CHAPTER IV

Outpost Fighting Expanded

_From the Center Sector to the Right--Early September Outpost

Clashes--Korean COPs Hit Again--More Enemy Assaults in Late

September--Chinese Intensify Their Outpost Attacks--More PRESSURE, More

CAS, More Accomplishments--Rockets, Resupply, and Radios_

_From the Center Sector to the Right_[208]

[208] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs

661–675, dtd 18–31 Aug 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1

ComdDs, Aug 52.

Following the progressively faltering Chinese attacks against Bunker

Hill in mid-August, the 1st Marines in the center MLR sector witnessed

a period of decreased enemy activity. By sunup on the 17th, Captain

Ksycewski’s Company C, from Lieutenant Colonel King’s 1st Battalion had

relieved B/1/1, marking the second complete tour of duty at Hill 122

for Company B that month. In two days on the shell-torn crest, Company

C received only a single enemy probe and only a few rounds of artillery

and mortar fire. In the early morning hours of the 19th, D/2/1 assumed

responsibility for Bunker and Hill 124. These new occupants of the

disputed property almost immediately were subjected to larger and more

frequent Chinese probes as well as increased fire from CCF supporting

weapons.

Enemy ground action was directed against the Marine flank, especially

the right. Four Chinese infantrymen attempted to infiltrate this corner

of the Bunker Hill defenses just before sunrise on 23 August. One even

made his way to the top of Hill 122 where he fired downhill at several

Marine defenders, wounding one. A moment later this lone Chinese’s

reconnaissance efforts was rewarded by a fatal hit from a Marine

sniper’s rifle.

Captain Moody’s Company F next took over the two-hill complex. That

night, the 24th, the Chinese shelled the two hills and probed their

defenses but again showed no inclination to press an attack. On the

following night, however, the Chinese became more aggressive. At dusk,

two squads charged the right flank of Bunker Hill, threw hand grenades,

and fired their submachine guns briefly at the Marines. The enemy then

retired, but about an hour afterwards, a force estimated at two-company

strength assaulted the outpost defenses from the center to the right.

At the same time, enemy shells began exploding around these Marine

positions. Captain Moody called for artillery and tank fire on the

attackers. Pushing forward, the Communist infantrymen forced a small

opening in the defense perimeter; by this time, a standby platoon on

the MLR was moving forward to strengthen the Bunker garrison. Upon

arrival of the Marine reinforcements, at midnight, the Chinese soldiers

withdrew. Simultaneously, the incoming artillery and mortar fire

diminished, and in less than a half hour all firing had ceased.

After the enemy had pulled back, Company F sent its platoon out to

reoccupy a forward listening position temporarily abandoned during the

second attack. Chinese soldiers immediately contested this advance

and, after a local fire fight, caused the Marines to retire once more.

That action ended the significant Bunker Hill action in August. In the

spirited infantry fighting and artillery dueling during the night of

25–26 August, Marines suffered 65 casualties, including 8 killed. The

Chinese losses were estimated at 100 killed and 170 wounded. Supporting

arms fire had contributed largely to the high casualty figures on both

sides.

During August, whenever a lull had occurred in Colonel Layer’s 1st

Marines embattled sector, it almost invariably signaled a step-up

of Chinese action elsewhere along the 1st Marine Division MLR. When

frustrated in their attacks against the positions held by the 1st

Marines, the enemy invariably turned his attention to the right of the

line, manned since June by the 5th Marines. During August the Chinese

seized three outposts forward of the 2/5[209] right battalion line,

which it had been the Marine practice to man during daylight hours

only. The trio, forming a diagonal line southwest to northeast, in

front of the battalion sector were Elmer, Hilda, and Irene.

[209] Command responsibility for this sector changed on 20

August, when Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin

took over the battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Cross.

After dusk on 6 August the enemy had advanced to COP Elmer, on the

far southwest end, and by skillful coordination of their infantry and

supporting fires denied the position to the Marines approaching to

reoccupy the outpost early the next morning. An hour before midnight

on 11 August, another 2/5 patrol had attempted to temporarily occupy

Hilda, in the center, during the diversionary fires supporting the

Bunker Hill attack. As the Marines neared the outpost, however, they

discovered the Chinese had already occupied it. Enemy mortar and

artillery fire drove the patrol back to its own lines.

A similar situation occurred at dawn on 17 August, when the Marine

outpost detail moved forward to occupy Irene during daylight hours

and found the Chinese already on the position. Enemy troops fired at

the Marines, pinning them down.[210] Although two rescue units were

dispatched to support the Marines, CCF fire interdicted their route of

approach. When it became evident the second reinforcement party could

not reach its objective, the outpost detail was ordered to pull back to

the MLR. The Chinese continued to occupy Irene, the last outpost lost

in August, for the remainder of the 2/5 tour on line.

[210] To escape the murderous hostile fire, the Marines

sought shelter in a trench nearby. During the ensuing

clash, a Chinese grenade landed in the midst of the

Marines. Private First Class Robert E. Simanek, E/2/5,

unhesitatingly threw himself upon the deadly missile an

instant before it exploded. Although gravely wounded, his

courageous action prevented injury or death to fellow

patrol members. The following year, President Dwight D.

Eisenhower presented the Medal of Honor to the Detroit,

Michigan Marine for his “daring initiative and great

personal valor.”

For the remainder of August the Chinese were apparently content to hold

what they had gained without immediately seeking additional positions.

As a result, operations along the front were mostly limited to patrol

action. Chinese infantry units, usually no larger than a squad,

regularly fired on Marine patrols, engaging them for a short period

from afar, and then quickly breaking off the contact. Seldom was this

small unit action supported by artillery or mortars.

On two occasions late in the month, however, the Chinese showed more

spirit. Both encounters took place during the early evening hours of 22

August when Chinese patrols came upon two different Company F ambushes

operating forward of the 2/5 sector. Heavy casualties were suffered by

both sides.

The next day a brief but heavy period of rainfall began with nine

inches recorded between 23–25 August. Although the flooding conditions

in the division sector were not so extensive as the July rains, they

curtailed ground activity considerably and air action to a lesser

degree. Division roads were badly damaged but not trenches and bunkers,

strengthened as a result of the experience with the July floods. High

waters made the ferry inoperable at the Honker Bridge site and also

washed out Widgeon Bridge, where the Imjin crested to 42.5 feet. If

the sudden flash floods wreaked havoc with some of the Marine division

installations, the Chinese were the recipients of similar disfavors;

intelligence indicated that damage to the CCF frontline positions was

even more severe than to the JAMESTOWN defenses.[211]

[211] 1stMarDiv PIR 669, dtd 25 Aug 52.

The end of August saw the relief of General Selden as Commanding

General, 1st Marine Division. He was succeeded on the 29th by Major

General Edwin A. Pollock. A brief ceremony at division headquarters,

attended by senior officers of EUSAK and KMC, marked the event. Earlier

that month, in recognition of his services to the Korean defense,

President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, had awarded General

Selden the Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, the highest Korean award.

The new division commander, General Pollock[212] had commanded the

2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina just prior to his

Korean tour. He had more than 30 years of military experience. During

World War II, he had participated in no fewer than five major campaigns

in the Pacific, including the first at Guadalcanal, where he earned

a Navy Cross, and one of the war’s most costly battles, Iwo Jima.

Following the war, he had served at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, in

command and staff assignments, and later at Headquarters Marine Corps

where in July 1949, he had received his first star.

[212] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, Jan

56, rev.

_Early September Outpost Clashes_[213]

[213] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1, 2/5,

3/5 ComdDs, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 188–189, dtd 6–7

Sep 52.

The new division commander shortly received a first-hand demonstration

of the ferocity and persistence of the Chinese Communists opposite his

division. On 4 September, the enemy suddenly stepped up his activities

which had recently been limited to sporadic probes and occasional

artillery fire against Bunker Hill. At 2030 that date Captain Moak,

E/2/1, commanding officer at the Bunker outpost, reported that an

artillery preparation was falling on his positions. Ten minutes later

he radioed 3/1[214] that an enemy platoon was vigorously probing his

right flank. When Company E Marines returned a heavy volume of small

arms fire, the enemy retired.

[214] Normally a component of the 2d Battalion, Company E

had been attached to the 3d Battalion on 1 September

when the company took over the Bunker Hill outpost. The

relieved Company H was then attached to 2/1, the reserve

battalion, from 1–3 September.

This Chinese withdrawal was only temporary, for the initial probe

proved the forerunner of more serious activity. Again at 0100 on

5 September a heavy deluge of Chinese mortar and artillery began

raining on Hill 122. The intense preparation had apparently convinced

the Chinese attacking force that they had eliminated resistance at

the Marine outpost, for their soldiers walked upright toward Marine

positions, without bothering to make any attempts at concealment. After

discovering that a stout defense was still being maintained at Bunker,

the Chinese again withdrew and reorganized.

When they resumed the attack, the Chinese used considerably greater

caution. This time, in addition to small arms, automatic weapons fire,

and a hail of grenades, their assault was supported by artillery and

mortars. The results of this concerted effort were not too rewarding,

however. Assaults on the center of Hill 122 were repulsed and attempts

to crack the left perimeter of Company E’s defenses were even more

speedily beaten back. A number of Chinese attempting to outflank the

E/2/1 defenders inadvertently strayed too far to the right of the

outpost and found themselves advancing against the MLR south of Hill

122.

