again emerged. They advanced towards a village immediately south of
the objective. After searching a few houses and not finding any enemy,
the KMCs started on the last leg to Hill 34. As soon as the objective
came into view the raiders deployed for the assault. At 0410 the two
squads of Korean Marines charged the knoll, immediately drawing heavy
Chinese small arms fire. When the raiders continued their assault, the
enemy retreated to his trenchworks and bunkers where he continued to
fire on the KMCs. Since it now appeared to the patrol leader that the
probability of taking a prisoner was unlikely, he prepared to return to
friendly lines. He first arranged for artillery to cover the withdrawal
of the patrol, and then broke off the 18-minute fire fight, taking his
only casualty, a wounded rifleman, with him. The KMCs counted 12 enemy
dead. No prisoners were taken. In the preliminary action, the support
squad had also suffered three killed and seven wounded.
As the KMC raiders were making their way back to the MLR, a combat
patrol from 1/5, the reserve battalion of the 5th Marines, prepared
to move out. This patrol was one of many dispatched by the battalion
during the first week of May in accordance with its mission of
patrolling in front of the OPLR, between the MLR and the OPLR, and
throughout the regimental sector. On this occasion, the patrol was to
occupy the high ground south of former Outpost 3, which had become the
focal point of activity in the center sector.[124] When used as a base
of fire, this ground provided a position from which automatic weapons
could readily cover enemy lines or tie in with adjacent friendly
defenses. In addition, the 1/5 patrol was to drop off friendly snipers
to cover the former OPLR position, to maintain surveillance, and to
ascertain to what extent the Chinese were developing the outpost. The
task went to a Company A platoon, which the unit commander, First
Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, reinforced with light and heavy machine guns.
[124] This position, the site of the mid-April battle, along
with several others had been abandoned when the division
withdrew its OPLR late in April. Infantry regiments
dispatched frequent patrols in an attempt to discourage
the enemy’s incorporating the hill into his own OPLR.
At sunup the Marines crossed line JAMESTOWN and before 0900 had reached
the high ground they were to occupy. Here the patrol leader set up his
base of fire, then pushed on with the rest of his men to the outpost,
receiving occasional mortar fire before reaching the old position.
While organizing his men at the objective, Lieutenant Lee received word
by radio that the Chinese were preparing to attack. Almost immediately,
intense shelling struck the forward slope of the hill. A Marine aerial
observer (AO) detected 60–70 Chinese advancing from the next hill, some
800 yards to the front of the Marines. The AO also reported that the
enemy was firing mortars towards OP 3.
Shortly thereafter the Chinese fire ceased. Moments before it lifted,
the patrol received a second warning that an enemy attack was imminent.
Even as this message was being received, about 30 Chinese rushed the
patrol. The Marines immediately took the hostile assault force under
fire, killing 14 CCF with well-placed small arms fire. Overhead, four
1947-vintage Marine Corsair fighters (F4U-4Bs) struck at troublesome
mortar positions previously located by the AO. At 1330 another aerial
strike against Chinese mortars and enemy positions on the hill north of
OP 3 was executed. These two air missions were credited with destroying
six mortars, damaging two others, and wrecking seven personnel bunkers.
During the second strike the 1/5 patrol began its withdrawal.
On two occasions during the patrol’s return to its base the enemy
attempted to ambush it. Each time the attempt was thwarted, once by the
patrol itself and the second time, with the help of friendly artillery.
On the way back several loud explosions suddenly halted the patrol.
Investigation revealed that the Marines, carrying their casualties
of one dead and four wounded, had inadvertently stumbled onto a path
not cleared of mines. Two members of the stretcher bearer detail were
killed and three others wounded by the AP (anti-personnel) mines that
had not been charted on friendly maps by the Marines’ predecessors in
the defense sector. A mine clearance team promptly disposed of the
danger. With the aid of fires from a 2/5 patrol on the nose of a nearby
hill, the 1/5 platoon was able to break contact. After pulling back
several hundred yards, the patrol reached a forward medical aid station
where jeeps picked up the more seriously wounded and took them to
helicopters, which completed the evacuation. Patrol members reported 27
known enemy dead, including one that had been propelled into the air by
a direct hit from an artillery round.
The next major Marine ground action soon involved the same Company A
platoon, but this time as part of a larger force. Colonel Culhane, the
regimental commander, directed his 1st Battalion to launch a new raid
on the Outpost 3 area in an attempt to oust the Chinese and thereby
deny the enemy use of the critical terrain. Inflicting casualties and
capturing prisoners were additional tasks assigned. On 8 May Lieutenant
Colonel Nihart issued Operation Order 12-52, calling for 1/5 to seize a
series of three intermediate objectives (S, V and X) en route to OP 3
(Y). (See Map 8.) The combat patrol, reinforced by regimental elements,
less Company B, was to be prepared to move north of OP 3 to occupy the
next hill mass (Z), if necessary.
[Illustration:
MAP 8 K. White
OBJECTIVES FOR 1/5 ATTACK
9 MAY 1952]
Operational plans called for Lieutenant Lee’s Company A to do most of
the leg work as the assault unit. Captain Leland Graham’s Company C,
the diversionary force, was to make a feint against Hill 67, an enemy
position southwest of OP 3, and to neutralize it by fire. Weapons
Company, under First Lieutenant Ross L. Tipps, in support of the
Company A force, was to set up a base of fire at a designated position
(T), southeast of OP 3. Artillery support was to be furnished by 1/11,
4/11, and the attached 4.5-inch Rocket Battery. A section of regimental
4.2-inch mortars was also assigned. One platoon of Company B tanks was
to assist the assault force by firing both on designated positions and
targets of opportunity. Close air support flights were to be on station
at two periods during the 9 May daylight operation.
In the early morning hours, under cover of darkness, all units moved
into position. At 0430 the 1st Platoon of Company A crossed the line
of departure heading for Objective S, a small ridge south and west of
OP 3. The 2d Platoon followed and moved out on the right, while the
3d Platoon covered the rear. This hill, lightly defended, was quickly
overrun by the Marines. The 1st Platoon then turned northeast towards
the four peaks (designated as V, X, Y, and Z), its main objectives.
These four positions were all situated at approximately the same
elevation, 450 feet. A distance of some 1,300 yards separated the first
and fourth hills in the north-south ridgeline.
As the 1/5 platoon neared Objective V, friendly rockets lashed the
crest of the hill, which was held by a reinforced enemy platoon in
mutually supporting fighting holes. Assisted by this fire, Marine
two-man teams with rifles and grenades assaulted the fighting holes
occupied by the Chinese. As the Marines proceeded to clear the
objective, half of the Chinese were forced to retreat to safer ground.
