Defending the Line
_UN Command Activities--Defense of West and East Coast Korean
Islands--Marine Air Operations--Spring 1952 on_ JAMESTOWN--_End
of the Second Year of War--A Long Fourth of July--Changes in the
Lineup--Replacement and Rotation--Logistical Operations, Summer 1952_
_UN Command Activities_[69]
[69] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: Cdr Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Cdr Frank
A. Manson, USN, _The Sea War in Korea_ (Annapolis, Md.:
U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), hereafter Cagle and Manson,
_Sea War, Korea_; James A. Field, Jr., _History of United
States Naval Operations_, Korea (Washington: [Div. of
Naval Hist], 1962), hereafter Field, _NavOps, Korea_;
John Miller, Jr., Maj Owen J. Carroll, USA, and Margaret
E. Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_ (Washington: OCMH, DA,
1958), hereafter Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, _Korea,
1951–1953_.
Movement of the 1st Marine Division to the west was part of an Eighth
Army master plan to strengthen UN defenses and at the same time to
enable South Korean forces to assume increased responsibility in the
defense of their homeland. The tactical realignment in the spring
of 1952 put more South Korean infantry units on the main line of
resistance and buttressed the fighting front with five corps sectors
instead of four. In the far west, the I Corps positions were newly
manned (left to right) by the 1st Marine, 1st Commonwealth, 1st ROK,
and the U.S. 45th Infantry Divisions. Next in line was IX Corps, whose
left boundary General Van Fleet[70] had shifted further west, which now
had a divisional line up of the ROK 9th on the left, the U.S. 7th in
the center, and the U.S. 40th on the right.
[70] General Van Fleet, CG, EUSAK since April 1951, had
advocated a program in which South Korean troops would be
rigorously trained to take over an increasingly greater
part of the UNC defense efforts in Korea. See Mark W.
Clark, _From the Danube to the Yalu_ (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1954), p. 185, hereafter Clark, _Danube to
Yalu_, quoted with permission of the publishers.
To fill in the central part of the EUSAK front where the change of
IX Corps boundary had created a gap in the line, the UN commander
inserted the ROK II Corps with three divisions (ROK 6th, ROK Capital,
and ROK 3d) forward. Immediately to the right of this new ROK corps
sector, the X Corps continued in approximately its same position on
the east-central front. Its ROK 7th and U.S. 25th Divisions remained
on line, while the ROK 8th had advanced to the former sector of the
Marine division in the wild Punchbowl country. At the far right of the
UN line, the ROK I Corps front was held by the ROK 11th Division at the
X Corps boundary and the ROK 5th along the Sea of Japan. By 1 May 1952,
nine Republic of Korea divisions had been emplaced on the UNC main
defense line, three more than had been there in mid-March.
Throughout Korea in March and April there had been a general stagnation
of offensive action on both sides because of fog, rain, and mud. In
May, however, the Chinese launched no less than 30 probing attacks
against the ROK 1st Division in the I Corps sector, without gaining
any significant advantage. To the right, the enemy and the U.S. 45th
Division traded blows in several patrol actions. In June, major
EUSAK combat action was still centered in the 45th’s sector, but the
following month was marked by sharp battlefront clashes in nearly all
Eighth Army division areas. For a two-week period in July and August,
heavy seasonal rains limited both ground and air action. With the
return of normal weather, heavy fighting again broke out, this time
concentrated in the I Corps sector. This action did not abate until
late August, when the onset of the heaviest rains of the season again
drastically reduced military operations.
Communist ground activity in the spring of 1952 was marked by increased
artillery support which resulted in telling damage to UN infantry and
artillery positions. Thus, during May, the enemy expended approximately
102,000 artillery and mortar rounds against the Allied front, roughly
12 times the number fired the previous July, just prior to the
period of stabilized battlelines in Korea. The artillery buildup was
accompanied by a sharp decrease in hostile air support activities.
While the Chinese had flown 3,700 jet sorties during the first month of
1952, by June the monthly total had dropped to 308.
As part of the balanced military forces, Allied air and sea units
continued their active defense in support of UN ground units. Beginning
in late May, Fifth Air Force shifted the emphasis of its destructive
effort from interdiction of communication routes to the bombing of
selected industrial targets. Naval air was committed to support the
FAF programs. At sea, ships steamed almost at will to sustain the
U.S. lifeline. Underscoring the complete UN control of Korean waters,
large naval vessels offshore fired their big guns in support of
ground troops. Off both the west and east coasts, Task Force (TF) 95
maintained its blockade of North Korean ports and reduced the extent of
water travel that enemy craft could safely undertake. This same naval
force was responsible for the Allied defense of islands located off the
east and west coasts of Korea.
_Defense of West and East Coast Korean Islands_[71]
[71] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9; No.
5, Chap. 8; West Coast Island Defense Element ComdDs,
Feb-Oct 52, hereafter _WCIDE ComdD_, with date; East
Coast Island Defense ComdDs, Jan-Oct 52, hereafter _ECIDE
ComdD_, with date; Col William K. Davenport ltr to CMC,
dtd 27 Jun 52, Subj: Type D Report of duty as Commander
West Coast Island Defense Element (CTE 95.15); Cagle and
Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_.
Just off the northwest Korean mainland a string of islands extends
from the mouth of the Yalu River down around the peninsula to Pusan in
the southeast. Most of these islands are tiny and are located south of
the 38th Parallel. Only a few lie off the east coast, and these are
clustered primarily in the North Korean harbor of Wonsan. By early
1951, UN forces exercised control over most of the Korean islands.
Their tactical importance is shown from their diverse use as sites for
UN Command intelligence activities, USAF radar installations, locations
for the emergency landing strips used by Allied planes, bases for U.S.
search and rescue operations, and as springboards for possible thrusts
into enemy rear areas.[72]
[72] Evidence of Chinese concern about such rear area attacks
is apparent in the countermeasures taken: “Order of
Battle reports indicated that a total of three North
Korean Corps and three Chinese Communist Armies were
engaged in coastal defense operations on the east and
west coasts of North Korea.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 5, p.
8-79.
Another reason for holding some of the islands had come to light
during truce negotiations in December 1951. At that time, in an
attempt to expedite the successful conclusion of the truce meetings,
UN representatives had offered the Communists all the islands north of
the 38th Parallel. Brushing aside the tactical value of the proposal,
the enemy boasted that he could capture the islands at any time.
