This was
resolved by using Marine control procedures when flying for the
division, and Army-Air Force procedures when scrambled on flights for
other divisions.) Whereas EUSAK-FAF considered strikes inside the
bombline[760] as “close air support” and those outside it as “general
support,” the Marine CAS concept was one of support in close proximity
to frontlines (ranging from 50 to 500 yards out) that affects the fire
and maneuver of those ground units. In the hands of Marine FACs, Marine
planes employed on close support strikes had a definite influence on
the MLR tactical situation.
[760] The bombline had been moved in to an average of 3–4,000
meters from the MLR in December 1952 to expose more
targets to the “mass” strike treatment.
Then, too, the Marine system of maintaining aircraft “on air alert”
resulted in CAS requests being filled in 5 to 15 minutes. Air support
requests screened in the regular manner by Eighth Army and FAF at the
JOC level resulted in a delivery of ordnance to the target in a minimum
of 30 minutes and delays sometimes of nearly four hours.[761] During
fluid situations, when the division required more than 40 sorties per
day, the “on station” system proved more tactically effective than the
FAF pre-planned “on call” procedure.
[761] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ Chap. 1, No. 6, p. 1-15.
Operational differences between the Marine-Navy and Army-Air Force type
of CAS in a critical ground situation were never more apparent than
in a major CCF last-ditch effort when the enemy slammed against ROK
defenses in the Kumsong area. An end-of-war report noted:
CCF penetration of the II ROK Corps sector, in July, 1953,
brought clearly into focus the ineffectiveness of the Air
Force-Army close air support (CAS) system during periods of fluid
operations. CCF eruption through the II ROK Corps MLR and deep
into friendly territory eliminated, as effective or practical,
the complete reliance by 5th AF on pre-planned CAS strikes (using
aircraft from the ground-alert pool), against fleeting targets
or targets of an immediate nature. These types of targets are
considered normal during a fluid situation.
The inadequacy of communications for rapid transmission of
air support requests in the CAS system employed in Korea, the
impossibility of only four TACP’s per division (U.S. and ROK
Army) to keep up with frontline battalion battle actions in
order to control CAS strikes, and the over-centralization of
control of CAS request approvals and CAS aircraft allocation
were all clearly demonstrated during that period of fluid ground
operations in July.[762]
[762] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-3.
Despite the accommodation reached during the Korean War, many of these
fundamental differences in doctrine and employment of air support to
ground troops in combat persisted until recent years.[763]
[763] For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems
dealing with air-ground liaison and communications, use
of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress,
Rpt of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of
the Committee on Armed Services, Otis G. Pike, Chairman
(House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington:
GPO, 1966.
As military history has shown countless times in the past, wars are
fought under the prevailing difficulties of the time. There never was a
war waged under ideal conditions. A reflection on operational problems
of the Korean period is predicated on the thought that a review of
them--and the solutions effected where possible--may help avoid their
repetition in a conflict of the future.
_Korean Lessons_[764]
[764] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No.
5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; _Generals’ Summary_;
_Lessons Learned 5-53_; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dtd 7 Aug 53;
1st MAW PIR 127-53, dtd 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of
Enemy Ground Situation #1-53 (end-of-war analysis); 1st
MAW PIR 169-53, dtd 18 Jun 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy
Air Situation 1-53, dtd 20 May 53 (end-of-war analysis);
5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI: Comments on Tactics,
Techniques, and Equipment, pp. 1–12; J. Lawton Collins,
_War in Peacetime--The History and Lessons of Korea_
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969); S. L. A. Marshall,
_The Military History of the Korean War_ (New York:
Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963); S. L. A. Marshall, _Pork
Chop Hill--The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea,
Spring 1953_ (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956),
quoted with permission of the publisher; Ridgway, _Korean
War_; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; Batterton, _Korea Notes_.
In the early phase of the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division
deployment was in a moving battle situation similar to numerous
engagements it had fought in the past 175 years. Most of the “lessons”
learned from the enemy, the tactical situation itself, and the terrain
in Korea are derived largely from the later outpost warfare stage when
the Marines were employed in a stabilized and sustained defensive
situation similar to that facing other Allied units across the entire
Eighth Army front. Tactics of defense on a wide front, construction
of permanent type field fortifications, and organization of the
battle position in difficult terrain was a new experience to Marines.
This period of limited objective attacks and battles of attrition
highlighted the importance of small unit tactics and demonstrated some
modified concepts regarding employment of supporting arms.
During the period of outpost warfare, the 1st Marine Division
was never confronted by a general enemy offensive or combined
infantry-armor-artillery-air assault. The nature of the conflict was
one of limited objective attacks, with strong and sometimes sustained
probes. Typically, these were two-battalion assaults against a
platoon-size outpost.
Time after time, as UNC defending troops learned, the CCF
characteristic pattern of attack was repetitive and almost predictable.
After dark, heavy preparatory fires deluged an isolated advance
outpost. Crude, but effective, improvised demolitions often reduced
COP fortifications[765] so that the enemy could assail the position.
