The Battle of Bunker Hill
_The Participants and the Battlefield--Preliminary Action on
Siberia--The Attack on Bunker Hill--Consolidating the Defense of Bunker
Hill--Company B Returns to Bunker Hill--Supporting Arms at Bunker
Hill--In Retrospect_
_The Participants and the Battlefield_[157]
[157] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, Jul-Aug 52; 1stMar, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52; 1st
MAW ComdD, Aug 52.
The torrential rains that had fallen just before the end of July
continued to affect ground operations into early August. Contacts
between opposing forces were few and brief, and casualties remained
correspondingly low. On 1 August, General Selden assigned the reserve
regiment, the 7th Marines, the task of developing the secondary defense
line, KANSAS, at the extreme right of the division sector. The 5th
Marines, manning this regimental area and originally responsible for
the construction, had been unable to reach the second line because
bridging across the Imjin to the rear of the sector was washed out. By
3 July the division put a ferry service into operation at the site of
the inoperable Honker Bridge for the purpose of feeding ammunition to
combat units north of the Imjin. The critical resupply problem began
to ease the next day when the waters overflowing the Widgeon Bridge
further upstream receded sufficiently to permit restoration of normal
vehicular crossings there.
Traffic in the air had, quite naturally, been less affected by the
heavy rains and by the flooded, mucky terrain that was slowing ground
movement throughout the entire division area. Flight operations during
the first week of August produced a daily sortie rate that would
approximate the monthly average. In fact, the month of August was to
become the record one for 1st MAW attack and fighter pilots during
1952, with a total of 5,869 sorties flown.
While the air people in August were maintaining a good weather pace
against the enemy following the July downpours, the Communist ground
troops apparently found the going too difficult to mount any sustained
attack. The enemy merely continued his active defense, with an average
of two contacts daily, while busily engaged in advancing his OPLR
by creeping tactics. Even the usually assiduous Chinese artillery
was strangely quiet. With respect to the enemy’s excellent artillery
capability, the 1st Marine Division in July learned that the Chinese
had introduced a 132mm Russian rocket in their combat operations. The
presence of this truck-mounted launcher, the _Katusha_, which could
fire 16 rockets simultaneously, was indicated by a POW who had been
informed by “his platoon leader that there were two _Katusha_ regiments
in the CCF.”[158] In addition to this new enemy weapon, the Marine
division reported the same month that positive sightings had been
made of self-propelled guns emplaced well forward, and that there was
an “indication that these guns were being used to fire direct fire
missions from frontline revetments.”[159]
[158] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52, p. 2.
[159] _Ibid._, p. 1.
Communist forward positions were gradually encroaching on JAMESTOWN.
Since April 1952 the division had noted every month that the enemy
was continuing to extend his trenches in the direction of the Marine
MLR. The Chinese technique was to occupy key, high terrain at night,
prepare the ground during darkness by digging trenches and constructing
bunkers, and then vacate the area before daybreak. After nightly
repetitions of this process had produced a tenable position, the
enemy moved in and occupied it. By means of these creeping tactics,
the Chinese hoped to acquire the dominating terrain necessary for
controlling access to Seoul. The ultimate goal of the Communist forces
was believed to be the 750-foot-high Paekhak Hill,[160] the Marine high
ground position also known as Hill 229, just over a mile east of the
road leading to Panmunjom and Kaesong.
[160] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 18 Jun 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 5.
During the four months that the 1st Marine Division’s mission had been
to conduct an aggressive defense of the EUSAK left flank, Marines
had become familiar with a number of Chinese small unit infantry
tactics. Shortly after assignment of the division to western Korea,
General Twining, the ADC, had observed that the Chinese first made a
diversionary frontal assault while the main force maneuvered around
UNC defenders to attack from the rear. Almost invariably the Chinese
employed this envelopment technique. Occasionally the enemy also used
more passive measures, such as attempting to demoralize Marines in the
front lines and subvert their allegiance by English language propaganda
broadcasts. These attempts represented wasted effort. Not one Marine
was swayed.
In some cases the Chinese were imaginative in changing their tactics or
improvising new ones. This tendency had been noted as early as May by a
5th Marines battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nihart, after 1/5
had engaged the enemy in a limited, objective attack:
... when friendlies marked targets with WP [white phosphorus],
the enemy would immediately drop rounds of WP between the target
and friendly troops to conceal the target and to confuse friendly
FOs [artillery forward observers]; the enemy tried very hard
to take prisoners (rather than shoot a friendly, they would
often attempt to knock him out with a concussion type grenade);
counterattacks were made in waves of four to seven men deployed
in a formation somewhat similar to the Marine Corps wedge;
snipers were deployed in holes that were mutually supporting;
concerted efforts were made to knock out automatic weapons; ...
for close-in fighting, the enemy used PPSH [Soviet-made 7.62mm
submachine gun] guns and grenades rather than bayonets; the enemy
attacked behind well coordinated mortar fire; some enemy snipers
were observed to have bushes tied to their backs....[161]
[161] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 12.
On occasion 1st Division Marines found evidence that the enemy
had infiltrated their lines. It appeared the most likely spot for
line-crossers to make their way into the Marine rear area was from the
far bank of the Imjin between the Sachon and Han Rivers where the enemy
MLR was only a short distance from the sector held by the 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion. Two enemy agents “armed with pistols of German
manufacture, six hand grenades, and one set of field glasses”[162] had
been apprehended here by a Marine reconnaissance company patrol. The
prisoners had stated they were “part of a force of one thousand men
who were infiltrating to form a guerrilla force somewhere in South
Korea.”[163] Six days later, after a brief fire fight between a small
group of Chinese and a Marine outpost in the center of the division
sector, the defenders discovered that two of the three enemy dead wore
under their own clothing various articles of Marine uniforms. Neither
of the Chinese had identification or any papers whatsoever. It was
believed that both were enemy agents and that the attack on the outpost
was a diversion “for the express purpose of detracting attention from
infiltrators.”[164]
[162] HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 27.
[163] _Ibid._
[164] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 5.
Even though enemy tactics and attempts to penetrate Marine positions
demonstrated a good deal of soldierly skills, his conduct of defensive
operations was nothing short of masterful. This was especially true of
Chinese construction of underground earthworks. It appeared that the
Chinese had no single pattern for this type of field fortification.
Like the Japanese in World War II, the Chinese Communists were experts
in organizing the ground thoroughly and in utilizing a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of manpower to hollow out tunnels, air-raid
shelters, living quarters, storage spaces, and mess halls. Americans
described the Chinese as industrious diggers,[165] who excavated
quickly and deeply for protection against UN bombardments. From
numerous reports of ground clashes in the 1st Marine Division sector
and from observations made by Marine pilots, it became known that the
enemy was quick to seek cover whenever he was exposed to sustained
artillery bombardment or air attack.
[165] “The Chinese attack by ‘shovel’ proved effective and
difficult to combat. They burrowed forward almost
continuously, even under direct observation. Every foot
of advance provided added opportunity to attack Marine
COPs with greater impunity. While this activity possibly
provided Marines with target practice in both small arms
and mortars, these CCF working parties in a narrow trench
7 to 10-feet deep probably took very few casualties.” Col
William R. Watson, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 18 July 67.
What was not known, however, was the extent of these subterranean
shelters. One Chinese account, allegedly written by a reconnaissance
staff officer named Li Yo-Yang, described the protection of a CCF
shelter to a recently captured UN prisoner as they were under Allied
artillery bombardment. While shells exploded all around the position
the enemy boasted: “There’s no danger of being killed on a position
fortified by the Chinese People’s Volunteers.... Don’t you know it’s
impossible for your shells to penetrate our air-raid shelters?”[166] An
American report on enemy field fortifications estimated that the amount
of earth cover in Chinese air-raid shelters was as high as 20 feet, and
in frontline defensive positions, up to 33 feet.[167]
[166] _A Volunteer Soldier’s Day: Recollections by Men of the
Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S.
Aggression and Aid Korea_ (Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, 1961), p. 193, hereafter CPV, _Recollections_.
[167] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-90.
Marine defensive installations carved out of the ground were not so
extensive as those of the enemy opposing JAMESTOWN. “In spite of
orders, instructions, and inspections many bunkers were only half dug
in, then built up above the ground with sandbags,” observed one Marine
battalion commander.[168] Back in April, just after the Marine division
had settled in the west, its 1st Engineer Battalion, using U.S. Army
drawings, had published bunker construction plans. Express instructions
to frontline units were to “construct bunkers to provide simultaneously
living and fighting space. Overhead cover on all bunkers will be such
as to withstand direct hit from 105mm and to allow friendly VT fire
over position.”[169]
[168] LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr., “Random Notes on Korea,”
_Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 11 (Nov 55), p. 29,
hereafter Batterton, _Korea Notes_.
[169] CO 5thMar msg to 5thMar units, dtd 20 Apr 52, in 5thMar
ComdD, Apr 52, #2, App. II, p. 6.
Some officers felt it was, perhaps, the work-during-light,
patrol-at-night routine that resulted in the shallow draft Marine
bunkers. Others suggested that the relatively limited defensive
training received by the more offensive-minded Marines created a
natural apathy to digging elaborate fighting positions.
It took a hole 12 feet square and 7 feet deep to house the Army,
Lincoln-logs-type bunker the Marines first used in the spring of 1952.
The fortification, using tree trunks up to eight inches in diameter,
had a cover of seven to eight feet. This consisted of four feet of
logs, and three-to-four more feet of rocks, sandbags, and earth fill.
By the summer of 1952, the division developed its own style of bunker,
a prefabricated timber structure designed to fit into a hole eight feet
square and somewhat less than seven feet deep. This size fortification
could accommodate a .50 caliber machine gun, crew members, or several
riflemen. Provision was also made for the inclusion of a sleeping shelf
in the rear of the bunker. Its construction required no saws, hammers,
or nails, only shovels to excavate. The major drawback to erection of
the prefab was the difficulty in manhandling the heavy roofing timbers,
11 feet long, 12 inches wide, and 4 inches thick. On top of this was
placed a two-foot layer of sandbags, tarpaper covering, and a four feet
high layer of earth that completed the structure and partly camouflaged
it.