When JAMESTOWN forces engaged these wanderers by fire, the latter

quickly realized their mistake and wheeled left for a hasty retreat.

They immediately came under fire of their own troops, some of whom

had meanwhile penetrated 60 yards into the extreme right of the

Bunker positions. At this point, Captain Moak’s Company E launched

a counterattack and restored its positions on the right. This

action forced a general withdrawal of the Chinese force, which the

Marines estimated at battalion strength. Lieutenant Colonel Sidney

J. Altman[215] subsequently advised division headquarters that his

men had killed 30 enemy soldiers and estimated that as many as 305

were probably wounded. This high rate of casualties was attributed,

in part, to the enemy’s mistaken sense of direction, their direct

walking approach which had made them easy standing targets, and to

the box-me-in artillery fires supporting the defenders. Marine losses

were 12 killed and 40 wounded, caused mostly by Chinese mortars and

artillery.

[215] On 20 August Lieutenant Colonel Altman became the

commander of 3/1 in relief of Lieutenant Colonel Armitage.

Although the left battalion area was the center of attention in the

1st Marines line early on 5 September, the far right sector was not

entirely neglected either. Five minutes after their initial attack

on Bunker, other Chinese units also lunged at the Hill 48A outpost,

Stromboli. An estimated reinforced platoon, supported by three active

machine guns on Hill 104, 850 yards to the north, employed submachine

guns, rifles, and grenades in their attack. This battle lasted for

nearly two hours, until the Chinese soldiers withdrew at 0240. There

were no Marine losses. No tally or estimate was made on the number

of enemy KIA or WIA. It was presumed that some of the Communists did

become casualties since the three machine guns that had been chattering

away to support the attacker’s ground action suddenly went silent after

Marines called down mortar and artillery fire on the Hill 104 positions.

The probes of 1st Marines positions at Bunker Hill and, to a lesser

degree, at Stromboli were repeated in the 5th Marines right regimental

sector. At almost exactly the same time Colonel Eustace R. Smoak’s

regiment[216] was struck at five of its forward outposts. In the case

of OP Gary, on the right, the enemy merely shelled the position for

40 minutes. Against the four other outposts, known as Allen, Bruce,

Clarence, and Felix, the Chinese employed both fire and assault

troops. (See Map 12.) At Felix the action had begun at 0130, a half

hour later than at the adjacent outposts. The difference was probably

due to a C/1/5 ambush[217] which had engaged an enemy force operating

between Donald and Felix. After a brief five minute fire fight the

Marines broke off the action, pulling back to Felix. The other three

outposts, clustered to the left of the 3/5 sector, received the brunt

of the enemy thrust which lasted for an hour and 20 minutes before the

Communists withdrew.

[216] Colonel Smoak had relieved Colonel Culhane on 15 August.

[217] Although 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman)

was the regimental reserve at this time, the regiment had

assigned one company to 2/5, manning the right sector.

[Illustration:

MAP 12 K. WHITE

COMBAT OUTPOSTS AND AMBUSH SITES

5TH MARINES SECTOR

(Division Right)

Early September 1952]

Employing a squad against both Allen and Clarence, and sending a

reinforced company against Bruce, the enemy alternately assaulted and

shelled the positions until 0420, after which the Communist units

policed the battlefield for casualties and withdrew to the north.

Although there was no official estimate of enemy losses, one Marine at

outpost Bruce was credited with inflicting approximately 200 casualties

by fire from two machine guns, a carbine, and grenades. He was Private

First Class Alford L. McLaughlin, of I/3/5, who was later to receive

the Medal of Honor for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity.” Another

Marine from the same company was posthumously awarded the medal.

Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia, although gravely wounded, had

thrown himself on a hostile grenade to save the life of his platoon

sergeant during the Chinese rush to take OP Bruce.

At daybreak the I/3/5 defenders at Bruce, commanded by Captain

Edward Y. Holt, Jr., were confronted by an almost unbelievable

scene of destruction. All of the bunkers on the forward side of the

hill had been destroyed by Chinese mortar and artillery; on the

reverse slope, only two had escaped ruination. Marine losses were 32

dead and wounded.[218] To restore the position the 3/5 commander,

Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T. Jensen, Jr., directed replacements forward

immediately. Carrying emergency supplies, including building materials,

the relief element reached Bruce about 1000. Evacuation of casualties

was the first task and at 1045 the relieved detail was on its way back

to the MLR. Later that day a supply party reached the outpost, having

been temporarily delayed by Chinese interdicting fire.

[218] Still another award of the Medal of Honor was to come

out of the action that ended on 5 September. Hospitalman

Third Class Edward C. Benfold had ministered aid to

several wounded Marines and was searching for others

who needed medical attention when he saw two wounded

Marines in a shell crater. Just as he neared its edge two

grenades fell into it and two Chinese prepared to assault

the Marines. “Picking up a grenade in each hand, Benfold

leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the

onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against

their chests and killing both.... He gallantly gave his

life for his country.” Medal of Honor citation, case of

Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold, USN,

4168234.

Reinforcement of Bruce and the repair of its defenses were considerably

slowed by the continuous rain of enemy projectiles during daylight.

Marine and USAF pilots bombed and napalmed enemy bunkers and troops

north of JAMESTOWN in the 5th Marines sector. Ten air strikes were

executed in support of the 5th Marines that day.

Early on 6 September, 10 minutes after midnight, long-range machine gun

fire, buttressed by artillery and mortars, hit outpost Bruce. After 35

minutes the firing subsided, but again at 0305 the outpost experienced

a heavy rate of incoming. At about this time, the Communist soldiers

massed for an assault on the battered position. Marine defenders called

down the artillery box, and the Chinese dispersed.

That evening, at 1915, the outpost commander reported that the Chinese

had again resumed a steady shelling of the position. The bombardment

continued for an hour. After these heavy preparatory fires, a wave of

enemy infantry began scrambling up the sides of Bruce. At the same

time, outpost Allen to the left came under long-range fire from enemy

strongholds to the west and north. After the Chinese made their initial

rush against Bruce, a second and third attack fared no better. Each was

met and repulsed by the 5th Marines.

After the third abortive attack, a period of deathly stillness

descended upon the contested hill. Occasionally, an enemy mortar round

found its mark among the scattered, splintered bunker timbers and the

caved-in trenches, which connected the sandbag and lumber positions.

At 0145 on the 7th, the Chinese interrupted the uneasy peace that had

settled upon Bruce with a brief, heavy preparatory fire.

Exactly an hour later, an estimated two Chinese companies advanced up

the forward slopes, using demolitions to destroy any friendly bunkers

their artillery and mortar had not earlier completely wrecked. By the

time this newest assault had raged for 30 minutes, nearly every 3/5

defender had become a casualty. Still the Marines refused to give

ground, dealing first with the forward slope assault by the Chinese and

later with those who attempted to envelop the Marines on the reverse

side. On the MLR Marines first observed enemy flares falling between

outpost Bruce and Line JAMESTOWN. Soon thereafter the Chinese policed

the battlefield. By 0400 the Communists retired, and the fight for this

key outpost had ended in failure.

During the 51-hour siege of Outpost Bruce, 19 Marines had been killed

and 38 wounded. At the adjacent 5th Marines outposts, additional losses

were 5 killed and 32 wounded. More than 200 enemy dead were counted.

During the last eight hours of the vicious, close-in fighting at Bruce,

it was estimated that another 200 Chinese had been wounded.

[Illustration:

MAP 13 K. White

COMBAT OUTPOSTS

KMC SECTOR

(Division Left)

5–7 September 1952]

The Korean Marines, holding down the western flank of the three

mainland regimental sectors in the 1st Marine Division line, also

received a share of the enemy’s attention. At dusk on 5 September,

Chinese barrages began to smash Outpost 37,[219] the first of a trio

of positions that would merit hostile attention for the next 22 hours.

Throughout the following day the Chinese continued their mortar

and artillery fire against Outposts 37 and 36, and the regimental

observation post located on Hill 155 (also called Hill 167) to the rear

of the MLR. (See Map 13.) The heaviest enemy fire was directed against

OP 36, a small rise in the low land terrain midway between the Sachon

River, on the west and the Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line, 600 yards to

the east.

[219] Contemporary records of the 1st KMC Regiment for

1952–1953 identify this as Outpost 37. Current reviewer

comments refer to this hill as OP 67. LtCol Kim Yong Kyu,

ROKMC, ltr to CMC, HQMC, dtd 5 Jul 67.

At 1605 a 50-round barrage struck OP 36. After this harassing fire

there was a lull until 1810 when Chinese artillery and mortars again

resumed a steady pounding of the three positions. One hour later enemy

soldiers hit both outposts. Twice the attacking company assaulted OP 37

but neither effort represented, in the view of the defenders, a serious

attempt at capture. Less than a mile south at OP 36, however, the enemy

motive appeared to be quite different.

Crossing the Sachon just north of the Freedom Gate Bridge (also known

as the highway bridge), the Communist infantry moved to assault

positions on the west, north, and northeast sides of the outpost. At

1910, the Chinese began their first rush. It was repulsed, as was a

second one. Another artillery barrage, joined this time by tank fire,

preceded the third attempt. At this point communications went out at

the besieged outpost. At 2150, a squad leader from OP 36 reached the

10th Company CP to report that his position had fallen. In 30 minutes a

communications link was reestablished with the outpost. The defending

Koreans reported that although enemy troops had overrun much of the

hill, they had subsequently withdrawn, apparently because their losses

had been so heavy.

