Marking Time
(April-June 1953)
_The Peace Talks Resume--Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH_--Interval Before the
Marines Go Off the Line--The May Relief--Training While in Reserve and
Division Change of Command--Heavy May-June Fighting--Developments in
Marine Air--Other Marine Defense Activities--The Division Is Ordered
Back to the Front_
_The Peace Talks Resume_[392]
[392] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv,
1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr 53; Berger, _Korea Knot_;
Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie,
_Conflict_; M/Sgt Robert T. Fugate, “Freedom Village,”
_Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 7 (Jul 53), hereafter Fugate,
“Freedom Village.”
It was April 1953, but it wasn’t an April Fool’s mirage. On 6 April,
representatives of the United Nations Command and the Communist
delegation sat down at the Panmunjom truce tents to resume the peace
talks that had been stalemated six months--since October 1952. If there
was a word that could be said to reflect the attitude of American
officials and private citizens alike--for that matter, the atmosphere
at Panmunjom itself--it was one of caution--not real optimism, not an
unbridled hopefulness, but a wearied caution born of the mountains of
words, gulfs of free-flowing dialogue and diatribe, and then ultimate
plateaus of intransigence that had marked negotiations with Communist
leaders since the original truce discussions had begun in July 1951.
Diplomatic maneuverings had been underway since the end of 1952 for
the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of both sides. This was
considered a first step towards ending the prisoner of war dispute and
achieving an ultimate truce. A resolution introduced in mid-November
by India at the United Nations session dealing with settlement of
nonrepatriate prisoners had been adopted in early December. Later that
month the Red Cross international conference had officially gone on
record favoring the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in advance
of a truce. A letter written on 22 February by the UNC commander,
General Clark, calling for the immediate exchange of ailing prisoners
had been delivered to the NKPA and CCF leaders.
Initially, the Communist answer was an oppressive silence that lasted
for more than a month. During this time the Communist hierarchy had
been stunned by the death, on 5 March, of Premier Stalin. Then, on 28
March, in a letter that reached General Clark at Tokyo in the middle
of the night, came an unexpected response from the two Communist
spokesmen. They not only agreed unconditionally to an exchange of the
sick and injured prisoners but further proposed that “the delegates
for armistice negotiations of both sides immediately resume the
negotiations at Panmunjom.”[393]
[393] Leckie, _Conflict_, p. 373.
This favorable development astonished not only the United Nations
Commander but the rest of the Free World as well. Several steps were
quickly put in motion. The UN Commander’s reply to the Kim-Peng offer
was expressed in such a way that resumption of full negotiations was
not tied in as a condition for the preliminary exchange of ailing POWs.
President Eisenhower, commenting on the new Communist proposals at his
2 April press conference, stated he thought the country should “now
take at face value every offer made to us until it is proved unworthy
of our confidence.”[394] He also further enjoined major military
commanders and subordinates to avoid anything that might be contrary to
this view when they made public remarks or issued press releases.
[394] CG, Eighth Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and others, dtd 4
Apr 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. I, p. 1.
In Korea, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was established on 5 April
under the Commanding General, Eighth Army, in the vicinity of the 1st
Marine Division railhead at Munsan-ni. The command was to prepare for
the many housekeeping details involved in the receiving and orderly
processing of all UNC prisoners. The anticipated exchange itself was
dubbed Operation LITTLE SWITCH. Two Army officers, one Marine Corps,
and one ROKA representative were designed to direct the administrative
machinery of the provisional command. Heading the organization was
Colonel Raymond W. Beggs, USA.
The Marine representative, Colonel Wallace M. Nelson, was named
commanding officer of the United Nations Personnel and Medical
Processing Unit. His responsibility was not limited to the obvious
medical aspects of the exchange, but extended to other details
involving clothing issue, personnel, security, chaplains, food,
communication, motor transport, engineering, and the operation of
unit headquarters. Among those matters to which the Munsan-ni command
directed its immediate attention was the setting up of a temporary
facility for Communist prisoners currently held in UNC camps at Koje,
Cheju, and Yongcho Islands and a hospital near Pusan. Arrangements were
also made for in interpreter pool, debriefing teams, and press center
facilities.
As the new week began on Monday, 6 April, and the world looked to
Panmunjom for the next set of signals in the war, a new stage developed
in the truce negotiations. Within five days after the talks had begun,
both sides agreed to return the disabled prisoners in their custody.
Final papers for the preliminary exchange were signed at noon on 11
April by Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, USN, for the United Nations
Command, and Major General Lee Sang Cho, of the Communist delegation.
The week-long transfer of sick and wounded POWs was scheduled to begin
20 April, at Panmunjom.
The Communists announced they intended to release 600 sick and wounded
UNC prisoners (450 Korean, 150 non-Korean), a figure which Admiral
Daniel called “incredibly small.”[395] For its part, the UNC indicated
that it planned to free nearly ten times that number of North Korean
and Chinese POWs. Communist and Allied representatives also agreed that
truce talks would be resumed at Panmunjom, once the prisoner exchange
was completed.
[395] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 415.
Security precautions went into effect at both Panmunjom[396] and the
entire Munsan-ni area, 10 miles southeast, on the first day of the
prisoner talks. All facilities at both Panmunjom and Munsan-ni were
placed off limits to Eighth Army personnel not directly involved in
the operations. Regulations were strictly enforced. Even before the
negotiations opened at Panmunjom, actual construction work for LITTLE
SWITCH was well under way by Marine engineers. “Operation RAINBOW,” as
the building of the facilities for the POW exchange was called, began 5
April.
[396] With resumption of truce negotiations, the 1st Marines,
whose left battalion sector was immediately adjacent to
the Panmunjom neutral zone between the two battle lines,
took certain precautionary measures. The regiment set
up radio communication with the UN base camp at Munsan
and reactivated its rescue task force. This unit was on
alert to evacuate the UN truce team from Panmunjom in
the event of Communist hostile action or any threat to
security. While the talks were in session, a forward
covering group, composed of a reinforced rifle company
and 1st Tank Battalion platoon, occupied the high ground
east of Panmunjom at COP 2. Here the Marine rescue
force maintained close surveillance of the enemy in the
Panmunjom peace corridor as well as the safe arrival and
departure of the UN truce team shuttled in by helicopter
or motor convoy. 1stMar ComdD, Apr 53, pp. 5, 14 and App.
II, pp. 1–4.
In a little over a day--actually 31 working hours--a task force of less
than 100 Marine construction personnel had erected the entire Freedom
Village POW recovery station at Munsan-ni. The special work detachment
was composed of men from Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, under
Major Charles E. Gocke, and attached to the engineer battalion; utility
personnel from Headquarters and Service Companies; and a Company D
platoon, 1st Engineer Battalion.[397]
[397] The battalion’s new commanding officer was Lieutenant
Colonel Francis “X” Witt, Jr., who a week earlier had
succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Francis W. Augustine.
Early Sunday morning the Marines moved their giant bulldozers, earth
movers, pans, and other heavy duty equipment into Munsan-ni. Ground
leveling started at 0800 and work continued around the clock until
0100 Monday. After a five-hour break the men dug in again at 0600 and
worked uninterruptedly until 2000 that night. Furniture, tentage,
and strongbacking stored at the 1st Engineer Battalion command post,
meanwhile, had been transported and emplaced. When it was all done
the Freedom Village complex, like ancient Gaul, had been divided into
three parts. The command area comprised receiving lines, processing and
press tents, and related facilities for United Nations troops. Adjacent
to this was the 45th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital tent, completely
wood-decked, equipped for mass examinations and emergency treatment.
Across the road from the UN site proper was the area reserved for
returning South Korean prisoners, who would form the bulk of the
repatriates.
Altogether the three camp areas represented some 35,100 square feet of
hospital tentage, 84 squad tents, and 5 wall tents. Gravel to surface
three miles of standard combat road, plus two miles of electrical
wiring, was hauled and installed. More than 100 signs, painted in
Korean and English, were erected, as well as the large one that
stretched clear across the road at the Freedom Village entrance. Six
welcome signs were raised above the UN and ROK processing tents, while
another mammoth Korean-English sign was installed at the Panmunjom
exchange site.
Special areas for ambulance parking; helicopter landing strips; five
50-foot flagpoles; graded access roads and foot paths; sanitation
facilities; and storage areas for food, blankets, and medical
supplies were also constructed. And timing was important. It had been
anticipated that the prisoner exchange might take place on short
notice. For this reason 1st Marine Division work and processing teams
had conducted their rehearsals so that they could complete all duties
within 36 hours after first receiving the “go ahead” signal for the
switch.
_Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH[398]
[398] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap 9; Commander
Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), “Operation Little
Switch--Apr 53”; ComNavFE Rpt of Intelligence Processing;
ComNavFE Rpt, 24 Jul 53; FMFPac ComdD, Apr 53 (#1);
FMFPac ComdD, May 53 (Pt. 2), rpt LtCol Fisher to CG,
FMFPac, subj, “Debriefing of Returned POWs”; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 53; MacDonald, _POW_; Clark, _Danube to
Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Fugate,
“Freedom Village”; _New York Times_, 19–21 Apr 53;
_Washington Post_, 19–21 Apr 53.
Nine days after the truce talks were temporarily suspended, 11 April,
Operation LITTLE SWITCH (code-named Little Swap) began the morning of
Monday, 20 April. By the time it ended on 26 April, a total of 6,670
North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners had been returned by the
UNC. The enemy released 684 captives,[399] of whom 149 were Americans.
Among them were 15 Marines, 3 Navy corpsmen who had been attached to
the 1st Marine Division, and a Navy aviator. The first day Allied
prisoners--walking, some hobbling along on crutches, and others carried
on litters--were delivered in two groups. The initial 50 men reached
Panmunjom at 0825, and the second group, two hours later. The first
Marine freed was Private Alberto Pizarro-Baez, H/3/7, a Puerto Rican,
who had been captured at Frisco in the early October 1952 outpost
clashes. Later that day, another POW taken in the same action, Private
Louis A. Pumphrey, was also released.
[399] The 684 UNC prisoners returned in LITTLE SWITCH
represented 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 British,
15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1
Greek, 1 South African, 1 Filipino, and 1 Netherlander.
Early moments of the exchange were tense as UNC sick and wounded
captives were shipped in a long line of CCF ambulances from Kaesong,
five miles northwest of Panmunjom, down the neutral corridor past enemy
lines to the exchange point. Despite the fact that all official papers
and agreements had been concluded more than a week earlier, no one was
absolutely sure until the last moment that the prisoner exchange would
actually take place. The mechanics of the transfer operation itself, as
it turned out, went off practically without hitch. One minor unsavory
incident had occurred when 50 North Korean prisoners in UNC custody en
route from Pusan to Panmunjom, had dumped their mess kits into garbage
cans, noisily complaining about breakfast.
There was also a long taut moment of uneasy silence when the first
Communist ambulance pulled up in front of the Panmunjom receiving
center. An American MP, who in the excitement had gotten his orders
confused, forgot to tell the enemy driver where to turn. The ambulance
almost went past the center. A UN officer raced out to the road and
motioned to the driver, who backed around and pulled into the parking
lot.
One of the first things the liberated POWs saw was the big sign
“Welcome Gate to Freedom” raised the preceding night over the Panmunjom
receiving tents. Here they could get a cup of coffee and momentarily
relax before starting the long one-and-a-half hour ambulance trip south
to Freedom Village. The returnees were outfitted in blue Communist
greatcoats, utilities, caps, and tennis shoes. Some of the men were
bearded; some wore thin smiles; some had half-hidden tears in their
eyes. Primarily, there was a subdued and businesslike air to the day’s
proceedings, however, with a marked absence of levity. Admiral Daniel,
whose UNC liaison group had negotiated the exchange, in commenting on
the smoothness of the first day’s operation observed: “It’s been a
tremendous emotional experience for us all. Not much was said between
us here, but we are all very happy.”[400]
[400] _New York Times_, dtd 20 Apr 53, p. 1.
From Panmunjom all Allied prisoners were taken to Freedom Village at
Munsan where they received a medical check, and the more seriously
wounded were flown to a field hospital near Seoul. The first American
prisoner to reach Freedom Village was an Army litter patient, Private
First Class Robert C. Stell, a Negro. Helicoptered in from Panmunjom
at 1007, he was treated “like a 5-star general by all hands, including
General Clark, UN commander.”[401] By noon the routine, agreed upon
in the earlier exchange talks, was moving along evenly and would be
in effect throughout the week-long exchange. The Communist quota was
100 prisoners freed daily, in two groups of 50 each, while the Allies
returned 500. Thirty Americans were among the 100 UNC men released that
first day.
[401] _Ibid._, p. 3.
Upon their arrival at Freedom Village the Marine POWs, all of whom had
been wounded prior to being captured, were greeted by representatives
of the 1st Marine Division. In addition to General Clark, other ranking
officials on hand included Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor,
new EUSAK commander, Major General Pollock, 1st Marine Division CG,
Brigadier General Joseph C. Burger, in one of his first public duties
since assuming the post of assistant division commander on 1 April, and
Dr. Otto Lehner, head of the International Red Cross inspection teams.
Each Marine prisoner was met by a 1st Division escort who gave
him physical assistance, if necessary, as well as a much-prized
possession--a new utility cap with its Marine Corps emblem. Recovered
personnel received a medical examination. Waiting helicopters stood
by to transport seriously sick or wounded Marines to the hospital
ships _Haven_ and _Consolation_ riding at anchor in the Inchon harbor.
Chaplains chatted as informally or seriously as a returnee desired.
Newspapers and magazines gave the ex-prisoners their first opportunity
in months to read unslanted news. And a full set of utility uniforms,
tailored on the spot for proper fit, were quickly donned by Marines
happy to discard their prison blues.
Although returnees received their initial medical processing at
Freedom Village, no intelligence processing was attempted in Korea.
Within 24 hours after their exchange, returned personnel were flown to
K-16 (Seoul) and from there to Haneda Air Force Base at Tokyo. Upon
arrival at the Tokyo Army Hospital Annex, a more detailed medical exam
was conducted, including a psychiatric interview by officials from
the newly formed Special Liaison Group of Commander, Naval Forces,
Far East. Lieutenant Colonel Regan Fuller, USMC, was designated by
ComNavFE as OIC of the detailed briefing of all returned personnel at
Tokyo. Other Marine officers participating in the debriefings included
Lieutenant Colonel Thell H. Fisher and Major James D. Swinson, of
FMFPac headquarters; Major Jack M. Daly, representing the 1st Marine
Division; and Captain Richard V. Rich, of the 1st Marine Air Wing.