Battlefield construction was carried out by the infantry regiments to
the limit of unit capabilities. The division engineers, one company per
frontline regiment, augmented at times by shore party units, supplied
the technical know-how and engineering materials and equipment. These
combat support troops processed the lumber for bunker construction and
built fortifications for forward medical treatment and one bunker for
observation of battle action by civilian and military dignitaries,
irreverently called VIPs (Very Important Persons), who frequently
visited the division. Engineers also erected some of the barbed wire
barriers in the forward areas and, when necessary, cleared firing lanes
for weapons housed in bunkers.
The processing of timbers for easier and faster bunker-construction had
begun on 28 July, but this was hardly in time for the most difficult
fighting the division had faced thus far in western Korea. Given the
name Bunker Hill,[170] this battle would take place in the center
sector of the division line manned since 27 July by Colonel Walter F.
Layer’s 1st Marines.[171] On that date Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s
battalion, 3/1, took over from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines on the
left, and 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterton, Jr.) relieved the
2d Battalion of the 7th Marines on the right.[172]
[170] Since bunkers were in everyone’s mind and frontline units
were heavily involved in the bunker-construction program,
it is felt likely “someone in G-2 arbitrarily assigned
the name.” Col Gerald T. Armitage ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3
Div, HQMC, dtd 6 July 67, hereafter _Armitage ltr._
[171] Two days earlier Colonel Layer had taken over the command
from Colonel Flournoy.
[172] Lieutenant Colonels Gerald F. Russell and Anthony Caputo,
respectively, commanded 3/7 and 2/7 at this time.
Across No-Man’s-Land, units of two Chinese divisions faced the
3,603 men of the 1st Marines. From west to east opposite the Marine
regiment’s frontline battalions were elements of the 580th Regiment,
194th Division, 65th CCF Army and of both the 352d and 354th Regiments,
118th Division, 40th CCF Army. The 352d Regiment held most of the area
on which the battle would be fought.[173] Enemy combat efficiency
was rated as excellent and his forward units were well-supplied. The
Chinese conducted an active defense, using limited objective attacks,
numerous small-size probes, and creeping tactics to extend their
OPLR line. Communist soldiers offered well-coordinated and tenacious
resistance to Marine patrols, raids, and attacks. Within enemy lines a
775-foot elevation, known as Taedok-san, was situated directly north of
the Marine division center and commanded the entire Bunker Hill area.
[173] 1stMarDiv PIR 657, dtd 13 Aug 52.
On JAMESTOWN, the dominating height was Hill 201, 660 feet high[174]
and immediately to the rear of the MLR in the left battalion sector.
Southwest of this elevation was the Marine stronghold, Hill 229, just
23 feet lower than Taedok, and believed by the Marines to have been the
objective of the August battle. Directly north of Hill 201 was Hill
122, adjacent to the enemy OPLR, and called Bunker Hill by the Marines.
It was shortly to become the scene of bitter fighting. The crest of
Hill 122 was about 350 yards long. At a distance of about 700 yards, it
generally paralleled the northeast-southwest direction of JAMESTOWN in
the left of the 2/1 sector and adjoining 3/1 sector.
[174] Frequently cartographers use elevations for names of
hills. Heights on the Korean maps are in meters, and
many of these hills derive their name (i.e., number)
from their elevation. For changing meters to feet, the
conversion factor 3.28 is used.
Southwest of Bunker and a little more than 200 yards from the Marine
MLR was Hill 124. This Hill 124–122 axis, for tactical purposes, was
known as the Bunker Ridge. The ridgeline, roughly “cashew” in shape
almost anchored back into the MLR on the forward slopes of Hill 229.
To the northeast of Bunker Hill and separated from it by a wide
saddle[175] was another enemy position, Hill 120. (See Map 9, for
outposts and key hill positions in the 1st Marines center regimental
area in early August.)
[175] A saddle, the low point in the crest line of a ridge, is
much in appearance like the side view of a riding saddle.
Approximately one mile east of Hill 124 was Hill 56A, or Samoa, the
right flank limit of the immediate battlefield. It guarded the best
avenue of approach into the Bunker Hill area, the Changdan Road.
Another Marine position west of Samoa was Hill 58A, or Siberia, a
sentinel overlooking a long draw running down the east sides of Hills
122 and 120. Both Samoa and Siberia were outposted by squads. Another
1st Marines squad occupied Hill 52, on the other side of Changdan Road
and not quite a half-mile east of Samoa. The entire battlefield was cut
up by numerous gullies and draws, most of which paralleled Bunker Hill.
[Illustration:
MAP 9 K. White
1ST MARINES SECTOR OF JAMESTOWN
(Division Center)
8 AUGUST 1952]
_Preliminary Action on Siberia_[176]
[176] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section
is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 9–11 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
The first round in the battle of Bunker Hill began as the fight for
Siberia, Hill 58A. Just slightly more than a quarter of a mile from
JAMESTOWN, this squad-size outpost, the most western in the right
battalion sector, had been occupied in June when the division moved
its MLR forward. Since Siberia was located halfway between the Marine
MLR and the Communist OPLR, the Marine seizure of Siberia prevented
the Chinese from holding terrain suitable for employing 60mm mortars
against Marine frontline troops.[177] Strong enemy outposts on Hills
120 to the north and 110 to the northeast constantly threatened the
squad on 58A. From these two forward positions, Chinese troops early on
9 August 1952 streamed down to Siberia, launching in the process the
Bunker Hill battle.
[177] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, App. VII, p. 1.
Just before 0100 an estimated four enemy squads fell upon Hill 58A,
outposted by Company E Marines. Using assorted infantry weapons, the
raiding party forced the outnumbered Siberia occupants to withdraw.
By 0145 the outpost Marines returned to the MLR. At this time the
JAMESTOWN sector south of the outpost, also held by Captain Jesse F.
Thorpe’s Company E, was under attack by approximately 50 Chinese.
After breaking up the enemy assault by well placed friendly mortar
fire, the Marines enjoyed a brief respite from Chinese pressure and
formulated plans to recapture Siberia. It was decided that a reinforced
Company E platoon would counterattack to regain the outpost. At 0355,
the 11th Marines fired a five-minute preparation against the objective.
On schedule, the platoon crossed JAMESTOWN at 0400 and in the darkness
headed towards the outpost. Advancing carefully to avoid detection as
long as possible, the Marines reached the area near the base of the
hill by 0525. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire again forced the
Marines to withdraw, and the platoon returned to its company CP at
0545. So far, the 58A action had resulted in the wounding of 32 Marines
and the killing of another.
It became evident that more preparation, by Marine air and artillery,
would be required for the recapture of Siberia. At 0650, four Marine
F9F jet fighters worked the hill over with napalm and 500-pound
bombs. Three hours later, a flight of Air Force F-80 “Shooting Star”
jets dropped eight 1,000-pound bombs on the same target. With the
aerial attack complete, Marine artillery opened fire. Five minutes
later another Marine reinforced platoon launched a second ground
attack. This was made by a unit from Company A (Captain Robert W.
Judson) of the regimental reserve battalion, supported by a Company E
platoon. Again the Marines advanced to the open sector south of the
hill before the enemy reacted. As before, the Chinese response was
a devastating barrage from their supporting weapons. The stubborn
Marine assault against Siberia brought down the full weight of Chinese
firepower--rifle, machine gun, and hand grenades--but the attack force
would not be beaten off. At 1103 the Siberia hill again belonged to the
Marines. Quickly the Company A platoon began to organize a defense to
repulse the Chinese counterattack, which was certain to come.
In anticipation of a prompt and violent retaliation by the Chinese,
and to help the speedily improvised defense efforts, the 2/1
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Batterton, had sent forward
the supporting platoon from Company E. This reinforcing unit reached
Siberia within seven minutes after the Marine attackers had gained
possession of the objective. The new arrivals scarcely had time to dig
in before a hail of mortar and artillery shells forced all the Marines
to seek cover in a defiladed position on the southern side of the
slope. From here, the 2/1 force directed counter mortar and artillery
fire onto the top and far side of Siberia and unleashed their own
assault weapons against the Chinese soldiers pressing for possession of
Siberia. By midafternoon, with heavy enemy counterfire on the position
and their casualties reaching nearly 75 percent, the Marines were
forced to withdraw and return to their own lines. The hill had changed
hands twice and the enemy had employed 5,000 rounds of artillery in the
contested ownership.
Badly mauled by two actions against Hill 58A, Company E came off the
lines to reorganize, exchanging positions with Company A, of Lieutenant
Colonel Louis N. King’s 1st Battalion. About this time Company C, less
one platoon, had moved from the 1/1 rear area forward to an assembly
point behind 2/1 in preparation for a night counterattack to retake
the now battle-scarred outpost. Without the customary artillery
preparation, the attacking force at 2245 crossed the MLR at a point
directly south of the former outpost Samoa, which had been abandoned
earlier when Siberia fell. Working their way northwest towards Siberia,
the Company C Marines, commanded by Captain Casimir C. Ksycewski,
cautiously approached the assault line. Reaching it at 0105 on 10
August the force deployed immediately and rushed the objective.
At about this time the Chinese defenders opened fire but could not halt
the assaulting Marines. The struggle to regain the Siberia objective
was fierce; some of the Chinese refused to yield and fought to their
death. Most, however, held their defense positions only briefly before
retiring to the refuge offered by the reverse slope of the hill.
Gaining the crest of Hill 58A at 0116, the Company C commander ordered
a platoon to the other side of the objective to dispatch remaining
elements of the enemy force. The resulting fire fight lasted nearly
four hours. At daybreak, however, the enemy, in estimated company
strength, strenuously renewed his counterfire and, for a third time,
forced the 1st Marines to retire from the disputed hill and return to
the main line.
