The Hook
_Before the Battle--Preparations for Attack and Defense--Attack on the
Hook--Reno Demonstration--Counterattack--Overview_
_Before the Battle_[254]
[254] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv, _Info for CG, FMFPac_;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 706–736, dtd 1–31
Oct 52; 7thMar ComdD, Oct 52; LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr.
memo to Dir, MarCorHist, HQMC, dtd 28 Oct 52, Subj: Notes
on 7th Marines’ Action (Defense of “The Hook”), 26–27 Oct
52, hereafter Heinl, _memo_.
After the heavy fighting in early October, there was a change in the
1st Marine Division dispositions. On the 12th, the 5th Marines relieved
the 1st in the center sector and the latter regiment went into reserve.
For the next two weeks the lull that prevailed across the regimental
front was in sharp contrast to the intense fighting there earlier
in the month. On the division left, the Korean Marines, not engaged
in any sizable Communist action, conducted frequent tank-infantry
reconnaissance patrols and ambushes forward of their MLR. In the
center of the division line the 5th Marines, too, found their Chinese
opponent seemingly reluctant to pursue any combat offensives, though
his harassment of the Bunker Hill area represented the strongest action
against the Marine division at this time. The 7th Marines, holding
down the right sector, similarly encountered the enemy for only brief
periods, these contacts during patrol actions lasting no more than 15
to 30 minutes.
Upon its relief from the MLR, the 1st Marines took over the division
rear area. There the regiment continued the improvement of the
secondary defensive lines, conducted extensive training, and dispatched
numerous security patrols throughout the regimental area. These
routine reserve roles were in addition to the primary mission of
augmenting units on the Marine MLR in order to counterattack and defeat
any attempted penetration of JAMESTOWN in the division area. As part
of its counterattack mission, the divisional reserve regiment was to
be prepared for employment anywhere in the I Corps sector to block an
enemy advance.
On the division right, the 7th Marines remained on position in defense
of JAMESTOWN. Following the bitter outpost contests on 6 October,
Colonel Moore continued to retain all three battalions on line: 2/7
on the left, 3/7 in the center, and 1/7 on the right. The regimental
commander had found it necessary to commit his three battalions on line
due to the vastly overextended six-mile front, the rugged terrain,
and the very real possibility of a major Communist attack anywhere
along the MLR. With all battalions forward, Colonel Moore was left
with a very small reserve, one company from 3/7. This battalion had to
use as its reserve what had become known as “clutch platoons”--units
composed of cooks, bakers, clerks, motor transport, and other
Marine headquarters personnel. These local reserves, and even the
reserve company from 3/7, could be employed only with the regimental
commander’s approval.
Line JAMESTOWN, in the 7th Marines area, meandered from the vicinity
of the burned-out village of Toryom, on the left, to the Hook salient
in the right battalion sector and from there southeast to the Samichon
River, the boundary with the 1st Commonwealth Division. From the left
battalion sector to the right, the terrain gradually grew more rugged
until the hills finally spilled over into the Samichon Valley. To the
rear of the MLR, the ground was less jagged; forward of the line, the
hills were more precipitous in character. The steepest heights were
in the right battalion sector. Highest terrain feature along Colonel
Moore’s MLR was Hill 146, located not far from the Hook. Throughout
the 7th Marines sector rice paddies covered the narrow valley floors
between the hills. Vegetation was sparse. A series of dirt roads and
trails served the regimental area.
Combat outposts varied greatly as to their distance from JAMESTOWN.
Farthest from the line were the three in the left battalion sector,
manned by Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7. This trio, Carson, Reno, and
Vegas, were approximately 1,000 yards forward of the MLR. Berlin and
East Berlin (a new outpost established on 13 October) were the forward
positions in the center line outposted by Lieutenant Colonel Charles D.
Barrett’s[255] Marines. To the right Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s 1/7
sector held three--COPs Ronson, Warsaw, and Verdun, the latter near the
Commonwealth border.
[255] Responsibility for this part of the 7th Marines line
changed on 13 October, when Lieutenant Colonel Barrett
took command of 3/7 from Lieutenant Colonel Russell.
The latter then was assigned as division senior liaison
officer to the KMC regiment.
Ronson was the outpost nearest to the Hook, a major defensive position
of the regiment. The importance of this part of the MLR, in the extreme
eastern sector, lay not in its strength but rather in its weakness.
Jutting as it did towards the Communist lines, the salient formed a
J-shaped bulge in the main line, which not only gave the Hook its
nickname but also established the vulnerability of the position. Its
susceptibility to capture derived both from violation of a defensive
axiom that the “MLR should not have sharp angles and salients”[256] and
to the fact that the ridgeline on which the Hook was located continued
northwest into Communist-held territory. Seattle, which the Chinese had
seized on 2 October, lay only about 500 yards northwest of the Hook.
[256] Heinl, _memo_. The originator of this memo, Lieutenant
Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., was an experienced Marine
officer and military historian who had just been assigned
to the division for duty. Temporarily attached to the 7th
Marines as an observer, his brief visit there happened to
coincide with the beginning of the Hook battle.
In spite of its vulnerability, the Hook could not be abandoned. There
was no other terrain feature held by the Marines that could command the
critical Samichon Valley, a major avenue of approach from the northeast
directly to Seoul. The salient also dominated the entire nearby area
of the Imjin River to the south. Possession of the Hook and adjoining
ridge would give the Communists observation of a substantial portion
of the Marine rear areas beyond the Imjin, as well as the vital river
crossings. In the opinion of Major General M. M. Austin-Roberts-West,
whose 1st Commonwealth Division was soon to take over the Hook sector,
had the salient been lost, “a withdrawal of 4,000 yards would have been
necessary.”[257]
[257] Quoted in LtCol Herbert F. Wood, _Strange Battleground:
The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defense
Policy of Canada_ (Ottawa: The Army Historical Section,
Canadian Forces Headquarters, 1966), p. 213.
At the beginning of October, this vital area had been protected by COPs
Seattle and Warsaw. When the former was overrun, it became necessary
to establish a new position. This was directed by Lieutenant Colonel
Dulacki, and on 16 October Ronson was established 200 yards southeast
of Seattle and 275 yards west of the Hook. About 600 yards northeast of
the salient the remaining position, COP Warsaw, commanded the lowlands
to the east and the narrow, east-west oriented valley of a Samichon
tributary immediately to the front.
Opposite the three MLR battalions of the 7th Marines were the 356th
and 357th Regiments of the 119th Division, 40th CCF Army. In addition
to these infantry units, numbering close to 7,000, an estimated 10
battalions (120 guns) of Chinese artillery[258] were facing Colonel
Moore’s regiment. Personnel strength of the American unit consisted
of 3,844 Marines, 11 medical officers and 133 corpsmen, 3 U.S. Army
communicators, and 764 Koreans (746 KSCs and 18 interpreters).
[258] The Marine division artillery regiment reported that
in late October nine battalions of Chinese artillery,
ranging from 75 or 76mm guns or howitzers to 122mm
howitzers, opposed the 7th Marines. It was estimated
that one other 122mm battalion was also emplaced north
of the right division sector. In addition to these CCF
units, elements of a 152mm self-propelled howitzer unit
were also believed to be in the area. Late in November
two batteries of 152mm howitzers were tentatively located
about 4,000 yards west northwest of the Hook. Disposition
had been determined “as a result of crater analysis,
shell reports, sound plots, and capabilities of the
weapon.” 11thMar ComdD, Nov 52, “Enemy Artillery Activity
Rpts,” Nos. 21, 23, dtd 1, 21 Nov. 52.
During the summer and early fall, the 7th Marines had amassed
considerable information about the enemy, including Chinese strength
and composition of forces and many of their combat characteristics.