In November 1951 the Communists had, in fact, seized two western
islands near the mouth of the Yalu. The 1,000 defending guerrillas
there--former North Koreans working for the UNC--had been unable to
stem the assault. The UN Command promptly reviewed the island situation
and on 6 January 1952 gave TF 95, the United Nations Blockading and
Escort Force, responsibility for both overall defense and local ground
defense for the 11 coastal islands north of the 38th Parallel and the
4 islands immediately south of this boundary. Two subordinate blockade
task groups, one in the west and another in the east, were responsible
for the defense of these islands.
[Illustration:
MAP 6 K. White
WEST COAST ISLAND DEFENSE ELEMENT
SUMMER 1952]
In the west, Task Group (TG) 95.1 was charged with the defense of six
islands. (See Map 6.) Two of these, Sok-to and Cho-do, lie between the
38th and 39th Parallels; the four remaining islands, Paengyong-do,
Taechong-do, Yongpyong-do, and Tokchok-to, are above the 37th Parallel.
In the east, TG 95.2 was responsible for keeping nine islands north
of the 38th Parallel in friendly hands. Situated in Wonsan harbor
are Mo-do, Sin-do, So-do, Tae-do, Hwangto-do, Ung-do, and Yo-do, the
largest. (See Map 7.) Another island, Yang-do, actually a two-island
group further north in the area of the 41 st Parallel, is 18 miles
northeast of the coastal city of Songjin. The southernmost island,
tiny Nan-do, is below Wonsan and the 39th Parallel and lies 10 miles
northeast of Kojo, another coastal city.
Ground defense of the islands had been, at best, a haphazard
arrangement before TF 95 took over the responsibility. Many of the
islands, especially those inhabited by friendly guerrillas, had neither
plans for a proper defense nor commanders experienced in organizing
resistance to enemy attack. Soon after the two islands near the mouth
of the Yalu were taken, ROK Marines were rushed to those islands
considered most strategic for South Korean defense. Late in 1951, U.S.
Marines had been assigned to the area in an advisory capacity. By early
1952, Marine Corps detachments were in command of the island defense
activities for both task groups. Korean Marines provided a majority of
the actual defending forces.
Although the 1st Marine Division initially had supplied the officers
and men for the island security missions, in January 1952 FMFPac took
on direct responsibility for furnishing personnel and providing for
their administrative and logistical support through the 1st Provisional
Casual Company, FMFPac. Located at Otsu, Japan, the company was the
administrative headquarters for seriously wounded Marine division and
wing personnel recuperating in service hospitals in Japan. Recovered
patients who volunteered for duty with the offshore commands provided
the bulk of the Marines used in this defense. Major responsibilities
were to plan, organize, and conduct the defense of these islands off
the Korean west and east coasts. A task element under each task group
was created for this purpose.
With its headquarters at Paengyang-do, Task Element (TE) 95.15, the
West Coast Island Defense Element (WCIDE), was organized early in
January 1952. The following month, the initial complement of U.S.
Marines arrived. Colonel William K. Davenport, Jr., element commander,
assigned his 5 officers and 29 enlisted men to the 4 most critical
islands and to his staff. Those islands garrisoned were Cho-do and
Sok-to, north of the Parallel and both within range of enemy mainland
guns, and Paengyang-do and Yongpyong-do, to the south. Taechong-do,
near the command island, and Tokchok-to, southwest of Inchon, were both
considered secure and not provided with U.S. Marine commanders. At each
of the four occupied islands, Marines reconnoitered the terrain, drew
up plans for preparation of defensive positions, organized and trained
the troops available, and began the laborious task of constructing
the defense. Protection against long-range hostile artillery fire was
emphasized for the northern Sok-to and Cho-do garrisons.
Off the other long coast of Korea, TE 95.23, the East Coast Island
Defense Element (ECIDE), commanded until early May 1952 by Colonel
Frank M. Reinecke, had an almost entirely different situation. Eight of
the nine islands in the vicinity of Wonsan Harbor or north of Songjin
that ECIDE was responsible for were within range of Communist shore
batteries and thus frequently fired upon. Even before the January
1952 decision, the U.S. Navy had been charged with the security of
these east coast islands north of the 38th Parallel. For these reasons
ECIDE defenses had to maintain a greater state of readiness and were
more advanced than in the west. Fire support ships and land based
U.S. Marine naval gunfire spotting teams from 1st ANGLICO (Air and
Naval Gunfire Liaison Company), FMF, which also provided forward air
controllers for the KMC regiment, stood by at all times to silence
unfriendly artillery fire emanating from the mainland. The Marines had
also trained Korean Marines to handle the spotting missions.
[Illustration:
MAP 7 K. WHITE
EAST COAST DEFENSE ELEMENT
SUMMER 1952]
A number of events of major interest occurred during those first
difficult weeks following organization of the two offshore island
commands. On 19 and 20 February, elements of two North Korean infantry
battalions launched an unsuccessful assault against the two Yang-do
islands. The combined “action of the island garrison and UN surface
forces”[73] repulsed the enemy attempt, which had been planned to gain
intelligence and kill as many of the defenders as possible.[74] On the
heels of this action, with the first enemy effort to take an east coast
island, came an unexpected bonus in the form of a defector. Brigadier
General Lee Il, NKPA, came ashore on 21 February at Tae-do “in a stolen
sampan with a briefcase full of top secret papers, a head full of top
secret plans, and a strong desire to make himself useful.”[75] He was
rushed immediately to Eighth Army intelligence officers.
[73] CinPac Weekly Intel Digest No. 23-52, dtd 6 Jun 52,
included as App. 17 to _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-110.
[74] First Lieutenant Joseph S. Bartos, Jr., a former
All-American football great, also distinguished himself
during the Yang-do action. His cool, resourceful, and
valiant leadership during the two-day defense earned him
the Silver Star Medal. BGen Frank M. Reinecke comments on
draft MS, dtd 25 Aug 66.
[75] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 426.
