OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE TAGUS.
[Sidenote: 1813. April.]
On this side as in the south, one part of the French fronted lord
Wellington’s forces, while the rest warred with the Partidas, watched
the English fleets on the coast, and endeavoured to maintain a free
intercourse with France; but the extent of country was greater, the
lines of communication longer, the war altogether more difficult, and
the various operations more dissevered.
Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus.
1º. The army of Portugal, composed of six divisions under Reille,
observing the allies from behind the Tormes; the Gallicians from
behind the Esla.
2º. That part of the army of the south which, posted in the valley of
the Tagus, observed Hill from behind the Tietar, and the Spaniards of
Estremadura from behind the Tagus.
3º. The army of the north, under Caffarelli, whose business was to
watch the English squadrons in the Bay of Biscay, to scour the great
line of communication with France, and to protect the fortresses of
Navarre and Biscay.
4º. The army of the centre, under count D’Erlon whose task was to
fight the Partidas in the central part of Spain, to cover Madrid and
to connect the other armies by means of moveable columns radiating
from that capital. Now if the reader will follow the operations of
these armies in the order of their importance and will mark their
bearing on the main action of the campaign, he will be led gradually
to understand how it was, that in 1813, the French, although
apparently in their full strength, were suddenly, irremediably and as
it were by a whirlwind, swept from the Peninsula.
[Sidenote: 1813.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
The army of the centre was composed of Darmagnac’s and Barrois’
French divisions, of Palombini’s Italians, Casa Palacio’s Spaniards,
Trielhard’s cavalry, and the king’s French guards. It has been
already shewn how, marching from the Tormes, it drove the Empecinado
and Bassecour from the capital; but in passing the Guadarama one
hundred and fifty men were frozen to death, a catastrophe produced
by the rash use of ardent spirits. Palombini immediately occupied
Alcala, and, having foraged the country towards Guadalaxara, brought
in a large convoy of provisions to the capital. He would then have
gone to Zaragoza to receive the recruits and stores which had arrived
from Italy for his division, but Caffarelli was at this time so
pressed that the Italian division finally marched to his succour, not
by the direct road, such was the state of the northern provinces, but
by the circuitous route of Valladolid and Burgos. The king’s guards
then replaced the Italians at Alcala, and excursions were commenced
on every side against the Partidas, which being now recruited and
taught by French deserters were become exceedingly wary and fought
obstinately.
On the 8th of January, Espert, governor of Segovia, beat Saornil not
far from Cuellar.
On the 3d of February, general Vichery, marching upon Medina Celi,
routed a regiment of horse called the volunteers of Madrid, and took
six hundred prisoners. The Empecinado with two thousand infantry and
a thousand cavalry intercepted him on his return, but Vichery beat
him with considerable slaughter, and made the retreat good with a
loss of only seventy men. However the Guerilla chief being reinforced
by Saornil and Abril, still kept the hills about Guadalaxara, and
when D’Erlon sent fresh troops against him, he attacked a detachment
under colonel Prieur, killed twenty men, took the baggage and
recovered a heavy contribution.
During these operations the troops in the valley of the Tagus were
continually harassed, especially by a chief called Cuesta who was
sometimes in the Guadalupe mountains, sometimes on the Tietar,
sometimes in the Vera de Placentia, and he was supported at times
on the side of the Guadalupe by Morillo and Penne Villemur. The
French were however most troubled by Hill’s vicinity, for that
general’s successful enterprises had made a profound impression, and
the slightest change of his quarters, or even the appearance of an
English uniform beyond the line of cantonments caused a concentration
of French troops as expecting one of his sudden blows.
Nor was the army of Portugal tranquil. The Gallicians menaced it from
Puebla Senabria and the gorges of the Bierzo; Silveira from the Tras
os Montes; the mountains separating Leon from the Asturias were full
of bands; Wellington was on the Agueda; and Hill, moving from Coria
by the pass of Bejar might make a sudden incursion towards Avila.
Finally the communication with the army of the north was to be kept
up, and on every side the Partidas were enterprising, especially the
horsemen in the plains of Leon. Reille however did not fail to war
down these last.
Early in January Foy, returning from Astorga to relieve general
Leval, then at Avila, killed some of Marquinez’ cavalry in San Pedro,
and more of them at Mota la Toro; and on the 15th of that month the
French captain Mathis killed or took four hundred of the same Partida
at Valderas. A convoy of Guerilla stores coming from the Asturias
was intercepted by general Boyer’s detachments, and one Florian, a
celebrated Spanish Partizan in the French service, destroyed the
band of Garido, in the Avila district. The same Florian on the 1st
of February defeated the Medico and another inferior chief, and soon
after, passing the Tormes, captured some Spanish dragoons who had
come out of Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 1st of March he crushed the band
of Tonto and at the same time captain Mathis, acting on the side of
the Carrion river, again surprised Marquinez’ band at Melgar Abaxo,
and that Partida, reduced to two hundred men under two inferior
chiefs called Tobar and Marcos, ceased to be formidable.
Previous to this some Gallician troops having advanced to Castro
Gonzalo on the Esla, were attacked by Boyer who beat them through
Benevente with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and then
driving the Spanish garrison from Puebla Senabria, raised
contributions with a rigour and ferocity said to be habitual to him.
His detachments afterwards penetrating into the Asturias, menaced
Oviedo, and vexed the country in despite of Porlier and Barceña who
were in that province. General Foy also having fixed his quarters at
Avila, feeling uneasy as to Hill’s intentions, had endeavoured on
the 20th of February to surprise Bejar with the view of ascertaining
if any large body was collected behind it, but he was vigorously
repulsed by the fiftieth regiment and sixth caçadores under the
command of colonel Harrison. However this attack and the movements
of Florian beyond the Tormes, induced Lord Wellington to bring up
another division to the Agueda, which, by a reaction, caused the
French to believe the allies were ready to advance.