Casualties and damage were severe. The Korean regiment estimated

that 110 enemy had been killed or wounded. An early morning KMC

reconnaissance patrol counted 33 dead Chinese in the vicinity of OP 36.

The attacking force had also left behind much equipment, including more

than 100 grenades and several automatic weapons. No papers were found

on the dead Communist soldiers, but many propaganda leaflets had been

dropped around the outpost. Korean Marine losses at OP 36 were nine

killed and seven wounded. At OP 37 there were four casualties; at the

regimental CP, one Korean and two U.S. Marines had been killed by enemy

artillery. Chinese incoming, estimated at 2,500 rounds during the two

actions, had also caused major damage to part of the OP 36 defenses,

but inflicted less harm to the other two positions. Repairs were begun

before daylight.

_Korean COPS Hit Again_[220]

[220] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts

195–202, dtd 13–20 Sep 52.

After the stepped-up enemy ground activity in early September, both

Chinese and Marine frontline units resumed their earlier pattern

of combat patrols, probes, and ambushes. Possession of Bunker Hill

remained the immediate objective of the enemy and his activities in

the middle of the Marine line were directed to this goal. Once again

on 9 September a marauding Chinese platoon, employing grenades and

submachine guns, sounded out the Bunker defenses, now manned by G/3/1

(Captain William F. Whitbeck, Jr.). After a tentative investigation,

the enemy withdrew. That same day, expanded patrol and raiding

activities were undertaken by Marine line battalions.

These sharply increased offensive measures resulted, in part, from the

Communist interest, as evinced during the summer truce negotiations, in

certain forward positions held by UNC units. On 7 September, the CG, I

Corps had alerted his division commanders to the fact that the enemy

“may attempt to seize and hold certain key terrain features ... over

which there was extensive disagreement during [the 1952 summer truce]

negotiations for the present line of demarcation.”[221] Since much of

the critical land was in his sector, Major General Kendall further

warned his division commanders “to take the necessary action within

your means to hold all terrain now occupied by your divisions.”[222]

Critical terrain features in the 1st Marine Division area of

responsibility were Bunker Hill and the height on which COP Bruce had

been established (Hill 148), in the center and right regimental sectors

respectively.

[221] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52, App. I, # 8.

[222] _Ibid._

Two days later, General Pollock amplified this directive by

underscoring the necessity for holding these two positions, plus eight

more he considered vital for sound tactical defense. These additional

positions, from west to east, were Hills 86 and 37 in the KMC sector;

Hills 56 and 48A in the center sector; and the outposts then known as

Allen, Clarence, Felix, and Jill, all the responsibility of the right

regiment.[223]

[223] When the 7th Marines took over this sector from the 5th

in early September, the names changed to Carson, Vegas,

Detroit, and Seattle respectively. COP Bruce was also

redesignated as Reno. Since the old names of the outposts

were well known to the enemy, for purposes of security

it was decided to identify them differently. U.S. cities

were selected.

Although the eastern part of the division main line thus contained

at this time more key hills than any other Marine sector, much of

the increase in Marine patrol and ambush activity took place in

No-Man’s-Land forward of the middle frontline regiment. Of the two

JAMESTOWN sectors manned by U.S. Marines, the one in the center of the

division area offered better ground for infantry operations.

On the divisional western flank, the Korean Marines conducted frequent

infantry-tank patrols during the second and third weeks of September,

but the enemy opposite the KMCs initiated little ground activity.

Instead, the Chinese relied upon their supporting weapons to provide

the contact. For a seven-day period ending 19 September, a total of

2,375 enemy rounds had fallen in that regimental sector, an average of

339 per day. Nearly a third had been in the vicinity of Hill 36.

Before sunrise on the 19th, a Chinese infantry company had crossed the

Sachon in the vicinity of the railroad bridge. Once on the east side,

the enemy soldiers concealed themselves in caves and holes, remaining

there until dusk. Then, when they came out of hiding, the Communists

held a briefing and organized themselves into three attack groups. As

these advance infantry elements approached their objective, OP 36,

other reinforcing units were prepared to seize OP 37, to the east, and

OPs 33 and 31, to the south. Artillery and mortar preparation supported

these diversionary attacks.

The main assault was accompanied by even heavier shelling. As the three

assault units reached the bottom of the hill at OP 36, artillery,

mortars, and tanks had fired more than 400 rounds. Approaching from

the north, east, and west, the Chinese scrambled up the hill, gaining

control of the wrecked defenses by 2000. Sporadic exchanges of fire

lasted until nearly midnight. At 0115 the Korean Marines attempted

to retake the hill. The counterattack was cut short, however, upon

discovery of another enemy unit moving towards the outpost and then

only one-half mile away. Three hours later the enemy came back in

strength when a CCF platoon successfully overthrew the outpost at

0520. This new assault occurred without any warning and was so swiftly

executed that a number of the KMC defenders found themselves encircled

and trapped at their posts. Most managed to escape, but several were

captured and later evacuated when the Chinese removed their own battle

casualties.

Another attempt to regain the outpost was made by the Koreans at 1400,

following artillery preparation and two air strikes. Three Marine

attack squadrons, VMAs-323, -121, and -212 blasted the Chinese on the

front slope of OP 36. The contour of the far side of the hill had

provided the enemy a defiladed position and safety from 1st Marine

Division organic weapons. But the MAG-12 air sorties, destroying

many CCF automatic weapons and mortars and breaking up a company

strongpoint, helped the Koreans counterattack and overrun the dazed

defenders. Two KMC platoons, supported by artillery, mortar, and tank

fire, then carried the OP after overcoming token Chinese resistance.

After the enemy vacated OP 36, he still continued to remain in the low

area to the northwest, close to the east side of the Sachon River. No

serious attempt was made by the enemy to occupy the position for the

rest of the month.

The 20-hour clash for control of OP 36 was believed to have developed

from the Chinese ambition to occupy the position and thereby eliminate

the harassing fires from Hill 36 that had struck CCF mainline troops.

The 19–20 September attempts to wrest the outpost from Korean control

resulted in an estimated 150 Chinese casualties, including 20 counted

dead. KMC losses were placed at 16 killed, 47 wounded, and 6 missing.

On the day that the second September battle for OP 36 had ended, the

Commandant of the Marine Corps had also just concluded his three-day

visit and inspection of General Pollock’s troops. Visiting every

battalion in the division, General Shepherd was impressed by the

morale and proficiency of the Marines, including the attached 1st KMC

Regiment. During his visit to Korea, the Marine Corps Commandant was

also presented the Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, by President Rhee.

General Shepherd ended his Korean battlefront visit after a two-day

inspection of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units commanded by Major General

Jerome (he had received his second star on 6 August).

_More Enemy Assaults in Late September_[224]

[224] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 7thMar, 2/1 ComdDs, Sep

52.

Even though the enemy had concentrated his strongest infantry attack

in late September against the Korean Marines, his most frequent probes

were launched against center regimental positions held by Colonel

Layer’s 1st Marines. Here the enemy was more consistent in conducting

his defense. Chinese troops doggedly held on to the northern slopes

of several Marine outposts, notably Hills 124 and 122. In this center

regimental sector, the enemy initiated several attacks, the most

significant of these occurring on the 20th.

This action against the left sector manned by 2/1 centered about Hill

124, where Lieutenant Colonel Batterton’s battalion had established a

24-hour, squad-size outpost three days earlier. At 0345, Marines on

Hill 124 observed two green flares fired from a hill about 1,100 yards

to their front. At the same time the men of 2/1 observed numerous

figures moving about downhill from their own position. It soon became

evident that four enemy groups were converging on Hill 124 and

preparing to assault the Marine defenses which shortly came under fire

from enemy submachine guns and rifles. The main probe was a frontal

assault against Batterton’s men; it was made by about 20 Chinese and

lasted only five minutes. Afterwards, all four assault groups withdrew

but continued firing intermittently at the Marine squad. Nearly every

Marine on the hill suffered wounds, most of these minor. Enemy losses

for the action were placed at 22.

In this same sector Marines in late September attacked the northern

slope of Hill 122, where the enemy still maintained a foothold. The

proximity of Marine defenses at Bunker Hill to enemy positions,

separated in some places by as little as 30 yards, was the cause of

frequent contact and clashes. Marines raided the enemy side of Bunker,

using demolitions and portable flamethrowers to destroy trenches and

bunkers, and their occupants. Tanks and artillery assisted in these

brief offensive actions, usually undertaken at night. Flares were used

frequently to aid in identifying and striking targets and in assessing

the results.

It became routine during the last days of September for the Chinese

to probe the Marine defenses at the Hills 124–122 axis. There did not

appear to be a serious or determined assault to take either outpost,

however. The Marines considered the infantry probes as just another

form of harassment, although perhaps more personal and direct than

the Chinese shelling, which inflicted daily losses. On the division

right, Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines, which had moved into this sector on

7 September, found enemy activities about the same. Artillery rounds

caused the greatest number of casualties, although these attacks were

not particularly spirited. Many enemy contacts occurred during the

Marine combat patrols that largely characterized frontline operations

at the end of September.