The next day command personnel of the west coast TE 95.15 were treated
to a surprise, though not so pleasant as the unforeseen defection of
the NKPA general. Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, Commander Task Force
(CTF) 95, and his staff were engaged in an inspection of the WCIDE
islands. While the party was looking over the antiaircraft defenses at
Paengyong-do:
... an aircraft of VMA-312 made a pass at the CP, followed
closely by a second plane. The second aircraft made a message
drop and accidentally released a 500-pound bomb, which landed
from 75–100 feet west of the CP, shattering all windows and
blowing all the doors off their hinges. Personnel harbored
within the CP were thrown to the floor by the concussion, a
few sustaining minor cuts and bruises, but no fatalities were
incurred.... Commanding Officer, USS _Bairoko_ [the carrier to
which VMA-312 was assigned], sent a note of apology to CTE 95.15
and later followed up with material to repair the CP.[76]
[76] CTE 95.15 ComdD, 1 Feb-31 May 52, p. 8.
In March, CTG 95.1 directed the occupation of Ho-do, barely more than
a speck of dirt 4,000 yards south of Sok-to and within 400 yards
of the Communist mainland. Despite Colonel Davenport’s objection
that the proposed action was beyond the defensive mission of his
command and that the proximity of Ho-do to the enemy shore made the
island untenable,[77] the task group commander would not rescind the
directive. After a detailed reconnaissance by First Lieutenant Wallace
E. Jobusch, Colonel Davenport ordered a reinforced Korean Marine Corps
platoon to occupy the island. This order was carried out, but during
the night of 25–26 March the platoon lost its newly gained objective to
a well-coordinated enemy amphibious attack. Not a single Korean Marine
survivor could be accounted for at daylight. On 2 April, however,
after the enemy force had departed Ho-do, six of the platoon turned
up on Sok-to. They had survived by hiding out at Ho-do. None of the
others were ever seen again. After the island was overrun, it was not
reoccupied by Allied forces.
[77] Colonel Davenport later pointed out that the enemy
could easily employ high-powered rifles against Ho-do
occupants, that resupply posed problems to his command,
and that at times the enemy could even walk to Ho-do
over the winter ice. Col William K. Davenport ltr to Hd,
HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.
After this latest offensive action in the west, the Communists
made no further attempts to seize any of the islands. U.S. and ROK
Marines enjoyed a period of relative freedom from enemy harassment,
except for frequent shore battery shelling directed against the east
coast islands. For WCIDE command members the quiet island duty was
interrupted only occasionally by hostile artillery fire although rumors
of imminent enemy landings abounded. On 13 October, however, the enemy
bombed Cho-do in the first air attack made against an island garrison
since the U.S. Marines had been assigned the west coast island command
responsibility. No casualties resulted from this raid. The lull in
enemy activity that then ensued enabled island personnel to devote
increased efforts towards improvement of their defenses.
Marines instructed, drilled, and conducted tactical exercises for
the island forces. Island commanders supervised the construction and
improvement of gun pits and other defense installations. At the ECIDE
command island, Yo-do, a 2,700-foot airstrip (Briscoe Field) for
emergency landings and intelligence flights had been completed by June.
Since much of the labor was performed by Koreans, the language barrier
sometimes created difficulties. In all these activities the Marines
found that they were hampered but not unduly burdened by this problem.
One condition, however, did handicap operations of the island Marines.
This was the supply situation which was prevented from becoming
desperate only because the Marines were able to borrow and obtain
necessities from other service activities. The inability of the island
Marines to draw needed supplies from the responsible U.S. Army agency
developed as a result of the slowness of the Marines in approving the
task element tables of equipment (T/E),[78] and from insistence of
the supplying activity that it would deal only with those units that
had approved tables of equipment. The urgency of the situation was
alleviated in May when weekly supply flights were begun by the 1st MAW.
Even when surface ships did arrive with provisions, Marines frequently
discovered that items which had been invoiced were missing.[79]
Consumables, especially, had a high rate of disappearance.
[78] A T/E is a listing of equipment that a unit needs to
accomplish its mission. Tables vary according to type of
unit and its mission.
[79] Commenting on logistical matters, Colonel Kenneth A.
King, who during 1952 commanded first the WCIDE and then
1st CSG, was of the opinion that the main difficulty
lay “not in getting requisitions filled, but in getting
delivery of what was approved” due to the fact Marines
were not assigned to processing of requisitions and
delivery of supplies. He had high praise for the concern
and assistance of 1st MAW units as well as Captain G. L.
G. Evans (RN) of HMS _Ocean_ and various other United
Kingdom ship captains. Colonel King further commented
that “for the benefit of Marines who may have to serve
in isolated areas, and I imagine this often prevails in
Vietnam today, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that
the Marine Corps should be very reluctant to leave the
support of any of its elements, no matter how small, to
other services or nationalities.” Col Kenneth A. King ltr
to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 Aug 66.
_Marine Air Operations_[80]
[80] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section has
been derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 10; No.
5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW ComdDs, May-Aug 52; MAG-12 ComdDs,
Jun, Aug 52; Robert F. Futrell, _The United States Air
Force in Korea, 1950–1953_ (New York: Duell, Sloan, and
Pearce, 1961), hereafter Futrell, _USAF, Korea_.
Close air support of ground troops remained an almost forgotten mission
of Fifth Air Force tactical aircraft. When planes were allotted for
close support, both their customary late arrival over the target
area and pilot inefficiency left Marine ground commanders less than
satisfied.[81] The particular concern of General Jerome, the new
1st MAW commander, was the continuing limited opportunity for his
Marines to execute their normal primary mission--close air support of
frontline troops. Although FAF assigned Marine pilots to support the
1st Marine Division whenever possible, the infrequent number of close
air support missions performed under the existing sortie limit was
beginning to detract from the quality of delivery. General Jerome set
out to remedy this unfavorable situation.
[81] 1st MAW ComdD, Feb 52, quoted in _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4,
p. 10-45.
Working with General Selden, the Marine wing commander prevailed upon
the Air Force to permit close air support training of wing pilots and
of forward air controllers with the Marine division. On 19 May, CG,
FAF lifted the close air support restriction that he had imposed in
front of General Selden’s MLR. By agreement between the FAF and the
two Marine commanders, Fifth Air Force would permit the scheduling of
12 close air support sorties daily for a one-month period, MAG-12 was
given this training mission, to begin on 21 May.[82]
[82] Two months earlier, FAF had begun “a program for training
pilots in close air support techniques.... Initially,
all training missions for this division were flown by
Air Force aircraft.” The flights, not in response to
specific requests, were assigned by the G-3, I Corps. CG,
1stMarDiv ltr to CG, FMFPac dtd 23 May 52, Subj: CAS sum
for pd 1 Jan-30 Apr 52, cited in _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No.