Marines estimated that 15 enemy were killed and a like number wounded.
By this time, three hours after setting out on the raid, the platoon
had seized one prisoner and sustained five wounded.
While reorganizing for the attack against Objectives X and Y, the 5th
Marines patrol came under a heavy artillery and mortar barrage that
killed one Marine and wounded three others. As the main body of the
assault force advanced towards Objective X to support the attack, the
lead elements of the company headed for OP 3. Throughout this maneuver,
the company remained under heavy artillery fire.
Proceeding along the eastern slope of the ridgeline to assault knobs
X and Y, the platoon had a good view of the effectiveness of their
friendly supporting artillery fire. In fact, the combined rocket,
howitzer, mortar, tank, and machine gun fire threw up so much dust
that at times it restricted the vision of the Marine assault team. As
platoon members neared the summit of Objective X they encountered a
heavy stream of defending fire. A strong counterattack from the front
and left flank assailed the 1st Platoon, but the Marines repulsed the
enemy with accurate small arms fire, killing six CCF. Infiltrators then
attempted to envelop the Marine platoon and isolate it from the rest of
the Company A assault force. Successive waves of Chinese, employing a
wedge formation, tried to overrun the main body of the assault force.
In repulsing this latest counterattack, Company A killed 12 and wounded
5 enemy.
Quickly sizing up the situation, the company commander ordered the
1st Platoon to rejoin the rest of the assault force. As the platoon
began to pull back at 1435 the Chinese blanketed the route with a
heavy barrage, firing “over four hundred rounds in a five minute
period.”[125] This intense shelling took the lives of three Marines,
wounded a number of others, and halted the assault force just short of
its final goal. Even though the Chinese had been driven from the three
intermediate objectives, the devastating enemy mortar and artillery
fire made the Marine position untenable. A third of the platoon moved
back to Objective V; the rest worked their way along a route east
of that objective. While the rest of Company A and Weapons Company
elements occupied Hill T, the diversionary force, Company C, reinforced
by other Weapons Company personnel, had remained at a strongpoint not
far from Objective S. All supporting ground weapons assisted in the
withdrawal. In addition to lending direct fire support, Marine tanks
brought forward emergency supplies and evacuated casualties. By 1730,
the assault force had returned to friendly lines, followed shortly by
the rest of the battalion.
[125] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 10.
Although the battalion failed to seize and hold all of its objectives,
that part of the mission calling for inflicting casualties and taking
prisoners had been successfully executed.[126] Marines counted 35
enemy dead, 53 wounded, and 1 POW, and estimated that an additional
70 CCF had been killed and 105 wounded. Seven Marines were killed
and 66 wounded in the action described by some observers as “the
largest offensive effort the 1st Marine Division [has] made since last
September.”[127] The battalion fire support was well controlled and
coordinated from an observation post on the MLR. Five air strikes,
including one MPQ-14 mission, were credited with destroying three
artillery pieces and an equal number of mortars, damaging two other
mortars, and demolishing six personnel bunkers.
[126] Lieutenant Colonel Nihart believed that the heavy enemy
shelling, which had caused the early retirement of his
battalion, had been possible either because Chinese
mortar and artillery positions were so well camouflaged
that intelligence had not located them or else so well
protected that UNC counterbattery fire had failed to
destroy them. _Nihart comments._
[127] 5thMar ComdD, May 52, p. 9.
As the regiment noted, the earlier withdrawal of the OPLR had “altered
to a considerable extent the tactics employed in this area. This is
especially apparent in the number of patrol contacts close to the MLR
and displayed the eagerness of the enemy to move in on any ground not
held by friendly forces.”[128] At the same time the increased number
of troops made available for the MLR defense considerably strengthened
the JAMESTOWN Line itself. Sector responsibility changed on 11 May.
Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz’ 7th Marines relieved the 5th Marines in
the center regimental sector, with 2/7 and 1/7 occupying the left and
right battalion positions, respectively.
[128] _Ibid._, p. 1.
When it took over the peace corridor sector the 7th Marines also
assumed the responsibility for emergency rescue of the Allied truce
delegates at Panmunjom.[129] The regiment advanced a mile nearer the
objective when it moved the pick-up force’s assembly area to within
400 yards of the line of departure. The 7th Marines also replaced the
tanks in the force with M-39 personnel carriers, a U.S. Army-developed
tracked vehicle similar in appearance to the Marine amphibian tractor.
Another vehicle the 7th Marines retained in its task force was a medium
tank equipped with additional radios. This armored communication and
control vehicle was used as a radio relay station on the MLR to assist
in liaison between moving infantry and tank units. Marine riflemen
dubbed this command tank the porcupine, to describe the effect of many
bristling antennas sticking out from its top. While the Marine division
right sector, occupied by the 1st Marines, remained relatively quiet
during the spring months on JAMESTOWN, the 7th Marines in the center
MLR would shortly be involved in the division’s major ground action in
late May.
[129] This force and its mission at various times were known as
“Task Force Jig” or “Operation Snatch.”
As part of the active defense of its JAMESTOWN line, Lieutenant Colonel
Daughtry, commanding 1/7, issued a directive on 26 May intended to
deny to the enemy key terrain remaining on the old OPLR. Operation
Plan 16-52 called for an attack to seize two parcels of high ground
to the regiment’s right front. At the same time, the battalion was to
neutralize two Chinese positions west of the main objectives, Hill 104
(Objective 1) and the Tumae-ri Ridge (Objective 2), approximately a
half-mile further north. The designated attack force, Captain Earl W.
Thompson’s Company A, was heavily reinforced. While Company A pursued
its mission to the right, a Company C reinforced platoon under Second
Lieutenant Howard L. Siers would conduct a feint on a pair of enemy
positions to the left. Support for the operation would come from 2/11,
two tank platoons, and from air, which was to be on call.
H-Hour was set for 0300 on 28 May. Attack and diversionary forces on
schedule crossed the line of departure, a half-mile north of the MLR.
Captain Thompson’s main force advanced nearly to the base of Hill 104
before the Chinese, in estimated reinforced platoon strength, began to
counterattack. The fight came to an abrupt end when Second Lieutenant
John J. Donahue led his platoon to the top with bayonets fixed.[130] As
the Marines dug in they came under heavy mortar and artillery fire from
CCF strongholds to the north. On the left, meanwhile, Lieutenant Siers
had received orders to seize the closer of his two objectives, former
OPLR 5, instead of merely placing suppressive fire on it.
[130] Maj Kenneth A. Seal comments on draft MS, dtd Oct 66. At
the time of this attack, Lieutenant Seal commanded the 2d
Platoon, A/1/7.