_Chinese Intensify Their Outpost Attacks_[225]

[225] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section

is derived from: FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_;

1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–7 Oct 52;

1stMarDiv PIRS 706–713, dtd 1–8 Oct 52; 1stMar, 5thMar,

7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7 ComdDs, Oct 52; KMC

Regt UnitRpts 214–220, dtd 2–8 Oct. 52.

With the beginning of October, the 1st Marine Division became aware of

certain changes that were occurring to its front. In the center sector,

for the first time in two weeks there was no significant enemy ground

activity, yet across the entire Marine front there was a build-up of

enemy shelling. Part of the increased bombardment was directed at Hill

86 in the KMC sector, one of the positions recently cited as integral

to the defense line in this area. Beginning at 2000 on 1 October, the

Chinese broadcast a warning that they would knock down the outpost

bunkers there unless the Korean Marines surrendered. When the KMCs

manning the position did not, of course, surrender in reaction to

this blatant propaganda tactic, the Chinese began showering Hill 86

with artillery rounds. During the next 20 hours, 145 rounds fell on

and around the outpost. This incident marked the first time that the

Chinese mainline forces had carried out an announced threat.

This type of operational tactic--first to warn, then to carry out

the threat--was not, however, the reason for the increased Chinese

shelling. Rather, as it turned out, the enemy was about to embark on

a series of limited objective attacks against the division flanks,

starting first with major outposts guarding the most critical terrain

on the MLR. The artillery and mortar fire of the 1st had been but an

initial step. At 1830 on 2 October, Communist direct fire weapons

opened up from an area 2,800 yards northwest of OP 36, lashing all the

KMC outposts within range. A tank platoon, dispatched to counter the

fire, returned at 1915 without having located the hostile emplacements.

Shortly after the tanks returned, an extremely heavy artillery barrage

again fell upon all of the KMC regimental outposts. Ten minutes later,

seemingly on the signal of one red and one green flare, the enemy guns

lifted their preparatory fires to permit an infantry attack. The ground

action simultaneously struck OPs 37, 36, and 86, the forward positions

closest to the Sachon River.

At OP 37, the defending Korean Marine platoon fought valiantly for more

than an hour against the assault of two enemy platoons, each of which

required a company-size reinforcement before the Korean Marines were

finally ousted. Although temporarily dislodged, they reorganized at the

base of the position for a counterattack. Two counterattacks were made

the next day, the second one carrying the Koreans to the top of the

hill. Fierce enemy mortar and artillery shelling forced them to seek

the shelter of the reverse slope before again renewing their assault.

On 4–5 October, the outpost changed hands four times. At 1340 on the

latter date, a heavy enemy artillery and ground attack compelled the

KMCs to abandon their ravaged outpost; this withdrawal ended friendly

control of OP 37 for the rest of the month.

Nearby OP 36 was also lost. In the course of the night the Korean

Marines on OP 36 turned back two Communist assaults, but fell under

the weight of the third. By sunup on 3 October, the exhausted Korean

Marines were forced to give ground; the Chinese immediately occupied OP

36 and held it.

One more KMC outpost was to fall during the first week. OP 86 guarded

the southwestern two-thirds of the regimental sector and frequently was

the target of artillery shelling and ground attacks. This position was

also the most distant from the main line and the closest to the Sachon

River.

The heaviest Communist attack on 2 October was against the KMC platoons

defending Hill 86. Nearly a battalion of Chinese took part in this

action, finally overpowering the outpost just before midnight. The

defenders withdrew south to the bottom of the hill, where they were

comparatively safe from enemy fire. Resting, receiving reinforcements,

and regrouping during the early morning hours of the 3d, the Korean

Marine force observed friendly artillery and air pound the outpost

preparatory to their counterattack. It was made at 1015 and succeeded,

after two hours fighting, in routing the Chinese from the outpost.

While the enemy was counteracting the ground loss with artillery and

mortars, Marine air flushed out the Chinese, who had retreated only a

short distance from the outpost. From atop the hill, Korean Marines

witnessed many of the enemy hurriedly leaving the area under attack.

This scattering of the enemy force prevented the Chinese from launching

an immediate counterattack for control of OP 86 and gave the Korean

Marines additional time in which to prepare their defenses. At 2200 on

6 October, an enemy force of undetermined size assaulted the position

and wrested it from the Koreans before the end of the day. Early the

next morning a KMC counterattack was successful, but at 0640 the

Koreans were again compelled to withdraw, due to devastating blows from

Chinese artillery. Loss of the third key outpost during the first week

of October, ended for a time the flare-up of outpost fighting in the

left regimental sector of the division front.

The middle part of the MLR, held in early October by the 1st Marines,

received the least enemy attention in this period. Although frequent

contacts were made with the enemy during the first part of the month,

no outposts were lost. Most of the action was minor, _i.e._, patrol

engagements and Communist probes centered around Bunker Hill and Hill

124. Late on 5 October, a combat patrol from H/3/1 became involved in

the most important ground action in Colonel Layer’s area during early

October. These Marines were surprised by a larger Chinese force lying

in wait. The ambushers held their fire until the Marine combat patrol

had cleared a small hilltop. At 2230, after a 20-minute fire fight, the

patrol withdrew to the reverse slope of the rise, called in 81mm mortar

fire, then broke contact, and returned to the MLR. There were 4 Marine

casualties, and by count, 13 dead Chinese.

By far the greatest number of personal losses at this time occurred

in the right area held by the 7th Marines, where the Chinese began

a series of limited objective attacks against outposts guarding the

division right flank. These offensives to obtain critical terrain

in this sector, and others manned by the 1st Marine Division, would

continue intermittently right up to the brink of the cease-fire, in

July 1953.

In early October, Colonel Moore’s troops manned nine permanent combat

outposts. (See Map 14.) Seven of these had been taken over when

the regiment relieved the 5th Marines in September. Two additional

ones--Frisco and Verdun--had been established by the 7th Marines on

the 14th and 26th, respectively. Of these nine forward positions, the

Communists chose to concentrate on four, which formed a diagonal line

roughly paralleling the center sector of the MLR at an average distance

of about 450 yards. This quartet--Detroit, Frisco, Seattle, and

Warsaw--together with Verdun,[226] at the 1st Commonwealth boundary,

comprised the easternmost permanent outposts of the division. The first

four positions were, on the average, slightly lower in elevation than

the COPs in the regimental area to the west.

[226] The outpost at the extreme right flank was given the name

“Verdun” because of its World War I connotation of “They

shall not pass.” Col. Leo J. Dulacki ltr to Hd, HistBr,

G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2 Jun 67, hereafter _Dulacki ltr_.

The frontline contest began with little forewarning other than a

slight increase in enemy artillery and machine gun fire against

Frisco and a light probe against Detroit. At 1836 on 2 October, the

Communists launched a heavy artillery and mortar barrage against

Seattle and Warsaw, and that part of the MLR nearest Seattle. Exactly

one hour later, the preparation on the outposts lifted, permitting the

enemy attack force to strike. Not less than a company assaulted the

reinforced platoon on Warsaw, while a squad moved against the Seattle

defenders. Warsaw fell in about 45 minutes,[227] Seattle held out five

minutes longer.

[227] During the latter stage of the fight for Warsaw, a

Chinese soldier tossed a grenade into a bunker shared by

five Marines. Private Jack W. Kelso, of I/3/7, quickly

picked up the missile and ran outside with it. As he was

throwing the grenade back to the Chinese, it went off in

his hand. Disregarding his wounds, the Marine moved back

inside the shelter, directed the other four to return to

the MLR and went outside to cover their exit. As he was

firing at the advancing Chinese soldiers, Private Kelso

was hit several times by enemy bullets. His “conspicuous

gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life” was

later recognized in the posthumous award of the Medal of

Honor.

[Illustration:

MAP 14 K. WHITE

7TH MARINES SECTOR

(Division Right)

EARLY OCTOBER 1952]

Immediately, plans for the recapture of both were made. At 2047,

Captain John H. Thomas dispatched a platoon from his company, I/3/7,

from the MLR to counterattack Warsaw. The platoon quickly took the

position, for the enemy had withdrawn. At Seattle, the result was

different. On 3 October, two squads from Company I departed JAMESTOWN

at 0340, but came under enemy artillery fire en route to the objective.

The squads worked their way forward nevertheless, but were unable

to take the outpost. Captain Thomas then recalled the force, which

reached JAMESTOWN at dawn. Later that day, just before dusk, air and

artillery placed a smoke screen on Seattle while two squads advanced

toward the outpost. When the counterattack met stiff resistance, a

squad-size reinforcement[228] was sent from the MLR. Together the

three units attempted to retake the position, but were forced to pull

back because of heavy casualties. As the infantry again regrouped,

Lieutenant Colonel Bert Davis, Jr.’s 2/11 fired preparatory barrages

on the Chinese occupying Seattle. At 2225 the Marines assaulted the

outpost again; as before, overpowering Chinese artillery and grenades

inflicted such high casualties that the counterattackers were compelled

to withdraw.

[228] This squad was from Company A (Captain Frederick C.

McLaughlin), which came under the operational control of

3/7 at 1130 on 3 October, relieving Company C (Captain

Paul B. Byrum). The latter company had reported to the 3d

Battalion from regimental reserve at 2130 the previous

day. Company D was sent immediately to reinforce the

hard-pressed Company I.

