Positional Warfare
_A Successful Korean Defense--Six Months on the UNC Line--Events on the
Diplomatic Front--The Marine Commands During the Third Winter--1st MAW
Operations 1952–1953 Behind the Lines--The Quiet Sectors--Changes in
the Concept of Ground Defense--Before the Nevadas Battle_
_A Successful Korean Defense_[296]
[296] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Oct-Nov 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs
737–738, dtd 31 Oct-1 Nov 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 238–244,
dtd 24–30 Oct 52.
In both the early and late October outpost battles the Chinese had
attempted to seize critical terrain on the flanks of the 1st Marine
Division. Although the majority of these attacks failed, the enemy had
acquired six outposts early in the month--three in the western Korean
Marine Corps sector and three north of the right regimental line. On
the last day of October, two hours before midnight, the CCF again
struck the Marine left flank. This time their efforts were directed
against four outposts that screened Hill 155, the most prominent
terrain feature in the entire KMC regimental zone. The fighting that
developed was brief but very sharp and would be the most costly of all
KMC clashes during this third winter of the war.
The latest enemy attack came as no real surprise to Korean Marines
of the 5th Battalion, occupying COPs 39, 33, and 31 in the northern
regimental sector, or 2d Battalion personnel at COP 51 in the southern
(western) half of the MLR. (Map 19.) The four outposts assisted in
defense of the MLR (particularly Hill 155 just inside the MLR),
afforded observation of CCF approach routes, and served as a base
for friendly raids and offensive operations. Hill 155 overlooked both
the wide Sachon Valley and Chinese frontline positions to the west.
This critical Korean hill also commanded a view of the Panmunjom peace
corridor, Freedom Gate Bridge, and the Marine division area east
of Line JAMESTOWN in the KMC sector. Hill 155 had further tactical
importance in that it protected the left flank of Paekhak Hill, the key
ground in the entire 34-mile expanse of JAMESTOWN within 1st Marine
Division territory.
Actually, the probability of a determined enemy attack against the four
outposts had been anticipated since early October following CCF seizure
of three positions (former COPs 37, 36, and 86) in their strike against
the KMC regimental OPLR. The enemy had then proceeded to organize an
OPLR of his own with the two northern outposts, COPs 37 and 36, and
informally occupied another position to the south and one toward the
north in the vicinity of COP 39. “With this OPLR once firmly organized,
the enemy will have an excellent jump-off point towards our OPs 39 and
33, his next probable objectives,” KMC officers reasoned.[297]
[297] KMC Regt UnitRpt 216, dtd 4 Oct 52, p. 2.
Sporadic probes throughout the month in the COP 39 and 33 areas
indicated continued enemy interest in the positions. COP 51, to the
south, was considered another likely target because of its location
immediately east of COP 86, previously annexed by the CCF.
Prior to attacking the four outposts on 31 October, the Chinese had
signaled their intentions by sharply stepping up artillery and tank
fire against the sector. During the 24-hour period ending 1800 on 30
October, a total of 1,881 rounds crashed on KMC positions, most of
these against the two northern outposts, COPs 39 and 33. Nearly 1,500
rounds fell the next day. More than 50 sightings of enemy troops and
weapons in the forward area were also reported. By contrast, during the
previous week less than 15 observations of enemy activity had been made
daily and, on the average, only about 200–340 rounds of fire had fallen
in the entire sector. Despite this comparatively moderate rate of
hostile fire, at least one Korean Marine was killed and three wounded
in late October from well-placed Chinese mortar or artillery rounds
striking the outposts.
[Illustration:
MAP 19 K. White
CCF ATTACK AGAINST KMC SECTOR
(Division Left)
31 October 1952]
After the two days of heavy shelling, the regiment warned in its daily
report issued only two hours before the full-scale attack began:
The enemy has made a consistent two-day effort to destroy
friendly outpost positions. Last night, at 1830, two enemy
companies were observed in an apparent attempt to attack OPs 39
and 33. Artillery fire broke up the attempt, but continued enemy
artillery today indicates further attack is probable tonight.
If enemy artillery preparation is indicative, a simultaneous
attack against outposts 39, 51, 33, and 31 can be considered
probable....[298]
[298] KMC Regt UnitRpt 243, dtd 31 Oct 52, pp. 5–6.
These earlier observations and predictions as to the enemy’s action
were shortly confirmed when the CCF launched its new ground attack.
Beginning at 2200,[299] the enemy delivered an intensive eight-minute
76mm and 122mm artillery preparation against the four outposts. Chinese
assault forces from four different infantry regiments then launched a
simultaneous attack on the positions. Moving in from the north, west,
and south, two CCF companies (3d Company, 1st Battalion, 581st Regiment
and 2d Company, 1st Battalion, 582d Regiment) virtually enveloped the
northern outpost, COP 39. Two more CCF companies (unidentified) lunged
against the two central outposts, COPs 33 and 31, a company at each
position.[300] The southern and most-heavily defended post, COP 51,
where a company of Korean Marines was on duty, was assailed by four
Chinese companies (4th Company, 2d Battalion, 584th Regiment; 4th and
6th Companies, 2d Battalion, 585th Regiment; and 1st Company, 1st
Battalion, 585th Regiment). Even though the enemy exerted his strongest
pressure against COP 51, the position held and the Chinese broke off
the attack there earlier than at the other outposts.
[299] The attack on the 31st took place after the KMC 5th
Battalion had taken over the right regimental sector,
at 1700, from the 3d Battalion. The Chinese often
deliberately timed their outpost attacks to coincide with
a relief of lines. Company personnel of both the 5th and
3d Battalions were on line during the fighting. KMC Regt
UnitRpts dtd 1 Nov 52, p. 4; 245, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 4.
[300] KMC Regt UnitRpt 244, dtd 1 Nov 52, pp. 1, 4. A different
account as to size of attacking units is given in Maj
Kang Shin Ho, ROKMC ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 30 Apr
70, which states two reinforced enemy companies assaulted
COP 33 and an estimated enemy battalion struck COP 31.
At COP 31 a heavy fire fight raged until 0155, when the defending
KMC platoon halted the Chinese and forced them to make a partial
withdrawal. To the northwest, at COP 33, the enemy encountered less
resistance from the two squads manning the outpost. The Chinese
achieved some success in penetrating the defenses and occupied several
positions. After heavy close fighting and friendly artillery support,
the Koreans expelled the invaders at 0515.
The enemy’s efforts appeared to have been most successful, temporarily,
at COP 39, the northern post and one nearest to Hill 155. Although
the Chinese wrested some ground from the KMC platoon, artillery fires
continued to punish the enemy and by 0410 had forced him to pull back.
A small hostile force returned at 0600 but after a 15-minute exchange
of small arms it left, this time for good. At about this same time the
last of the Chinese had also withdrawn from the two central outposts,
33 and 31.
In terms of sheer numbers, the enemy’s strongest effort was made
against COP 51. This was the most isolated of the Korean positions and,
at 2,625 yards, the one farthest from the MLR. Ironically, in the week
preceding the attack COP 51 was least harassed by hostile artillery
although it had received 20 rounds of 90mm. tank fire, more than any
other position. On the 31st, elements of three companies struck the
southwestern trenches and defenses, while a fourth attempted to break
through from the north. As it turned out the action here was the least
intense of the outpost clashes. After initial heavy fighting the
Chinese seemed reluctant to press the assault even though they vastly
outnumbered the Korean company deployed at the outpost. In the early
morning hours the enemy broke contact and by 0330 had withdrawn from
COP 51.
During the night approximately 2,500 rounds of CCF artillery and
mortar fire lashed the positions. Korean Marines, aided by friendly
artillery, repelled the assault and inflicted heavy casualties on the
enemy. Supporting fires included more than 1,200 rounds of HE shells
from the KMC 4.2-inch Mortar Company. Chinese casualties were listed
as 295 known killed, 461 estimated wounded, and 9 POWs. Korean Marine
losses were 50 killed, 86 wounded, and 18 missing.[301] By first light
the Korean outposts had thrown back the enemy’s latest well-coordinated
attack. This ended the last significant action of October in the 1st
Marine Division sector.
[301] _Ibid._
_Six Months on the UNC Line_[302]
[302] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: Barclay, _Commonwealth_; Cagle and
Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_;
Field, _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Walter
G. Hermes, _Truce Tent and Fighting Front--United States
Army in the Korean War_ (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1966),
hereafter Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Miller, Carroll, and
Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_.
The KMC Regiment’s battle in late October marked the end of two months
of heavy fighting in the division sector. October had witnessed the
most intense combat in more than a year. As the third Korean winter
approached outpost clashes and small unit actions along the rest of the
UNC frontline began to slacken. During November and December, neither
side appeared eager to pursue the offensive. Chinese aggressiveness
declined noticeably.
Despite other action initiated by the enemy, the I Corps sector
remained the chief Communist target. On 19 November, the British 1st
Commonwealth Division successfully withstood what was initially a
company-size attempt to capture the Hook. In sharp fighting between
1900 and 0430, Black Watch and reinforcing Canadian units repulsed
a determined battalion-strength CCF assault, killing more than
100 Chinese.[303] Marine and I Corps artillery units fired almost
continuously throughout the night in support of the Hook defenders.
Fighting flared again, briefly, in December in the I Corps sector when
Chinese soldiers attempted to overrun outposts on the Imjin River line,
but were thrown back by the ROK 1st Division. The enemy then tried
to seize key terrain forward of the U.S. 2nd Division, but was again
halted.
[303] For details of this action see Canadian Department of
National Defence ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70
in v. V, Korean comment file.
Elsewhere before the end of the year, the CCF captured one outpost in
the IX Corps area, to the right of I Corps, but suffered a telling
defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian battalion during an attempt to
crack this sector of the U.S. 7th Division line. After a brief fire
fight the Chinese were forced to withdraw, leaving 131 CCF dead in the
Ethiopian positions. North Korean efforts to seize critical ground in
the X and ROK I Corps sectors, at the far eastern end of the EUSAK
line, was similarly broken up by the U.S. 40th and ROK 5th Divisions.
By the end of 1952 General Van Fleet had not only revitalized his
defenses with recent rotation of frontline units but had also
strengthened his line by inserting another division in the critical
and long-troublesome Chorwon-Kumhwa sector of IX Corps, on the I Corps
right flank. With these changes by late December there were 16 EUSAK
divisions on line--11 Korean, 3 U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 1 British
Commonwealth--plus 4 divisions in reserve (1 Korean and 3 U.S. Army).
Nearly 75 percent of the UNC line had been entrusted to Republic of
Korea units. Their performance was a tribute to growing ROK military
proficiency and justified the EUSAK decision to assign to ROK troops a
greater role in the Allied ground defense.