Moving forward from its base of fire, the platoon soon established
contact with the enemy. At 0554 the platoon began its attack on the
objective. Despite the close-in, hand-to-hand fighting, when it became
apparent the assault could not be stopped the enemy gave way to Marine
persistence in seizing the hill. By 0700 the Company C, 7th Marines
platoon had secured its objectives and begun preparations for defense
of the positions as well as continued support of the main attack force.
Heavy casualties, however, forced Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry to recall
the platoon and it returned to the lines by 0930.
Up on Hill 104, Company A, 1/7 faced practically the same situation.
Taking Objective 1 had been costly and the advance through withering
enemy fire was adding to the casualties. A reinforcing platoon was
sent from the MLR to help the company disengage and return to friendly
lines. Contact with the enemy was broken shortly after noon. With the
aid of air and artillery, the company was able to make its way to the
MLR by 1405.
Advancing only as far as it did, the attack, like the one earlier that
month, failed to take all the designated objectives. Casualties to the
1/7 Marines were placed at 9 killed[131] and 107 wounded. Most of the
latter were evacuated for further treatment. Forty-five of the enemy
were counted dead and three wounded. Marines estimated another 40 enemy
killed and 40 more wounded.[132] The action resulted in a casualty toll
that was the highest to date for any Marine company in western Korea.
All three Company A rifle platoon leaders--Second Lieutenants Donahue,
Jules E. Gerding, and Kenneth A. Seal--were wounded. This battle also
became the occasion for another unwelcomed record--4,053 rounds of
enemy incoming, during a 24-hour period.
[131] Two Marines killed in the action were later posthumously
awarded the Medal of Honor. Corporal David B. Champagne,
A/1/7, was responsible for saving the lives of the
three other members of his fire team. When a grenade
fell in their midst, Champagne grabbed it to hurl back
to CCF positions. Just as it cleared his hand, the
grenade exploded, showering lethal shrapnel into the
body of the 19-year-old Rhode Islander. One of the C/1/7
reinforcement Marines, Private First Class John D. Kelly,
had conducted a one-man assault against a dug-in Chinese
machine gun crew. Though painfully wounded during this
encounter, he disposed of the enemy, then reduced a
second weapons bunker. While firing point-blank into a
third position the brave Marine was fatally wounded. This
1/7 action was the first in the western Korea defense to
result in multiple Medal of Honor awards.
[132] 1/7 ComdD, May 52, pp. 17–18.
Following this late May offensive, a brief period of relative calm
settled over the MLR. Marine and Chinese units continued the active
defense of their respective sectors, with generally only a limited
number of contacts. Fire fights between Marine patrols and CCF
defenders lasted only a short time and usually ended when artillery
fire caused the patrol to pull back. Even though this state of affairs
remained essentially unchanged through June, several other events that
month would affect Marine defense of the westernmost sector in I Corps.
_End of the Second Year of War_[133]
[133] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5,
Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52; 5th Mar ComdDs, Apr,
Jun 52; 7thMar ComdDs, May-Jun 52; 1/7 ComdD, May 52; KMC
Regt Unit Rpt 120, dtd 30 Jun 52.
A second realignment of the Marine-Commonwealth boundary along Line
JAMESTOWN was made on 1 June. Part of the rear of the MLR was moved
eastward to enable the Marine division to assume full responsibility
for a key ridgetop. Prior to this date the hill mass had been divided
along its crest, a factor that made it a potential trouble spot for
both divisions. On 23 and 24 June, the 7th Marines MLR battalions
relocated their positions towards the enemy along JAMESTOWN. This
readjustment of the line varied from 1,300 yards in the center of the
regimental sector to 400 yards near its right. The additional terrain
strengthened the division front by placing the center regiment on
improved and more defensible ground.
A week before this MLR change took place, there had been a shift in
occupants in its far right sector. Colonel Culhane’s 5th Marines
replaced the 1st on line, which then went into division reserve.
Manning the MLR were 2/5 on the left and 1/5 to the right.
In early June the recently appointed UN commander, General Clark, made
his first visit to the 1st Marine Division front. During his briefing,
General Selden reviewed the unusual combat difficulties confronting his
Marines. In addition to the unfavorable terrain, the division commander
noted the special operational restrictions caused by proximity to the
truce talk site. Presence of a large number of uncharted minefields
created another obstacle. Herculean efforts were required of the
Marines to simultaneously man and construct defenses over 35 miles of
JAMESTOWN. Adding to Marine problems were the facts that ground units
were not receiving sufficient close air support and the capabilities
of the Chinese were constantly increasing.
Chinese order of battle (OOB) information was fed into the division
intelligence network by higher commands, I Corps and EUSAK, and
adjacent units, but a large part of the data about Communist forces
was produced by the division itself. Frontline units in contact with
the enemy, by observation of his activities, supplied the bulk of
intelligence about enemy defense tactics, employment of weapons, and
combat characteristics. Supporting Marine division units, particularly
artillery and armor, fed more facts into the system, mostly through
identification of the caliber of enemy shells fired at the Marines. As
a result of its missions forward of the line and actions in defense
of it, the division reconnaissance company also contributed to the
intelligence network. Individual Marines, performing as tactical air
observers and artillery air observers, as well as the VMO and HMR
pilots, were other important sources readily available to the 1st
Marine Division.
G-2 directed the division intelligence effort, including processing of
raw material and supplying of updated reports to 1st Division units.
The G-2 section also maintained OOB and target identification data
on Chinese units and their commanders. Members of the G-2 staff also
assisted in interrogation of prisoners of war (POWs), screened the
civilians apprehended in unauthorized areas, debriefed Marines exposed
to enemy intelligence, and conducted inspections of division internal
security. In areas where the 1st Marine Division had only a limited
intelligence capability it turned to EUSAK for assistance.
Eighth Army teams augmented the division counterintelligence efforts
and provided most of the translation service. In addition, three radio
intercept units furnished information to the Marines. The critical
importance of this service had been proven during several combat
patrols in May when additional information was instantly radioed to a
friendly unit under fire.
Other intelligence activities were less beneficial to the Marines.
These operations were conducted by Tactical Liaison Officers (TLOs,
friendly Koreans trained by U.S. intelligence teams), and members of
a Higher Intelligence Detachment (HID), a Korean unit assigned from
EUSAK. Both the TLO and HID proved of limited value to the division,
due to the generally poor educational background of the agents, their
inadequate training, and frequent failure to return from assignments
behind enemy lines. Some Marines believed the basic fault in these
operatives lay in “an exaggerated opinion of their importance.”[134]
[134] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-33.