By this time, action at the two outposts had resulted in 101 Marine

casualties, including 13 killed. By sundown on 3 October, the regiment

had been forced off the two COPs and had been able to retake only one

of them. Against Warsaw, the one that the Marines had recaptured, the

Chinese immediately launched a counterattack. At 0145 on 4 October

a platoon struck the position. This time the Warsaw garrison held,

inflicting losses on the CCF and receiving none. The Chinese made an

unsuccessful attempt against Frisco at 2300 on 5 October, when a squad

attempted to drive the Marines from the outpost.

The enemy’s repeated attacks and apparent determination to seize

commanding terrain, plus the heavy casualties suffered by 3/7, led the

7th Marines to reinforce its MLR at 1200 on 5 October. At this time the

right battalion sector then held by 3/7, was split into two sectors and

the regimental reserve, 1/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki) took

over the far right of the 3/7 line, assuming responsibility for Warsaw

and Verdun.[229] The 7th Marines thus had all three of its battalions

on line with the regimental front manned, from the left, by 2/7, 3/7,

and 1/7.

[229] At the same time one company, I/3/7, became the

regimental reserve, having been relieved on the MLR at

1500 the previous day by A/1/7.

During the next 30 hours, the Communists launched a series of strong

probing actions against the regimental outposts of the 7th Marines.

Although the numerical strength used in these widespread limited

objective attacks did not exceed that employed in previous large-scale

outpost offensives, the scope of the operation on 6 and 7 October and

the well-coordinated attacks indicated careful and detailed planning.

Each move against the five outposts and two MLR positions attacked

was preceded by unusually close attention to artillery and mortar

preparation. This was to a degree unprecedented even when measured

against those massive concentrations that had characterized Communist

operations since the Chinese intervention in the war late in 1950.

Prior to the Communist general attack, the Marines made another attempt

to retake Seattle. Leaving JAMESTOWN at 0600 on 6 October, a C/1/7

reinforced platoon was halted by solid resistance in the form of

exploding artillery and mortar rounds. The forces returned to the MLR,

reorganized, and jumped off again. At 0815, a two-squad reinforcement

was dispatched from the main line. Meanwhile, the enemy, estimated

at platoon reinforced strength, doubled his garrison, using troops

from his outpost line. By 0900, a heavy fire fight was in progress,

supported by artillery and mortars on both sides. Marines called on

air in support of the attack, but the combined air and infantry action

was unable to penetrate enemy defenses. Finally, at 1100, after five

hours of close heavy fighting, the Marines broke contact and retired,

bringing with them 12 dead and 44 wounded. Estimates of enemy losses

totaled 71.

That evening, at dusk, artillery and mortar fire began falling on

outpost positions across the entire regimental front and at two

locations on the MLR. At the same time an estimated Chinese reinforced

battalion in a coordinated effort advanced toward the Marine line

and at 1930 assaulted the seven positions that had just been under

artillery preparation. By midnight an estimated 4,300 rounds of

artillery fire and 104 rounds of counterbattery fire had fallen on

Marine positions. In the regimental left manned by 2/7 (Lieutenant

Colonel Caputo) the attacks appeared to be more of a diversion--merely

probes by small units, which showed little inclination to press the

attack. Carson, the most western COP held by the regiment, reported

that the enemy soldiers withdrew at 2050. Two hours later Reno, the

next outpost to the east, radioed to the MLR that the Chinese had just

ceased their attacks at that forward post. A total of 12 Marines were

wounded in these two actions.

On the far right, in Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector, a reinforced

CCF platoon poured over the Warsaw defenses at 1930. Immediately

the outpost Marines called for the friendly artillery box. As these

protective fires were being delivered all communication at the outpost

was severed by hostile fire. Enemy artillery continued at a heavy rate.

By 2000, however, communication was reestablished between the COP and

MLR. The first message from the besieged outpost was a request for more

artillery. With additional fire support and continued stiff outpost

resistance, the Chinese at 2055 relinquished their quest to regain

Warsaw.

The enemy’s most determined assaults on the night of 6–7 October were

made upon a pair of outposts, Detroit and Frisco, manned by the middle

battalion, 3/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Russell). Two JAMESTOWN

areas in this sector were also attacked, but only briefly. The assault

against the outposts was executed by a Chinese battalion which sent one

company against Detroit and another against Frisco, east of Detroit.

Both outposts were manned by two squads of Marines.

At Detroit, the Company G Marines reported that the initial attack

made at 1940 on 6 October by a Chinese company had been rebuffed. The

enemy did succeed, however, in advancing to the outpost trenchline.

Strong defensive fires prevented him from exploiting this initial gain

by occupying any of the bunkers, and the attackers were forced to pull

back. After regrouping, the Chinese returned at 2100 and again were

able to secure a foothold at the main trench.

Marine artillery assisted the outpost defenders in repulsing this

new attack, but not before Chinese interdictory fires had disrupted

all communications between the COP and its MLR support company. Some

Chinese had also moved south in the vicinity of the MLR, but these

attacks were neither persistent nor heavily supported. At 2115 the last

of the enemy intruders had withdrawn from the MLR. At about this same

time, 3/7 heard Detroit request overhead VT fires, but shortly after

this the battalion again lost contact with the outpost.

Two squads were then sent out to reinforce the position. They were

stopped, however, by heavy Chinese artillery barrages. At the outpost,

Marine artillery fires had forced the Chinese to retreat, but at 0015

the enemy reappeared at the trenchline. The artillery regiment once

again applied the overhead fire remedy, but with less success--the

Chinese, neither retreating nor advancing, took cover in the trenches.

During the long night, attempts to reestablish communications with

Detroit had proved fruitless, although battalion radio operators

reported that they had heard Chinese language coming over one of the

Marine radio nets used by the COP. A six-man reconnaissance detail was

sent forward to investigate. It returned at 0355 with the information

that Detroit was now held by the enemy. Two wounded Marines had

escaped; the rest of the Detroit garrison had fallen to the enemy. At

0630 the Marines withdrew after heavy fighting that had lasted more

than 10 hours.

During the earlier part of the night, while the battle for outpost

control raged at Detroit, reinforcements had also been dispatched to

Frisco to help stabilize the situation at this adjacent Company H/3/7

outpost. Like Detroit, it had been attacked by a Chinese company,

beginning about 2000. An hour and a half later some of the enemy had

made their way into the trenchline, but were repulsed with the help of

friendly artillery VT. Shortly after midnight the enemy again probed

Frisco and reached the trenchline. At 0115, two squads jumped off from

JAMESTOWN, but a rain of Chinese artillery interrupted their progress.

Throughout the early morning hours of 7 October, Company H and I units

were sent out from the MLR to buttress the Frisco defense and stem the

enemy attack. At 0510, a reinforced platoon from the reserve company

was sent to renew the counterattack. It was this Company I unit that

finally restored control of the COP to the Marines.[230] Another

reinforcing platoon arrived at the outpost just as the Marines there

had evicted the remaining Chinese assault forces. At 0715, 7 October,

Frisco was declared secure.

[230] During the predawn attempt to retake Frisco on 7 October,

Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, I/3/7, although already

wounded, led his rifle platoon in the assault against

Frisco. When an enemy machine gun impeded their progress,

Staff Sergeant Watkins grabbed a wounded man’s automatic

rifle to help get the assault moving forward again. At

that instant, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the

Marines. Staff Sergeant Watkins immediately seized it.

Just as he was about to hurl it away it exploded in his

hand. The grenade took the sergeant’s life but he had

saved his fellow Marines. For his bravery Staff Sergeant

Watkins was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Its precarious position, however, demanded either an investment of more

outpost troops to retain possession of it or else its abandonment, in

conjunction with other measures to neutralize loss of the position.

At 1804 that day the latter course was instituted. The 7th Marines

reported that the enemy had suffered an estimated 200 KIA and unknown

WIA as a result of the bitterly contested outpost attacks on 6–7

October. Marine casualties were listed as 10 killed, 22 missing, 105

wounded and evacuated, and 23 not-seriously wounded.

In all, during the first week in October, the 1st Marine Division gave

up six outposts, or forward positions, that had been sited on some of

the commanding ground in the Marine area. On the division left, COPs

37, 36, and 86 were the ones most removed from the Korean MLR and thus

easily susceptible to being overrun by the enemy at will and to his

early reinforcement.[231] The division theorized that near winter and

the subsequent freezing of the Sachon would facilitate the movement

of Chinese troops and supplies across the river to new positions.

The enemy was now able to operate patrols east of the river without

interference. At the opposite side of the division MLR, on its right

flank, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle had been lost. By gaining this

string of outposts, the enemy was better able to exert pressure against

other Marine positions forward of the line and the critical ground on

JAMESTOWN.

[231] FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_.

To counter this threat, General Pollock strengthened the outposts close

to the MLR and increased his patrolling requirements. It was decided

that in some cases the mission of the COP--that of providing early

warning of impending attack and slowing it down--could be accomplished

as effectively by using patrols and listening posts at night.

By these activities, the Marines hoped to minimize the Chinese gains

and prevent the launching of new attacks against either division COPs

or JAMESTOWN. The serious situation on the outposts was compounded by

existing political considerations, which prevented the Marines from

initiating any real offensive campaigns. Moreover, any hill taken was

invariably backed up by a still higher one, controlled by the enemy.

The key factor was not so much holding an individual outpost as it was

to insure that the enemy was unable to penetrate the JAMESTOWN line.