Each Marine returnee was interviewed by a two-man debriefing team
that consisted of a Marine and a Navy officer, the latter usually a
counterintelligence expert. The three-phase interrogation averaged 9–12
hours and covered personal data, counterintelligence, and a detailed
military questionnaire. The latter, particularly, sought information
about UN personnel still held captive by the enemy. Since all of the
15 Marine POWs had been captured relatively recently (either in the
October outpost contests or the Vegas battle the previous month), the
information they had about the enemy was of limited intelligence value.
From debriefing reports of Marine returnees, many of whom brought
address books with them, it was learned that at least 115 more USMC and
Navy prisoners were alive and still held in POW camps.
Upon completion of counterintelligence processing, returned personnel
were available for press interviews. Long-distance telephone calls to
parents or other family members were arranged by the Red Cross. Summer
service uniforms and campaign ribbons were issued, pay provided, and
administrative records updated by representatives dispatched by Colonel
John F. Dunlap, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Yokosuka.
All of the 19 Marine and Navy POWs had been released by 25 April.
After final processing and clearance for return to the U.S. the men
were flown home, via Hawaii, in three groups that departed 28 April,
30 April, and 4 May. Each was accompanied by a Marine Corps officer.
Members of the first contingent of POWs arrived at Travis Air Force
Base, California, on 29 April, thereby completing their 7,000-mile
journey from Communist prison camps. Another small group of POWs
considered possible security risks were airlifted directly from Japan
to Valley Forge Hospital, near Philadelphia, for further interviewing.
No Marines were among them. With the initial prisoner exchange
completed, staffs of the major Far East commands began to prepare for
the final return of all POWs. Operation BIG SWITCH would take place
after the ceasefire that, hopefully, was not too far away.
On the day that Operation LITTLE SWITCH ended, 26 April, plenary
truce talks resumed at Panmunjom. The stormy issue of repatriation of
prisoners, which had already prolonged the war by more than a year,
was still the one major problem preventing final agreement. There was
indication, however, that the Communists appeared to be softening on
their rigid insistence of forced repatriation. And, on 7 May, the
Communists accepted the UN proposal that nonrepatriate prisoners be
kept in neutral custody within Korea (rather than being removed to a
foreign neutral nation) and offered an eight-point armistice plan. With
modifications, this ultimately became the basis for the armistice.
While discussions and disagreements continued on this proposal, another
real problem developed from a totally different source.
Since early in April rumblings had been heard, through the polite
ambassadorial circuits, that Syngman Rhee, the aging South Korean
president, was dissatisfied with major truce issues. In particular, he
was disturbed over the possibility that Korea would not become reunited
politically. Further, Rhee gave indication that he might take some
kind of action on his own. The Korean leader had advised President
Eisenhower that if any armistice was signed that permitted Chinese
Communist troops to remain south of the Yalu, with his country divided,
he would withdraw ROK military forces from the UN command. Since South
Korean troops, backed by American specialized units, presently manned
the bulk of the UNC front line, Rhee’s threat to remove them from
General Clark’s command presented harrowing possibilities.
Meanwhile, on 13 May, General Harrison, senior UN representative
at Panmunjom, made a counterproposal to the Communist plan. This
incorporated three measures aimed at reconciling differences in the
long-controversial repatriation issue.[402] Arguments flew back and
forth at Panmunjom, with a temporary recess called in the talks; but
on 4 June the Communists accepted this UN final offer. The dispute of
18 months’ duration had ended and the Allied principle of voluntary
repatriation had won out in the end. About the only homework left for
the negotiating teams was to map out final details of the Demilitarized
Zone.
[402] In brief, these were: (1) that the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission (NNRC) take custody of Chinese
nonrepatriates but give Korean POWs the option of
settling either in North or South Korea, as they wished;
(2) that troops from just one country (India) be used
to guard nonrepatriates, rather than the unwieldy
five-nation force earlier proposed by the Communists;
and (3), that specific procedures, which were clearly
spelled out, be followed for granting political asylum to
returning prisoners who refused repatriation.
President Rhee now even more violently denounced the projected
armistice plan. He declared that he and the Koreans would fight on
alone, if necessary. South Korean delegates boycotted the Panmunjom
truce meetings, and Rhee began a campaign to block the cease-fire.
Final agreement on the POW issue was reached 8 June. It provided that
the NNRC offer a “civilian status” to former POWs who did not exercise
their right of repatriation within four months after being taken into
custody by the commission. Those POWs who desired asylum would be set
free. The South Korean National Assembly unanimously rejected the truce
terms the following day.
Revision of the truce line, to correspond to current battle positions,
and other concluding details of the truce were being settled by 17
June. On 18 June, chaos suddenly replaced progress. Acting on orders
from Rhee, during early morning hours ROK guards at the South Korean
prisons released approximately 27,000 North Korean anti-Communist POW
inmates (the majority of the large group of NKPA who did not wish to
be repatriated). They quickly escaped and became absorbed into the
civilian populace of South Korea. Immediately the Communists charged
the Americans with complicity and demanded to know whether the United
Nations Command was able to control its South Korean ally or not.
For the next two weeks the American ambassadorial and military team
tried to restore some measure of international good grace and hope to
the crisis. Daily talks (and pressure) took place with Rhee, as well
as with the Communist negotiators, to set the course back on track
again in the direction of a final truce agreement. At the end of June,
UNC Commander Clark was authorized by Washington to work out a way in
which it would be possible to sign the tenuous armistice--without the
Koreans, if necessary.
_Interval Before the Marines Go Off the Line_[403]
[403] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 896–900, dtd 8–12 Apr 53;
1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 2/11, 1st TkBn
ComdDs, Apr 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311,
VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr 53.
Shortly after the heavy Vegas fighting in late March, Colonel Funk’s
7th Marines, which had been in reserve, exchanged positions with the
5th Marines. The new line regiment assumed responsibility for the
critical, action-prone right sector of the MLR on 4–5 April. In the
center part of JAMESTOWN, the 1st Marines of Colonel Adams continued to
man the MLR and its 12 outposts, including the strategic COP-2 tucked
down by the Panmunjom peace corridor. With the resumption of truce
talks on 6 April, this position had again taken on renewed importance
with its tank-infantry covering force of 5 armored vehicles and 245
Marines on call at all times.
After its relief from the MLR in early April the 5th Marines, as the
new division reserve unit, assumed the regular missions of serving
as a counterforce for Marines in the I Corps sector, if required;
maintenance of the secondary KANSAS line; and a rigorous training
program. On 10 April, the 3d Battalion moved out to the KANSAS position
for a two-day field exercise. By midmonth, spring thaws and heavy rains
had so weakened the trench and bunker fortifications of KANSAS that
an all-out effort was temporarily diverted from refresher training
to reconstruction. The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, under Operation Plan
24-53, pursued an intensive five-day shore-based training program,
7–11 April, in preparation for its coming amphibious exercise, MARLEX
XX. On the 13th, BLT 2/5 under Lieutenant Colonel Finch, with armored
amphibian, tank, amtrac, and 1/11 detachments, proceeded to the landing
area, Tokchok-to, one of the WCIDE command offshore islands southwest
of Inchon. Battalion assault companies hit the southern Tokchok-to
beaches on D-Day, 15 April, according to schedule, although high winds
and rough seas subsequently modified the exercise.[404]
[404] Official records are at variance on this point. The 2/5
command diary indicates that the battalion continued the
exercise on 16–17 April, returning the latter date. The
5th Marines report categorically indicates that MARLEX XX
was cancelled on 15 April, because of the weather.
Not long afterward a training exercise involving UNC personnel got
underway when the 5th[405] and 1st Marines, together with the
artillerymen, combined with the Army, ROK, and Commonwealth Division on
20 April for a four-day I Corps command post exercise (CPX) EVEREADY
GEORGE, not far from Seoul.
[405] Now under a new regimental commander, Colonel Tschirgi,
who had joined the 5th Marines on 14 April, succeeding
Colonel Walt, newly assigned division G-3.
Along the division front the war was still a daily survival contest,
despite the promising outlook at Panmunjom. The most ambitious attempt
by the Chinese during the month took place over a three-day period
in the right regimental sector, not long after the 7th Marines had
moved to the MLR. On 9 April, following a heavy two-hour ballistic
downpour of 2,000 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery, a reinforced
company of about 300 Chinese soldiers launched a strong probe against
Carson at 0345. Attacking in two echelons, the enemy approached from
the direction of Arrowhead on the north and the Reno ridgeline. In an
hour’s time, the enemy had reached the Marine trenches and protective
wire, at some places, and was being unceremoniously repulsed by the 1/7
detachment at Carson. For an hour and a half a heavy fire fight raged
at the outpost while intruders and defenders battled at point-blank
range to settle the dispute.
A reinforcement platoon, from 4/2/7, dispatched from the MLR at 0530,
made it as far as the newly established Marine outpost at Elko, about
400 yards southeast of Carson, before being held up by a heavy shower
of mortar rounds, and small arms fire. Tankers from the Company A
direct element[406] plus a section (two tanks) from the regiment’s
armored platoon leveled their lethal 90mm fires to discourage the
enemy, as did the defender’s barrage of 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch
mortars.
[406] Throughout the three-day action, gun tanks from Companies
A and B (the forward reserve unit) and the regimental
antitank company fired a total of more than 1,469 90mm
shells to neutralize enemy positions and weapons.
Two rocket ripples and 22 defensive fire concentrations unleashed by
2/11, also in direct support of Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Lawrence
Jr.’s 1st Battalion, plus additional reinforcing fires by batteries of
1/11 and 4/11 drove off the enemy at 0700. As a security measure, a
company from the regimental reserve (E/2/7) was assigned to Carson to
buttress the position and assist in reorganizing the outpost defense.
The enemy’s activity had cost him 60 known dead. Additional casualties
were estimated to be 90 killed and 70 wounded. Marine losses numbered
14 killed, 4 missing, 44 wounded/evacuated, and 22 non-seriously
wounded. Meanwhile, beginning at 0715, Marine prop-driven attack AUs
from VMAs-212 and -323 and ADs from VMA-121 were aloft over prime
Chinese targets to perform CAS missions and MPQ drops.
Between the morning’s first strike and midafternoon the three MAG-12
squadrons completed 43 sorties and blasted enemy hills and weapons
positions north of Carson with a total of 67½ tons of bombs. Later that
night three Chinese platoons, operating in small units, reappeared in
the Carson-Elko-Vegas vicinity to recover casualties. Although they
reached an unoccupied caved-in bunker 50 feet from Carson, the enemy’s
nocturnal activity only cost him more casualties from the COP’s defense
fires: 15 known dead, 15 estimated killed, 7 known wounded, and 27
estimated wounded.
The following day, Panther jets from Marine Fighter Squadrons 311 and
115 contributed to the further destruction of hostile emplacements,
but the enemy himself was nowhere to be seen. Again that night,
ground-controlled radar bombing runs were made by VMA-121 and
VMF(N)-513 to help keep the enemy off balance. In the early-morning
hours of the 11th, however, a band of 30 grenade-slinging Chinese
renewed the assault on 7th Marines positions by attacking the reverse
slope of Elko. This ambition was deterred by outpost organic weapons
and box-me-in fires. After a brief fire fight the CCF withdrew, and
the two MAG-33 squadrons later that morning returned to station for
CAS strikes against CCF trouble spots. Another raid on Carson began at
2115 that night when 70 Chinese moved out from Ungok to the west ridge
of the Marine position. Ten minutes later, Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch
mortars, artillery, machine guns, and tanks forced them back with
approximately 20 CCF killed and wounded to show for their efforts.
A brief repeat action occurred the following night when two squads
of Chinese reappeared at Elko, but they were dispatched by Marine
infantry, artillery, and armor direct fires following a 15-minute
spirited exchange. During the night of the 12th[407] Chinese probes
and harassing efforts diminished. Other than a few spotty, abortive
skirmishes in the KMC sector, this pattern of reduced enemy effort
would continue for the next several weeks, until after the change of
the Marine line in early May. As the peace talks at Panmunjom were
beginning to show some progress, enemy psychological warfare efforts
in the KMC, 1st, and 7th regimental sectors became more zealous,
an indication of the Chinese attempt to increase their propaganda
offensive. This included not only loudspeaker broadcasts and propaganda
leaflet fired in mortar shells but a more unusual tactic, on 6 April,
of enemy messages dropped over the COP Vegas area by airplane.
[407] This same date was significant because it marked the
first time a searchlight-guided night close air support
mission was flown by 1st MAW in the division sector.
Little ground action took place in the division sector throughout
the rest of the month. During the last three days of April, as the
operational period for the Marines drew to an end, both infantry and
artillery units noticed an unusual lull across the front. Marine
patrols made few contacts, and there was a sharp decrease in the
heavy enemy sightings of midmonth. Chinese incoming, in fact, during
the latter part of the month decreased markedly, with a total of 873
rounds compared to the 4,149 tallied during the 1–15 April period. An
average of 58.2 rounds daily made it, in fact, the quietest period in
the Marine division sector since the holiday calm of late December when
only 84.2 rounds had fallen the last 10 days of the month.
_The May Relief_[408]
[408] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr-13 May
53; 1stMar ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar
ComdDs, May 53; 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr-May 53; Hermes,
_Truce Tent_.
By late April, plans had moved into high gear for relief of the 1st
Marine Division by the 25th U.S. Infantry Division and transfer of the
Marines to U.S. I Corps reserve at Camp Casey. Although the Marine
division had been in active defense positions for 20 months (first in
the eastern X Corps and, for the past year, on the western front),
some observers noted that there was a reluctance to turn over their
presently occupied positions and that the Marines were coming out
“under protest from commanders who wanted the Division to remain on the
line.”[409]
[409] News story (AP), Robert D. Tuckman, Seoul, dtd 12 May 53,
1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, p. 1.
For its part, the 25th Division, commanded by Major General Samuel T.
Williams, was to shift over to the I Corps far west coastal area from
its own neighboring IX Corps sector on the right. Marine association
with the Army division went back to the early days of the war.[410]
In August 1950, when the Korean Conflict was then only a few weeks
old, the 25th Division, with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and
the Army’s RCT-5, had spearheaded the first UN counteroffensive on the
far southern front, in the Sachon-Chinju area. Now fresh from its own
recent period in reserve[411] the 25th Division, including its attached
Turkish Brigade, was to take over the 33-mile 1st Marine Division line,
effective 5 May. Marine armor and artillery, however, would remain in
support of the 25th Division and transfer to I Corps control.
[410] The two divisions had also seen combat together early in
WW II, at Guadalcanal. Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. ltr to Dir,
MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Sep 70, hereafter _Heinl ltr_.