Several division intelligence Marines, in conjunction with training
and shore party personnel, took part in an informational activity of a
different type. These Marines reconnoitered several friendly islands
off western Korea to determine their suitability for division landing
exercises. The second one inspected, Tokchok-to, 30 miles southwest
of Inchon, was selected. By early June planning had progressed to
the point where a program had been developed for bimonthly battalion
landing team exercises. The KPR maneuver force, appropriately
reinforced, was designated as a participating unit. Landings were to
employ boat teams, amphibian tractors, and helicopters. The entire
program was designed to provide refresher training for Marines in
carrying out their primary mission of amphibious assault. By the end of
June, 3/5 and 3/1, in turn, had captured Tokchok-to.
Other training concentrated more on the task at hand. Division units
in reserve rehearsed tactics for offensive and defensive warfare. Most
ground units conducted extensive schooling in both mine and booby
trap detection and clearance. Recognizing that patrolling was an
important part of a Marine’s life on the MLR, the division included
in its Noncommissioned Officers’ (NCO) Leadership School a thorough
indoctrination in patrolling tactics.[135] More than 50 percent of
the training at all levels was at night. In addition, an extensive
orientation was conducted for newly arrived combat replacements,
who could not be committed to action for 72 hours after joining the
division.
[135] BGen Austin R. Brunelli ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 13 Sep 66, hereafter _Brunelli ltr_. The division
chief of staff during more than half of 1952, Colonel
Brunelli later observed that the “school produced more
effective patrolling and ... contributed to reducing our
casualties.”
A week after the division’s June replacements landed at Inchon, General
Selden’s headquarters received a directive that would affect a number
of these new Marines. On 10 June CG, EUSAK ordered his corps commanders
to make continuous efforts to secure the identification and changes in
the enemy order of battle. Two days later I Corps followed the Eighth
Army order with a letter of instruction which called for each I Corps
division to “prepare plans for launching swift, vigorous, and violent
large-scale raids to capture prisoners, to gain intelligence, to
destroy enemy positions and material and/or strong limited objective
attacks to improve and strengthen Line JAMESTOWN.”[136] Large scale
was defined as an “attacking force limited to battalion or regimental
(brigade) size with appropriate armor and artillery support.”[137]
Divisions were required to submit detailed proposals for future action
by 21 June. Marine division plans for limited objective attacks during
July by units of the 7th Marines and KMCs were subsequently prepared
and forwarded to I Corps.
[136] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 8.
[137] _Ibid._
One operation conducted north of the 2/5 left battalion sector early
on 22 June was not, however, in response to this enemy identification
mission. Late the previous day, Company G had sent out a 16-man
ambush. Before the Marines reached their destination, a small enemy
force, itself lying in wait, began to pour a heavy volume of fire on
the Marines. At this point the patrol was ordered to pull back. One
group of 10 made it back to the MLR; the remaining Marines headed for
a nearby combat outpost in friendly hands. Reports to the company
revealed one Marine not accounted for. The outpost commander was
directed to search the area for the missing Marine. This reconnaissance
by a fire team failed, but a reinforced squad sent out later brought
back the body of the Marine who had been killed by Chinese artillery.
While this rescue effort was in progress, another similar action was
under way. Not long after its arrival on the MLR, Company E, 2/5 had
spotted in the No-Man’s-Land between the two main defensive lines a
figure that appeared to be the body of a Marine. Since one man had been
reported missing from an earlier 1st Marines patrol, recovery of the
body, which had been propped up against a mound of dirt in the open,
was undertaken. A special Company E patrol left the main line shortly
before dawn on the 22d and reached the recovery area at daybreak. After
artillery had laid down smoke, the patrol moved in, quickly recovered
the body, and set out for friendly territory. Before the Marines had
advanced very far on their return trip, the Chinese interdicted their
route with heavy mortar fire, which killed one member of the patrol and
wounded another. When the 5th Marines patrol returned to JAMESTOWN
shortly after 0700, it carried not only the body it had recovered but
also that of the Marine who had been killed on the recovery mission.
By the end of June, major command changes had taken place within the
1st Marine Division as well as in several other UNC components. On
13 June, Brigadier General Robert O. Bare took over the second spot
from Brigadier General Twining. Both ADCs were graduates of the Naval
Academy and both were native mid-Westerners (General Bare--Iowa,
General Twining--Wisconsin). Before joining the 1st Marine Division in
Korea General Bare had served at Camp Pendleton, California where most
recently he had been commanding general of the Training and Replacement
Command. His World War II experience included participation in both
European and Pacific campaigns. He was the Staff Officer, Plans,
in the U.S. Naval Section for the Allied naval group that planned
the amphibious assault at Normandy, France. Later he served in the
Peleliu and Okinawa campaigns and, with the ending of hostilities, had
participated in the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese in north
China.
The outgoing ADC, General Twining, was being reassigned to the Office
of the Commandant, HQMC. For his outstanding service as assistant
division commander from March through May 1952, he received a Gold Star
in lieu of his second Legion of Merit with Combat “V.”
Other high-level changes in command that had also recently taken place
had included the UNC commander himself, General Ridgway, who had been
succeeded in mid-May by General Clark. Major General Glenn O. Barcus,
USAF, had assumed command of Fifth Air Force, replacing Lieutenant
General Everest on 30 May. On 4 June, Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe
had been named the new Commander, Naval Forces Far East to succeed Vice
Admiral C. Turner Joy who had held the position since August 1949. And
in I Corps, Major General Paul W. Kendall, USA, took over as corps
commander on 29 June from Lieutenant General O’Daniel.
The end of the second year of the Korean fighting and the beginning of
the third was observed by the Chinese with an attack against the 2d
Battalion, 5th Marines, manning JAMESTOWN positions to the left of the
regimental sector. Commanded at that time by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas
J. Cross, 2/5 was new on line, having relieved 2/1 during the night of
15–16 June.
Late in the afternoon of 24 June, the enemy began registering his
mortars and artillery on MLR company positions of 2/5 and a portion of
the rear area occupied by the battalion 81mm mortars. Chinese incoming,
sometimes intense, sometimes sporadic, continued until shortly after
2130. By this time the CCF were moving down their trenches toward a
key outpost, Yoke, known also as Hill 159, which was still occupied
on daytime basis by the Marines and lay north of the Company F Sector
(Captain Harold C. Fuson). Moments later, the 34 men temporarily
outposting Yoke saw the Chinese and opened with small arms fire,
but the Marine positions were quickly enveloped by the Chinese. The
Americans occupying the forward slopes of Yoke suffered many casualties
from the intense fires supporting the enemy rush.
While the initial attack was in progress, the Chinese were able to
position and fire machine guns from behind the outpost and in trenches
on the forward slopes. Communist mortars interdicted the Marine supply
routes to make normal withdrawal and reinforcement measures difficult.