_More_ PRESSURE, _More CAS, More Accomplishments_[232]

[232] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW

ComdDs, Jun-Oct 52; MAG-12 ComdDs, Jun, Sep 52; MAG-33

ComdD, Aug 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Sep 52; VMA-312 ComdDs,

Sep-Oct 52; VMA-323 ComdDs, Jun-Jul, Sep 52; VMF(N)-513

ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52; VMJ-1 ComdD, Jul 52; Cagle and

Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Field,

_NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Rees, _Korea_.

Some of the enemy ground pressure against the outposts in September

and October had been relieved by the increase in the number of air

strikes received by the 1st Marine Division. De-emphasis of the Air

Force interdiction strategy in favor of striking the enemy wherever

(and whenever) it hurt him most had made available more aircraft for

close support of ground operations.[233] The UN commander, General

Clark, who had given the green light to the shift in USAF policy and

targets, followed the giant hydroelectric strike in June with a mass

attack the next month on 30 military targets located near the North

Korean Capital. During a year’s freedom from air attack (July 1951-July

1952) Pyongyang had become not only the major logistics center for

combat equipment and personnel but also the focal point for command and

control of Communist ground and air defense efforts.

[233] The 1st MAW chief of staff during this period, then

Colonel Samuel S. Jack, offered the opinion that “the

Fifth Air Force was most sympathetic to Division

requirements for close air support from Wing sources. The

Eighth Army in the Joint Operations Center proved to be

the principal limiting factor in the assignment of air

in accordance with these requests. Also, requirements

that Division CAS requests filter through I Corps and JOC

constituted a major factor in Wing response.” _Jack ltr._

Designated Operation PRESSURE PUMP, the 11 July strike against

Pyongyang called for three separate attacks during daylight and a

fourth at night. This extended time over the target would give enemy

fighters more than ample time to take to the skies in defense of the

Capital. Because Pyongyang “was defended by 48 guns and more than

100 automatic weapons, making it one of the worst ‘flak traps’ in

Korea,”[234] there was considerable hazard in the operation. Added

danger to the pilots resulted from the decision to forewarn the North

Korean civilian population of the air assault. General Clark explained

the reason for dropping warning leaflets prior to the attack on

Pyongyang:

[234] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482.

The objective was in part humanitarian and in part practical. We

had to hit Pyongyang because the Communists had made it a major

military headquarters and stockpile area. We wanted to warn the

people away from danger areas. By warning them away we disrupted

their daily lives and made it difficult for the Communists to

maintain any kind of schedules in their work in the city.[235]

[235] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, pp. 208–209.

Results indicated that both the destructive and the psychological

aspects of the mission were successful. American, British, and ROK

planes completely destroyed 3 of the 30 military targets attacked. Of

the rest, only two escaped major damage:

According to ... reports, the North Korean Ministry of Industry’s

underground offices were destroyed and a direct hit on another

shelter was said to have killed 400 to 500 Communist officials.

Off the air for two days, Radio Pyongyang finally announced

that the ‘brutal’ strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had

inflicted 7,000 casualties.[236]

[236] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482.

Of the far-reaching effect of the leaflets, the UN commander later

wrote:

The warning leaflets, coupled with the bombing, hurt North Korean

civilian morale badly. The very audacity of the United Nations

in warning the Communists where bombers would strike hurt morale

because it emphasized to the North Koreans just how complete was

UN mastery of the air. Contrarily, it made them see even more

clearly that the Communists were ineffectual in their efforts to

ward off our air blows....

As a result of the warnings, the bombings, the failure of

the Communists to provide protection, and the refusal of the

Communists to permit evacuation of the clearly defined target

areas, civilian resentment was channeled away from the UNC

bombers and towards the Communist rulers.[237]

[237] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 209. “I told you so” leaflets

were dropped after the raid to impress the inhabitants

with the importance of believing the warning leaflets.

USAF, _Ops in Korea_, No. 127, pp. 36, 37.

The record set by the 1,254 sorties flown in this 11 July operation was

to last only seven weeks. On 29 August, 1,403 sorties were employed in

a new strike against the Capital. The massed raids against military

targets in Pyongyang, known as the “All United Nations Air Effort”

turned out to be the largest one-day air assault during the entire

three years of the Korean War. Again attacking at four-hour intervals

three times during daylight, Allied aircraft blasted a list of targets

that “read like a guide to public offices in Pyongyang and included

such points of interest as the Ministry of Rail Transportation, the

Munitions Bureau, Radio Pyongyang, plus many factories, warehouses,

and troop billets.”[238] Of the 45 military targets in the city, 31

received moderate-to-severe damage according to post-strike photographs.

[238] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 489.

Substitution of the previous interdiction strategy by PRESSURE attacks

brought increased close air support to frontline troops. As a result

of this expanded number of CAS sorties, wing pilots and ground forward

air controllers greatly increased their operational proficiency.[239]

The Marines were still not satisfied with the close support picture,

however, and neither were a number of U.S. Army commanders. Some of the

latter regarded General Clark as the champion of more extensive close

air support missions for frontline units, but he quickly dispelled

this view. Instead, he cautioned these supporters of Marine-type close

air support to accept the existing procedures, which were derived from

the “vast reservoir of experience ... [representing] the composite view

of senior members of the Armed Forces [with] the longest and most

responsible experience in close support during World War II.”[240] At

the same time the UN commander, on 11 August 1952, had advised his

force commanders to study the factors affecting the close air support

situation in Korea and comment on certain UNC proposals for improving

the CAS system.

[239] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-53.

[240] _Ibid._, p. 9-143.

In the close air support picture for the Marines, October was a bright

month. In the outpost battles of early October, the 1st MAW put 319

sorties in the air during both day and night to strike, strafe, bomb,

and burn enemy positions and troops facing General Pollock’s division.

A new level of achievement had been reached during the Bunker Hill

battle in August. That month nearly 1,000 aircraft, predominantly

Marine, loosed ordnance at targets on and near the Chinese MLR and OPLR.

During the first six months of Marine ground operations in defense of

JAMESTOWN, wing squadrons and pilots had made major contributions to

the U.S. air effort in Korea. On 7 June 1952, First Lieutenant John W.

Andre, VMF(N)-513, piloting a World War II model Corsair on a night

armed reconnaissance mission over the west coast of North Korea, shot

down an enemy piston-driven Yak fighter. It was the first time that a

Russian-built plane of that model had been knocked out of the skies at

night by another plane. This aircraft was also the fifth kill for the

lieutenant, making him the first Marine nightfighter ace in Korea.[241]

[241] The first Marine night ace was Captain Robert Baird, who

shot down six Japanese planes between 9 June and 14 July

1945. Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_, p. 404. Lieutenant

Andre’s first four planes were also downed during World

War II. See Appendix F for Marine air kills during the

Korean War.

Nearly three months after that record, another one emerged: the first

Marine to down an enemy jet with a propeller-driven aircraft. Late

on the afternoon of 10 September, Captain Jesse G. Folmar and First

Lieutenant Willie L. Daniels, both of VMA-312, had taken off from the

_Sicily_ to attack an enemy troop concentration reported to be south

of Chinnampo, on the west coast just below the 39th Parallel. Shortly

after reaching the vicinity of the target, the Marine Corsairs were

jumped by a pair of MIG-15s. Two more Russian-made jets tore into the

fight. During a fast exchange of cannon and machine gun fire, the

Marine captain was able to score lethal hits on one of the MIGs. When

four more of them picked up the chase, the vastly outnumbered Marines

broke for home, heading westward in a diving turn.

Captain Folmar’s return to the _Sicily_ was delayed almost immediately:

I had just started picking up good diving speed when I saw balls

of tracer ammo passing on my left and at the same instant felt a

severe explosion in my left wing ... I saw that the left aileron

and four feet of my left wing were gone.[242]

[242] VMA-312 ComdD, Sep 52.

This damage caused the plane to rapidly go out of control. While still

able to maneuver, the Marine aviator headed for the sea and as he

neared it, bailed out of his Corsair and parachuted into the ocean.

A rescue plane out of Cho-do picked him up and returned the captain,

who had sustained a slight shoulder injury, to the carrier. Lieutenant

Daniels, who had alerted the rescue force, circled his descending

flight leader until he hit the water. After ascertaining that the

waterborne flier’s condition was satisfactory, the lieutenant turned

his plane towards the _Sicily_. In a short while he was safely home.

In late September, Major Alexander J. Gillis, VMF-311, assigned earlier

that summer to the Air Force’s 335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron,

4th Fighter Group, as an exchange pilot.[243] distinguished himself

by becoming not only the first naval aviator to destroy three enemy

aircraft in Korea but also the second one to get a multiple killing

in a single day.[244] Flying in a four-plane Sabrejet formation near

the vicinity of the mouth of the Yalu on 28 September, Major Gillis

led another plane after two MIG-15s. By superior pilot technique and

aggressive tactics, he forced one of the enemy to crash during a low

altitude chase. Later on during the sortie, the Marine initiated an

attack on a solo MIG, closing on it and scoring hits that caused the

plane to become uncontrollable and the pilot to eject. Major Gillis

also had to eject from his F-86 after it became disabled by the MIG.

The incident had occurred on the Marine aviator’s 50th combat mission

with the Air Force. He spent nearly four hours in the Yellow Sea before

a rescue helicopter picked him up.