The slow pace of infantry action during the last two months of 1952
continued into the new year. Raids by small UNC units highlighted the
limited combat during January and February. During the following month
the battlefront tempo accelerated, due in part to expanded patrol
activities. A number of sharp clashes in No-Man’s-Land resulted in
several Communist setbacks but led the enemy to make an increased use
of ambushes. These traps initially caught the UNC troops by surprise,
inflicting heavy casualties on them. But by far the most severe
fighting of the new year resulted when the Chinese renewed their fierce
outpost and main line of resistance attacks in March.
Again, the western I Corps sector was the major combat area as enemy
pressure mounted along the front. This was believed due, in part, to
the “growing Chinese sensitivity to the I Corps raids”[304] as well as
an attempt by the CCF to regain the initiative as they began to send
out larger forces to probe and assault UNC positions. On 17 March,
the Chinese launched a battalion-size attack against Hill 355 (Little
Gibraltar). This MLR position was defended by elements of the U.S. 2d
Infantry Division, on line immediately east of the Marine division, in
the sector customarily occupied by the 1st Commonwealth Division. (The
Army unit had relieved the British division on 30 January.) A second
large-scale assault on the hill that month was also turned back.
[304] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 392.
On 23 March, a Chinese Communist regiment attempted to capture three
outposts manned by the U.S. 7th Division, at the far right of the
I Corps line. Hills 225 (Pork Chop Hill) and 191 held. The enemy’s
main effort was against Hill 266 (Old Baldy), defended by units of
the division’s Colombian battalion. One attack carried the position,
despite company strength reinforcements of the original defenders. Two
strong UN counterattacks the next day to retake the outpost failed,
and the Chinese retained the crest of Old Baldy. Although the CCF had
gained their objective in Hill 266, the battles on the three hillocks
had cost the enemy 750 casualties, according to 7th Division records.
In one respect, the nature and extent of ground operations affected the
type of air activity over North and South Korea during the winter of
1952–1953. Introduction of PRESSURE strategy, which had embodied the
policy of the Far East Air Forces since mid-1952, brought more aircraft
in close support of Eighth Army ground troops, a change that pleased
the corps commanders. When the heavy outpost fighting throughout
October diminished to only occasional skirmishes in November, there
was temporarily a decreased need for large numbers of CAS sorties.
As a result more planes became available for PRESSURE attacks. These
strikes at first appeared to be reverting to the previous STRANGLE
strategy since railroads were often the targets. But interdiction
of the transportation system was only part of the PRESSURE aerial
concept which also called for striking enemy production, repair, and
storage facilities. The Allied strategy in conducting its air offensive
remained the same: to make the bombing hurt the Communists so that they
would end their deliberate delaying tactics in the truce sessions and
join the UNC in effecting a Korean settlement.
During the winter FEAF maintained a steady air pressure against the
Communists. Major raids were made from time to time, but the number of
strategic targets was gradually disappearing due to repeated UNC air
attacks. Further, much of the enemy logistical net had gone so deeply
underground during the prolonged stalemate that UN bombing and rocket
attacks were having only a limited destructive effect. The U.S. B-29s,
which had carried the fight to the enemy since the first week of the
Korean conflict, found their last worthwhile objectives in stockpiles
hidden in North Korean towns and villages. For the Fifth Air Force
fighters there was little opportunity to increase their skill in
air-to-air combat, since the Communist fliers continued to take evasive
action and avoid “dogfights.”
Naval aviation contributed importantly to UNC air operations from
September 1952 to March 1953. On the first day of this period, three
carriers staged the largest all-Navy Korean air strike to date, which
simultaneously attacked an oil refinery at Aoji and other targets
in the northeastern corner of Korea. Less than two weeks later, two
carriers launched another assault in the same part of the country.
The significance of these September strikes stemmed from the almost
complete lack of enemy response. Apparently the Communists in this
area had felt secure and protected, their territory being next to the
Chinese border. In fact, their location close to the sanctuary had
ruled out bombings proposed earlier. Strikes in this part of Korea
were particularly suited to carrier planes of the Seventh Fleet, whose
mobile airfields brought the targets within easy striking range along
approaches that would not violate the Manchurian haven.
Perhaps the greatest naval contribution to the air war were the
Cherokee strikes, so named after the commander of the Seventh Fleet,
Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, because of his Indian ancestry. This
new type of deep air support attack, which came into use in October
1952, employed the maxim of mass delivery of ordnance. Usually,
targets were immediately behind the enemy MLR but beyond the range of
friendly artillery. In May 1952, when the rail interdiction program
was being phased out and Admiral Clark’s pilots were faced with a
decreasing number of prime industrial targets, the fleet commander had
theorized that he could most effectually damage the enemy by bombing
supply dumps, artillery positions, and reserve forces immediately to
the rear of the Chinese MLR. As the admiral reasoned, the enemy could
not fight the kind of war he was waging “and still have _all_ his
forces, supplies, and equipment underground. _Some_ of his stocks of
supplies had to be above ground, out of sight and out of range of our
artillery.”[305]
[305] Quoted in Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_, p. 461.
Eighth Army welcomed the increased support that would result from
the strikes, but FEAF expressed concern about the lack of top-level
coordination. Admiral Clark had proposed that a EUSAK corps commander
be allowed to authorize the attacks, which employed 24 to 36 aircraft.
The Fifth Air Force initially maintained that it should control
Cherokee strikes, just as it did the CAS missions. The matter was
finally resolved in November.
Following a high-level conference it was decided that attacks inside
the bombline would be subjected to FAF coordination and that a minimal
amount of tactical control would be exercised by the corps commander.
Eighth Army gave a big assist to the Navy by moving the bombline to
within 3,000 meters (nearly two miles) of the outpost line. A line was
also drawn approximately 25 miles beyond the bombline, separating the
area of “general support” from “interdiction.” Thereafter, the Cherokee
strikes were effectively conducted against enemy installations outside
the 3,000-meter line but within 20,000 meters of the ground front.
General Clark, CinCUNC, had high praise for the strikes, which the
Seventh Fleet employed until the end of the war.
Surface ships of the fleet were in much the same static warfare
situation as the ground and air components of the United Nations
Command. Aside from the Kojo demonstration in mid-October, the
fleet had little diversification in its daily routine other than
to maintain the siege around Wonsan. This operation had started in
mid-February 1951 and had grown from the original plan to seize certain
strategically-placed islands on both coasts into an attempt to isolate
the entire port and city of Wonsan. Each day Allied minesweepers
cleared the harbor; at night the enemy sampan fleet resowed the fields.
Daily, usually during mine-clearing operations, ships of Task Force
95 fired on batteries in the mountains beyond the city and at other
military targets in and around Wonsan. From time to time heavy units
of the Seventh Fleet bombarded the area to keep the enemy off-balance
and to partially deter the solid buildup of Communist arms and defenses
just north of the 39th Parallel.
_Events on the Diplomatic Front_[306]
[306] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Dec 52; Berger, _Korea
Knot_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_;
Robert Leckie, _Conflict--The History of the Korean
War, 1950–1953_ (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962),
hereafter Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.
For many of the UNC military personnel, the stalemated combat situation
in Korea had become a depressing, no-win daily routine by the end of
1952. Back in the States, the Korean War was not only unpopular and
ill-supported, but the slow progress of the conflict had also dulled
public interest. In the course of the Presidential election campaign
the question of Korea had become increasingly a matter of widespread
national concern. Two weeks before election day the Republican
candidate, former General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,[307] had
vowed to bring the Korean fighting to an end. As a first step toward
accomplishing this he had pledged, if elected, to visit the battlefront.
[307] Eisenhower had resigned his commission, following his
return to the States in April to seek election.
Some had labeled Eisenhower’s statement, “I will go to Korea” as a mere
pre-election gesture. The general intended to act on this pledge and,
following his election, began a four-day visit to Korea on 2 December
1952. Part of the President-elect’s brief tour in Korea was spent
at General Pollock’s command post. Here, on 3 December, the Marine
ground chief briefed his future Commander in Chief on current Marine
division operations. Generals Clark, Van Fleet, and Kendall accompanied
Eisenhower and his party. This included General of the Army Omar
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as Charles E.
Wilson and Herbert Brownell, Jr., the new designates for Secretary of
Defense and Attorney General, respectively.
Though General Eisenhower’s promise to visit Korea personally to see
the situation first-hand and his subsequent election had renewed
American hopes for an early peace in Korea, negotiations there had been
deadlocked since 1951 on the exchange of prisoners. Disagreement on
this issue thus became the major obstacle which was not overcome until
the truce was signed nearly 20 months later. The Communists insisted on
repatriation to their native land of all NKPA and CCF prisoners held
by the United Nations Command. More than 60,000 of the 132,000 enemy
captives held by the UNC in South Korean POW camps did not wish to
return to Communism, a fact which had been borne out by a UN survey.
To draw attention from this unpopular position the Communists, through
the civil and military links existing in the POW camps, had staged a
series of riots in the spring of 1952. The worst, at Koje Island (just
off the coast of Pusan) lasted six days, largely because the Communist
prisoners planned for, and successfully carried out, the capture of the
UN camp commander. His release, on 12 May, was effected only after the
new commander signed, under duress, a statement which the Communists
immediately exploited in an effort to discredit the validity of the
prisoner survey.
The propaganda gains had enabled the Communists to occupy a commanding
position at the truce talks. In the meantime, the UN had offered
several plans until, on 28 April, Admiral Joy presented “what we called
our final package proposal.”[308] By instituting the tactic of calling
a recess whenever the Communists had nothing constructive to offer, a
recommendation of Admiral Joy’s, the UN regained the advantage of the
conference table. The talks continued but with no appreciable progress.
On 8 October 1952, after continued Communist intransigence, Brigadier
General William K. Harrison, who had become the senior UN delegate
in late May, took the initiative in recessing the truce talks. This
unexpected action, which caught the enemy off-guard, followed three
separate proposals made by Harrison for ending the POW controversy.
All had been promptly rejected by the Communist delegation. As General
Harrison had informed one of its spokesmen, the North Korean General
Nam Il:
[308] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 156. The proposal was a
“complete armistice agreement,” not merely another offer
to solve the prisoner question.
We are not terminating the armistice negotiations, we are merely
recessing them. We are willing to meet with you at any time
that you are ready to accept one of our proposals or to make a
constructive proposal of your own, in writing, which could lead
to an honorable armistice ... Since you have offered nothing
constructive, we stand in recess.[309]
[309] Quoted in Berger, _Korea Knot_, p. 153.