The Marines moved into bunkers, called down pre-planned fires, and
continued the defense. Although the Chinese had overrun Yoke, they
could not evict the Marines. At about 0300, the enemy withdrew. When
the 2/5 troops followed to reoccupy the forward slopes of Yoke, the
enemy renewed his attack and struck again. As before, the Marines took
to bunkers and called in defensive artillery fires. These boxing fires
fell around the outpost perimeter until first light when the attackers
withdrew for the second time.
Four other outposts in the battalion area were involved in the
anniversary attack, but the action around Yoke was by far the heaviest.
It resulted in 10 Marines of 2/5 killed and 36 wounded. At Yoke alone,
9 were killed and 23 wounded. Enemy dead were 12 known and 50 estimated
killed. Chinese wounded were estimated at 100. At one point during the
attack on Yoke, the outpost commander reported that the enemy were
wearing gas masks and using tear-gas grenades. Investigation revealed
that the Chinese had carried and even worn the masks, but that they had
employed white phosphorus grenades rather than tear gas. This was the
first instance Marine division personnel had ever encountered of CCF
soldiers carrying gas masks in an attack and it was “believed part of
the enemy’s hate campaign to impress their troops with the possible
use by the UN Forces of CBR (Chemical, Biological and Radiological)
warfare.”[138]
[138] Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_, p. 16.
This violent eruption of enemy activity on the night of 24 June was
followed by a brief period of greatly reduced ground action. Late on
the 29th, however, the battlefront lull was broken when the 1st KMC
Regiment sent out a raiding party to capture Chinese soldiers and their
weapons and equipment, to inflict casualties, and to destroy positions.
Second Lieutenant Kwak Sang In had his reinforced platoon from the 3d
Company, 1st Battalion, equipped with rifles, carbines, machine guns,
flamethrowers, and explosives. Target for the attack was an enemy
outpost four miles south of Panmunjom that overlooked the Sachon River.
The patrol followed the general pattern of previous raids. It made
use of supporting elements positioned on high ground in front of the
objective. In this action the patrol struck from the rear, using
artillery fire for both the assault and the withdrawal. Another
similarity existed in that the results were nearly the same--no
prisoners taken but fewer casualties to the attackers. One difference
from earlier operations was that this patrol employed flamethrowers
and TNT for destroying bunkers and inflicting casualties. Both weapons
were credited in the killing of 12 and the wounding of 6 Chinese, in
destroying 1 mortar and 7 bunkers, and in burning 3 other bunkers and
numerous automatic weapons and rifles. Because of the heavy weight of a
loaded flamethrower and the small size of the Korean Marines carrying
these weapons, the flamethrower operators were fairly well exhausted by
the end of the patrol.
_A Long Fourth of July_[139]
[139] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8; and
1stMarDiv, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7,
1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 52.
The approach of the American Fourth of July holiday marking an earlier
struggle for freedom was appropriately accompanied by ground action
initiated by all of the mainland MLR regiments. In the KMC area, a 3
July raiding party struck at forward enemy positions before dawn,
killing nine Chinese. In the center regimental sector Colonel Thomas
C. Moore’s[140] 7th Marines were also engaged in an active sector
defense. In the left battalion spot 3/7, which had replaced 2/7 on
line, dispatched raids on each of the first three nights of the month.
Its Company G patrol on the night of 2–3 July was to be involved in one
of the most costly small unit actions in the western Korea tour of duty
for the Marine division.
[140] Colonel Moore took over regimental command on 11 June.
The former CO, Colonel Honsowetz, had been named
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 of the 1st Marine Division.
Operational plans called for the platoon night raid on the 2d to be
followed by a dawn attack the next morning. In both actions, the
prisoner-taking aspect of the mission was considered a primary one.
The early part of the operation was uneventful. One platoon moved
forward toward the objective, Hill 159 (Yoke), 1,200 yards beyond
combat outpost (COP) White, to the regimental left, without making
contact with the enemy. The platoon then established a base of fire on
favorable terrain from which the attack by the second platoon could be
supported.
The second platoon passed through the forward position of the first
shortly before 0630 and moved out into enemy terrain. It advanced less
than 300 yards before its progress was halted by a Chinese force of
battalion strength occupying the objective, Hill 159. Heavy enemy rifle
and machine gun fire, hand grenades, mortar and artillery deluged the
advancing Marines. Many of them quickly became casualties, but the
operation continued, due in part to the determination and initiative
of the NCOs. One of these was Staff Sergeant William E. Shuck, Jr.,
in charge of a machine gun squad. When the leader of one of the rifle
squads became a casualty, Sergeant Shuck assumed command of that squad
in addition to his own. Although wounded, he organized the two units
and led them against the objective. Nearing the summit of the hill, the
sergeant was hit a second time. Still he refused evacuation, remaining
well forward in the lines to direct his assault force.
It was not until he had received orders to break contact with the enemy
that the sergeant pulled back from the attack. During the withdrawal
he looked after the other Marine casualties, making certain that all
dead and wounded had been evacuated from the zone of action. While
directing the last of the evacuation, Sergeant Shuck was struck by a
sniper’s bullet and killed by this third hit.[141] He was one of four
Marines killed in the engagement. Forty others were wounded. Although
no Chinese were captured, Marines estimated the enemy suffered losses
of 50 killed and an additional 150 wounded.
[141] The leadership, bravery, and unselfish devotion to duty
earned for Sergeant Shuck the Medal of Honor, an award
made to 14 Marines during the fighting in West Korea.
During the earlier part of the war, 28 Marines had
received the Medal of Honor. Of these, 17 were awarded
posthumously. Five Navy hospital corpsmen, all attached
to the 1st Marine Division, also earned the MOH. These
awards, with one exception, were for heroism under combat
conditions during the 1952–1953 period of the Korean War.
To the east of the 7th Marines, the 5th Marines in the right MLR sector
ordered a company-size patrol, also on the night of 2–3 July. Company
A, 1/5 was directed to attack successively three outposts in the
vicinity of the village of Samichon along the river bearing the same
name and two miles beyond the point where the MLR crossed the river.
After the reinforced company had taken the first two objectives, which
were unoccupied, it received orders from division to return to the
battalion area. Despite the fact the patrol had ventured far beyond the
Marine lines, it did not come into contact with any Chinese forces.
A 2/5 combat patrol leaving the MLR just after dawn was successful in
inflicting casualties on the enemy, taking prisoners, and destroying
enemy field fortifications. The patrol made good progress until a
Marine inadvertently set off an enemy mine. This mishap gave away the
patrol’s location and prompted reprisal by the Chinese. A one-hour fire
fight followed. Then the patrol called in smoke and returned under its
cover to JAMESTOWN. Marine casualties were 1 killed and 11 wounded.