[243] The exchange program “appears to have originated with the

participation--at Tactical Air Command’s invitation--of

two Marine Corps and two Navy pilots ... in the fall

of 1947.” Within two years, the program designed to

“indoctrinate selected Air Force and Navy pilots in the

air operational and air training activities of each

other’s service, had received Department of Defense

approval.” On 1 October 1949 the program went into

effect. Initially the exchange period was one year,

but after the Korean fighting broke out, the period

was reduced to approximately three months. Marine

participation began late in 1951. Atch 1 to Hq, USAF

(AFCHO) memo to Maj J. M. Yingling, HQMC, dtd 16 Jan 67

in v. V, Korean comment file.

[244] On 15 September, Major Gillis had shot down a solo MIG-15.

Another feat, this one a study in determination and perseverance,

had occurred early in the summer. On 22 July, the VMJ-1 commander,

Lieutenant Colonel Vernon O. Ullman, had taken to the air for a photo

mission over North Korea in the vicinity of Sinanju, located near

the Yellow Sea 40 miles above Pyongyang. During the first of seven

scheduled flights, he encountered heavy flak but nevertheless completed

his first mapping run in the area. Further, the Marine flier decided

that the antiaircraft menace was not going to force him to abandon the

remaining part of his task. He continued. On the second of his seven

runs, some 40 enemy jets (MIG-15s) appeared on the scene. These were

dissuaded from close-in interference, however, by the photo escort of

24 USAF single-engine Sabrejet fighters. Thereafter, the Russian-made

aircraft disappeared; Lieutenant Colonel Ullman continued, despite

the intense, accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, until he concluded his

mission.

The type of determination displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Ullman

helped Marine tactical squadrons achieve some kind of distinction

nearly every month from late spring to the fall of 1952. In May,

VMF-323 (“the Death Rattlers”), then commanded by Major William A.

Weir, established a squadron one-month record for number of combat

sorties, 1,160, and total combat hours, 2,362.7. A high percentage of

aircraft availability, 95.6, helped make this mark possible. On 1 June,

VMA-312 received the congratulations of CTF 95 for its “outstanding

performance under difficult conditions” during the spring months.

During this period the squadron, based on board the USS _Bataan_,

had been particularly hampered by excessive turnover of key squadron

officers and flight leaders. This continual squadron rotation resulted

in considerable variation in pilot indoctrination and need for field

carrier landing qualification, due to the “close tolerances in pilot

skill required by carrier operations.”[245] Despite these difficulties,

VMA-312 had scored an impressive 80-sortie mission, flown by 24

aircraft, on 18 April.

[245] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-77.

Additional recognition of professional excellence was conferred upon

Marine squadrons in July. On the 17th, the senior advisor to the

ROK I Corps expressed the gratitude of the corps commander for the

magnificent support the 1st MAW pilots had provided during the second

week of the month. All four attack squadrons in MAG-12 and both fighter

units in MAG-33 had taken part in these CAS missions. A week later,

eight planes from Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Miller’s VMA-323, (which,

along with Lieutenant Colonel Graham H. Benson’s VMA-212, had been

redesignated from fighter to attack squadrons the previous month),

completed an unusually successful interdiction mission at Hago.

Located 25 miles northwest of Kaesong, the village reportedly was

the site of heavy troop concentrations, active mortar positions, and

antitank weapons. Leaving K-6 at 1725, the eight Marine VMA-323 pilots

were soon over the target. Comprising the Death Rattler’s flight were

Majors John M. Dufford, Raymond C. Holben, William H. Irvin, Jr., and

Curtis E. Knudson; Captain John Church, Jr.; First Lieutenant William

A. Poe, Jr.; and Second Lieutenants Stuart L. Spurlock and James S.

Thompson. At 1810 their attacks were launched, using 1,000-pound bombs,

napalm, rockets, and 20mm ammunition. The strike was over almost as

soon as it had started, and when the Marines departed, not one building

remained in useful condition. But it was not until several days later

that the final results of the strike were known. Intelligence sources

reported that the raid had caught the enemy troops at the evening meal;

more than 500 had been killed by the Corsairs, aptly called “Whistling

Death” by the Japanese in World War II.

For the remainder of the summer and into the fall Marine groups and

squadrons continued their record-breaking and efficient support of

ground troops and naval forces. With four squadrons (two day, one

night-fighter, and one photo), MAG-33 sent 141 sorties against the

enemy on 6 August. This one-day group record occurred just before

the departure of Colonel Condon, who turned over the reins of the

organization to Colonel Herbert H. Williamson on the 11th, and then

took command of MAG-12.

Shortly before Colonel Condon relinquished command, he was particularly

pleased by the success of a four-plane strike by VMF-311 (Major William

J. Sims) in support of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division commanded by

Brigadier General Samuel T. Williams. Major Johnnie C. Vance, Jr.,

strike leader, was accompanied in this flight by Captain George R.

Brier and Second Lieutenants Charles E. Pangburn and Whitlock N.

Sharpe. Up until this time the infantry had been particularly harassed

by several enemy frontline fortifications and supporting artillery. The

four pilots destroyed three bunkers and two heavy guns and also caved

in approximately 50 feet of trenchline on the 7 August strike. Upon

learning of the success of the Marine pilots and the conditions under

which the attacks were carried out--dangerous terrain and constant

ground fire directed towards the planes--the general dispatched a

letter, commending the “skill, courage, and determination displayed by

these pilots....”[246]

[246] MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 16.

Another congratulatory message was received in September, this one

from General Pollock for the excellent support given by MAG-12 on the

20th. With three attack squadrons participating, Colonel Condon’s group

had neutralized Chinese weapons and troops at OP 36 to help prevent

a takeover of the Korean position. The pilots reported well over

100 Chinese casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Chamberlain’s

VMA-323 contributed most of the 23 Marine sorties. The other attacking

squadrons were VMA-121 (Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Cargill, who 10

days earlier had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Crawford), and VMA-212,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice W. Fletcher.

September was a month of mixed fortunes in the air war over Korea.

The successful CAS strikes of the 20th followed only a few days after

another high point set on 14 September, when Lieutenant Colonel

Cargill’s attack squadron flew its 5,000th combat sortie since

arrival in the Korean theater in October 1951. Then on 15 September,

General Jerome commissioned a new kind of unit in the wing, Marine

Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1), whose mission was to provide electronic

counter-measures (ECM) for UN aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence F.

Fox headed the squadron, the only one in the naval service with an ECM

primary mission in Korea.

Three days after the commissioning, a strange incident transpired.

North of the UN line and at an altitude of 9,500 feet, a F-84

Thunderjet fighter, with U.S. Air Force markings and insignia, attacked

a propeller-driven Air Force trainer. The slower plane immediately

began defensive maneuvering, flying in tight circles. After making five

turns, the trainer pilot saw the supposedly friendly jet fly off.

It was believed that such a paradoxical occurrence was due to

the substantial number of F-84 losses and the enemy’s ability to

piece together and fly an aircraft of that model. A few similar

episodes--attacks by apparently friendly aircraft on UN planes--had

previously taken place. In each case, the impostor was a model of U.S.

aircraft that had suffered particularly heavy losses.

Another incident in September had dire consequences. On the 10th,

MAG-33 dispatched 22 fighter aircraft from VMF-115 (Lieutenant Colonel

Royce W. Coln) to attack reported troop concentrations near Sariwon, 35

miles directly south of Pyongyang. The F9F Panther jets had completed

the strike and were returning to their K-3 base when they were diverted

to land at K-2, Taegu, where the weather was better. Fog had suddenly

swept over the field at K-3, reducing visibility to zero. Sixteen

Panthers landed safely at K-2, 45 miles southwest of the Marine field

at Pohang. The remaining six, piloted by Majors Raymond E. Demers and

Donald F. Givens, First Lieutenant Alvin R. Bourgeois, and by Second

Lieutenants John W. Hill, Jr., Carl R. Lafleur, and Richard L. Roth,

flying in formation in poor weather, crashed into the side of a

3,000-foot mountain while descending.[247] They would have required

only an additional 600 feet of altitude to clear the summit.

[247] Although not definitely proven, there were “some

indications of false radio beacons being used by the

enemy in clandestine operations in the K-2 area.” _Jack

ltr._

Losses of Marine pilots and aircraft had been of growing concern to the

wing command. The initial success of the flak suppression fires had

eliminated the one successful Communist source of air defense, accurate

antiaircraft firing. One result was that noncombat accidents for a

while during the summer became the principal cause of pilot and plane

attrition. To help reduce these operational accidents as well as the

combat losses, the two Marine air groups instituted squadron training

programs and also directed the adoption of several new corrective

procedures. In MAG-12, for example, a study of results from the FAF

policy that limited bombing runs to one for interdiction and two for

CAS targets revealed a sharp reduction in hits from flak. Tactical

squadron commanders in MAG-12 drew up a syllabus during September to

test proposed defensive tactics for their propeller aircraft to employ

against enemy jets. The carrier squadron, VMA-312, began that same

month the additional practice of field carrier landing qualification at

K-6 for new pilots before permitting them to operate from the carriers.

In spite of these efforts, pilot losses spiralled alarmingly in

October. For the rest of 1952, the monthly totals remained near that

month’s level. On the other hand, aircraft losses during October

dropped sharply to 10 from the September total of 22. This lower figure

was not to be exceeded until May 1953. These remedial procedures were

considered at least partially responsible for the substantial decrease

in aircraft losses.