Later that day, at the regimental CP, Colonel Layer called a staff
conference to decide on the best course of action. Successive Marine
withdrawals had been caused by the intense enemy shelling. The key to
its effectiveness was the observation provided the Chinese from Hills
122 and 110. Heavy enemy fire had also caused most of the casualties,
17 killed and 243 wounded, in 1st Marine ranks. It was decided to
shift the battle area to better restrict this enemy capability not
only to observe Marine troop movements but also to call down accurate
fire on friendly attacking units. Bunker Hill, an enemy outpost west
of Siberia, was selected. In the eyes of 1st Marines tacticians,
possession of Hill 122 instead of Hill 58A presented three major
advantages:
Hill 122 offered excellent observation into the rear of enemy
outposts;
Possession of Hill 122 would greatly strengthen the MLR in the
regimental sector, effectively neutralize Siberia, provide
dominating terrain that was more defensible than 58A; and
Bunker offered an excellent opportunity for an attack employing
the element of surprise against the enemy.
To help preserve this tactical surprise, the plan for the Bunker Hill
attack included a diversionary attack against Siberia. Making this
secondary effort would be a reinforced rifle platoon and a composite
unit of gun and flame tanks. For the main attack, Lieutenant Colonel
Batterton’s 2d Battalion would employ a reinforced rifle company with
supporting artillery and armor, if needed. The operation was to be
conducted at night, to further ensure the opportunity for tactical
surprise. For the same reason, the attack was not to be preceded by
artillery preparation on either objective. To the right of the 1st
Marines, however, Colonel Culhane’s 5th Marines would support the
diversion by artillery and tank fire placed on enemy strongpoints in
the Ungok area, about 1¼ miles northeast of Siberia. During daylight,
air, artillery, and tanks attacked targets on both 122 and 58A.
Priority of effort in the 1st Marines area went to units preparing for
the Siberia-Bunker offensive.
_The Attack on Bunker Hill_[178]
[178] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is
derived from: Encl (1) to CG, FMFPac ltr 0762/161 over A9
to CMC, dtd 25 Nov 52, Subj: “Summary of 1stMarDiv Sit
from 20 July-20 Oct 52,” hereafter FMFPac, _1stMarDiv
Sum, Jul-Oct 52_; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 2/1, 1st TkBn
ComdDs, Aug 52.
At dusk on 11 August, 1,000 yards behind the MLR in the western sector
of the 2/1 line, the eight Company C tanks that were to provide much
of the diversionary effort at Hill 58A moved out of their assembly
area. Leading the column east of the MSR, Changdan Road, were four M-46
mediums, mounting 90mm guns. They were followed by an equal number
of flame vehicles. Each M-46 was specially equipped with an 18-inch
fighting light, actually a searchlight with a shutter over the lens, to
be used for battlefield illumination. The flame vehicles, World War II
M4A3E8 mediums, mounted a 105mm howitzer in addition to the flame tube.
As the tanks reached the Changdan Road, they turned north, crossed the
MLR, and proceeded to preselected positions. (See Map 10.)
[Illustration:
MAP 10 K. WHITE
2/1 SECTOR
9–11 AUGUST 1952]
When the M-46 gun tanks were in position to fire on Siberia and its
flanks, their powerful 90s opened up on the objective. At this time,
2110, the first section of flames (two tanks) made its way along the
stream bed between the MLR and Hill 56A (Samoa). Lighting their way
with very short bursts of flame, the two tanks advanced in this manner
to the base of Hill 58A. There the vehicles paused momentarily, then
began to move up the near slope, using longer spurts of flame to sear
the ground and sparse vegetation to the crest of the position. The gun
tanks, in the meantime, had shifted their fire from Siberia northeast
to neutralize Hill 110. When the flame vehicles reached the top of
Siberia, they lumbered down the far slope, firing then in shorter
bursts and sweeping the area with machine guns to discourage any enemy
infantry interference.
With some fuel reserved to light their way on the return trip, the
flame section reversed its course from the far side of the objective,
mounted the crest, and clanked back to the Changdan Road. When the
first section had returned, the second departed, completing its mission
in much the same manner. Tank personnel of both groups observed that
the enemy artillery and mortar fire was medium to heavy on Siberia.
Some rifle fire was also received. Gun tanks, firing from Changdan Road
east of Siberia, experienced less fire from the Chinese.
Although the flame vehicles had completed their mission and were on
their way home, the M-46s remained on position in support of the 3d
Platoon, Company D which, at 2230, was advancing from the MLR to
complete the infantry part of the diversion. Staying out of the low
ground that the tanks had used, the platoon swept over Hill 56A at 2255
and immediately struck out for the further objective, Hill 58A. Gun
tanks firing their 90s on the Chinese OPLR on Hill 110 and on Siberia
illuminated the target area with their fighting lights, the shutter
of which the tankers flicked open and closed during each five-second
interval that the light remained on.
Less than an hour after crossing JAMESTOWN, the platoon from Captain
George W. Campbell’s Company D reported the capture of Siberia. The
enemy quickly made his presence felt at the objective; a half hour
before midnight, he assaulted the hill in reinforced platoon strength.
Ten minutes later the Chinese withdrew and the Company D Marines, in
accordance with their battle plan, did likewise. At about the same
time the 5th Marines, having completed its part in the diversion, also
secured from the operation.
Ten minutes after the diversionary infantry had cleared Samoa while
enroute to Siberia, the main attack force, Company B, which had come
under operational control of 2/1 at 1800, crossed the MLR, the line of
departure. Moving at a fast pace to preserve the element of anticipated
surprise, the attack force, commanded by Captain Sereno S. Scranton,
Jr., soon deployed two squads of the lead platoon against the near side
of the hill. By 2318 on 11 August the squads were moving up Bunker Hill
and, 10 minutes later, one platoon had gained the top of the objective
and one was at the base of the hill, both moving northward along the
forward slope. As the advancing units neared the end of their sweep
forward, they began to come under small amounts of rifle fire from
the front and left flank of the position.[179] The Company B platoons
continued to advance, returning well-placed small arms fire.
[179] Recalling the Marine seizure of Bunker, the G-3,
1stMarDiv at that time expressed the view that “taking
these places was easy but holding them under heavy
Chinese artillery and mortar fire was extremely costly.
Our counterbattery fire was ineffective because we were
limited to from one to eight rounds per tube per day,
depending on the weapon, by Army order, because of
an ammunition shortage.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz MS
comments, dtd 15 Jun 67, hereafter _Honsowetz ltr II_.
Soon the intensity of Chinese small arms fire increased; at the same
time enemy mortars and artillery opened up on the company. Marines
attempting to assault the top of Hill 122 also came under a hail of
hand grenades hurled by the staunch Chinese defenders. After a brief
but vicious fight at point-blank range, the Chinese gave ground on the
eastern side, heading uphill. Several Marines pursued the fleeing enemy
to the summit, then joined the rest of the assault units of Company B
in organizing a defense. By 0300, 12 August the battle had quieted down
and for a short while all firing ceased. Then, as the Marines began to
dig in, a bypassed pocket of enemy resistance came to life. Two fire
teams in the 1st Platoon took these Chinese Communists under fire.
Even as the fighting continued, Marines and KSC personnel were hauling
fortification materials towards Bunker to consolidate the precarious
foothold. For a while, enemy mortars unleashed a heavy fire against
the newly won position, but by 0230 Company B was able to report that
enemy shelling had stopped and that the objective was in friendly
hands. A new fire fight broke out at 0345 between a small force of
enemy soldiers occupying a draw forward of Bunker Hill and Marines
nearby. The exchange of fire continued for nearly two hours, but short
of harassing the Marines on Bunker Hill the enemy did not launch
a counterattack. Dawn on 12 August revealed that thus far in the
Bunker Hill fighting 1 Marine of Company B had been killed and 22 were
wounded. The earlier diversionary attack on Siberia had resulted in
only one Marine casualty, the wounding of the platoon commander, Second
Lieutenant James W. Dion.
Personnel losses were kept to a minimum by the well-organized medical
support and the efficient service of medical and evacuation personnel.
A forward aid station was established in the vicinity of the Company
E CP. Casualties that were not ambulatory arrived at this two-bunker
installation usually by hand litter, other wounded men were transported
in armored personnel carriers, U.S. Army tracked vehicles similar in
appearance to the Marine LVT, that had accompanied the diversionary
unit and were part of the Panmunjom rescue force stationed in the
area of COP 2 on the 3/1 left flank. Wounded Marines were examined
immediately. Minor injury cases were treated and discharged; more
seriously injured personnel were given emergency treatment and
evacuated. Movement to the rear was accomplished by ambulance jeeps.
Helicopters, landing only 30 yards from the station, flew out the
critically wounded. A sandbag-protected squad tent was used to house
casualties waiting to be examined. This emergency aid station closed
down on 13 August, when action in the right battalion sector diminished.
Even though the remainder of the morning of 12 August was practically
free of any retaliatory attempts by the Chinese against Bunker Hill,
the Marines occupying the new position were not idle, for they
anticipated an immediate and severe reaction for capturing the hill.
Quickly, but methodically, the company dug in. At noon, regiment
passed to 3/1[180] the responsibility for Bunker Hill and operational
control of Company B. Consolidation of Hill 122 continued until about
1500, when the Marines were forced to put down their entrenching tools
and grab their rifles instead. The Chinese had suddenly launched an
intense mortar and artillery attack against the hill. Defending Marines
expected to see enemy soldiers start up the western slopes at any
minute.
[180] Initially the diversionary attack against Siberia and
subsequent assault against Bunker had been made by
Marines of 2/1 since Siberia was in the 2/1 sector. On
12 August operational control was transferred to 3/1
as the fighting continued at Bunker, in the area of
responsibility of the left battalion sector.