Waves of attacking Chinese then overwhelmed the greatly outnumbered
defenders. Almost invariably the initial attack made on the front of
the position was a feint; the real attack would be made by troops
that had enveloped the position and moved to the rear. Enemy ambush
forces were also located to the rear of the outpost, between the COP
and MLR, at normal reinforcement routes to prevent both a pullback by
the defenders to the MLR and to stop reinforcements from reaching the
outpost.
[765] If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely
following under heavy preparatory fires, he could
penetrate the position. At this close range, normal
box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break
up the attack. _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 10.
Effective defensive fire plans for the COPs covered all likely enemy
approaches and assembly areas, as well as close-in boxing fires of the
COP on all sides. Marine defense positions were sited for all-round
defense, with special attention paid to covering the rear approaches
at night. This tactic of rear envelopment also applied on a smaller
scale to patrols. Invariably the CCF maneuvered to the flanks and rear
of a friendly patrol in an attempt to encircle it. The CCF skillfully
employed both the terrain and troops and regularly attacked from more
than one direction.
Experience with Communist combat techniques forced UNC leaders to
reevaluate their own night-fighting tactics. The Chinese had a marked
superiority in night operations. Every major attack on Marine outposts
during the last year of the war was made at night. When they were
not directly assaulting a friendly site, the CCF advanced their own
ground positions by digging and their well-known creeping tactics. This
enabled them to establish an OP line within small arms and mortar range
of Marine COPs and the MLR. The battle for Bunker Hill came about as
a result of this enemy tactic. Organization in early 1952 of COP-2A,
adjacent to the Panmunjom corridor, was in direct rebuttal to this same
tactic. By such indirect methods, the Chinese were further able to
extend their already favorable high ground positions which gave them
observation over practically all of the Marine front line. Defensively
the enemy used the cover of darkness equally well: mountain roads were
aswarm with trucks and supply movements, which UNC night-fighters and
bombers slowed with only moderate success.
Skilled, rapid construction of field fortifications and excellent
camouflage discipline by the enemy were also object lessons. Entrances
to tunnels and caves, as well as the bunkers themselves were so
carefully disguised by fresh branches, weeds, logs, and other natural
foliage that they were rarely visible either by air observer or
aerial photographs. Active weapons positions were also effectively
camouflaged. Often 60mm and 82mm mortars were housed in bunkers and
fired through a narrow opening at the top. If moved out temporarily
to an open slope, they were quickly returned to the bunker to avoid
detection. The Chinese elaborate underground system of trenchworks and
radial tunnels between forward and rear bunkers was sometimes as much
as 35 yards long. Underground bunkers and tunnels often had 20 feet or
more of protective dirt cover and offered security from anything except
a direct aerial hit.
Destruction of the enemy’s trenches, bunkers, and cave network by
medium and heavy artillery was only partially successful. Napalm was
generally ineffective due to the lack of combustible materials in CCF
ground defenses. The well-prepared, deeply dug fortifications were
virtually impervious to anything less than air assaults with heavy
ordnance (1,000-pound bombs and over) which were required to destroy
CCF reverse slope positions.
A well dug-in secondary line was located four to eight miles to the
rear of the Chinese MLR. Intelligence indicated that an attack to
infiltrate CCF defenses would “require the penetration of a fortified
area to a minimum depth of 10 miles.”[766] Some Korean War analysts
maintained that behind their front line the Chinese had entrenched
the ridges to an average depth of 14 miles and that the enemy “could
have fallen back upon successive prepared positions for all that
distance.”[767] Although the trench warfare period of the Korean War
was often likened to World War I, the Chinese defensive works were
estimated to have “ten times the depth of any belt of entrenchments
in World War I.”[768] Some areas had even been engineered for defense
against nuclear attack. Caves, tunnels, and particularly reverse slope
positions also showed CCF skill in the selection and organization of
terrain features.
[766] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-29.
[767] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, p. 24.
[768] _Ibid._, p. 116.
Both the nature of the ground fighting and weather in Korea quickly
indicated that our bunker construction needed to be improved. Siting
them lower into the ground, so that the outline of the bunkers would
not make them such ready targets, and reinforcing them to withstand
a 105mm direct hit were steps in this direction. Use of sandbags (of
which there was a continuing shortage) for both bunkers and trenches
proved to be almost as much a problem as a solution. Bunkers above
ground shored up with sandbags frequently collapsed in times of heavy
rains or Korean spring thawing conditions.
Outpost warfare also proved that the average bunker often became a
deathtrap when used defensively. This was due to the enemy proclivity
for sealing entrances with their satchel charges, as occurred in the
Vegas Cities battle. It became evident that large living-fighting
bunkers could easily turn into traps in which many men could become
casualties simultaneously, and from which few could fight. Despite
their exposed nature, fighting holes were often safer. Some Korean
combat officers were of the opinion that rather than our six- to
eight-man bunkers, smaller two-man fighting units would be obviously
faster to build, more effective, and safer since they would present a
smaller target.
A 1st Marine Division training bulletin issued near the end of the war
stated categorically:
As a rule no bunker or cave should be large enough to accommodate
more than four men. If the cave is bombardment proof, there
is another greater danger that the men will fail to man their
fighting positions quickly enough after the enemy fire lifts or
ceases.[769]
[769] _Lessons Learned_, 5-53, p. 11.