Encroachment on Marine ground positions by steadily creeping the CCF
trenchline forward continued to be the enemy’s major ground-gaining
tactic. In fact, the Chinese units facing the Marine division
concentrated their digging during the fall of 1952 in the sector north
of the 7th Marines MLR. (See Map 15.) Other intelligence, however,
seemed open to question. For example, there was the reported frontline
presence of women among the 90 Chinese who had engaged a 2/1 patrol
on 5 October as well as the sighting in the KMC sector on the 17th of
enemy “super soldiers” far taller than the ordinary Chinese. Many in
the division found it difficult to believe the statements of enemy
prisoners. During interrogation they invariably maintained that the
mission of Chinese Communist Forces in Korea was a “defensive” one.
[Illustration:
MAP 15 K. WHITE
“CCF CREEPING TACTICS”
MARCH-OCTOBER 1952]
The static battle situation encouraged the use of psychological
warfare. In attempting to influence the minds of their opponents and
weaken morale, the Chinese depended upon loudspeakers to carry their
propaganda barrage across No-Man’s-Land. Enemy employment of this
technique was especially heavy during October. To Marines, for example,
Chinese directed pleas of “Go home and have peace,” “Surrender, we
treat POWs well,” “Leave Korea,” “Marines, come and get your buddies’
bodies,” and the like, often to the accompaniment of music. On
occasion, Chinese patrols left propaganda pamphlets behind them in the
KMC sector. Infrequently, the enemy displayed signs along patrol routes
urging Marines to surrender. Most of the Chinese psychological efforts
were directed against the Korean Marines.
In enemy employment of artillery, Marine frontline units and division
intelligence had become well aware of the vast improvements the
Communists had made in recent months. Aided by a plentiful supply
of ammunition, enemy guns and howitzers, including the heavy 152mm
weapon, frequently delivered concentrated fires on critical positions
in the division area. Marines felt the effects of how well the Chinese
had learned to mass their fires against a single target for maximum
destructive power. From the Marines, moreover, the enemy had picked
up the artillery box tactic, employing it for the first time in their
sector opposite Colonel Moore’s regiment during the early October
outpost battles.
During those same clashes, the 11th Marines had observed how the
Chinese displaced some of their batteries well forward for more
effective artillery support of their attacking infantry. One enemy
artillery innovation had been noted the previous month by a Marine AO;
on 19 September a Chinese artillery piece was detected firing in the
open. Previous observations had indicated that the Chinese generally
used wooded areas or extensive bunker-type positions to conceal their
supporting weapons.
By the middle of October, 62.5 percent of the Chinese artillery
opposing General Pollock’s division was located in positions north
of the 7th Marines. The importance the enemy put on the principle of
massed artillery fire and the improvement of their ammunition supply
can be seen in a remark attributed to a Chinese division commander:
The enemy had organized an attack of two-battalion strength on
our first-line platoon. As the enemy were getting into their
assembly area I directed several volleys of rapid fire against
them with a total expenditure of about 120 rounds. That very
evening the army commander rang me up and said disapprovingly,
‘You’ve expended a bit too much ammunition today!’ It seemed as
though the army commander had detected precisely what was in my
mind. There was an instant change in his voice as he said: ‘Oh,
comrade, it really could not be accounted as waste, but you must
know we are short of supplies.’
Scarcely two years had passed but the situation was completely
altered. In the present we had emplaced 120 guns to each
kilometre of front line so that in a rapid-fire bombardment of
25 minutes more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition could be hurled
against the enemy positions. If the fire used in supporting
attacks and in repulsing enemy counterattacks were taken into
account the total would reach 70,000 rounds.[259]
[259] _CPV, Recollections_, p. 360.
Exaggerated as the numbers of guns and rounds may be, the basic massing
technique was in line with U.S. intelligence estimates at the time. The
remark also pointed to the importance the Chinese had learned to place
on employment of artillery, a shift in emphasis that Colonel Moore’s
regiment was soon to experience in unprecedented volume.
_Preparations for Attack and Defense_[260]
[260] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 24–26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 729–732, dtd 24–27 Oct
52; 7th Mar, 1/7, VMA-323 ComdDs, Oct 52; Heinl, _memo_.
Before the Hook battle erupted, the defensive fires that the 7th
Marines could draw upon were not overpowering in terms of numbers of
units available. Only one battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Bert Davis’
2/11, was in direct support of Colonel Moore’s regiment. In this
mission, the 2/11 fires were reinforced by those of 1/11 (Lieutenant
Colonel David S. Randall). In addition to these organic units, the
batteries of the 623d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers)
and one platoon of C Battery, 17th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch
self-propelled howitzers) were readily available to the 7th Marines.
In all, 38 light, medium, and heavy pieces constituted the artillery
support of the right sector.[261] General support was available from
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond D. Wright’s 4/11 and from the 4.2-inch
Rocket Battery (Captain Donald G. Frier). The 159th Field Artillery
Battalion (155mm howitzers) and B Battery, 204th Field Artillery
Battalion (155mm guns), like the other Army units positioned in the
Marine Division sector, reinforced the fires of division artillery.
Fire support from 1st Commonwealth Division weapons within range of the
Hook area could also be depended upon.
[261] 11thMar ComdD, Oct 52, App III, Sheet 3. Eighteen of the
weapons (the 623d Field Artillery Battalion) had just
moved into the Marine sector and begun operating on 14
October. The unit remained under I Corps operational
control, with the mission of providing general support
reinforcing fire.
Although the Army artillery units satisfied the heavy punch requirement
of the 11th Marines, commanded since 21 September by Colonel Harry N.
Shea, there was one basic element the regiment lacked. This missing
ingredient was a sufficient amount of ammunition for the howitzers.
Defense of outposts and mainline positions along the EUSAK front in
early and mid-October 1952 consumed a great deal of this type of
ammunition. This heavy expenditure was brought to the attention of the
corps commanders by Eighth Army. General Van Fleet pointed out that
ammunition consumption rates for both the 105mm and 155mm howitzers
during these two critical weeks in October not only exceeded the
expenditures of the massive Communist spring offensive in 1951 but also
the UN counterstroke that followed.[262]
[262] Later in 1951, during the UN Summer-Fall offensive,
ammunition consumption had again risen sharply, creating
concern among corps commanders and occasioning one of
them to remark to a subordinate, “We have the distinct
impression that two of your battalions are trying to
compete for a world’s record.” Capt Edward C. Williamson,
_et al._, “Bloody Ridge,” ms OCMH, 1951, cited in
James A. Huston, _The Sinews of War: Army Logistics,
1775–1953--The Army Historical Series_ (Washington: OCMH,
1966), v. II, p. 632.
To help remedy the situation, the EUSAK commander urged “continuous
command supervision to insure the maximum return for all ammunition
expended.”[263] The general made it plain that he was not changing his
policy of exacting a heavy toll whenever the enemy began an attack.
This course had been followed by the 1st Marine Division, but the
Marines’ ability to both restrict the enemy’s creeping tactics and
simultaneously fight a siege-type war was noticeably impeded.[264]
[263] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App I, No. 19.
[264] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-71.
As the end of October approached, the shortage of ammunition was
becoming a subject of increased concern to the frontline Marine units.
Daily allowances established for the last 11 days of the month were
20 rounds of 105mm high explosive (HE) and 4.3 rounds of 155mm high
explosive for each tube.[265] With such small quantities to fire
and further restricted by an equally critical shortage of both hand
grenades and 81mm mortar rounds, Colonel Moore was almost powerless to
spike the Chinese preparations for assault of the Hook.[266] Artillery
fires were reserved for only the most urgent situations or for large
bodies of troops. It was one observer’s opinion that the “enemy could
show himself almost at will without receiving fire, and that it was
impossible either to harass or neutralize his continual fortification
activity, let alone embark upon systematic destructive fires of the
kind he was carrying out.”[267]
[265] _Ibid._
[266] For example, during the latter part of the month each
rifle company in the Hook battalion was limited to 150
hand grenades. The total 11-day allowance for Lieutenant
Colonel Dulacki’s 81mm mortars was 475 rounds. 1/7 ComdD,
Oct 52, App. III.