Actually, more than an hour elapsed before the Communists initiated
their first main ground attack to regain Bunker. By that time, heavy
casualties from the continued shelling had forced Company B to pull
back from the ridge and take up positions on the reverse (eastern)
slope of Bunker Hill. At this point, with reduced Company B forces
and with no radio communication between Captain Scranton’s unit and
3/1, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage sent I/3/1,[181] under Captain Howard
J. Connolly, forward from the MLR. Shortly before 1600, a force of
more than 350 Chinese lunged out of the low ground of Hill 123, west
of Bunker, to attack defensive positions along the ridge between
Hills 124–122. Striking in rapid succession first the west side and
then the northern end of the Company B position to find a weak spot
in the defense, the enemy counterattack finally concentrated on the
southwestern part of the hill.
[181] From the division reserve, Captain Anthony J. Skotnicki’s
company, I/3/7, was en route to take over the I/3/1
sector. As an interim measure, Captain Byron J.
Melancon’s Company H extended its MLR positions to the
right to cover the Company I area.
An intense exchange of fire raged here until 1715, when the defending
fire of Company B plus the added weight of the Company I reinforcements
combined to stall the enemy advance. Having failed to gain their
objective, the Communists abruptly broke off their artillery and mortar
fire and ordered their infantry to withdraw. They pulled back only to
the far side of the hill, however. By 1740 the enemy was occupying his
new post on the northern slope, while the Marines continued to hold
their positions on the reverse slope of Bunker Ridge. Enemy supporting
fires had lifted and a lull ensued in the fighting.
_Consolidating the Defense of Bunker Hill_[182]
[182] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
12–13 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
Even before the Chinese had made their coordinated attack against Hill
122 in the midafternoon of the 12th, the 1st Marines had implemented
a plan of action to assure that the critical position would remain
in Marine hands. In addition to the movement of Company I/3/1 to
reinforce Bunker Hill and of Company I/3/7 as its relief on the MLR,
a precautionary displacement was also made of the 3/1 reconnaissance
platoon to Hill 124 to tie in that terrain feature with both Bunker
and JAMESTOWN and thus consolidate the defense north of the MLR and
west of Bunker. (See Map 11.)
[Illustration:
MAP 11 K. WHITE
BUNKER HILL AREA
2300, 12 AUGUST 1952]
Other activities behind the line aimed at making the Marine position
on the newly seized hill more tenable. As one step in this direction,
General Selden shifted most of his reserve into the zone of action.
Before the end of the day remaining units of 3/7 were placed under
operational control of 3/1, and 2/7 was attached to Colonel Layer’s
reserve. The 7th Marines was directed to place its 4.2-inch mortars
on call to the 1st Marines. Priority of artillery support went to the
Bunker Hill regiment. Within the 1st Marines, the regimental commander
moved two provisional platoons (118 Marines) of the reserve 1st
Battalion to the 3d Battalion sector. All 81mm mortars in 1/1 were sent
to the left battalion. The fire plan also called for employment of all
the 60mm mortars that could bear on the crest of 124–122, with 81mm and
artillery box-me-in barrage fires on the ridge and flanks.
Machine guns from the MLR were assigned missions on the crest of Bunker
Ridge and 4.5-inch ripples were planned on the deep enemy approaches.
Gun and flame tanks were to protect the right flank of Hill 122 where
the steep draw between Bunker and the MLR offered the most dangerous
approach into Bunker Hill. Supplies and fortification materials,
meanwhile, were being carried forward and casualties taken to the rear
by the relief party. Although 3/1 initially reported that the Bunker
Hill fighting had resulted in 58 killed or wounded Marines, a later
battalion count showed this number to be 34--5 killed and 29 wounded.
Most of the casualties had been caused by hostile shelling. Although
the Hill 122 reverse slope afforded some cover from the Chinese
artillery and mortars, the positions on the crest did not offer any
protection, so Marines continued their trenchworks and other defensive
preparations at a rapid pace and supporting fires were registered by
1900. The approach of night was certain to bring renewed Communist
attempts to capture Bunker Hill.
At 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage reported to division that his
force on Hill 122 occupied the entire reverse slope and that the Marine
of I/3/1 and B/1/1 were digging in and consolidating their scant
defenses. Enemy shells were still falling on both Bunker and Hill 124.
Company commanders forward of the MLR estimated that as many as 400
Chinese occupied the ridge on the other side of the slope from the
Marines. Since the crest of the long Hill 124–122 ridgeline was fairly
level, the gentle incline of the Bunker rear slope permitted defending
Marine units excellent fields of fire to the ridge crest, a major
consideration in the 3/1 battalion commander’s decision to adopt a
rear slope defense. Moreover, the top of the ridge could be swept with
direct fire from the MLR as well as supporting weapons from the two
nearest companies on JAMESTOWN. Opposing Marine and Chinese forces were
thus lined up for a continuation of the battle for Bunker Hill.
It appeared that the Chinese wished to attempt a diversionary tactic
of their own. To draw attention away from Hill 122 they engaged a
Marine outpost east of Bunker and a KMC ambush far to the left before
attacking Bunker again. In the KMC sector, shortly after 2300, an enemy
infantry platoon walked into a trap near the eastern edge of the Sachon
and 500 yards south of the Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line. The brief fire
fight lasted only 10 minutes before the Chinese broke contact.
Perhaps the ambush was incidental to the forthcoming attack against
the Bunker complex, but this same reasoning cannot be applied to
the Communist-inspired action which broke out shortly at Hill 48A,
Stromboli, another friendly outpost far to the east of Hill 122.
Near the right limiting point of Colonel Layer’s 1st Marines and the
5th Marines boundary, Stromboli was another Marine fire-team-by-day,
squad-by-night position. It occupied a small rise 250 yards forward
of the MLR and commanded the immediate sector in all directions. The
entire MLR in the regimental right was dominated by the enemy-held Hill
104, a half-mile north of 48A.
Communist infantry opened the attack without benefit of any supporting
arms preparation and rushed to seize Hill 48A early on the morning of
13 August, a few minutes after midnight. Defending Marines immediately
responded with small arms and automatic weapons fire. By the time the
outpost commander had informed battalion of the attack by radio, the
far right sector of the 1st Marines line, held by Captain Clarence G.
Moody, Jr.’s Company F, had also come under attack. Firing rifles and
submachine guns and hurling hand grenades as they assaulted the main
position, the Chinese attempted to penetrate the JAMESTOWN defenses.
In spite of the enemy’s concerted efforts, the Marine line remained
staunch.
At Stromboli, the Communists met with no greater success, although
they did cause enough casualties to warrant the dispatch of a Company F
reinforcing squad. When this unit left the MLR, at 0106 on 13 August,
the Marine line was still under a heavy attack not only from Chinese
infantry but from hostile artillery and mortars as well. Out at Hill
48A the outpost remained in comparative quiet until the approach of the
reinforcing party. As the Company F squad neared the base of the hill,
Chinese infantry that earlier had been assaulting the Marine MLR turned
their rifle and machine gun fire from positions on the JAMESTOWN side
of the outpost. A heavy rain of devastating mortar fire engulfed the
reinforcing Marines. On order, they broke off the approach march and
returned to the company rear area.
On the main line, meanwhile, Company F positions were still being
bombarded by Chinese artillery and assaulted by their infantry.
Casualties along the entire line forced Lieutenant Colonel Batterton to
order his 1st Provisional Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company,
2/1, to the Company F command post. After the clutch unit departed the
battalion area, at 0210, and approached Captain Moody’s CP, enemy fires
immediately intensified. A violent fight erupted to the left of the
Company F sector, but the Marines there held. The Chinese then tried to
punch holes in other parts of the company line, moving eastward along
JAMESTOWN. Each failure to breach the line seemed to signal a decrease
in the intensity of Chinese shelling.
This easing of Communist pressure against the main line enabled
the Company F commander to put into operation a new attempt at the
reinforcement and rescue of Stromboli. After the initial enemy assault
in the early hours of 13 August had ended in failure, the Chinese made
repeated attempts to capture the outpost. At one time it appeared
that a company of Chinese had overrun the hill. Later, however, the
Stromboli stronghold radioed that the enemy force, subsequently
identified as only a platoon, had encircled the Marine position. To
relieve enemy pressure at Hill 48A, Captain Moody employed a rifle
platoon which set out for the outpost at 0325.
Simultaneously, as if their intelligence had advance knowledge of the
1st Marines recovery plan, the Chinese stepped up the tempo of their
attack at Stromboli. A fresh assault by the enemy was stymied by Marine
superiority in hand-to-hand combat. Thereafter, close-in defensive
fires continued to ring the outpost and to discourage future assaults.
The approach of the second Marine rescue party eliminated much of
the pressure that Communist foot soldiers had maintained around the
hill position. After a 90-minute exchange of fire with the enemy, the
friendly platoon penetrated the encirclement and rushed to the besieged
outpost at the hill crest. At this point the Chinese disengaged and
withdrew towards the north.
After their diversion against Stromboli had approached the proportions
of a full-scale attack, with the enemy having reinforced from platoon
to company size, the Chinese then initiated their main thrust, an
attempt to retake Bunker. Captain Connolly (I/3/1) had reported
that shortly before 0100 Communist mortar fire had begun falling on
his positions on the southern slope of Bunker Hill. Simultaneously,
Chinese artillery stepped up the rate of its barrage fires as did the
assaulting close-in enemy infantry. Captain Connolly then requested
the 11th Marines to place box-me-in fires around the Marine company
positions on Hill 122. Artillery furnished these defensive fires almost
immediately.
Shortly after 0130, the Marines in the center and right of the I/3/1
position observed a large number of Chinese, deployed into a skirmish
line, headed directly for their part of the hill. The attack was
accompanied by intense machine gun and rifle fire. It was countered by
an equally heavy reply from Marines on Bunker. For nearly four hours
the battle raged at Hill 122. Unsuccessful enemy frontal assaults were
followed by attempts to dislodge the defenders from the rear. In their
continuing thrust against the hill, the Chinese were repulsed by Marine
coordinated support fires--tank, rocket, artillery, and mortar.
By firing on known or suspected assembly areas and Chinese infantry
units advancing up the draws towards Hill 122, these Marine
supporting weapons helped to preserve the status quo at Bunker.