UNC reconnaissance and security activities also showed need for
improvement. Night raids, patrol operations, and ambushes were
conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him
off balance, and obtain intelligence. This type of mobile, small-unit
action repeatedly indicated an urgent need for more basic training in
night combat operations at the squad and platoon level. The frequent
breakdown of communications in night fighting, whether it involved
a small patrol or besieged outpost, was particularly critical. Some
regimental commanders noted the failure to employ properly organic
small arms in combat action during darkness before requesting heavier
supporting fires. It was felt that the practice of calling for mortar
or artillery fire to the exclusion of using small arms was a dangerous
practice which was being overused and that “_even in the defense the
spirit of the offensive must be maintained_.”[770] Meticulous planning
was vital for effective fire plans, alternate avenues of approach, and
evacuation. Detailed rehearsals of raids were essential.
[770] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.
Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol
sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission
and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience,
Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively
on “pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in
front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be
silhouetted.”[771] Some commanders declared that such circumstances
often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields--their own,
as well as the enemy’s.
[771] Batterton, _Korea Notes_, p. 34.
In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield
after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every
Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to
preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts
were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the
relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953,
enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date
one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was
equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual
battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity
in intelligence activities.
The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations
was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier
killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans:
Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches,
and at the same time heavily bombard our positions.
For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of
men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale
attacks, they intensely bombard our positions.
An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance
indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack
within a short period.[772]
[772] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army
PIR No. 948.
As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of
established procedures:
The same tactics and techniques should not be followed in every
raid. The pattern should be altered to the extent that the
tactics and techniques employed will not indicate the objective
to the enemy. The time selected for raids should vary to permit
the conduct of both daylight and night raids. Employment of
supporting arms including the delivery of smoke must be varied to
prevent indication of the objective.[773]
[773] _Lessons Learned 5-53_, p. 2.
Enemy ability to locate listening posts and take them under direct
fire or mortar attack also dictated the need for frequent change in
location.
Regarding the use of supporting arms, the Korean terrain itself
dictated a need for modification of traditional practices of employing
both direct and indirect fire weapons in order to achieve maximum
effectiveness. Standard Marine Corps use of both crew-served infantry
weapons and artillery centered around the concept of interlocking and
mutually reinforcing bands of fire. Neither the frontage nor terrain in
Korea was what could be termed “normal.” Battalion frontages were often
more than twice the accepted maximum. The terrain consisted of steep
main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges leading off both sides.
Such contours require twice as many machine guns for adequate defense
against enemy attacks if employed in positions affording the usual
interlocking grazing fire.
For both infantry weapons on the forward COPs and MLR, and supporting
artillery batteries, the combination of “stretching unit fronts
and unstretchable ranges”[774] of the weapons caused them to lose
a considerable amount of their mutual support capability, as one
artillery regimental commander commented about the experience of the
1st Marine Division in Korea. As a result, a compromise was often
effected whereby machine guns were emplaced on the high ground of the
ridge line, with their individual sectors of fire extended to 180
degrees. Although the guns were no longer mutually supporting, the
numerous finger ridges could be better covered by fire to prevent the
enemy from gaining a foothold on them prior to assault on the main
ridge line.
[774] Col F. P. Henderson, “Amphibious Artillery of the
Future,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55),
p. 30.
As previously noted, the Marine division also modified its concept
about occupying the military crest, rather than the topographical
crest, of forward slopes.[775] In view of CCF tactics, forward slope
positions offered the advantage of observation and superior fields of
fire and assisted in bringing fire on the enemy in those areas and
approaches masked from the view of reverse slope positions.
[775] See Chapter VI.
Under conditions of stabilized defensive lines in Korea, the great
offensive power of Marine tanks was somewhat limited. They were used
extensively as direct fire weapons and supplemented the artillery
regiment by firing deep H&I (harassing and interdiction) missions. In
West Korea, it proved expedient to have friendly tanks positioned in
defiladed assembly areas where they were on call and ready to move
into MLR firing slots on short notice. They often provided close fire
support to Marine patrols and outpost defense actions, sometimes being
called in for fire missions before the direct support artillery.
Since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire,
they usually remained in firing positions on the MLR only long enough
to complete their fire mission. Deployment of several M-46s in mutually
supporting MLR positions, however, tended to reduce the volume of
hostile fire. When operating forward of the MLR, it was important that
the armored vehicles be protected by infantry from enemy tank-killer
teams. Often the Marine artillery observer’s knowledge of the terrain
and familiarity with objective targets upon which the tank could be
effectively used was thus relayed to the tanker, particularly when such
targets were themselves obscured to the tank gunner. In registering the
target, however, the adjustment system used by the gunner differed from
that of the artillery FOs. It was recommended that use of tank guns and
lights be made part of the regular COP fire plan.
The Korean experience demonstrated in particular the need for better
rehearsed tank-infantry patrols. It also showed the need for a reliable
tank-mounted searchlight with a range up to 2,000 yards. Smoke and
muzzle blast of the 90mm gun often reduced the effectiveness of the
tank searchlight. When two tanks were employed as a team (one spotting
targets and adjusting fire with the light, while the other zeroed in on
the illuminated targets), the searchlight was markedly more effective.
