[Illustration: KOREA]
[Illustration: WESTERN KOREAN FRONT
SITES OF MAJOR OUTPOST BATTLES
1952–53]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME V
_Operations in West Korea_
by
LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAT MEID, USMCR
and
MAJOR JAMES M. YINGLING, USMC
[Illustration]
Historical Division
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C., 1972
Preceding Volumes of
_U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_
Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter”
Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Campaign”
Volume III, “The Chosin Reservoir Campaign”
Volume IV, “The East-Central Front”
Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 55-60727
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402--Price $4.50 (Cloth)
Stock Number 0855-0059
Foreword
Mention the Korean War and almost immediately it evokes the memory of
Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl. Americans
everywhere remember the Marine Corps’ combat readiness, courage, and
military skills that were largely responsible for the success of these
early operations in 1950–1951. Not as dramatic or well-known are the
important accomplishments of the Marines during the latter part of the
Korean War.
In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division redeployed from the East-Central
front to West Korea. This new sector, nearly 35 miles in length,
anchored the far western end of I Corps and was one of the most
critical of the entire Eighth Army line. Here the Marines blocked
the enemy’s goal of penetrating to Seoul, the South Korean capital.
Northwest of the Marine Main Line of Resistance, less than five miles
distant, lay Panmunjom, site of the sporadic truce negotiations.
Defense of their strategic area exposed the Marines to continuous and
deadly Communist probes and limited objective attacks. These bitter and
costly contests for key outposts bore such names as Bunker Hill, the
Hook, the Nevadas (Carson-Reno-Vegas), and Boulder City. For the ground
Marines, supported by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons, the fighting
continued until the last day of the war, 27 July 1953.
The Korean War marked the first real test of Free World solidarity in
the face of Communist force. In repulsing this attempted Communist
aggression, the United Nations, led by the United States, served notice
that it would not hesitate to aid those nations whose freedom and
independence were under attack.
As events have subsequently proven, holding the line against Communist
encroachment is a battle whose end is not yet in sight. Enemy
aggression may explode brazenly upon the world scene, with an overt
act of invasion, as it did in Korea in June 1950, or it may take the
form of a murderous guerrilla war as it has more recently, for over a
decade, in Vietnam.
Whatever guise the enemy of the United States chooses or wherever he
draws his battleline, he will find the Marines with their age-old
answer. Today, as in the Korean era, Marine Corps readiness and
professionalism are prepared to apply the cutting edge against any
threat to American security.
[Illustration: (signature)]
L. F. CHAPMAN, JR.
_General, U.S. Marine Corps,_
_Commandant of the Marine Corps_
Reviewed and approved: 12 May 1971.
Preface
This is the concluding volume of a five-part series dealing with
operations of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and
27 July 1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations
of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during
1952–1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the division
operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) control in the
far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and squadrons
functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF).
The period covered by this history begins in March 1952, when the
Marine division moved west to occupy positions defending the approaches
to Seoul, the South Korean capital. As it had for most of the war the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, operating under FAF, flew close support
missions not only for the Marines but for as many as 19 other Allied
frontline divisions. Included in the narrative is a detailed account of
Marine POWs, a discussion of the new defense mission of Marine units
in the immediate postwar period, and an evaluation of Marine Corps
contributions to the Korean War.
Marines, both ground and aviation, comprised an integral part of the
United Nations Command in Korea. Since this is primarily a Marine Corps
history, actions of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force are presented
only in sufficient detail to place Marine operations in their proper
perspective.
Official Marine Corps combat records form the basis for the book. This
primary source material has been further supplemented by comments and
interviews from key participants in the action described. More than
180 persons reviewed the draft chapters. Their technical knowledge
and advice have been invaluable. Although the full details of these
comments could not be used in the text, this material has been placed
in Marine Corps archives for possible use by future historians.
The manuscript of this volume was prepared during the tenure of Colonel
Frank C. Caldwell, Director of Marine Corps History, Historical
Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Production was accomplished
under the direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Deputy Director and
Chief Historian, who also outlined the volume. Preliminary drafts
were written by the late Lynn Montross, prime author of this series,
and Major Hubard D. Kuokka. Major James M. Yingling researched and
wrote chapters 1–6 and compiled the Command and Staff List. Lieutenant
Colonel Pat Meid researched and wrote chapters 7–12, prepared
appendices, processed photographs and maps, and did the final editing
of the book.
Historical Division staff members, past or present, who freely lent
suggestions or provided information include Lieutenant Colonel John J.
Cahill, Captain Charles B. Collins, Mr. Ralph W. Donnelly, Mr. Benis
M. Frank, Mr. George W. Garand, Mr. Rowland P. Gill, Captain Robert J.
Kane, Major Jack K. Ringler, and Major Lloyd E. Tatem. Warrant Officer
Dennis Egan was Administrative Officer during the final stages of
preparation and production of this book.
The many exacting administrative duties involved in processing the
volume from first draft manuscripts through the final printed form,
including the formidable task of indexing the book, were handled
expertly and cheerfully by Miss Kay P. Sue. Mrs. Frances J. Rubright
also furnished gracious and speedy assistance in obtaining the tomes
of official Marine Corps records. The maps were prepared by Sergeants
Kenneth W. White and Ernest L. Wilson. Official Department of Defense
photographs illustrate the book.
A major contribution to the history was made by the Office of the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army; the Naval History
Division, Department of the Navy; and the Office of Air Force History,
Department of the Air Force. Military history offices of England,
Canada, and South Korea provided additional details that add to the
accuracy and interest of this concluding volume of the Korean series.
[Illustration: (signature)]
F. C. CALDWELL
_Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Director of Marine Corps History_
Contents
_Page_
I Operations in West Korea Begin 1
From Cairo to JAMESTOWN--The Marines’ Home in West
Korea--Organization of the 1st Marine Division
Area--The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing--The Enemy--Initial
CCF Attack--Subsequent CCF Attacks--Strengthening the
Line--Marine Air Operations--Supporting the Division
and the Wing--Different Area, Different Problem
II Defending the Line 51
UN Command Activities--Defense of East and West Coast
Korean Islands--Marine Air Operations--Spring 1952
on JAMESTOWN--End of the Second Year of War--A Long
Fourth of July--Changes in the Lineup--Replacement and
Rotation--Logistical Operations, Summer 1952
III The Battle of Bunker Hill 103
The Participants and the Battlefield--Preliminary
Action on Siberia--The Attack on Bunker
Hill--Consolidating the Defense of Bunker Hill--Company
B Returns to Bunker Hill--Supporting Arms at Bunker
Hill--In Retrospect
IV Outpost Fighting Expanded 145
From the Center Sector to the Right--Early September
Outpost Clashes--Korean COPs Hit Again--More Enemy
Assaults in Late September--Chinese Intensify Their
Outpost Attacks--More PRESSURE, More CAS, More
Accomplishments--Rockets, Resupply, and Radios
V The Hook 185
Before the Battle--Preparations for Attack
and Defense--Attack on the Hook--Reno
Demonstration--Counterattack--Overview
VI Positional Warfare 217
A Successful Korean Defense--Six Months on the UNC
Line--Events on the Diplomatic Front--The Marine
Commands During the Third Winter--1st MAW Operations
1952–1953--Behind the Lines--The Quiet Sectors--Changes
in the Concept of Ground Defense--Before the Nevadas
Battle
VII Vegas 263
The Nevada Cities--Supporting Arms--Defense
Organization at the Outposts--Chinese Attack on 26
March--Reinforcements Dispatched--Massed Counterattack
the Next Day--Push to the Summit--Other Communist
Probes--Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost--Vegas
Consolidation Begins--Aftermath
VIII Marking Time (April-June 1953) 313
The Peace Talks Resume--Operation LITTLE
SWITCH--Interval Before the Marines Go Off the
Line--The May Relief--Training While in Reserve
and Division Change of Command--Heavy May-June
Fighting--Developments in Marine Air--Other Marine
Defense Activities--The Division Is Ordered Back to the
Front
IX Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice 363
Relief of the 25th Division--Initial Attacks on
Outposts Berlin and East Berlin--Enemy Probes,
11–18 July--Marine Air Operations--Fall of the
Berlins--Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July--Last
Day of the War
X Return of the Prisoners of War 399
Operation BIG SWITCH--Circumstances of Capture--The
Communist POW Camps--CCF “Lenient Policy” and
Indoctrination Attempts--The Germ Warfare
Issue--Problems and Performance of Marine POWs--Marine
Escape Attempts--Evaluation and Aftermath
XI While Guns Cool 445
The Postwar Transition--Control of the DMZ and the
Military Police Company--Organization of New Defense
Positions--Postwar Employment of Marine Units in FECOM
XII Korean Reflection 475
Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean
War: Ground, Air, Helicopter--FMF and Readiness
Posture--Problems Peculiar to the Korean War--Korean
Lessons
Appendices
_Page_
A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 537
B Korean War Chronology 541
C Command and Staff List 549
D Effective Strength, 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing 573
E Marine Corps Casualties 575
F Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War 577
G Unit Citations (during 1952–1953 period) 579
H Armistice Agreement 587
Bibliography 611
Index 617
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs following pages 212 and 436
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
1 EUSAK Dispositions--15 March 1952 9
2 Western Korea--I Corps Sector--1952–1953 14
3 1st Marine Division Sector--30 April 1952 23
4 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Dispositions--30 April 1952 25
5 2/5 Sector--15–16 April 1952 35
6 West Coast Island Defense Element--Summer 1952 54
7 East Coast Island Defense Element--Summer 1952 57
8 Objectives for 1/5 Attack--9 May 1952 78
9 1st Marines Sector of JAMESTOWN (Division Center)--
8 August 1952 110
10 2/1 Sector--9–11 August 1952 115
11 Bunker Hill Area--2300, 12 August 1952 120
12 Combat Outposts and Ambush Sites--5th Marines Sector
(Division Right)--Early September 1952 151
13 Combat Outposts--KMC Sector (Division Left)--5–7
September 1952 154
14 7th Marines Sector (Division Right)--Early October 1952 164
15 “CCF Creeping Tactics”--March-October 1952 189
16 Hook Sector of MLR--1800, 26 October 1952 198
17 Hook Penetrations--26–27 October 1952 201
18 Outpost Reno Attacks--27 October 1952 204
19 CCF Attack Against KMC Sector (Division Left)--
31 October 1952 219
20 Organization of Ground Defense--Winter 1952–1953 252
21 Typical Hill Defense (Cross Section)--Winter 1952–1953 254
22 5th Marines MLR Sector--26 March 1953 266
23 1st Marines MLR Sector (Division Center)--26 March 1953 269
24 COP Carson--March 1953 272
25 COP Reno--March 1953 274
26 COP Vegas--March 1953 277
27 Attack on 5th Marines Front--26–30 March 1953 282
28 25th Infantry Division Sector (Following Relief of the
1st Marine Division)--5 May 1953 330
29 Eighth Army Sector--1 January-27 July 1953 343
30 7th Marines MLR Sector (Division Right)--Linear Defense--
19–20 July 1953 380
31 7th Marines MLR Sector--Defense-in-Depth--20–21 July 1953 382
32 7th Marines MLR Sector--Defense-in-Depth--22–23 July 1953 384
33 Eighth Army Front--27 July 1953 395
34 POW Camps in which Marines Were Held 417
35 1st Marine Division Post-Armistice Main Battle Position--
30 September 1953 462
CHAPTER I
Operations in West Korea Begin
_From Cairo to_ JAMESTOWN_--The Marines’ Home in West
Korea--Organization of the 1st Marine Division Area--The 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing--The Enemy--Initial CCF Attack--Subsequent CCF
Attacks--Strengthening the Line--Marine Air Operations--Supporting the
Division and the Wing--Different Area, Different Problem_
_From Cairo to_ JAMESTOWN[1]
[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1st Marine Division Staff Report,
titled “Notes for Major General J. T. Selden, Commanding
General, First Marine Division, Korea,” dtd 20 Aug 52,
hereafter Selden, _Div. Staff Rpt_; the four previous
volumes of the series _U.S. Marine Operations in Korea,
1950–1953_, namely, Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.
Canzona, _The Pusan Perimeter_, v. I; _The Inchon-Seoul
Operation_, v. II; _The Chosin Reservoir Campaign_, v.
III; Lynn Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and Maj Norman
W. Hicks, _The East-Central Front_, v. IV (Washington.
HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954–1962), hereafter Montross,
Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--Central Front_, v.
IV; Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S.
Military Academy, _Operations in Korea_ (West Point,
N.Y.: 1956), hereafter USMA, _Korea_; David Rees, _Korea:
The Limited War_ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964),
hereafter Rees, _Korea_, quoted with permission of the
publisher. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary
material cited is on file at, or obtainable through, the
Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps.