Repeated box-me-ins were also fired by the 11th Marines during the
early-morning Communist attacks on 13 August. Exploding friendly mortar
shells increased the effectiveness of the hill defense; nine rocket
ripples[183] fired by the artillery regiment further supported Marines
at the critical terrain position. Tanks unleashed their deadly fire on
nearby enemy outposts to neutralize them; their 90mm guns, aided by the
battlefield illumination from tank fighting lights, helped eliminate
Chinese foot soldiers attempting to envelop Marine positions on Bunker.
[183] A characteristic of 4.5-inch rocket launcher is the
discharge of 24 rounds in quick succession, called a
ripple. A battery of six launchers can fire 144 rounds on
target in less than a minute.
It was in this direction that an enemy force, estimated at reinforced
battalion strength, headed during the early morning fighting on Hill
122. At 0330, the struggle for possession of the height had reached
the climax. For an hour the issue remained in doubt. Then, as the
Chinese small arms fire decreased, the tempo of the enemy’s artillery
shelling increased. This, the division correctly deduced, announced the
beginning of a temporary Communist withdrawal from Bunker Hill.
Although the immediate danger of the enemy onslaught had ended for
the time being, Marines to the rear of the JAMESTOWN Line stepped up
their defensive preparations. Division, regimental, and battalion
operational plans were put into effect to prevent a Chinese victory.
The seriousness of the situation on the 1st Marines right flank at
Stromboli early on 13 August had resulted in the movement of one
company of 5th Marines into blocking positions behind the MLR near
the left regimental boundary. To the south of Bunker Hill, relief
and replacement units from the division reserve, ordered into action
late the previous day, maneuvered into position to strengthen the
regimental front. One of these relief units, G/3/7, under command of
Captain William M. Vanzuyen, had just deployed from its assembly area
to pass through the ranks of an MLR company and take over the Bunker
Hill positions. The Marines’ situation on Hill 122 had deteriorated so
rapidly, however, that the 3/1 commander rushed two reinforced squads
forward from I/3/7, the nearest MLR unit.
The Company G reinforcement unit jumped off from JAMESTOWN and arrived
at Bunker shortly after sunup, where it reinforced Captain Connolly’s
positions during the height of the battle for possession of Hill 122.
Not long after, the Chinese initiated their withdrawal under cover of
increased artillery and mortar barrages. As they left, the Communists
policed the battlefield in their typically thorough manner. A Marine
platoon that swept the northern slope of Bunker failed to find any
enemy bodies in this area so recently abandoned by the Chinese, but did
take under fire and kill seven enemy that had remained on Hill 122.
Before I/3/1 had sent one of its platoons to reconnoiter the far side
of Bunker Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage ordered H/3/7, under
Captain John G. Demas, forward to relieve friendly forces at the
contested height. The exchange of units was completed before noon
of the 13th. By late afternoon, except for Company H, all 2d and 3d
Battalions, 7th Marines units that had moved up to reinforce the 1st
Marines were on their way back to the regimental reserve area. At this
time the 1st Marines CO, Colonel Layer, reported to General Selden
that the Bunker Hill action during 12–13 August had resulted in 24
Marines killed and 214 wounded. On the right, in the 2d Battalion
sector, an additional 40 Marines were listed as casualties, including
7 killed in the Stromboli defense. Chinese known dead numbered 210,
plus an estimated 470 killed and 625 wounded.[184] Artillery and aerial
observers reported that between 1500 on the 12th and 0600 the following
morning an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 rounds of enemy fire had fallen
on 1st Marines positions, the “heaviest incoming fires received by the
Division since coming into the present sector.”[185]
[184] 1stMarDiv PIR 658, dtd 14 Aug 52.
[185] Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_, p. 19.
The number of casualties from the Bunker Hill action was to increase
further that same day with a renewed attack on the outpost. Before
the Chinese again engaged Hill 122, however, they made a diversionary
attack on the western flank at the extreme left of the 3/1 sector.
At dusk on 13 August, the enemy shelled the Company G Marines at COP
2, the critical height overlooking the Panmunjom peace corridor. The
shelling caused several casualties and lasted 90 minutes. Towards the
end, Communist infantrymen moved forward and fired on the outpost.
At about the same time, Company H personnel emplaced on the MLR to
the rear of COP 2 began to receive artillery rounds in preassault
proportions.
A ground attack in this western end of the 3/1 sector did not
materialize, however. Instead, the Chinese resumed their attack on
Bunker Hill. Since their temporary withdrawal early on the 13th, the
CCF had repeatedly sent mortar and artillery barrages against the
bastion to harass its new occupants. On occasion these well-aimed
mortar rounds found their mark. Mortars interdicting a trail used for
resupply of the Hill 122 defenders did inflict some casualties on two
groups rushing emergency supplies forward from the MLR.
At 2100, while continuing his shelling of the left end of the 3/1
sector, the enemy lifted his preparation on Hill 122 to permit a CCF
reinforced company to make a new assault there on the Marine defenders.
Captain Demas called for box-me-ins to seal off his positions and
illumination shells to help locate the enemy force. Utilizing the draw
to the east of Hill 58A, the Chinese proceeded west to Bunker where
they pitted one platoon against the center of the Company H, 3/7 line
and another against the right flank. Defensive fires momentarily held
off the intruders, although some were able to break through to the
Marines’ fighting positions.
Those enemy troops who penetrated the Marine defenses were quickly
eliminated by grenades and small arms fire. Unable to weaken the Marine
defenses any further and by now sustaining sizable casualties from
unrelenting Marine artillery and mortar concentrations, the Communists
withdrew at 2215. Marine defenders estimated they had killed 175 enemy
during this latest encounter; a firm count of 20 bodies were found on
the shell-torn slopes. Company H casualties, all from enemy mortar and
artillery fire, were 7 killed and 21 wounded.[186] Enemy incoming was
again heavy during this period, with a reported 3,000 rounds falling in
the sector.
[186] During the fighting on the 13th, Hospitalman John E.
Kilmer was mortally wounded while “administering aid to
the wounded and expediting their evacuation.” Though
wounded by enemy mortars, he continued his life-saving
efforts until another barrage took his life. He had
died shielding a wounded Marine undergoing emergency
treatment. Hospitalman Kilmer, a distant cousin of poet
Joyce Kilmer, became the first of four corpsmen serving
with the 1st Marine Division to be awarded the Medal of
Honor during the trench warfare in western Korea.
In the 3d Battalion sector, Marine and KSC stretcher bearers brought
casualties to the I/3/1 CP, several hundred yards to the rear of the
front line. At the command post, the critically wounded were airlifted
by helicopter to the rear. Less seriously wounded casualties were
placed in jeep ambulances and carried to the battalion forward aid
station, about two miles away. Here a team of doctors and corpsmen
examined and treated patients, discharged a few, but prepared most for
further evacuation. At the 1st Marines forward aid station, patients
were reexamined and their wounds redressed when required; discharge or
further evacuation was also accomplished. Most of the Marines brought
to this forward facility had become exhausted from vigorous activity
in the high temperature and humidity which characterized the South
Korean summer. The regimental aid station treated these heat cases and
then released them to their units.
_Company B Returns to Bunker Hill_[187]
[187] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 3/1, 1st TkBn ComdDs,
Aug 52.
Division intelligence subsequently reported that the 2100 attack on 13
August had been made by an enemy battalion with a reinforced company
in assault. This same unit again sent a small band of Chinese soldiers
against Hill 122 at 0225 the following morning. This clash was to be
the briefest of all offensives for control of Bunker Hill during the
11–17 August period. Prior to launching this four-minute fire fight,
an enemy machine gun at Siberia had attempted to harass the Marines at
Bunker Hill. In retaliation, Marine tanks illuminated this enemy weapon
with their searchlights and immediately took it under fire with their
90mm guns, knocking it out of action. At the same time, enemy artillery
attempted to shell friendly tanks. During this brief fire exchange,
one tanker was wounded slightly and the lens of one fighting light was
splintered by fragments from enemy shells bursting around the tanks.
The inconsequential probe was made, Marines believed, not so much to
seriously challenge Marines holding Hill 122 as it was to retrieve CCF
dead and wounded from the major attack a few hours earlier that night.
Anticipating that a much heavier ground attack was close at hand,
the 1st Marines ordered a reinforcement of the Bunker Hill position.
Even before the heavy action on the 13th, this machinery had been set
in motion. To this end, the 3d Battalion was to reinforce the Bunker
defense by sending a 1/1 platoon to the hill and the 2d Battalion was
instructed to return Company A (minus this platoon) to the reserve
battalion. At 0415 on the 14th, Company E/2/1, led since 10 August
by Captain Stanley T. Moak, took over from A/1/1 the responsibility
for the 2d Battalion’s MLR “Siberia sector,” adjacent to the Bunker
Hill area held by the 3d Battalion. The Company A reinforcing platoon
arrived at Hill 122 just before dusk, preceding another CCF company
attack by only a few hours.
At midnight the 1st Marines front was suspiciously quiet for a few
minutes. Forward on Hill 122, there was no apparent enemy activity.
Captain Demas sent out a two fire-team patrol from Bunker to
reconnoiter northwest of Bunker towards the Chinese lines. Shortly
after the eight Marines returned with a negative report of contact with
the enemy, the regiment received a report about the outbreak of a small
arms clash between defenders on the left flank of Bunker and an enemy
unit farther west. At 0118 on 15 August what had initially appeared to
be a minor contest suddenly erupted into a heated fire fight all along
the 124–122 Bunker Ridge complex. At the request of Captain Dumas,
Marine artillery fired protective boxes around the Bunker positions.
This defensive maneuver held the attackers in check.
At this moment, Chinese infantrymen in the draw running alongside the
124–122–120 ridge system were massed for an assault on Bunker from the
northeast. The plan might have been successful had not a fighting light
from a tank on the main line intercepted the Communists in this state
of their preparations. In a matter of moments, friendly artillery,
mortar, and tank fire struck the Chinese and scattered the formation.