Outpost warfare, which was predominantly night fighting, was thus
characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery dueling, and sharp
battles for contested terrain that would offer improved observation.
In this stand-off period of positional warfare, ground defenses were
developed to the point where “both sides were incomparably stronger
than they had been in actual [moving] battle.”[776]
[776] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 72.
Lessons from Korea dealt not only with modified battle tactics, but
involved an evaluation of enemy performance and capabilities, as well
as certain strategic considerations which had so markedly affected the
course of the war. UNC forces in Korea faced an adversary who had vast
resources of manpower and, accordingly, was wholly indifferent to the
cost of victory in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy
believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances Chinese
commanders did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a
three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly unit.
Combat effectiveness of the CCF was evaluated as good to excellent.
Chinese officers demonstrated good combat leadership. They were well
schooled in both offensive and defensive military tactics. Some units
had been trained for amphibious operations. During the long period of
positional warfare, the CCF had built up their military capability
(troops, artillery, AA guns) and resupplied their forward units.
Maintaining a steady flow of supplies had been an earlier weakness of
the CCF logistics system. During the last six months of the war Chinese
stockpiles were adequate for 35 days of offensive operations; the enemy
was capable of supporting a major offensive for a 17–24 day period.
By contrast, the North Korean soldier was considerably less effective.
The larger number of NKPA prisoners taken and their greater desertion
rate indicated poorer discipline and lower morale. NKPA units were
rated from poor to good. After 1951, NKPA forces decreased in
importance while the CCF assumed a greater role in the combat effort as
well as in the truce negotiations.
Chinese weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of
standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or
ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign
manufacture--Japanese, U.S., German, Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and
Chinese design. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more
than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually
armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and
had “proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.”[777]
[777] 1st MAW PIR 127-53, Encl (1), p. 1.
Individually and as units, the CCF exhibited the traditional Oriental
characteristics of extreme patience, passivity, and determination. Some
authorities went so far as to declare that the Chinese ability to:
... remain quiet for a long period and to patrol stealthily are
the main reasons for the success of his engagements. The enemy’s
successes which have resulted from his patience and stealth show
that our troops need more training in the same technique.[778]
[778] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-41.
The enemy’s tenacious determination to hold key terrain, regardless of
the costs of lives, was well known. Another evaluation concluded:
The Chinese [is] well and courageously led at the small unit
level. He is thoroughly disciplined. He is an industrious digger.
His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN
superiority in the air, his inferior communications equipment and
his hodgepodge of weapons and equipment.[779]
[779] _Ibid._, No. 5, p. 8-31.
Battlefront lightweightness and mobility, particularly in Korean winter
operations, was another important object lesson from the enemy. Marine
cold weather clothing, including thermal boot and body armor which
had saved so many lives, was of excellent design and quality. Despite
this, some authorities felt that during the Korean War the Marine was
“placed at a disadvantage when he met the CCF soldier,”[780] because
of bulky cold-weather clothing that hindered freedom of movement. The
weight of some of the Marine infantryman’s weapons, such as the 16½ lb.
BAR (plus magazines) and the 9½ lb. M-1 rifle, was felt to contribute
further to this lack of mobility. In contrast, “the CCF soldier dressed
in his quilted uniform and armed with a ‘burp’ [submachine] gun, moved
freely and quietly over the roughest of terrain, thereby gaining a not
inconsiderable advantage over his heavily burdened adversary.”[781]
[780] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-82.
[781] _Ibid._
This superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical
surprise. Since CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they
could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their
movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often
there was no preliminary warning until the CCF were virtually within
grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The
enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed
their presence from UN air reconnaissance.
One observer of the Korean scene, both in the early battles of 1950
and again in 1953, has compared the CCF development of military skills
during this period, as follows:
In 1950, the Red Chinese were a crude lot, given more to
pell-mell attacks and diehard stands than to deception and
protection. But they stayed and they learned as they went along.
When they entered the war, apart from their exceptional skill and
persistence with the machine gun, they were not accurate users
of hand weapons ... by 1953, few of the old signs remained. They
had become as tenacious and as earth-seeking as ants, and in that
lay a great part of their success. Two and one-half years of war
in Korea were a bonanza for Communist China. On that training
ground her armies became as skilled as any in the world in the
techniques of hitting, evading and surviving.[782]
[782] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, pp. 20–21.
The most telling characteristic of the Chinese Communist soldier, who
essentially was a guerrilla fighter, may thus be his ready capacity to
learn from experience, particularly the fine art of deception.
As important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the
experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce table.
Cease-fire talks dragged on interminably over a period of 2 years and
17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words
recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had
been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years
of the truce talks, from July 1951-July 1953, an additional 56,000
Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. combat losses
to more than 136,000.[783] (U.S. forces suffered some 80,000 casualties
in the first year of the war.) And in the end, the final solution to
the POW problem was substantially that first proposed by the UNC in
April 1952.
[783] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, pp. 77, 78.
Commenting on the Communist strategem that opened the truce talks
in July 1951, U.S. government officials observed at the time the
negotiations began:
The suggestion was received with caution since the free people of
the world have learned that Communist words and Communist intent
seldom coincide. Regardless, our leaders initiated action for
preliminary ceasefire talks with the hope that the Communists
were acting in good faith.[784]
[784] Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.