4, p. 10-196. These flights ceased just before the ones
from MAG-12 began. 1st MarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 4. A 1st
MarDiv staff officer, who had observed the frequency of
General Jerome’s visits to the division CP to discuss the
new close air support training program, has credited the
two Marine CGs for their “great amount of coordinated
personal aggressiveness in bringing this about.” Col
Robert A. McGill comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter
_McGill comments_.
The objective of the CAS program, in addition to providing operational
training and practice for Marine ground officers, air controllers,
and pilots, was to inflict maximum casualties on Chinese troops and
to increase the destruction and damage to their positions. Before
assigning a pilot to the actual training flights, MAG-12 sent him
on a tour of the front lines to become better familiarized with the
topography, the restricted (“no-fly”) areas, and probable enemy
targets. Air strikes requested by the division went directly to MAG-12.
Initially, a limitation of 12 sorties per day was established, but on
17 July--the program having already been extended beyond its original
30-day limit--a new ceiling of 20 daily sorties went into effect. The
division was also allowed additional flights above this prescribed
daily sortie number when air support was needed to repel a large-scale
enemy attack or to assist in a major Marine ground assault.
Almost as soon as the Marines began to derive the benefit of the
training program, the flights were terminated by FAF. On 3 August
1952, following a complaint by CG, Eighth Army that Marines were
getting a disproportionate share of the close air support sorties,
the Fifth Air Force notified General Jerome that the special program
would end the next day. General Selden was instructed to request air
support “in the same manner as other divisions on the Army front.”[83]
Despite the abrupt termination of the training program, the division
had derived substantial benefits from the 12 weeks of Marine-type close
air support. “Air attacks were the most useful weapon for dealing with
enemy dug-in on the reverse slopes,”[84] according to an official
analysis. One regimental commander reported that the 1,000-pound
bombs were effective in destroying enemy bunkers and further noted
that the strikes had produced good results in the “destruction or
damaging of enemy artillery and mortar pieces.”[85] Another senior
officer commented that air overhead kept the Communists “buttoned up,”
which permitted Marines greater freedom of movement for tactical and
logistical operations.[86]
[83] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-54.
[84] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-36.
[85] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.
[86] Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.
A second type of Marine close air support aided the mission of Marine
infantrymen in western Korea during the summer of 1952. This was
controlled radar bombing, which permitted delivery of aviation ordnance
at night or under other conditions of limited or poor visibility. The
Air Force had introduced the concept into Korea in January 1951, had
tested and evaluated it in combat, and shortly thereafter had put it
to good use against the Communist spring offensives that year. Based
on a concept oriented towards deep support of troops in extended land
campaigns, the Air Force system made use of 20-ton vans to house its
ground components.[87]
[87] As an Air Force spokesman noted, “... the AN/MPQ-2 radars
introduced into Korea in January 1951 were Strategic Air
Command bomb scoring radars and not tactical equipment.
This would explain the large vans.” Robert C. Futrell,
Historian, Hist Studies Br USAF Hist Div, comments
on draft MS, dtd 12 Oct 66. Dr. Futrell authored the
definitive unclassified history of Air Force operations
in Korea, previously cited as _USAF, Korea_.
The Marine equipment, on the other hand, was more mobile since it was
to be employed close to friendly lines. Referred to as the MPQ-14,[88]
the Marine radar bombing system was designed so that the largest
piece could be put into a one-ton trailer. Major ground items were a
generator power supply, a tracking radar, and a computer; the last
essential component, an automatic bombing control, was mounted in the
aircraft.
[88] These letters indicate first, the type of installation;
next, the kind of electronic equipment; and finally, its
purpose. In this case, M-mobile ground installation,
P-radar, and Q-intended for a combination of purposes.
The figure indicates the model number in the
developmental history of the equipment.
Developed and hand built after World War II by Marines under Major
Marion C. Dalby at the Naval Air Materiel Test Center, Point Mugu,
California, the MPQ-14 was first used in Korea in September 1951.
Initially, considerable mechanical difficulty was experienced with
radar bombing, which affected the accuracy of the bombs, but later the
system became sufficiently reliable to permit bomb drops within one
mile of friendly lines. Subsequent use confirmed the tactical precision
of the MPQ-14. By the middle of summer 1952, the Marines had obtained
Fifth Air Force permission to use radar bombing, controlled by a
forward observer on the ground, in a close support role.
Before this policy change took place another one, at a still higher
command level, had occurred. On 23 June, FAF planes struck at eight
North Korean hydroelectric plants in the central and northwestern part
of the country. The attack represented a departure from the intense
interdiction of enemy lines of communication (Operation STRANGLE)
which, since May 1951, had characterized FAF support operations. The
shift came about after a Far East Air Forces study on the effectiveness
of the interdiction campaign had concluded, in part, that the program
had been indecisive.[89]
[89] HistDiv; Air Univ, USAF, _United States Air Force
Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30
June 1952_, USAF Hist Study No. 72 (Washington, 1955),
p. 159, hereafter USAF, _Ops in Korea_, with appropriate
number. The Air Force operations were published in three
books, numbered 72, 73, and 127.
For more than a year preceding the 23 June attack, the Fifth Air Force
had concentrated its ground support efforts on the disruption of
Communist communication lines so that the enemy would be unable “to
contain a determined offensive ... or to mount a sustained offensive
himself.”[90] During the lifetime of the doctrine, no major offensive
had been launched by the enemy, and on this fact was based the claim
for success of the interdiction program. Opponents, however, pointed
out that despite this maximum FAF air effort, the Communists had built
up their strength, including support areas immediately to the rear
of their front lines and resupply installations. As the recent UN
commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway,[91] told members of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on 21 May 1952, the same month that FAF had
begun to shift its air effort away from interdiction, “I think that the
hostile forces opposing the Eighth Army ... have a substantially greater
offensive potential than at any time in the past....”[92]
[90] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 435–436.
[91] General Mark W. Clark had succeeded Ridgway as UN
Commander on 12 May 1952. Ridgway was to take over as the
new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1 June, replacing
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was
returning to the United States.