During the latter part of March 1952, the 1st Marine Division, a
component of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), pulled out of its
positions astride the Soyang River in east-central Korea and moved to
the far western part of the country in the I Corps sector. There the
Marines took over the EUSAK left flank, guarding the most likely enemy
approaches to the South Korean capital city, Seoul, and improving the
ground defense in their sector to comply with the strict requirements
which the division commander, Major General John T. Selden, had set
down. Except for a brief period in reserve, the Marine division would
remain in the Korean front lines until a cease-fire agreement in July
1953 ended active hostilities.
The division CG, Major General Selden,[2] had assumed command of the
25,000-man 1st Marine Division two months earlier, on 11 January, from
Major General Gerald C. Thomas while the Marines were still in the
eastern X Corps sector. The new Marine commander was a 37-year veteran
of Marine Corps service, having enlisted as a private in 1915, serving
shortly thereafter in Haiti. During World War I he was commissioned a
second lieutenant, in 1918, while on convoy duty. Between the two world
wars, his overseas service had included a second assignment to Haiti,
two China tours, and sea duty. When the United States entered World
War II, Lieutenant Colonel Selden was an intelligence officer aboard
the carrier _Lexington_. Later in the war Colonel Selden led the 5th
Marines in the New Britain fighting and was Chief of Staff of the 1st
Marine Division in the Peleliu campaign. He was promoted to brigadier
general in 1948 and received his second star in 1951, prior to his
combat assignment in Korea.
[2] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen John T. Selden, Mar 54.
American concern in the 1950s for South Korea’s struggle to preserve
its independence stemmed from a World War II agreement between the
United States, the United Kingdom, and China. In December 1943, the
three powers had signed the Cairo Declaration and bound themselves to
ensure the freedom of the Korean people, then under the yoke of the
Japanese Empire. At the Potsdam Conference, held on the outskirts of
Berlin, Germany in July 1945, the United States, China,[3] and Britain
renewed their Cairo promise.
[3] China did not attend. Instead, it received an advance
copy of the proposed text. President Chiang Kai-shek
signified Chinese approval on 26 July. A few hours
later, the Potsdam Declaration was made public. _Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo
and Teheran, 1943_ (Department of State publication
7187), pp. 448–449; _The Conference of Berlin (The
Potsdam Conference)_, 1945, v. II (Department of State
publication 7163), pp. 1278, 1282–1283, 1474–1476.
When the Soviet Union agreed to join forces against Japan, on 8 August,
the USSR also became a party to the Cairo Declaration. According to
terms of the Japanese capitulation on 11 August, the Soviets were to
accept surrender of the defeated forces north of the 38th Parallel in
Korea. South of that line, the commander of the American occupation
forces would receive the surrender. The Russians wasted no time and on
12 August had their troops in northern Korea. American combat units,
deployed throughout the Pacific, did not enter Korea until 8 September.
Then they found the Soviet soldiers so firmly established they even
refused to permit U.S. occupation officials from the south to cross
over into the Russian sector. A December conference in Moscow led to a
Russo-American commission to work out the postwar problems of Korean
independence.
Meeting for the first time in March 1946, the commission was
short-lived. Its failure, due to lack of Russian cooperation, paved
the way for politico-military factions within the country that set up
two separate Koreas. In the north the Communists, under Kim Il Sung,
and in the south the Korean nationalists, led by Dr. Syngman Rhee,
organized independent governments early in 1947. In May of that year,
a second joint commission failed to unify the country. As a result
the Korean problem was presented to the United Nations (UN). This
postwar international agency was no more successful in resolving the
differences between the disputing factions. It did, however, recognize
the Rhee government in December 1948 as the representative one of the
two dissident groups.
In June 1950, the North Koreans attempted to force unification of
Korea under Communist control by crossing the 38th Parallel with seven
infantry divisions heavily supported by artillery and tanks. Acting
on a resolution presented by the United States, the United Nations
responded by declaring the North Korean action a “breach of the peace”
and called upon its members to assist the South Koreans in ousting the
invaders. Many free countries around the globe offered their aid. In
the United States, President Harry S. Truman authorized the use of U.S.
air and naval units and, shortly thereafter, ground forces to evict the
aggressors and restore the status quo. Under the command of General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur, then Far East Commander, U.S. Eighth Army
occupation troops in Japan embarked to South Korea.
The first combat unit sent from America to Korea was a Marine
air-ground team, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed at Camp
Pendleton, California on 7 July 1950, under Brigadier General Edward
A. Craig. The same day the UN Security Council passed a resolution
creating the United Nations Command (UNC) which was to exercise
operational control over the international military forces rallying
to the defense of South Korea. The Council asked the United States to
appoint a commander of the UN forces; on the 8th, President Truman
named his Far East Commander, General MacArthur, as Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CinCUNC).
In Korea the Marines soon became known as the firemen of the Pusan
Perimeter, for they were shifted from one trouble spot to the next
all along the defensive ring around Pusan, the last United Nations
stronghold in southeastern Korea during the early days of the fighting.
A bold tactical stroke planned for mid-September was designed to
relieve enemy pressure on Pusan and weaken the strength of the North
Korean People’s Army (NKPA). As envisioned by General MacArthur, an
amphibious landing at Inchon on the west coast, far to the enemy rear,
would threaten the entire North Korean position south of the 38th
Parallel. To help effect this coup, the UN Commander directed that the
Marine brigade be pulled out of the Pusan area to take part in the
landing at Inchon.
MacArthur’s assault force consisted of the 1st Marine Division, less
one of its three regiments,[4] but including the 1st Korean Marine
Corps (KMC) Regiment. Marine ground and aviation units were to assist
in retaking Seoul, the South Korean capital, and to cut the supply line
sustaining the NKPA divisions.
[4] The 7th Marines was on its way to Korea at the time of
the Inchon landing. The brigade, however, joined the 1st
Division at sea en route to the objective to provide
elements of the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT).
On 15 September, Marines stormed ashore on three Inchon beaches.
Despite difficulties inherent in effecting a landing there,[5] it
was an outstandingly successful amphibious assault. The 1st and 5th
Marines, with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) assault squadrons
providing close air support, quickly captured the port city of Inchon,
Ascom City[6] to the east, and Kimpo Airfield. Advancing eastward the
Marines approached the Han River that separates Kimpo Peninsula from
the Korean mainland. Crossing this obstacle in amphibian vehicles,
1st Division Marines converged on Seoul from three directions. By
27 September, the Marines had captured the South Korean government
complex and, together with the U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division, had
severed the enemy’s main supply route (MSR) to Pusan. In heavy, close
fighting near the city, other United Nations troops pursued and cut off
major units of the NKPA.
[5] For a discussion of the hardships facing the
landing force, see Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops
Korea--Inchon_, v. II, _op. cit._, pp. 41–42, 59–60,
62–64.
[6] In World War II, the Japanese developed a logistical base
east of Inchon. When the Japanese surrendered, the Army
Service Command temporarily took over the installation,
naming it Ascom City. Maj Robert K. Sawyer, _Military
Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War_ (Washington:
OCMH, DA, 1962), p. 43_n_.
Ordered back to East Korea, the Marine division re-embarked at Inchon
in October and made an administrative landing at Wonsan on the
North Korean coast 75 miles above the 38th Parallel. As part of the
U.S. X Corps, the 1st Marine Division was to move the 5th and 7th
Marines (Reinforced) to the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir, from
where they were to continue the advance northward toward the North
Korean-Manchurian border. The 1st Marines and support troops were to
remain in the Wonsan area.
While the bulk of the division moved northward, an unforeseen
development was in the making that was to change materially the
military situation in Korea overnight. Aware that the North Koreans
were on the brink of military disaster, Communist China had decided
to enter the fighting. Nine Chinese divisions had been dispatched
into the area with the specific mission of destroying the 1st Marine
Division.[7] Without prior warning, on the night of 27 November, hordes
of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF, or “Chinese People’s Volunteers” as
they called themselves) assaulted the unsuspecting Marines and nearly
succeeding in trapping the two Marine regiments. The enemy’s failure
to do so was due to the military discipline and courage displayed by
able-bodied and wounded Marines alike, as well as effective support
furnished by Marine aviation. Under conditions of great hardship, the
division fought its way out over 78 miles of frozen ground from Chosin
to the port of Hungnam, where transports stood by to evacuate the weary
men and the equipment they had salvaged.
[7] Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops Korea--Chosin_, v. III,
p. 161.
This Chinese offensive had wrested victory from the grasp of General
MacArthur just as the successful completion of the campaign seemed
assured. In the west, the bulk of the Eighth Army paced its withdrawal
with that of the X Corps. The UNC established a major line of defense
across the country generally following the 38th Parallel. On Christmas
Day, massed Chinese forces crossed the parallel, and within a week the
UN positions were bearing the full brunt of the enemy assault. Driving
southward, the Communists recaptured Seoul, but by mid-February 1951
the advance had been slowed down, the result of determined Eighth Army
stands from a series of successive defensive lines.[8]
[8] On 9 January 1951, General MacArthur was “directed to
defend himself in successive positions, inflicting
maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea subject to the
primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his
basic mission of protecting Japan.” Carl Berger, _The
Korea Knot--A Military-Political History_ (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 131–132,
hereafter Berger, _Korea Knot_, quoted with permission of
the publisher.
Following its evacuation from Hungnam, the 1st Marine Division early
in 1951 underwent a brief period of rehabilitation and training in
the vicinity of Masan, west of Pusan. From there, the division moved
northeast to an area beyond Pohang on the east coast. Under operational
control of Eighth Army, the Marines, with the 1st Korean Marine Corps
Regiment attached for most of the period, protected 75 miles of a
vital supply route from attack by bands of guerrillas. In addition,
the Marines conducted patrols to locate, trap, and destroy the enemy.
The Pohang guerrilla hunt also provided valuable training for several
thousand recently arrived Marine division replacements.
In mid-February the 1st Marine Division was assigned to the U.S. IX
Corps, then operating in east-central Korea near Wonju. Initially
without the KMCs,[9] the Marine division helped push the corps line
across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. On 22 April, the Chinese
unleashed a gigantic offensive, which again forced UN troops back into
South Korea. By the end of the month, however, the Allies had halted
the 40-mile-wide enemy spring offensive.
[9] The 1st KMC Regiment was again attached to the Marine
Division on 17 March 1951 and remained under its
operational control for the remainder of the war.
CinCPacFlt Interim Evaluation Rpt No. 4, Chap 9, p. 9-53,
hereafter _PacFlt EvalRpt_ with number and chapter.
Once again, in May, the Marine division was assigned to the U.S. X
Corps, east of the IX Corps sector. Shortly thereafter the Communists
launched another major offensive. Heavy casualties inflicted by UNC
forces slowed this new enemy drive. Marine, Army, and Korean troops
not only repelled the Chinese onslaught but immediately launched a
counteroffensive, routing the enemy back into North Korea until the
rough, mountainous terrain and stiffening resistance conspired to slow
the Allied advance.
In addition to these combat difficulties, the Marine division began
to encounter increasing trouble in obtaining what it considered
sufficient and timely close air support (CAS). Most attack and fighter
aircraft of the 1st MAW, commanded by Major General Field Harris[10]
and operating since the Chosin Reservoir days under Fifth Air Force
(FAF), had been employed primarily in a program of interdicting North
Korean supply routes. Due to this diversion of Marine air from its
primary CAS mission, both the division and wing suffered--the latter
by its pilots’ limited experience in performing precision CAS sorties.
Despite the difficulties, the Marine division drove northward reaching,
by 20 June, a grotesque scooped-out terrain feature on the east-central
front appropriately dubbed the Punchbowl.
[10] Command responsibility of 1st MAW changed on 29 May
51 when Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman succeeded
General Harris.
Eighth Army advances into North Korea had caused the enemy to
reappraise his military situation. On 23 June, the Russian delegate to
the United Nations, Jacob Malik, hinted that the Korean differences
might be settled at the conference table. Subsequently, United Nations
Command and Communist leaders agreed that truce negotiations would
begin on 7 July at Kaesong, located in West Korea immediately south of
the 38th Parallel, but under Communist control. The Communists broke
off the talks on 22 August. Without offering any credible evidence,
they declared that UNC aircraft had violated the neutrality zone
surrounding the conference area.[11] Military and political observers
then realized that the enemy’s overture to peace negotiations had
served its intended purpose of permitting him to slow his retreat,
regroup his forces, and prepare his ground defenses for a new
determined stand.
[11] The Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations
Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Commission,
Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, has described how the
Communists in Korea concocted incidents “calculated to
provide advantage for their negotiating efforts or for
their basic propaganda objectives, or for both.” Examples
of such duplicity are given in Chapter IV of his book,
_How Communists Negotiate_ (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1955), hereafter Joy, _Truce Negotiations_,
quoted with permission of the publisher. The quote above
appears on p. 30.