[267] Heinl, _memo_.
As a means of compensating for the shortage of 81mm mortar and 105mm
howitzer ammunition, the Marines reverted to a former method of using
machine guns. This technique, employed during the trench warfare days
of World War I but seldom thereafter, was considered a useful expedient
to discourage enemy defensive creeping tactics as well as to deter his
preparations for objective attacks. The system required emplacing heavy
machine guns both on and to the rear of the MLR to fire into areas that
troops used for assembly or as check points. If the target was visible
to the machine gunner, he could take it under direct fire. At night,
when the enemy operated under cover of darkness, the machine guns fired
into zones which had already been registered in the daytime. Colonel
Moore directed his units on 23 October to resort to this expedient.
A 1st Marine Division daily intelligence report covering the 24-hour
period beginning at 1800 on 24 October noted that there was “a
marked increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire with an estimated
twelve hundred rounds falling in the CT 1010 area of the 7th Marines
sector.”[268] According to the division PIR there was also an increased
number of enemy troops observed that same day in locations west and
northwest of the Hook. Most of the fire was directed against the Hook
area of the MLR and on the two sentinels, Ronson and Warsaw. Efforts by
Marines and some 250 KSCs to repair the damaged or destroyed bunkers,
trenches, communications lines, and tactical wire, during brief
periods of relief from the artillery deluges, were wiped out again by
subsequent shellings.
[268] 1stMarDiv PIR 729, dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2. Ronson, the Hook,
and Warsaw are within the 1,000-meter square, CT 1010.
It would not be correct to say that 1/7 remained entirely passive at
this time. Battalion weapons replied, though in faint voices barely
audible in the din created by Chinese firing. Regimental mortars chimed
in and so did 2/11, which fired 416 rounds in the 24 hours ending at
1800 on the 24th. For that same period, tanks expended 137 rounds at
active weapon positions firing on the Hook. One air strike was directed
against the enemy opposing the Hook battalion. This attack by a quartet
of Marine F9Fs from VMF-311 (Lieutenant Colonel Arthur H. Adams) bombed
and napalmed a troublesome group of Chinese entrenched on the enemy MLR
750 yards east of the Hook.
During the next 48 hours, the enemy continued his preparations for an
attack, concentrating his artillery fire on the Hook area. Colonel
Moore’s battalions received approximately 2,850 artillery and mortar
rounds, most of which rained down on 1/7 to the right. There, the heavy
and continuous fire slowed Marine efforts to restore their wrecked
bunkers and trenches. Late on the 25th there was some relief from the
artillery bombardment, but by that time many of the prophets on the
line and in the rear area were uncertain only as to the precise time of
the unexpected Chinese attack.
Colonel Clarence A. Barninger, the division intelligence officer,
had himself alerted General Pollock to the implications of “the
intensification and character of enemy fires”[269] being received in
the 1/7 sector. The intelligence evaluation was not based only on
recent events. A detailed study of Chinese capabilities and possible
courses of action had just been completed by the G-2 and his staff. In
its discussion of the early October outpost attacks in the division
right, the report concluded that Chinese interests lay in gaining the
“terrain dominating the Samichon Valley....”[270]
[269] Heinl, _memo_.
[270] 1stMarDiv Intell. Est., dtd 19 Oct 52, p. 8, filed with
the divisions PIRs for that month.
Since 5 October when 1/7 had been moved into the line as the regiment’s
third MLR battalion, the enemy had begun a regular shelling of 1/7
positions adjacent to the Hook. Incoming rounds had increased almost
daily. “Troops, vehicles, and tanks moving in daylight even behind the
MLR almost invariably brought down enemy artillery or mortars upon
them. It was apparent that the enemy was making preparation for a
large scale assault in this portion of the MLR,”[271] the battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki, later recalled. Matters took
an even more ominous turn about 23 October when the Chinese “began a
deliberate, deadly accurate precision fire aimed at destruction of the
major fortifications in the Hook’s system of dug-in defense.”[272]
As the tempo of this fire stepped up daily, the destruction of the
battalion’s carefully prepared defenses exceeded the Marines’ ability
to repair the damage. The artillery build-up was believed preparatory
to an attempt to either seize or breach the MLR.
[271] _Dulacki ltr._
[272] Heinl, _memo_.
In late October, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki had two companies on the
MLR to protect this important area. On the 23d, Captain Frederick C.
McLaughlin’s Company A was assigned the left part of the battalion
sector, which included the Hook. A squad outposted Ronson and a
reinforced platoon was stationed at Warsaw. At 0200 on the 26th,
Company C (Captain Paul B. Byrum) departed the battalion reserve area
to take over responsibility as the left MLR company. Relief of Company
A was completed at 0410.[273] Holding down the right flank of the main
line during this time was Company B (Captain Dexter E. Evans). This
area was larger but somewhat less rugged than the western part of the
1/7 sector.
[273] Due to the width of the Hook sector, it was necessary to
keep all three rifle platoons in the line. A reinforced
platoon from the battalion reserve outposted Warsaw.
While Company A was on line, a Company C platoon manned
the outpost; when Company C was relieved on 26 October,
a Company A platoon was sent to Warsaw. Maj Frederick
C. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Jan 70,
hereafter _McLaughlin ltr_.
In the two days immediately preceding the Chinese attack of 26
October, 1/7 received a limited amount of support intended to harass
the enemy and throw him off balance, if possible. Tanks fired their
90s at bunkers, caves, trenches, and direct fire weapons in the enemy
sector. On the 25th, Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion blasted away
54 times at these targets; on the next day, Captain Clyde W. Hunter’s
gunners more than tripled their previous day’s output, firing 173 high
explosive shells. Artillery, in the meantime, stepped up its rate
of fire on the 25th, when Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ 2/11 fired 575
rounds, followed by 506 more the next day. The division general support
battalion, 4/11, fired a total of 195 rounds on these two days.[274]
Nearly half were to assist the 7th Marines. On both days the regiment
received the benefit of 4.5-inch rocket ripples.
[274] On 24 October, Battery M of the battalion was temporarily
relaid to provide additional support to Colonel Moore’s
regiment.
Air support just prior to the attack was increased slightly, but only
two strikes were flown for the Hook battalion. At 1535 on the 25th,
two Corsair fighters and a pair of AUs, the attack version of the
Corsair, dive-bombed a section of Chinese trench that housed a number
of weapons bothersome to the Marines nearby.[275] The four VMA-323
aircraft claimed destruction of 40 yards of trench and damage to 35
yards more. The target was 1,000 yards southwest of the Hook. Next
morning the squadron sent three of its famed fighters against bunker
positions on a hill 900 yards west of the 1/7 salient. This mission had
been prebriefed to attack enemy artillery positions opposite the KMC
line. Instead, the flight was diverted to take on the bunkers, which
represented, at that time, more of a menace to the division. The attack
destroyed one bunker, damaged another, and produced an estimated seven
casualties.
[275] The flight had been scheduled to attack active artillery
positions 3½ miles north of the Carson-Reno-Vegas area.
When some of their ordnance was unexpended after putting
these guns out of action, the planes, were ordered to
take on the trench target.
Hidden nearby the area of this air strike in the early morning hours
of 26 October was the Chinese infantry unit which later that same
day would attack the Hook. Before daybreak the 3d Battalion, 357th
Regiment, had moved from an area nearly two miles west of the Hook. The
forward elements, two companies, with two day’s rations for each man,
halted about a mile from their objective. There the Chinese remained
throughout most of the 26th, carefully concealing themselves from
observation by friendly forces.[276] While the enemy troops were lying
low, their mortars and artillery began the final preparatory fires.