During these events Caffarelli vainly urged Reille to send him
reinforcements, the insurrection in the north gained strength, and
the communications were entirely intercepted until Palombini, driving
away Mendizabal and Longa from Burgos, enabled the great convoy and
all Napoleon’s despatches, which had been long accumulating there, to
reach Madrid in the latter end of February. Joseph then reluctantly
prepared to abandon his capital and concentrate the armies in
Castile, but he neglected those essential ingredients of the
emperor’s plan, rapidity and boldness. By the first Napoleon proposed
to gain time for the suppression of the insurrection in the northern
provinces. By the second to impose upon Lord Wellington and keep him
on the defensive. Joseph did neither, he was slow and assumed the
defensive himself, and he and the other French generals expected
to be attacked, for they had not fathomed the English general’s
political difficulties; and French writers since, misconceiving the
character of his warfare, have attributed to slowness in the man
what was really the long-reaching policy of a great commander. The
allied army was not so lithe as the French army; the latter carried
on occasion ten days’ provisions on the soldiers’ backs, or it lived
upon the country, and was in respect of its organization and customs
a superior military machine; the former never carried more than
three days’ provisions, never lived upon the country, avoided the
principle of making the war support the war, payed or promised to pay
for every thing, and often carried in its marches even the corn for
its cavalry. The difference of this organization resulting from the
difference of policy between the two nations, was a complete bar to
any great and sudden excursion on the part of the British general and
must always be considered in judging his operations.
It is true that if Wellington had then passed the Upper Tormes with
a considerable force, drawing Hill to him through Bejar, and moving
rapidly by Avila, he might have broken in upon the defensive system
of the king and beat his armies in detail, and much the French
feared such a blow, which would have been quite in the manner of
Napoleon. But Wellington’s views were directed by other than mere
military principles. Thus striking, he was not certain that his blow
would be decisive, his Portuguese forces would have been ruined, his
British soldiers seriously injured by the attempt, and the resources
of France would have repaired the loss of the enemy, sooner than
he could have recovered the weakness which must necessarily have
followed such an unseasonable exertion. His plan was to bring a great
and enduring power early into the field, for like Phocion he desired
to have an army fitted for a long race and would not start on the
short course.
Joseph though he conceived the probability and dreaded the effect
of such a sudden attack, could by no means conceive the spirit of
his brother’s plans. It was in vain that Napoleon, while admitting
the bad moral effect of abandoning the capital, pointed out the
difference between flying from it and making a forward movement
at the head of an army; the king even maintained that Madrid was
a better military centre of operations than Valladolid, because
it had lines of communication by Segovia, Aranda de Duero, and
Zaragoza; nothing could be more unmilitary, unless he was prepared to
march direct upon Lisbon if the allies marched upon the Duero. His
extreme reluctance to quit Madrid induced slowness, but the actual
position of his troops at the moment likewise presented obstacles to
the immediate execution of the emperor’s orders; for as Daricau’s
division had not returned from Valencia, the French outposts towards
the Morena could not be withdrawn, nor could the army of the centre
march upon Valladolid until the army of the south relieved it at
Madrid. Moreover Soult’s counsels had troubled the king’s judgment;
for that marshal agreeing that to abandon Madrid at that time was
to abandon Spain, offered a project for reconciling the possession
of the capital with the emperor’s views. This was to place the
army of Portugal, and the army of the south, in position along the
slopes of the Avila mountains, and on the Upper Tormes menacing
Ciudad Rodrigo, while the king with the army of the centre remained
at Madrid in reserve. In this situation he said they would be an
over-match for any force the allies could bring into the field, and
the latter could not move either by the valley of the Tagus or upon
the Duero without exposing themselves to a flank attack.
The king objected that such a force could only be fed in that
country by the utter ruin of the people, which he would not consent
to; but he was deceived by his ministers; the comfortable state
of the houses, the immense plains of standing corn seen by the
allies in their march from the Esla to the Carrion proved that the
people were not much impoverished. Soult, well acquainted with the
resources of the country and a better and more practised master of
such operations, looked to the military question rather than to the
king’s conciliatory policy, and positively affirmed that the armies
could be subsisted; yet it does not appear that he had taken into
his consideration how the insurrection in the northern provinces was
to be suppressed, which was the principal object of Napoleon’s plan.
He no doubt expected that the emperor would, from France send troops
for that purpose, but Napoleon knowing the true state of his affairs
foresaw that all the resources of France would be required in another
quarter.
[Sidenote: March.]
[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan’s Official correspondence, MSS.]
Hatred and suspicion would have made Joseph reject any plan suggested
by Soult, and the more so that the latter now declared the armies
could exist without assistance in money from France; yet his mind
was evidently unsettled by that marshal’s proposal, and by the
coincidence of his ideas as to holding Madrid, for even when the
armies were in movement towards the northern parts, he vacillated
in his resolutions, at one time thinking to stay at Madrid, at
another to march with the army of the centre to Burgos, instead of
Valladolid. However upon the 18th of March he quitted the capital
leaving the Spanish ministers Angulo and Almenara to govern there
in conjunction with Gazan. The army of the south then moved in two
columns, one under Couroux across the Gredos mountains to Avila, the
other under Gazan upon Madrid to relieve the army of the centre,
which immediately marched to Aranda de Duero and Lerma, with orders
to settle at Burgos. Meanwhile Villatte’s division and all the
outposts withdrawn from La Mancha remained on the Alberche, and the
army of the south was thus concentrated between that river, Madrid,
and Avila.