The lull in military offensive activity during the mid-1951 truce talks
presaged the kind of warfare that would soon typify the final phase
of the Korean conflict. Before the fighting settled into positional
trench warfare reminiscent of World War I, the Marines participated
in the final UN offensive. In a bitter struggle, the division hacked
its way northward through, over, and around the Punchbowl, and in
September 1951 occupied a series of commanding terrain positions that
became part of the MINNESOTA Line, the Eighth Army main defensive line.
Beginning on the 20th of that month, it became the primary mission of
frontline units to organize, construct, and defend positions they held
on MINNESOTA. To show good faith at the peace table, the UNC outlawed
large-scale attacks against the enemy. Intent upon not appearing
the aggressor and determined to keep the door open for future truce
negotiations, the United Nations Command in late 1951 decreed a new
military policy of limited offensives and an aggressive defense of
its line. This change in Allied strategy, due to politico-military
considerations, from a moving battle situation to stabilized warfare
would affect both the tactics and future of the Korean War.
Even as Allied major tactical offensive operations and the era
of fire and maneuver in Korea was passing into oblivion, several
innovations were coming into use. One was the Marine Corps employment
of helicopters. First used for evacuation of casualties from Pusan
in August 1950, the versatile aircraft had also been adopted by the
Marine brigade commander, General Craig, as an airborne jeep. On
13 September 1951, Marines made a significant contribution to the
military profession when they introduced helicopters for large-scale
resupply combat operations. This mission was followed one week later
by the first use of helicopters for a combat zone troop lift. These
revolutionary air tactics were contemporary with two new Marine Corps
developments in ground equipment--body armor and insulated combat
boots, which underwent extensive combat testing that summer and fall.
The latter were to be especially welcomed for field use during the
1951–1952 winter.
Along the MINNESOTA Line, neither the freezing cold of a Korean winter
nor blazing summer heat altered the daily routine. Ground defense
operations consisted of dispatching patrols and raiding parties,
laying ambushes, and improving the physical defenses. The enemy seemed
reluctant to engage UN forces, and on one occasion to draw him into
the open, EUSAK ordered Operation CLAM-UP across the entire UN front,
beginning 10 February. Under cover of darkness, reserve battalions
moved forward; then, during daylight, they pulled back, simulating a
withdrawal of the main defenses. At the same time, frontline troops had
explicit orders not to fire or even show themselves.[12]
[12] Col Franklin B. Nihart comments on draft MS, Sep 66,
hereafter _Nihart comments_.
[Illustration:
MAP 1 K. WHITE
EUSAK DISPOSITIONS
15 MARCH 1952]
It was hoped that the rearward movement of units from the front line
and the subsequent inactivity there would cause the enemy to come out
of his trenches to investigate the apparent large-scale withdrawal of
UNC troops. Then Marine and other EUSAK troops could open fire and
inflict maximum casualties from covered positions. On the fifth day of
the operation, CLAM-UP was ended. The North Koreans were lured out of
their defenses, but not in the numbers expected. CLAM-UP was the last
action in the X Corps sector for the 1st Marine Division, which would
begin its cross-country relocation the following month. (See Map 1.)
Code-named Operation MIXMASTER, the transfer of the 1st Marine Division
began on 17 March when major infantry units began to move out of their
eastern X Corps positions, after their relief on line by the 8th
Republic of Korea (ROK) Division. Regiments of the Marine division
relocated in the following order: the 1st KMCs, 1st, 7th, and 5th
Marines. The division’s artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, made
the shift by battalions at two-day intervals. In the motor march to
West Korea, Marine units traveled approximately 140 miles over narrow,
mountainous, and frequently mud-clogged primitive roads. Day and night,
division transport augmented by a motor transport battalion attached
from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) and one company from the
1st Combat Service Group (CSG) rolled through rain, snow, sleet, and
occasional good weather.
Marines employed 5,800 truck and DUKW (amphibious truck) loads to move
most of the division personnel, gear, and supplies. Sixty-three flatbed
trailers, 83 railroad cars, 14 landing ships, 2 transport aircraft, the
vehicles of 4 Army truck companies, as well as hundreds of smaller jeep
trailers and jeeps were utilized. The division estimated that these
carriers moved about 50,000 tons of equipment and vehicles,[13] with
some of the support units making as many as a dozen round trips. The
MIXMASTER move was made primarily by truck and by ship[14] or rail for
units with heavy vehicles.
[13] Marine commanders and staff officers involved in the
planning and execution of the division move were alarmed
at the amount of additional equipment that infantry units
had acquired during the static battle situation. Many
had become overburdened with “nice-to-have” items in
excess of actual T/E (Table of Equipment) allowances. Col
William P. Pala comments on draft MS, 5 Sep 66, hereafter
_Pala comments_.
[14] Heavy equipment and tracked vehicles were loaded aboard
LSDs and LSTs which sailed from Sokcho-ri to Inchon.
Impressive as these figures are, they almost pall in significance
compared with the meticulous planning and precision logistics required
by the week-long move. It was made, without mishap, over main routes
that supplied nearly a dozen other divisions on the EUSAK line and
thus had to be executed so as not to interfere with combat support.
Although the transfer of the 1st Marine Division from the eastern to
western front was the longest transplacement of any EUSAK division,
MIXMASTER was a complicated tactical maneuver that involved realignment
of UNC divisions across the entire Korean front. Some 200,000 men and
their combat equipment had to be relocated as part of a master plan to
strengthen the Allied front and deploy more troops on line.
Upon its arrival in West Korea, the 1st Marine Division was under
orders to relieve the 1st ROK Division and take over a sector at the
extreme left of the Eighth Army line, under I Corps control, where the
weaknesses of Kimpo Peninsula defenses had been of considerable concern
to EUSAK and its commander, General James A. Van Fleet. As division
units reached their new sector, they moved to locations pre-selected
in accordance with their assigned mission. First Marine unit into
the I Corps main defensive position, the JAMESTOWN Line, was the 1st
KMC Regiment attached to the division, with its organic artillery
battalion. The KMCs, as well as 1/11, began to move into their new
positions on 18 March. At 1400 on 20 March, the Korean Marines
completed the relief of the 15th Republic of Korea Regiment in the left
sector of the MLR (main line of resistance). Next into the division
line, occupying the right regimental sector adjacent to the 1st
Commonwealth Division, was Colonel Sidney S. Wade’s 1st Marines with
three battalions forward and 2/5 attached as the regimental reserve.
Relief of the 1st ROK Division was completed on the night of 24–25
March. At 0400 on 25 March the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
assumed responsibility for the defense of 32 miles of the JAMESTOWN
Line. That same date the remainder of the Marine artillery battalions
also relocated in their new positions.
As the division took over its new I Corps mission on 25 March, the
Marine commander had one regiment of the 1st ROK Division attached
as division reserve while his 5th Marines was still in the east.
Operational plans originally had called for the 5th Marines, less
a battalion, to locate in the Kimpo Peninsula area where it was
anticipated Marine reserve units would be able to conduct extensive
amphibious training. So overextended was the assigned battlefront
position that General Selden realized this regiment would also be
needed to man the line. He quickly alerted the 5th Marines commanding
officer, Colonel Thomas A. Culhane, Jr., to deploy his regiment, then
en route to western Korea, to take over a section of the JAMESTOWN
front line instead of assuming reserve positions at Kimpo as originally
assigned. General Selden believed that putting another regiment on the
main line was essential to carrying out the division’s mission, to
aggressively _defend_ JAMESTOWN Line, not merely to _delay_ a Communist
advance.
Only a few hours after the 5th Marines had begun its trans-Korea move,
helicopters picked up Colonel Culhane, his battalion commanders, and
key regimental staff officers and flew them to the relocated division
command post (CP) in the west. Here, on 26 March, the regimental
commander officially received the change in the 5th Marines mission.
Following this briefing, 5th Marines officers reconnoitered the newly
assigned area[15] while awaiting the arrival of their units. When
the regiment arrived on the 28th, plans had been completed for it
to relieve a part of the thinly-held 1st Marines line. On 29 March,
the 5th Marines took over the center regimental sector while the 1st
Marines, on the right regimental flank, compressed its ranks for a more
solid defense.
[15] Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 16 Sep 59, hereafter _Culhane ltr_.
Frontline units, from the west, were the 1st KMCs, the 5th, and
1st Marines. To the rear, the 7th Marines, designated as division
reserve, together with organic and attached units of the division,
had established an extensive support and supply area. As a temporary
measure, a battalion of the division reserve, 2/7, was detached for
defense of the Kimpo Peninsula pending a reorganization of forces in
this area. Major logistical facilities were the division airhead,
located at K-16 airfield, just southwest of Seoul, and the railhead at
Munsan-ni, 25 miles northwest of the capital city and about five miles
to the rear of the division sector at its nearest point. Forward of
the 1st Marine Division line, outposts were established to enhance the
division’s security. In the rear area the support facilities, secondary
defense lines, and unit command posts kept pace with development of
defensive installations on the MLR. Throughout the 1st Marine Division
sector outpost security, field fortifications, and the ground defense
net were thorough and intended to deny the enemy access to Seoul.
_The Marines’ Home in Western Korea_[16]
[16] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52; CIA, _NIS
41B_, South Korea, Chap I, Brief, Section 21, Military
Geographic Regions, Section 24, Topography (Washington:
1957–1962); Map, Korea, 1:50,000, AMS Series L 751,
Sheets 6526 I and IV, 6527 I, II, III, and IV, 6528 II
and III, 6627 III and IV, and 6628 III (prepared by the
Engineer, HQ, AFFE, and AFFE/8A, 1952–1954).
In western Korea, the home of the 1st Marine Division lay in a
particularly significant area. (See Map 2.) Within the Marine
boundaries ran the route that invaders through the ages had used in
their drive south to Seoul. It was the 1st Marine Division’s mission
to block any such future attempts. One of the reasons for moving the
Marines to the west[17] was that the terrain there had to be held at
all costs; land in the east, mountainous and less valuable, could
better be sacrificed if a partial withdrawal in Korea became necessary.
At the end of March 1952, the division main line of resistance
stretched across difficult terrain for more than 30 miles, from Kimpo
to the British Commonwealth sector on the east, a frontage far in
excess of the textbook concept.
[17] The two other reasons were the weakness of the Kimpo
defenses and abandonment of plans for an amphibious
strike along the east coast. Montross, Kuokka, and
Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p. 253. Planning for
a Marine-led assault had been directed by the EUSAK
commander, General Van Fleet, early in 1952. The Marine
division CG, General Selden, had given the task to his
intelligence and operations deputies, Colonel James H.
Tinsley and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle. On 12
March General Van Fleet came to the Marine Division CP
for a briefing on the proposed amphibious assault. At the
conclusion of the meeting the EUSAK commander revealed
his concern for a possible enemy attack down the Korean
west coast and told the Marine commander to prepare, in
utmost secrecy, to move his division to the west coast.
Lynn Montross, draft MS.
Although Seoul was not actually within the area of Marine Corps
responsibility, the capital city was only 33 air miles south of the
right limiting point of the division MLR and 26 miles southeast of the
left. The port of Inchon lay but 19 air miles south of the western
end of the division sector. Kaesong, the original site of the truce
negotiations, was 13 miles northwest of the nearest part of the 1st
Marine Division frontline while Panmunjom was less than 5 miles away
and within the area of Marine forward outpost security. From the far
northeastern end of the JAMESTOWN Line, which roughly paralleled the
Imjin River, distances were correspondingly lengthened: Inchon, thus
being 39 miles southwest and Kaesong, about 17 miles west.
[Illustration:
MAP 2 K. WHITE
WESTERN KOREA
I CORPS SECTOR 1952–1953]
The area to which the Marines had moved was situated in the western
coastal lowlands and highlands area of northwestern South Korea. On the
left flank, the division MLR hooked around the northwest tip of the
Kimpo Peninsula, moved east across the high ground overlooking the Han
River, and bent around the northeast cap of the peninsula. At a point
opposite the mouth of the Kongnung River, the MLR traversed the Han to
the mainland, proceeding north alongside that river to its confluence
with the Imjin. Crossing north over the Imjin, JAMESTOWN followed the
high ground on the east bank of the Sachon River for nearly two miles
to where the river valley widened. There the MLR turned abruptly to
the northeast and generally pursued that direction to the end of the
Marine sector, meandering frequently, however, to take advantage of key
terrain. Approximately 2½ miles west of the 1st Commonwealth Division
boundary, the JAMESTOWN Line intersected the 38th Parallel near the
tiny village of Madam-ni.
Within the Marine division sector to the north of Seoul lay the
junction of two major rivers, the Imjin and the Han, and a portion of
the broad fertile valley fed by the latter. Flowing into the division
area from the east, the Imjin River snaked its way southwestward to the
rear of JAMESTOWN. At the northeastern tip of the Kimpo Peninsula, the
Imjin joined the Han. The latter there changed its course from south to
west, flowed past Kimpo and neighboring Kanghwa-do Island, and emptied
eventually into the Yellow Sea. At the far western end of the division
sector the Yom River formed a natural boundary, separating Kanghwa and
Kimpo, as it ran into the Han River and south to the Yellow Sea. To
the east, the Sachon River streamed into the Imjin, while the Kongnung
emptied into the Han where the MLR crossed from the mainland to Kimpo.