[411] Soon after assuming command of the Eighth Army, in
mid-February, General Taylor had begun to stress the need
for a complete eight-week training program for reserve
divisions before reentering the line, detailed rehearsal
of patrols, and more frequent rotation of artillery
battalions to maintain their basic mobility. Hermes,
_Truce Tent_, p. 391.
Another change at this time affected the designation of the United
Nations MLR. Called Line JAMESTOWN in the I Corps sector (and variously
in other parts of the EUSAK front as MISSOURI, DULUTH, MINNESOTA,
and CAT), the Allied front was redesignated simply as “main line of
resistance,” beginning 28 April, and was to be so known in all future
orders and communications throughout the entire Eighth Army. A further
modification dropped the reference “in Korea” from the acronym EUSAK,
the title becoming “Eighth U.S. Army.”
In the Marine sector, the last few days of April were a study in
contrasts. While Marine frontline infantrymen and cannoneers were
having a comparatively peaceful interlude during this period of minimal
CCF activity, division engineers were the proverbial colony of beavers.
Following up their rigorous schedule in early April of building Freedom
Village from scratch within 36 hours, engineer personnel moved out from
the division sector late that month to begin construction of the rear
area camps that would shortly be occupied by the Marines while in I
Corps reserve.
Located approximately 15 miles east of the Marine MLR, the Camp Casey
reserve complex consisted of three major areas. They were: the central
one, Casey, which gave its name to the entire installation and would
house the new division CP and 5th Marines; Indianhead, to the north,
where the 7th Marines, 1st KMC Regiment, Division Reconnaissance
Company, machine gun and NCO schools were to be established; and
Britannia, to the south, assigned to the 1st Marines. Motor transport,
engineer, and medical units in support of the respective regiments were
to locate nearby.
On 27 April, the day after resumption of truce talks at Panmunjom,
Company A engineers began the work of clearing the camp site, erecting
prefabricated buildings, and pioneering roads in the 7th Marines
northern area. Two days later the 1st KMC Engineer Company was also
detailed to Indianhead for work on the 1st KMC Regimental camp. Company
C engineers and Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, attached to the
Engineer Battalion, meanwhile moved into the Casey sector to ready the
relocated Division CP and the 5th Marines camp.
Tactical relief of the 1st Marine Division officially began 1 May.
By the time it was over, four days later, more than 2,370 truckloads
of Marine personnel and equipment had been used in the transfer to
Camp Casey. Described another way: if placed bumper to bumper in a
continuous convoy, this would have extended more than six miles, the
length of the MLR held by a Marine regiment in any major defense
sector. As a preliminary step in the relief, on 29 April the division
assumed operational control of several incoming Army artillery units
(the 8th, 64th, 69th, and 90th Field Artillery Battalions, and the 21st
Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion) plus elements of the Turkish
command, including the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. By midafternoon,
the first of the Army infantry relief personnel had also arrived in
the division sector, when elements of the three battalions of the 35th
Infantry Regiment had reported in to respective 1st Marines[412] host
units, preparatory to assuming responsibility for the center sector of
the Marine line.
[412] The regiment was newly-commanded by Colonel Nelson, the
former UN Personnel and Medical Processing Unit officer,
who succeeded Colonel Adams as CO, 1st Marines on 1 May.
On 1 May the 5th Marines, then in reserve at Camp Rose, took over
responsibility for the 14th Infantry Regiment, designated as the
Army maneuver unit. Later that day, when Colonel Tschirgi’s regiment
closed its headquarters and moved out by motor march to Casey, control
of the Army unit transferred to the division. The same day, the 1st
KMC/RCT artillery battalion--which, like the 11th Marines units, was to
remain on line although KMC infantry personnel were to move to I Corps
reserve--came under control of I Corps; two days later an Army armored
unit, the 89th Tank Battalion, rolled into position in the KMC rear
support area and came under division command.
The 7th Marines right regimental sector, with its critical Nevada
Cities and two Berlin positions, became the new home for the Turkish
battalions of Brigadier General Sirri Acar in a four-day phased
operation, beginning 0115 on 3 May. Actual bulk displacement of the
first Marine MLR units and their respective outposts got underway on
this date, when responsibility for the 7th Marines left battalion
sector transferred from 2/7[413] to the 1st Battalion, TAFC, and the
7th Marines battalion began displacing to Indianhead. On the same day
the division opened its advance command post at Camp Casey.
[413] On 23 April, 2/7 had relieved 1/7 in the left battalion
sector and 1/7 became the regimental reserve. There was
no change in 3/7’s location in the right sector. These
were the positions for transfer with the Turkish troops
in early May.
The first Marine sector to complete the relief was the 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, to the south of the Munsan-ni railhead; at midnight
on 4 May, with the assumption of sector responsibility by the Army
Task Force Track, it moved to the logistical complex at Ascom City
where it opened its new CP. Throughout the BMNT hours of 4 and 5 May,
Marine positions were transferred to the incoming organic and/or
attached units of the U.S. Army 25th Division. Relief of three of the
major sectors in the Marine division line was thus well under way by
the early hours of the 5th. Final relief and its elaborate phasing
operations were completed that morning. On the left flank, the 1st KMC
was relieved at 1030 by the incoming U.S. Army 27th Infantry;[414] 30
minutes later, the 1st Marines was replaced in the line by the Army
35th Infantry; and on the right, the 7th Marines sector was taken over
by the TAFC. (See Map 28.)
[414] _ROKMC Comments._
Sharply at 1120 on 5 May,[415] the U.S. Army 25th Division assumed
responsibility for defense of the MLR in what had been the 1st Marine
Division sector for more than 13 months. At the same time all 25th
Infantry Division units under operational direction of the division
also reverted to parent control. In addition to the Kimpo Regiment,
several small Korean Service Corps and medical units retained in the
sector also came under Army command.
[415] Final relief was largely complete at this time.
Exceptions were the 7th Marines reserve battalion, 1/7,
relieved by TAFC forces at 0350 the following day and a
few remaining Marine rear echelon elements that closed
out the sector on 7 May.
[Illustration:
MAP 28 K. White
25th INFANTRY DIVISION SECTOR
FOLLOWING RELIEF OF THE 1st MARINE DIVISION
5 MAY 1953]
I Corps Operation Orders No. 31 and 32 had directed that the 11th
Marines remain on line in the sector attached to I Corps Artillery,
with a general support mission of reinforcing the fires of the 25th
Division artillery, and a secondary task of coordinating counterbattery
support. The medium battalion, 4/11, and the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket
Battery, furnished general support for I Corps. Regimental and
battalion CPs, as well as the rocket battery, continued to occupy their
same locations. A change affected the KMC artillery battalion, however;
when transferred to I Corps artillery control it displaced from the
Marine sector, with a new general support role of reinforcing the I
Corps line.
Also on 5 May, at 1130, the 1st Tank Battalion[416] passed to 25th
Division control. Two companies, C and B, were assigned to the TAFC
(which had no armored units) in the left and right battalion areas,
respectively. Company D vehicles came under command of the 35th
Infantry Regiment, in the center sector; while A, the remaining
company, was designated as the single reserve unit. This was a
modification of the Marine system of maintaining two tank companies
in reserve, one a short distance behind the MLR and the other, at the
armored battalion CP near Munsan-ni. A change in tactics also took
place when the Marine tanks came under Army operational control. It
had been the Marine practice to retain the tanks at the company CP
from where they moved to prepared firing slots at the request of the
supported infantry unit.
[416] The 1st Tank Battalion was now commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Charles W. McCoy, who had relieved Lieutenant
Colonel Williamson on 16 April 1953.
When the 1st Tank Battalion was attached to the 25th Division, the
armored vehicles were shifted to firing slots near the MLR where they
occupied semifixed positions.[417] Armored personnel carriers (APCs)
were assigned by the Army to Company B and used by both B and C as
resupply vehicles to haul food, water, fuel, and ammunition to the
tanks on line. Also as part of the relief, control of the KMC tank
company was transferred from the Marine 1st Tank Battalion to I Corps,
although the company still continued in its same location in the old
KMC sector.
[417] The tanks were not kept in exposed firing positions
at all times. They were parked in protected, defilade
revetments and were periodically driven into the firing
slots to zero in on targets of opportunity. One tank
might thus use any of several slots, and in cases of
major attacks reserve tanks could reinforce. LtCol
Robert J. Post ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70,
hereafter _Post ltr_.
Also remaining in their same positions were MASRT-1 (Marine Air Support
Radar Team One), in support of the 25th Infantry Division, MTACS-2
(Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two), and VMO-6. The mobile air
support section of the observation squadron, however, had moved with
the 1st Marine Division to the new Casey area for participation in the
coming MARLEX operations scheduled during the reserve training period.
Thus with the relief completed, components of the old Marine division
front, from left to right, were: the Kimpo Provisional Regiment; Task
Force Track; the 27th Infantry Regiment; 35th Infantry Regiment in the
center sector, including its armor and heavy mortar company and 2d and
3d Battalions forward, replacing the 1st Marines 3d and 1st Battalions;
and in the right sector, the Turkish Brigade 4.2-inch mortar company
and its 1st and 3d Battalions initially located[418] in the MLR
positions vacated by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines.
[418] Later, the Turkish forces were to place three battalions
forward [adding the 2d], with a fourth in reserve.
In addition to the 1st Marine Division railhead and truckhead at
Munsan-ni and Ascom City, a subsidiary railhead/truckhead was opened
at Tongduchon-ni, two miles southwest of the new division CP at Casey.
No change was made in the airhead at K-16. Effective with the 5 May
change, remaining elements of the division CP staff at Yongji-ri joined
the advance elements at Casey. As the Marines moved off the front
lines they received “well-done” messages from the Commandant, General
Shepherd, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief, Admiral
Arthur W. Radford, as well as the new I Corps Commander, Lieutenant
General Bruce C. Clarke[419] who cited the “excellence of the planning,
coordination and cooperation which enabled the operation of the past
few days to be successfully accomplished.”[420]
[419] General Clarke had succeeded General Kendall on 10 April
1953.
[420] CG, I Corps msg to CGs, 1stMarDiv, 25th InfDiv, dtd 6 May
53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. I, p. 2.
_Training While in Reserve and Division Change of Command_[421]
[421] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt Eval Rpts_ No. 5. Chap 6, No. 6,
Chaps. 7, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May-June 53; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 22 Apr-30 Jun 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar,
1st EngrBn, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, May-June 53; Field,
_NavOps, Korea_.
While the division was in reserve, its tactical mission consisted of
preparation for commitment on I Corps order as a counterattack force
in any of the four division sectors of I Corps. Division Operation
Plan 7-53 implemented this I Corps Plan “RESTORE” and set forth the
designated blocking positions in the 25th Army, Commonwealth, 1st ROK,
and 7th Army Division sectors in event of threatened or actual enemy
penetration of the MLR.
The 1st Marine Division’s Training Order 8-53, issued on 6 May, the
day after the relief was officially effected, outlined the training
to be accomplished during the eight-week reserve period, 10 May-5
July. Following a few days’ interval devoted to camp construction
and improvement of facilities, an active training program commenced.
Its objective was the continued improvement of amphibious and ground
offensive combat potential of all personnel. Three major regimental
combat team MARLEXES were scheduled.[422] The training syllabus
called for a four-phased progressive schooling from individual to
battalion and regimental level conducted in all phases of offensive,
defensive, and amphibious warfare. Weaponry familiarization, small unit
tactics, and combined unit training, with tank-infantry deployment and
integration of helicopters at company-level exercises, were emphasized,
culminating in a week-long field maneuver.
[422] Relief from the Eighth Army defense line provided the
first opportunity for expansion of the 1st Marine
Division amphibious training to regimental level.
Amphibious training in battalion-sized MARLEXES had
been under way since June 1952, upon transfer of the
Marines to the western coastal sector. This had, in
fact, “produced an extra dividend as [their] amphibious
retraining program, conducted throughout the summer in
the Tokchok Islands, was apprehensively observed by the
enemy.” Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 430.
Lectures were to be kept to a minimum, with at least 50 percent of
the tactical training conducted at night. Specialty training in
intelligence, signal communications, antitank and mortar, machine gun,
mine warfare, and staff NCO schools was also prescribed. Numerous
command post exercises were programmed to obtain a high standard of
efficiency in both battalion and regimental-level staff functioning.
It was the first time the division had been in reserve since a brief
two-week period in late July-August of 1951. A brisk 40–44 hour week,
plus organized athletics, insured that the training period was to be
fully utilized.
No time was lost getting under way. At a staff conference with
battalion commanders on 11 May, General Pollock, division CG, stressed
the importance of using the time they were in reserve for enhancing
division combat-readiness. Even as he spoke, his 5th Marines had the
day before boarded ships at Inchon and were en route to the Yongjong-ni
landing area for MARLEX I. Since the 5th Marines, in division reserve,
had been the first of the regiments to displace and on 1 May had turned
its sector over to the incoming 14th Infantry Regiment, it got the jump
on training during the reserve period. Regimental Operation Plan 12-53,
of 28 April, had outlined requirements for the 5th Marines RCT LEX
1; from 2–9 May the regiment had participated in a week of intensive
amphibious training, including reduced and normal distance CPX dry runs
for the coming MARLEX.
With ships from CTE 90.85,[423] and air defense by VMFs-311 and -115,
Colonel Tschirgi’s RCT-5 made the D-Day landing on 13 May with its two
assault BLTs securing the objective. An unexpectedly shallow beach
gradient and difficulties encountered in unloading vehicles from the
causeway resulted in less than a 100 percent performance rating. These
were deficiencies that might have been prevented had not the customary
rehearsal been cancelled the previous day when a heavy fog obscured the
landing beaches. Besides regimental antitank and 4.2-inch mortar units,
participating support elements included Company D, 1st Tank Battalion;
Company A, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; Company C, 1st Engineer
Battalion; 1/11; and helicopters from HMR-161 and VMO-6.
[423] CTE 90.85 constituted the MARLEX training element of
TF-90, Amphibious Force Far East, redesignated Amphibious
Group Western Pacific earlier that month.
Meanwhile, on 15 May, command post and subordinate units from the 1st,
5th (less RCT-5 currently deployed in MARLEX I), and 7th Marines and
support elements took part in a one-day division CPX at Camp Casey
stressing mobility, security and operational procedures. Another CPX on
22–23 May by 11th Marines and engineer personnel emphasized dispersion,
camouflage, and message handling under simulated combat conditions.
Units of the three infantry regiments plus the KMCs training with the
7th Marines at Indianhead combined in a CPX-FEX (command post-firing
exercise) on 26–27 May. Realism bowed to current ordnance supply
economics in that ammunition was carried for individual weapons, but it
would “not be loaded except on specific orders from an officer.”[424]
[424] 1stMarDiv msg to addees in 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 22 May
53.