[92] Cited in Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 435.
A number of factors contributed to the reduced emphasis on the
interdiction strategy. Three, however, appear to have most influenced
the inauguration of Operation PRESSURE, the name given the new policy
of concentrating aerial attacks on major industrial targets considered
of greatest value to the North Korean economy. Mounting FAF aircraft
losses due to enemy flak (fire from ground-based antiaircraft weapons)
and an insufficient number of replacements helped shape the new
program. By April 1952 FEAF had received “only 131 replacement aircraft
of the types engaged in rail interdiction against the 243 it had lost
and the 290 major-damaged aircraft on interdiction sorties.”[93] These
heavy losses had resulted from the increasing accuracy of Communist
antiaircraft ground weapons, a capability Air Force planners had failed
to consider sufficiently.[94]
[93] USAF, _Ops in Korea_, No. 72, p. 156.
[94] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 436–437.
Although significant, this loss factor was not the final consideration
in executing PRESSURE attacks against the power plants. More directly
responsible were two other recent developments. These were the decision
of the new UN commander, General Mark W. Clark, to take forceful
action to bring the Communists around to an armistice agreement and a
top-level Defense Department change of policy that had removed a major
North Korean hydroelectric facility from the restricted bombing list.
This was the Suiho plant, fourth largest in the world. Adjacent to
the Yalu River, about 75 miles northeast of its mouth, Suiho supplied
approximately 25 percent of the electrical power used in nearby
northeast China.[95]
[95] _Ibid._, pp. 452–453 and Cagle and Manson, _Sea War,
Korea_, pp. 443–445.
Results of the PRESSURE strikes, carried on from 23–27 June, were
highly successful. Marine, Navy, and Air Force planes flew 1,654 attack
and escort sorties in these raids. Of the 13 target plants attacked
during this period, 11 were put out of commission and 2 others were
presumably destroyed. North Korea was almost blacked out for two weeks.
Chinese and Russian experts were rushed to North Korea to lend a hand
in restoration. The hydroelectric strikes marked the first time that
Marine, Navy, and Air Force pilots had flown a combined mission in
Korea. The 23 June strike, moreover, was of particular significance
to 1st MAW since it was also the first time that MAGs-12 and -33 were
assigned group strikes at specific adjacent targets at the same time.
Led by Colonel Robert E. Galer, the new MAG-12 commander since 25 May,
group pilots struck and leveled the single power complex, Chosin 3, in
the 23–24 June runs. Colonel John P. Condon, who had taken over MAG-33
on 24 May, put 43 jets from VMFs-311 and -115 into the air during the
two-day mission. The first time that its F9Fs had ever been massed for
a strike of this type, the MAG-33 jets similarly destroyed the Chosin 4
plant, 11 miles northwest of Hamhung.
Although the jets carried a smaller payload than the Corsairs and ADs
of MAG-12 (approximately 37 gross tons to more than 150 tons), the
extremely precise bombing record made by the Grumman Panther jet pilots
forever put to rest the doubts about jet accuracy that had been held by
some in 1st MAW. As the group commander later recalled, “The capability
of jet strike aircraft for extremely accurate bombing, an item of
open discussion prior to this time, was never questioned in the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing after this mission.”[96] Another gratifying result
was that flight personnel on all of the 150 Marine aircraft returned
safely. In fact, of the total 1,645 FAF sorties, only 2 aircraft were
downed; rescue aircraft successfully picked up these two pilots, both
U.S. Navy officers.
[96] MajGen John P. Condon ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 1 Oct 66.
It was the high probability of being rescued, if forced to abandon
their aircraft, that not only eased the minds of pilots on missions
north of the 38th Parallel but also permitted the fliers a greater
degree of success. As the MAG-12 commander, Colonel Galer, who was
shortly to escape imminent capture by the enemy, later declared, “I do
know that every pilot flying in this theatre should have the highest
possible morale with the knowledge that so many are ready and willing
to risk so much to get them.”[97]
[97] MAG-12 ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-4.
A Medal of Honor holder from World War II, Colonel Galer was leading
a flight of 31 aircraft on 5 August. His objective was the supply area
and tungsten mines in the mountainous northeastern part of North Korea,
just below the 39th Parallel and 35 miles southwest of Wonsan. After
several hits had killed his engine, the MAG-12 commander, preparing
to parachute, climbed out over the side of his plane, but found that
he had one foot stuck inside the cockpit, probably on the shoulder
straps or the loop of the belt. He then pulled himself partially back
towards the cockpit, freed his foot with a vigorous kick, cleared the
plane, and headed in spread-eagle fashion towards the ground. Almost
immediately the plane, falling in a nose dive, caught the descending
pilot on the shoulder and pulled him into a spin. Colonel Galer
recovered in time, however, to pull the ripcord and thus ease his
impact onto enemy terrain. He landed within ten feet of his crashed
AU.[98]
[98] The AU is the attack version of the Marines’ famed World
War II fighter, the F4U Corsair.
“Immediately upon getting free of the chute, I ran as rapidly as
possible, staying low, down through a corn field.”[99] At the end of
the field, the Marine aviator paused momentarily to survey the terrain
for an escape route. Spotting a dry stream bed nearby, Colonel Galer
dashed toward it and quickly but cautiously moved up it some 100
yards. Then he halted to put into operation a small survivor radio to
report his position. The message was received by the rescue air patrol
orbiting overhead which relayed the information to pickup aircraft. The
patrol advised the downed pilot that a rescue helicopter had already
departed for the crash area.
[99] MAG-12, ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-2.
Before breaking radio contact, Colonel Galer told the air patrol his
planned movements in order to facilitate pickup. He then quickly left
the area which was located too near the crashed aircraft for a rescue
attempt. Evading detection by enemy soldiers and curious teenagers
moving towards the wreckage, the Marine worked his way to higher
ground, keeping the air patrol advised of his changing position. By
1845, a search of the area was underway. Of the events that followed:
Colonel Galer wrote:
At 1908 I heard the helicopter go down the next valley and saw it
disappear. I called, told them to make a 180-degree turn since
I was in the valley to the southwest and on the north slope. I
did not get an answer but soon the helicopter came through a
saddle in the ridge.... I immediately let the red smoke (day
flare) go, and came out of the bushes ... calling the helicopter
on the radio also. They apparently saw me immediately and came
over and hovered. The mechanic leaned out and swung the hoisting
sling back and forth.... Finally, I grabbed it and got in ... and
the pilot took off.... The mechanic pulled me up and into the
helicopter as we crossed the valley.[100]
[100] _Ibid._, p. D-3.