In another area, a mid-October landing at Kojo, on the east coast

immediately south of the 39th Parallel, did not work out as planned.

The amphibious operation was in reality a feint intended to draw troops

away from frontline positions and expose them to naval air and gunfire

as they rushed in reinforcements. The enemy failed to rise to the bait,

and actually only a few Communist troops were sighted. VMA-312 provided

armed reconnaissance, tactical air operation, and naval gunfire

spotting during the feint. Although they made little enemy contact, the

Marine “Checkerboard” pilots operating off the _Sicily_ gained much

experience in landings and take-offs under the adverse conditions of

rough seas and high winds.

_Rockets, Resupply, and Radios_[248]

[248] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is

derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1st

MAW ComdD, Oct 52; HMR-161 ComdDs Aug-Sep 52.

Through October 1952, operational control of Korean based Marine

fighter and attack squadrons was still vested in commanders other than

General Jerome. Tactical squadrons continued to be directed by the FAF

or Navy in their missions; the observation and helicopter squadrons

were under operational control of the 1st Marine Division and utilized,

as before, at its discretion.

HMR-161, commanded since 8 August by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Carey,

continued its primary mission of evaluating rotary wing aircraft

and their methods of employment. One tactical innovation, movement

of elements of the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, was undertaken during

August soon after the Bunker Hill battle. With ground-fired rockets,

the problem of a tell-tale cloud of dust and brilliant flash of the

rockets after each salvo had always plagued the artillerymen. This

seldom went unnoticed by the enemy, who often showered the marked area

with counterbattery fire. On 19 and 20 August, in Operation RIPPLE,

HMR-161 and the rocket battery proved that these two units could

successfully shoot and scoot to a new location and fire effectively

again without drawing an enemy reprisal. This Marine Corps innovation

in air mobility--the first displacement of field artillery under combat

conditions--offered a major time-saving advantage. Whereas previously

it took approximately a half-hour for rocket launchers to move from

their bivouac area to firing position,[249] deployment by helicopter

could be made in a matter of minutes, a time factor that could be

critical in event of an enemy attempted breakthrough.

[249] _Henderson ltr III._

The operation demonstrated that helicopters not only could transport

rocket crews with weapons and ammunition to firing areas far more

rapidly than conventional wheeled vehicles, but that the rotary craft

could airlift these weapons into places inaccessible by road. The

nature of the mountainous terrain proved advantageous in that hills

and valleys provided defiladed areas for loading and firing the weapons

as well as protected routes for helicopter movements. An observation

made by pilots for operations in other types of environment, not

offering as much cover and concealment, was that the shiny blue paint

on their birds would make detection easy in most surroundings and that

camouflage paint would lessen the risk from enemy AA.

Transport helicopters of HMR-161 continued to augment those of VMO-6 in

casualty evacuation and ferrying Marines and other frontline troops.

The observation squadron maintained its policy and outstanding record

of emergency flights of the wounded under any weather conditions except

dense fog (electronic navigational aids still were not available). In

August, various mechanical failures developed among the newly received

HO5S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. These three-place observation aircraft

were underpowered but superior in many flight characteristics to the

HTL-4 helicopters then in the squadron. Mechanical difficulties with

the newer aircraft increased until it became necessary to ground them

late in October until replacement parts became available in the supply

system.

Employment of transport helicopters for logistical support continued

to be a principal use of such rotary wing aircraft as the end of

1952 approached. Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory

that this versatile aircraft could resupply a battalion manning the

MLR. The next step was to determine if the logistical support for an

entire combat regiment could be accomplished by helicopter. Operation

HAYLIFT, conducted during 22–26 September, the last of five operations

that month for HMR-161, was to test and evaluate helicopter resupply

of Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines. Plans called for delivering all

Class I, III, and V items and such Class II and IV items as could be

accommodated. Two loading and four unloading sites were prescribed.

All but extremely valuable cargo, such as mail, was to be carried

externally in slings or wire baskets.

HAYLIFT did show that at least for a short period of time--five days--a

helicopter squadron, utilizing 40 percent of its aircraft, could

sustain a MLR regiment. Following the general procedures employed

previously with the battalion, HMR-161 found that no great changes were

necessary for resupply of the regiment. Two recommendations emerged

from an evaluation of HAYLIFT. One stressed the need for establishment

of an operations center manned by representatives of each unit

participating in the exercise. The second called for development of

a more flexible loading system, one that would permit rapid weight

increases or decreases of 50 pound increments, as the situation

demanded. Such a method would make possible a more efficient payload

for each lift.[250]

[250] For example, on 25 September, rain soaked the cardboard

cover of the rations, adding extra weight to each

preloaded lift of these Class I supplies. On the other

hand, a heavier load could have been used at times. As

the helicopter used up its fuel, a commensurate increase

in cargo could have been carried.

Transport on a larger scale in the 1st MAW was accomplished by General

Jerome’s few transport aircraft reinforced by the eight R5Ds from the

VMR-152 detachment. In June, the passenger-carrying operations reached

the peak for the entire Korean War; that month, 17,490 troops and

military-associated civilians utilized the reinforced wing transport

aircraft. June 1952 was also the second busiest month in freight

transportation (7,397,824 pounds, nearly double the figure for June

1951).

Squadrons that were unable to better their performance records in some

cases could trace their trouble to the inability to get all of their

planes off the ground. Several models were subject to spare parts

shortages.[251] New aircraft, the F3D-2s and the AU-1s received in

June by VMF(N)-513 and VMA-212, respectively, had preceded an adequate

stocking of normal replacements for worn out or defective parts. The

night fighter squadron was handicapped also by introduction into the

supply system of inadequate radio tubes, which burned out rapidly. The

most critical shortage, however, was parts for starter units of jet

engines. This deficiency was not corrected until summer. One problem

never quite eliminated was the confusion of supply orders intended for

the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6. It was believed that the close

resemblance of Sikorsky HRS and HO5S part numbers and nomenclatures had

caused the improperly-marked requisitions and mix-up.

[251] Spare parts shortages are “inherent in the introduction

of new equipment into the field and prior to the

development of usage data.” a major effort was made at

this time by 1st MAW to improve its critical spare parts

support by improved stock control procedures and complete

inventory. _Jack ltr._

The 1st Marine Division logistical situation during the summer and fall

of 1952 was generally excellent. General Pollock’s units did not suffer

from the shortage of spare parts experienced by the 1st MAW whose

aircraft sometimes had to be grounded because of a missing spare part.

U.S. Army support in the replacement of worn-out Marine vehicles for

new Army ones proved satisfactory. No major problems arose in engineer

support. Medical evacuation and treatment and the level of supplies in

the five companies of the 1st Medical Battalion remained excellent.

There were two significant changes in the logistical support provided

the Marine division early in the fall. One dealt with employment of

the division’s 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, located in

the rear support areas. Beginning in September, the companies were

placed in direct support of the four infantry regiments, with liaison

by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Martin, division motor transport

officer. It was believed this decentralization would have the following

advantages:

1. Decreased vehicle mileage and therefore less driver fatigue

and prolonged vehicle life.

2. Increased dispersal as a safeguard against loss of wheeled

vehicle support in event of an unexpected and successful enemy

attack.

The other change was a shift in the emphasis of support rendered by

the Korean Service Corps. During October, each of the three frontline

regiments received 300 more laborers, raising the total to 800. Rear

area units paid for the increase, since the KSCs were detached from

support units and sent forward to the MLR.

Logistical support from the 1st Signal Battalion left little to be

desired. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Morris[252] when the

Marines moved to western Korea, the signalmen helped establish and

maintain an extensive communications net, with 5,200 miles of wire

within the division and several vital links to adjacent and higher

commands.[253] Wiremen worked around the clock to lay and maintain the

telephone lines, which suffered considerable damage from the artillery

and mortar barrages. When possible, the signalmen raised the wires off

the ground. The battalion set in more than 1,400 telephone poles. After

the system had been installed and was working efficiently, the July

floods washed away part of the major communications. By improvising

and by setting up emergency equipment, the battalion was able to

maintain the flow of communications traffic at a satisfactory level.

Replacement items were provided by the U.S. Army on a reimbursable

basis in accordance with existing directives.

[252] On 4 April Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Hicks assumed

command of the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob E.

Glick relieved him on 3 August.

[253] Communication with General Kendall’s I Corps consisted of

radio-teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane,

and motor messenger. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-68.

The 11th Marines also had an additional 1,100 miles of

communication wire. _Henderson ltr III._

In September it became apparent that the signal equipment used to

maintain division communications was no longer equal to the demands

placed upon it. The extensive ground area plus the number and size of

reinforcing units had not only put a heavy burden on radio, telephone,

and teletype equipment but also caused the depletion of reserve stocks.

With the spare equipment in use, there was no pool to draw upon when

units turned in defective equipment for repair. Neither were there

available replacements for materiel destroyed by enemy action. Items

most urgently needed were flown in from the States. Other critical

parts came from Army sources in Japan and Korea. By the end of October,

the communication resupply had returned to a more normal condition.

Before the month ended a different type of critical situation was to

confront the division. It appeared that the enemy’s success in seizing

a half-dozen outposts earlier in October had only whetted his appetite

for more. Chinese eyes were turned towards positions that held still

more potential value than the stepping-stones just acquired. The

extreme right battalion in the division front held by the 7th Marines

was the focal point of the new effort.