Despite this early realistic appraisal of the enemy, the degree to
which the Communists were to employ truce negotiations as simply an
extension of the battlefield was not immediately evident.
A key factor is involved here. The proverbial Chinese quality of
passivity and seemingly endless patience, both on the individual and
national level, was fully utilized to their advantage. In contrast,
the Western people, particularly Americans, are characteristically
impatient to complete a task once it is started. As Admiral C. Turner
Joy, USN, who initially headed the UNC delegation to the Korean
Armistice Conference, commented, “We are a people who like to get
things _done_.... The Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks
to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience
through the imposition of endless delays.”[785] The American attitude
is to feel that a deadlocked issue should be resolved by mutual
concessions, which puts the enemy on favorable ground in employing his
delaying tactics. The Communist view is that by deliberately slowing
the progress toward completion of the armistice the position of their
opponent will gradually be undermined. Thus, Communists regard any
concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Whereas
Westerners often feel that to accept part of a negotiating proposal
will encourage the Communists to respond in kind, such an action is apt
to lead to an even more unyielding position on their part.
[785] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 39.
* * * * *
The armistice effort in Korea also taught the following lessons:
Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for [an]
armistice. Increase it.
Armistice conferences should be brief ... to allow ... talks to
become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This
encourages your Communist opponents.
The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the
area of conflict.
Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to
make progress.[786]
[786] _Ibid._, pp. 166–173, _passim_.
Possibly no one had more first-hand experience in negotiating with the
enemy in the Korean War than Colonel James C. Murray, the Marine Corps
staff officer who was involved in the truce talks from 8 July 1951 to
27 July 1953. In these two years he served as liaison officer between
the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in meetings.
On three different occasions he negotiated the truce line which was
to separate UNC and Communist forces. In July 1953, as Senior Liaison
Officer, he was in charge of the UNC staff group that determined the
final line of demarcation. He has noted that Communist rationalizations
readily disregard whatever facts or logic which do not fit their
purpose, no matter how inconsistent.
While customarily ignoring all restrictions of the Geneva Convention
in dealing with prisoners, for example, when it was expedient to their
interests the Communists would then argue for an incredibly narrow
interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Declared Colonel Murray:
“Having come to the conference table only because they were near
defeat, the Communists were prepared from the very first to make the
most of the negotiations to create ... a ‘climate of victory’.”[787]
This accounts for their concern with even the smallest detail of “stage
setting,” for maintaining “face,” and for practical advantages from
negotiating conditions, such as the physical setting of the truce talk
site.
[787] Col J. C. Murray, “Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice
Negotiations,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep
55), p. 30.
* * * * *
As the Marine officer further observed:
A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the
truce was the appearance of the Communist victory in Korea....
An armistice, no less than war, could be looked upon only as
a means to an end ... to this end they negotiate patiently and
skillfully ... temporary inconveniences must be borne for ... the
attainment of long-range political objectives.[788]
[788] _Ibid._, p. 29.
Certainly, the close interaction between Communist military operations
and truce negotiations, a key factor since 1951, was particularly
apparent during April-July 1953 as the war drew to an end.
In addition to Communist China which had emerged stronger and with
considerably more prestige from the war, the other Asian nation to
have undergone marked military growth was the Republic of Korea. In
June 1950, the ROK army had numbered approximately 98,000 inadequately
trained troops, armed chiefly with hand-carried weapons such as rifles
and carbines, ill-prepared to hold back a determined enemy attack. The
ROK army was little more than a constabulary force organized by KMAG
(Korean Military Advisory Group) for internal police duty. Only 65,000
men had actually received unit combat training. ROK armed forces during
the three years of the war had increased six-fold and by July 1953
totaled nearly 600,000 men.
Training and equipment had steadily improved the ROK battle efficiency
which, in the 1950–1951 period, had been handicapped by lack of heavy
tanks, mortars, artillery, antitank mines and shells, and other heavy
weapons. By the spring of 1951 the ROK army was being transformed
into an effective fighting force, due largely to the determination of
General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander. In 1952 the ROK army had been
enlarged to 12 divisions and the ROK Marine forces had been similarly
expanded. Gradual augmentation resulted in a total of 16 ROK divisions,
most of these with organic artillery; by July 1953 ROK troops had
assumed responsibility for the majority of the UN line.
Marine Corps experience with its ROK counterpart had been instructive
and generally encouraging.[789] Organized in 1949 by the Republic of
Korea with assistance from KMAG, the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment
had taken part in antiguerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion.
With the outbreak of hostilities, the KMCs engaged in UN delaying
actions in southwest Korea until September 1950 when the Korean
regiment of nearly 3,000 men was attached to the 5th Marines as part of
the Inchon assault force. Later the KMCs were involved in defense of
Wonsan and the Hamhung-Hungnam beachhead as well as the Pohang patrol.
After serving as a maneuver element with the ROK forces in early
1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was attached permanently to the 1st Marine
Division in March of that year, participating in the Hwachon Reservoir
fighting and performing valuable service in the interrogation of POWs.