After October, while the truce negotiations were in a period of
indefinite recess, liaison officers at Panmunjom kept the channels
of communication open between the Communist and UNC sides. Several
developments along other diplomatic lines about this time were to prove
more fruitful and lead the way to solution of the POW dispute and, in
fact, to the end of the war.
In mid-November, an attempt was made to end the prisoner exchange
impasse through a resolution introduced by India at the United Nations
session. The compromise measure recognized the United States position,
namely, that force should not be used in returning prisoners to
their homeland. This principle was to become known as the concept of
voluntary repatriation.
To reconcile the widely conflicting Communist and UNC views on
handling of prisoners, the Indian proposal suggested that a
repatriation commission be established. This body was to be composed
of representatives of two Communist and two Allied nations. It would
function within a designated demilitarized zone in Korea through which
all prisoners would be received and processed. Each prisoner was to be
given a choice of being returned to his homeland or not. Both sides
would have the opportunity of explaining to reluctant nationals “their
rights” of repatriation. If these persuasive efforts failed and a man
still chose not to return to his country, he would then be referred to
a special political conference established by the armistice agreement.
Should this four-member repatriation commission still not agree on
settlement of the nonrepatriates, a final determination was then to be
made by an official named by the commission or UN General Assembly.
Many UNC nations favored the Indian proposal. U.S. official reaction
was frankly skeptical and critical, well aware that the many vague
aspects of the proposal could easily be exploited by the Communists to
the disadvantage of the individual POW. Despite the promise of a good
many headaches in its implementation, the UN adopted the compromise
Indian resolution in December 1952 by a vote of 54 to 5.
Later that same month the Executive Committee of the League of Red
Cross Societies, meeting in Geneva, adopted another feature of the
Indian resolution proposing an exchange of sick and wounded POWs in
advance of a truce. As General Clark observed, “It was hardly an
auspicious omen for an armistice, yet it was the action which set in
motion a chain of events which finally resulted in cease-fire.”[310]
[310] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 240.
On another front, State Department officials advised the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that a resolution similar to that of the Red Cross
would probably be introduced when the UN reconvened on 24 February.
Following a JCS suggestion that a “feeler” proposition be first made
to the Communists, General Clark wrote the NKPA and CCF leaders on
22 February. His letter was addressed to North Korean Premier Kim Il
Sung and General Peng Teh-huai, the CCF military commander. Delivered
through the Panmunjom liaison officers, it requested the immediate
exchange of sick and wounded POWs. As both diplomatic and military
leaders doubtfully awaited the results, a totally unexpected and
far-reaching event, the death of the Russian leader, Premier Joseph
Stalin, jolted the Communist world. Its repercussions soon extended to
the truce tent at Panmunjom and decisively affected the progress of
negotiations there.
_The Marine Commands During the Third Winter_[311]
[311] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Nov 52-Jan 53; 1stMar
ComdDs, Nov 52-Feb 53; 5thMar ComdD, Dec 52; 7thMar
ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53; 11th Mar ComdDs, Jan-Feb 53; 2/1
ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdD, Jan 53; MAG-12 ComdD, Jan
53; MAG-33 ComdD, Oct 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Feb 53.
Although renewed negotiations to bring the war to a close were
under way with the enemy in late 1952 and early 1953, action on the
battlefield continued the tedious routine of the war. An exception
to the general lethargy across the front occurred on 22 November in
the right regimental sector. A predawn raid was conducted by the 1st
Marines, which had advanced to the front upon relief of the 7th Marines
after their battle of the Hook. With the left and right battalion
sectors manned by 1/1 and 3/1, respectively, Lieutenant Colonel Charles
E. Warren’s 2/1, in regimental reserve, had been ordered to provide
a company to raid Chinese positions across from COPs Reno and Vegas.
Drawing the assignment was Company D (Captain Jay V. Poage).
Code-named WAKEUP, the raid was conducted in a manner typical of many
earlier forays against Chinese strongpoints. Its results, too, in most
respects were similar to the outcome of previous raids. Artillery
preparation of the objective area was accomplished, the infantry
assaults were somewhat short of the targets due to heavy CCF defensive
fires, and the prisoner-taking part of the mission was unfulfilled.
Counterbalancing this, and what made the raid of value to the regiment,
was the information gained about enemy defenses and Chinese reaction to
the raid. It was one of the rare occasions during which the CCF did not
employ artillery fire while their positions were under attack, using
instead mortars and automatic weapons against Marine assault forces.
Raids such as WAKEUP, patrols, and ambushes became the pattern of
action in late November and in December. Earlier in November some
changes in the MLR dispositions had taken place. On 3 November,
at 2345, the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch, 29th Infantry
Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Division, had relieved 1/7 of the Hook
sector responsibility, ending Marine occupation of that part of
JAMESTOWN.[312] And, on 16 November, the 7th Marines itself had been
replaced in line by the 1st Marines. In between these changes of
command on the frontlines, Generals Pollock and Jerome had received
many congratulations and well wishes from combat commands and from
government officials in the States. The occasion was the 177th birthday
of the Marine Corps. Both of these senior commanders passed on to their
Marines not only the Commandant’s Anniversary message but also the
congratulations of the UNC commander, General Clark.
[312] At this time a new limiting point between the division
and British division was also established. This slightly
reduced Marine division frontage to 33 miles and allowed
the two MLR regiments to shorten their lines and maintain
somewhat larger reserve units. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5,
Chap. 8, p. 8-23.
Though the Commonwealth division had taken over the Hook area from
the infantry Marines, the division’s participation in defense of
the British sector had not completely ended. On 18–19 November,
the 11th Marines expended more than 2,000 rounds to repel Chinese
attacks on the Hook. This firing by the artillery regiment helped to
repay the British for their “cooperation and outstanding artillery
and tank support during the engagements of 26–28 October....”[313]
And as the Commonwealth division commander, Major General M. M.
Austin-Roberts-West, had himself reported to General Pollock the day
following the Hook attack, “All hands on the Hook much appreciated the
prompt and effective support given last night. Grateful if you would
pass on their thanks to all concerned.”[314]
[313] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to GOC, 1stComWelDiv, dtd 29 Oct 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App. II, p. 6.
[314] GOC, 1stComWelDiv msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 19 Nov 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52, App. I, p. 3.
Throughout December 1952 and January 1953, the lull in ground fighting
continued. Mass Cherokee strikes by Admiral Clark’s Navy and Marine
fliers had begun for the Marine division on 17 December, when the
bombline was moved in nearer to the MLR for expanded operations. In
noncombat activities, later that month Francis Cardinal Spellman,
Archbishop of New York and Vicar for Catholic Chaplains of the Armed
Forces, conducted a Christmas Mass at the division CP. On the 31st,
His Eminence visited the 1st MAW at K-3 (Pohang). There he delivered
an address to about 1,000 Marines, shook hands with nearly all of
them, and later heard confessions for many. Another special guest, not
long afterward, was Episcopal Bishop Austin Pardue, of the Pittsburgh
Diocese, who held Holy Communion at the division chapel.
The passing of 1952 and the arrival of the new year was not marked by
any special observance on the battlefield. For that matter there was,
it seemed, no change to note; the Marines, like the rest of the Eighth
Army troops, maintained much the same regular, reduced, wintertime
schedule. Activity of Marine infantry units consisted of aggressive
patrolling and raids, and improvement of the secondary defenses of
Lines WYOMING and KANSAS. Units in division reserve, during January,
also participated in MARLEX (Marine Landing Exercise) operations.
No major ground action had taken place in December, although Marine
patrols, on a half dozen occasions, had engaged as many as 50 enemy
for brief clashes and fire fights. January was a different story,
however. On 8 January, a 7th Marines raiding party, reinforced by
air, artillery, and tank support, skirmished with 85 Chinese in the
Hill 134 area not far from COP 2, overlooking Panmunjom. Ten days
later, the 1st and 7th Marines, together with the artillery regiment,
took part in Operation BIMBO. This was another attempt, by combined
infantry-artillery-tank-air action, to create the impression that CCF
objective areas were under attack.
BIMBO began with heavy preparatory fires by the 11th Marines, including
the 155mm projectiles hurled by 4/11, that inflicted early damage
to CCF personnel and materiel. At 0630, on 18 January, frontline
battalions of the two participating infantry regiments opened
fire; reserve battalions assisted with indirect machine gun fire.
Armored vehicles added to the effect of the ruse by shelling Chinese
emplacements from prepared MLR positions. Marine attack planes streaked
in to unload flaming napalm. In response to the BIMBO mock attack, the
Chinese directed mortar fire into suspected Marine avenues of approach
and assembly areas. Forward observers on JAMESTOWN could detect some
enemy troop movement. (Marine artillery took these formations under
intensive fire), but as in similar feint operations in the past,
the enemy again failed to pick up the bait. The operation lasted
approximately an hour and a half.
During the winter months, a number of command changes had occurred in
the Marines’ combat organizations in Korea. In the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing, the rotation of commanders began at the very top when, on 8
January, General Jerome handed over the wing colors to Major General
Vernon E. Megee. During a ceremony at wing headquarters that day, Air
Force Generals Weyland and Barcus paid tribute to General Jerome’s
“exceptionally meritorious service” as 1st MAW CG since April 1952 by
presenting him with the Distinguished Service Medal.
The incoming wing commander, General Megee, had been a Marine flyer for
20 years, having received his wings in 1932. His Marine Corps career
began more than a decade earlier, with enlistment in 1919. Commissioned
in 1922, he served in infantry, artillery, and expeditionary billets
before undergoing pilot training in 1931. Following school, staff, and
command assignments, Major Megee was named advisor to the Peruvian
Minister of Aviation from 1940–1943. During World War II, Colonel Megee
was sent overseas as 3d MAW Chief of Staff in early 1944. As Commander,
Control Unit One, he participated in the Iwo Jima campaign, earning
the Legion of Merit. Later, at Okinawa, he commanded all Marine Corps
Landing Force Air Support Control Units. After promotion to brigadier
general in 1949, General Megee was named Chief of Staff, FMFLant.
Receiving his second star in 1951, he served as Commanding General
at Cherry Point, El Toro, and Air FMFPac prior to his assignment in
Korea.[315]
[315] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Vernon E. Megee, 1959.
Within the wing and the division, every one of the top commands
experienced changes of commanding officers in late 1952 and early 1953:
1st Marines--Colonel Hewitt D. Adams took over from Colonel Layer
on 21 November;
5th Marines--Colonel Lewis W. Walt relieved Colonel Smoak on 10
December;
7th Marines--Colonel Loren E. Haffner took command from Colonel
Moore on 5 November;
11th Marines--Colonel James E. Mills vice Colonel Sea on 22
February;
MACG-2--Colonel Kenneth D. Kerby relieved Colonel Jack R. Cram on
16 February;
MAG-12--Colonel George S. Bowman, Jr. vice Colonel Condon on 13
January;
MAG-33--Colonel Louis B. Robertshaw succeeded Colonel Herbert
Williamson on 22 October.