After discovering he could not successfully pull a sneak attack,
the enemy reverted to his usual procedure, employing a preassault
bombardment prior to his infantry assault. This preparation began at
0206; it reached the rate of approximately 100 rounds of 82 and 122mm
mortar shells per minute. While supporting weapons pounded the Marines,
the Chinese assault commander reorganized his attack force that the
Marine shelling had scattered. Communist infantry then moved forward
and fired on the Bunker Marines, who replied with rifles and machine
guns and box-me-in fires. Unable to penetrate this protective mask
around the positions, the Chinese gradually decreased their small arms
and artillery fire until, at 0315, the rate of exploding shells at Hill
122 had dropped to only four or five per minute. Soon thereafter the
small arms fire slacked off entirely and by 0400 even the mortars had
stopped. Across the entire 1st Marines front, all was quiet again.
During the Company H defense of the hill, enemy losses, caused mostly
by friendly artillery and mortar fire, were placed at 350, including 40
counted dead. Captain Demas’ Marines suffered 35 casualties, of whom
7 were killed. En route to the MLR after relief by B/3/1, the company
suffered four more casualties, including two KIAs, all the victims of
Chinese mortars.
It was not long before these weapons inflicted casualties on Company B,
which had six of its men wounded even before the H/3/7 unit had reached
JAMESTOWN. Another Marine at Bunker was wounded by enemy mortars later
that morning. At 1640 the Communists again probed Bunker Hill, this
time in company strength. Striking in daylight during a thunderstorm
and without any preparatory fires, the Chinese attackers failed to
achieve any tactical surprise. The defenders fired both infantry and
supporting weapons; some threw grenades at the few Communists who did
manage to get close to the fighting positions. At 1750, the Chinese
withdrew, this time leaving 35 of their dead in the attack area. Four
Marines had been wounded; five others suffering from battle fatigue
were later evacuated.
Exactly when the enemy would strike next at Bunker Hill was not known
by the Marines. Most believed that the Communists would return but only
speculated as to when. Although the battalion felt that “the enemy was
not expected to attack again for some time,”[188] events were to prove
otherwise. In any case, the battalion was prepared, having an adequate
force on Bunker and sufficient local reserves to absorb an attack up
to the strength of any received so far. Division supporting arms were
readily available for commitment at critical points.
[188] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.
The Chinese soon put an end to the conjecture about the next attack.
At 0040, 16 August, an enemy force, later estimated as a battalion,
came out of positions to the west and north of Hill 122. Supported
by mortars at first, and later on by artillery, the battalion sent
one company against the Marine outpost. Several attacking elements
were able to penetrate the defensive fires. These Chinese reached the
crest of the hill and began using their rifles, automatic weapons,
and hand grenades against the defenders. Captain Scranton called for
reinforcements. A platoon from I/3/7 was dispatched promptly from the
3/1 sector. The reinforcements departed JAMESTOWN just as the fire
fight on Bunker began to subside. By 0315, the enemy had begun his
withdrawal, and another reinforcing element, I/3/1, had moved forward,
this time from regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s CP.
About two hours later a brief fire fight flared up in the Company B
sector. No ground assault was made on Marine positions. The enemy
force, of undetermined strength, never closed with the Marines and
within 10 minutes, the firing stopped. No casualties to the Marines
resulted during this exchange. The earlier clash had resulted in the
death of 3 Marines and the wounding of 27. Enemy losses were estimated
at 40 killed and 30 wounded.
Before it came off the hill, Company B was engaged by enemy fire three
more times. At 1945, Chinese mortars (82mm) wounded two Marines.
Later, heavier mortars placed 20 rounds on Hill 122, but these caused
no casualties. There were some losses, however, early on the morning
of the 17th when C/1/1 was relieving the Bunker defenders. Captain
Scranton’s Marines sustained five more wounded from automatic weapons,
five during the relief.
The second relief of Company B on Bunker brought to a close the battle
that had been waged for possession of the vital hill complex. During
the Hill 122 tours of Company C and other 1st Marines units that
followed in August, seven more ground actions tested the Bunker Hill
defenses. Only one of them, during the night of 25–26 August, was of
significant size. This attack also failed to dislodge the Marines from
the hill.
_Supporting Arms at Bunker Hill_[189]
[189] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 4–16 Aug 52;
1st Mar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs,
Aug 52.
It was quite natural that the flurry of ground activity during the
battle of Bunker Hill created a need for increased participation from
Marine supporting arms. The magnitude of infantry action during the
contest for Hill 122 resulted in a monthly record to date in 1952
for the amount of air support received as well as the volume of both
artillery and tank fires supporting the division. During this critical
9–16 August period, the 11th Marines played a part in every ground
action except the feint attack on Siberia and the seizure of Bunker
Hill, both of which were purposely executed without an artillery
preparation. Medium tanks fired day and night missions during most of
the infantry action. Close air support at times amounted to a strike
every 20 minutes.
During the ground action around Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli, the
division received close air support in amounts unparalleled for
JAMESTOWN Marines to that time. Marine and U.S. Air Force pilots flew
a total of 458 missions (including 27 ground controlled MPQ-14 radar
bombing attacks) during five of the most critical days, 9–13 August.
On two of them, the 1st Marine Division received priority of close air
support along the whole EUSAK front. Fifth Air Force assigned 1st MAW
aircraft to Marine requests for close air support as long as Marine
aircraft were available.
The initial air strike by Marines in the Bunker fighting was on 9
August in support of counterattack plans for Siberia. MAG-33 provided
a morning and evening flight of four F9F jet fighters to destroy enemy
forces and defensive works on 58A (Siberia). USAF fighter-bombers
attacked Siberia and other outposts nearby and enemy artillery
positions supporting the Chinese forward line. On the next day, air
operations, concentrating on Siberia, were stepped up considerably
against enemy outposts. Thirty-five aircraft in nine missions attacked
58A with bombs, rockets, and napalm. These strikes were carried out by
MAG-12 and U.S. Air Force pilots at irregular intervals during daylight
hours. Air controllers reported good results. Other aircraft hit known
mortar locations capable of supporting the Chinese. During the morning,
Marine Attack Squadron 121 (Lieutenant Colonel Philip “L” Crawford)
bombed and burned Bunker Hill. Just before sunset, F-80 and -84 jets
of the U.S. Air Force dropped 15 tons of bombs on mortar positions and
troops on and around Hill 120. Four F-80s also participated with eight
Marine AD-2 propeller-driven attack aircraft in the morning attack on
Bunker.
Air activity in support of the 1st Marines continued unabated on 11
August. Before the diversionary ground attack just after dusk that day,
Marine and Fifth Air Force fliers repeated the treatment that Hills
58A and 122 had received the previous day. During daylight, supporting
weapons positions were hit by FAF fighter planes. At night, MAG-12 air
attacks guided by the MPQ-14 radar bombing system destroyed hostile
artillery and mortars. Also during the dark, the medium bombers of
the FEAF Bomber Command struck deeper in the rear at heavy weapons
locations.
These Air Force bombers conducted four more controlled-bombing attacks
against Chinese artillery during the early hours of 12 August, when
Company B was consolidating its positions and hastily organizing the
defense of Bunker Hill. After daylight and until dusk, MAGs-12 and -33
and USAF squadrons provided four-plane flights to strike troop assembly
areas, supporting weapons positions, and observation posts close to
Hill 122. In late afternoon, Marine pilots in four F9F Panther jets
and three ADs bombed and burned the enemy side of Bunker Hill during
the shelling and subsequent ground attack against the Marines on the
eastern slope.
Marines flew, on 13 August, all of the daylight close air support
missions in support of the actions on both Bunker in the center and
Stromboli in the right of the 1st Marines sector. On 13 August, a total
of 94 aircraft were committed over the regimental sector to conduct
strikes in support of ground operations. Enemy Hill 104, commanding
the 2/1 outpost on 48A (Stromboli), received four attacks. Fighter
bombers (F4U propeller-driven Corsairs) carrying napalm, rockets, and
1,000-pound bombs, raided the hill mass at 0535. The other strikes
against this key terrain-feature were made by attack and fighter
aircraft during the afternoon. Other targets on the regimental right
were weapons positions beyond Hill 104 and an enemy outpost one
thousand yards west of Stromboli.
Most of the air support received by the 1st Marines on the 13th was
directed against targets that were participating--or that were capable
of taking part--in the battle on Bunker Hill. Against the enemy on the
height itself, the Marines directed only three strikes, and these came
late in the morning. A majority of the air attacks were dispatched
against observation and command posts and the firing positions of both
automatic and large caliber weapons. Chinese artillery and mortar
fire had inflicted more casualties and punishment on the Marines than
the enemy infantry assaults. As a consequence, the main effort of the
close air support strikes was directed against these hostile supporting
weapons.
After dark on the 13th, VMF(N)-513 commanded by Colonel Peter D.
Lambrecht,[190] took up the air offensive against the heavy firing
positions in the rear of the enemy line. The squadron conducted four
attacks with its night fighters. Two of its attacks were made just
before sunrise.
[190] Two days later, Colonel Lambrecht, flying a F3D twin jet
night fighter with his radar operator, Second Lieutenant
James M. Brown, disappeared while on a night flight. The
last known position of the plane was over the Yellow
Sea, 50 air miles west of Pyongyang. At about that point
the aircraft faded from the radar screen. Efforts to
reestablish communications failed. It was reported that
observers at sea sighted a crash and explosion at about
this same time. Extensive search failed to uncover any
trace of the Marines or their aircraft.
During the remainder of the battle of Bunker Hill, the ground fighting
subsided and the requirement for close air support abated accordingly.
On the 14th, only four daylight strikes were flown in the 1st Marines
area. These, all by Marine squadrons, were against active artillery and
mortars in the defilade of Hill 120 and others to the west on the far
slope of Hill 123, and Chinese outpost positions, west of 48A, which
had been pestering the Stromboli garrison. There were no flights after
dark on the 14th, but on the following night, two MPQ missions were
flown by VMF(N)-513. Each was a single plane flight against a reported
artillery location. This was the final night air action in the battle
for Bunker Hill. Daylight missions in support of Hill 122 defense after
the sharp decrease of attacks on the 14th numbered only seven attacks,
each by four planes. These, flown by Marines, continued to emphasize
the destruction of enemy artillery.