In addition, two north-south oriented rivers flanked enemy positions
opposite the Marines and emptied into major rivers in the Marine
sector. Northwest of Kimpo, the Yesong River ran south to the Han; far
to the northeast, just beyond the March 1952 division right boundary,
the Samichon River flowed into the Imjin.
Although the rivers in the Marine division were navigable, they were
little used for supply or transportation. The railroads, too, were
considered secondary ways, for there was but one line, which ran north
out of Seoul to Munsan-ni and then continued towards Kaesong. Below the
division railhead, located at Munsan-ni, a spur cut off to Ascom City.
Roads, the chief means of surface transport, were numerous but lacked
sufficient width and durability for supporting heavy military traffic.
Within the sector occupied by the Marines, the main route generally
paralleled the railroad. Most of the existing roads south of JAMESTOWN
eventually found their way to the logistic center at Munsan-ni.
Immediately across the Imjin, the road net was more dense but not of
any better construction.
From the logistical point of view, the Imjin River was a critical
factor. Spanning it and connecting the division forward and rear
support areas in March 1952 were only three bridges, which were
vulnerable to river flooding conditions and possible enemy attack.
Besides intersecting the Marine sector, the Imjin formed a barrier to
the rear of much of the division MLR, thereby increasing the difficulty
of normal defense and resupply operations.
When the Marines moved to the west, the winter was just ending. It had
begun in November and was characterized by frequent light snowfalls
but otherwise generally clear skies. Snow and wind storms seldom
occurred in western Korea. From November to March the mean daily
minimum Fahrenheit readings ranged from 15° to 30° above zero. The
mean daily maximums during the summer were between the upper 70s and
mid-80s. Extensive cloud cover, fog, and heavy rains were frequent
during the summer season. Hot weather periods were also characterized
by occasional severe winds. Spring and fall were moderate transitional
seasons.
Steep-sided hills and mountains, which sloped abruptly into narrow
valleys pierced by many of the rivers and larger streams, predominated
the terrain in the I Corps sector where the Marines located. The
most rugged terrain was to the rear of the JAMESTOWN Line; six miles
northeast of the Munsan-ni railhead was a 1,948-foot mountain, far
higher than any other elevation on the Marine or Chinese MLR but lower
than the rear area peaks supporting the Communist defenses. Ground
cover in the division sector consisted of grass, scrub brush, and,
occasionally, small trees. Rice fields crowded the valley floors.
Mud flats were prevalent in many areas immediately adjacent to the
larger rivers which intersected the division territory or virtually
paralleled the east and western boundaries of the Marine sector.
The transfer from the Punchbowl in the east to western Korea thus
resulted in a distinct change of scene for the Marines, who went from
a rugged mountainous area to comparatively level terrain. Instead of
facing a line held by predominantly North Korean forces the division
was now confronted by the Chinese Communists. The Marines also went
from a front that had been characterized by lively patrol action to one
that in March 1952 was relatively dormant. With the arrival of the 1st
Marine Division, this critical I Corps sector would witness sharply
renewed activity and become a focal point of action in the UNC line.
_Organization of the 1st Marine Division Area_[18]
[18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv,
1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, Mar 52; 1st KMC
RCT Daily Intelligence and Operations Rpts, hereafter KMC
Regt UnitRpts, Mar 52; Kimpo ProvRegt ComdDs, hereafter
KPR ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.
“To defend” were the key words in the 1st Marine Division mission--“to
organize, occupy, and actively defend its sector of Line JAMESTOWN”--in
West Korea. General Selden’s force to prevent enemy penetration of
JAMESTOWN numbered 1,364 Marine officers, 24,846 enlisted Marines,
1,100 naval personnel, and 4,400 Koreans of the attached 1st KMC
Regiment. The division also had operational control of several I Corps
reinforcing artillery units in its sector. On 31 March, another major
infantry unit, the Kimpo Provisional Regiment (KPR) was organized. The
division then assumed responsibility for the Kimpo Peninsula defense on
the west flank with this Marine-Korean force.
A major reason for transfer of the 1st Marine Division to the west,
it will be remembered, had been the weakness of the Kimpo defense.
Several units, the 5th KMC Battalion, the Marine 1st Armored Amphibian
Battalion, and the 13th ROK Security Battalion (less one company), had
been charged with the protection of the peninsula. Their operations,
although coordinated by I Corps, were conducted independently. The
fixed nature of the Kimpo defenses provided for neither a reserve
maneuver element to help repel any enemy action that might develop nor
a single commander to coordinate the operations of the defending units.
These weaknesses become more critical in consideration of the type of
facilities at Kimpo and their proximity to the South Korean Capital.
Seoul lay just east of the base of Kimpo Peninsula, separated from it
only by the Han River. Located on Kimpo was the key port of Inchon and
two other vital installations, the logistical complex at Ascom City and
the Kimpo Airfield (K-14). All of these facilities were indispensable
to the United Nations Command.
To improve the security of Kimpo and provide a cohesive, integrated
defense line, CG, 1st Marine Division formed the independent commands
into the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. Colonel Edward M. Staab, Jr.,
was named the first KPR commander. His small headquarters functioned
in a tactical capacity only without major administrative duties. The
detachments that comprised the KPR upon its formation were:
Headquarters and Service Company, with regimental and company
headquarters and a communication platoon;
1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, as supporting artillery;
5th KMC Battalion;
13th ROK Security Battalion (-);
One battalion from the reserve regiment of the 1st Marine
Division (2/7), as the maneuver element;
Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion;
Company B, 1st Shore Party Battalion, as engineers;
Company D, 1st Medical Battalion;
Reconnaissance Company (-), 1st Marine Division;
Detachment, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 1st
Signal Battalion;
Detachment, 181st Counterintelligence Corps Unit, USA;
Detachment, 61st Engineer Searchlight Company, USA; and the
163rd Military Intelligence Service Detachment, USA.
The Kimpo Regiment, in addition to maintaining security of the division
left flank, was assigned the mission to “protect supporting and
communication installations in that sector against airborne or ground
attack.”[19] Within the division, both the artillery regiment and
the motor transport battalion were to be prepared to support tactical
operations of Colonel Staab’s organization.
[19] KPR ComdD, Mar 52, p. 13.
For defense purposes, the KPR commander divided the peninsula into
three sectors. The northern one was manned by the KMC battalion,
which occupied commanding terrain and organized the area for defense.
The southern part was defended by the ROK Army battalion, charged
specifically with protection of the Kimpo Airfield and containment of
any attempted enemy attack from the north. Both forces provided for
the security of supply and communication installations within their
areas. The western sector, held by the amphibian tractor company, less
two platoons, had the mission of screening traffic along the east bank
of the Yom River, that flanked the western part of the peninsula.
Providing flexibility to the defense plan was the maneuver unit, the
battalion assigned from the 1st Marine Division reserve.
The unit adjacent to the KPR[20] in the division line in late March
was the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which had been the first
division unit to deploy along JAMESTOWN. The KMC Regiment, command by
Colonel Kim Dong Ha,[21] had assumed responsibility for its portion of
JAMESTOWN at 0400 on 20 March with orders to organize and defend its
sector. The regiment placed two battalions, the 3d and 1st, on the MLR
and the 2d in the rear. Holding down the regimental right of the sector
was the 1st Battalion, which had shared its eastern boundary with that
of Colonel Wade’s 1st Marines until 29 March when the 5th Marines was
emplaced on the MLR between the 1st KMC and 1st Marines.
[20] The following month the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
would be added to the four regiments on line, making a
total of five major units manning the 1stMarDiv front. It
was inserted between the Kimpo and 1st KMC regiments.
[21] Commandant, Korean Marine Corps ltr to CMC, dtd 20 Sep
66, hereafter _CKMC ltr_.
The 1st Marines regimental right boundary, which on the MLR was 1,100
yards north of the 38th Parallel, separated the 1st Marine Division
area from the western end of the 1st Commonwealth Division, then held
by the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade. In late March, Colonel Wade’s
2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Thell H. Fisher) and 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel
Spencer H. Pratt) manned the frontline positions while 1/1 (Lieutenant
Colonel John H. Papurca), less Company A, was in reserve. The regiment
was committed to the defense of its part of the division area and
improvement of its ground positions. In the division center sector
Colonel Culhane’s 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart) and
3/5 (Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin) manned the left and
right battalion MLR positions, with 2/5 (Lieutenant Colonel William
H. Cushing) in reserve. The latter unit was to be prepared either to
relieve the MLR battalions or for use as a counterattack force.
It did not take the Marines long to discover the existence of serious
flaws in the area defense which made it questionable whether the Allied
line here could have successfully withstood an enemy attack. While
his Marine units were effecting their relief of JAMESTOWN, Colonel
Wade noted that “field fortifications were practically nonexistent in
some sections.”[22] General Selden later pointed out that “populated
villages existed between opposing lines. Farmers were cultivating
their fields in full view of both forces. Traffic across the river was
brisk.”[23] A member of the division staff reported that there was
“even a school operating in one area ahead of the Marine lines.”[24]
In addition to these indications of sector weakness, there was still
another. Although the ROK division had placed three regiments in the
line, when the two Marine regiments relieved them there were then more
men on JAMESTOWN due to the greater personnel strength of a Marine
regiment. Nevertheless, the division commander was still appalled at
the width of the defense sector assigned to so few Marines.
[22] 1stMar ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.
[23] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App IX, p. 1.
[24] LtCol Harry W. Edwards comments on preliminary draft MS,
_ca._ Sep 59.
At division level, the reserve mission was filled by Colonel Russell
E. Honsowetz’, 7th Marines, minus 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Noel C.
Gregory), which on 30 March became the maneuver force for the Kimpo
Regiment. As the division reserve, the regiment was to be prepared
to assume at any time either a defensive or offensive mission of any
of the frontline regiments. In addition, the reserve regiment was
to draw up counterattack plans, protect the division rear, improve
secondary line defenses, and conduct training, including tank-infantry
coordination, for units in reserve. The 7th Marines, with 3/7
(Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff) on the left and 1/7 (Lieutenant
Colonel George W. E. Daughtry) on the right, was emplaced in the
vicinity of the secondary defense lines, WYOMING and KANSAS, to the
rear of the 5th and 1st Marines.
Another regiment located in the rear area was the 11th Marines. Its
artillery battalions had begun displacement on 17 March and completed
their move by 25 March. Early on the 26th, the 11th Marines resumed
support of the 1st Marine Division. While the Marine artillery had been
en route, U.S. Army artillery from I Corps supported the division. With
the arrival on the 29th of the administrative rear echelon, the Marine
artillery regiment was fully positioned in the west.
For Colonel Frederick P. Henderson, who became the division artillery
commander on 27 March, operational problems in western Korea differed
somewhat from those experienced in the east by his predecessor,
Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill. The most critical difficulty, however, was
the same situation that confronted General Selden--the vast amount
of ground to be covered and defended, and the insufficient number of
units to accomplish this mission. To the artillery, the wide division
front resulted in spreading the available fire support dangerously
thin. Placement of 11th Marines units to best support the MLR
regiments created wide gaps between each artillery battalion, caused
communication and resupply difficulties, prevented a maximum massing of
fires, and made redeployment difficult.[25]
[25] Col Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 25 Aug 59, hereafter _Henderson ltr I_.
In making use of all available fire support, the artillery regiment
had to guard not only against the duplication of effort in planning
or delivery of fires, but also against firing in the Panmunjom peace
corridor restricted areas, located near the sector held by the Marine
division’s center regiment. Moreover, the artillerymen had to maintain
a flexibility sufficient to place the weight of available fire support
on call into any zone of action.
Other difficulties were more directly associated with the nature of
the sector rather than with its broad expanse. The positioning of the
division in the west, although close to the coast, put the Marines
beyond the range of protective naval gunfire. The sparse and inadequate
road net further aggravated the tactical and logistical problems caused
by wide separation of units. Finally, the cannoneers had exceptionally
heavy demands placed on them due to the restricted amount of close air
support allocated to frontline troops under operational procedures
employed by Fifth Air Force. This command had jurisdiction over the
entire Korean air defense system, including Marine squadrons.
Manning the main line of resistance also frequently presented
perplexing situations to the infantry. There had been little time for
a thorough reconnaissance and selection of positions by any of the
frontline regiments. When the 1st Marines moved into its assigned
position on the MLR, the troops soon discovered many minefields, “some
marked, some poorly marked, and some not marked at all.”[26] Uncharted
mines caused the regiment to suffer “some casualties the first night
of our move and more the second and third days.”[27] As it was to turn
out, during the first weeks in the I Corps sector, mines of all types
caused 50 percent of total Marine casualties.