[276] Within the division there were no reports of sightings
of unusually large groups of enemy soldiers in this
area. In fact, there were fewer enemy seen on the 26th
than any other day since 18 October. During the 23d and
24th, about 100 enemy had been observed almost a half
mile closer to the Hook than the hideout area used on the
26th. 11thMar ComdD, Oct. 52, p. 12; 1stMarDiv PIR 729,
dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2.
_Attack on the Hook_[277]
[277] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 723, 734, dtd 27, 29 Oct 52;
7thMar, 11th Mar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs,
Oct 52; Heinl, _memo_.
On the morning of 26 October, Chinese artillery and mortar fire
striking the MLR slackened a bit but was still sufficiently heavy in
the vicinity of the Hook to prevent visitors in the area any direct
observation from the salient. During his inspection of Hook defenses
that morning, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki was knocked to the ground by
the concussion of an enemy artillery round exploding nearby.[278] In
the afternoon, enemy shelling continued at a steady pace, but towards
the end of the day intense mixed artillery and mortar fire increased
to preattack proportions. Dusk brought no relief from the enemy’s
supporting weapons.
[278] The 1/7 commander, who was uninjured by the blast,
might have become a believer that day in the military
cliche, “Rank hath its privileges,” for Brigadier A.
H. G. Ricketts (29th British Infantry Brigade, 1st
Commonwealth Division), who was standing near Lieutenant
Colonel Dulacki, was untouched. The British division was
scheduled to take over responsibility for the Hook sector
in early November.
Out at the flanking positions, Ronson and Warsaw, there was little
change in the intensity of the enemy shelling for the remainder of the
afternoon. Bunkers and trenches were caved in, just as they were on the
Hook[279] from the preparatory fires that had been building up over a
period of days. (For a sketch of the Hook battle area on 26 October,
see Map 16.) Enemy shelling had also produced a number of casualties.
Marines at Ronson were the first to experience the enemy’s ground
assault. At 1810 the outpost reported an increased rate of mortar
and artillery rounds exploding on the position. Two groups of enemy
soldiers were seen moving towards the outpost, one from the east and
the other from the west. Ronson Marines took these advancing soldiers
under fire immediately.
[279] Prior to the enemy’s steady shelling of the Hook, the
trenches were six feet deep. The preparatory fires of the
past several days had been so intense that in nearly all
areas the trenchline had been leveled by the time of the
Chinese attack. “I am convinced that the Chinese didn’t
realize that they had penetrated our MLR or they would
have exploited the penetration.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz
ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 26 Jan 70.
Initially, the radio messages from Ronson reported that the attacking
force was a company, but a later estimate of approximately 50 Chinese
appeared to be more nearly correct. Communist infantry made their way
through the defensive artillery barrages requested by the COP garrison
and into the rifle and machine gun fire of the Marines. By 1838 the
enemy had overrun the squad of Marines and was in possession of Ronson.
No one had escaped from the outpost.
[Illustration:
MAP 16 K. White
HOOK SECTOR OF MLR
1800, 26 October 1952]
At this time, 800 yards northeast, the 9th Company, 357th Battalion
was working its way towards Warsaw. Striking at the COP from both east
and west, the enemy company was momentarily halted by extremely heavy
Marine mortar and artillery fire. By 1820, the platoon at Warsaw had
requested the protective box around its position; this fire the 11th
Marines delivered promptly. Still the Chinese continued to besiege
the position and Company A defending Marines, under outpost commander
Second Lieutenant John Babson, Jr., were locked in a hand-to-hand
struggle. As a platoon was being readied to reinforce Warsaw the
outpost reported, at 1907, that enemy soldiers had reached the Marine
bunkers and that the defenders were using bayonets, pistols, hand
grenades, and both ends of their rifles to repel the Communist invaders.
Three minutes later came the word, “We’re being overrun.” With this
message all communication from the outpost temporarily ceased, but
at 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s CP heard Warsaw report heavy
fighting still in progress there. The outpost first stated that enemy
soldiers were on top of the bunkers; then called for “VT on own
position” which the 11th Marines furnished.
The seriousness of the situation was immediately apparent at higher
commands. One outpost had been lost; a second was in jeopardy. At about
this time, a veritable avalanche of enemy artillery and mortar fire
began to blanket the Hook. Colonel Moore released Captain McLaughlin’s
company to 1/7. The 7th Marines commander also ordered regimental
ammunition supplies be allotted to Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s area.
Shortly after that, division lifted ammunition restrictions on 1/7.
To counter the impending ground attack, at 1859 Lieutenant Colonel
Dulacki ordered Captain McLaughlin’s Company A forward to reinforce the
Hook sector and to assist Company C in containing the enemy attack. One
platoon, the 1st, departed immediately for the MLR. As the remainder
of the company prepared to move out, the enemy struck in estimated
battalion strength. By 1938 some of the CCF infantry had advanced to
the main trenches immediately south of the Hook. Within a few minutes,
a second wave of Communist soldiers, following closely the preparatory
barrages, hit JAMESTOWN just east of the 1/7 salient and frontally at
the Hook itself. It appeared that the Communists had come to stay, for
many cargo carriers--Chinese with construction materials for bunkers
and trenches--accompanied the attacking infantry.
Fire fights raged during the early phase of the struggle, with
continuous support furnished the assault troops by Chinese artillery
and mortars. The momentum of the enemy’s three-pronged attack, aided
by heavy rear area fire support, enabled the Chinese to overrun the
trenches and push on along the crest of the ridge, its slope near the
spine, and across the segments formed by the spurs that jutted south
from the crest. Marine defenders pulled back while a small rear guard
covered their movement with fire. Along the MLR, about 400 yards south
of the Hook, the Chinese had slipped around the flanks of the COP and
at 2030 forced a penetration in the C/1/7 line. Second Lieutenant
John W. Meikle (1st Platoon, Company C) organized the Marines into a
perimeter defense adjacent to the MLR. At 2130, remaining elements of
the company formed another defense blocking area 550 yards east of the
Hook near the crest of the ridge.
Between these two positions small groups of Marines continued the heavy
close fight to repulse the enemy while inching their way forward to
tie-in with the rest of the unit. (See Map 17 for penetration limits
during the Hook battle.) To the northeast, the platoon at Warsaw had
not been heard from since 1945, and at 2330, Colonel Moore reluctantly
declared the outpost to be in enemy hands.
At the time the loss of Warsaw was announced, counter-measures designed
to halt the enemy assault were in various stages of preparation or
completion. The initial reinforcing element sent forward to strengthen
the main line had linked up with Lieutenant Meikle’s 1st Platoon,
Company C, in the perimeter near the 3d Battalion boundary. The
remainder of Company A was en route to the crest of the east-west ridge
to thwart what appeared to be the main enemy drive. Colonel Moore had
released his meager reserve, H/3/7, at 0300 on the 27th, and General
Pollock had ordered one of the division reserve battalions, 3/1, to the
7th Marines area, although still retaining operational control of the
unit.
As the forward battalion of the division reserve, 3/1 (Lieutenant
Colonel Altman) had prepared counterattack plans for critical
locations in the division sector and had previously made a
reconnaissance of the Hook area. The battalion immediately displaced
from its bivouac site north of the Imjin (Camp Rose) to an assembly
area behind the 7th Marines on the MLR.
[Illustration:
MAP 17 K. White
HOOK PENETRATIONS
26–27 October 1952]
All possible support for 1/7 was made available, since the critical
situation resulting from the major enemy assault automatically
suspended previous restrictions on use of artillery and mortar
allowances. At Warsaw, 2/11 blanketed the position with a continuous
barrage in order to limit the enemy’s ability to effectively hold and
consolidate the captured COP. Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ cannoneers also
blasted enemy formations in response to fire missions from forward
observers. Artillery rounds fell on Chinese outposts supporting the
attack, on approach routes to the battleground, on assembly areas, and
on known and suspected Chinese artillery locations.