The CPX-FEX was held as a trial exercise for an Eighth Army CPX
scheduled later in the month, which was postponed indefinitely on
29 May because of the critical battlefront situation and continuing
enemy attacks across the EUSAK front. Extensive preparations were also
underway for MARLEX II, with RCT-7, from 2–10 June; and concluding
MARLEX III, scheduled 14–23 June, with RCT-1.
Armor and advance regimental elements had left for the Ascom
City-Inchon staging area by 1 June, preparatory for departure to the
Yongjong-ni beaches on the Korean west coast in the vicinity of Kunsan.
The troop list included approximately 250 officers and 4,450 enlisted
from Colonel Funk’s 7th Marines and support units, including USN and
KMC. Infantry personnel from the regiment’s three battalions formed the
three assault teams plus a reserve battalion composed of 475 Korean
Marines designated as BLT 5/KMC. Regimental support units included
Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion; Company D, 1st Medical Battalion;
Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion; Company B, 1st Armored Amphibian
Battalion, and various motor transport, amphibian truck, military
police, and helicopter detachments.
R-Day on 5 June went off per schedule. Despite intelligence estimates
which cheerily predicted that only “nine days of rain can be expected
during the month of June”,[425] RCT-7 drew one out of the barrel with
its D-Day landing, 6 June. This took place during heavy rains and
decreased visibility which threw the boat waves off phase by minutes
and required more than the allotted time for HMR-161 troop and cargo
lifts.
[425] MAR RCT LEX II, Opn Plan I, App. 1 to Annex B, dtd 9 May
53, p. 1, in 7thMar ComdD, May 53.
Use of a 144-foot-long M-2 steel treadway pontoon bridge loaned by the
Army, emplaced from the end of the causeway to the beach high water
mark, was considered highly successful. It solved unloading problems
encountered in the earlier MARLEX, in that all heavy equipment and
vehicles were landed on the designated beaches. Further experimentation
with this novel employment of the M-2 was recommended to test the
coupling system of bridge and causeway during periods of heavy surf.
On the minus side, shore party officers noted that night transfer
operations had been hindered because of the lack of running lights on
the amtracs.
On 9 June, as RCT-7 was on the way back from its amphibious exercise,
a directive from ComNavFE (Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe) notified
the division of cancellation of the forthcoming RCT MARLEX III. All
available shipping was being held on 24-hour readiness for the expected
final repatriation of POWs (Operation BIG SWITCH). All afloat training
exercises by Marine, Army, and Navy units between 6 June and 15 October
were to be cancelled.
The division was host to ranking I Corps, Eighth Army, Korean, and 1st
Commonwealth officials when a special helicopter assault demonstration
was staged 11–12 June at Camp Casey. Two rocket launcher sections, 14
HMR-161 copters, and 2/5 infantrymen were deployed to show the diverse
combat capabilities of the aerial workhorse. While in I Corps reserve,
the division was also host--and winner--of the I Corps Pistol Matches.
And 3/11, which the previous month had taken the Army Training Test 6-2
(a) Modified, was notified the battalion had scored 92.91 percent and
received congratulations from the CGs, I Corps Artillery and Eighth
Army.
A change of command within the 1st Marine Division took place on 15
June with the arrival of Major General Randolph McC. Pate. The retiring
CG, General Pollock, was presented the Distinguished Service Medal by
the I Corps commander, General Clarke, for his “outstanding success in
the defense of Carson, Vegas, and Elko.” The previous month, General
Pollock had received the Korean Order of Military Merit, Taiguk for his
active part in the formation, development, and training of the Korean
Marine Corps. Attending the change of command ceremonies were General
Megee, CG 1st MAW, General Schilt, CG AirFMFPac, and other Marine, I
Corps, Commonwealth, and Korean senior officers.
The new 1st Marine Division CG was coming to his Korean post from Camp
Lejeune, N. C. where (like General Pollock before him) he had most
recently commanded the 2d Marine Division. Commissioned originally
in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1921, General Pate was to later rise
to four-star rank. Prior to World War II, he had seen expeditionary
service in Santo Domingo, in 1923–1924, and in China from 1927–1929,
and also served in Hawaii. For his outstanding service and skill in
complicated staff duties, first at Guadalcanal, and later during
amphibious operations at Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, General Pate
had been awarded the Legion of Merit and a Gold Star in lieu of a
second Legion of Merit.
After the war, he had served two tours as head of the Division Reserve,
in 1946 and 1951. Other assignments included Director of the Marine
Corps Educational Center at Quantico and Deputy Director of Logistic
Plans in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[426]
[426] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Jan
56, rev.
_Heavy May-June Fighting_[427]
[427] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 15 May, 28–30
May 53; 11thMar, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1st
MAW ComdD, May 53; 1st MAW PIR 136-53, dtd 14–15 May 53
and PIR 150-53, dtd 28–29 May 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323,
VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, May 53; Hermes, _Truce Tent_;
Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_.
After the early May change of lines, the Chinese lost little time
in testing the new UNC defenses. Shortly after 0200 on 15 May, the
CCF directed a two-battalion probe on the Carson-Elko-Vegas trio and
the Berlin-East Berlin outposts newly held by the Turkish brigade.
Supported by heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery, one
battalion of enemy soldiers moved against each of the two major defense
complexes. Marine Company C tanks, occupying the firing slots that
night, accounted for heavy enemy losses in the action, estimated at
200 CCF killed and 100 wounded. Assisting the TAFC Field Artillery
Battalion in throwing back the attack were 1/11, 2/11, and 4/11 which
sent 3,640 rounds into the sharp four-hour engagement.
The TAFC defense was further reinforced later that day with 21 air
strikes against hostile personnel and weapons positions north of the
Turkish sector. Adding their weight to the clash, 3/11 and the rocket
battery also brought their guns into action, for a combined 5,526
Marine rounds[428] dispatched against the enemy.
[428] Total ammunition expenditure by the 11th Marines and the
25th Division artillery batteries was 11,527 rounds,
to the Chinese output of approximately 10,000 rounds.
11thMarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 13.
It was not until 25 May, after the UNC had made its final offer at the
truce talks, however, that CCF artillery really began to open up on
the Nevada complex. The increased activity by hostile pieces, during
the 25–27 May period, was duly noted by the artillery Marines who
laconically reported, “Operations followed the recent pattern: enemy
shelling of the Turkish Brigade increased during the afternoon; no
contacts were reported.”[429]
[429] 11thMar ComdD, May 53, dtd 27 May, p. 19.
This latter situation changed abruptly on 28 May. Beginning at 1800,
major elements of the Chinese 120th Division launched simultaneous
attacks over 17,500 yards of I Corps front that stretched from COP-2
eastward to that consistent trouble-spot, the Nevada Cities, on to
the Berlins, and finally the Hook area in the adjacent Commonwealth
Division sector. Supported by heavy artillery fires, one CCF battalion
moved in towards Carson and Elko. Another battalion,[430] under cover
of smoke, attacked central COP Vegas, while a third struck Berlin and
East Berlin on the right flank. Three hours after the initial attack,
defenders at Carson and Elko were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with
the Chinese.
[430] Some historians indicate that the 120th Division
initially sent four battalions forward in the action,
with two against the main objective, Vegas. Hermes,
_Truce Tent_, p. 463.
By midnight the men of the 35th Infantry had beaten back the attack at
COP-2. The Turks, likewise, were still in possession of the two Berlin
(platoon-strength) outposts, but Commonwealth forces were involved in
a pitched battle at Ronson and Warsaw. The situation was even grimmer
at this time in the Nevada Cities area outposted by the TAFC. Although
the Turkish troops continued to hold Vegas, where 140 men were dug
in, Carson (two-platoon size) had fallen and Elko (platoon-strength)
was heavily besieged. Shortly thereafter, the 25th Division ordered
that the TAFC withdraw from the latter position to its own MLR. The
diversionary attack against Berlin-East Berlin had been broken off and
the twin positions were secured.
During the first six hours of the attack, the night of 28–29 May,
Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines, now under I Corps command, had sent 9,500
rounds crashing into Chinese strongpoints, while Marine air observers
directed eight missions against active enemy artillery positions.
Ripples from the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, transferred to the
Commonwealth sector to support the Hook defense, were fired on CCF
troop activity there. Another curtain of flame engulfed the Carson
intruders. When the fighting started, 15 Marine tanks were positioned
in the Turkish sector. Company B and C vehicles, under Captains James
M. Sherwood and Robert J. Post, relentlessly pounded the approaching
CCF columns, while Company D was put on a 30-minute standby. As the
action developed, additional tanks were committed until 33 were on line
at one time or another.[431]
[431] Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR
positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although
many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this
procedure, “I am forced to confess that it worked well
in that static defensive situation.” A major advantage
resulting from this change was that tanks effectively
linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and
radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out
the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was
“generally the only reliable means of communications with
the scene of action.” _Post ltr._
When savage Chinese pummeling of the 25th Division outposts continued
the following day, Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines was transferred at
1315 to operational control of I Corps. The regiment’s three infantry
battalions, antitank, and heavy mortar companies promptly moved out
from their Britannia headquarters and within two hours had relocated at
25th Division bivouac areas south of the KANSAS line in readiness for
counterattack orders. The 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company
was similarly ordered to 25th Division control to relieve a 14th
Infantry Regiment reserve company in position along the east bank Imjin
River defenses.
Overhead, close air support runs were being conducted by pilots of
Marine Attack Squadrons 212, 121, and 323. A series of seven 4-plane
strikes hit repeatedly from noon on those Chinese troops, hardware,
and resupply areas north of the 25th Division line. The aerial assault
continued late into the night with MPQ missions executed by VMA-121 and
VMF-311.
During the 29th, control of the Vegas outposts--where 1st Division
Marines had fought and died exactly two months earlier--changed hands
several times between the indomitable Turkish defenders and the
persistent Chinese. By dark, the CCF had wrested the northern crest
from the TAFC which still held the southeastern face of the position.
In the 24-hour period from 1800 on the 28th through the 29th, the 11th
Marines had expended 41,523 rounds in 531 missions. At one point in
the action Chinese counterbattery fire scored a direct hit on Turkish
gun emplacements, knocking six howitzers out of action from the
explosions of charges already loaded. As a result 2/11, under its new
battalion commander, Major Max Berueffy, Jr., took over the direct
support mission of the TAFC Brigade. Marine artillery spotters on
station from 0450 to midnight directed 42 fire missions on CCF guns,
while the rocket battery unleashed 20 ripples against troop activity,
one of which caused 50 WIAs. Although an Allied counterattack early in
the day had restored Elko to friendly control, the enemy refused to be
dislodged from Carson.
I Corps had previously regarded the defensive positions of the Nevada
complex as “critical,” with the TAFC having been “instructed to hold
them against all enemy attacks.”[432] By midday on the 29th, however,
the I Corps commander, General Clarke, and 25th Division CG, General
Williams, had apparently had a change of mind. The Vegas strength was
down to some 40 Turks. Altogether more than 150 men under the 25th
command had been killed and another 245 wounded in defense of Nevada
positions. It appeared that the Chinese, constantly reinforcing with
fresh battalions despite estimated losses of 3,000, intended to retain
the offensive until the outposts were taken.
[432] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 462.
With Carson and Vegas both occupied by the enemy, the Elko position
became untenable without the support of its sister outposts. Six times
the CCF had crossed over from Carson to Elko to try to retake the
latter position, but had been thus far deterred by Allied firepower.
Accordingly, at 2300, the 25th Division ordered its reserve 14th
Regiment, earlier committed to the Elko-Carson counterattack, to
withdraw from Elko and the Turks to pull back from Vegas to the MLR.
By daybreak the withdrawal was completed and 25th Division and Turkish
troops had regrouped on the MLR.
The Army reported that more than 117,000 rounds of artillery and 67
close air support missions had buttressed the UNC ground effort.
Official estimates indicated that in the three-day action the Chinese
had fired 65,000 rounds of artillery and mortar, “up to this point an
unprecedented volume in the Korean War.”[433] The Marine artillery
contribution from its four active battalions during this 28–30 May
period totaled 56,280 rounds in 835 missions.
[433] _Ibid._, p. 464.
During the three-day siege, 15 to 33 Marine tanks poured their lethal
90mm projectiles on the enemy from MLR firing slots. At times the
action was so heavy that the tanks were refueled on line. As they ran
out of ammunition and fuel, “armored utility vehicles of the battalion,
with a basic load of ammunition aboard, maneuvered beside the tanks
in position and rearmed them on the spot,”[434] to permit virtual
uninterrupted tank firing. One Marine was killed in the action the
first night. Although 4,162 rounds of Chinese fire fell near the tank
positions, no damage to materiel was reported. For their part the M-46s
and flames were responsible for 721 enemy deaths, an estimated 137 more
killed, 141 wounded, and an estimated 1,200 injured.
[434] 1st TkBn ComdD, May 53, p. 3.
During the second day of action, nearly 20 missions were flown by
Corsairs and Skyraiders of the three Marine attack squadrons and the
jet fighters of VMF-311 and -115. Altogether throughout 28–30 May,
Marine aircraft had flown no less than 119 sorties for the inflamed
sectors of the U.S. Army 25th Division and adjacent British 1st
Commonwealth Division. Of these, 99 were in support of the sagging
Carson-Elko-Vegas-Berlins line.
Ground action ceased the following day as rain drenched the
battlefield, although the 11th Marines reported sightings of more than
200 Chinese soldiers, most of them on the three recently lost outposts.
Benched while the fierce battle was going on, the 1st Marines remained
under operational control of I Corps as a possible contingency force
from 29 May to 5 June. On the latter date, following the Eighth Army
decision not to retake the Carson-Elko-Vegas outposts, the regiment
reverted to Marine control and returned to Camp Britannia. The previous
day the Communists had agreed on all major points of the UNC final
offer and it appeared that a ceasefire was close at hand.
Diplomats and military leaders both felt this latest Chinese assault
was to show a strong military hand and win dominating terrain features
along the MLR. Thus the enemy would be able to improve his defensive
posture when final battlelines were adjusted at the truce. It was not
believed that the CCF effort was an attempt to expand their operations
into a general offensive. In any event, the Nevada positions were
downgraded from their previous designation as major outposts. I Corps
also decreed no further effort would be made to retake them and that a
“revaluation of the terrain in view of the destruction of the defensive
work indicates these hills are not presently essential to defense of
the sector.”[435]
[435] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 7thInfDiv, CG, 25thInfDiv, CG,
1stMarDiv, GOC, 1stComWelDiv, CG I Corps Arty, dtd 9 Jun
53 in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 53, App. 1, p. 1.