[26] Col Sidney S. Wade ltr to Deputy AsstCofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd
25 Aug 59.
[27] _Ibid._
A heavy drain on the limited manpower of Marine infantry regiments
defending JAMESTOWN was caused by the need to occupy an additional
position, an outpost line of resistance (OPLR). This defensive line to
the front of the Marine MLR provided additional security against the
enemy, but decreased the strength of the regimental reserve battalion,
which furnished the OPLR troops. The outposts manned by the Marines
consisted of a series of strongpoints built largely around commanding
terrain features that screened the 1st Marine Division area. The OPLR
across the division front was, on the average, about 2,500 yards
forward of the MLR. (See Map 3.)
To the rear of the main line were two secondary defensive lines,
WYOMING and KANSAS. Both had been established before the Marines
arrived and both required considerable work, primarily construction
of bunkers and weapons emplacements, to meet General Selden’s strict
requirement for a strong defensive sector. Work in improving the lines,
exercises in rapid battalion tactical deployment by helicopter, and
actual manning of the lines were among the many tasks assigned to the
division reserve regiment.
[Illustration:
MAP 3 K. White
1st MARINE DIVISION SECTOR
30 APRIL 1952]
Rear and frontline units alike found that new regulations affected
combat operations with the enemy in West Korea. These restrictions were
a result of the truce talks that had taken place first at Kaesong and,
later, at Panmunjom. In line with agreements reached in October 1951:
Panmunjom was designated as the center of a circular neutral zone
of a 1,000 yard radius, and a three mile radius around Munsan and
Kaesong was also neutralized, as well as two hundred meters on
either side of the Kaesong-Munsan road.[28]
[28] Rees, _Korea_, p. 295.
To prevent the occurrence of any hostile act within this sanctuary,
Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel, I Corps commander, ordered
that an additional area, forward of the OPLR, be set aside. This
megaphone-shaped zone “could not be fired into, out of, or over.”[29]
It was adjacent to the OPLR in the division center regimental sector,
near its left boundary, and took a generally northwest course.
Marines reported that the Communists knew of this restricted zone and
frequently used it for assembly areas and artillery emplacements.
[29] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52, p. 7.
_The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing_[30]
[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Mar 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.
When the 1st Marine Division moved to western Korea in March 1952, the
two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units that had been in direct support
of the ground Marines also relocated. Marine Observation Squadron
6 (VMO-6) and Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161)
completed their displacements by 24 March from their eastern airfield
(X-83) to sites in the vicinity of the new division CP. HMR-161, headed
by Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon, set up headquarters at A-17,[31] on a
hillside 3½ miles southeast of Munsan-ni, the division railhead, “using
a couple of rice paddies as our L. Z. (Landing Zone).”[32] The squadron
rear echelon, including the machine shops, was maintained at A-33, near
Ascom City. About 2½ miles south of the helicopter forward site was an
old landing strip, A-9, which Lieutenant Colonel William T. Herring’s
observation squadron used as home field for its fixed and rotary wing
aircraft. (For location of 1st MAW units see Map 4.) In West Korea,
VMO-6 and HMR-161 continued to provide air transport for tactical and
logistical missions. Both squadrons were under operational control of
the division, but administered by the wing.
[31] In Korea, fields near U.S. Army installations were known
as “A”; major airfields carried a “K” designation; and
auxiliary strips were the “X” category.
[32] MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon comments on draft MS, dtd 1
Sep 66.
Commanding General of the 1st MAW, since 27 July 1951, was Major
General Christian F. Schilt,[33] a Marine airman who had brought to
Korea a vast amount of experience as a flying officer. Entering the
Marine Corps in June 1917, he had served as an enlisted man with the
1st Marine Aeronautical Company in the Azores during World War I.
Commissioned in 1919, he served in a variety of training and overseas
naval air assignments. As a first lieutenant in Nicaragua, he had
been awarded the Medal of Honor in 1928 for his bravery and “almost
superhuman skill” in flying out Marines wounded at Quilali.[34] During
World War II, General Schilt had served as 1st MAW Assistant Chief of
Staff, at Guadalcanal, was later CO of Marine Aircraft Group 11, and
participated in the consolidation of the Southern Solomons and air
defense of Peleliu and Okinawa.
[33] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of General Christian F. Schilt,
USMC (Ret.), Jun 59 rev.
[34] Robert Sherrod, _History of Marine Corps Aviation in
World War II_ (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952), p.
26, hereafter Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_.
[Illustration:
MAP 4 E. WILSON
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING DISPOSITIONS
30 APRIL 1952]
As in past months, the majority of General Schilt’s Marine aircraft
in Korea during March 1952 continued to be under operational control
of Fifth Air Force. In turn, FAF was the largest subordinate command
of Far East Air Forces (FEAF), headquartered at Tokyo. The latter was
the U.S. Air Force component of the Far East Command and encompassed
all USAF installations in the Far East. The FAF-EUSAK Joint Operations
Center (JOC) at Seoul coordinated and controlled all Allied air
operations in Korea. Marine fighter and attack squadrons were employed
by FAF to:
Maintain air superiority.
Furnish close support for ground units.
Provide escort [for attack aircraft].
Conduct day and night reconnaissance and fulfill requests.
Effect the complete interdiction of North Korean and Chinese
Communist forces and other military targets that have an
immediate effect upon the current tactical situation.[35]
[35] 1st MAW ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.
Squadrons carrying out these assignments were attached to Marine
Aircraft Groups (MAGs) 12 and 33. Commanded by Colonel Luther S.
Moore, MAG-12 and its two day attack squadrons (VMF-212 and VMF-323)
in March 1952 was still located in eastern Korea (K-18, Kangnung).
The Marine night-fighters of VMF(N)-513 were also here as part of
the MAG-12 group. Farther removed from the immediate battlefront was
Colonel Martin A. Severson’s MAG-33, located at K-3 (Pohang), with its
two powerful jet fighter squadrons (VMFs-115 and -311) and an attack
squadron (VMA-121). A new MAG-33 unit was Marine Photographic Squadron
1 (VMJ-1), just formed in February 1952 and commanded by Major Robert
R. Read.
In addition to its land-based squadrons, one 1st MAW unit was assigned
to Commander, West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group, designated
Commander, Task Group 95.1 (CTG 95.1). He in turn assigned this
Marine unit to Commander, Task Element 95.11 (CTE 95.11), whose ships
comprised the West Coast Carrier Element. Marine Attack Squadron
312 (VMA-312) was at this time assigned to CTE 95.11. In late March
squadron aircraft were based on the escort carrier USS _Bairoko_ but
transferred on 21 April to the light carrier _Bataan_.[36] Operating
normally with a complement of 21 F4U-4 propeller-driven Corsair
aircraft, VMA-312 had the following missions:
To conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea
from the United Nations front lines northward to latitude 39°/15´
N.
Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haeju-Chinnampo
region.[37]
Provide air spot services to naval units on request.
Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services
as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).
Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of
opportunity at discretion.
Be prepared to provide combat air patrol to friendly naval forces
operating off the West Coast of Korea.
Render SAR [search and rescue] assistance.
[36] Unit commanders also changed about this time. Lieutenant
Colonel Robert E. Smith, Jr. assumed command of the
Checkerboard squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Joe H.
McGlothlin, on 9 April.
[37] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-75. The Haeju-Chinnampo
region, noted in the surveillance mission, is a coastal
area in southwestern North Korea between the 38th and
39th Parallels.
Because they were under operational control of Fifth Air Force, 1st
MAW flying squadrons, except those assigned to CTG 95.1 and 1st Marine
Division control, did not change their dispositions in March. Plans
were under way at this time, however, to relocate one of the aircraft
groups, MAG-12, to the west.
On 30 March the ground element of the night-fighters redeployed from
its east coast home field to K-8 (Kunsan), on the west coast, 105
miles south of Seoul. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Burnett’s VMF (N)-513
completed this relocation by 11 April without loss of a single day of
flight operations. On 20 April the rest of MAG-12,[38] newly commanded
since the first of the month by Colonel Elmer T. Dorsey, moved to
K-6 (Pyongtaek), located 30 miles directly south of the South Korean
capital.
[38] VMFs-212 (LtCol Robert L. Bryson) and -323 (LtCol
Richard L. Blume) left an east coast field for a flight
mission over North Korea and landed at K-6 thereafter,
also completing the move without closing down combat
operations. The relocation in airfields was designed to
keep several squadrons of support aircraft close to the
1st Marine Division. Col E. T. Dorsey ltr to Hd, HistBr,
G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.
Marine aircraft support units were also located at K-3 and at Itami
Air Force Base, on Honshu, Japan. Under direct 1st MAW control were
four ground-type logistical support units with MAG-33, a Provisional
Automatic Weapons Battery from Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2),
and most of wing headquarters. This last unit, commanded by Colonel
Frederick R. Payne, Jr., included the 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion (based
at Pusan and led by Colonel Max C. Chapman), and a detachment of Marine
Transport Squadron 152 (VMR-152), which had seven Douglas four-engine
R5D transports. This element and the wing service squadron were based
at Itami.
Marines, and others flying in western Korea, found themselves
restricted much as Marines on the ground were. One limitation resulted
from a FAF-EUSAK agreement in November 1951 limiting the number of
daily close air support sorties across the entire Eighth Army line.
This policy had restricted air activity along the 155-mile Korean front
to 96 sorties per day. The curtailment seriously interfered with the
Marine type of close air support teamwork evolved during World War II,
and its execution had an adverse effect on Marine ground operations as
well. A second restriction, also detrimental to Marine division and
wing efficiency, was the prohibitive cushion Fifth Air Force had placed
around the United Nations peace corridor area north of the Marine
MLR. This buffer no-fly, no-fire zone which had been added to prevent
violation of the UN sanctuary by stray hits did not apply, of course,
to the Communists.
_The Enemy_[39]
[39] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52.
Directly beyond the 1st Marine Division sector, to the west and north,
were two first-rate units of the Chinese Communist Forces, the 65th and
63d CCF Armies. Together, they totaled approximately 49,800 troops in
late March 1952. Opposite the west and center of the Marine division
front was the 65th CCF Army, with elements of the 193d Division across
from the KPR and the 194th Division holding positions opposing the
KMC regiment. Across from the Marine line in the center was the 195th
Division of the 65th CCF Army, which had placed two regiments forward.
North of the division right sector lay the 188th Division, 63d CCF
Army, also with two regiments forward. The estimated 15 infantry
battalions facing the Marine division were supported by 10 organic
artillery battalions, numbering 106 guns, and varying in caliber from
75 to 155mm.[40] In addition, intelligence reported that the 1st CCF
Armored Division and an unidentified airborne brigade were located near
enough to aid enemy operations.
[40] The Korean Marine Corps placed the artillery count at 240
weapons ranging from 57 to 122mm. _CKMC ltr._
Chinese infantry units were not only solidly entrenched across their
front line opposite the Marine division but were also in depth. Their
successive defensive lines, protected by minefields, wire, and other
obstacles, were supported by artillery and had been, as a result
of activities in recent months, supplied sufficiently to conduct
continuous operations. Not only were enemy ground units well-supplied,
but their CCF soldiers were well disciplined and well led. Their morale
was officially evaluated as ranging from good to excellent. In all,
the CCF was a determined adversary of considerable ability, with their
greatest strength being in plentiful combat manpower.
Air opposition to Marine pilots in Korea was of unknown quantity
and only on occasion did the caliber of enemy pilots approach that
of the Americans. Pilots reported that their Chinese counterparts
generally lacked overall combat proficiency, but that at times their
“aggressiveness, sheer weight of numbers, and utter disregard for
losses have counterbalanced any apparent deficiencies.”[41] The
Communists had built their offensive potential around the Russian
MIG-15 jet fighter-interceptor. Use of this aircraft for ground support
or ground attack was believed to be in the training stage only. The
Chinese had also based their air defense on the same MIG plus various
types of ground antiaircraft (AA) weapons, particularly the mobile 37mm
automatic weapons and machine guns that protected their main supply
routes. In use of these ground AA weapons, enemy forces north of the
38th Parallel had become most proficient. Their defense system against
UNC planes had been steadily built up and improved since stabilization
of the battle lines in 1951, and by March 1952 was reaching a
formidable state.
[41] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 4, p. 10-38.
As the more favorable weather for ground combat approached toward the
end of March, the CCF was well prepared to continue and expand its
operations. Enemy soldiers were considered able to defend their sector
easily with infantry and support units. Division intelligence also
reported that Chinese ground troops had the capability for launching
limited objective attacks to improve their observation of Marine MLR
rear areas.
_Initial CCF Attack_[42]
[42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52; KMC Regt
UnitRpt 31, dtd 2 Apr 52.