[789] See “1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the
1stMarDiv,” “SAR” File (Korea), Type “C” Rpt.
The KMCs modeled themselves after U.S. Marines, particularly emulating
the traditional offensive Marine _esprit de corps_ and overriding goal
to “close with the enemy and seize the objective” regardless of strong
resistance. The combat courage and determination of the KMCs was cited
by CG, 1st Marine Division, on several occasions.
During the 1952–1953 period, the KMC/RCT provided the Marine division
with nearly a quarter of its combat strength and became the fourth
regiment of the division. The ROK Marine Corps also consisted of the
2d KMC Regiment, which furnished personnel for the WCIDU/ECIDU island
security forces, and the 5th KMC Battalion, attached to the Marine
division in 1952. Classes in infantry tactics for KMC officer and
enlisted personnel were conducted at the Korean Marine Corps Training
Center at Chinhae. This was patterned after U.S. Marine Corps recruit
and officers’ basic schools, under supervision of USMC staff personnel.
Coupled with an offensive spirit and desire to attain U.S. Marine Corps
standards and combat performance, the Korean Marines largely overcame
early major problems resulting from the language barrier, translation
of U.S. basic training materials, and the insufficient number of
qualified and experienced Korean military instructors. One early
recruit class possibly established a record for brevity in training
when its members, after only a few weeks, were ordered to participate
in the Inchon assault which was the Korean Marines’ first specialized
amphibious operation.
Many of the hard lessons of Korea--as well as some of its unique
problems--resulted from the fact that this was America’s first major
experience in a modern, undeclared, and limited war. Accustomed to the
tradition of hard-hitting, all-out war and decisive victory, both the
fighting man at the front and Nation tended to view the conflict as
well as its ultimate accomplishments as inconclusive.[790]
[790] The course of the war, particularly its protracted and
static nature, had led to growing national apathy and
opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late
1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the
people were in favor of the war and seven months later
that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front
lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground
actions or large scale air attacks. _Washington Post_,
dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 1-16.
Most importantly, immediate collective security action by the UNC had
prevented another small country from being subdued by direct, armed
aggression. And the Communists had failed to attain their objective:
the forced unification of Korea, not as a free nation but as a Russian
satellite, as was North Korea. The balance sheet for UNC military
intervention showed that 22 nations (including the ROK) had provided
assistance, either personnel or materiel in defense of South Korea.
Many of these countries had supplied token units of battalion-size or
less and several had furnished noncombat medical facilities. Despite
the fact these detachments from other Allied countries totalled “only
44,000 men they were disproportionately valuable in emphasizing the
collective, coalition nature of the Korean war effort.”[791] Major
losses, however, had been borne by ROK and American troops.
[791] Rees, _Korea_, p. 33.
UNC casualties numbered 996,937 killed, wounded, and missing. U.S.
losses were 136,937, of which 33,629 represented battle deaths and
103,308 wounded in action. A measure of the role that ground forces
played in Korea “may be judged from the fact that, of the total United
States battle casualties for the entire conflict, the Army and Marines
accounted for 97 percent.”[792] Casualties of other UNC countries,
exclusive of the U.S. and ROK, totaled approximately 17,000 although
no other Allied nation lost as many as 1,000 dead. ROK casualties were
listed at 850,000. Communist losses were estimated at 1,420,000 (CCF:
900,000 killed and wounded; NKPA: 520,000 killed and wounded).
[792] Ridgway, _Korean War_, p. viii.
For the Republic of South Korea, the end of the war in some respects
represented a _status quo ante bellum_. Korea still remained
politically partitioned and geographically divided. Whereas the 38th
Parallel had been the territorial boundary prior to the Communist
attack of 25 June 1950, the cease-fire line dividing North and South
Korea in 1953 was the point of contact between ground forces at
the time the armistice was signed. This demarcation line, however,
“represented a stronger defense than the 38th Parallel as it possessed
a geographical basis all along its approximately 155-mile length.”[793]
The new boundary ran above the KANSAS Line, the commanding ground north
of the 38th Parallel.
[793] Rees, _Korea_, p. 431. In the three years of war, North
Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest
of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square
miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.
Possibly the single, most important lesson to be drawn from the Korean
War is that many of our nation’s military assumptions--and resulting
tactical decisions--tended to be based on a lack of appreciation
of enemy capabilities. In many instances intelligence evaluations
focused on “probable intentions of the enemy rather than on his
capabilities.”[794]
[794] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, p. 175.
While America put great military value and reliance on its massive
destructive air power, for example, we were confronted by an enemy
who practically never employed his own air capability, but instead
moved freely at night and hid by day and was thus little deterred by
our aerial harassment. And while our own battle summaries regularly
cited kill ratios of 1 USMC to 3.75 CCF and substantial Communist
losses,[795] we seemed to ignore an enemy mind that thought in terms
of numerical superiority and was little concerned about the high human
cost of holding key terrain or annexing a desired position. In the
last month of the war alone, Eighth Army estimated that CCF casualties
numbered 72,000, with more than 25,000 killed.
[795] Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted
approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111
estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs)
during the Apr 52-Jul 53 period on the western front.
For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were
approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/RCT.