If things were now relatively quiet along the battlefront of the
I Corps coastal sector, the situation had begun to heat up in the
central part of the UNC defense line. On 10 June, following a CCF
realignment of troops and supply buildup that had not gone unnoticed
by Eighth Army intelligence officials, elements of the CCF 60th and
68th Armies struck the ROK II Corps area, on the east-central front.
(See Map 29.) Advancing south along both sides of the Pukhan River with
two divisions, the Chinese struck at the ROK II defense line which
originally had bulged out to form a salient in the Kumsong vicinity.
Within six days the ROK line had been forced back 4,000 yards. In
subsequent assaults the enemy made new penetrations further west in the
ROK II MLR. Although the main Communist thrust was directed against the
ROK II Corps, secondary attacks were also made in the X Corps sector
east of ROK II, in the Punchbowl area manned by the ROK 20th Division.
It was the heaviest, all-out drive since the CCF spring offensive of
April-May 1951, when the UNC had been pushed south approximately 30
miles across the entire Korean front.
By 18 June, the CCF assaults started to settle down. During the nine
days of flaming action, ROK units had suffered some 7,300 casualties
to enemy losses of 6,600. Boundaries had been redrawn and three ROK
divisions had been redeployed in counterattacks to plug holes in the
line that the Chinese had punched open. Nearly 15,000 yards of ROK
front had been pushed 4,000 yards south and several hill positions east
of the Pukhan had been lost.
[Illustration:
MAP 29 K. WHITE
EIGHTH ARMY SECTORS
1 JANUARY-27 JULY 1953]
The brief respite ended 24 June when the CCF again directed heavy blows
against the ROK troops, ignoring other UN forces in the Eighth Army
line. It was generally considered a retaliatory move for the 18 June
mass release of anti-Communist prisoners by South Korean President
Rhee. This time the major target of the renewed Chinese offensive was
the ROK 9th Division, in the IX Corps sector immediately west of the
ROK II Corps. On 25 June the 1st ROK Division on the eastern flank of
I Corps, to the right of the 1st Commonwealth Division, was pounded
by another Chinese division. Significantly, the date was the third
anniversary of the invasion of South Korea.[436] The 7th Marines,
training in I Corps reserve, was put on standby status. The regiment
was removed the following day when the 1st KMC/RCT (minus its 3d
Battalion) was instead placed in readiness,[437] and subsequently moved
out from its Indianhead area to be committed as a relief force in the
left sector of the 1st ROK line.
[436] The strong likelihood of such attacks at this time
had been noted by Eighth Army in a warning issued
the previous day that reminded all commanders to be
“particularly alert” at this time. CG, 8th Army msg to
CG, 1stMarDiv and addees, G-3 Jnl, dtd 24 Jun 53.
[437] This change was due to the existing policy of not having
a United States unit serving under operational control
of a Korean commander. Had the 7th Marines or other U.S.
unit been so committed, it is expected that a provisional
task force would have been created for the assignment,
under a non-Korean commander. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6,
Chap. 9, p. 9-20. Actually, the 7th Marines alert on the
25th was of such short duration that no mention of it
appears in the regimental command diary, although the
fact is so noted in division records. The 1st KMC/RCT
was ordered to move out from the Indianhead area at 1630
on 26 June and came under operational control of 1st ROK
Division at 1540, 27 June. By 0100 the following day, it
had relieved 11th ROK Regiment. _ROKMC Comments._
By the 26th, the persistent Chinese probes of the 1st ROK sector had
resulted in several forward outposts being overrun. To help stem the
action the Marine 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery was displaced on I Corps
Artillery order from its regular position (in the right regimental
sector) 20 miles east to support the hard-pressed ROK division. On at
least two occasions the battery placed ripples between ROK positions
only 600 yards apart and it was felt that these “continued requests
for fire close to friendly troops attested to the gunnery of the
unit.”[438] Between that date and the 30th, the rocket battery remained
in the ROK sector, firing a total of 25 ripples. For the 25th Infantry
Division sector, however, the front continued undisturbed throughout
the entire month of June.
[438] 11thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 15.
_Developments in Marine Air_[439]
[439] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap 10, No. 5,
Chap 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1/7
ComdD, Apr 53, App. IV, Rpt of Night Air Strikes; 1st
MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311,
VMF(N)-513, VMJ-1 ComdDs, Apr-Jun 53; VMA-312 ComdDs,
Apr-May 53; VMA-251 ComdD, June 53; VMO-6 ComdD, Apr 53;
Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_.
While the division was in I Corps reserve during the greater part
of the April-June period, the 6,800-man 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
continued its missions as an operational component of Fifth Air Force.
For the Marine air arm it was a time of a major tactical innovation,
a number of new air records set, and rapid personnel changes in the
squadrons.
Shortly before the Marine division went off the line, a new method of
close air support at night was introduced. This employed the use of two
or more ground controlled 24-inch searchlights located on prominent
terrain features along the MLR in the 7th Marines left battalion sector
where the missions were to be flown. Enemy-held reverse slopes--in
some cases less than 500 yards from Marine positions--were thereby
pinpointed by the powerful intersecting searchlight beams. These long
pencil-shaped beams created an excellent artificial horizon and enabled
pilots to make bombing or strafing runs with a high degree of accuracy
even on the blackest of nights. Manned by ANGLICO personnel, the lights
were employed either for target location or illumination (both shadow
and direct). A tactical airborne observer in an OE light liaison plane
of VMO-6 directed the searchlight teams and controlled the missions.
A week of experimentation and trial runs to perfect the night close
air support (NCAS) was conducted by several VMF(N)-513 pilots under
direction of Colonel Jack R. Cram. Formerly CO of Marine Air Control
Group Two at K-3, he had extended his tour in Korea to complete work
on the new program. On 12 April, the first night of operations, Major
Charles L. Schroeder and Second Lieutenant Thomas F. St. Denis flew two
night support missions in F7F Tigercats. Although employed only a few
weeks prior to the division going into reserve on 5 May, the new system
rated an enthusiastic response from both pilots and ground commanders,
all the way up to the division CG. As the latter reported to the
Commandant following the first week of night close support missions,
“results ... exceeded all expectations.”[440]
[440] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 18 Apr 53; in 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 53, App. II, p. 2.
Between 12 April and 5 May, the night fighter squadron conducted 58
NCAS sorties in the division right sector employing this new control
system with excellent results.[441] The procedure was a marked success
and made it possible to provide continuous 24-hour-a-day close support
to Marine infantry units. It was considered a supplement to, not a
replacement for the MPQ (radar controlled bombing) missions of MASRT-1.
Plans called for F9F aircraft to be integrated into the program, since
the F7F Tigercats were being replaced by jets. Allied psychological
warfare teams on 17 April introduced a different theme in their
broadcasts to the enemy: that of the dangers to the CCF from the new
searchlight marking of targets. As a Marine training bulletin noted:
“It is believed that this method of attack by aircraft is particularly
demoralizing to the enemy because he is unable to anticipate where
the strike will hit, and therefore has no means of defending himself
against it.”[442]
[441] Confirmed damage assessment in this period: 75 enemy
KIA, 5 WIA; 25 bunkers, 12 personnel shelters, 20 mortar
positions, 32 automatic weapons positions, 1 ammunition
bunker, and 1 37mm AA position destroyed; 1 supply area,
3 weapons damaged; 1,545 yards trenchline destroyed;
and 190 secondary explosions or fires. Due to operating
conditions, these figures represented only 80 percent of
the total flights made on which TAOs confirmed results.
VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr-May 53.
[442] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-106, quoting
1stMarDiv Training Bulletin No. 5-53, dtd 10 Jun 53.
Another tactical improvement about this same time dealt with artillery
flak suppression in support of close support aircraft. Two refinements
made in the procedure in the late spring of 1953 involved firing of
HE rounds during the actual run of planes over the target. Basically,
the plan consisted of releasing a TOT or VT concentration on the most
lucrative enemy antiaircraft positions within a 2,500-yard circle
around the strike area. A continuous rain of HE-fuzed projectiles was
placed on these targets for a three-minute period, during which Marine
planes made their runs.
Favorable results were achieved in that new system tended to keep enemy
antiaircraft gunners off-balance for a longer period of time and thus
decreased the danger to friendly attacking aircraft. On the other hand,
pilots quickly noted that this became an “unimaginative employment of
an unvarying flak suppression schedule which Communist AA gunners soon
caught onto and turned to their own advantage.”[443]
[443] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-70.
With respect to squadron hardware, Marine combat potential increased
substantially during the spring months with the phasing out of F7Fs in
Night Fighter Squadron 513 and introduction of the new F3D-2 twin-jet
Skyknight intruder. By late May the Allocation of 24 of these jet
night fighters had been augmented by 4 more jets from the carrier USS
_Lake Champlain_ and the squadron “assumed its primary night-fighter
mission for the first time in the Korean War.”[444] While the sturdy,
dependable Tigercats[445] made their final contribution to the United
Nations air effort early in May with the experimental NCAS program, the
new Skyknights continued the squadron’s unique assignment inaugurated
in late 1952 as night escort to Air Force B-29 bombers on their strike
missions. Not a single B-29 was lost to enemy interceptors after 29
January 1953. The capabilities of the skilled Marine night-fighters
were noted in a “well done” message received by the CO, VMF(N)-513 in
April from the Air Force.[446]
[444] _Ibid._, p. 10-99.
[445] Also characterized by squadron members as the “tired old
Tigercats” in reference to the war-weary, 1945-vintage
aircraft. VMF(N)-513 ComdD, May 53, p. 6.
[446] CO, 19th Bomber Group (Col Harvey C. Dorney, USAF)
msg to CO, VMF(N)-513 (LtCol Robert F. Conley), n.d.,
reading: “19th Bomber Group Airborne Commander and crews
participating in attack on Sinanju Bridge Complex, 11
April, have high praise for night fighter protection. All
feel that without their protection severe damage or loss
of B-29’s would have resulted.” VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Apr 53,
p. 6.
Organizational changes within the wing included the arrival, on 29
May, of a new MAG-12 unit to replace the “Checkerboard” squadron.
VMA-332 (Lieutenant Colonel John B. Berteling) was slated to operate
on board the USS _Bairoko_ (CVE-115) for the F4U carrier-based
squadron VMA-312[447] due for return to CONUS. Veteran of 33 months of
combat while attached to the wing as West Coast (CTE 95.1.1) aerial
reconnaissance and blockade squadron, VMA-312 (Lieutenant Colonel
Winston E. Jewson) was officially relieved 10 June. The change,
moreover, was the first phase of a new personnel policy, carrier unit
rotation, that was expected to implement a unit rotation program for
land-based squadrons. It was anticipated that the new unit rotation
program would eliminate inherent weakness of the individual pilot
rotation system and thus increase the combat effectiveness of the
wing.[448]
[447] Prior to early May, VMA-312 had been based aboard the USS
_Bataan_ (CVL-29). The carrier itself was scheduled for
relief from the Korean Theater shortly before the new
afloat MAG-12 squadron reported in, and a transfer was
made by 312 to the new, larger escort carrier on 8 May.
[448] Comments _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-33:
“Severe tactical operations weakness developed throughout
the war in Korea which can be traced directly to the
individual pilot rotation system. These weaknesses are
inherent in any system which precludes pre-combat unit
training of pilots in the tactical squadron with which
they later go into combat. The situation is aggravated
further when pilots, many of them inadequately pre-combat
trained, are rotated through combat engaged units so
rapidly that squadron esprit cannot develop to a degree
which will insure a high standard of tactical efficiency.”
During the period other organizational changes included transfer
of administrative control of VMF(N)-513 on 15 May from MAG-33 to
MAG-12.[449] The squadron, with its new twin-engined jet fighters,
moved from K-8 (Kunsan) further up the coast to the MAG-12 complex at
K-6 (Pyongtaek), upon completion of the new 8,000-foot concrete runway
there. This phased redeployment of nightfighter personnel and equipment
began in late May and was concluded on 6 June without any interim
reduction of combat commitments. Replacement of the squadron F7F-3Ns
with F3D-2s was also completed in early June.
[449] MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B.
Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel
Bowman to the States.
Late that month, plans were underway for two additional changes:
the Marine photographic squadron, VMJ-1, was due to be separated
administratively and operationally from MAG-33 on 1 July and revert
to 1st MAW; and Marine Wing Service Squadron One (MWSS-1) was to be
deactivated, effective 1 July.
The change of command relationships between CG, FAF and CG, 1st MAW
earlier in the year[450] which had restored operational control of
certain designated Marine air units to the wing commander, increased
the efficiency of 1st MAW operations. Despite the fact that VMJ-1 at
times contributed nearly 40 percent to the total FAF input of all
daylight combat photographs,[451] aerial intelligence (both pre-
and post-strike photos) supplied to wing and group headquarters was
considered inadequate. As a MAG-33 intelligence officer commented with
some exasperation as late in the war as May 1953:
[450] See Chapter VI.
[451] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load “can be gauged by
one day’s peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid
end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one
half miles long.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p.
10-67.
The Section continued to experience difficulty in obtaining
1:50,000 scale overlays of friendly MLR and OP positions. These
overlays are important for making up target maps for close
support missions, but they are continually held up for long
periods by higher echelons, and, if received here at all, are
then often too old to be considered reliable.[452]
[452] MAG-33 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2.
Similarly, at the individual squadron level, the carrier unit VMA-312
shortly before its relief, reported: “The one limitation on squadron
activities continued to be photo coverage of the strikes. With limited
facilities available, the squadron has no clear cut pictures of strike
results.”[453] Return of VMJ-1 to operational control of General Megee
ultimately “gave the Wing adequate photo-intelligence for the first
time since commencement of combat operations in Korea.”[454]
[453] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2.
[454] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65.
Indoctrination of new replacement personnel within the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing took a swift upturn during the spring period. Pilots
who had completed 100 combat missions were transferred to staff duty
elsewhere in the wing in Korea or rotated Stateside. The average
squadron personnel strength ran to 88 percent of T/O for enlisted; and
officer strength, considerably less, frequently dipped as low as 61
percent. Under the 100-missions policy, it was a time of rapid turnover
of unit commanders, too, as witnessed from the following squadron diary
entries:
_VMA-212_--Lieutenant Colonel James R. Wallace assumed command
from Major Edward C. Kicklighter, effective 19 June; the latter
had been squadron ExO and acting CO in interim period following
30 April departure of former CO, Lieutenant Colonel Smunk;
_VMA-323_--Lieutenant Colonel Clarence H. Moore vice Lieutenant
Colonel Frash, on 11 April; and Major Robert C. Woten succeeding
Lieutenant Colonel Moore on 27 June;
_VMA-121_--Major Richard L. Braun vice Lieutenant Colonel Hughes,
on 21 April;
_VMF(N)-513_--Lieutenant Colonel Ross S. Mickey vice Lieutenant
Colonel Conley, on 6 May; in June, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
L. Conrad, acting CO, named CO for Lieutenant Colonel Mickey,
hospitalized for injuries received in a May aircraft accident;
_VMJ-1_--Lieutenant Colonel Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. vice Lieutenant
Colonel William M. Ritchey, on 15 May;
_VMF-311_--Lieutenant Colonel Arthur M. Moran vice Lieutenant
Colonel Coss, on 21 April; Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane
vice Lieutenant Colonel Moran, on 1 June;
_VMF-115_--Lieutenant Colonel Lynn H. Stewart vice Lieutenant
Colonel Warren, 5 June.