Whether by intent or default, the Chinese infantry occupying the enemy
forward positions did not interfere with the Marine relief. With
assumption of sector responsibility by the division early on 25 March,
the initial enemy contact came from Chinese supporting weapons. Later
that day the two division frontline regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines,
received 189 mortar and artillery shells in their sectors which wounded
10 Marines. One man in the 1st Marines was killed by sniper fire on 25
March; in the same regiment, another Marine was fatally wounded the
following day. Forward of the lines, the day after the division took
over, there was no ground action by either side.
During the rest of the month, the tempo of activities on both sides
increased. Marines began regular patrol actions to probe and ambush the
enemy. Division artillery increased its number of observed missions by
the end of the month. By this time the CCF had also begun to probe
the lines of the Marine regimental sectors. In these ground actions to
reconnoiter and test division defenses, the Chinese became increasingly
bold, with the most activity on 28 March. Between 25–31 March, the
first week on JAMESTOWN, some 100 Chinese engaged in 5 different
probing actions. Most of these were against the 1st KMC Regiment on the
left flank of the division MLR.
It was no wonder that the Chinese concentrated their effort against
the Korean Marines, for they held the area containing Freedom Gate,
the best of the three bridges spanning the Imjin. Both of the other
two, X-Ray and Widgeon, were further east in the division sector. If
the enemy could exploit a weak point in the KMC lines, he could attack
in strength, capture the bridge, and turn the division left flank,
after which he would have a direct route to Seoul.[43] Without the
bridge in the KMC sector, the division would be hard pressed, even with
helicopter lift, to maneuver or maintain the regiments north of the
Imjin.
[43] _Henderson ltr I._
On 1 April, at about 2130, the CCF began pounding the frontline
companies in the KMC area with an artillery preparation. A half hour
later, the enemy attacked an outpost and the main line. First to engage
the Chinese were the OPLR troops of the KMC 1st Company; 1st Battalion,
on the regimental right. There, a Chinese company forced an opening
between friendly outposts and reached a point about 200 yards short of
the MLR and just north of a road leading to the main bridge over the
Imjin. While this attack was in progress, another CCF company hit the
outpost line further south. This attack, less successful, ended far
short of the MLR and about a half-mile south of the bridge road. Both
enemy companies withdrew at about 2345.
To the left of the 1st Battalion, the 3d was receiving the brunt of
this initial CCF attack. The 9th, 11th, and 10th Companies (deployed in
that order from west to east, in the left battalion sector), had been
engaged by the same preliminary 30-minute shelling. At 2200, when four
CCF squads attacked the two companies on the left, an enemy company hit
the left end of the 10th Company, occupied by the 2d Platoon. About
midnight the South Koreans, under fire from both flanks and under heavy
frontal assault, were forced to withdraw. In the rear, the company
commander pulled the 1st Platoon from the line, ordered the 3d to
extend left to cover both sectors, and led a counterattack with the 1st
Platoon and elements of the 2d. Positions were quickly restored by the
KMC action.
Soon after it had hurled the Chinese back across the OPLR, the 1st
Battalion was subjected to a second attack. An enemy unit, estimated
to be a company, engaged a 1st Company platoon briefly. When the KMCs
returned heavy defensive fires, the Communists pulled back but struck
again at 0300. After a 20-minute fire fight, the Chinese company
retreated.
This action on 1–2 April cost the attackers 2 killed, 34 estimated
killed, and 10 estimated wounded. For the KMC, casualties were 2
killed, 10 wounded. To all 1st Division Marines, the successful defense
by the 1st KMC regimental Marines was heartening. It had preserved not
only the division western flank but also the vital link over the Imjin.
_Subsequent CCF Attacks_[44]
[44] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, KPR ComdDs, Apr
52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 35, dtd 16 Apr 52.
Following his attempted assault against the KMC regiment, the enemy
opposite the 1st Marine Division reverted to a passive defense. Except
for a probe late on 2 April of the far eastern line held by Lieutenant
Colonel Pratt’s 3/1 and two patrols that scouted MLR positions in the
western Korean Marine area that same date, Communist offensive measures
consisted largely of artillery and mortar fire. Chinese line units
appeared to concentrate on improving their dugouts and trench systems.
Marines reported frequent sightings of enemy groups working in and
around their forward trenches.
Marine division troops, too, were busy fortifying their defensive
positions. On the Kimpo Peninsula they dug gun emplacements and erected
camp facilities for the newly activated Kimpo Provisional Regiment.
North of the Han, mine clearance and construction of trenchworks and
fortifications was the order of the day for most Marines. Other Marines
patrolled forward of the lines as a major aspect of the division’s
continuous active defense. During daylight hours, MLR regiments
dispatched reconnaissance and combat patrols and sent out snipers,
armed with telescope-equipped M-1 rifles. Division tanks firing from
temporary gun slots on the main line and artillery batteries emplaced
in rear area dugouts hammered away at enemy positions and disposed of
his patrols. At night, harassing and interdicting (H&I) artillery fires
and infantry raids continued to keep the Communists off-balance.
A combat raid on 5 April typified the extensive Marine division night
activities forward of the line. Conducted by three platoons, less a
squad, of the KMC 10th Company, the raiding party had the mission of
capturing prisoners. Departing the MLR at 2300, the Korean Marines
worked their way over the low ground and then crossed the Sachon River.
Immediately thereafter the raid leader, who was the 10th Company
commander (First Lieutenant No Won Keun) dispatched two squad-sized
ambushes along the patrol route. The raiders then continued northwest
toward their objective, an area near the village of Tonggang-ni, a
half mile beyond the river. When about 50 yards from its objective,
the patrol ran into tactical wire and an enemy sentry, who alerted his
unit by rifle fire. The KMC raiders opened up and called in pre-planned
mortar and artillery support. The CCF defenders replied immediately
with rifles and machine gun fire.
To complete the maneuver, the patrol leader positioned his machine guns
to fire on the Communist flanks and directed one platoon to prepare
for a frontal assault on the defenders. At 0148, the 1st Platoon
attacked from the right. A minute later the 2d Platoon charged headlong
at the defenders. Hand-to-hand fighting followed until the Chinese
broke contact and disappeared into bunkers within the trenchline.
From inside, the CCF soldiers continued the battle, firing through
gun revetments and wounding several KMC pursuers in the legs. After
30 minutes had passed, the South Korean assault troops observed enemy
reinforcements moving in from the northwest. At 0230, the Marine patrol
withdrew under the cover of artillery, reaching its battalion MLR at
0400. The raiders brought back seven civilians found in the area and
several Russian-made carbines. At the cost of 2 killed and 18 wounded,
the KMCs inflicted casualties totaling 12 counted killed and 25
estimated wounded.
Other division patrols similarly took into custody civilians living
between the MLR and OPLR. It was also the job of these patrols to
destroy buildings that the enemy had used. On the night of 5 April, 5th
Marines patrols apprehended 34 civilians, and a wounded enemy soldier.
The day before, a patrol from 2/1 had also captured a Chinese soldier.
On 12 and 13 April, the enemy stepped up his ground actions. He
launched two probes against the 5th Marines occupying the center
regimental sector. Both attempts were beaten back. The 1st Marines on
the extreme right flank encountered little hostile activity, but in
the western KMC sector, Chinese shelling increased noticeably. The
following day the artillery picked up again, accompanied by several
infantry probes directed against the two KMC frontline battalions. To
the right, the Chinese also tested 5th Marines lines again. On the far
right, in the area held by the 1st Marines, an air alert was sounded
from 0410 to 0726, but no enemy aircraft appeared. By mid-month, the
Chinese were dispatching fewer infantry probes but firing a greater
number of artillery and mortar shells toward the division line. The
enemy even sent 25 rounds to Kimpo, where a total of only 4 had fallen
during the first two weeks in April.
Ushering in the second half of April was another Communist attack,
this one on 15–16 April and to be the last that month against the
central part of the Marine Division sector. This attempt to breach the
Marine lines was directed against Company E of 2/5, manning an outpost
position on the OPLR. The rest of the battalion was now holding the
left sector of the center regimental front, having assumed its new
mission on line three days earlier in relief of 1/5, which reverted
to the role of regimental reserve. Northwest of the 5th Marines MLR,
the Company E commander, Captain Charles C. Matthews, had placed a
reinforced rifle platoon. His Marines had occupied several dug-in
positions near the top of a 400-foot hill, known as Outpost 3 (OP 3).
(See Map 5.) The platoon had been improving this outpost area and
fortifications so that the bunkers could be employed for living and
fighting.[45] During the afternoon and again at dusk on 15 April the
Communists had shelled this location. One Marine was wounded in the
second firing.
[45] Chapter III discusses in detail the construction of
bunkers.
[Illustration:
MAP 5 K. WHITE
2/5 SECTOR
15–16 APRIL 1952]
At 2330 on 15 April, Company E reported that a green flare cluster had
just burst over Hill 67, approximately 1,900 yards southwest of OP
3 and just beyond the OPLR. This signal triggered a 20-minute heavy
enemy preparation of 76mm artillery and 120mm mortars on the friendly
outpost and its supporting mortar position. Ten minutes before
midnight, another green flare exploded over the same height, and the
shelling stopped. After five minutes the signal reappeared. Immediately
thereafter, the Chinese shifted their artillery and mortar fire to an
area west of the OP 3 mortar site and north of a Company F observation
post. At the same time, the enemy attacked Outpost 3.
Initially, the Chinese struck the Marine defenses in a frontal
assault, but as the fighting progressed enemy forces quickly enveloped
the outpost and charged it simultaneously from three sides. The
vastly outnumbered Marine defenders withdrew into a tight perimeter
at the southeastern corner of the outpost where their defending
firepower prevented the enemy from seizing the position. Within 15
minutes the enemy had surrounded the Marines and severed the outpost
communications, but could not take the outpost. The CCF soldiers then
pulled back and let their artillery soften OP 3 while they regrouped
for another assault. The Chinese soon stormed the outpost a second
time, but were again unsuccessful. Moreover, they lost three of their
men who were captured by the tenacious 2/5 defenders.
The fighting continued until 0315, reaching a hand-to-hand clash at one
stage. In addition to mortar and artillery fire, the enemy employed
small arms, automatic weapons, hand and stick-type grenades, bangalore
torpedoes, and 57mm recoilless rifles. During the attack, patrols were
sent out from the MLR and OP 2, to the west, to reestablish contact and
help with casualty evacuation.
Well to the rear of the outpost and unknown to its occupants,
intelligence personnel intercepted a Chinese message ordering the
Communists to withdraw. Immediately, friendly artillery fired on
all known escape routes available to the attackers. Despite this
interdicting fire, the enemy soldiers managed to withdraw without
further loss. Their unsuccessful thrust against the 2/5 OPLR cost the
Chinese 25 known killed, 25 estimated killed, 45 known wounded, and 3
prisoners. Marine casualties were 6 killed, 5 missing, and 25 wounded
and evacuated.[46]
[46] One of those wounded was Corporal Duane E. Dewey, a
machine gunner. He was wounded twice, in fact, the
second time from an exploding enemy grenade which he had
rolled upon to shield two nearby comrades. Dewey somehow
survived, and the following March, after release from
the Marine Corps, he went to the White House where he
received the Medal of Honor, the first to be presented by
the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Duane E. Dewey
Biog. File)
Why the Chinese had selected OP 3 for their mid-April attack is not
known. Several theories, however, have been advanced by those involved
in the action. Colonel Culhane, the regimental commander, believed that
the enemy incursion “was the direct result of the aggressive patrols
that frequently used the outpost as a point of departure....”[47]
Brigadier General Merrill B. Twining, the assistant division commander
since 22 March, declared that the position was too large for a
reinforced platoon to hold.[48] Perhaps the Chinese had harbored the
same thoughts before the night of 15–16 April.
[47] _Culhane ltr._
[48] LtGen Merrill B. Twining ltr to Deputy Asst CofS, G-3,
HQMC, dtd 19 Aug 54.
Just before its OPLR was withdrawn in favor of an observation line, the
1st Korean Regiment was struck by the Chinese in the area immediately
north of the 1–2 April clash. Beginning at 0100 on 17 April, the
enemy placed a 15-minute preparatory fire on the left flank of the
3d Battalion, occupying the regimental right sector. The CCF then
probed friendly lines in and around the area pounded during the
preliminary fires. Three separate attacks took place before 0400, when
the Communists withdrew. In these probes, the Chinese made free use
of automatic weapons; the enemy’s well-coordinated action attested
to their training and discipline. Confirmed casualties were 36 CCF
and 2 Koreans killed. The KMCs suffered 5 wounded and estimated that
70 Chinese had been wounded. Although the South Koreans frequently
called down artillery support during the attack, most of the casualties
inflicted on the enemy were from rifle and machine gun fire. The 17
April probe was to mark the last major infantry action for the 1st
Marine Division during its second month on JAMESTOWN.