North of the Tagus the troops were unmolested, save by the bands
during these movements, which were not completed before April, but in
La Mancha the retiring French posts had been followed by Del Parque’s
advanced guard under Cruz Murgeon, as far as Yebenes, and at the
bridge of Algobar the French cavalry checked the Spanish horsemen
so roughly, that Cruz Murgeon retired again towards the Morena. At
the same time on the Cuenca side, the Empecinado having attempted to
cut off a party of French cavalry, escorting the marquis of Salices
to collect his rents previous to quitting Madrid, was defeated with
the loss of seventy troopers. Meanwhile the great dépôt at Madrid
being partly removed, general Villatte marched upon Salamanca and
Gazan fixed his head-quarters at Arevalo. The army of the south was
thus cantoned between the Tormes, the Duero, and the Adaja, with
exception of six chosen regiments of infantry and four of cavalry,
in all about ten thousand men; these remained at Madrid under Leval,
who was ordered to push advanced guards to Toledo, and the Alberche,
lest the allies should suddenly march that way and turn the left of
the French army. But beyond the Alberche there were roads leading
from the valley of the Tagus over the Gredos mountains into the rear
of the advanced positions which the French had on the Upper Tormes,
wherefore these last were now withdrawn from Pedrahita and Puente
Congosto.
In proportion as the troops arrived in Castile Reille sent men to
the army of the north, and contracting his cantonments, concentrated
his remaining forces about Medina de Rio Seco with his cavalry on
the Esla. But the men recalled by the emperor were now in full
march, the French were in a state of great confusion, the people
urged by Wellington’s emissaries and expecting great events every
where showed their dislike by withholding provisions, and the
Partida warfare became as lively in the interior as on the coast,
yet with worse fortune. Captain Giordano, a Spaniard of Joseph’s
guard killed one hundred and fifty of Saornil’s people near Arevalo,
and the indefatigable Florian defeated Morales’ band, seized a
dépôt in the valley of the Tietar, beat the Medico there, and then
crossing the Gredos mountains, destroyed near Segovia on the 28th
the band of Purchas; the king’s Spanish guards also crushed some
smaller Partidas, and Renovales with his whole staff was captured
at Carvajales and carried to Valladolid. Meanwhile the Empecinado
gained the hills above Sepulveda and joining with Merino obliged the
people of the Segovia district, to abandon their houses and refuse
the supplies demanded by the army of the centre. When D’Armagnac
and Cassagne marched against them, Merino returned to his northern
haunts, the Empecinado to the Tagus, and D’Erlon then removed his
head-quarters to Cuellar.
[Sidenote: April.]
[Sidenote: French Papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.]
During April Leval was very much disturbed, and gave false alarms,
which extending to Valladolid caused an unseasonable concentration of
the troops and D’Erlon abandoned Cuellar and Sepulveda. Del Parque
and the Empecinado were said to have established the bridge of
Aranjuez, Elio to be advancing in La Mancha, Hill to be in the valley
of the Tagus and moving by Mombeltran with the intention of seizing
the passes of the Guadarama. All of this was false. It was the
Empecinado and Abuelo who were at Aranjuez, the Partidas of Firmin,
Cuesta, Rivero, and El Medico who were collecting at Arzobispo, to
mask the march of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, and of
the reserve from Andalusia; it was the prince of Anglona who was
advancing in La Mancha to cover the movement of Del Parque upon
Murcia. When disabused of his error, Leval easily drove away the
Empecinado who had advanced to Alcala; afterwards chasing Firmin
from Valdemoro into the valley of the Tagus, he re-established his
advanced posts in Toledo and on the Alberche, and scoured the whole
country around. But Joseph himself was anxious to abandon Madrid
altogether, and was only restrained by the emperor’s orders and by
the hope of still gathering some contributions there to support
his court at Valladolid. With reluctance also he had obeyed his
brother’s reiterated orders to bring the army of the centre over the
Duero to replace the detached divisions of the army of Portugal.
He wished D’Erlon rather than Reille, to reinforce the north, and
nothing could more clearly show how entirely the subtle spirit of
Napoleon’s instructions had escaped his perception. It was necessary
that Madrid should be held, to watch the valley of the Tagus and
if necessary to enable the French armies to fall back on Zaragoza,
but principally to give force to the moral effect of the offensive
movement towards Portugal. It was equally important and for the same
reason, that the army of Portugal instead of the army of the centre
should furnish reinforcements for the north.
In the contracted positions which the armies now occupied, the
difficulty of subsisting was increased, and each general was
dissatisfied with his district, disputes multiplied, and the court
clashed with the army at every turn. Leval also inveighed against
the conduct of the Spanish ministers and minor authorities left at
Madrid, as being hurtful to both troops and people, and no doubt
justly, since it appears to have been precisely like that of the
Portuguese and Spanish authorities on the other side towards the
allies. Joseph’s letters to his brother became daily more bitter.
Napoleon’s regulations for the support of the troops were at
variance with his, and when the king’s budget shewed a deficit of
many millions, the emperor so little regarded it that he reduced
the French subsidy to two millions per month, and strictly forbad
the application of the money to any other purpose than the pay of
the soldiers. When Joseph asked, how he was to find resources?
his brother with a just sarcasm on his political and military
blindness, desired him to seek what was necessary in those provinces
of the north which were rich enough to nourish the Partidas and the
insurrectional juntas. The king thus pushed to the wall prevailed
upon Gazan secretly to lend him fifty thousand francs, for the
support of his court, from the chest of the army of the south; but
with the other generals he could by no means agree, and instead of
the vigour and vigilance necessary to meet the coming campaign there
was weakness, disunion, and ill blood.