_1st MAW Operations 1952–1953_[316]
[316] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt Eval Rpts_ No. 5, Chap. 9 and No.
6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdDs,
Oct 52, Jan-Feb 53; MAG-12 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53, Mar
53; MAG-33 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan-Mar 53; VMA-121 ComdDs,
Nov-Dec 52, VMF-115 ComdDs, Nov-Dec 52; VMF(N)-513
ComdDs, Oct 52-Jan 53; HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 52, Nov-Dec
52, Jan 53; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Montross, _SkyCav_.
The heavy ground fighting across the Eighth Army front in October 1952
had drawn heavily upon units of the 1st MAW. That month Marine pilots
logged their greatest number of sorties--3,897--since June 1951.[317]
As a result of the intense infantry action in the 1st Marine Division
sector another air record was established--365 casualty evacuations
by HMR-161 during October. This was a peak number to that time for
the helicopter transport squadron for which med evac was a secondary
mission. These “mercy missions” were not limited only to wounded Marine
infantrymen or downed aviators.
[317] A total of 1,362 CAS sorties were flown, with 443
for the 1st Marine Division. Interdiction missions
numbered 1,842, plus additional miscellaneous and air
reconnaissance flights. 1st MAW ComdD, Oct. 52.
Whenever and wherever immediate air rescue was needed, the choppers
were sent. In July 1952, HMR-161 evacuated “650 Army and Air Force
troops as well as 150 Koreans”[318] from a flooded river island. On the
night of 18 January 1953, a helicopter retrieved five Marines from an
uncharted minefield after one of the group had accidentally stepped on
a mine. On 13 March, HMR-161 sent three helicopters aloft in an attempt
to save five men from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion who had
become trapped in mud near the edge of the Imjin, and later that month
the squadron dispatched a chopper to rescue a hunter marooned in the
middle of the Han River.
[318] Montross, _SkyCav_, p. 189.
Almost obscured in the magnificent record of the mercy missions,
especially the hazardous casualty evacuations by the VMO-6 pilots, were
the problems encountered by the observation and helicopter squadrons.
Under operational control of the division and administrative control of
the wing, the squadrons found themselves exposed to overlapping command
authority which sometimes resulted in conflicting directives from
higher headquarters. Some squadron personnel felt that establishment
of a helicopter group under the 1st MAW might have solved many of the
organizational problems, but such a unit was never established in
Korea, partly because only one helicopter squadron (plus half of the
observation squadron) existed.
Another organizational difficulty beset VMO-6. With two types of
aircraft and two unrelated missions (med evac for the HTL and HO5S
copters; observation and artillery spotting for its little OYs and,
later, OE-1s), the squadron found supply and maintenance problems
doubled and operational control of its rotary and fixed wing sections
extremely complex. Attachment of the VMO-6 choppers (for evacuation,
administrative, and liaison missions) to HMR-161 was suggested as a
possible solution to these difficulties, but was never done.
Other problem areas became apparent during the winter of 1952–1953.
Accompanying the freezing weather were difficulties in starting and,
for a brief time, in flying the helicopters. In order to overcome the
engine starting problem on emergency evacuation missions, HMR-161
preheated its number one standby aircraft every two hours during the
extreme cold. Dilution of engine oil with gasoline and use of warming
huts (the latter, a scarcity) were also employed to cut down cold
weather starting time.
Not related to freezing Korean temperatures were two additional
problems, one navigational and the other mechanical. In January, the
helicopter squadron put into use a jeep-mounted homing device for
operations in reduced visibility. It proved unsatisfactory due to
interference from other radio transmitters in the area, a difficulty
never resolved during the rest of the war. The mechanical problem
lay with the rotary winged aircraft in HMR-161. On 27 March, all of
its HRS-2 choppers with more than 200 hours on the main rotor blades
were grounded. Discovery in the States that minute .002-inch cuts on
the blade surface had occurred during fabrication resulted in the
grounding. New blades were promptly flown to Korea from both Japan and
the United States, and the squadron again became fully operational on 2
April.
Evaluation of transport helicopter techniques continued during the
period despite ever-present minor difficulties. At least one new
HMR-161 tactical maneuver was scheduled each month to evaluate existing
procedures and determine full operational capabilities of the aircraft.
During these landing exercises both the infantry and helicopter
commanders and their staffs had the opportunity to further develop
vertical envelopment techniques that would soon be the new trademark of
U.S. Marine Corps operations.
Most of the time HMR-161 operations drew more attention than those of
VMO-6, but pilots in the latter unit had a host of division Marines who
could attest to the skills and critical role performed by helicopter
fliers in the composite observation squadron. VMO-6 had pioneered the
night casualty evacuation service, and during the active fighting in
Korea, had flown out more than 1,000 Marines from frontline medical
facilities to better-equipped ones in the rear areas. These flights
were made in all kinds of weather and without the benefit of adequate
instrumentation or a homing device. No other Eighth Army helicopter
unit made regularly scheduled night frontline evacuations.[319]
[319] A relatively small number of night med evac flights was
also being flown by HMR-161. During March 1953, for
example, in transferring 283 casualties to the hospital
ships, squadron helicopters made only 15 flights at night.
The courage of these VMO-6 pilots was recalled nearly 15 years later by
a former executive officer of the 1st Marines:
The flying of the evacuation helicopters from the jury-rigged
and inadequate landing sites was nothing short of miraculous.
I’ve always contended those pilots of the observation squadron
received far less credit than they deserved. They used to fly
at night, to frontline landing strips, where I had difficulty
walking without barking my shins.[320]
[320] Col Glenn R. Long ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd
11 Jun 67.
During the latter part of 1952 and the first months of 1953, 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing command relationships underwent a significant
change. On 26 January 1953, General Megee forwarded a memorandum
request to General Barcus. The paper outlined specific recommendations
for restoring 1st MAW tactical elements to wing operational control,
even though the Marine wing would continue as a tactical component
of Fifth Air Force. In the proposal, CG, 1st MAW pointed out (as had
his predecessors) that the existing command structure, in effect,
completely bypassed the Marine wing commander. It had prevented him
from exercising normal tactical command functions, even though he was
fully responsible for the performance of his air groups and squadrons
to FEAF/FAF orders. The 1st MAW commander’s proposal was intended
to counter previous Air Force objections and demonstrate that more
normal command relations would “enhance, rather than reduce [1st MAW]
operational efficiency and effectiveness.”[321]
[321] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-76.
At the same time, having been informally advised in an earlier
conversation that CG, FAF would approve at least some of the requests
made, General Megee implemented changes in his G-2 and G-3 staff
sections. This reorganization was aimed at carrying out the increased
functions which would result from approval of the request. Operational
control of Marine tactical squadrons by FAF since 1951 had “relegated
1st MAW to the status of an administrative headquarters, forcing its
G-2 and G-3 sections partially to atrophy.”[322] To effect the changes
in command relationships and establish the wing on an operational
basis, the G-2 and G-3 sections were expanded. By the nature of
their organization these were not capable of either targeting or
tactical planning. In the intelligence section, a Target Information
Sub-section was established to compile data on the mission targets (and
accompanying photographs) received from FAF and to evaluate the desired
objectives.
[322] _Ibid._
Upon receipt of this information, the G-3 planning group accomplished
the target solution, prepared general tactics for conducting the
strike, (number of planes, amount and kind of ordnance, approach routes
to be used) and provided post-strike target evaluation. The chiefs
of these sections jointly presented the completed information to the
wing commander each afternoon. He selected the targets and forwarded
via teletype and air courier to the wing G-3 representative at FAF
headquarters a report of intended operations, providing a lead time of
36–48 hours.
As soon as the OP INTENT (Operations Intentions Report) was on its way
to General Barcus for approval, the 1st MAW intelligence section began
to prepare the target dossiers (including photographs, flak analysis,
and related identification information) on each of the approved
targets. The compiled dossiers were then sent to the appropriate
tactical squadron. At this point, still perhaps a half-day before
issuance of the FAF orders, the squadrons received two major advantages
over the previous system:
(1) Adequate photo intelligence employed for the first time since
FAF had assumed operational control of 1st MAW; and
(2) A substantial lead time advantage for proper briefing of
pilots and arming of aircraft.
After the strike, and usually within an hour, Marine planes
photographed the targets for damage assessment. These photos were
annotated and an assessment report prepared. This information was
then presented by the G-2 and G-3 to the wing commander. Immediately
thereafter, prints of the photographs were distributed to the
appropriate tactical units, thus making post-strike photography more
freely available on a regular basis to the participating tactical units.
In a letter dated 18 February, General Barcus approved most of the
1st MAW commander’s specific requests, but retained full control over
General Megee’s squadrons used in close air support. This was due to
the fact that EUSAK-FAF joint policy required CAS mission requests to
be approved by JOC, in accordance with daily Eighth Army priorities,
which allocated the aircraft for each request. Returned to operational
control of the Marine wing were planes used on interdiction, armed
reconnaissance and general support activities--the planes on strikes
beyond the bombline, the photo, and all-weather (night) squadrons.
FAF also retained control over assignment of missions to VMC-1, the
electronics unit.
Although some of the Marine wing tactical squadrons thus newly enjoyed
the advantages of flying under their own commander’s wings, 1st MAW
headquarters staff members had to pay for these benefits. An increased
work load swamped the G-2 section, where 7 photo interpreters were
kept busy 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. Marine personnel processed
and reviewed an average of 100,000 prints per month and these were
“only those from that portion of the VMJ-1 effort devoted to 1st
MAW operations.”[323] Expansion of 1st MAW headquarters to set up
a tactical planning capability pointed to a deficiency in the wing
organization T/O, a weakness that existed during the rest of the war.
[323] _Ibid._, p. 10-80.
While General Barcus earlier had General Megee’s recommendations
under study, a radio news broadcast back in the States momentarily
resulted in poor publicity for the Marine Corps. On 1 February a
nationally syndicated columnist reported instances in which friendly
troops had been bombed and strafed by U.S. aircraft. Marine Corps
planes were the most careless, the broadcaster alleged, basing his
statement on incomplete information. The news story had developed from
an unfortunate publicity release issued by FEAF dealing with a MAG-33
incident. The phrasing implied that Marine aviators were “guilty of
gross carelessness resulting in casualties among their own ground
troops.”[324]
[324] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-81.