Throughout the month a total of 5,000 rounds of artillery fire and
3,786 rounds of mortar fire fell in the division sector. On 2 April
the greatest volume for any single day was received: 3,000 artillery
and 118 mortar rounds. An average day’s incoming, during April, was
approximately 167 artillery and 125 mortar rounds.
_Strengthening the Line_[49]
[49] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 46, dtd 17 Apr 52.
Even before the Communists had launched their mid-April attacks
against JAMESTOWN, the 1st Marine Division had implemented plans to
strengthen its line in western Korea. Besides the digging, timbering,
and sandbagging to accomplish a major improvement of the physical
defenses, General Selden required Marine infantry regiments to conduct
an aggressive defense of their sector of responsibility. He ordered
MLR units to employ snipers all along JAMESTOWN and to dispatch daily
patrols forward of the line to ambush, raid, kill, or capture Chinese
and their positions. The division commander further directed that
supporting arms such as artillery, tank, and air, when available, be
used to destroy hostile defenses, harass the enemy, and break up his
assemblies as well as to protect Marine positions.
As a result of an I Corps directive, the 1st Marine Division assumed
responsibility for an additional 6,800 yards of front on 14 April from
the 1st Commonwealth Division sector to the right of the division.
In preparation, the 5th Marines had taken over the western end of
the 1st Marines sector, held by 2/1, two days earlier. On the 14th
the 1st Marines, newly commanded by Colonel Walter N. Flournoy,[50]
extended its line eastward to assume new limiting points and part of
the MLR in the western part of the Canadian Brigade sector. Relief of
the Commonwealth unit was completed without any difficulty or enemy
interference. This additional yardage, plus the Kimpo Peninsula front,
now stretched the Marine division MLR to 35½ miles.
[50] Colonel Flournoy became regimental CO on 10 April,
succeeding Colonel Wade.
As a result, General Selden found it necessary to withdraw the division
general outpost line in order to build up his main line of resistance.
On 17 April, the 1st KMC Regiment reduced its OPLR to an OPLO (outpost
line of observation) and the left battalion pulled its MLR back to
more defensible ground. The Marine division center and right regiments
withdrew their outpost lines on 23 and 24 April. Both regiments then
established forward outposts and listening posts which, in many cases,
utilized former OPLR positions. Many of these posts were manned during
daylight hours only.
Abandonment of the forward OPLR added strength to the main line, but it
also meant that frontline battalions had to commit all their companies
on line, thus losing their reserve. To prevent Chinese occupation of
desirable terrain features on the former OPLR, the division dispatched
combat and reconnaissance patrols forward of its line. In the KMC
sector, the only Marine area favorable for tank operations forward of
JAMESTOWN, tank-infantry patrols were periodically employed.
To the west of the KMC sector, the Marine 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Michiel Dobervich) was assigned a
section of the KANSAS Line to defend, beginning 16 April. Reinforced
by attachment of the Division Reconnaissance Company (Major Ephraim
Kirby-Smith) that same day, Lieutenant Colonel Dobervich employed
Company C (two platoons), the headquarters LVT platoon, and the
reconnaissance unit to man 30 defensive positions from the Han River
eastward to the KMC western boundary.[51]
[51] Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been
attached to the Kimpo Provisional Regiment since 31 March
and Company B was supporting MAG-33 at Pohang.
Two other measures to strengthen his sector of JAMESTOWN were utilized
by the Marine division commander. On 18 April, he asked General
O’Daniel to reconsider the no-fire zone recently established by the
corps commander. General Selden, who had received reports of Chinese
use of the sanctuary located within Marine Corps territory--for firing
positions and assembly areas primarily--recommended, after I Corps
had refused him permission to fire into the haven, a redrawing of the
O’Daniel line to coincide more closely with the boundaries established
by the UN. Approval along the lines submitted by the division was
given by I Corps that same day. The second measure employed by General
Selden was use of an additional defensive line, WYOMING FORWARD. This
position, closely paralleling JAMESTOWN in the KMC and 5th Marines
sectors, added depth to the sector defenses.
A unique rescue and recovery operation also came into existence about
this time. On 19 April the division ordered the 5th Marines, occupying
the center regimental sector, to organize a tank-infantry force for
rescue of the United Nations Truce Team, should such action become
necessary. The regimental plan, published on 22 April, utilized a
reinforced rifle company-tank company organization directly supported
by organic 5th Marines 4.2-inch mortars and 1/11. The Everready Rescue
Force, from the regimental reserve, occupied the high ground (OP 2)
east of and dominating Panmunjom.
In addition to setting forth organizational details of the task unit,
the 5th Marines Operational Plan 6-52 specified the method of operation
for the rescue force. Taking advantage of the peace corridor in the
western end of the center sector, a Forward Covering Force would
speed tank-riding infantry to the high ground one-half mile beyond
the objective, Panmunjon. Following would be the Pick-Up Force, from
the 1st Tank Battalion Headquarters Platoon, which would retrieve the
principal UN delegates and take them quickly to the assembly area
two miles to the rear of the MLR. A Rear Covering Force, composed of
a tank-infantry element, would follow the Pick-Up force both on its
way towards the objective and on the return trip. Withdrawal of both
covering forces was regulated by a series of phase lines.
_Marine Air Operations_[52]
[52] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10;
1st MAW, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, Apr 52; Lynn Montross,
_Cavalry of the Sky--The Story of U. S. Marine Combat
Helicopters_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954),
hereafter Montross, _SkyCav_, quoted with permission of
the publishers.
Even though the Marine air-ground team had been shorn of much of its
tactical aviation, what remained was well utilized. Helicopter troop
operations had become commonplace by the end of April 1952. That month
there were three exercises to further evaluate tactical concepts of
helicopter employment. Operation PRONTO, conducted on 5 April, was the
first major troop lift in the new I Corps sector. In this maneuver
approximately 670 troops of 2/7 and 10,000 pounds of rations were
transported by helicopter and truck from the Munsan-ni vicinity across
the Han River to the Kimpo Peninsula. Here the reserve battalion
served as a counterattack force in a hypothetical enemy landing. Due
to the necessity for avoiding the neutrality zone in the Munsan area,
round-trip flights averaged about 57 miles.
The exercise combined the shortest notice and longest distance of any
large-scale helicopter troop movement conducted by HMR-161. It pointed
to the fact that a helicopter unit could successfully lift a troop
organization virtually as an “on call” tactical tool and without the
benefit of previous liaison.
Operation LEAPFROG, on 18–19 April, transported one KMC battalion
across the Han to the peninsula and lifted out another the following
day. The purpose of this test was to determine the feasibility of a
replacement movement conducted over water, with “consideration given to
the language barrier existing between the troops and the transporting
facility.”[53] The six-mile round trip was the shortest troop haul yet
made by the transport chopper squadron. Consequently, it took the 12
HRS-1 single-engine Sikorsky aircraft only 3 hours and 26 minutes to
complete the exchange of the 1,702 KMC troops.
[53] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, 10-73.
Colonel McCutcheon’s HMR-161 pilots found that their helicopters could
carry six combat-equipped Korean Marines instead of five American
Marines, due to the smaller size and weight of the average Korean.
Since the U.S. and KMC Marine battalions were the same size, the larger
load factor for the Korean Marines enabled their unit to be moved
faster. In LEAPFROG the language difference proved to be no handicap,
since there were sufficient interpreters on hand and the troops were
cooperative. Helicopter pilots could use landing sites close together
because the terrain was open and the area of operations beyond the
reach of Chinese artillery.
Close on the heels of LEAPFROG came a third airlift. Operation CIRCUS,
conducted on 23 April, provided for the air deployment of the 7th
Marines reserve regiment, minus two battalions, across the Imjin to
landing sites just to the rear of the secondary defensive line, WYOMING
FORWARD. Ten helicopters carried 1,185 Marines over the river barrier
to blocking positions in 90 minutes. The CIRCUS exercise illustrated
that a minimum distance should be maintained between loading and
unloading sites for a safe and efficient transport operation. It also
pointed up that “consideration must be given to the number of aircraft
assigned to each traffic pattern during short hops over a river.”[54]
This successful maneuver came three days before all HRS-1 aircraft were
grounded due to a defect in the tail rotors. By mid-May the problem had
been corrected and the aircraft returned to flying status.
[54] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-50.
During April, Lieutenant Colonel Herring’s VMO-6 employed its 11
single-engine OE-1 observation planes for a total of 508 fixed-wing
combat flights. More than half of these, 275, were for artillery
spotting; of the remainder, 166 were flown for reconnaissance and 67
represented photo, weather, liaison, and area check-out maneuvers.
Combat flights by the squadron helicopters[55] during the month were
110 liaison, 45 reconnaissance, and 93 evacuations. Of the total 756
combat flights performed by both fixed-wing and rotary craft, 511 were
over enemy territory.
[55] Rotary wing aircraft assigned were two types, HTL-4 and
H03S-1. The former is a two-place, plastic-dome Bell
product; the latter, the first helicopter operated by the
Marine Corps, is an observation-utility, three-passenger
Sikorsky-made craft. HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, _Marine Corps
Aircraft, 1913–1965_, Marine Corps Historical Reference
Pamphlet (Washington: 1967 ed.) pp. 34, 38.
During that same month, Marine squadrons operating under the Fifth Air
Force put a total of 2,708 planes into the air despite restrictive or
prohibitive weather on 20 days. Continuing its emphasis on attacking
the North Korean transportation system, the Air Force command
dispatched 1,397 Marine planes on interdiction missions. Marine-piloted
close air support sorties flown to assist the 1st Marine Division
numbered only 56 throughout April; those piloted by Marines for 16
other UN divisions totaled 547.
Not all the air sortie records were made by land-based Marine
squadrons. On 18 April, VMA-312, the CTE 95.11 squadron provided by
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, flew 80 sorties, a Korean record for a
carrier-based squadron to that date and twice the daily average for the
initial six months of 1952.
By 20 April the three tactical squadrons of MAG-12--VMF(N)-513,
VMF-212, and VMF-323--had completed their relocations on the Korean
west coast. Two days later, combined MAG-12 attack and -33 jet aircraft
participated in what was a Fifth Air Force one-day combat record: 1,049
sorties.
One MAG-33 unit, the newly-formed Marine Photographic Squadron 1,
was already flying a large number of aerial reconnaissance missions
directed by Fifth Air Force. It provided almost one-third of the
daylight photo effort required by FAF with but one-quarter of the
aircraft.[56] VMJ-1’s complement of a dozen 550 mph McDonnell twin-jet
Banshee F2H-2P aircraft mounted three cameras and were capable both of
high altitude work and good speed. Introduction of this single-seat jet
was considered the “first important development in aerial photography
in the Korean War,”[57] since the Banshee could outproduce any photo
plane in Korea.
[56] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, pp. 10-2, 10-108. This record was
established despite the fact that the Marine squadron,
with 10 jets, flying out of K-3 (Pohang) was more than
150 miles further from most targets than the other major
photo unit, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, based at K-14
(Kimpo).
[57] _Ibid._, p. 10-59.
The month of April also marked change of command ceremonies for the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing. On 11 April at K-3, General Schilt turned
over wing responsibility to Brigadier General Clayton C. Jerome. Among
the numerous civilian and military dignitaries attending the ceremony
at the Pohang 1st MAW headquarters were the Honorable John J. Muccio,
U.S. Ambassador to Korea; Air Force Lieutenant Generals Otto P. Weyland
and Frank F. Everest, commanders of FEAF and FAF respectively; and the
Marine division CG, Major General Selden.
The new wing commander, General Jerome, like his predecessor, had a
distinguished flight career. A 1922 graduate of the Naval Academy,
he had served in various foreign and U.S. aviation billets and was
a veteran of five World War II campaigns. In 1943 Colonel Jerome
was operations officer for Commander, Aircraft, Solomon Islands.
Later he was named Chief of Staff, Commander, Aircraft, Northern
Solomons and Commander, Aircraft and Island Commander, Emirau, in the
northern Solomons. Before returning to the States, Colonel Jerome had
participated in the recapture of the Philippines, commanding MAG-32
and directing all Marine air support in the Luzon fighting. Brigadier
General Jerome became Director of Aviation and Assistant Commandant of
the Marine Corps for Air in September 1950 and served in this capacity
until taking command of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea.[58]
[58] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Clayton C. Jerome, Jul
58, rev.
During the command ceremonies the outgoing 1st MAW commander, General
Schilt, was presented the Distinguished Service Medal for his
outstanding leadership of the wing. The award was made by Lieutenant
General Weyland. Shortly before his Korean tour ended, General Schilt
had also received from ROK President Syngman Rhee the Order of Military
Merit Taiguk, for his contribution to the military defense of South
Korea.
_Supporting the Division and the Wing_[59]
[59] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10;
1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, 1st CSG, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs,
Mar-Apr 52; 1st CSG UnitRpts, Apr 52.