With respect to CAS activities, excellent weather in April--only a
single day of restricted flying--brought the 1st MAW air tally that
month for its land-based squadrons to 3,850 effective combat sorties
(440 more by VMA-312) and 7,052.8 combat hours. This was a substantial
increase over the preceding months. Not surprisingly, the average daily
sortie rate for the month was correspondingly high: 128.3. Of 1,319
CAS sorties the largest proportion, 579 and 424 (43.9 percent, 32.1
percent), were for Marine and ROK operations, respectively.
The outstanding day of the month was 17 April. During the 24-hour
reporting period, 262 sorties were completed by MAGs-33 and -12
pilots,[455] who expended a combined total of 228.3 tons of bombs
and 28,385 rounds of 20mm ammunition. For the two MAG-33 fighter
bomber squadrons, it represented maximum effort day. Preparation had
been made a week earlier to devise the targeting and best all-round
flight schedules for ordnance and line sections. Objective areas for
the mass attack were picked by the wing G-3 target selection branch
and approved by the EUSAK-Fifth Air Force JOC. It was decided that
“flights of eight aircraft staggered throughout the day would offer the
best efficiency in expediting reloading and refueling with not more
than sixteen aircraft inactive on the flight line at one time.”[456]
Throughout the day, from 0410 to 2030, VMFs-311 and -115 continuously
pounded designated targets in support of the U.S. 7th and 3d Infantry
Divisions.[457] Commented MAG-33:
[455] Between 15–18 April the west coast carrier squadron
was under a FEAF order restricting normal interdiction
missions. This was to protect UNC sick and wounded POWs
in transit from China to Kaesong for final exchange
at Panmunjom. VMA-312 air operations were held to CAS
along the bombline. “Marine fliers of the ‘Checkerboard’
squadron proved adept at this unusual role [CAS support
missions along the front lines], and received a ‘well
done’ from JOC Korea as the Corsairs flew more than 100
close air support sorties from 16–18 April.” _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-110.
[456] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.
[457] Their respective locations were: 7th Division, at the
extreme right of I Corps sector; and further east, the
3d Division occupied the corresponding right flank of IX
Corps sector. VMF-311 concentrated on the 7th Division
targets while VMF-115 efforts were devoted primarily to
the 3d Division.
Hitting an all-time high in the annals of memorable days, this,
the seventeenth of April not only further proved MAG-33’s ability
to cripple the enemy’s already diminishing strength but it also
allowed VMF-115 to set records in total airborne sorties launched
in a single day plus a record total ordnance carried and expended
in one day by jet type aircraft.[458]
[458] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.
VMF-115 alone, with 30 pilots and 23 aircraft, had flown 114 sorties
and delivered 120 tons of bombs on North Korean targets.
A sample of the intensity of this maximum day was a series of three
early-morning interdiction strikes led by three VMF-115 pilots that
launched the effort. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Joe L. Warren, Major
Samuel J. Mantel, Jr., and Major John F. Bolt, the 23 attacking Panther
jets lashed the objective with 22.35 tons of ordnance and 4,630 rounds
of 20mm ammunition. The three missions destroyed half of the buildings
and inflamed 95 percent of the target area in the enemy supply
concentration point T’ongch’on on the Korean east coast.
By contrast, wing operations in May were considerably hampered by the
bad weather peculiar to this time of the year in Korea. Restricted
flying conditions were recorded for 18 days of the month. A total of
153 CAS sorties were flown for the Marine division before its 5 May
relief from the front lines. Of the wing’s 3,359 sorties[459] during
the month, 1,405 were for close support to forward units beating back
Communist encroachment efforts. The allocation of CAS sorties was
412 for U.S. infantry divisions (including 211 for the 25th Division
occupying the customary Marine sector); 153 for the 1st Commonwealth
Division at the Hook which the Communists assaulted on 27–28 May as
part of their overall thrust against western I Corps defenses; 412
sorties for ROK units; and 63, miscellaneous. Heaviest action for
Marine aviators took place towards the end of the month to thwart
enemy blows in the I Corps sector where Army and Turkish units were
attempting to repulse the Chinese.
[459] This figure does not include sorties by VMA-312
(carrier-based), VMO-6, or HMR-161, the latter two under
operational control of the 1st Marine Division.
The renewed effort of the Chinese Communists against UNC ground forces
in late May continued sporadically the following month. A number of new
records were set by Marines flying CAS assignments under the Fifth Air
Force. During the intense mid-June attacks on the ROK II Corps area
and adjacent X Corps sector, MAGs-12 and -33 pilots chalked up some
busy days. Between 10–17 June, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft
had flown 8,359 effective sorties, the bulk of this massive FAF
effort to buttress the crumbling ROK defense. Of this number, Marine
sorties totaled 1,156, or nearly 14 percent. (Combat sorties for the
1st MAW throughout June came to 3,276 despite 23 days of marginal to
nonoperational weather.) Marine pilots scored as high as 48 percent
of a single day’s interdiction strikes made by FAF. This occurred 15
June when the 1st MAW flew a record-breaking 283 sorties, followed by
another peak 227 sorties the next day.
Actually, when the ground situation in the ROK II Corps front began to
deteriorate on 12 June, the new Fifth Air Force commander, Lieutenant
General Samuel E. Anderson, “waived the [3,000 foot] minimum-altitude
restrictions on his fighter-bombers and ordered his wings to give
all-out support to the Eighth Army.”[460] The Seventh Fleet commander,
Admiral Clark, likewise kept his carriers on line for seven days and
ordered its naval pilots to “team with Marine and Fifth Air Force
airmen for a close-support effort exceeding anything up to that
time.”[461] When the ROK II Corps defenses cracked open on 15 June,
temporary clearing weather “allowed General Anderson and Admiral Clark
to hit the Reds with everything they had. FEAF planes flew a total of
2,143 sorties of all kinds for the largest single day’s effort of the
war.”[462]
[460] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 631.
[461] _Ibid._
[462] _Ibid._
Commenting on this heavy action period, 14–17 June, a dispatch to
General Megee from the new FAF commander, who had succeeded General
Barcus the previous month, noted:
The figures are now in. From 2000, 14 Jun 53, to 0001, 17 Jun
53, Fifth Air Force units flew a total of 3,941 combat sorties.
The cost was 9 pilots lost, 11 aircraft lost, 11 aircraft major
damage, 42 aircraft minor damage. The results: 1 enemy offensive
stopped cold. I very deeply appreciate the splendid efforts of
all members of the 5th AF at all levels. Only a concerted team
effort made the foregoing possible.[463]
[463] CG, FAF msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 17 Jun 53, in 1st MAW
ComdD Jun 53 (Vol I), p. 3 and App., IV (Vol III).
This came, incidentally, only five days after receipt by the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing of the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.[464] The award
cited the wing’s “outstanding and superior performance of duty” between
27 February 1951 and 11 June 1953. During this period Marine fliers
executed more than 80,000 combat sorties for UNC divisions.
[464] Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW
was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive
ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among
the many ranking military officials attending the
ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and
newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The fighter-bombers of MAG-33 and the MAG-12 attack planes saw heavy
action during 24–30 June when the Chinese again concentrated their
attention on ROK divisions in the UNC line. Peak operational day was 30
June. Marine squadrons alone executed 301 sorties, including 28 percent
of the CAS and 24 percent of total FAF interdiction missions. It was
also an outstanding day for MAG-12 which “outdid itself by flying 217
combat sorties against enemy forces. The 30th of this month saw MAG-12
establish a new ordnance record when an all-time high of 340 tons of
bombs and napalm were dropped on North Korea.”[465] Contributing
heavily to this accomplishment was Marine Attack Squadron 121. It
unleashed 156 tons of ordnance, a squadron record. It was believed this
also established an all-time record for tonnage expended on the enemy
by a Marine single-engine propeller squadron.
[465] MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1.
_Other Marine Defense Activities_[466]
[466] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No.
6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U)
ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War,
Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_.
Like their counterparts on the Korean mainland, the Marines, naval
gunfire teams, and ROK security troops comprising the West Coast and
East Coast Island Defense Commands felt the alternating pressure
build-up and slow-down that typified the closing months of the war.
At both installations the defense had been recently strengthened,
more or less by way of response to a CINCPacFleet intelligence
evaluation in December 1952. This alerted the isolated island forces
to the possibility of a renewed Communist attempt to recapture their
positions. The Allied east coast defense structure at Wonsan, right at
the enemy’s own front door just above the 39th Parallel, was considered
particularly vulnerable.
As in the preceding months, the mission of the west coast island group
remained unchanged--namely, the occupation, defense, and control of
its six island components. These, it will be remembered, were: Sok-to,
Cho-do, Paengyong-do (command headquarters), Yongpyong-do, and the two
lesser islands at Taechong-do and Tokchok-to.[467] Formal designation
of the island commands was modified on 1 January 1953. At this time
the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Elements (TE 95.15 and
TE 95.23) were redesignated as Task Units (TU 95.1.3 and TU 95.2.3)
respectively. Korean Marines, who represented the bulk of these task
units, were provided from the 2d KMC Regiment, the island security
force. This unit constituted the main defense for the important U.S.
Marine-controlled islands off the Korean west and east coasts.
[467] Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II.
Approximately 17 Marine officers and 100 enlisted men were assigned
to the western coastal complex, with two battalions of Korean Marines
fleshing out the garrison defense. The primary mission of this
island group was to serve as offshore bases for UNC intelligence
activities, including encouragement of friendly guerrilla operations
conducted by anti-Communist North Korean personnel. Artillery based
on the Marine-controlled islands provided both defensive fires and
counterbattery missions against enemy guns sited on the nearby mainland.
The secondary mission of WCIDU, that of training Korean troops in
infantry and weapons firing exercises, continued to be hampered
somewhat by faulty communication. As one officer observed, the training
program to qualify selected KMCs for naval gunfire duties “met with
only modest success, due primarily to the language barrier and lack
of communications equipment in the Korean Marine Corps. Personnel
who had received this training did prove to be extremely helpful in
accompanying raiding parties on the mainland in that they were able to
call for and adjust fires.”[468]
[468] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also
Chapter II.
Enemy pressure against the West Coast Islands, both from Communist
shore guns and bombing, had increased during the fall and winter of
1952. Cho-do, shaped roughly like a giant downward-plunging fish, as
previously noted had been bombed in October for the first time in the
history of the command. This new trend was repeated for the next two
months. By way of response, two 90mm guns were transferred to Cho-do
from Kanghwa-do (a more peaceful guerrilla-controlled island northwest
of Inchon) for use there as counterbattery fire against aggressive
mainland batteries. The islands of Sok-to and Paengyong-do had
likewise been bombed during this period, although no damage or serious
casualties resulted. In December, enemy shore guns fired 752 rounds
against Task Force 95 (United Nations Blockading and Escort Force)
ships charged with responsibility for the island defense, in contrast
to the 156 rounds of the preceding month.
Intelligence in December from “Leopard,” the friendly Korean guerrilla
unit at Paengyong-do, also reported the presence of junks, rubber
boats, and a nearby enemy artillery battalion off Chinnampo, believed
to be in readiness to attack the island. A captured POW, moreover,
on 22 December reported that elements of the 23d NKPA Brigade located
on the mainland across from Sok-to would attempt to seize the island
group before the end of the year. The next day, shortly after dusk,
when a concentration of 200 rounds[469] of 76mm suddenly fell on
Sok-to, and another 125 rounds struck neighboring Cho-do, it looked as
if it might be the beginning of trouble. Naval gunfire (NGF) spotters
on the islands directed the fire from UNC patrol boats cruising the
Yellow Sea. This counterbattery fire quickly silenced the enemy guns.
Again, at the end of the month, West Coast islands were alerted for an
invasion, but it never materialized.
[469] An average day’s enemy harassment consisted of 4, 7, 10,
or at the most approximately 28 rounds of fire. WCIDE
ComdDs, _passim_.
A matter of continuing concern to the command during the fall and
winter months was the North Korean refugee problem. So serious was the
situation, in fact, that it had warranted a directive from the TF 95
commander (Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich). In the early fall, a large
number of refugees had filtered into the West Coast Islands, raising
serious doubts as to their feeding and ultimate survival during the
Korean winter. Through the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, a
tentative date of September had been set for evacuating these North
Korean refugees to South Korea. By November the question of their
relocation was still not settled, although the feeding problem had been
eased somewhat by two LST-resupply loads of emergency rations and grain
by CTF 90.
Activities followed a fairly consistent pattern during early 1953,
with harassing fire striking the islands from the North Korean shore
batteries and sporadic bomb and propaganda drops. Periodically USAF
pilots who had strayed off course, planes from the nearby British
carriers HMS _Glory_ or _Ocean_, or Marine fliers from USS _Badoeng
Strait_ or _Bataan_ made emergency landings on the beach airstrips
at Paengyong-do for engine repairs or refueling. Logistical support
continued to be a problem, due to the peculiarities of the joint
ordering system through the Army. In January the western islands had
unfilled requisitions dated from as early as February 1952. Official
unit reports also noted the difficulty of obtaining medical supplies
either promptly or in full.
In April, with the hot-cold cease-fire talks again taking one of their
spasmodic upswings, WCIDU commander, Colonel Harry N. Shea, conferred
with American and British naval officials regarding CTG 95.1’s (Royal
Navy Commander, West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group) Operation
PANDORA. This called for the evacuation of Sok-to and Cho-do, the two
WCIDU islands north of the 38th Parallel, at the time of the armistice.
Increased naval gunfire and artillery missions against active
enemy mainland targets, caves, and observation posts gave the two
new 90mm guns delivered to the Sok-to garrison the month before
and the pair already at Cho-do, as well as their gun crews, some
unscheduled practice. Marine garrison personnel at the two islands
and nearby patrol ships were busy 25 days of the month knocking out
or neutralizing Communist mainside batteries. Late that month, the
battleship USS _New Jersey_ stationed off the east coast, sailed around
the Korean peninsula to add its 16-inch guns to the bombardment. Enemy
shelling of the two western islands increased in June, with 1,815
rounds expended in response by the two Marine gun sections.