Actually, of the 63 incidents in which friendly casualties had resulted
from aircraft flown by FAF units between January and October 1952,
1st MAW pilots were responsible for 18, or 28.5 percent of the total
number of incidents and majority of casualties. What was left unsaid,
however, in the unfavorable publicity was that with approximately 14.5
percent of the aircraft represented in FEAF, Marine fliers had been
accomplishing monthly totals of between 30 to 40 percent of all Eighth
Army CAS missions. They also performed virtually all of the very close
air support jobs (50 to 100 yards out from the MLR) which further
reduced the comparative percentage of Marine “carelessness.”
It was true, of course, that on rare occasions freak accidents did
kill and injure UN troops, despite the continual training of pilots
and controllers in strike procedures and target identification. The
position taken by the two senior Marine commanders in Korea was
that although any CAS incident involving friendly troops was highly
regrettable, it was in the same category as “short” mortar and
artillery rounds and just as unavoidable.
Target identification, low visibility flying conditions, and ballistic
computations made the task of precision close air support an enormous
one. If anything, it was almost a wonder that more accidents did
not happen. Despite the similarity of Korean geography, an unending
panorama of almost identical hilltops, ridges, and streams, the pilot
had to release ordnance at the proper altitude and speed, and in a
balanced (trim) flight. While conducting his dive the pilot’s view
could be blocked by cloud formations and his attention distracted by
antiaircraft fire which required evasive action. Even when the ordnance
had been properly released, prevailing wind conditions could affect
the flight path of the bombs. This, in addition to human error and
mechanical factors, such as the occasional malfunctioning of parts,
also affected the accuracy of bombing.
Throughout the November 1952-March 1953 period, 1st MAW squadrons
continued to provide the bulk of close air sorties to the 1st Marine
Division, in keeping with General Barcus’ policy stated earlier in
1952. Between November and January there had been a lull in the heavy
ground fighting that had prevailed in October and little need to
request air strikes. When enemy forces opposing the division began to
grow more active in February, however, the requirement for air support
to 1st MarDiv greatly increased. During this month 1st MAW aviators
reached an all-time high in the percentage of their total CAS sorties
devoted to the division--two of every three wing close support sorties
went to General Pollock’s infantry regiments.
On the critical issue of close air support, the Marine division had
become better satisfied by the end of 1952 with the quantity of air
support received from FAF. A continuing difficulty, however, was the
delayed response to requests for immediate CAS. For the wing, several
other conditions existed which bothered General Megee. One was that the
VMA-312 carrier-based squadron was not utilized to any great extent
in execution of CAS missions. This detrimental condition saddled the
wing commander with an “unqualified” squadron. It also prevented pilots
from practicing a highly developed skill they were responsible for
maintaining, although later in the war this condition was gradually
alleviated. Two other difficulties--centralized control of CAS
mission assignments by JOC and the prevailing differences between
the Marine and Air Force/Army CAS communications systems and request
procedures--were never rectified.[325]
[325] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-80.
One long-standing difficulty, though not a CAS matter, had been solved
early in the winter. Following a series of mechanical troubles with the
F3D-2 aircraft in VMF(N)-513 and prolonged delay in receipt of blast
tube extensions for its 20mm guns, the squadron finally became fully
operational on 1 November with its complement of 12 of the new jet
Skyknight aircraft. Almost as soon as the F3D-2s were ready for night
work, FEAF had put them to escorting B-29s on bombing runs over North
Korea. With the F3D escort and changes in B-29 tactics, bomber losses,
which had been severe, decreased sharply. Enemy attackers became fewer
and fewer so that by February, air-to-air opposition was encountered
only infrequently. Instead of sending up groups of night fighters at
the escorted B-29s, the enemy would fly a single jet across the bomber
formation. If a Skyknight followed, one or two MIG-15s, well to the
rear and higher than the decoy, would attempt to gun down the Skyknight
in its pursuit. But because of the F3D tail warning radar, the Marine
radar operator could detect the enemy plane in its approach for the
kill before it got within effective firing range.
Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson’s VMF(N)-513 pilots soon established
an enviable record for Marine aviation, netting by 31 January five
enemy jets without loss of a single F3D. In addition to the jets, the
squadron downed a piston engine plane and scored a probable destruct on
another. During its first three months of operations with the Douglas
Skyknights--the first Navy-Marine jet night-fighter to arrive in the
Korean combat theater--the squadron earned two night-kill records. It
also quickly proved the design theory and proposed tactics for the
Skyknights that enemy aircraft could be located, intercepted, and
destroyed purely by electronic means.
While on a night combat air patrol in the vicinity of Sinuiju airfield
early on 3 November, Master Sergeant H. C. Hoglind picked up a contact
on his intercept radar, which a ground radar station had passed on
to him, and notified the pilot, Major William T. Stratton, Jr. After
losing and reestablishing radar contact, Major Stratton made a visual
sighting of a jet exhaust straight ahead. When he had been cleared to
proceed, the Flying Nightmare’s pilot sent three bursts of 20mm into
the other plane, identified as a YAK-15. Three explosions followed and
the aircraft plunged towards the airfield directly below. This marked
the first time that an enemy jet had been destroyed at night by use of
airborne intercept radar equipment in a jet fighter.
Five days later the team of Captain Oliver R. Davis and Warrant Officer
Dramus F. Fessler bagged the first MIG-15 for the squadron. Captain
Davis expended only 20 rounds of 20mm cannon fire in his aerial
victory, which took place northwest of Pyongyang near the Yellow Sea.
The next two months brought new distinction to Marines in -513. Shortly
after dark on 10 December, First Lieutenant Joseph A. Corvi had
departed on a night combat patrol mission. About 35 miles northwest of
Chinnampo, his radar operator, Master Sergeant D. R. George, picked up
a target on his scope. Since the “bogey” (an unidentified aircraft,
believed to be hostile) was three miles distant, the pilot quickly
closed on the contact and shot it down. Almost immediately another
blip appeared on the radar screen. Lieutenant Corvi turned to the new
attack and began approaching it, but because of the slower speed of
the enemy plane the Marine pilot was able to fire only one short burst
before overtaking it. An instant before passing the enemy aircraft,
Lieutenant Corvi saw it disappear from the radar screen, but neither
member of the Flying Nightmares crew had made a visual sighting with
the plane itself, listed as a probable kill. What these two Marines
had accomplished with their earlier encounter was the first attempt to
destroy an enemy aircraft without use of a visual sighting by means of
lock-on radar gear.
All-weather squadron crews continued to demonstrate the F3D-2
capability for destruction of hostile aircraft by electronic intercept
during January. The first MIG-15 downed was by Major Elswin P. (Jack)
Dunn and Master Sergeant Lawrence J. Fortin, his radar operator. On 28
January Captain James R. Weaver and Master Sergeant Robert P. Becker
destroyed another of the Russian fighter-interceptors in an aerial
duel. The final kill came on the 31st when the new squadron commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Conley (who had taken over VMF(N)-513 on
the 20th) accompanied by Master Sergeant James M. Scott bagged the
Marine fighter pilots’ 12th MIG of the war.
While VMF(N)-513 wrote several records in the sky, other MAG-33 and
-12 squadrons also made their contribution during the winter of
1952–1953. In MAG-12, a highly successful noontime strike was launched
on 16 November by 21 attack planes from VMAs-121 and -212 against a
hydroelectric plant 25 miles southeast of Wonsan. For this exploit the
group received the plaudits of the Fifth Air Force CG, General Barcus.
Lieutenant Colonel John B. Maas, Jr.’s VMF-115 (he had succeeded
Lieutenant Colonel Coin as CO on 29 September) helped all Marines
celebrate their 177th birthday by sending 22 Panthers against enemy
troops and supply shelters. On these strikes each MAG-33 aircraft
was armed with 760 rounds of 20mm and 4 napalm tanks (500 pounds
each), the first time that 4 tanks that large had been dropped from
a fighter-bomber. This was part of the 98 sorties flown by 1st MAW
against 21 enemy targets on the 10 November anniversary date. During
December 1952, the frequency of combat flights by VMF-115 enabled the
squadron to surpass its old (August 1951) monthly sortie record. The
Panther jet fliers set this new mark of 726 effective sorties in the
last 31 days of the year.
More honors came to wing pilots in the new year. On 8 January, three
MAG-12 squadrons flew more than 28 combat sorties. Some, in support
of the 1st Marine Division near the Panmunjom corridor, by VMAs-121,
-212, and -323, produced outstanding results, earning the praise of
General Pollock. Among the participating pilots was Lieutenant Colonel
Barnett Robinson (VMA-212), who a week earlier had taken command of the
squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Dobson.
Between 9–14 January, MAG-33 participated in a USAF-USMC joint
operation to strike the rail system at Sinanju, 45 miles north of
the enemy capital, and at Yongmi-dong, to the northwest across both
the Chongchon and Taedong Rivers. During the six-day Operation
PARALYSIS, Marine and Air Force jet squadrons flew flak suppression and
interdiction missions, knocking out ground-based air defense weapons
and damaging and destroying bridges, rails, and rolling stock. At night
FEAF Bomber Command, with Flying Nightmare escorts, worked over the
communications net, including repair facilities; during daylight, the
fighter-bombers attacked marshalling yards near Sinanju, where railroad
cars were stacked up awaiting repair of the river bridges. Bomb
assessments and intelligence reports showed that two major rail lines
were inoperative for 16 days and that, as General Barcus had predicted,
the Chinese “hurriedly increased their antiaircraft defenses in the
Chongchon estuary and shot down seven fighter-bombers.”[326]
[326] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 582.
Following this operation, Colonel Robertshaw’s jets from VMFs-115 and
-311 achieved extremely effective close air support in strikes flown
24 January in the I Corps area. About a month later, with an F9F as
an airborne command post and with Lieutenant Colonel Walt Bartosh on
his wing, the MAG-33 commander directed the operations of 208 USAF and
Marine aircraft on another mass strike. The two-day mission was flown
on 18–19 February against the North Korean tank and infantry school
southwest of Pyongyang. More than 240 buildings were destroyed in 379
sorties. The attack was one of the largest all-jet fighter-bomber
strikes of the war. Colonel Robertshaw thereby became the first Marine
to lead such a large joint air-strike force from a CP aloft. And the
next month, on 8 March, the Group CO flew the first Marine jet night
MPQ mission, dropping six 250-pound bombs from an F9F-2 Panther on an
enemy ammunition dump.
_Behind the Lines_[327]
[327] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No.
6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs. Jan-Feb 53; 1/1 ComdD,
Feb 53; HMR-161 ComdD, Feb 53; Montross, _SkyCav_.