Because of the command relationships existing in Korea, with all
ground units under operational control of CG, EUSAK, the majority of
the logistical support to the Marines was handled by the Army. Eighth
Army, 2d Logistical Command (2d LogCom) provided for resupply of items
used commonly by both Marine and Army personnel; the Marine Corps
(Commanding General, FMFPac) furnished those supplies and equipment
used by Marine units only.
When the division moved to the west, the 1st Shore Party Battalion
opened a rear service area at Ascom City. Here the division established
and maintained Class II (organizational equipment) and IV (special
equipment) dumps for its units, as well as Class I (rations) and III
(petroleum products) facilities for both the Kimpo regiment and the
service units stationed at Ascom. Class I shipments were forwarded
to the Munsan-ni railhead and stored there. Fuels and lubricants and
Class V items (ordnance) were received from the U.S. Army. A forward
ammunition supply point (ASP) was located north of the Imjin to assure
a steady flow of ammunition to frontline combat units in the event that
either an enemy attack or emergency flooding conditions of the river
prevented use of the bridges. For the same reason a truck company was
positioned near this supply point each night.
Reinforcing the division logistic effort was the 1st Combat Service
Group. Commanded by Colonel Russell N. Jordahl, the 1st CSG in late
April had nearly 1,400 Marines and Navy medical personnel stationed at
various points between Japan and Korea. At Kobe, Japan, the Support
Company processed Marine drafts arriving and departing Korea. At Masan,
the Supply Company, 1st CSG, requisitioned for the division those
Class II and IV items peculiar to the Marine Corps needs and forwarded
them upon request. Heavy maintenance of all technical equipment
was performed by the Maintenance Company. Supporting the 1st Motor
Transport Battalion operation was the Motor Transport Company, 1st
CSG. Most of the group, including Headquarters Company, was based at
Masan.[60] Splinter detachments from the group also operated transport
facilities at other locations in Korea.
[60] The Support Company moved to Ascom City on 14 Jun 52.
In western Korea, good rail transport into Munsan-ni and an adequate
but not all-weather road system improved the division’s logistical
situation. Greater storage facilities also existed in the JAMESTOWN
rear supply areas than in the X Corps sector just vacated by the
Marines. Division motor equipment did not suffer any appreciable damage
due to the rigors of the MIXMASTER transplacement. Vehicle maintenance
also presented a favorable outlook, due to the expected decreased use
during the period of positional warfare. On the other hand, an unduly
large number of tanks developed engine troubles in March, which were
traced back to defective oil cooling fans. This condition was corrected
in April and May by installation of new fan assemblies.
Guns of the 1st Tank Battalion immediately began to render valuable
support to Marine frontline regiments with the division’s new
assignment in the west. Companies A, B, and C were placed in direct
support of the three forward infantry regiments. Company D drew the
reserve mission, which included tank-infantry training with the 7th
Marines and preparation for reinforcing division artillery fires. Tank
companies were used almost daily in the forward sectors for destruction
by direct fire of the Chinese MLR fortifications. For such missions the
M-46 tanks, equipped with high-velocity 90mm guns, lumbered forward
from secure assembly areas to the rear of JAMESTOWN to temporary firing
positions on the line.
After pouring direct fire on preselected targets and completion of the
fire mission, the armored vehicles then returned to the rear. Less
frequently, a five-vehicle tank platoon accompanied a reinforced rifle
platoon and conducted daylight reconnaissance missions of forward areas
to engage the Chinese and to gain intelligence about enemy positions
and terrain. During April six such tank-infantry patrols, all in the
KMC regimental area, failed to establish direct contact with the enemy
but did draw mortar and artillery fire.
Marine artillery, which had been receiving its share of attention
from Communist field guns,[61] was faced by problems in two other
respects. Although the enemy held only four more artillery weapons
than did the Marines, General Seiden still lacked the ability to
mass artillery fires to the same degree as did the Chinese.[62] This
limitation stemmed directly from the wide physical separation of 11th
Marines batteries and the frontline infantry regiments being supported.
A second problem, the loss of qualified forward observers--reserve
officers due to return to the States for release from active
service--forced the 11th Marines to begin a school to train infantry
officers for this function. To make the course realistic, all firing
was done at live targets.[63]
[61] One artillery weapon, in particular, as well as the
Marine tanks habitually drew the fury of Chinese
counterfire. The heavy destructive power of the U.S. Army
8-inch, self-propelled howitzers firing on tough Chinese
defensive positions, generally brought down on their own
emplacements a rain of enemy shells, so sensitive were
enemy commanders to these hard-hitting weapons. _Pala
comments._
[62] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-39.
[63] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 6 Sep 66,
hereafter _Henderson ltr II_.
In April 1952, the 11th Marines organization had three light 105mm
howitzer battalions (54 guns), one medium 155mm howitzer battalion (12
guns), the KMC 105mm howitzer battalion (18 pieces), and a 4.5-inch
rocket battery (6 launchers). Attached to the 1st Marine Division and
located in its sector were one battalion and one battery of the I Corps
field artillery. The mission of the Marine artillery regiment was to
provide accurate and timely fires in support of both the MLR and OPLR
defenses, until withdrawal of the latter late in April. Batteries
of the 11th Marines also fired on known and suspected Chinese gun
emplacements and on targets of opportunity. The regiment also provided
intelligence on enemy artillery.
Throughout April, Colonel Henderson’s units continued to improve
their tactical and administrative areas, concentrating on field
fortifications, wire communications, and road trafficability. In the
last category, the artillery dozers and dump trucks not only did
nearly all of this work for the 11th Marines but also provided “a fair
amount of ‘direct support’ bulldozing to the infantry regiments and
occasionally loaned dozers and operators to the engineers.”[64]
[64] _Ibid._
Within a Marine aircraft wing, personnel and equipment for logistic
support are purposely limited to carrying out the wing primary
mission--providing air support during an amphibious operation. The wing
T/O (Table of Organization) provides a streamlined organization with
light, transportable organic equipment. Additional logistical support
personnel and equipment are not included since this would result in (1)
a duplication of support effort between the wing and landing force
and (2) a great increase in wing transport shipping requirements. When
the wing moves ashore, organic units render support necessary for
operations on the airfield only. Responsibility for activities beyond
this basic mission--airfield construction, maintenance of runways,
and movement of supplies to the airfield--must come from more senior
commands. Usually such assistance is obtained by attaching elements of
a naval construction battalion and other logistical support units.
In April 1952, Naval Construction Battalion Unit 1804 assisted in
the construction and maintenance received by MAG-33 at K-3. Here at
the port of Pohang, a detachment from the 1st Combat Service Group
controlled the movement of fuels, oils, lubricants, and ordnance to
wing dumps. Amphibian tractors (LVTs) of Company B, 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, provided most of the transportation required for
these supplies excepting ordnance. Assistance in the form of amphibious
trucks (DUKWs) was furnished by a platoon from the 1st Amphibian Truck
Company. When required, Marines of these two companies manhandled the
supplies.
Logistical support for the Marine wing was governed by the same general
procedures that applied to the division; 1st MAW supply requirements
beyond its augmented capability became the responsibility of Eighth
Army (2d LogCom) which furnished items common to both Marine and Army
units. If this EUSAK agency did not stock the requisitioned item,
it provided a substitute. Responsibility for resupply of aviation
items rested with the U.S. Navy. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
(ComNavFE) replaced unserviceable aviation technical equipment such as
aircraft parts and special maintenance tools. Commander, Service Force,
Pacific (ComServPac) replenished aviation ordnance. Responsibility for
supplying items peculiar to the Marine Corps rested with CG, FMFPac.
The repair and maintenance of 1st MAW equipment posed far less of a
problem than the construction and upkeep of airfields. Major repair
work on aircraft was satisfactorily performed in Japan by the wing
support squadron at Itami, and by the U.S. Navy Fleet Air Service
Squadron 11 (FASRon-11), located at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi.
The establishment in Japan of the wing heavy maintenance facility
depended, in part, upon its proximity to the wing flying squadrons.
Other considerations were the availability to the wing commander of
adequate air transport for continuous resupply of both routine and
emergency items and reliable communications between the users and the
maintenance unit. Because these conditions favoring removal of the
heavy maintenance facility from the immediate combat area existed
throughout Korean hostilities, it was possible for the maintenance
units to operate successfully in Japan away from the combat zone.
Air base construction and maintenance of airfield runways and taxiways
had plagued wing operations since the early days of the Korean War.
During the first winter these problems had appeared repeatedly at those
installations where Marine air was either not properly supported or
insufficiently augmented by the operational commander. Shortly after
MAG-33 had moved to K-3 in early 1951, the wing commander requested
emergency repairs for the runway and a permanent solution to the
airfield maintenance difficulties. Assistance was made available, but
it was insufficient. The repair force had to be augmented by Marines
pulled away from their own vital jobs and by native laborers. Later, in
the spring of 1952, when the Air Force assigned some of its engineers
to assist, the maintenance problem almost disappeared.
Motor transport within the wing was a continuing source of logistical
problems. Vehicles for handling the heavier aviation ordnance were
unsatisfactory because their configuration, of World War II vintage,
did not permit them to service the newer aircraft. Other trucks lacked
engine power or rigidity to withstand sustained use under primitive
airfield conditions. World War II vehicles that had been preserved and
placed in open storage required reconditioning before their use in
Korea. Mechanics’ general and special tools had a high replacement rate
throughout the entire period of wing operations in Korea.
Aircraft fuel handling in April 1952 followed outmoded World War
II methods. For K-3, amphibian vehicles received drummed fuel from
ships and landed it at the beach. There MAG-33 personnel transferred
the gasoline to 1,200-gallon fuel trucks, which then moved it to the
airfield servicing area, where other Marines transferred it again,
this time to 3,200-gallon stationary refuelers for dispensing into
the aircraft. Although this method became highly developed, it was
extremely slow and wasteful of manpower and vehicles in comparison to
the tank farm system, which was soon to reach K-3.
Two areas of logistics continued to remain almost trouble free for
division and wing Marines. Medical problems existed but were not
extensive. During a five-day period in late March, Marine Air Control
Group 2 experienced 13 cases of scarlet fever but no fatalities. That
same month, the Pacific Fleet Medical Officer noted that MAG-12 sick
bays were in excellent condition and that medical “personnel have shown
great ingenuity in fabricating various items of medical equipment from
scrap metal and lumber.”[65]
[65] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 12, p. 12-8. The medical
officer’s report to CinCPac noted that a vast improvement
“in the spaces allocated for the care of the sick and
wounded” had been made.
Evacuation of casualties and the utilization of air vehicles for
transport of passengers and cargo proved to be the second asset in
logistical operations. The Itami-based detachment of VMR-152 moved
7,757 personnel from the division and wing and 738.7 tons of cargo
during April 1952. In addition, the R5D craft hauled a total of 325.2
tons of U.S. mail that month for the two Marine organizations. Speedy
removal of patients to better equipped facilities in the rear by
VMO-6 and HMR-161 helicopters was a giant step forward in life-saving
techniques. VMO-6 usually provided this service, but early in April,
Colonel McCutcheon’s squadron was assigned emergency medical evacuation
duties to augment the observation squadron.[66] Pilots flew these
evacuation missions with almost total disregard for adverse weather or
darkness, and without radar control or adequate instrumentation for
all-weather operations.[67]
[66] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-69, p. 10-73.
[67] _Ibid._, p. 10-68. Flights were not made in heavy fog.
Test use by the Marine Corps Equipment Board of some of
the equipment needed to navigate under conditions of
reduced visibility was nearing the end of its development
cycle.
_Different Area, Different Problem_[68]
[68] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Jul 53,
Subj: Type “C” Rpt: “Civilian Affairs and the Korean
Service Corps, Mar 52-May 53,” hereafter CG, 1stMarDiv
ltr, _Civ Afrs and KSC_; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52;
HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.
An additional responsibility the 1st Marine Division inherited
when it moved to western Korea was control of civilians within the
division boundary. In eastern Korea, all nonmilitary personnel had
been evacuated from the vicinity of the MINNESOTA Line in the division
sector; they had not been removed from the JAMESTOWN area. Prior to
the arrival of the division in the west, the STAYBACK Line, averaging
seven miles to the rear of the Imjin River and running in a generally
northeast-southwest direction, had been established to limit the
movement of civilian personnel in the forward areas. The Marines soon
found that their predecessors must have been lax, however, in requiring
that Korean civilians remain behind STAYBACK. What seemed equally
unsuitable to the division was the poor military-civilian relationship
that had apparently existed for some time.
To correct the situation, General Selden cautioned his units to avoid
unnecessary damage or destruction to the civilian economy. He directed
his commanding officers to keep unauthorized Koreans away from Marine
installations. Military police set up check points and instituted
roving patrols to enforce division controls. Civil violators were
turned over to Korean authorities or held for investigation before
release. Civilians who lived in the forward areas were removed to the
rear. They were prevented from going beyond STAYBACK until August 1952,
when a controlled passage system was instituted.