In both battlefield tactics and high-level strategy, the Korean
War revealed a strong tendency on the part of the UNC to predict
enemy action by values and ideology largely reflecting our own.
Whether because of wishful thinking, basic mistakes in judgment,
or international _naiveté_, the 1950–1953 experience repeatedly
indicated a need on the part of Allied nations for considerably more
hard-headed realism in dealing with a Communist adversary. The original
UNC military objective of halting Communist aggression in Korea had
been successfully accomplished, without enlarging the conflict into
a nuclear war. At the same time, Korea had also provided a sobering
lesson. It demonstrated how, in a limited war, overriding political
considerations may permit the enemy to operate from a privileged
sanctuary and allow him to seize and, in many respects, retain the
initiative.
The Korean War had made America more aware of the threat of world
Communism and had resulted in the strengthening of our national defense
commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe. It had also validated
the concept of a balanced defense force. In contrast to the emphasis
on air capability and atomic power that had dominated the strategic
thinking in the post-World War II era, the Korean hostilities pointed
to the requirement for a balanced, diversified military force of
sufficient strength and readiness to cope effectively and on short
notice with any emergency. Korea had underscored how severe peacetime
budgetary cut-backs had led to unpreparedness. The Korean experience
had also shown the need for flexibility in mobilization planning.
Previously, this had been projected for an all-out, general war, based
on America’s role in World War II. The Nation’s post-Korean policy thus
sought, for the first time, a military strategy that would effectively
deter either a major war or local aggression.
Korean hostilities illustrated another important lesson. South
Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant
violation of the Cairo Declaration and U.N. Charter. It was apparent
that, despite the defense treaties and mutual aid pacts which the
United States had signed during and after World War II, “any number
of alliances, if not supported by strong military preparedness, would
never restrain aggression.”[796] It had taken the Korean War to drive
home the harsh reality that military preparedness, possession of
superior power, and _the willingness to use that power_ were the only
deterrent to enemy aggression throughout the world.
[796] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 2.
The Korean War also caused the Communists to modify their strategy
from one of overt aggression to more insidious means of gaining their
political and economic objectives. As the Marine Corps Commandant,
General Shepherd, warned: “Their tactic is to use war by proxy, war by
satellite, war by threat and subversion.”[797] And, although it was not
fully apparent at the time, the Korean attack “was to prove to be one
of the first in a series of ‘wars of liberation’”[798] that the world
would be witness to.
[797] Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.
[798] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, pp. 3–4.
In the final analysis, the Korean War evolved into a prolonged battle
of position and attrition in which the Communists, operating close to
their base of supply, were fought to a standstill by United Nations
forces under unfavorable conditions of climate and logistics. In
countering the enemy threat in Korea, the American units committed
there initially suffered from the effects of peacetime apathy that had
followed the rapid demobilization following World War II. As the Korean
War, originally visualized as a “police action” of brief duration,
ground on into a major effort spanning a period of three years and
one month, loud voices were raised on the home front to protest the
expenditure of lives and materiel in a venture that was not always
clearly understood by all Americans.
Among the U.S. forces committed on this far flung battlefront, it
was once again the Marine Corps component that stood out in its
sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. When rushed into
the battle during the first desperate weeks and months of the war,
the quickly-augmented Marine units helped to restore stability to the
shattered EUSAK front line. During the daringly conceived and executed
operation at Inchon, Marines accomplished this incredibly complex
amphibious operation with their customary spirit and precision. Never
was their courage and tenacity more conspicuous than during those
bitter days of the Chosin Reservoir campaign following the Chinese
Communist intervention.
In the static, or positional, warfare that marked the final operations
in Korea, the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
executed their respective missions with professional skill and
dispatch, regardless of tactical problems and the dreary monotony that
characterized a large part of the Korean War. U.S. Marines had seen
combat throughout much of the Korean peninsula. The fighting had taken
them from Pusan to Inchon and Seoul, to the Chosin, to Inje and the
Hwachon Reservoir in the Punchbowl area, and finally, in 1952–1953, to
the critical 35-mile front in West Korea near Panmunjom. In Korea, as
in past wars, Marines demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and
readiness which has always been a tradition of the Corps.
Marine courage and combat performance went far toward removing the
image of Western softness and decadence which the Communists had so
mistakenly construed in their own minds. It is a record of which all
Americans and the Free World can be proud.