The second 2/5 patrol that same date was a successful ambush completed
10 minutes before midnight. In the brief clash that developed, Marine
ambushers killed 6 enemy and wounded 8 more. The Marine force suffered
no casualties.
The ambush patrol returned 15 minutes after midnight on 4 July.
Even at that early hour division artillerymen had already initiated
an appropriate ceremony to mark the Fourth. On 2 July, I Corps had
directed the massing of fires on 4 July on the most remunerative
targets in each division area. All objectives in the corps sector were
to be attacked simultaneously at specified times for a one-minute
period by employing a firing technique known as time on target
(TOT).[142] Normal daily fires were also to be carried out. Designated
as Operation FIRECRACKER, the shoot expended 3,202 rounds in the
division sector. Light and medium battalions of the 11th Marines, plus
its 4.5-inch Rocket Battery destroyed some enemy trenches, bunkers,
mortar and artillery positions, and damaged others. The division
reported that the special fires on 4 July had also resulted in 44 known
CCF casualties, including 21 dead, and 12 more who were estimated to
have been injured.
[142] In the TOT technique, participating units time their
initial volleys to ensure that their shells arrive on the
target at the same time.
More casualties, however, resulted from the issuing of another I
Corps directive, this one dealing with the conduct of raids to seize
prisoners, obtain information about the enemy, and to destroy his
positions, supplies, and equipment. Back in June, the EUSAK commander
had first stressed to his corps commanders the increased importance of
combat raids to obtain additional intelligence during this period of
stabilized conflict.
Although General Selden had submitted two division plans, he strongly
believed that smaller patrols could accomplish the objective with fewer
casualties and loss of life.[143] In particular, the division commander
pointed out to I Corps that adequate defense of the 35-mile-long
Marine division front did not permit the withdrawal of a sizable force
for patrol missions without endangering the security of the entire
Corps sector. The attack order was issued, however, on 3 July for
the first large-scale raid to be conducted prior to 7 July. The code
name BUCKSHOT 2B was assigned for this particular raid. As soon as he
received the date of execution for the proposed operation, the Marine
division commander advised I Corps that designation of 7 July as the
cut-off date for the raid precluded proper rehearsal of attack plans.
The operation would also conflict with rotation to the States of 2,651
Marines, whose replacements would not be available until 11 July. Corps
turned a deaf ear; division then ordered a battalion-size attack for
the night of 6–7 July.
[143] Among division commanders in the I Corps area, General
Selden was not alone in his grave misgivings of this
method of gaining information about the Chinese. Major
General A. J. H. Cassels, 1st Commonwealth Division,
shared with the Marine commander the belief that such
operations were too costly for the intended purpose.
_McGill comments_ and Brigadier C. N. Barclay, _The first
Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth
Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953_ (Aldershot, England:
Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954), p. 127, hereafter Barclay,
_Commonwealth_.
Before dusk on 6 July, Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry’s reinforced
1st Battalion, 7th Marines moved into position--on the left, a
tank-infantry force, A/1/7 (still under Captain Thompson), to create a
diversion; in the center, the main assault force, Company C (Captain
Robert A. Owens); and on the right, a reinforced platoon from Company
B (Captain Lyle S. Whitmore, Jr.) to support the attack by fire from
positions close to the objective, Yoke. Earlier, three reinforced
squads from Captain Thompson’s unit had occupied combat outposts in the
area of operations to deny the use of key terrain to the enemy and to
provide additional fire support in the attack. At 2200, Captain Owens’
Company C crossed the line of departure and set its course for Yoke,
three-quarters of a mile northeast. Five minutes later the Company B
support unit moved out to occupy the intermediate objective, COP Green,
one-half mile southeast of Yoke. As it took up positions on COP Green,
Captain Whitmore’s Company B platoon discovered that no Chinese were
in its vicinity; in fact, the platoon was not to encounter any enemy
forces during BUCKSHOT.
Even though Company B failed to engage any Chinese, the remainder
of the battalion encountered more than its share. About 450 yards
southwest of the objective the Company C attack force was hit by an
enemy ambush, which cut off Captain Owens’ lead element. Although the
Chinese directed strong efforts at halting the Marine advance, they
were unsuccessful in this attempt. The Marines pressed the attack and
seized Yoke 20 minutes after midnight.
On the left, the diversionary attack unit, Company A supported by the
five tanks of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 1st Tank Battalion, and by a
section of flame tanks from the armored battalion headquarters, began
its mission at 2355. In three-quarters of an hour, the tank-infantry
unit reached its objective, the first high ground southwest of Yoke.
Tanks turned their 90mm guns on known Chinese positions on the hill to
the north. During the next hour, the big guns of the M-46 medium tanks
sent 49 rounds into enemy emplacements. The Marine tanks ceased fire at
0113 when Captain Thompson was alerted to assist Company C. He left one
rifle platoon with the tanks.
Over on the high ground to the north and east, the attack force was
under heavy fire from Communist mortars and artillery and was also
receiving a number of enemy small-unit probes. At 0200, Company A made
contact with Company C. Captain Thompson found the main force somewhat
disorganized as a result of the wounding of the company commander,
Captain Owens, the loss of several key officers and NCOs, and the
effects of the lead element of Company C being ambushed and cut off.
After being briefed on the situation by Captain Owens and conducting a
reconnaissance, Captain Thompson recommended to the battalion commander
that the entire force be recalled before daylight. At 0310 the two
companies at Yoke began to disengage, returning to the MLR by 0636 on
the 7th, without further casualties.
The one platoon of Company A and seven tanks of the diversion unit were
still in their forward positions on the left and had prepared to resume
firing. At dawn the M-46s relaid their guns on targets that had become
visible. Tank gunners destroyed two observation posts and three machine
gun positions and damaged many feet of trenchlines. At one point in
the firing, the tank platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Terry K.
Donk, using a power scope, observed “... two officers in forest green
uniforms without equipment. They were definitely giving orders to
machine gunners and infantry.”[144] These 2 were among the 19 counted
casualties (10 wounded) that the tankers inflicted during BUCKSHOT.
[144] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 52.
With the return at 0645 of the tank-infantry diversion force, the
special operation for obtaining prisoners and information ended.
No Chinese had been captured and no data gleaned from Communist
casualties, listed as the 19 reported by the tankers and an estimated
20 more wounded or killed. Marine casualties from the operation were
out of proportion to the results achieved--12 dead, 85 wounded, and 5
missing. It had been a high price to pay for a venture of this type,
particularly when the primary objectives went unaccomplished.