All the movements and arrangements for concentrating the French
forces, as made by Joseph, displeased Napoleon. The manner in which
the army of the centre stole away from Madrid by the road of Lerma
was, he said, only calculated to expose his real views and draw
the allies upon the French before the communication with France
was restored. But more than all his indignation was aroused by the
conduct of the king after the concentration. The French armies
were held on the defensive and the allies might without fear for
Portugal embark troops to invade France, whereas a bold and confident
offensive movement sustained by the formation of a battering train at
Burgos, as if to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, would have imposed upon the
English general, secured France from the danger of such an insult,
and would at the same time have masked the necessary measures for
suppressing the insurrection in the northern provinces. To quell
that insurrection was of vital importance, but from the various
circumstances already noticed it had now existed for seven months,
five of which, the king, although at the head of ninety thousand
men, and uninterrupted by Wellington, had wasted unprofitably, having
done no more than chase a few inferior bands of the interior while
this formidable warfare was consolidating in his rear; and while his
great adversary was organizing the most powerful army which had yet
taken the field in his front. It is thus kingdoms are lost. I shall
now trace the progress of the northern insurrection so unaccountably
neglected by the king, and to the last misunderstood by him; for
when Wellington was actually in movement; when the dispersed French
corps were rushing and crowding to the rear to avoid the ponderous
mass which the English general was pushing forward; even then, the
king, who had done every thing possible to render defeat certain,
was urging upon Napoleon the propriety of first beating the allies
and afterwards reducing the insurrection by the establishment of a
Spanish civil government beyond the Ebro!
NORTHERN INSURRECTION.
[Sidenote: 1813.]
It has been already shewn how the old Partidas had been strengthened
and new corps organized on a better footing in Biscay and Navarre;
how in the latter end of 1812 Caffarelli marched to succour Santona,
and how Longa taking advantage of his absence captured a convoy
near Burgos while other bands menaced Logroño. All the littoral
posts, with the exception of Santona and Gueteria were then in the
possession of the Spaniards, and Mendizabel made an attempt on Bilbao
the 6th of January. Repulsed by general Rouget he rejoined Longa and
together they captured the little fort of Salinas de Anara, near the
Ebro, and that of Cuba in the Bureba, while the bands of Logroño
invested Domingo Calçada in the Rioja. On the 26th of January,
Caffarelli, having returned from Santona, detached Vandermaesen and
Dubreton to drive the Spaniards from Santander, and they seized many
stores there, but neglected to make any movement to aid Santona which
was again blockaded by the Partidas; meanwhile the convoy with all
the emperor’s despatches was stopped at Burgos. Palombini re-opened
the communications and enabled the convoy to reach Madrid, but his
division did not muster more than three thousand men, and various
detachments belonging to the other armies were now in march to the
interior of Spain. The regiments recalled to France from all parts
were also in full movement, together with many convoys and escorts
for the marshals and generals quitting the Peninsula; thus the army
of the north was reduced, as its duties increased, and the young
French soldiers died fast of a peculiar malady which especially
attacked them in small garrisons. Meanwhile the Spaniards’ forces
increased. In February Mendizabel and Longa were again in the
Bureba intercepting the communication between Burgos and Bilbao,
and they menaced Pancorbo and Briviesca. This brought Caffarelli
from Vittoria and Palombini from Burgos. The latter surprised by
Longa, lost many men near Poza de Sal, and only saved himself by his
courage and firmness yet he finally drove the Spaniards away. But
now Mina returning from Aragon after his unsuccessful action near
Huesca surprized and burned the castle of Fuenterrabia in a most
daring manner on the 11th of March, after which, having assembled
five thousand men in Guipuscoa, he obtained guns from the English
fleet at Motrico, invested Villa Real within a few leagues of
Vittoria, and repulsed six hundred men who came to relieve the
fort. This brought Caffarelli back from Pancorbo. Mina then raised
the siege, and Palombini marching into the Rioja, succoured the
garrison of San Domingo Calçada and drove the Partidas towards
Soria. The communication with Logroño was thus re-opened, and the
Italians passing the Ebro marched by Vittoria towards Bilbao where
they arrived the 21st of February; but the gens-d’armes and imperial
guards immediately moved from Bilbao to France, Caffarelli went with
them, and the Spanish chiefs remained masters of Navarre and Biscay.
The people now refused war contributions both in money and kind, the
harvest was not ripe, and the distress of the French increased in
an alarming manner because the weather enabled the English fleets
to keep upon the coast and intercept all supplies from France by
sea. The communications were all broken; in front by Longa who was
again at the defile of Pancorbo; in the rear by Mina who was in the
hills of Arlaban; on the left by a collection of bands at Caroncal
in Navarre. Abbé, governor of Pampeluna severely checked these
last, but Mina soon restored affairs; for leaving the volunteers of
Guipuscoa to watch the defiles of Arlaban, he assembled all the bands
in Navarre, destroyed the bridges leading to Taffalla from Pampeluna
and from Puente la Reyna, and though Abbé twice attacked him, he got
stronger, and bringing up two English guns from the coast besieged
Taffalla.
[Sidenote: February.]
Napoleon, discontented with Caffarelli’s mode of conducting the
war, now gave Clauzel the command in the north, with discretionary
power to draw as many troops from the army of Portugal as he judged
necessary. He was to correspond directly with the emperor to avoid
loss of time, but was to obey the king in all things not clashing
with Napoleon’s orders, which contained a complete review of what
had passed and what was necessary to be done. “The Partidas,” the
emperor said, “were strong, organized, exercised, and seconded by
the exaltation of spirit which the battle of Salamanca had produced.
The insurrectional juntas had been revived, the posts on the coast
abandoned by the French and seized by the Spaniards gave free
intercourse with the English; the bands enjoyed all the resources
of the country, and the system of warfare hitherto followed had
favoured their progress. Instead of forestalling their enterprises
the French had waited for their attacks, and contrived to be always
behind the event; they obeyed the enemy’s impulsion and the troops
were fatigued without gaining their object. Clauzel was to adopt
a contrary system, he was to attack suddenly, pursue rapidly, and
combine his movements with reference to the features of the country.