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
AAA--Antiaircraft Artillery
AA--Antiaircraft
AD--Douglas “Skyraider” Single-Engine Attack Aircraft
ADC--Assistant Division Commander
ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO--Aerial Observer
ASP--Ammunition Supply Point
AT--Antitank
AU--Attack model of Vought F4U “Corsair”
BAR--Browning Automatic Rifle
BLT--Battalion Landing Team
Bn--Battalion
Brig--Brigade
Btry--Battery
CAS--Close Air Support
CCF--Chinese Communist Forces
CG--Commanding General
CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East
CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO--Chief of Naval Operations
Co--Company
CO--Commanding Officer
ComdD--Command Diary (also called Historical Diary, or War Diary)
ComNavFE--Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
ComServPac--Commander, Service Force, Pacific
CONUS--Continental United States
COP--Combat Outpost
CP--Command Post
CPX--Command Post Exercise
CSG--Combat Service Group
CTE--Commander Task Element
CTF--Commander Task Force
CTG--Commander Task Group
CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier
CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier
Div--Division
DMZ--Demilitarized Zone
DOW--Died of Wounds
Dtd--Dated
DUKW--Marine Amphibious Truck
ECIDE(U)--East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
ECM--Electronic Countermeasures
Engr--Engineer
EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea
F2H-2P--McDonnell “Banshee” Two-Engine Jet Fighter (photo model)
F3D-2--Douglas “Skyknight” Two-Engine Jet Fighter
F4U--Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Fighter
F7F-3N--Grumman “Tigercat” Twin-Engine Night Fighter
F9F-2,4,5--Grumman “Panther” Single-Engine Jet Fighter
F-80--Air Force “Shooting Star” Fighter Aircraft
F-84--Air Force “Thunderjet” Fighter Aircraft
FAC--Forward Air Controller
FAF--Fifth Air Force
FASRon--Fleet Air Service Squadron
FDC--Fire Direction Center
FEAF--Far East Air Forces
FECOM--Far East Command
FMFLant--Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FO--Forward Observer (artillery)
FY--Fiscal Year
HE--High Explosive
Hedron--Headquarters Squadron
H&I--Harassing & Interdiction
HMR--Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron
H03S-1--Sikorsky Three-Place Observation Helicopter
Hq--Headquarters
HQMC--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
HRS-1--Sikorsky Single-Engine Helicopter
H&S--Headquarters and Service
HTL-4--Bell Two-Place Helicopter
Interv--Interview
JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC--Joint Operations Center
KCOMZ--Korean Communication Zone (sometimes KComZ)
KIA--Killed in Action
KMAG--Korean Military Advisory Group
KMC--Korean Marine Corps
KMC/RCT--Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team
KPR--Kimpo Provisional Regiment
KSC--Korean Service Corps
LogCom--Logistical Command
Ltr--Letter
LST--Landing Ship, Tank
LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked
M4A3E8--Flame Tank, Medium
M-46--Medium Tank
MAC--Military Armistice Commission
MACG--Marine Air Control Group
MAG--Marine Aircraft Group
Mar--Marine(s)
MARLEX--Marine Landing Exercise
MASRT--Marine Air Support Radar Team
MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing
MBP--Main Battle Position
MDL--Military Demarcation Line
MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron
MIA--Missing in Action
MIG--Russian Single-Seat Jet Fighter-Interceptor
MLR--Main Line of Resistance
MOH--Medal of Honor
MOS--Military Occupation Specialty
Mosquito--Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and for Target
Spotting
MP--Military Police
MPQ--Ground Radar-Controlled Bombing
MS--Manuscript
Msg--Message
MSR--Main Supply Route
MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron
MT--Motor Transport
NCAS--Night Close Air Support
NCO--Noncommissioned Officer
NGF--Naval Gunfire
NKPA--North Korean People’s Army
N.d.--Date not given
NNRC--Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
NNSC--Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
N.t.--Title not given
OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA)
OE-1--Cessna Single-Engine Light Observation Plane
OOB--Order of Battle
OP--Observation Post (Sometimes used to refer to an Outpost)
OPLR--Outpost Line of Resistance
OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane
PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report
PO-2--Russian Trainer Aircraft
POW--Prisoner of War
PPSH--Soviet-made 7.62mm Sub-machine (“Burp”) Gun
Prov--Provisional
PUC--Presidential Unit Citation
R4D--Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps
designation of C-47)
R5D--Douglas Four-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps
designation of C-54)
RCT--Regimental Combat Team
ROK--Republic of Korea
SAR--Special Action Report
SecDef--Secretary of Defense
SecNav--Secretary of Navy
Serv--Service
Sig--Signal
SOP--Standing Operating Procedure
TACC--Tactical Air Coordination Center
TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center
TAFC--Turkish Armed Forces Command
TAO--Tactical Air Observer
TE--Task Element
T/E--Table of Equipment
TF--Task Force
TG--Task Group
Tk--Tank
T/O--Table of Organization
TOT--Time on Target Fuze
TU--Task Unit
UN--United Nations
UNC--United Nations Command
USA--United States Army
USAF--United States Air Force
USMC--United States Marine Corps
USN--United States Navy
VMA--Marine Attack Squadron
VMC--Marine Composite Squadron
VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron
VMF(N)--Marine Night (All-Weather) Fighter Squadron
VMJ--Marine Photographic Squadron
VMO--Marine Observation Squadron
VMR--Marine Transport Squadron
VT--Variable Time Fuze
WCIDE(U)--West Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
WIA--Wounded in Action
WP--White Phosphorous Shell
YAK--Russian Fighter Aircraft
APPENDIX B
Korean War Chronology
_1950_
25 Jun North Korean People’s Army, with 60,000 troops and 100
Russian tanks, crosses 38th Parallel to invade South
Korea.
25 Jun United Nations Security Council calls for end of
aggression and withdrawal of NKPA troops.
27 Jun UN, adopting a U.S. resolution, proclaims NKPA attack
a breach of world peace. Asks member nations to assist
ROK in repelling invasion.