Marine artillery continued its support of ground troops and air
strikes. Cannoneers of the 11th Marines fired 21 flak suppression
missions during the five days beginning on 11 August. This type of
close coordination between Marine supporting arms further reduced
combat losses of aircraft providing CAS to the division. The Marine
artillerymen had played a vital part in the defense of the besieged
outposts. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage credited the box-me-in fires with
an important role in thwarting each enemy attack on Bunker.[191]
[191] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, pp. 3–4.
In the 24-hour period beginning at 1800 on 12 August, Marine artillery
directly supporting the 1st Marines fired 10,652 rounds. Most of the
ammunition was expended in support of the Bunker Hill defense; some
was used in behalf of the Marines outposting Stromboli during the
Communists’ early morning diversion that day. On the 9th, the direct
support battalion, 3/11 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Rogers), had
fired about one-fourth of the 12–13 August total. Many of the shells
that first day of the Bunker battle were preparatory to counterattacks
for regaining Siberia.
When the retaking of Hill 58A was discarded in favor of the surprise
attack on 122, the amount of artillery support was reduced, during
the 1st Marines infantry preparations on the 10th and 11th, in keeping
with the fire support plan. Upon seizure of Bunker, Lieutenant Colonel
Rogers’ business immediately picked up and quickly reached a crescendo
the following day, when the 10,652 shells fired became a Marine one-day
battalion record for western Korea until the last stages of fighting
in 1953. Other Marine artillery battalions fired reinforcing missions
during the critical period as did the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery which
fired a large number of on-call ripples. The regimental commander
later recalled that “during some of the crises every gun that could
bear on Bunker in the 11th Marines and reinforcing units was shooting
there.”[192]
[192] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC and MS comments, dtd 20 Jun 67, hereafter _Henderson
ltr III_.
After a sharp drop on the 14th, the artillery support gradually
decreased in proportion to the amount and strength of the enemy’s
action against Hill 122. By 20 August, 3/11 was firing only 244 rounds
a day. Only on the 26th, during a serious Chinese attempt to retake
Bunker, did the number of artillery rounds match the intensity of the
fire support rendered during the earlier part of the month.
It was not only the quantity of 11th Marines support that the infantry
called for during the battle of Bunker Hill; quality was equally
important. A majority of the more than 28,000 rounds that 3/11 fired
during the eight days of Bunker Hill fell around the besieged outposts.
Many rounds were fired in defense of MLR positions. In both of these
types of protective fires, extreme accuracy and precision were required
due to the proximity of enemy and friendly lines in order to prevent
any “short” rounds from falling among Marine positions. Lieutenant
Colonel Armitage recalled that during the height of the battle on the
night of 12 August, “we did have a bad scare ... when Captain Connolly
reported that friendly mortar fire was falling short.”[193] The
battalion immediately ceased fire with its 60mms, 81mms, and 4.2s and
each piece was checked; the culprit was quickly located and within 5–10
minutes 3/1 resumed fire.
[193] _Armitage ltr_ and comments, p. 12.
During the August battle, artillery in general support of the entire
division and I Corps artillery reinforcing the fires of Colonel
Henderson’s regiment, stepped up their efforts to destroy the distant
and more difficult targets, including mortars and artillery. These
continued to be the main cause of Marine casualties. Some of the labors
of the 11th Marines gun crews did silence enemy heavy weapons, but
personnel losses from enemy shellings still mounted, especially in the
infantry units. To assist in the location and destruction of the enemy
artillery, aerial observers spent considerable time in spotting and
fixing Chinese weapons positions.
Besides these counterbattery efforts, the 11th Marines employed
other artillery means to provide the additional support the 1st
Marine Division requested during Bunker Hill. Two of these were the
counter-counterbattery and the countermortar programs, the former being
a passive defense-deception program to minimize Chinese counterbattery
fires against 11th Marines weapons. Nearly every day C Battery, 17th
Field Artillery Battalion, fired special request missions.[194] Another
type of fire, flak suppression, aided the cause of close air support
pilots delivering ordnance against those Chinese positions taking
Bunker Hill and Stromboli under fire. At night, illumination shells
helped outpost and frontline Marines in locating groups of enemy
massing for assault on Hill 122.
[194] Many of these targets were CCF choke points, dumps,
and weapons emplacements. Targets were identified and
confirmed by a highly developed system that employed air
spotting, aerial photographic interpretation, artillery
evaluation, and POW interrogation.
Mortars (4.2-inch) of the 1st Marines contributed heavily to the
defense of the outposts. Operations reached a peak on 12–13 August
when, in a 24-hour period, Captain Carl H. Benson’s mortar company
fired 5,952 rounds--4,084 high explosive and 1,868 illuminating. In
addition to their defensive fires, these hard-hitting weapons attacked
Chinese mortars, automatic weapons, defensive positions, and troop
formations with deadly accuracy.
No less precise and lethal were the fires of Captain Gene M. McCain’s
gun tanks (Company C, 1st Tank Battalion), and the battalion flame
tanks. Three of the latter had fired their 105s in support of the KMC
on the morning of the 9th before the vehicles received orders to move
east to join Company C temporarily. On the next day, 90s fired on enemy
bunkers, observation posts, and trenches in the vicinity of Siberia
and Stromboli. During 11 August, two gun tanks blasted at targets
immediately beyond Siberia and others to the west of that outpost.
Towards the end of the 11th, the critical part of Bunker battle began
for the tankers also. Those elements of Lieutenant Colonel John I.
Williamson’s battalion supporting the diversion and the subsequent
main attack pulled into positions south of Hill 122 on the MLR and to
the right in the Company F sector. It was not until the next day that
the tanks operating with the 1st Marines reached a peak in gun support
for the Bunker fight. Beginning with the defense of Hill 122 from 1600
that day, and for the next 26 hours, the tankers placed 817 shells
on targets effecting the Chinese capability of capturing Bunker and
Stromboli. In addition to the heavy ammunition, the Company C tanks,
augmented by the 1st Marines antitank platoon and five tanks from the
division tank reserve, fired 32,000 rounds of .30 caliber machine gun
ammunition.
Except on the 11th, most of the tank firing in the fight for Bunker
Hill through 14 August was accomplished during the hours of darkness.
On the latter date, the cannons and machine guns of the mediums blasted
directly at Chinese outposts opposite Colonel Layer’s regiment. The
number of rounds that day fell off considerably from the high on the
13th; on the 15th the tanks in the 1st Marines area did not fire at
all. Heavy rain that had accompanied the late afternoon thundershower
that day made movement forward to firing positions impractical. By
the next day, however, the ground was solid enough to permit some
maneuvering by the tracked vehicles. They fired 52 rounds of 90mm
shells and 14,750 machine gun rounds at automatic weapons positions and
bunkers on the western slope of Hill 122. This marked the final tank
mission in support of the 1st Marines in the battle for Bunker Hill.
During the early part of the August fighting, tanks of the
division were able to get the first real test of a technique of
night support,[195] and at the same time experiment with a towing
device to permit retrieval of disabled vehicles under fire without
getting outside the tank. The use of the lights to support both the
diversionary force and the defense of Hill 122 showed the value of
these instruments. Lieutenant Colonel Williamson recommended that
tanks be employed in pairs, one to spot and adjust fire and the other
to fire. With respect to the towing device, he considered the new
piece of equipment an improvement over the manual hook-up method, but
noted that the device limited tank maneuverability and had a tendency
when bouncing up and down over rough terrain to dig into the ground,
impeding the forward progress of the vehicle.
[195] The use of fighting lights to illuminate targets for tank
gunners had been undertaken in July, but the results were
inconclusive, owing to failure of one of the bulbs of the
two lights tested. 1st TkBn ComdD, Aug 52, App. VI, Encl.
2. Declared the G-3, 1stMarDiv: “The diversion on Siberia
was 100 percent effective, due largely to the new tank
battle lights which we were using for the first time.”
_Honsowetz ltr II._
_In Retrospect_[196]
[196] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_;
_PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar
ComdDs, Aug 52.
Whether the sacrifice of Siberia in favor of the seizure of Bunker
justified the outcome can be determined, in part, by looking back
to the division commander’s reasons for this decision. He had cited
three advantages in seizing and occupying Hill 122 instead of 58A.
One, tactical surprise achieved by an attack on the former, was an
unqualified success. That Bunker Hill would provide more defensible
terrain and at the same time add strength to the main line were two
sound judgments that the test of time would bear out. The third point,
that observation into the enemy’s outpost line would be increased from
the higher hill, also proved to be correct.
Only the inability to neutralize Hill 58A effectively from Bunker
cast any doubt on the considerations. At night the enemy could occupy
Siberia both for firing positions and flank security to attack friendly
forces moving down the corridor east of Hill 122. Action to counter
these two enemy actions came mainly from MLR forces.
One measure of the results of the Bunker Hill fighting is seen in the
price paid. Chinese losses were estimated by the 1st Marine Division
at approximately 3,200, including more than 400 known dead. Marine
casualties in the action were 48 killed and 313 seriously wounded.
Several hundred additional wounded were treated at 1st Marines medical
facilities and returned to duty shortly thereafter.
To replace combat losses in the infantry regiment, General Selden on
12 August directed that rear area service and support units fill the
vacancies. Two hundred Marines, nearly all of them volunteers, were
provided to Colonel Layer by the 14th. To offset other losses within
the division, its commander similarly had requested on 12 August
that the Commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., authorize an
air-lifting of 500 enlisted Marine infantrymen to the 1st Marine
Division as soon as possible. Pointing out that mounting battle
casualties had reduced the effective strength of the division, General
Selden also urged that each of the next two monthly replacement drafts
scheduled for the division be increased by 500 more enlisted men. After
some debate at the next senior administrative headquarters,[197] the
request was granted by General Shepherd, and the emergency replacements
were made available from the 3d Marine Division at Camp Pendleton,
California. The initial replacement of 500 Marines arrived on 21 August.