A few good strokes against the Spaniards’ magazines, hospitals,
or dépôts of arms would inevitably trouble their operations, and
after one or two military successes some political measures would
suffice to disperse the authorities, disorganise the insurrection,
and bring the young men who had been enrolled by force back to their
homes. All the generals recommended, and the emperor approved of
the construction of block-houses on well-chosen points, especially
where many roads met; the forests would furnish the materials
cheaply, and these posts should support each other and form chains
of communication. With respect to the greater fortresses, Pampeluna
and Santona were the most important, and the enemy knew it, for Mina
was intent to famish the first and the English squadron to get hold
of the second. To supply Pampeluna it was only necessary to clear the
communications, the country around being rich and fertile. Santona
required combinations. The emperor wished to supply it by sea from
Bayonne and St. Sebastian, but the French marine officers would never
attempt the passage, even with favourable winds and when the English
squadron were away, unless all the intermediate ports were occupied
by the land forces.
“Six months before, these ports had been in the hands of the French,
but Caffarelli had lightly abandoned them, leaving the field open
to the insurgents in his rear while he marched with Souham against
Wellington. Since that period the English and Spaniards held them.
For four months the emperor had unceasingly ordered the retaking of
Bermeo and Castro, but whether from the difficulty of the operations
or the necessity of answering more pressing calls, no effort had been
made to obey, and the fine season now permitted the English ships to
aid in the defence. Castro was said to be strongly fortified by the
English, no wonder, Caffarelli had given them sufficient time, and
they knew its value. In one month every post on the coast from the
mouth of the Bidassoa to St. Ander should be again re-occupied by
the French, and St. Ander itself should be garrisoned strongly. And
simultaneous with the coast operations should be Clauzel’s attack on
Mina in Navarre and the chasing of the Partidas in the interior of
Biscay. The administration of the country also demanded reform, and
still more the organization and discipline of the army of the north
should be attended to. It was the pith and marrow of the French power
in Spain, all would fail if that failed, whereas if the north was
strong, its administration sound, its fortresses well provided and
its state tranquil, no irreparable misfortune could happen in any
other part.”
Clauzel assumed the command on the 22d of February, Abbé was then
confined to Pampeluna, Mina, master of Navarre, was besieging
Taffalla; Pastor, Longa, Campillo, Merino and others ranged through
Biscay and Castile unmolested; and the spirit of the country was so
changed that fathers now sent their sons to join Partidas which had
hitherto been composed of robbers and deserters. Clauzel demanded a
reinforcement of twenty thousand men from the army of Portugal, but
Joseph was still in Madrid and proposed to send D’Erlon with the army
of the centre instead, an arrangement to which Clauzel would not
accede. Twenty thousand troops were, he said, wanted beyond the Ebro.
Two independent chiefs, himself and D’Erlon, could not act together;
and if the latter was only to remain quiet at Burgos his army would
devour the resources without aiding the operations of the army of
the north. The king might choose another commander, but the troops
required must be sent. Joseph changed his plan, yet it was the end of
March before Reille’s divisions moved, three upon Navarre, and one
upon Burgos. Meanwhile Clauzel repaired with some troops to Bilbao,
where general Rouget had eight hundred men in garrison besides
Palombini’s Italians.
[Sidenote: March.]
This place was in a manner blockaded by the Partidas. The Pastor
with three thousand men was on the right of the Durango river, in
the hills of Guernica, and Navarnis, between Bilbao and the fort
of Bermeo. Mendizabal with from eight to ten thousand men was on
the left of the Durango in the mountains, menacing at once Santoña
and Bilbao and protecting Castro. However the French had a strong
garrison in the town of Durango, the construction of new works
round Bilbao was in progress, and on the 22d of March Clauzel
moved with the Italians and a French regiment to assault Castro.
Campillo and Mendizabel immediately appeared from different sides
and the garrison made a sally; the Spaniards after some sharp
fighting regained the high valleys in disorder, and the design of
escalading Castro was resumed, but again interrupted by the return
of Mendizabel to Trucios, only seven miles from the French camp,
and by intelligence that the Pastor with the volunteers of Biscay
and Guipuscoa was menacing Bilbao. Clauzel immediately marched with
the French regiments to the latter place, leaving Palombini to
oppose Mendizabel. Finding all safe at Bilbao, he sent Rouget with
two French battalions to reinforce the Italians, who then drove
Mendizabel from Trucios into the hills about Valmaceda. It being now
necessary to attack Castro in form, Palombini occupied the heights
of Ojeba and Ramales, from whence he communicated with the garrison
of Santona, introduced a convoy of money and fresh provisions there,
received ammunition in return, and directed the governor Lameth to
prepare a battering train of six pieces for the siege. This done, the
Italians who had lost many men returned hastily to Bilbao, for the
Pastor was again menacing that city.
[Sidenote: April.]
On the evening of the 31st Palombini marched against this new
enemy and finding him too strong retreated, but being promised a
reinforcement of two regiments from Durango he returned; Pastor was
then with three thousand men in position at Navarnis, Palombini gave
him battle on the 3d and was defeated with the loss of eighty men,
but on the 5th being joined by the French regiments from Durango
he beat the Spaniards. They dispersed and while some collected in
the same positions behind him, and others under Pastor gained the
interior, one column retired by the coast towards the Deba on the
side of St. Sebastian. Palombini eagerly pursued these last, because
he expected troops from that fortress to line the Deba, and hoped
thus to surround the Spaniards, but the English squadron was at
Lequitio and carried them off. Pastor meanwhile descending the Deba
drove the French from that river to the very walls of St. Sebastian,
and Palombini was forced to make for Bergara on the road to Vittoria.