The colonel was not yet out of the woods. The trip to a rescue ship at
Wonsan was marked by intermittent bursts of enemy antiaircraft fire.
On one occasion the chopper was hit hard enough to spin it completely
around. As the rescue craft neared the coast patches of fog added
to the hazards of night flying. About this time the warning light
indicating low fuel supply came on but “the pilot gambled on making the
sea at the risk of having to autorotate through the overcast into the
mountains.”[101] It was a correct decision. The fuel lasted until the
helicopter landed on the rescue vessel. It was then 2100.
[101] _Ibid._, p. D-4.
Quite naturally the episode brought forth high praise for the
rescue system, and particularly for those individuals whose skills,
initiative, and courage made downed crew rescues of this type possible.
But Colonel Galer also saw some weaknesses. He pointed out that rescue
helicopter pilots should be kept up to date on changing enemy flak
positions. The Marine group commander also stressed the need for rescue
helicopters to establish and maintain a minimum safe fuel level which
would depend largely upon the position of the downed aircraft. One
final suggestion, not about the system but the aircraft itself, was
that fixed-wing aircraft have ejection-type seats. Remembering his
own difficulties, the MAG-12 commander further cautioned pilots to be
certain they were free of all straps and cords before bailing out.
In addition to attack missions by tactical aircraft and rescue work by
its helicopters, the Marine wing was also responsible for providing
antiaircraft defense. It was not until July 1951, 13 months after
the NKPA invasion of South Korea, that a formal air defense had been
established for the country. Fifth Air Force was given the command
responsibility of coordinating the aerial defense net for South Korea
and its adjacent sea frontiers. In mid-November 1951, the FAF commander
had revised the defensive system, dividing his area into a northern
and southern sector, at a point exactly halfway between the 36th and
37th Parallels.
FAF commanded the northern air defense sector while the southern sector
became the responsibility of CG, 1st MAW. In turn, these two sectors
were further divided into subsectors. Each of these, through a tactical
air direction center (TADC), maintained radar surveillance of its
assigned area and performed plotting and identification functions. Each
subsector was charged with being “directly responsible for sector air
defense.”[102]
[102] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 616.
Although the 1st MAW commander had been designated as the Air Defense
Commander, Southern Sector, Korea, he was not actually given the means
to carry out this responsibility. He still did not have command over
his tactical squadrons, nor could he exercise control over operations
of his tactical air coordination center (TACC) or TADC.[103] Moreover,
his southern sector could not originate practice air warning messages.
The wing commander had to obtain permission from JOC before he could
begin practice intercepts for training his radar intercept controllers.
[103] TACC is the senior agency for controlling all tactical
aircraft and air warning functions; the TADC performs
similar functions in an area controlled by the TACC. JCS,
_Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint
Usage_ (Short title: JD). JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, 1964),
p. 141, hereafter _JCS, JD_.
Several other deficiencies existed in the air defense system that
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had inherited. There were no ground
antiaircraft weapons at the Marine fields until a .50 caliber automatic
weapons battery was detached from the 1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion, FMF, early in 1952 and sent to K-3, the home field of
MAG-33. Other inadequacies were deficient equipment--a search radar
limited to 30 miles out and 20,000 feet up--and lack of an interceptor
aircraft capable of rising to meet the faster swept-wing jets the
enemy was employing. Airfields housing Marine air groups did not have
revetments for either aircraft parking areas or ordnance dumps.
Not all of these weaknesses were acquired with assumption of the air
defense mission. There had been a general lack of concern about air
defense throughout South Korea. This attitude had resulted from the air
supremacy which the Fifth Air Force had quickly established. Camouflage
was seldom practiced. Dispersal of aircraft, supply dumps, and
servicing facilities was employed only rarely. In fact, at K-6, there
was not sufficient land to properly scatter installations and aircraft.
Defense of the southern sector was commanded from K-3 (Pohang),
the site of the TACC (Major Fred A. Steel). Marine Ground Control
Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1) was set up on the west coast at K-8 and
MGCIS-3 (Lieutenant Colonel Owen M. Hines), on the east coast, near
Pohang. Each of these intercept units had an early warning detachment
operating off the mainland. Antiaircraft artillery was provided by the
90mm AAA battalion, which was controlled, however, by EUSAK. The 1st
MAW commander specified a ready alert status for two aircraft during
daylight hours. Just before sunrise and sunset, four planes were put on
strip alert. Aircraft for night alert were provided by VMF(N)-513 until
April, when the requirement was withdrawn. By 30 June 1952, 1st MAW
air defense operations had destroyed a total of five enemy planes. The
F7F night fighters flown by VMF(N)-513, moreover, had frequently been
scrambled to intercept hostile night intruders that had penetrated into
the Seoul area, or northern sector.
This low kill rate did little to atone for the steadily increasing
number of Marine aircraft lost to enemy flak. Although the number
of friendly planes destroyed or damaged in air-to-air combat during
the latter half of Korean hostilities diminished sharply compared to
the early period, losses due to ground fire were reaching alarming
proportions in early and mid-1952. In May 1952 Navy and Marine air
losses to enemy action were twice the total for April, and the June
figure was even higher. By June, the Communists had massed more than
half of their antiaircraft artillery along communication routes that
FAF struck nearly every day.
Remedial action was soon taken. Stress on flak evasion was emphasized
in pilot briefings and debriefings. The MAG-33 intelligence section
came up with a program that attempted to reduce losses by a detailed
analysis of flak information. The originator of this system, First
Lieutenant Kenneth S. Foley, based his method on:
... photo interpretation of an up-to-date flak map, scale
1:50,000, and an intelligent utilization of flak reports
disseminated by the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the
5th Air Force. Frequent briefings were given to each squadron
on the enemy AA capabilities. Elaborate overlays were drawn up
and displayed. Target maps, clearly showing AA positions and
flak clocks [danger areas], were given to flight leaders to aid
them in evading known AA guns in their target area. Through flak
analysis, the safest route to the target area was determined
and an actual attack and retirement route was suggested. These
recommendations appeared in a flak summary presented at each
combat briefing.[104]
[104] VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Jun 52, App II, p. 5. Mention of a flak
analysis program first appeared in the March 1952 records
of MAG-33. Aircraft losses on interdiction strikes (the
program was not applicable to CAS missions) dropped
for the next several months. When Lieutenant Foley
transferred to the night squadron, he took his system
with him and had it put into operation there. LtCol
Kenneth S. Foley interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24
Mar 66.