During the entire 4–7 July period, 22 Marines had lost their lives in
combat operations. Division reported that 268 Marines had been wounded
during the long Fourth of July. These figures were the highest since
September 1951 when large scale attacks by UN forces had first been
abolished in line with the new tactic of positional warfare that would
be waged until the truce talks resulted in an armistice.
_Changes in the Lineup_[145]
[145] The material in this section is derived from the
1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52.
Division casualties were considerably higher during the first week in
July than they were for the rest of the month. Once the pace of combat
slowed, following the initial flurry of activity, the front again
settled down to the patrol, raid, and ambush routine that had marked
the static period of the Korean fighting. In accordance with the orders
previously issued by higher authority the division placed continued
emphasis on gathering all information it could about the enemy, his
dispositions, and tactics. To assist in this effort, General Selden
in July removed his reconnaissance company from defense of its small
sector of JAMESTOWN and directed the unit to conduct training for its
primary mission, obtaining intelligence about the enemy. Its place on
the MLR was assumed by the two amphibian tractor companies then on line.
Another change of lineup took place on 14 July. At this time a
battalion from the 15th Regiment, U.S. 3d Infantry Division took over
the role of the maneuver element in the Kimpo Provisional Regiment,
then held by 1/1, thereby releasing that battalion to its parent unit.
With this change, the 1st Marine Division had a full regiment in
reserve for the first time since its arrival in western Korea. A later
shift in units occurred on 26 July when the 7th and 1st Marines traded
places and missions. At that time the MLR, from west to east, was
manned by the KPR, 1st AmTrac Bn, KMC, 1st Marines, and 5th Marines.
Opposing them in mid-July were an estimated 27 infantry battalions,
whose primary missions were to defend the sectors assigned. The
division credited these units with the capability of launching limited
objective attacks at any time or of taking part in a major attack with
a force of up to 57 infantry and 16 artillery battalions, augmented
by 40 tanks or self-propelled guns. It was estimated also that the
enemy could cross the Han in battalion strength in the vicinity of
the northern shore of Kimpo Peninsula at any time and that Communist
aircraft could attack anywhere in the division sector. Enemy forces
identified at the end of July, from west to east, were the 193d, 195th,
and 194th Divisions of the 65th CCF Army; the 189th Division of the 63d
CCF Army; and the 118th Division, 40th CCF Army, which had recently
moved from a position opposite the Commonwealth and U.S. 3d Infantry
Divisions. Infantry strength of the Communists was established at
28,328.
_Replacement and Rotation_[146]
[146] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; No.
5, Chaps. 8, 9.
Marine infantry strength at the end of July 1952 was little more
than half of the Chinese total. The division personnel strength was
maintained by the monthly replacement and rotation program of Marines
to fill vacancies created by the return of Marine combat personnel to
CONUS (Continental United States) and combat losses. In the second
quarter of 1952, the division rotated 433 officers and 6,280 enlisted
men from Korea. In exchange, 506 officers and 7,359 enlisted men
arrived from the States in replacement drafts. A new arrival could
expect to stay with the division about 10½ months.
In the late spring of 1952 many of the division’s new replacements were
“dental cripples”--Marines requiring dental treatment, even emergency
care in some cases.[147] General Selden directed that contact teams be
formed to meet the replacement drafts in Japan. During the last leg of
the trip to Korea dental personnel screened the new combat Marines on
shipboard. By the time the division area had been reached, the dentists
knew what remedial work would be required by incoming troops. At the
end of the summer the problem was well under control.
[147] _Brunelli ltr._
Even though the 1st Marine Division in July continued to be somewhat
in excess of its authorized strength in total personnel, it had
certain imbalances and was in rather short supply of certain ranks and
specialists. While the normal tour for most infantry officers ranged
from 9 to 12 months, an excess of company grade officers, particularly
lieutenants, had resulted in a reduction of the Korean tour for them
to just six months. This brief period of duty plus an intra-division
rotation policy that caused a mass shifting of duty assignments every
three-to-five months tended to reduce unit combat efficiency. On the
other hand the change of assignments had a favorable effect in that
it broadened the experience of individual Marines. Beginning in the
summer of 1952, however, the division modified this policy to reduce
its number of intra-division transfers.
Personnel shortages existed in both the artillery and tank MOSs
(Military Occupational Speciality). Mass rotation of reservist company
grade artillery officers had necessitated the transfer of infantry
officers to the 11th Marines for training and reassignment within the
regiment. During the time when the supply of artillery officers was
limited, however, the quality of support rendered remained high.[148]
The other major shortage in the division was that of qualified
crewmen--both drivers and gunners--for the M-46 tanks. Neither tank
driving nor gunnery for the M-46 was taught in the tank crewmen’s
course conducted at Camp Pendleton, California. General Selden
requested of Lieutenant General Franklin A. Hart (CG, FMFPac) that
“tank crewmen be thoroughly trained prior to leaving the U.S.”[149]
[148] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-27.
[149] 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 52, p. 4.
Fundamental to the tank problem was a shortage of the M-46 itself.
At the training facility, Training and Replacement Command, Camp
Pendleton, M-46 engines had been available for maintenance instruction
but no tanks for the training of gunners and drivers.[150] General
Hart pointed out this deficiency to the Commandant, General Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr. On 13 August the Commandant directed the transfer of five
tanks to the training installation from the 7th Tank Battalion,[151]
also located at Camp Pendleton. At the same time General Shepherd
ordered an increase in the school quota for tank crewmen. The first
graduates would not reach the division in Korea, however, until the
November draft.
[150] FMFPac ComdD, Jul 52, App VIII, Encl (7), Anx (E).
[151] FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App I, Encl (35).
The presence of not fully trained personnel in a combat zone was not
limited to the division. In the summer and fall of 1952, a large
number of volunteer reservists, both pilots and enlisted replacements
with little experience since the end of World War II, joined the 1st
MAW. It had not been possible for the Stateside training and tactical
squadrons, themselves short of personnel and aircraft, to qualify all
pilots as combat ready. It fell upon the wing in Korea, therefore,
to take the needed corrective action. The more experienced 1st MAW
pilots, after completing their combat missions, flew instructional
flights to help prepare the rusty fliers. Some reserve pilots, away
from regular daily flying since 1945, found the adjustment too
difficult and turned in their wings. MACG-2 operated “Pohang U,” a
training course for forward air controllers. In practically every
squadron, there were shortages of electronics personnel. Jet squadrons
found mechanics hard to come by. There were never enough motor
transport replacements. For unqualified enlisted Marines, squadrons
operated on-the-job training programs.