Marine aviation and tanks were employed as part of the plan to first
limit the penetration made by the enemy before the counterattack to
expel him. A section of tanks had been firing since 1930 against the
enemy main line; a second section joined the direct fire assault a
half hour later. At 2113, one F7F, with 1,300 pounds of bombs, hit
a portion of the enemy’s MSR. At 2306, another twin-engine Grumman
Tigercat blasted the same area, about three-quarters of a mile west of
the Hook. These initial one-plane strikes in support of the defense of
the salient were flown by Captain Leon C. Cheek, Jr. and Major Laurel
M. Mickelson, respectively, of VMF(N)-513.
_Reno Demonstration_[280]
[280] The material in this section has been derived from
7thMar, “Summary of Action, 26 Oct-1 Nov 52, Hook, Reno,
Ronson”; 2/7 ComdD, Oct 52.
At 0030 on the 27th, Major Mickelson, returning from his MPQ attack,
touched his Tigercat down at K-8 (Kunsan). At the very moment that
the plane set down on the Kunsan runway, the Chinese launched another
assault against the 7th Marines, the second in less than six hours.
This later action, in Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7 sector, nearly
two miles west of the Hook, was not a surprise move either. In fact, an
attack against the Carson-Reno-Vegas area had been anticipated for some
time, and it was this state of preparedness that throttled the enemy’s
attempt to seize an outpost here.
Division intelligence had accumulated considerable evidence that the
Chinese buildup in late October was intended to ultimately clear the
way to the 2/7 outposts rather than those of 1/7 in the eastern Hook
area. A majority of the Marine supporting arms effort immediately prior
to 1800 on the 26th had gone to the left battalion of Colonel Moore’s
regiment. Aware of the interest the enemy had shown in the outposts
earlier in the month, the battalion commander had strengthened the
defense of this key area. One measure, increasing the size of the
ambush force maintained at night near Reno from a squad to a platoon,
was to pay handsome dividends before October was over.
Just after dark on the 26th, a reinforced platoon from Captain James
R. Flores’ Company E departed the MLR on a combat patrol and ambush
mission. After reaching its assigned area, about 300 yards short of
the hill that housed COP Reno, the ambush platoon disappeared into
camouflaged dug-in positions and waited. At midnight, the Marines were
alerted by faint noises to the front. There, elements of two Chinese
companies, which had stealthily maneuvered into the ambush area, were
organizing for a sneak assault by an envelopment on Reno from the rear.
(See Map 18.) The waiting platoon apprised the outpost of the enemy’s
presence in the area; then when it appeared that the Chinese were about
to launch their assault, the ambushers opened fire.
As the surprised Chinese turned to take on the hidden ambush
platoon, the two defending squads at Reno began firing. It took 10
minutes before the Chinese were sufficiently recovered to organize
a withdrawal. At 0040, enemy elements quickly began to pull back
towards the north. The outpost had been spared a major action, but its
occupants were to be again engaged by the Chinese before daybreak.
[Illustration:
MAP 18 K. White
OUTPOST RENO ATTACKS
27 October 1952]
At 0400, one platoon from a third CCF company, approaching from an
enemy hill to the northeast, hit Reno. The attack was conducted in a
fashion not previously experienced by the 1st Marine Division in West
Korea--platoons echeloned in depth, assaulting in successive waves.
The first unit to reach Reno was composed of grenade throwers and
supporting riflemen. This advance element was followed immediately
by the rest of the platoon, infantry armed with submachine guns and
rifles. Marines on Reno were not troubled by the initial platoon
assault, but the second one made some inroads before the defenders’
fires forced the enemy to pull back. A third two-phased attack
succeeded, however, in cracking the defenses at the northeast section
of the position. The outpost commander then ordered his Marines into
the bunkers and called for overhead artillery fire. Caught in the open,
the Chinese were forced to withdraw at 0440 and did not return.
_Counterattack_[281]
[281] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
dtd 27–28 Oct 52; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn,
VMAs-121, -212, -323 ComdDs, Oct. 52.
After the Marines in Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7 sector had dealt
with the demonstration force, the action shifted back to the Hook.
Early on the morning of the 27th, Captain McLaughlin’s unit, sent
to the Hook-Hill 146 crest to block the penetration of the MLR, had
established contact with Captain Byrum’s Company C, passed through
its lines, and pressed on to the Hook. Suddenly, enemy small arms and
machine guns opened up on lead elements of Company A. Artillery and
mortar fire then began to hit the company. The Marines continued their
advance and made some progress in arresting the Chinese thrust at the
ridge. Shortly thereafter the enemy called in heavy supporting fires,
forcing Company A to halt its attack temporarily. When the company
commander ordered his men to resume the advance, overwhelming enemy
fire again slowed the movement. McLaughlin then ordered his men to hold
and dig in.
When report of the Company A situation reached the regimental CP,
Colonel Moore ordered into action his last reserve unit, Captain
Bernard B. Belant’s Company H.[282] He was directed to report to 1/7,
then to pass through the depleted ranks of Company A, and take up the
attack downridge towards the salient. At 0340 the regiment attached
H/3/7 to 1/7 for operational control; at 0505 the company arrived at
the 1st Battalion CP. Forty minutes later, Company H reached Captain
McLaughlin’s area, where it regrouped and then deployed toward the
ridgeline for the counterattack.
[282] At 0545 on the 25th, Company I (Captain John Thomas),
then the regimental reserve, and Captain Belant’s Company
H, responsible for the right sector of 3/7, had exchanged
roles.
When Captain Belant led his Marines towards the Hook to oust the
Chinese, the enemy drive had reached the point of its deepest
penetration. By this time the Chinese had seized control of slightly
more than a mile of the meandering MLR. Most of the captured main
defense line extended from the Hook east along the ridge towards Hill
146. (One-third of the Communist advance was from the Hook southwest,
in the direction of the 3d Battalion boundary.) Between 0545 and 0800,
H/3/7 worked its way towards the Hook-Hill 146 crest. After two hours
the company was at the ridgeline, and at 0800 Captain Belant was ready
to move forward towards the salient, a straight-line distance of about
a half-mile. On the hour, the push downridge started. After having
advanced about 200 yards, the H/3/7 Marines were assailed by small
arms fire and the rain of heavy caliber rounds supporting the enemy’s
thrust. Captain Belant signalled his Marines to attack.
Immediately, Second Lieutenant George H. O’Brien, Jr. leaped up from
his position and shouted for his platoon to follow. On the run, he
zigzagged across the exposed ridge and continued down the front slope
towards the main trench. Before reaching this objective, the platoon
commander was knocked to the ground by the impact of a single bullet.
Scrambling quickly to his feet he motioned for his men to follow
and took off on the run for the enemy-occupied trenchline. Again he
stopped, this time to assist an injured Marine.
As he neared the trenchline, Lieutenant O’Brien started to throw a
hand grenade into the enemy-occupied bunkers, but was stopped by
the Chinese. With his carbine, the officer methodically eliminated
this resistance, then hurled the grenades. Overcoming this position,
the Texas Marine and his platoon advanced towards the Hook, but the
enemy, now partly recovered, was able to slow and ultimately stop the
counterattack. A profusion of artillery and mortar fire was primarily
responsible for halting the advance, which had carried Company H very
close to the Hook bunkers.
Spurred on by the leadership of Lieutenant O’Brien, who later received
the Medal of Honor,[283] the company was able to execute a limited
advance. Despite the heavy artillery and mortar fire, the company drove
a wedge into the Communist position, thereby retaking the initiative
from the enemy. Company H also took three prisoners in the southeast
end of the Hook before being forced by a deadly enemy mortar and
artillery barrage to withdraw upridge.