Other measures attempted to reduce mounting losses of personnel
and aircraft. In all Marine air units, evasion and escape tactics
were stressed. In addition to the FAF de-emphasis on interdiction
of communication routes that had come about, in part, due to heavy
aircraft losses, Fifth Air Force decreed that beginning 3 June, “with
the exception of the AD and F4U aircraft [1st MAW types] only one run
will be made for each type of external ordnance carried and no strafing
runs will be made.”[105] CTF 77 ordered that in all attack runs,
aircraft would pull out by the 3,000-foot altitude level. The Marines,
combining their air and ground efforts, came up with a positive program
of their own. It was to become the first known instance of Marine
ground in support of Marine air.
[105] FAF CbtOps Notam No. 6-10.1 cited in App. 9, _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-199.
Although the originator of the idea cannot be positively identified,
the time that artillery flak suppression firing was first employed
can be traced back to late 1951, when the division was still in East
Korea.[106] It was not until June 1952, however, that a published
procedure for conducting flak suppression firing appeared in Marine
division records. That same month another type of flak suppression,
this by an aircraft, was utilized by the 1st Marines, commanded at the
time by Colonel Walter N. Flournoy. The procedure called for the FAC
[forward air controller] to relay gun positions to friendly strike
planes which temporarily diverted their attack to silence the located
gun. Although the method “worked with good results,”[107] it was not
destined to become the system adopted by the Marines.
[106] _Paid comments_; _Nihart comments_. Both of these
officers, the former artillery, the latter infantry,
recall flak suppression firing late in 1951 or early in
1952 when the division was on the eastern front. Colonel
Nihart pointed out, in addition, that “such expedients
and new tactics went on for some time before getting into
the regimental commander’s reports.”
[107] 1stMar ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.
The more frequently used flak suppression called for artillery to fire
on hostile gun positions that could impede the success of a friendly
close air support strike. Several Marine officers appear to have had
a major role in the development and employment of this technique.
Among them were Brigadier General Frank H. Lamson-Scribner, Assistant
Commanding General, 1st MAW; Colonel Henderson, the 11th Marines
commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Gerald T. Armitage, 3/1 commander.
The 1st Marines battalion commander explained how the system operated
in late spring 1952:
I was in an outpost watching an air strike. I asked Captain
Shoden [John C., the battalion forward air controller] to work
out some idea of flak suppression. Shoden, G-2, and others worked
two or three weeks to complete the first plot of antiaircraft
positions. My idea was to have a plane start a run and then pull
up before finishing the dive. The enemy antiaircraft gunners
could not tell that the pilot was pulling out at an extremely
high level. The batteries would fire and Marine observers would
plot their positions from their fires. Then, the Marine artillery
would lay a heavy barrage on these positions.[108]
[108] LtCol Gerald T. Armitage interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 15 Aug 61.
While observing an air strike from the Marine division sector,
General Lamson-Scribner noted that prior to the strike there had been
no preparatory firing on enemy antiaircraft artillery positions.
After the strike he discussed this matter with General Selden, who
“directed me to discuss with his chief of staff what I had observed
and my suggestions that division firepower for ‘flak suppression’ be
coordinated with air strikes.”[109] The upshot of this was that the
division chief of staff suggested that the 11th Marines regimental
commander and his staff members develop an SOP[110] for using artillery
flak suppression fires in support of close air support strikes. It was
believed that proper utilization of these fires would reduce aircraft
losses and further increase the opportunity for a successful close air
support mission by destruction of enemy antiaircraft weapons.[111]
[109] MajGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3
Div, HQMC, dtd 12 Oct 66.
[110] An SOP, standing operating procedure, is a set of
instructions for conducting operations that lend
themselves to established procedures. _JCS, JD_, p. 133.
[111] With respect to the effect of enemy fire on attack
aircraft, the CO, MAG-33 later commented that
“Antiaircraft artillery has a direct deterioration effect
on pilot accuracy, particularly with regard to care in
getting on target and doing a precise job.” CO, MAG-33
ltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 25 Jul 52, quoted in _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-76.
On 30 June 1952, the 11th Marines published the SOP. Since the
objective was to prevent enemy fire from interfering with friendly
strike planes, the key to the entire procedure was the precise
coordination of artillery fire with the delivery of aircraft ordnance.
As Colonel Henderson described the system:
When the infantry regiment received word of an air strike, the
air liaison officer plotted on the map ... the target of the
strike, the orbit point, the direction of approach, and the
altitude ... and direction of pullout. Then the artillery liaison
officer, by looking at the map, could determine which of the
Chinese positions could bring effective fire on the strike
aircraft. The artillery battalion had prearranged code names
and numbers for every antiaircraft position. All the artillery
liaison officer had to do was pick up the phone and tell the
F.D.C. [fire direction center] ‘flak suppression’ and read off
what targets he wanted covered.
These fires were then delivered on the request of a forward
observer who was with the forward air controller.... When there
was a forward air controller up in the front lines controlling
the strike, we would put a forward observer with him. When the
planes were ... ready to go, the F.O. [forward observer] got the
word ‘Batteries laid and loaded,’ and he would tell them to fire.
The minute the FO would get the word, ‘On the way,’ the forward
air controller would tell the planes to start their run. As a
result, we had cases where the planes were in their bombing run
within 30 seconds after the flak suppression was fired, which
meant that they were in on the target while the positions were
still neutralized. The question of control and split second
timing is of exceeding importance because the aircraft are going
300 to 400 miles an hour....[112]
[112] _Henderson ltr II._
Early in the program the MAG-12 commander reported that although the
flak suppression procedure was not flawless, it was proving “very
capable and workable.”[113] An indication of the success of 1st Marine
Division pioneering efforts in flak suppression is seen in the fact
that shortly after it was put into operation “there was a steady stream
of visitors to the 11th Marines CP to find out what [it was] and how
we were doing it and to get copies of our SOP.”[114] The procedure was
eventually adopted by other Eighth Army units.