To maintain a reasonable degree of unit proficiency, the wing limited
the monthly turnover of pilots to 25 percent. Like the division,
the wing employed split tours between an officer’s primary duty and
staff work to broaden his experience. In some cases the amount of
time required by administrative work as compared to a pilot’s actual
flying time reduced his proficiency in the air. In June, Task Force 95
reported that the proportionately large number of take-off and landing
accidents on the carrier _Bataan_ was caused by the rapid turnover of
pilots and their need for frequent carrier qualification.[152]
[152] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-198.
A Marine pilot joining the wing could expect his assignment to last for
6 to 9 months. Personnel in a nonflight status had longer tours of 10
months to a year. Wing replacements were made on an individual basis,
although there were plans that by mid-1953 a new policy of at least
partial squadron replacement would be in effect. That 1st MAW squadrons
were able to operate effectively on an individual replacement system
was attributable to the peculiarity of combat conditions in Korea.
Absence of real enemy aerial opposition permitted the use of basic,
parade-type flight formations and non-tactical approaches and attacks.
An unusually high-level of experienced pilots in each of the two wing
groups helped in the establishment of training programs and operational
doctrine. The FAF limitation of four aircraft per flight eliminated
the problem of large-scale, precombat squadron training as well as the
difficulty of controlling and coordinating a large number of planes in
a strike.
_Logistical Operations, Summer 1952_[153]
[153] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_; _PacFlt EvalRpts_
No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn
ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52.
Logistical support of the division and wing remained largely unchanged
through July. Several modifications did take place, however, and these
were:
(1) The change of responsibility for logistical support
of ground-based units in Korea from Commanding General,
2d Logistical Command to the Commanding General, Korean
Communication Zone (CG, KComZ).
(2) The opening of a pipeline system for resupply of aviation
fuel at K-3, beginning in May.
(3) The beginning of increased support for airbase maintenance at
those airfields housing Marine squadrons.
Resupply of common items used by both Marine and Army units was still
being hampered by the Marines’ limited knowledge of the Army supply
system in effect and by their inability to obtain the catalogues,
orders, and directives essential for requisitioning.
Two logistical operations, both of an engineering nature, took
place between May and July 1952 in western Korea. One was Operation
TIMBER, undertaken to provide lumber required to complete the bunker
construction on the JAMESTOWN, WYOMING, and KANSAS lines. The division
had estimated that three million linear feet of 4 x 8-inch timbers
would be needed. Since lumber in this amount was not available
through supply channels or standing timber in the division sector,
Corps assigned the Marines a wooded area 50 miles to the east in the
U.S. 45th Infantry Division sector. On 12 May a reinforced engineer
platoon, under Second Lieutenant Roger E. Galliher, a truck platoon,
and 500 Korean Service Corps (KSC) laborers,[154] began the cutting,
processing, and hauling of timbers which were then trucked to the
railhead. Between 500 and 1,000 logs were cut daily. When the operation
ended in July a total of 35,194 sections of timber had been cut. This
was still not enough lumber to complete the required construction.
Eighth Army then made up the difference, mostly with 12 x 12-inch
timbers 30 feet long; these the Marine engineers cut to 4 x 8s for
standard bunker construction.[155]
[154] The KSC was a ROK quasi-military organization for
logistical support of the UNC. Personnel were drafted
from those rejected for Army service. Each KSC unit had
a cadre of ROK officers and enlisted. All types of labor
except personal services were performed by these Koreans.
During its period in western Korea, the 1st Marine
Division was supported by the 103d KSC Regiment of 5,222
men. CG, 1stMarDiv, _Civ Afrs and KSC_, pp. 8–9.
[155] Col Harry D. Clarke ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd
1 Sep 66.
Operation AMAZON, published by I Corps on 12 June, ordered that
bridging preparations be made for the approaching summer flood season.
The previous August at the Honker Bridge, the one nearest the railhead,
the Imjin had crested some 27 feet above normal. One reason for the
precautionary efforts taken to insure bridge security during the
flood season was the potential damage the Chinese could cause. Since
they controlled the upriver area of the Imjin, before it entered the
division sector, they could introduce floatable debris or explosives
into the swift running flood waters. Another major concern was the
logistical problem that would be faced by forward MLR units in event
the bridges became impassable and the enormous strain that would thus
be placed on helicopter resupply operations.
The I Corps directive specified that its divisions maintain a transport
capability that would enable medium tanks to pass safely over bridges
spanning the major rivers in their I Corps sector. The order also
called for the removal of debris that could cause damage to bridges.
Removal of those bridges vulnerable to flood conditions and the
erection of emergency river spans were also to take place on corps
order.
To carry out the I Corps operational order, General Seiden put the
division’s own AMAZON plan into effect on 1 July. On this date
Companies A, B, and D of Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Clarke’s 1st
Engineer Battalion began extensive preparations for debris removal from
the four bridge sites in the division sector. Even before this, Marine
engineers and shore party personnel had been trained at special schools
to handle U.S. Army equipment provided for the AMAZON operation.[156]
[156] This included employment of the 60-inch searchlight
for night illumination, maintenance of boats for
debris removal, and operation of the M-4 ferry. Other
preparations by the division, of a non-engineer nature,
included positioning of 13,000 life-saving floatation
devices for use by frontline troops should they become
shut off from planned evacuation.
Beginning 1 June, division engineers began blasting away at objects
that flood waters could loosen and carry into the bridge supports.
Bridge approaches were improved and their supports strengthened.
Each company had a detail living at the bridge site for which it was
responsible. With the advent of heavy rains, these Marines were to
operate 24-hour boat patrols to keep the river free of debris. The
engineers were also to maintain a round-the-clock debris watch at the
four division bridges--Freedom Gate, or the Munsan-ni Railroad Bridge
in the left regimental sector; Honker and X-Ray in the center; and
finally, Widgeon, very close to the Commonwealth boundary.
Heavy rains began on 27 July and continued until the 30th. On the first
day the decking of Widgeon Bridge was completely submerged and Honker
was removed to prevent its being carried away. Precipitation increased
on 28 July and reached its peak on 29 July when 3.66 inches of rainfall
were recorded. By the 30th, the rains had subsided but not before the
overflowing Imjin had collapsed the X-Ray bridge. During the height of
the four flood days, engineers fought the rains, flooding waters, and
floating debris. The major effort took place downstream to save the
Freedom Gate Bridge.
Assigned personnel removed debris from the bridge supports, guided
large, dangerous pieces away with poles, while upriver the boat teams
blasted still larger sections into manageable chunks that would pass
between the bridge supports. These engineer efforts, in addition to
regular repair and maintenance of the large road net, constituted the
major ground activity in the 1st Marine Division sector in late July.
August would bring more rains and emergency demands on the engineers,
but the critical ground activity at that time would be directed against
the Communists in the area around Bunker Hill.