During June, as it appeared the end of the war was in sight, the
first phase of PANDORA got underway with the evacuation by CTF 95 of
approximately 19,425 partisans, their families, and refugees from
Sok-to and Cho-do to islands south of the 38th Parallel. A new WCIDU
commander, Colonel Alexander B. Swenceski, had also arrived by this
time, since the average tour of duty was but a brief four months at
both island commands.
Across the Korean peninsula, the east coast Allied offshore island
defense centered on a cluster of islands in Wonsan Harbor. Situated
more than 100 miles north of the battleline, these strategically-placed
islands comprised the northernmost UN-held territory in Korea. The East
Coast Island Defense Command numbered approximately 35 Marines, 1,270
Korean Marines, and 15 Naval personnel. Headquarters for TU 95.2.3 was
Yo-do, the largest installation, which was garrisoned by approximately
300 Korean Marines and a limited detachment of USMC and USN personnel.
Smaller defense forces were located on the other islands under ECIDU
command.[470] In addition, an improvised NGF spotting team was also
stationed at the three forward islands (Mo-do, Tae-do, and Hwangto-do).
Mission of the ECIDU was a defensive one: to hold the islands as a
base for covert intelligence activities. The island defense system
existed for the purpose of “containing and destroying any enemy forces
who escape detection or who press home an attack in the face of Navy
attempts at their destruction.”[471]
[470] See Chapter II and ECIDE map.
[471] ECIDE ComdD, Oct 2, p. 1.
Individual island commanders were responsible for the defense of their
small parcels of seaborne real estate, control of both defensive and
offensive NGF missions in the area, and evaluation of intelligence
regarding enemy troop locations, the movement of supplies north, or
new emplacements of hostile guns. Fire support for the ECIDU islands,
exposed to the enemy shore batteries above the 39th Parallel, was
available from Task Force 95, which maintained a task, group of ships
off both the east and west coasts. Aircraft and ships of Task Force
77 (Seventh Fleet Striking Force), operating off the East Korean
coastline, were also on call. In December, for instance, the Corsairs
of TF 77 had resumed their rail-bridge interdiction. All-out attacks on
railroad and highway bridges, as well as bombing runs on the 90-mile
stretch of east coast railroad from Hungnam to Songjin, were undertaken
to cut off supplies being moved north for Communist industrial use.
February marked the second anniversary of the siege of Wonsan by the
UNC, the longest blockade of a port in recent U.S. history. Some
naval authorities by this time argued that the venture had become one
of doubtful merit which “should never have been undertaken, but its
long history made it difficult to abandon without apparent admission
of defeat.”[472] In any event, the month also signaled increasing
attention paid by hostile shore batteries to the little island enclave.
For seven consecutive days, 9–15 February, the harbor islands were
targets for enemy mixed artillery and mortar shells. Minor materiel
damage and casualties were sustained at Yo-do during a Valentine’s Day
bombardment, 14 February.
[472] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 434.
Altogether, the enemy harassed the harbor islands for 16 days during
the month, expending 316 rounds, compared with 11 days in January.
Hostile fire, not limited to the Wonsan Harbor islands, was also
directed against friendly ships USS _DeHaven_ and USS _Moore_. These
provided counterbattery fire and were, in turn, fired upon, the nearest
shells landing only 400 yards from the two vessels. This attack,
also on 14 February, was described as an “unusually determined and
precise”[473] effort. The enemy, moreover, did not appear to take his
usual precautions with respect to disclosing his positions. The fact
that a Communist shore battery would cease fire when subjected to
friendly counterbattery, with other positions then immediately taking
up the delivery, “indicated some sort of central control for the first
time.”[474] The I Corps, NKPA artillery units across from the Wonsan
Island command revealed the “heavy, effective artillery capability of
enemy batteries which encircle Wonsan Harbor.”[475]
[473] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 2, p. 2-5.
[474] _Ibid._
[475] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Feb 53, p. 1. Seventh Fleet intelligence
estimated that there were no less than “21 active
batteries emplaced on Wonsan Bay and within range of our
islands.” _Heinl ltr._
Unseasonably good weather the latter part of February improved the
transportation and supply situation. With the bitter cold and wind
subsiding, maintenance crews could repair the ravages of the past
several months. Craft, up to LCVP size, were hoisted in on a large
pontoon for repair. For most of December and January, “this small,
physically remote Marine Corps command,”[476] as the ECIDU commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr. himself described it, had
been snowbound. Winds howled in excess of 40 knots, and temperatures
dropped to 10° below at night. Personnel at the command island,
Yo-do, subsisted on C rations for eight days. With boating operations
suspended because of the high winds, it was not possible to send
supplies or water to Hwangto-do which for several days relied solely on
melted snow.
[476] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.
The prolonged foul weather, moreover, interrupted all classified radio
communications between the ECIDU and the outside world. Crypto guard
for the Wonsan islands was maintained by elements of the East Coast TG
95. Coded and decoded security radio messages had to be picked up by
patrol boat which could not reach the islands during extreme conditions
of icy seas and heavy snows.
As with the men on the front line, the Communists stepped up their
pressure and gunfire against the island command Marines during
March. The record[477] 524 rounds which fell on the ECIDU islands
in March doubled the following month when the command received 1,050
rounds from active mainland batteries. In April the persistent NKPA
artillerymen kept up a continuing bombardment of the eastern coastal
UNC islands, missing only three days of the entire month, that caused
nine casualties when a direct hit was made on the Tae-do CP bunker. It
was the highest rate of incoming since UN occupation of the islands.
Another April record was enemy mine laying, which increased sharply
in both the WCIDU and ECIDU command areas. A total of 37 mines were
sighted, the highest number since August 1952. Communist shore gunners,
in addition to harassment of the island themselves, fired 2,091 rounds
against TF 95 ships, another all-time high.
[477] Another record at this time was the spate of senior
visiting officers. Seven times during the month no less
than 15 flag and general officers had taken their turn
inspecting the ECIDU command headquarters at Yo-do.
Services represented were the Marine Corps, U.S. Army,
Korean Marine Corps, ROK Navy, and ROK Army. “One local
statistician computed the total number of stars for the
month (one side of the collar only) as 38,” the monthly
report brightly noted. This was believed possibly an
all-time high for any headquarters in the Korean theater,
short of the Eighth Army. ECIDE(U) ComdD, Mar 53, p. 1.
With respect to personnel, the situation had improved markedly. An
increase in ECIDU command strength authorized by CG, FMFPac in March
provided for an additional 9 Marine officers, 38 enlisted Marines,
and 6 Navy personnel. These were exclusive of the current detachments
of 1st ANGLICO shore party and naval maintenance personnel, and
represented nearly a 40 percent strength increase.[478] Not long
afterward the new ECIDU commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hoyt U. Bookhart,
Jr., arrived to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Heinl, who had held the
position since the preceding November.
[478] The previous T/O for the ECIDU was 5 officers and 30
enlisted USMC, 15 USN attached primarily to the Navy
maintenance unit, and 55 officers and 1,217 enlisted KMCs.
As with the WCIDU force, by late spring it appeared that the days of
UNC control and occupation of the east coast islands were numbered.
In view of the imminent armistice, a CinCFE directive of 11 June
called for the evacuation of all civilians, supplies, and equipment
“in excess of immediate needs.”[479] This was a preliminary step
towards full evacuation of the islands once the armistice agreement was
reached. Accordingly, on 11 June, as evacuation of the friendly west
coast partisans got under way, villagers from Yo-do, the largest and
ECIDU headquarters site, and the far northern island of Yang-do were
similarly moved south. The evacuation was completed by mid-June.
[479] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.
_The Division is Ordered Back to the Front_[480]
[480] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv,
1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar ComdDs, Jun 53.
A rash of political activity in June markedly affected the tenor
of military operations in Korea. Intensified Communist aggression
broke out north of ROK sectors in the Eighth Army line, largely as
a reaction to President Rhee’s unprecedented action on 18 June of
freeing, with the help of ROK guards, approximately 25,000 North
Korean anti-Communist prisoners at POW camps in the south. Other
anti-Communist POWs at Camp No. 10, near Ascom City, staged violent
break-out attempts at that same time and Company A, 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion passed to operational control of the camp commanding
officer there to help prevent a repetition of any such incidents in the
future. Following a recess of truce talks, pending a clarification of
the status of the current military-diplomatic agreements, key delegates
held crisis meetings at Panmunjom and Tokyo to get the beleaguered
talks back on track.
Despite the furor, signing of the armistice agreement was expected
shortly. As a result, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was
reorganized with the 1st Marine Division assigned the responsibility
of reactivating the United Nations Personnel and Medical Processing
Unit for the anticipated post-truce exchange of prisoners of war. This
was to be conducted along lines similar to that for Operation LITTLE
SWITCH, the initial limited exchange. The Division Inspector was named
processing unit commander and functional sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4,
interpreters, messing, medical, engineer) were also activated. As the
division training tour in I Corps reserve drew to a close, a number of
regimental CPXs were held during June. And the 5th Marines drew a new
assignment: training in riot control. Following civilian demonstrations
that had erupted in various populated areas of Eighth Army, including
the I Corps sector, the regiment was ordered “to be prepared to move
in battalion size increments, to be employed as army service area
reserve in suppression of civil disturbances anywhere in army service
area.”[481]
[481] 5thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.
While the Marine infantry regiments concluded their training period,
the 1st Tank Battalion, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, and Division
Reconnaissance Company remained under operational control of the
frontline U.S. 25th Infantry Division. Marine artillerymen likewise
continued under orders of CG, I Corps Artillery, in the forward area,
reinforcing division artillery fires. Tentative plans were underway for
movement of the 1st Marine Division back to its former position on the
MLR in early July. After the signing of the cease-fire, the division
would comply with provisions of the truce agreement by closing out its
former MLR and withdrawing to designated positions two kilometers south
of the former defensive positions.
CHAPTER IX
Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice
_Relief of the 25th Division--Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and
East Berlin--Enemy Probes, 11–18 July--Marine Air Operations--Fall of
the Berlins--Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July--Last Day of the War_
_Relief of the 25th Division_[482]
[482] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _Pac Flt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
1stMarDiv ltr to CMC 3/cpc, A16-13, n.d., Subj: Berlin
and East Berlin Action, Rpt of, in 1stMarDiv Summary
of Activities, Jul 53 (G-3) file (Records Group 127,
61A-2265, Box 74, FRC, Alex., Va.), hereafter _CG,
1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–9 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar,
11th Mar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53.
For the first week of July the 1st Marine Division continued its
mission as I Corps Reserve and its two-month period of intensive combat
training that had begun on 5 May. Planning got under way on 1 July,
however, for return of the division to its former sector of the MLR, as
the western anchor of I Corps, in relief of the 25th Infantry Division.
Marine infantry components were directed by I Corps to effect the
transfer of operational control during the night of 7–8 July. Tank and
artillery units--already in the division sector throughout the reserve
period--were to make whatever minor relocations were necessary at
suitable times thereafter. Division Operation Plan 10-53 ordered the
7th Marines to reassume its responsibility for the right regimental
sector of the MLR, eastward to the 1st Commonwealth boundary. The 5th
Marines, which had been in reserve at the time of the May relief of
lines, was assigned to the center sector of the MLR, while the 1st
Marines was designated as divisional reserve.
Relief of the 25th Infantry Division by Marine units got underway on
6 July when the first incoming elements of Colonel Funk’s 7th Marines
moved up to the right regimental sector manned jointly by the U.S.
14th Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Armed Forces Command. Advance
personnel reported into the left sector, to be taken over by the Marine
1st Battalion, and at 1400 the 3d Battalion relieved the TAFC reserve
battalion in the rear area.
Two platoons from the Marine regiment’s 4.2-inch Mortar Company,
meanwhile, also began their phased relief of the Turkish Heavy Mortar
Company. The incoming mortar crews had some unexpected early target
practice. As the men took up their active MLR firing positions in the
right battalion sector, they were promptly forced to put their tubes
into action to silence a troublesome machine gun, enemy mortars, and
hostile troops behind the Jersey Ridge to the north and Reno and Elko
on the west. That evening the 2d Battalion opened its new command post
in the eastern sector, occupied by two TAFC battalions.
Sharply at 0455 on 7 July, the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for
the right regimental sector and came under operational control of
the 25th Division. Shortly after noon that day, forward units of 1/7
reached the 25th Division sector after a three hour motor march from
Camp Indianhead, through driving rains in their second day without
letup. At the battalion sector, 1/7 joined the advance echelon of 40
men who had arrived the previous day and took over its MLR positions
from the 14th Infantry. Additional 7th Marines units reporting in
throughout the day and assuming new locations were the weapons, mortar,
and antitank companies.
The first of Colonel Tschirgi’s 5th Marines returned to their center
regimental sector before dawn that same day to begin their relief of
the Army 35th Infantry Regiment. At 0300 the 3d Battalion assumed
responsibility for the eastern half of the MLR. By late afternoon,
antitank personnel and the 2d Battalion were in line, the latter taking
over the western battalion sector at 1716. In the rear regimental area,
early elements of Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines, locating just south of
the Imjin River, had begun to arrive by 1300. The regiment would assume
ground security for the Spoonbill and Libby (formerly X-Ray) bridges in
the sector as well as MASRT #1.
No one needed to remind the 1st Marine Division that the territory it
was moving back into was not the same--with respect to defense posts
in the right regimental sector--that it had left two months earlier.
Three of its six outposts there (Carson, Elko, Vegas) had fallen to
the enemy in the late-May battle, despite the formidable resistance
of the defending Turks. Outpost Ava remained at the far western end of
the line, with the Berlin-East Berlin complex in the right battalion
area. Some 6,750 yards of intervening MLR--more than four miles--lay
in between, bereft of any protective outposts to screen and alert the
defending line companies to sudden enemy assaults. The Marines were
thus returning to a main line of resistance considerably weakened in
its right regimental sector.
As the 1st Division CG, General Pate, observed:
Vegas [had] dominated the enemy approaches to Berlin from the
north and northwest and therefore made Berlin relatively secure.
Berlin, in turn, dominated the enemy approaches from the north
and northwest to East Berlin and made East Berlin relatively
secure. The loss of Outpost Vegas to the CCF placed Berlin and
East Berlin in very precarious positions and negated their being
supported by ground fire except from the MLR.[483]
[483] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_., p. 1.