[283] Another Medal of Honor resulting from the Hook action
was awarded posthumously to Second Lieutenant Sherrod E.
Skinner, Jr. for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity.”
Lieutenant Skinner, whose twin brother was also a Marine
officer, had been assigned as an artillery forward
observer with F/2/11. When the Chinese attack hit the
MLR, Lieutenant Skinner organized the surviving Marines
in defense of their observation post. Fighting off the
enemy and calling down defensive artillery fire on the
assaulting Chinese, he delayed capture of the position.
Twice he left the bunker to direct fire on the enemy and
get more ammunition.
When the Communists finally overran the bunker, Lieutenant
Skinner instructed his fellow Marines to pretend
they were dead; during the next three hours several
different enemy groups frisked the inert Marines without
discovering their ruse. Later, when a skeptical enemy
soldier hurled a grenade into the bunker, Lieutenant
Skinner unhesitatingly rolled on top of the missile,
shielding the two surviving Marines. By thus absorbing
the full force of the explosion, he sacrificed his life
for theirs. (2dLt Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. Biog. File)
The attack by Company H had been well supported from the air. At
0840, a flight of four ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s VMA-121
assaulted the former Marine COP Seattle, where enemy reinforcements
were being funneled through on the way to the Hook. Bombs and napalm
took a heavy toll of the troops, bunkers, and weapons pouring fire on
the counterattacking Marines. One hour later, a division (four planes)
from VMA-323 struck another trouble spot, a former Marine outpost known
as Irene (later, Rome). Aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlain’s
squadron hit this objective with three tons of bombs and more than
4,000 pounds of burning napalm. Thirty minutes later, another foursome,
these from VMA-212, (Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Dobson, Jr.),[284]
delivered bombs, napalm, and 20mm shells on enemy soldiers moving on
the MSR towards JAMESTOWN.
[284] The new squadron commander had relieved Lieutenant
Colonel Maurice Fletcher two days earlier. This flight
was the first of two CAS attacks in behalf of the Hook
forces that the new commanding officer participated in
that day.
While these three squadrons were bombing enemy strongpoints and other
targets of opportunity, division artillery and tanks continued their
destructive fire missions. Between 0930 and 1300, two tanks from
Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, blasted away at Chinese bunkers and
trenches, at an enemy 76mm gun on Seattle, and at positions southwest
of the Hook. Artillery--2/11, 4/11, and the rocket battery--contributed
the weight of its support. The 11th Marines, in an effort to stop the
heavy hostile shelling of the Hook sector, fired 60 counterbattery
missions on Chinese gun emplacements during the first 24 hours of the
attack.
In the early afternoon of the 27th, 1st MAW attack squadrons continued
their bombing and strafing of enemy troops engaged in the assault
against the Hook. Before sundown, 30 aircraft had taken part in 8
additional strikes in support of Marine counterattacks along the ridge.
The number of aircraft involved in close air support sorties for the
Hook was approximately half the number received by the division all
day. Of the 72 aircraft flying CAS strikes during the first 24 hours of
the Hook action, 67 were Marine planes, all from MAG-12.
As in the morning’s close air support flights, Lieutenant Colonel
Cargill’s ADs provided the bulk of air support for ground action
that afternoon. Striking first a command post southeast of the 1/7
salient, at 1410, VMA-121 came back a half-hour later with four more
Skyraiders against CCF troops pressing to envelop the right flank of
the counterattack force. At 1635, two squadron aircraft flew in quickly
in response to a sighting of troops moving forward in the Samichon
tributary 1,000 yards north of the Hook. Twenty minutes after this
successful attack, four more Skyraiders attacked bunkers opposite the
left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector. The final daylight
strike for 1/7 was again made by four ADs from -121. These planes took
under attack a target that had been bombarded just 25 minutes earlier
by Corsairs from VMA-323.
Another Marine attack squadron, VMA-212, participated in the Hook
support that afternoon. At 1344, a four-plane flight assaulted troops
moving through Frisco to reinforce the Chinese drive on the Hook. Two
of the planes dropped three 1,000-pound bombs and two 250-pounders
on the enemy soldiers. The other pair of attack Corsairs released
six 780-pound napalm tanks over the position. It was estimated that
25 Chinese casualties resulted from this air attack. Wrapping up the
VMA-212 CAS for the Hook sector on the 27th was a strike, at 1440, on
camouflaged positions and another at 1520 against caves and bunkers.
Each of these air assaults took place about 950 yards from the Hook.
The earlier one was a napalm attack from 50 feet above the ground. One
of the six tanks would not release and three did not ignite. Four caves
were destroyed and one bunker was damaged in the latter strikes.
Between the morning and afternoon air strikes, the ground commanders
put together the final plans for recapture and defense of the Hook.
When General Pollock had released I/3/1 to the regiment during an
inspection trip to the 1/7 area that morning, the company was already
en route to the ridge to make the counterattack. The ground commanders
agreed that after I/3/1 regained the salient, H/3/1 would take over the
right sector of 1/7 and the relieved company, B/1/7, would then occupy
both the critical MLR sector and Warsaw. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s
scheme to recapture the positions and ground lost on 26 October was a
continuation of the attack from atop the ridge directly towards the
objective. It was to be a hard-nosed, frontal assault, but the only
maneuver deemed advisable.
Clearing the Company C command post about noon, the lead elements of
Captain Murray V. Harlan, Jr.’s Company I, the 1st Platoon, continued
its route to the ridge. After the 40 Marines had gained the crest,
they quickly reoriented themselves to the new direction, and at 1350,
led the I/3/1 assault. Artillery preparation by the 11th Marines had
preceded the crossing of the line of departure, and these supporting
fires were partially responsible for the substantial initial advance
made by the counterattacking Marines. But Chinese artillery was not
idle at this time either, and the volume of enemy fire matched that of
the Marines. The I/3/1 movement forward was also slowed by Communist
soldiers, estimated at about a company, who fired from protected
positions along the perimeter of the Hook.
Inch by inch the company crawled forward. The vicious Chinese
supporting barrages were exacting many casualties among Captain
Harlan’s troops,[285] yet they crept on, and ultimately reached the
artillery forward observer bunker atop the ridge but 150 yards short of
the Hook trenches. At this time, 1635, the enemy supporting fires were
directed not only on the advancing Marines and the MLR defenses but
extended as far back as the regimental CP.[286] Chinese soldiers still
clung to some of the Hook positions and trenches of the MLR just below
the crest on the northern sides. Marines closest to the Hook could see
the virtual ruination caused by enemy artillery and mortar shells to
the trench system within the salient.
[285] During this action, the company suffered 15 killed, 71
seriously wounded, and 6 slightly wounded. 3/1 ComdD,
Oct. 52, p. 3.
[286] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Oct 52.
Nearing their objective, elements of Company I pressed on with even
more determination. By 1700 a few had made it to the shell-torn
ditches, where they sought momentary refuge to reorganize. Several more
joined, and together they reconnoitered the trenches and bunkers for
enemy soldiers. Just then the Communists reacted with an even heavier
supporting arms assault, which forced these few Marines to pull back
with their platoon to the reverse slope of the ridge. To the right,
about 250 yards away, the main body of Company I Marines occupied the
reverse side of the hill, riding out the onslaught of artillery and
mortar rounds while they waited for a lull before making the final dash
to recapture the lost area of JAMESTOWN.
While Captain Harlan’s company was exposed to this extremely heavy
enemy artillery fire, another unit, B/1/7, was on the move from
Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s command post to the ridge to strike what
was intended as a lethal blow to the Communist invaders. At 1932,
Company B began its march forward. By midnight, the 1st Platoon was
nearing its assault position close to the left flank of Company I of
3/1. Simultaneously, the 3d Platoon closed in on its jump-off point.