[197] CG, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Hart, requested the
Commandant to delay decision until FMFPac could
survey the combat replacement situation and aircraft
availability. After a quick evaluation of both these
factors, General Hart on the 14th recommended approval.
FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App. I, Encl. (6). The air lift
of 500 replacements to Korea was an “all out effort for
Marine Aviation Transport based on the West Coast. This
general support of Korean based forces demonstrated the
total capability of Marine Aviation in support of ground
forces.” MajGen Samuel S. Jack to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 27 Jun 67, hereafter _Jack ltr_.
More men to replace divisional combat losses might have been required
had not the medical support been such an efficient operation. After
the battle, the regimental surgeon, Lieutenant Robert E. Murto,
called for a review of the medical facilities in effect during the
Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli fighting. In attendance were the
battalion doctors and the division surgeon, Captain Lawrence E.
Bach. Participants discussed both the major difficulties and routine
procedures involved in medical care of the wounded. Problem areas
were the high incidence of heat exhaustion, ground transportation of
the wounded, enemy artillery fire that interfered with helicopter
evacuations, and the need for increased medical support under battle
conditions.
Regarding the last category, the surgeons noted that medical supplies
during the heavy fighting of 9–16 August were never at a dangerously
low level. The only shortage that had developed was in stretchers, due
to the normal delay in transfer of stretchers from medical stations
along the evacuation route to the company forward medical facilities.
To help combat the Chinese artillery problem, medical officers had
placed aid stations on the reverse slopes of hills. There was no
available or known solution to hastening and easing the movement of
battlefield casualties over the ground. The armored personnel carrier
offered some protection from ground fire and a ride less painful than
one in a truck, but the wheeled vehicles remained the most widely used.
There was little that could be done about the number of heat exhaustion
cases. High temperature and humidity, vigorous activity, and the
wearing of the armored vest (and to some degree, the steel helmet),
combined to produce the casualties. All the surgeons agreed that
regardless of the number of heat casualties, the wearing of these two
items must continue. Regimental doctors credited the armored vest with
saving the lives of 17 Marines. Several other Marines, they noted, had
received only slight head wounds from bullets that had spent most of
their velocity penetrating the steel helmet.
Helicopter evacuation saved the lives of other Marines. The doctors
credited the flying skills and bravery of the evacuation pilots
for these rescues. Immediate response to day and night calls was
instrumental in the recovery of numerous Marines. Rear Admiral Lamont
Pugh, Surgeon General of the U.S. Navy, commented upon the value of the
helicopter and on other reasons for success of medical support. After
a Far East inspection trip, which included a visit to the 1st Marine
Division during the battle of Bunker Hill, Admiral Pugh expressed the
following opinion:
... [I] attributed the new low record “2% mortality” of
those men wounded in action to the bullet resistant vest, to
skillful frontline surgery with availability of whole blood,
the utilization of helicopters for casualty evacuation direct
to hospital ships and rear area hospitals, and the efficient
manner in which the Hospital Corpsmen of the Navy fulfilled their
mission with the Marines.[198]
[198] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 12. p. 12-8.
In another logistical area, the performance was not quite
as satisfactory, for the level of supply of one important
item--illuminating shells--fell dangerously low during the Bunker
fighting. On 16 August, 3/1 reported early in the morning that
“artillery illumination was exhausted and 81mm mortar illumination
was fast diminishing.”[199] To replace the shell-produced light, the
regiment used a flare plane.[200]
[199] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.
[200] Earlier, on 13 August, a flare drop requested by the 1st
Marines went awry when the aircraft got off course and
dropped the flares forward of the 5th Marines main line.
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 13 Aug 52.
Ammunition supply appeared to be no problem to the Chinese. The rate
and frequency of mortar and artillery fire proved that the enemy had
a vast store of these shells. During the heavy fighting, the division
observed that the enemy expended approximately 17,000 mortar and
artillery rounds in the 11–16 August period of the battle. It was
noted for the first time that the Chinese used mortars primarily in
support of limited attacks.
About the enemy’s reliance on mortars and the technique of their
employment, the 1st Marine Division reported:
This was particularly true of his 60 and 82mm mortars, which are
easily displaced forward and shifted to alternate positions.
These light mortars were difficult to locate by our observers
mainly because of the small size and limited development of
their positions, and the fact that they are moved frequently. A
large number of enemy mortars were fired from bunkers deep in
the ground with only a narrow aperture at the top through which
to fire. There were some instances, during the Battle of Bunker
Hill, when the enemy brought his 60mm mortars out from cover on
the forward slope and set them up in the open near the crest of
the ridge. After delivering several rounds, the mortars would
then displace quickly back to a covered position. During August,
mortar fire averaged between 50 and 60 percent of the total
incoming received by the 1st Marine Division.[201]
[201] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, p. 2.
Further information about the Chinese was also derived at this time,
although not always directly associated with the battle. Deserters
picked up in the left sectors of the 1st and 5th Marines on 12 and
13 August and papers taken from enemy dead on the 13th confirmed
earlier-reported dispositions of Chinese units. One prisoner, from
the artillery regiment of the 118th Division, the unit facing the
major part of the 1st Marines line, indicated that another artillery
regiment had been assigned to support his division. If true, this extra
unit would account for both the increased Chinese fires in the Bunker
area and the additional artillery emplacements that photo planes had
spotted in the 118th Division sector. Infantry units of this division,
the Marines observed, introduced no new techniques or equipment during
the battle. Prior intelligence had provided the 1st Marines with
typical enemy ground attack tactics. Neither the Chinese envelopment
of Siberia, Stromboli, and Bunker nor the diversion against Hill 48A
before the main attack on Hill 122 represented a departure from normal
CCF practice.
Nor was the earlier Marine diversion new, but unlike the Chinese
attempt, the 1st Marines tactic was successful. Just before the
maneuver, the division pulled off another strategem, described by
General Selden in a letter to General Shepherd:
I worked a ruse that morning which proved to be very profitable.
Throughout the Eighth Army front, it had been routine to put on
a strike, this to be followed by smoke, then a good artillery
barrage, with troops following for the assault. This was done
with the exception that there were no troops. The enemy,
thinking that there were troops, opened up with everything. The
only damage inflicted was on their own forces.... While they
were firing on their own troops, we again opened fire with our
artillery, just to help the situation along.[202]
[202] MajGen John T. Selden ltr to Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,
dtd 14 Aug 52.
One technique the Marines employed in the Bunker Hill battle was
defense of the reverse (protected) side of the hill. Although counter
to the usual American military practice, the reverse slope defense was
required by the intense artillery and mortar fire massed upon the front
slope defenders. As the 3/1 battalion commander later commented:
It’s true, we suffered from the heavy incoming--but had we had to
work replacements, casualties, and supplies all the way up to the
(forward) military crest of Bunker--the losses would have been
prohibitive. With the weight of the incoming and our inability
to get greater infantry mass onto the battlefield at one time, a
conventional defense would have been far more costly ... [after]
the damage done to Baker Company in the [12 August] afternoon
attack ... had we not gone into a reverse slope defense, we could
not [have held] with the strength at hand.[203]
[203] _Armitage ltr_ and draft MS comments, p. 7. For further
details of the Bunker Hill action, see _Armitage ltr_ in
v. V, Korean comment file.
On the other hand, a tactical weakness of the reverse slope defense,
that “plagued us until the end of the battle,”[204] was the fact that
the 1st Marines initial gain was not more fully exploited. As the
battalion commander explained:
[204] _Ibid._, p. 8.
To be successful, in a reverse slope defense, the defender
must immediately counterattack, retake and reoccupy the
_forward_ slope of the position as soon as enemy pressure
diminishes. Because of the incoming and primarily because of
our overextension in regiment, we ... [employed] piecemeal
commitment ... and fed units into the battle by company, where we
should have employed our entire battalion in counterattacks to
punish the withdrawing force and restore the forward slope. To
the very end, lack of decisive strength prevented this. We stayed
on the reverse slope all the way, except for brief forays to the
forward slope.[205]
[205] _Ibid._
Some officers felt, in retrospect, that a more feasible solution during
the August battle might have been to move all three battalions on
line--3/1, 1/1, and 2/1, with the reserve battalion (1/1) deployed on
a narrow front. This would have provided decisive strength on Bunker
and the MLR behind it to give greater depth counterattack capability,
and better control at the point where needed.[206] Departure from
standard doctrine by employment of the reverse slope defense furthered
the existing controversy as to the best method of ground organization
in the division sector. But it was to be some months before a change
would be effected.[207]
[206] _Ibid._, p. 9.
[207] As the military situation changed in Korea to become
increasingly one of a battle of position and attrition,
the Marine Corps Basic School, Quantico, Va. curriculum
was revised to give greater emphasis to tactics of
positional warfare. Close attention was paid to terrain
evaluation, employment of infantry units, offensive and
defensive use of automatic and supporting weapons, night
counterattacks, field problems of reverse slope defense,
and even tasks of “research into WW I--and the American
Civil and Revolutionary Wars for the tactic of Reverse
Slope defense.” _Armitage ltr._
Tank, artillery, air, and ground Marines participating in the battle
of Bunker Hill gave up one outpost but took another, one that added
strength not only to the outpost defense but also to the main line. A
well thought-out plan and its skillful execution permitted Marines to
take the critical terrain quickly without crippling casualties. Defense
of the position on Hill 122 was complicated not so much by the Chinese
infantry action but by the intensive mortar and artillery shelling.
The Marines’ capability to defend was enhanced by close coordination
among artillery, air, and tank units. Chinese casualties, by estimate,
were 500 percent more than the losses actually suffered by the Marines.
The battle of Bunker Hill resulted in the first major Marine action
and victory in West Korea. It ushered in two straight months of hard
fighting, the most difficult ones yet for Marines on the western
front.