At Bergara he left his wounded men with a garrison to protect
them, and returning on the 9th of April attacked the volunteers of
Guipuscoa at Ascoytia; repulsed in this attempt he retired again
towards Bergara, and soon after took charge of a convoy of artillery
going from St. Sebastian for the siege of Castro. Meanwhile Bilbao
was in great danger, for the volunteers of Biscay coming from the
Arlaban, made on the 10th a false attack at a bridge two miles above
the entrenched camp, while Tapia, Dos Pelos, and Campillo fell on
seriously from the side of Valmaceda. Mendizabel, who commanded, did
not combine his movements well and was repulsed by Rouget although
with difficulty; the noise of the action reached Palombini who
hastened his march, and having deposited his convoy, followed the
volunteers of Biscay to Guernica and drove them upon Bermeo where
they got on board the English vessels.
During these events Clauzel was at Vittoria arranging the general
plan of operations. Mina had on the 1st of April defeated one of
his columns near Lerin with the loss of five or six hundred men.
The four divisions sent from the army of Portugal, together with
some unattached regiments furnished, according to Reille, the
twenty thousand men demanded, yet only seventeen thousand reached
Clauzel; and as the unattached regiments merely replaced a like
number belonging to the other armies, and now recalled from the
north, the French general found his expected reinforcements dwindled
to thirteen thousand. Hence notwithstanding Palombini’s activity,
the insurrection was in the beginning of April more formidable than
ever; the line of correspondence from Torquemada to Burgos was quite
unprotected for want of troops, neither was the line from Burgos
to Irun so well guarded that couriers could pass without powerful
escorts, nor always then. The fortifications of the castle of Burgos
were to have been improved, but there was no money to pay for the
works, the French, in default of transport, could not collect
provisions for the magazines ordered to be formed there by the king,
and two generals, La Martiniere and Rey, were disputing for the
command. Nearly forty thousand irregular Spanish troops were in the
field. The garrison of Taffalla, five hundred strong, had yielded
to Mina, and that chief, in concert with Duran, Amor, Tabueca, the
militia men of Logroña, and some minor guerillas occupied both sides
of the Ebro, between Calahora, Logroño, Santa Cruz de Campero, and
Guardia. They could in one day unite eighteen thousand infantry and a
thousand horsemen. Mendizabel, Longa, Campillo, Herrera, El Pastor,
and the volunteers of Biscay, Guipuscoa, and Alava, in all about
sixteen thousand, were on the coast acting in conjunction with the
English squadrons, Santander, Castro, and Bermeo were still in their
hands, and maritime expeditions were preparing at Coruña and in the
Asturias.
This Partizan war thus presented three distinct branches, that of
Navarre, that of the coast, and that on the lines of communication.
The last alone required above fifteen thousand men; namely ten
thousand from Irun to Burgos, and the line between Tolosa and
Pampeluna, which was destroyed, required fifteen hundred to restore
it, while four thousand were necessary between Mondragon and Bilbao,
comprising the garrison of the latter place; even then no post would
be safe from a sudden attack. Nearly all the army of the north was
appropriated to the garrisons and lines of communication, but the
divisions of Abbé and Vandermaesen could be used on the side of
Pampeluna, and there were besides, disposable, Palombini’s Italians
and the divisions sent by Reille. But one of these, Sarrut’s, was
still in march, and all the sick of the armies in Castile were now
pouring into Navarre, when, from the loss of the contributions,
there was no money to provide assistance for them. Clauzel had
however ameliorated both the civil and the military administrations,
improved the works of Gueteria, commenced the construction of
block-houses between Irun and Vittoria, and as we have seen had
shaken the bands about Bilbao. Now dividing his forces he destined
Palombini to besiege Castro, ordering Foy and Sarrut’s divisions when
the latter should arrive, to cover the operation and to oppose any
disembarkation.
The field force thus appropriated, together with the troops in
Bilbao under Rouget, was about ten thousand men, and in the middle
of April, Clauzel, beating Mina from Taffalla and Estella, assembled
the remainder of the active army, composed of Taupin and Barbout’s
divisions of the army of Portugal, Vandermaesen’s and Abbé’s
divisions of the army of the north, in all about thirteen thousand
men, at Puenta La Reyna in Navarre. He urged general L’Huillier,
who commanded the reserve at Bayonne, to reinforce St. Sebastian
and Gueteria and to push forward his troops of observation into the
valley of Bastan, and he also gave the commandant of Zaragoza notice
of his arrival, that he might watch Mina on that side. From Puente
la Reyna he made some excursions but he lost men uselessly, for the
Spaniards would only fight at advantage, and to hunt Mina without
first barring all his passages of flight was to destroy the French
soldiers by fatigue. And here the king’s delay was most seriously
felt because the winter season, when, the tops of the mountains
being covered with snow, the Partidas could only move along the
ordinary roads, was most favourable for the French operations, and
it had passed away. Clauzel despairing to effect any thing with so
few troops was even going to separate his forces and march to the
coast, when in May Mina, who had taken post in the valley of Ronçal,
furnished an occasion which did not escape the French general.
[Sidenote: May.]
On the 13th Abbé’s and Vandermaesen’s divisions and the cavalry
entered that valley at once by the upper and lower parts, and
suddenly closing upon the Guerilla chief killed and wounded a
thousand of his men and dispersed the rest; one part fled by the
mountains to Navarquez, on the side of Sanguessa, with the wounded
whom they dropped at different places in care of the country people.