The Marine aviation command, like the division, found that its
commitment to a large-scale land campaign in Korea considerably
increased its requirements for nonorganic support, compared with
normal amphibious combat operations. The wing fell heir to more of the
permanent problems because its organization was less suited to the
heavy support requirements of prolonged combat. Whereas the 1st Marine
Division received adequate support through the FMFPac Service Command,
the wing did not since the service command had been tailored more
for support of ground organizations. Moreover, the command relations
established in Korea underscored this situation, with the 1st Combat
Service Group placed under CG, 1st Marine Division. The wing received
emergency logistical support from VMR (Marine transport squadron)
units. This was not an adequate substitute for the various ground
support agencies essential for employment of the wing’s full combat
potential.
Major problems pertaining to service and support functions of 1st
MAW units resulted from the use of amphibious Tables of Organization
throughout the period of prolonged land combat without making a T/O
adjustment for the actual combat mission being performed. What the
wing had recommended to solve its longstanding support and supply
problems was either to strengthen its organic logistical structure
or to increase it by the attachment of appropriate units. It was
emphasized that “prolonged Wing operations under Air Force control with
logistical support derived from four different services, each at the
end of its supply pipeline, brought clearly into focus the requirement
for centralized control and monitoring of Wing requisitions and
supplies.”[328]
[328] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-133.
A step toward expanding the amphibious T/O of the wing was made in 1953
with the request from CG, 1st MAW to CG, FMFPac for a detachment of the
1st Combat Service Group to provide electronics logistical support. It
was further recommended that the electronics section be made organic to
the wing to meet its need for this type of service unit.
Unlike the division, existing T/Os made it impossible for the wing to
consolidate and control resupply requests from subordinate units and
then to monitor the requisitions until parts or supplies were received
by the users. This lack of a central wing supply agency had, for some
time, impaired the effective, sustained performance of 1st MAW ground
electronics equipment in Korea. CG, FMFPac concurred with the proposal.
He requested an increase in the wing T/O of four additional electronics
supply personnel to be attached to the wing for this purpose. The basic
problem of establishment of a combat service group tailored to fully
meet 1st MAW needs in the field remained unresolved, however.
Supply problems in the division were less complicated. On 11 November
1952, General Pollock submitted a letter to the theater commander
requesting approval of a special list of equipment in excess of
certain Tables of Organization and Equipment within the division. The
requirements of the Marine land war mission in Korea dictated the need
for additional equipment, primarily crew-served weapons and automatic
rifles. Approval was given on 19 January 1953 by CG, AFFE (Army Forces,
Far East). All equipment received through this program was to be
returned upon the departure of the Marine division from Korea.
During the cold months that ended in March 1953, the division continued
its evaluation of experimental clothing and equipment. Items of winter
wear generally proved to be highly satisfactory. The thermal boot, in
particular, gave excellent service. On the other hand, the leather
combat boot did not fully measure up to expectations. Most of its
deficiencies were caused by the rapid wearing of the composition sole.
One clothing item, the armored vest, had undergone further testing. In
November, delivery of the vests to the division had been completed,
including 400 sets of the new lower torso armor. Recent issue of this
additional type of body armor appeared highly effective in reducing
combat casualties; its extended coverage also raised morale.
Though their ability to halt successfully a Chinese bullet or exploding
shell was being improved on, thanks to armored wear, the Marines’
opportunity to keep the enemy from division outposts or MLR areas was
still being hampered by occasional ammunition shortages. From time to
time during the winter months there was some relief from the grenade
and howitzer firing restrictions that had been in effect before the
Hook fighting. The cutback on use of 81mm mortar shells continued,
however, as the supply level of these projectiles remained dangerously
low.
A new shortage, this one in fuel, developed during the winter. In
January 1953 it became necessary to reduce the distribution of
gasoline for motor vehicles to .829 gallons per man per day, a drop
of 17 percent from the previous month’s allocation. Diesel fuel was
cut back to 1.41 gallons, or 7 percent less than the December ration.
By February, however, the crisis had passed and vehicles returned to
a less restricted operating schedule. No extreme hardship had been
experienced by the Marines during the fuel drought. It was considered
that “prolonged operation under such restrictions would result in a
marked decrease in efficiency since many essential activities may be
temporarily postponed, although not entirely eliminated.”[329]
[329] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.
The month of February also witnessed the largest helicopter supply lift
in Korea, HAYLIFT I, the previous September, had tested the feasibility
of transporting Class I, III, and V supplies to a frontline infantry
regiment for five consecutive days. HMR-161 and the 7th Marines had
turned out an excellent test performance of the rotary craft in this
logistical operation. It then became the task for the infantry and
helicopters to run a resupply operation for two frontline regiments for
a five-day period. HAYLIFT II, conducted 23–27 February, was the code
name for this test.
Both the planning and execution of the February operation followed
the general pattern of HAYLIFT I, but on a much larger scale. As in
September, division ordnance and service battalions moved the supplies
to helicopter loading zones near Lieutenant Colonel Carey’s HMR-161
air strip. It had been estimated that 130 tons each day would have to
be lifted to supply the two MLR regiments, the 7th and 5th Marines.
On the first day, this figure was exceeded by 30 tons. A request
by A/1/5 on 24 February for support during an emergency operation
necessitated additional ammunition[330] and helicopters to be diverted
from those resupplying the 7th Marines. By the third day, a backlog of
supplies had accumulated in the loading areas. In order to eliminate
this buildup and to replace ammunition expended that morning by 1/5,
HMR-161 on 25 February transported 200 tons in a single day, thereby
establishing a new record. This represented 392 lifts made in 138.4
hours flying time. Maximum time for unloading a chopper was 54 seconds;
the minimum, 28 seconds.
[330] The following month, HMR-161 engaged in a four-day
ammunition resupply operation for the division. Except
for one day, the 22d, all available helicopters were
assigned to that mission, beginning 20 March. HMR-161
also had a new CO by that time, Colonel Owen A. Chambers
who had taken over from Lieutenant Colonel Carey on 15
March.
The last two days of HAYLIFT II, although less eventful, contributed
to a resupply tonnage record five times greater than that set by
HAYLIFT I. On the last day, when fog grounded their aircraft for a
second time during the morning, Marines were again reminded of an
operational limitation of the helicopters. In the end, though, the
accomplishments far out-weighed this shortcoming. During the five
days, a total of 1,612,406 pounds of supplies had been lifted to the
two frontline regiments. Not one crewman or helicopter was lost. The
operation contributed significantly to the February record for the
greatest number of combat hours (765), total hours (1,275.5), combat
flights (575), and total flights (1,183) flown by HMR-161 for any
one-month period during the Korean fighting. For the rest of the war,
the February 1953 gross lift of 2,018,120 pounds would also rank as the
largest amount transported by HMR-161 for a single month.
_The Quiet Sectors_[331]
[331] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: KPR ComdDs, Jun, Aug, Oct-Dec 52, Jan-Mar
53; 1st AmTracBn ComdDs, Mar-Dec 52, Jan-Mar 53.
Two frontline units in the division MLR seldom became involved in
setting records or bitter contests with the enemy, even though they
carried out important roles in the sector defense. These were the
Kimpo Provisional Regiment and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, both
located on the left flank of the Marine line. The Kimpo Provisional
Regiment had been organized as a component of the 1st Marine Division
a week after its arrival in the west, specifically for defending that
vital sector at the extreme left of the UNC line. The next month the
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been assigned part of Line KANSAS
between the KPR and KMC sectors.
Because it was set apart from the Korean mainland on the north and east
by the Han River,[332] Kimpo Peninsula afforded little opportunity
for its occupants to engage the enemy directly in infantry clashes.
Artillery thus became the normal medium for carrying on the limited
hostilities as they existed in this sector between the Communists
and UNC opponents. Hostile forces opposing the KPR were deployed
in company-sized strongpoints across the river, occupying numerous
fortified heights on the north bank of the Han estuary. Enemy
strength[333] was estimated to be 7 infantry companies, supported by
7 artillery batteries and 40 mortar positions. Sporadic mortar and
artillery rounds fell in the sector, with little harm. Occasionally,
enemy counterbattery fire caused minor damage to the LVTs of the
command. During 1952, the first year of the existence of the Kimpo
regiment, 15 June had stood as the record day for the number of enemy
artillery rounds received. Between 1900–2100 a total of 588 shells had
fallen in the sector.
[332] On the west, the Yom River similarly separates the Kimpo
Peninsula from Kanghwa-do Island, second in size of all
Korean islands and a base for friendly intelligence
operations.
[333] Identified as elements of the 195th CCF Division of the
65th CCF Army and an unidentified CCF division, in a
revised EOOB issued in December. Previously, units of the
193d CCF Division were at the front in this far western
sector. KPR ComdDs, Oct-Dec 52.
As part of its normal defense mission, personnel of the regiment
spent a large part of their time controlling civilians and regulating
traffic, especially water travel. Certain counterintelligence
problems confronted the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. A large civilian
population, numbering nearly 80,000 natives, lived within the
regimental sector. Local restrictions set by the National Police on
Kimpo (who cooperated with the KPR in security matters) included the
STAYBACK LINE to the north of the peninsula. As a rule, no civilians
other than those with daytime farming permits, were allowed beyond this
line. Numerous regulations were also issued to control boat traffic.
Surrounded by rivers on three sides, there was ample opportunity for
enemy agents or line crossers to infiltrate the defense line, despite
continuous screening by friendly outposts and waterborne patrols.
Two months after the “heavy” June shelling came the August floods,
which were more destructive than the artillery had been. The rest of
the summer and fall followed a fairly regular, uneventful pattern with
customary defense duties, rotation of frontline units, and training
exercises. Among the latter were four helicopter demonstrations in
October and a five-hour communication CPX (Command Post Exercise) the
following month.
One episode toward the end of the year created a temporary stir in
the daily routine. In late November, two Communist espionage agents
and their North Korean guides were apprehended on the west bank of
the Han, almost directly east of the Kimpo Airfield. They had crossed
the Imjin-Han Rivers by boat, using this normal infiltration route to
penetrate the Marine defense net. The agents were seized by National
Police on 22 November and their North Korean guides two days later. It
was unusual for agents and guides to be captured so closely together.
Normal defense measures of the peninsula had assigned separate
northern, western, and southern sector units for protection against
possible amphibious or overland attacks or--far more likely--enemy
infiltration.
The following month four more “roving” two-man outposts were
established in the western coastal area of the southern sector.