The going was extremely difficult, complicated by a moonless night and
the many shell craters that pockmarked the terrain. But at 0019, 28
October, the platoons mounted their assault, firing their rifles and
machine guns, and hurling grenades to silence enemy automatic weapons
and to reach dug-in Communist soldiers occupying the trenchline.
The Marine charge was met by a burst of small arms fire and a shower
of grenades. Weapons supporting the Chinese defense were still very
active. After a standoff of 90 minutes the Marines pulled back, calling
on their mortars and artillery to lay precise fire concentrations on
the trouble spots. The weapons also fired on enemy approach routes
through Ronson and Warsaw. After this preparation, Company B again
made an assault against the enemy, at 0340. This advance was contested
vigorously by the Chinese, but their resistance this time was not
lasting. Quickly B/1/7 Marines deployed throughout the entire area, and
by 0600 the Hook was again in Marine hands.
Before the victors could permit themselves the luxury of a breathing
spell, there were a number of critical tasks that demanded immediate
attention. Defense of the MLR had to be quickly and securely shored
up for a possible enemy counterattack. The newly rewon area had to be
searched for Marines, both casualties and holdouts, and for Chinese
diehards or wounded. The company had to be reorganized. In addition to
these missions, there were two others, regaining Ronson and Warsaw. As
it turned out, the duties were discharged nearly at the same time. COPs
Ronson and Warsaw were reoccupied by the 7th Marines at 0630 and 0845,
respectively, on 28 October.
In organizing the recaptured position, the Marines were hampered to
some extent by a dense ground fog. Nevertheless, work still went ahead
on these necessary tasks. Most of the Hook area was held by Company B;
the western part of the 1/7 line, south of the Hook, was still manned
by the platoon from Company A and one from Company C. The 1st Platoon
of Company B quickly searched the retaken area of the MLR (except the
caved in parts of the trenchline and bunkers, which were investigated
later), but found no enemy soldiers. During the day, as Company B
expanded its responsibility along the Marine main line, the platoons
from A/1/7 and C/1/7 were relieved to rejoin their companies.[287]
Supplies began to move in, once the permanency of the defense had been
established.
[287] As a part of the reorganization, H/3/1 remained in the
right sector, and Company C, of the Hook battalion,
filled in the middle. Company A was in position on the
friendly side of that part of the ridge held by Captain
Byrum’s Company C. During the afternoon of the 28th,
I/3/1 and H/3/7 also left Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s
area to rejoin their parent organizations.
_Overview_[288]
[288] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs
734–735, 741, dtd 29–30 Oct 52, 5 Nov. 52.
In evaluating the battle for the Hook, it would appear that the Chinese
assault against Reno was merely a demonstration or feint. By making a
sizable effort near the primary objective after the attack there was
well under way, the Communists expected not to obscure the real target
but rather to cause the Marines to hesitate in moving higher echelon
reserves to influence the action at the Hook. It was to the credit of
the ambush force that the Chinese ruse was unsuccessful.
Including losses from the Reno ambush, Marines estimated that the
Chinese actions against that outpost cost the enemy 38 killed and 51
wounded. The COP defenders and the platoon that had surprised the enemy
counted 22 dead Communist soldiers during and after the Reno action.
Together with the Hook casualties, confirmed at 274 killed and 73
wounded and estimated at 494 killed and 370 wounded,[289] the figure
represented more than a third of an enemy battalion permanently lost in
addition to about a battalion and a half put out of action temporarily.
Distributed among the number of battalions that participated in the two
actions, the total number of casualties lost some impact. What remains
significant, however, are the cost and results--369 counted and 953
estimated casualties for not one inch of ground.
[289] The CCF casualty figures were derived from a comparison
of reports of participating Marine battalions, the 7th
Marines, and division. In addition to these losses caused
by Marine infantry units were enemy casualties listed
by the artillery and tank battalion command diaries and
records of participating air squadrons; these supporting
arms figures amount to 468 casualties, more than
one-third the total number.
Marine losses in the Hook battle were 70 killed, 386 wounded (286
evacuated), and 39 missing, of whom 27 were later definitely known
to have been captured. This was the second highest number of Marines
taken prisoner in any single action during the Korean fighting.[290]
Such a large number was attributed to the tactics of the Chinese
infantry, which followed the preparatory barrages so closely--at times
even advancing into the rolling barrages--that the enemy was able to
surprise and capture a considerable number of Marine outpost defenders.
Nearly all of the 27 were captured in the enemy’s first rushes against
the two outposts and MLR. In the diversion on Reno, an additional 9
Marines were killed and 49 wounded (29 evacuated).
[290] During the Task Force Drysdale operation, in November
1950, more than 40 Marines had been seized by the enemy.
Maj James Angus MacDonald, Jr., “The Problems of U.S.
Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea” (M.A. thesis,
Univ. of Maryland, 1961), App. G, pp. 261–262, hereafter
MacDonald, _POW_.
Perhaps as significant as any result of the Hook fighting is the amount
of supporting fires the Chinese provided their infantry. Calculations
of total incoming ran from 15,500 to 34,000 rounds during the 36-hour
engagement. The 1st Marine Division reported conservatively that the
enemy expended between 15,500–16,000 artillery and mortar rounds;
estimates by supporting arms units put the total at the higher level.
In any event, the 12,500 rounds the 7th Marines received during the
first 24 hours represented the heaviest bombardment any Marine regiment
had been subjected to up to that time. Moreover, it had now become
clearly evident that the enemy could stockpile a plentiful supply of
ammunition, despite attempts of UN aircraft to interfere with the
enemy’s flow of supplies to the frontline.[291]
[291] Comments by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, USAF Historian, in
ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 2 Feb 70: “The Air Force
position about the accumulation of munitions at frontline
units was that by exercising supply discipline and
refraining from combat, the enemy could hoard and build
supply over a period of time.”
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160346]
_Marine Division Redeploys to West Korea--5th Marines units en
route to new sector in April 1952 are slowed by muddy roads and
spring thaws. Below, Korean washwomen labor at daily tasks while
1st Tank Battalion convoy moves up to new fighting area._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160984]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164524]
_Surveillance of the Enemy--Men of the Reconnaissance Company,
1st MarDiv, scan CCF positions across the Imjin River. Below,
Marines empty 75mm shell cases from armored amphibian after a
shoot-out on Independence Day, 1952._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162962]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173690]
_Scene of See-Saw Fighting--View of enemy-held outpost Yoke as
seen from Marine trenches. Below, clothing and equipment packed
in a “survival bomb” dropped to Marine pilots awaiting rescue.