[113] CO, MAG-12 Spdltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 2 Jul 52, Subj:
Comments on 11th Mar Flak Suppression SOP, cited in
_PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 5, Chap. 9, p. 9-78.
[114] _Henderson ltr II._
Marine air losses from hostile ground fire during CAS strikes
immediately began to drop from the June peak and never again reached
this level. In 124 close support sorties flown by 1st MAW on 13 August,
not one plane was shot down and only four received minor damage from
enemy flak. Although there were some complaints as to execution of the
flak suppression program these would be corrected, in the main, by a
revised procedure which the 11th Marines would undertake in the winter
of 1952.
_Spring 1952 on_ JAMESTOWN[115]
[115] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5,
Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr-Jun 52; 5thMar ComdDs,
Apr-Jun 52; 7thMar ComdD, Jun 52; 11thMar ComdDs, Apr-May
52; 1/5 ComdD May 52; 1/7, 2/7 ComdDs, May 52.
Earlier in the year the Marines had revised their estimate of enemy
capabilities after the lengthening of the division MLR by I Corps and
the subsequent heavy enemy attack. The re-evaluation placed the most
likely course of Chinese action as defending their present positions
with the 21 infantry battalions assigned and also cautioned that the
Communists could mount a limited objective attack at any time of their
choosing. Division intelligence estimated that the Chinese could muster
up to “57 infantry battalions supported by 12 artillery battalions
and 40 tanks and/or self-propelled guns” for a thrust into the Marine
sector.[116]
[116] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 52, p. 1.
The enemy, however, showed little disposition for any concerted ground
attack during the remainder of April. But before the month ended,
Marines, in conjunction with other I Corps divisions, had deluged the
enemy with artillery and tank fire in Operation CLOBBER. The purpose of
this shoot was to inflict maximum casualties and damage by employment
of the element of tactical surprise. The reinforced 11th Marines,
augmented for this occasion by Company D, 1st Tank Battalion and nine
of the battalion’s 105mm howitzer and flame tanks, blasted Chinese CPs,
bivouac areas, artillery and mortar positions, and observation posts.
Marine frontline regiments joined in with their organic mortars. Since
most of the firing took place at night when results were unobserved, no
estimate could be made as to the effect of the operation on the enemy.
A new Marine artillery tactic about this time was the
counter-counterbattery program instituted by the 11th Marines. The
regiment had developed this technique to counter superior enemy
artillery strength. This situation, as well as the fact that I Corps
artillery available to the division was considered inadequate for
counterbattery support, led the Marine division to adopt the new
program in May 1952. One provision required a battery in each battalion
to select counter-counterbattery positions and occupy them for 24
consecutive hours each week. Another proviso of the program was the
selection by each battalion of 10 roving gun positions that were to
be occupied by a single weapon rotated to each place at least once
weekly. By these tactics, the artillery regiment hoped not only to
mislead the Chinese in their estimate of the strength and location of
Marine artillery but also to dilute enemy counterbattery intelligence
by causing him to fire into areas just vacated by friendly guns. “The
effectiveness of the program was demonstrated on numerous occasions
when the enemy fired counterbattery into unoccupied positions.”[117] An
added advantage was that of providing deeper supporting fires on target
areas.[118]
[117] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-51.
[118] LtCol Bruce F. Hillam comments on draft MS, dtd 31 Aug 66.
Still another concept regarding the employment of artillery developed
during the early days of the JAMESTOWN defense. The 11th Marines had
advised the infantry regiments that it could effectively fire on
enemy troops attacking friendly positions if the Marines had overhead
cover. The idea was to use variable time (VT) fuzes[119] with the
standard high explosive (HE) shells. Artillery battalions supporting
the frontline regiments registered on positions occupied frequently by
patrols going forward from JAMESTOWN.
[119] A type of proximity fuze, the V.T. depends upon an
external source, such as an electronic signal, rather
than the force of ground impact, to detonate the shell at
a predetermined height over the target.
According to the recollections of veteran artillery and infantrymen in
the division, the first occasion that pre-planned artillery fire was
placed on friendly positions occurred in May 1952.[120] The episode
involved a 2/7 platoon patrol that late on 18 May was ordered to return
to the MLR from an outpost on the former OPLR. Operating forward of the
center regimental sector,[121] the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant
Theodore H. Watson, directed that two of the three Marine squads return
to the MLR. The remaining unit, surrounded by about 50 Chinese, engaged
them in a brisk fire fight.
[120] 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 4.
[121] The 7th Marines advanced to the line to relieve the 5th
Marines in the center sector on 11 May.
When the artillery fired to seal off the enemy and box-in the defensive
position failed to discourage the hostile force, Lieutenant Watson
ordered his men into the shelter of two nearby bunkers. He then
requested the artillery to place VT directly over his positions.[122]
The volleys of overhead fire and effective Marine small arms fire then
forced the enemy to call off his assault. Although the exact number
of Chinese casualties could not be determined, the new fire technique
fully accomplished its purpose--repelling the enemy force.
[122] The artillery regiment had earlier developed the
“box-me-in” fires for outpost defense. If under heavy
attack the outpost could call for these pre-planned
close-in fires that completely surrounded the position.
In event of radio or wire communication failures, the
outpost could call for “box-me-in” or “Fire VT on my
position” by signal flare or other pyrotechnic device.
_Henderson ltr II._
Initiating the infantry action in May was the 1st KMC Regiment, holding
the division left flank, with its 2d and 1st Battalions on line. At
dusk on 3 May a platoon-size raiding party, under Second Lieutenant
Kim Young Ha, left an outpost forward of the 1st Battalion line on a
prisoner-taking mission and headed for the objective, Hill 34, adjacent
to the rail line to Kaesong and about a half-mile west of the Sachon
River. When the platoon was within approximately 1,000 yards of its
goal, a support squad was detached near a trail and stream juncture to
ambush any enemy attempting to attack the raiders from the rear.[123]
The remainder of the platoon, two assault squads, then continued
towards the objective, moving cautiously and halting for an hour
because of the bright moonlight.
[123] This support squad itself was later ambushed. The
heavy casualties it received prevented its further
participation in the raid. KMC Regt UnitRpt 53, dtd 4 May
52.