Manned from sunset to 30 minutes after sunrise daily by either KPR
military personnel or National Police, the outposts occupied different
positions each night. They were responsible for checking for proper
identification and enforcing the rigid 2100–0500 curfew hours. Another
unusual occurrence took place the last four nights of December when a
single-engine light aircraft dropped propaganda leaflets in Colonel
Harvey C. Tschirgi’s[334] sector.
[334] Colonel Tschirgi had taken command of the KPR on 1
December from Colonel Richard H. Crockett, who previously
relieved Colonel Staab (the original KPR commander) on 31
August.
Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dobervich, the 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion (minus Company A at KPR, and Company B at Pohang), reinforced
by the Division Reconnaissance Company, had manned positions on the
KANSAS line since April 1952. By the end of May, the battalion had
inserted an additional unit, a provisional company,[335] in the
KANSAS secondary defense line. In July, the amtrac company relieved
the reconnaissance company on line, the latter then becoming part of
Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. All amphibian tractor
battalion units assigned to ground defense missions received special
refresher training in infantry operations, including the employment of
forward observers.
[335] Comprising a platoon from Company B and several
headquarters elements, the provisional company was
disbanded on 14 June when Company B that had been
supporting MAG-33 at Pohang was reassigned to the
battalion.
During the first summer in the west, the mainland-based amphibian
organization continued its KANSAS defense mission. The battalion also
instituted a training program for patrolling the Han River by tractor.
(Company A, attached to the KPR, had conducted waterborne patrols of
the Yom since June. The unit also manned outposts along that river.)
Headquarters and Service Company assisted the U.S. Army in laying a
signal cable across the river during August, the same month Lieutenant
Colonel Dobervich relinquished unit command to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin
B. Wheeler. In late August the battalion sent 58 of its members to help
augment 1st Marines ranks, thinned by the fierce Bunker Hill fighting.
Through the end of 1952, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion continued
its KANSAS mission. Although the sector had witnessed relatively
little action for some months, several incidents about this time
varied the generally quiet daily routine. In October, Company B (Major
Charles W. Fitzmaurice) sent out an amphibious patrol to capture
prisoners (Operation CAT WHISKER). The plan was to cross the Han in
a rubber boat and set up an ambush after reaching the enemy shore,
but a storm-angered river, with a strong tide boosted by heavy winds,
prevented landing of the boat. Two months later, another snare--this
one set by the enemy--was partially successful. Several hours after
dark on 1 December, the jeep assigned to the battalion commander, Major
George S. Saussy, Jr.,[336] was being driven on the MSR by Private
First Class Billy J. Webb, its operator and only occupant.
[336] Formerly the executive officer, Major Saussy took over
unit command on 7 November, when Lieutenant Colonel
Wheeler was transferred to the 5th Marines. Lieutenant
Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., became the next
commanding officer on 16 March 1953.
Suddenly shots rang out from the side of the road. Within a few
seconds, 23 bullets from a Russian-made submachine gun had struck the
jeep; the driver, astonishingly, received only a knee wound. No trace
of the ambushers could be found by the friendly patrol dispatched to
investigate the incident. An activity of an entirely different nature
that same month was the assignment of battalion LVTs to break up the
heavily encrusted ice that had formed around and endangered supports of
three bridges in the I Corps area. A rash of minor incidents involving
would-be, but unsuccessful, enemy infiltrators also took place during
the winter months in the amtrac sector. In November, three agents
attempted to cross the Imjin on their way to the division area, but
were engaged by a battalion patrol. After a brief fire fight, friendly
artillery was called down on the retreating boat and it was believed
destroyed. Enemy agents on foot were engaged by National Police or
Marine listening posts again in January and March and deterred from
their espionage missions.
Commitment to an infantry role in the KANSAS line, meanwhile, had
permitted little time for operation of the battalion tractors. In
December, construction began on a storage park for those LVTs not in
use. By placing the non-operating tracked vehicles in a single area,
the battalion could handle routine maintenance with just a few men.
This facility, located at Ascom City, was completed early in 1953.
By March, a total of 34 tractors had been placed there in caretaker
status. Implicit in this economy measure was the requirement that all
stowed tractors could revert to combat status, if necessary, on a
48-hour alert.
_Changes in the Concept of Ground Defense_[337]
[337] The material in this section is derived from: _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8.
During the winter months of 1952–1953, the 1st Marine Division modified
the organization of its tactical defense, although it retained the
basic concept of the combat outpost system as the backbone of MLR
defense.[338] Development of much of the KANSAS line and parts of the
Marine MLR during this period reflected several new ideas on how the
ground defense could be better organized. Recent experience during
Communist attacks had shown that defensive emplacements and positions
could be dug deeper and below ground to withstand massed enemy fires.
Contrary to traditional concepts, it had also been found that centering
the defense on the military crest[339] of a hill was not always the
best procedure. Emplacement of machine guns downslope or in low firing
positions to cover draws or flat ground was not entirely suitable to
the Korean terrain, enemy, or nature of positional warfare.
[338] The 1st Commonwealth Division, to the Marine right,
utilized a different defense system. Instead of relying
on the COPs forward of the main line of defense as major
deterrent positions, the British preferred to include all
strategic terrain features within the MLR itself. They
followed a policy of active patrolling to the front and,
at night, occupied selected ground sites, preferring to
fight the enemy from their main battle positions rather
than from more isolated COP positions. _PactFlt EvalRpt_
No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-92, 9-93.
[339] The military crest is that point along the slope of a
hill from which maximum observation up and down the hill
can be obtained. The topographical crest is the highest
point on a hill or ridge.
[Illustration:
MAP DIAGRAM 20 K. White
ORGANIZATION OF GROUND DEFENSE
WINTER 1952–1953]
Altered defense concepts, beginning in October, took the following form:
(1) The trace of defensive positions followed the topographical
crest (A) rather than military crest (B) of key terrain features.
(Map diagrams 20 and 21 illustrate these changes.)
(2) Fighting positions and emplacements were dug a short distance
downslope (C) from the topographical crest.
(3) Trenches on the topographical crest permitted easier, faster,
and more protected access to fighting positions from the reverse
slope and support area (D).
(4) Positions on the topographical crest were less vulnerable to
enemy artillery because it was more difficult for the enemy to
adjust his fire on these positions than on trenches dug along the
military crest. Many shells simply passed over the top (E) of the
hill.
(5) Certain hills and noses were selected and organized so that
trenches and gun emplacements, encircling the crest, would form
mutually supporting positions (X).
(6) Machine guns were moved from the draws (Y) to hilltops and
noses (Z) where better long-range observation and fields of fire
existed.
[Illustration:
MAP DIAGRAM 21 K. WHITE
TYPICAL HILL DEFENSE
(Cross Section)
WINTER 1952–1953]
Another change in the improvement of field fortifications came into use
during the winter months. A different type of barbed wire obstacle,
called “Canadian,” “random,” or “double-apron” wire, began to find
favor with Marine infantrymen. Canadian wire consisted of two parallel
rows of three-strand barbed wire fencing, erected about three feet
apart. The void was filled in with additional barbed wire, placed
at random, but connected to the parallel fences.[340] The new type
barbed wire appeared more effective for several reasons. Besides being
simple and fast to emplace, Canadian wire merely became more entangled
by artillery shelling, which quickly ripped apart the standard
double-apron barbed wire previously used in COP slope defenses.
[340] Commenting on the heavy destruction of Hook
fortifications by CCF preparation, one 7th Marine company
commander stated: “Enemy artillery and mortars did tend
to destroy the protective wire. We noted especially that
the Canadian ‘Random Wire,’ although it tended to move
about under fire, did hold together and continue to offer
good protection.” _McLaughlin ltr._
_Before the Nevadas Battle_[341]
[341] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, Feb-Mar 53; 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdDs,
Feb-Mar 53; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7
ComdDs, Feb 53.
As the Marine division continued to revamp and strengthen its primary
defenses, a change of pace on the battlefront was gradually being felt.
Only a few major raids had taken place during November, December, and
January, and these involved no transfer of real estate. Casualties had
been light. Artillery rounds, both incoming and outgoing, had dropped
substantially. By February, however, it became apparent that the period
of winter inactivity was nearing an end.
Taking the initiative in the renewed action was the 5th Marines,
occupants of the right regimental sector since 25 January. The next
month the regiment conducted three successful daytime raids against
fortified enemy positions. Targets for the initial action, on 3
February, were two consistently troublesome hills, 31 and 31A in the
Ungok Hill mass, north of the left battalion sector.
Since all battalions of the 5th Marines were to be involved either
directly or indirectly in Operation CLAMBAKE, the initial planning and
actual execution of the raid was to be carried out by the regimental
commander, Colonel Walt. CLAMBAKE required especially thorough
coordination of the heavy fire support since it was to be launched with
a tank-artillery feint against several CCF positions (Hill 104, Kumgok,
and Red Hill) generally west of the Ungok objective area. The two
target hills were to be assaulted by reinforced platoons from Company
A (Captain Don H. Blanchard) of the reserve battalion, 1/5, commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel Jonas M. Platt, who was responsible for the later
planning stages of the raid. It was anticipated that intensive air and
artillery preparation on the feint objectives and movement of gun and
flame tanks during the diversion would gain the element of surprise for
the assault platoons. Thus the Marines hoped to take prisoners, the
main purpose of the raid, and to kill enemy troops and destroy their
defenses.
During the five weeks of preparation, every aspect of the maneuver was
thoroughly reviewed and rehearsed. All participating units took part
in the planning conferences. Routes were reconnoitered, mines cleared,
and fire concentrations plotted and registered. MAG-12 pilots studied
the target areas from the nearby Marine MLR. Six rehearsals, including
practice in casualty evacuation, uncovered potential problem areas.
Final rehearsal was held 1 February, with artillery and air preparation
made against the feint objectives. Four close air support strikes were
conducted that day and the next as part of the plan to divert enemy
attention from the CLAMBAKE destruction mission.
Shortly after first light on 3 February, three platoons of tanks
rumbled across the MLR to assault the feint area. A heavy “false”
artillery preparation by 1/11 was also placed on the three western
enemy hills as well as direct fire from gun and flame tanks. The two
Marine assault forces, one against each hill, moved out armed with
flamethrowers, 3.5-inch rockets, machine guns, grenades, satchel
charges, bangalore torpedoes, and automatic weapons. Enemy forces
occupying the positions made three separate counterattack attempts,
which were blunted by Marine supporting arms. During the infantry
attack, friendly air hovered on station and artillery fired continuous
counterbattery and countermortar fire.