Ground support fire from the MLR, moreover, tended to be only
moderately successful in supporting the outposts because of the nature
of the terrain. A major Communist stronghold, Hill 190, lay northeast
of the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. Since Berlin (COP 19) and East Berlin
(COP 19-A) were sited on extensions of this same hill mass, the enemy
could make sudden “ridgeline” attacks against the Berlins. With buffer
outpost Vegas now lost, the likelihood of CCF success in such attacks
was “immeasurably increased.”[484]
[484] _Ibid._, p. 2.
_Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and East Berlin_[485]
[485] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10;
_CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–10 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 992, dtd
8–9 Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/7,
2/7, 3/7, 2/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1st MAW, VMF-311,
VMO-6, HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_;
MacDonald, _POW_.
It did not take the Chinese long to exploit this situation. At about
2100 on 7 July, while the relief of lines was in progress, the two
Berlin outposts and newly-located MLR companies of Lieutenant Colonel
Cereghino’s 2d Battalion (from the left: D, F, and E), were greeted
by a heavy volume of Chinese mortar and artillery fire. The barrage
continued unremittingly, followed by waves of a reinforced Chinese
battalion that swept over the two platoon-sized outposts, from the
direction of Vegas. By 2345 defending Marines at both outposts were
engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, identified as elements
of the 407th Regiment, 136th Division, 46th CCF Army.
Berlin, manned at the time by TAFC[486] and Marine personnel, was
unexpectedly strengthened by a Company F reinforced squad that had been
dispatched on an earlier ambush patrol in the vicinity of the outpost.
At East Berlin, however, the overwhelming hordes of Chinese soldiers
advanced to the trenchline of the steep forward slope and quickly
locked with the Marines at point-blank range. Despite the coordination
of MLR machine gun, 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortar, and artillery
fires from 2/11[487] and 4/11, the enemy overran the outpost at 2355
after heavy, close fighting. Chinese mortar and artillery barrages, by
midnight, had continuously disrupted the Marine communications net at
East Berlin, and by 0130 radio relay was also out at Berlin proper.
[486] Discussing this phase of operations, the 2/7 commander
stated: “As it turned out we were in great shape with
both Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some
instances. We had a great rapport with the Turks in that
they had previously relieved 2/7. In fact, they made
us honorary members of their battalions, giving each
2/7 Marine one of the unit patches.” Col Alexander D.
Cereghino ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 19 Jun 70.
[487] On 7 July, 2/11 had become the direct support battalion
for the 7th Marines.
A provisional platoon from Headquarters and Service Company of 2/7
was quickly ordered to reinforce the main line against any attempted
breakthrough by the Chinese. This was a distinct possibility since the
Berlins were only 325 yards from the MLR, nearer than most outposts.
Men from Companies H and I of the rear reserve 3d Battalion (since 26
May commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Jones) were also placed
under operational control of 2/7 and ordered to forward assembly areas
in readiness for a thrust against the enemy at East Berlin.
At 0355 a Company F squad jumped off for the initial counterattack.
This was made at 0415, without artillery preparation, in an attempt to
gain surprise for the assault. It was thrown back. A second Company F
unit, by 0440, was on its way to reinforce the first but got caught by
25 rounds of incoming, with 15 men wounded. It continued on, however,
but an hour later the Marines were ordered to disengage so that the
artillerymen could place TOT fire on the area preparatory to a fresh
attempt to dislodge the enemy soldiers.
During the early morning hours of 8 July, large numbers of Chinese
were seen at their new Vegas and Reno strongholds. Marines of the
1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery blanketed hostile troops there and
at the Berlin outposts with four ripples. On another occasion, a
time-on-target mission launched by the 2/11 direct support battalion,
landed in the midst of an enemy company assembled on Vegas. Friendly
firepower by this time consisted of all four battalions of the 11th
Marines, as well as seven Army and Turkish artillery battalions still
emplaced in the area during the relief period and thus under tactical
control of 25th Division Artillery.
Throughout 7–8 July, 11 Marine tanks from Company B placed 800 shells
on enemy installations and troops. In the characteristic pattern,
use of Marine armor heightened unfriendly response. The tanks drew
in return 2,000 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery on their own
positions, but without any serious damage. Elements of the Army 14th
Infantry Regiment Tank Company, still in the area, also opened up with
some additional shells and bullets.
Despite the Chinese attack, the relief of lines continued during
the night. In the center MLR sector, the 5th Marines had taken over
regimental responsibility at 2130, with 3/11 becoming its direct
supporting unit. And in the western half of the 7th Marines line--about
the only undisturbed part of the regimental sector--1/7 had routinely
completed is battalion relief at 0335 on 8 July.
At 0630 it was confirmed that East Berlin, an extension of the ridge on
which Berlin was located, was under enemy control. Better news at first
light was that Berlin,[488] 500 yards west, had repulsed the enemy,
a fact not definitely known earlier due to communication failure. At
this time, G-3 reported that 18 effectives were holding Berlin, and 2/7
assigned an 18-man reinforced squad to buttress the defense. It was not
considered feasible to send a larger reinforcement “since the Berlin
area [could] accommodate only a small garrison.”[489]
[488] The ridge on which COP Berlin was located was split by
two valleys. Both of these and the ridge itself served
as approaches to the Marine MLR. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6,
Chap. 9, p. 9-169.
[489] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, p. 2.
Meanwhile, another 7th Marines counterforce was being organized for
a massed assault to retake East Berlin. At 1000, under cover of a
thundering 1,600-round mortar and artillery preparation by Marine and
TAFC gunners, a reinforced two-platoon unit from Companies George
and How, launched the attack. The unlucky H/3/7 platoon, in the lead,
got caught between well-aimed Chinese shells and the Marines’ own
protective wire. In less than 15 minutes the platoon had been reduced
to 20 effectives, with Company G passing through its ranks to continue
the attack. By 1123 the Marines were in a violent fire fight and
grenade duel in the main trenchline at East Berlin.
Tank guns, meanwhile, blasted away at Chinese troops, bunkers, active
weapons, and trenches. On call they placed their fire “only a few yards
in front of the friendly attacking infantry and moved this fire forward
as the foot troops advanced.”[490] Heavy countermortar and artillery
rounds were also hitting their mark on forward, top, and reverse slopes
of East Berlin to soften the Chinese defenses. A few minutes later
the 3d Battalion men had formed for the assault. During the heavy
hand-to-hand fighting of the next hour the Marines “literally threw
some of the Chinese down the reverse slope.”[491] Gaining the crest of
the hill, the Marines by force and fire dispatched the enemy intruders.
At 1233 they were again in possession of East Berlin. With just 20 men
left in fighting condition at the outpost, a reinforcing platoon from
I/3/7 was dispatched to buttress the assault force.
[490] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2.
[491] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 136.
North of the 7th Marines sector four F9F Panthers, led by the
commanding officer of VMF-311, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane,
found their way through the rainy skies that had restricted aerial
support efforts nearly everywhere. In a noon MPQ mission, the quartet
delivered five tons of ordnance on Chinese reinforcement troops and
bunkers.
Promptly at 1300--a half hour after retaking the outpost--the 7th
Marines effected the relief of the last Turkish elements at Berlin and
occupied the twin defense positions. And by 1500 on 8 July, the 1st
Marine Division assumed operational control of the entire division
sector from the Army 25th Infantry Division. Relief of individual units
would continue, however, through several more days. At the same time,
the mission of the 11th Marines, since 5 July under a new regimental
commander, Colonel Manly L. Curry, changed from general support of
U.S. I Corps, reinforcing the fires of the 25th Division Artillery,
to direct support of the Marine Division. The 1st Tank Battalion
similarly took over its regular direct support role. Other units under
temporary Army jurisdiction, such as the Kimpo Provisional Regiment and
Division Reconnaissance Company, reverted to Marine control.
During the rest of the day, gunners of the 11th Marines continued their
fire missions despite reduced visibility that hindered surveillance
by the OY spotting planes and forward observers. Only 42 Chinese were
sighted during the daytime, although shortly before dusk a CCF group
reportedly heading toward the Berlins area southwest from Frisco was
taken under fire. Estimates of enemy incoming throughout the 7–8 July
action from 17-odd battalions of Chinese artillery dug in across the
division sector was placed at 19,000 rounds of all types. Marine and
Army-controlled battalions, for their part, pounded Chinese strongholds
with a total of 20,178 rounds.
That night Colonel Funk authorized a 3d Battalion platoon to bolster
the MLR. Five tanks were also ordered to locate in the Hill 126 area,
the Marine high-ground terrain feature to the rear of the frontlines.
This foresight was well rewarded. During the late evening hours strange
motor noises “sounding like a convoy pulling in and then back out
again”[492] floated over the Korean hills and the tanks immediately
swept suspected hostile installations with their 90mm guns. Later that
night of 8–9 July, the Chinese suddenly renewed their probing efforts
at the battered Marine outposts. Moving in from Vegas, an estimated
reinforced enemy company attacked Berlin at 0104, then brushed on
to East Berlin. An intense fire fight ensued off and on for nearly
two hours at the two posts. Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars, plus
artillery illumination, boxing fires, and tanks blunted the assaults.
At 0315 the enemy broke contact and action quieted down at both
locations.
[492] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 9 Jul 53.
Throughout the rest of the day, eight Company C[493] armored vehicles
assisted the infantrymen in consolidation of positions. A total of 25
rounds of shells and 19,140 rounds of .30 and .50 caliber machine gun
bullets were expended on CCF strongpoints and troops during a 24-hour
firing period that ended at 1700.
[493] On 9 July Company C relieved Company B on the MLR in
support of the 7th Marines. Both tank companies had been
in action with the TAFC during the entire 60-day period
the division was in I Corps reserve. Due to the rotation
system, however, Baker Company had been on line longer
and transferred to the rear ranks for a “much needed rest
and rehabilitation.” 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 3.
Because of the casualties at Berlin, an H/3/7 reinforcement squad was
sent to augment the Marine force there. Losses suffered by the 7th
Marines for the two successive nights were 9 killed, 12 missing,[494]
126 wounded and evacuated, and 14 with minor wounds. The cost to the
CCF was 30 known dead, and an estimated 200 killed and 400 wounded.
[494] Later it was determined that only two were actually
captured and they were subsequently repatriated.
MacDonald, _POW_, p. 211.
With the Marines back on line, VMO-6 and HMR-161 which were under
division operational control again resumed normal combat routine.
Returning on 8 July to their forward airstrip in the center regimental
sector, VMO-6 helicopters made eight frontline helicopter evacuations.
Observation planes that same day conducted four artillery spotting
missions behind enemy lines. HMR-161, assuming normal operations on 10
July, resupplied Marine division outposts with 1,200 pounds of rations,
water, and gear as part of its 25.3 hours flight time this first day
back in full service.
_Enemy and Marine Probes, 11–18 July_[495]
[495] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 10–17 Jul 53;
1stMarDiv PIRs 923–930, dtd 10–17 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar,
7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53;
Hermes, _Truce Tent_.
After the flare-up on the Berlin front, there was relatively little
action for the next 10 days. Marines continued the relief of the last
of the outgoing 25th Division units. When this was completed on 13
July, 1st Marine Division units, including the 1st KMC/RCT[496] and
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, were all back in their accustomed
sectors. They thus rejoined the 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, Kimpo
Regiment, and Division Reconnaissance Company which had remained on
line throughout the period. The July relief was one that could hardly
be characterized as routine. Interfering elements had included not only
the Chinese but torrential summer rains. These had continued virtually
nonstop from 5–8 July causing bridge and road washouts, rerouting of
supply trucks, and juggling of manifests at a time when the regiments
were using an average of 90 transport vehicles daily.
[496] The 1st KMC/RCT turned over its sector of the 1st ROK
Division front to the 1st ROK Regiment at 1800 on 8 July
and relieved the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment on 12 July.
_ROKMC Comments._
Forward of the MLR the regular nightly patrols probed enemy territory,
often with no contact. On at least three occasions division
intelligence reported entire 24-hour periods during which the elusive
Chinese could not be sighted anywhere in No-Man’s-Land by friendly
patrols operating north of the Marine division front.
More rain,[497] continual haze, and ground fog for 6 of the 10 days
between 9–18 July not only reduced the activity of air observers and
Marine pilots, but apparently inspired the ground-digging Chinese to
pursue--at least across from the division sector of I Corps--a more
mole-like existence than ever. Enemy troop sightings during the daytime
decreased from as many as 310 CCF to a new low of 14. Incoming, for one
24-hour period, totaled no more than 48 rounds of Chinese artillery and
228 of mortar fire that struck Marine positions, causing only slight
damage.
[497] Spoonbill Bridge was submerged under 11 feet of water and
destroyed by the pressure against it on 7 July. Flood
conditions existed again on 14–15 July when the Imjin
crested at 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads in the vicinity
were impassable for three days. Resupply of forward
companies was made via Freedom Bridge. One command diary
writer, discussing the elaborate series of six moves made
by 1/1 during July, added a touch of unconscious humor
when he observed, “During the month, it seemed as if the
Battalion was constantly on the move.... Rain hampered
these moves considerably. The weather between moves was
generally clear and dry.” 1/1 ComdD, July 53, p. 1; 1st
TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, pp. 5, 11–12, 23; _PacFlt EvalRpt_
No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-68, 9-136.
The same could not be said for their mines. One 7th Marines
reconnaissance patrol located a new minefield staked out with Soviet
antipersonnel mines (POMZ-2) of an unfamiliar type with both pull and
tension fuses. It appeared that mines which had lain dormant during the
winter months had suddenly come to life with the warm weather, or else
been recently re-laid. Nearly a dozen were uncovered by 5th and 7th
Marines patrols, soon after their return to the front, and sometimes
the discovery came too late. Probably the worst day was 12 July when
four Marines were killed and eight wounded as a result of accidentally
detonating mines.
At the same time, in the 5th Marines sector near the vicinity of truce
corridor COP-2, the persistent voice of the Dragon Lady taunted Marines
with such lackluster gambits as “Surrender now! What is your girl
doing back home?” in the stepped-up pace of its midnight propaganda
broadcasts.
The regular nightly patrols checked in and out, performing their
mission routinely. Even during this last month of the war, when word
of the final truce agreement was expected daily, fire fights ensued.
On 12 July, a 5th Marines 13-man reconnaissance patrol clashed briefly
north of COP Esther, while a 7th Marines platoon-size combat patrol
brushed with a Chinese squad west of Elko in an 18-minute fire fight.
The same night the 11th Marines reported increased enemy sightings of
318 CCF soldiers--the most seen since the Berlin probe of 7–8 July.
No follow-up was made. The Chinese were busy with major offensives
elsewhere along the UNC front, devoting their primary efforts to ROK
divisions on the central and eastern sectors of the Eighth Army line.
Apparently they fully intended to demonstrate to the South Koreans that
continuation of the war would be a costly business.[498]
[498] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 470.