Pilots of VMJ-1 are briefed on the day’s mission over North
Korea._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 134927 DOD Photo A 134103]
[Illustration: Official USN Photo]
_Island Marines--Korean Marine platoon undergoes instruction at
Yo-do, ECIDE. Damaged AD-4 had crash landed at Briscoe Field
nearby and was awaiting salvage. Below, Marine tank-infantry unit
in stand-by position during truce sessions at Panmunjom._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162782]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162952]
_Amphibious Exercise--Caterpillars of 1st Shore Party Battalion
pull floating dock ashore during 1st Marines training at
Tokchok-to. Below, HMR-161 choppers airlift 1st 4.5-inch Rocket
Battery to new firing positions during August 1952 maneuver._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 163906]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 16448]
_Main Logistic Link to the Front--View of the Freedom Gate Bridge
from eastern shore of Imjin. This bridge was the only one left
standing after August 1952 floods. Below, the FDC bunker of 1st
Battalion, 11th Marines CP. From this nerve center, fire missions
are relayed to the batteries by radio._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 163812]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162984 DOD Photo A 165569]
_On Guard at Critical Site--Korean Marines clean their 3.5-inch
bazooka at blocking position near Hill 155. Gen Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr., CMC, observes fire placed on CCF position during
frontline visit to 1st MarDiv. Below, AU Corsair of Deathrattler
Squadron ready for action._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349270]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164153 DOD Photo A 164151]
_Battle Humor--Marine replacements moving up to front at Bunker
Hill get friendly warning of occupational hazards. The versatile
“Weasel” hauls ammo and supplies to the MLR. Below, Marine OP
reports on Chinese dispositions during August 1952 battle._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165141]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166041]
_Operation Haylift--Cargo lift from 1st Air Delivery Platoon area
to MLR sector occupied by 7th Marines. Cargo net slung under
copter body greatly increased airlift capability. Below, BGen
Robert O. Bare, ADC, inspects pre-fabricated bunker at Marine
outpost._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 167201]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 133865]
_Debriefing--Marine pilots of MAG-33 report to BGen Clayton
C. Jerome, 1st MAW CG, upon return from June 1952 air strike,
biggest to date. Below, aerial shot of 1stMarDiv CP at Yong-ri,
as viewed from mess hall, looking north._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164363]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162261]
_River Patrol--Amtracs of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
Kimpo Provisional Regiment, on the Imjin River. Below, F7F
Tigercat of 1st MAW, carrying napalm bomb, approaches target._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 133537]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166423 DOD Photo A 167466]
_Support for Battle of the Hook--Marines heading for embattled
Hook carry machine gun ammunition. Note bandoliers. Captured
CCF equipment taken in October 1952 battle included prima cord,
cartridges, Soviet hand grenades. Below, VMO-6 helicopter
returning from front lines lands at Field #19._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 346322]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168980]
KANSAS _Line--This recently completed secondary line is occupied
by 1/7 while in reserve in late 1952. Below, tactical problems
are reviewed (from left) by MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, CG, 1st
MarDiv; LtGen Paul A. Kendall, I Corps Commander; and Col Russell
E. Honsowetz, AC/S, G-3, 1st MarDiv._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165743]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171273]
_Combat Surveillance--Marine counter mortar radar crew receives
instruction on adjustment of electronic equipment. Below,
regimental inspection of KMC troops by Col Kim Suk Bom, CO, 1st
Regiment._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165936]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168468]
_Combat Interlude--Cardinal Spellman celebrates Christmas Mass
before 2,500 bareheaded Marines in December 1952. Below, the
Black Watch Pipe and Drum Corps honors Marines during their 177th
Anniversary celebration, November 1952._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166804]
[Illustration: USN Photo 447570]
_Truce Talks Resumed--Marine helicopter approaches truce site
at Panmunjom as negotiations reopen in October 1952. Below,
Master Sergeant Theodore H. Hughes, 1st MAW, presents 900,000 won
(equivalent to $150,000) to Bishop Mousset, of Little Flower’s
Orphanage in Pohang. Money was donated by MAG 33 Staff NCO Club._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 132432]
With regard to combat tactics, the attacks during 26–27 October
confirmed earlier reports that extremely heavy use of preparatory
barrages by the enemy signalled an imminent infantry attack on the
area. Defensive concentrations of apparently unlimited quantity
typified Communist artillery support for their attacking forces.
Meticulous policing of the battlefield, an established Chinese
practice, was also apparent during the Hook battle. In order to prevent
identification of his combat units, the enemy also took pains to ensure
that assault troops remove all papers and unit insignia before going
forward of their own lines.
Two other previously reported tactics were corroborated during the late
October battle for the Hook. One was the presence of cargo carriers
with the attacking force. These soldiers, estimated by the division
to comprise as high as 75 percent of the total number of Chinese
troops committed, carried shovels, lumber, extra rations, medical aid
equipment, and stocks of ammunition. One Marine evacuated from a bunker
reported on a method of bunker searching by the Chinese. “English
speaking Chinese were yelling into bunkers for Marines to ‘Come out
and surrender.’ When there was no evidence of surrender, the Chinese
would use bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges to destroy and seal
bunkers.”[292]
[292] 1stMarDiv PIR 738, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 3. The Chinese also
used hand grenades in searching the bunkers. All of these
explosives had been widely employed during World War II.
In one respect the enemy deviated from his usual tactics. During the
battle for the Hook Marines who took prisoners made the discovery that
the Chinese employed close-up relief forces. Prior to an offensive
action, the enemy positioned a reserve just to the rear of the assault
unit. After the attack had started, and at the appropriate time, the
commander would signal the fresh force forward to take over the mission
of the old unit. In this manner, the enemy hoped to sustain his drive
or to retain a newly-won position.
Though the foresight appeared appropriate, the result was not always
what had been anticipated. In the earlier part of the month, during a
fight in another I Corps sector, the Communists had rushed a reserve
force forward to consolidate the defense of an outpost immediately
after its capture. In the Hook fighting, a fresh unit, which had been
placed immediately to the rear of the assault troops, was ordered
forward to keep the attack alive. Both attempts failed. Marines
attributed this lack of success to the Communists’ apparent inability
to organize or reorganize quickly, a difficulty which was believed to
have resulted from the scarcity of officers in forward areas.[293]
[293] 1stMarDiv PIR 741, dtd 5 Nov 52, Encl. 2, p. 2.
Discussing the defense of the Hook area, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki
commented shortly after the battle ended:
The Chinese seemed to gain their greatest tactical advantage
during action on “The Hook” by assaulting friendly positions
directly under their own artillery and mortar barrages. The
effects on defending Marines were two-fold: heavy incoming either
physically trapped them in their bunkers, or the Chinese, having
overrun our positions through their own barrages, took the
defenders by surprise as they left their bunkers to man their
fighting holes. It is therefore considered imperative that in
future instances of heavy enemy supporting fires, all Marines
physically occupy an individual shelter from which their fighting
positions are readily accessible.
Marines gained a false sense of security by taking cover, in
groups, inside bunkers. In some cases, groups of three or four
Marines were killed when a bunker caved in on top of them. Had
they been spread out along the trenchline, but under individual
cover, it is believed that far fewer casualties would have
resulted, and also the position would have been better prepared
for defense. The false sense of security gained by being with
comrades inside a bunker must be overcome.[294]
[294] 1/7 ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI.
Another factor bothered the 1/7 commander. He directed unit leaders to
exercise closer control over the care and cleaning of weapons under
their custody. During the Hook fighting, the malfunctioning of weapons
due to improper cleaning and loss of some rifles “in the excitement to
gain cover” caused the Marines to take casualties that might otherwise
have been prevented.
These same deficiencies were also observed by General Pollock, and
he ordered their immediate correction. Lieutenant General Hart, CG
FMFPac, whose inspection of the division coincided with the Hook battle
and who saw the trenches after they had been leveled, noted that
shallow trenches and bunkers built above the ground did not offer
sufficient protection from intensive enemy shelling. He directed that
more emphasis be placed on the digging of field fortifications and
bunkers.[295]
[295] CG, FMFPac ComdD, Nov 52, App IV, Encl (8), Anx G, p. 4.
During the Hook fighting, General Hart also witnessed
the helicopter deployment of the 4.5-inch rockets. He
was impressed with the progress that had been made in
this helicopter-ground team performance, particularly the
speed and efficiency with which these weapons could be
set up to fire and then displaced to a new position.
In considering not only how the fight was conducted but why, one has
only to go back to the first part of October and recall the situation
that existed along the 1st Marine Division line. During the hotly
contested outpost battles early in the month, the Chinese had attempted
to outflank the division by seizing key terrain in the left and right
sectors. Where the enemy had been unsuccessful, he returned later in
the month for another major assault. On the night of the 26th the
endeavor was in the division right. A new blow against the left was not
far off.