With the exception of the change of withdrawal route of one of the
assault teams, the 5th Marines reported that the operation was carried
out according to plan. Company A tanks had swung left across the frozen
rice paddies to provide left flank security for the infantry and to
interdict trenchlines that connected with the Ungok objective. Intense
enemy fire lashed the armored vehicles as they approached Kumgok
and Red Hill as well as those supporting tanks that remained on the
MLR.[342] Air, artillery, infantry, and tanks produced an estimated
390 Chinese casualties (including 90 known KIA) in addition to damaged
or destroyed trenchlines, tunnels, caves, bunkers, and weapons of the
enemy. Marine losses were 14 killed and 91 wounded. One flame tank was
lost.
[342] For a detailed account of the tank action in the CLAMBAKE
raid see Col Clyde W. Hunter ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd
6 Jun 70, in v. V, Korean comment file.
As in the case of the 1st Marines WAKEUP raid in November 1952,
CLAMBAKE was important not so much in accomplishing its primary
mission (actually, no POWs were taken) as in lessons learned. One of
these was to reemphasize the fact that thorough preparation helped
to ensure smooth coordination of infantry and supporting arms. In
his report of the operation, Lieutenant Colonel Platt wrote, “minute
planning to the last detail along with carefully executed rehearsals
are basic to success in actions of this type.”[343] He further noted
that “confidence and enthusiasm stimulated by the rehearsals are
assets which cannot be overlooked.”[344] The battalion commander also
commented on the importance of planning for both troop withdrawal and
maintaining a flexible schedule of fires by supporting arms. Air,[345]
artillery, and tanks all employed fire plans that could be readily
adjusted to meet the changing tactical situation.
[343] 1/5 ComdD, Feb. 53, App. IVc, dtd 19 Feb 53, p. 5.
[344] _Ibid._
[345] In order to assure better close air support during the
assault; an SOP for the airborne tactical controller was
proposed and drafted by MAG-12 for 1st MAW approval.
The plan utilized the marking of targets by rocket and
subsequent corrections to be made by the FAC. This
enabled MAG-12 aircraft “to scramble, fly a CAS mission
at the Division front and be back at the field at K-6 in
approximately 40 minutes.” Col Wayne M. Cargill ltr to
Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70.
On the ground, flame was found to be the best weapon for neutralizing
the well-fortified CCF caves. From Company A, 1st Tank Battalion
(Captain Hunter) came information about Chinese 3.5-inch rocket
launcher teams used in antitank defense. Several of these tank-killer
teams had run down the trenchline holding small bushes in front of
them. The enemy then boldly advanced through a hail of bullets to
within 15–20 yards of the Marine tank before opening fire with their
rockets. Short bursts of flame from headquarters tanks soon caused even
the most intrepid to beat a hurried retreat.
Concluding his after-action report of CLAMBAKE, the regimental
commander, Colonel Walt, observed:
In addition to inflicting large numbers of casualties and
destruction upon the enemy, the operation served a secondary
purpose, none the less important. It provided excellent training
and experience for the various infantry and supporting arms
staffs involved, helping to develop them into a smoothly
functioning infantry-air-artillery-tank team.[346]
[346] 5th Mar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 20 Feb 53, p. 3.
Shortly before the end of the month, the 5th Marines made another
major assault. As in the earlier CLAMBAKE, this raid was again in
two-reinforced-platoon size and made during the early daylight hours
of 25 February. This time the objective was a single height, Hill 15
(Detroit), two miles east of the CLAMBAKE objective. Lieutenant Colonel
Oscar F. Peatross’[347] 2/5, manning the extreme right sector of the
division, gave the assignment to Company F, then under Captain Harold
D. Kurth, Jr. Planning for Operation CHARLIE, a standard-type kill,
capture, and destroy raid, was carried out in much the same detailed
manner as the earlier 1/5 raid.
[347] Lieutenant Colonel Peatross had succeeded Lieutenant
Colonel McLaughlin as battalion CO on 11 Sep 52.
CHARLIE differed somewhat in concept in that the 2/5 operational plan
attempted to gain surprise by launching the attack during the BMNT[348]
period as well as in use of smoke to screen enemy observation.
Supporting arms preparatory fires had been carefully plotted, including
the precision destruction aerial bombing that had proved so effective
in the CLAMBAKE assault. In actual execution of CHARLIE, however, bad
weather prevented the use of almost all the planned pre-D-Day and D-Day
air strikes. Upon reaching the Detroit objective area assault Marines
“found the majority of enemy installations were relatively undamaged,
even though subjected to heavy bombardment by other supporting
arms.”[349] Artillery preparatory fires had been employed successfully
to isolate the battle area and howitzer and tank missions supported the
raid.[350]
[348] Beginning morning nautical twilight is that period
before sunrise or after sunset (BENT, or beginning
evening nautical twilight) when visibility is limited to
approximately 300 yards.
[349] 5thMar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 28 Feb 53, p. 5.
[350] In nearly three hours of firing, the 11th Marines and
its reinforcing and attached units, including the 1st
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, expended 11,881 rounds.
Indicative of the meticulous planning that preceded an
operation such as CHARLIE is the 11th Marines report of
this raid, 11thMar ComdD, Feb 53.
Between the time of CLAMBAKE and CHARLIE a series of Marine and enemy
small units actions erupted which were soon to become a way of life
for the MLR combatants. By sporadic outpost attacks and increasing
their use of artillery, the Chinese were beginning to demonstrate a
more aggressive attitude than in recent months. On the night of 12–13
February, a CCF platoon supported by mortars and artillery probed
COP Hedy (Hill 124), in the right battalion of the center regimental
sector, held by Lieutenant Colonel Barrett’s 3/7. On the next night,
it was the Korean Marines who turned aggressor. Two of their platoons
raided Hill 240, on the west bank of the Sachon, nearly three miles
north of the mouth of the river. The following night, a 7th Marines
patrol moving into ambush positions was itself stalked by a large CCF
patrol. When reinforcements, including armored vehicles, moved out from
the MLR to support the Marines, the Chinese hastily withdrew.
Three more contacts were made before the end of the month along the
division front. On 19 February CCF soldiers, in two-platoon strength,
engaged KMC sentries forward of COP 33, located about a mile east of
the action the previous week. After the initial exchange of small arms
fire, the Koreans moved back to the outpost and called down supporting
fires on the Chinese. Artillery and mortars tore into the attackers
causing numerous casualties and forcing the enemy to withdraw. On the
morning of 22 February, a raiding party from the 5th Marines assaulted
a smaller enemy force at Hill 35A, approximately 1,300 yards southwest
of the Ungok hills. In this second raid staged by the 5th Marines that
month, assault troops (H/3/5) used flamethrowers in the early stages of
the action to help clear enemy trenches of hostile grenade throwers.
Late the next night a 7th Marines unit, consisting of a reinforced
platoon and four M-46 tanks, set out to raid Yoke, located near the
peace corridor five miles north of Freedom Bridge. The assault against
that position never came off. At 2137 as the B/1/7 platoon moved into
preliminary positions on Hill 90, north of the ultimate objective, a
Chinese company ambushed the patrol from three sides. When the Marines
closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting, a support platoon was
sent from the MLR. After an intense 30 minute fire fight, the CCF began
withdrawing at 0138. Enemy losses were listed as 45 counted KIA, 33
estimated KIA, and 35 estimated WIA. As a result of the assault, orders
for the 7th Marines raid on Yoke were cancelled. Marine casualties
numbered 5 killed, 22 wounded.
Whereas February was characterized by a marked increase in ground
contacts between Marines and their CCF adversaries, during the first
part of March the Chinese again assumed an inactive posture. Marine
patrols reported few contacts. Except for a KMC raid on 3 March, little
action that could be considered a sizable engagement took place until
after midmonth. On the 16th there was a brief skirmish involving a 5th
Marines combat patrol near Reno and a short fire fight between Carson
defenders and an enemy squad. The next night a Chinese platoon, waiting
near Vegas for a Marine patrol to pass by, was itself put to flight by
the patrol.
Two encounters with the CCF on 19 March marked the heaviest action
yet of the month. Early that morning, a predawn raid was staged by
B/1/5 (Captain Theodore J. Mildner) at Hill 31A, one of the Ungok twin
objectives in CLAMBAKE the previous month. The March ITEM raid employed
111 Marines. One platoon was to make the assault and the second platoon
to support the operation and assist in casualty evacuation. Following
a series of nearly a dozen air strikes on the objective and artillery
preparation, Captain Mildner’s two assault platoons jumped off from
the MLR check point at 0518. As usually happened in such operations,
the preliminary fire drove the Chinese to reverse slope defenses. No
enemy POWs were taken and at 0700 the Marine units disengaged, due to
casualties sustained from enemy shelling and machine gun fire.[351]
[351] Prior to the raid various combinations of flamethrower
fuels and pressure were extensively used. The purpose
was to determine the maximum effective range of
the flamethrower teams in order to “neutralize the
hand-grenade throwing potential of the enemy, this being
one of the major problems confronting assault elements on
other raids.” Final tests resulted in flame being thrown
more than 40 yards up hill. 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, App. IVf,
p. 3.
Earlier that same date, two attacks had been made simultaneously by
the enemy on outposts in the center regimental sector, where the 1st
Marines had relieved the 7th on 10 March. At 0105 one CCF company
struck in the vicinity of Hedy while a second lunged at Esther, about
1½ miles east. When a G/3/1 reconnaissance patrol operating forward
of COP Esther observed enemy movement, the Marines pulled back to
the outpost, alerting it to the impending attack. After a heavy
incoming artillery barrage, the enemy assaulted the outpost, but when
a three-hour effort failed to carry the position, the attackers
withdrew. By that time the Chinese company which had hit COP Hedy had
also broken off the attack.
Actually the fight in Captain Carl R. Gray’s Company H sector, to the
rear of Hedy, was mainly at the MLR, for the Chinese indulged in merely
a brief fire fight at the latter outpost, bypassing it in favor of a
crack at JAMESTOWN. The main line of resistance failed to yield to
the enemy thrust, which was supported by 2,400 rounds of mortar and
artillery fire along the MLR and outposts.
After being thwarted by Hedy-Esther defenses, the enemy shifted his
efforts westward to the 1st KMC area. The Korean regiment received
the brunt of the enemy’s minor infantry probes immediately preceding
the Nevada Cities battle. Late on 25 March a series of skirmishes
broke out in the 1st Marines sector between one-or-two platoon size
Chinese infantry forces and Marine outpost defenders. Following a quiet
daylight spell on the 26th, the Chinese resumed the offensive with a
probe at COP Dagmar. This coincided with what developed into a massive
regimental assault unleashed against Carson, Reno, and Vegas, outposts
in the 5th Marines sector, to the right. There Colonel Walt’s regiment
would shortly be the target of the bloodiest Chinese attack to date on
the 1st Marine Division in West Korea.