Chaplangarra, Cruchaga, and Carena, Mina’s lieutenants, went off,
each with a column, in the opposite direction and by different routes
to the valley of the Aragon, they passed that river at St. Gilla, and
made their way towards the sacred mountain of La Pena near Jaeca. The
French cavalry following them by Villa Real, entered that town the
14th on one side, while Mina with twelve men entered it on the other,
but he escaped to Martes where another ineffectual attempt was made
to surprise him. Abbé’s columns then descended the smaller valleys
leading towards the upper valley of the Aragon, while Vandermaesen’s
infantry and the cavalry entered the lower part of the same valley,
and the former approaching Jacca sent his wounded men there and got
fresh ammunition.
Meanwhile Mina and the insurgent junta making a push to regain
Navarre by the left of the Aragon river were like to have been taken,
but again escaped towards the valley of the Gallego, whither also the
greater part of their troops now sought refuge. Clauzel was careful
not to force them over that river, lest they should remain there
and intercept the communication from Zaragoza by Jacca, which was
the only free line the French now possessed and too far removed from
Clauzel’s true theatre of operations to be watched. Abbé therefore
returned to Roncal in search of the Spanish dépôts, and Vandermaesen
entered Sos at one end just as Mina, who had now one hundred and
fifty horsemen and was always intent upon regaining Navarre, passed
out at the other; the light cavalry pursuing overtook him at Sos
Fuentes and he fled to Carcastillo, but there unexpectedly meeting
some of his own squadrons which had wandered over the mountains after
the action at Roncal, he gave battle, was defeated with the loss of
fifty men and fled once more to Aragon, whereupon the insurrectional
junta dispersed, and dissentions arose between Mina and the minor
chiefs under his command. Clauzel anxious to increase this discord
sent troops into all the valleys to seek out the Spanish dépôts
and to attack their scattered men, and he was well served by the
Aragonese, for Suchet’s wise administration was still proof against
the insurrectional juntas.
[Sidenote: 1813.]
During these events four battalions left by Mina at Santa Cruz de
Campero in the Amescoas, were chased by Taupin, who had remained at
Estella when the other divisions marched up the valley of Roncal.
Mina, however, reassembled at Barbastro in Aragon a strong column,
crowds of deserters from the other Spanish armies were daily
increasing his power, and so completely had he organized Navarre that
the presence of a single soldier of his in a village sufficed to
have any courier without a strong escort stopped. Many bands also
were still in the Rioja, and two French regiments rashly foraging
towards Lerim were nearly all destroyed. In fine the losses were
well balanced, and Clauzel demanded more troops, especially cavalry,
to scour the Rioja. Nevertheless the dispersion of Mina’s troops
lowered the reputation of that chief, and the French general taking
up his quarters in Pampeluna so improved this advantage by address,
that many townships withdrew from the insurrection, and recalling
their young men from the bands commenced the formation of eight free
Spanish companies to serve on the French side. Corps of this sort
were raised with so much facility in every part of Spain, that it
would seem nations, as well as individuals, have an idiosyncrasy, and
in these changeable warriors we again see the Mandonius and Indibilis
of ancient days.
Joseph, urged by Clauzel, now sent Maucune’s division and some
light cavalry of the army of Portugal, to occupy Pampleiga, Burgos,
and Briviesca, and to protect the great communication, which the
diverging direction of Clauzel’s double operations had again exposed
to the partidas. Meanwhile the French troops had not been less
successful in Biscay than in Navarre. Foy reached Bilbao the 24th of
April, and finding all things there ready for the siege of Castro
marched to Santona to hasten the preparations at that place, and he
attempted also to surprise the chiefs Campillo and Herrera in the
hills above Santona, but was worsted in the combat. The two battering
trains then endeavoured to proceed from Bilbao and Santona by sea to
Castro, but the English vessels, coming to the mouth of the Durango,
stopped those at Bilbao, and obliged them to proceed by land, but
thus gave an opportunity for those at Santona to make the sea-run in
safety.
SIEGE OF CASTRO.
[Sidenote: May.]
This place situated on a promontory was garrisoned by twelve hundred
men, under the command of Don Pedro Alvarez, three English sloops
of war commanded by the captains Bloye, Bremen, and Tayler, were at
hand, some gun-boats were in the harbour, and twenty-seven guns were
mounted on the works. An outward wall with towers, extended from
sea to sea on the low neck which connected the promontory with the
main land; this line of defence was strengthened by some fortified
convents, behind it came the town, and behind the town at the
extremity of the promontory stood the castle.
On the 4th of May, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, took post at different
points to cover the siege; the Italian general St. Paul invested the
place; the engineer Vacani conducted the works, having twelve guns
at his disposal. The defence was lively and vigorous, and captain
Tayler with great labour landed a heavy ship-gun on a rocky island
to the right of the town, looking from the sea, which he worked with
effect against the French counter-batteries. On the 11th a second
gun was mounted on this island, but that day the breaching batteries
opened, and in a few hours broke the wall while the counter-batteries
set fire to some houses with shells, wherefore the English guns were
removed from the island. The assault was then ordered but delayed
by a sudden accident, for a foraging party having been sent into
the hills, came flying back, pursued by a column of Spaniards which
had passed unperceived through the positions of the French; and the
besiegers were for some time in confusion as thinking the covering
army had been beaten; however they soon recovered, and the assault
and escalade took place in the night.
The attack was rapid and fierce, the walls were carried, and the
garrison driven through the town to the castle which was maintained
by two companies, while the flying troops got on board the English
vessels; finally the Italians stormed the castle, but every gun
had been destroyed, and the two companies safely rejoined their
countrymen on board the ships. The English had ten seamen wounded,
the Spaniards lost about a hundred and eighty, and the remainder
were immediately conveyed to Bermeo from whence they marched inland
to join Longa. The besiegers lost only fifty men killed and wounded,
and the Italian soldiers committed great excesses, setting fire
to the town in many places. Foy and Sarrut, separating after the
siege, marched, the former through the district of Incartaciones to
Bilbao defeating a battalion of Biscay volunteers on his route; the
latter to Orduña with the design of destroying Longa; but that chief
crossed the Ebro at Puente Lara, and finding the additional troops
sent by Joseph were beginning to arrive in the vicinity of Burgos,
recrossed the river, and after a long chase escaped in the mountains
of Espinosa. Sarrut having captured a few gun-carriages and one of
Longa’s forest dépôts of ammunition, returned towards Bilbao, and
Foy immediately marched from that place against the two remaining
battalions of Biscay volunteers, which under the chiefs Mugartegui
and Artola were now at Villaro and Guernica.
These battalions, each a thousand strong, raised by conscription, and
officered from the best families, were the champions of Biscay; but
though brave and well-equipped, the difficulty of crushing them and
the volunteers of Guipuscoa, was not great, because neither would
leave their own peculiar provinces. The third battalion had been
already dispersed in the district of Incartaciones, and Foy having
in the night of the 29th combined the march of several columns to
surround Villaro, fell at day-break upon Mugartegui’s battalion
and dispersed it with the loss of all its baggage. Two hundred of
the volunteers immediately returned to their homes, and the French
general marched rapidly, through Durango, against Artola, who was at
Guernica. The Italians who were still at Bilbao, immediately turned
Guernica on the west by Mungia, while a French column turned it
eastward by Marquinez; then Artola fled to Lequitio, but the column
from Marquinez, coming over the mountain, fell upon his right flank
just as he was defiling by a narrow way along the sea-coast. Artola
himself escaped, but two hundred Biscayens were killed or drowned,
more than three hundred with twenty-seven officers were taken, and
two companies which formed his rear-guard dispersed in the mountains,
and some men finding a few boats rowed to an English vessel. The
perfect success of this action, which did not cost the French a
man killed or wounded, was attributed to the talents and vigour of
captain Guinget, the daring officer who won the passage of the Douro
at Tordesillas in Wellington’s retreat from Burgos.
When the three battalions of Biscay were thus disposed of, all their
magazines, hospitals, and dépôts fell into Foy’s hands, the junta
dispersed, the privateers quitted the coast for Santander, Pastor
abandoned Guipuscoa, and the Italians recovered Bermeo from which the
garrison fled to the English ships. They also destroyed the works
of the little island of Isaro, which being situated three thousand
yards from the shore, and having no access to the summit, save by
a staircase cut in the rock, was deemed impregnable, and used as
a dépôt for the English stores; but this was the last memorable
exploit of Palombini’s division in the north. That general himself
had already gone to Italy to join Napoleon’s reserves, and his
troops being ordered to march by Aragon to join Suchet, were in
movement, when new events caused them to remain in Guipuscoa, with
the reputation of being brave and active but ferocious soldiers,
barbarous and devastating, differing little from their Roman
ancestors.
It has been already observed that, during these double operations
of the French on the coast and in Navarre, the partidas had fallen
upon the line of communication with France, thus working out the
third branch of the insurrectional warfare. Their success went nigh
to balance all their losses on each flank. For Mendizabel settled
with Longa’s partida upon the line between Burgos and Miranda de
Ebro; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay, and part of Pastor’s bands
concentrated on the mountains of Arlaban above the defiles of Salinas
and Descarga; Merino and Salazar came up from the country between
the Ebro and the Duero; and the three battalions left by Mina in the
Amescoa, after escaping from Taupin, reassembled close to Vittoria.
Every convoy and every courier’s escort was attacked at one or other
of these points without hindering Mendizabel from making sudden
descents towards the coast when occasion offered. Thus, on the 11th
of April, as we have seen, he attacked Bilbao. On the 25th of April
Longa, who had four thousand men and several guns, was repulsed at
Armiñion, between Miranda and Trevino, by some of the drafted men
going to France; but on the 3d of May at the same place Longa met and
obliged a large convoy, coming from Castile with an escort of eight
hundred men, to return to Miranda, and even cannonaded that place
on the 5th. Thouvenot the commandant of the government, immediately
detached twelve hundred men and three guns from Vittoria to relieve
the convoy; but then Mina’s battalions endeavoured to escalade
Salvatierra, and they were repulsed with difficulty. Meanwhile the
volunteers of Alava gathered above the pass of Salinas to intercept
the rescued convoy, and finding that the latter would not stir
from Vittoria, they went on the 10th to aid in a fresh attack on
Salvatierra; being again repulsed they returned to the Arlaban, where
they captured a courier with a strong escort in the pass of Descarga
near Villa Real. A French regiment sent to succour Salvatierra
finally drove these volunteers towards Bilbao where, as we have seen,
Foy routed them, but Longa continued to infest the post of Armiñion
until Sarrut arriving from the siege of Castro chased him also.
[Sidenote: June.]
Notwithstanding these successes Clauzel, whose troops were worn
out with fatigue, declared that it would require fifty thousand
men and three months’ time to quell the insurrection entirely. And
Napoleon more discontented than ever with the king, complained that
the happy enterprizes of Clauzel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had
brought no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his orders about
the posts and the infantry escorts had been neglected; that the
reinforcements sent to the north from Castile had gone slowly and in
succession instead of at once; finally that the cautious movement
of concentration by the other armies was inexcusable, since the
inaction of the allies, their distance, their want of transport,
their ordinary and even timid circumspection in any operation out of
the ordinary course, enabled the French to act in the most convenient
manner. The growing dissentions between the English and the
Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, and the changes in his
army, were, he said, all favourable circumstances for the French, but
the king had taken no advantage of them; the insurrection continued,
and the object of interest was now changed. Joseph defended himself
with more vehemence than reason against these charges, but Wellington
soon vindicated Napoleon’s judgement, and the voice of controversy
was smothered by the din of battle, for the English general was again
abroad in his strength, and the clang of his arms resounded through
the Peninsula.