[Sidenote: 1813.]
While the French power in Spain was being disorganized by the various
circumstances related in the former chapter, Lord Wellington’s
diligence and energy had reorganized the allied army with greater
strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry,
had come out from England. The efficiency and the spirit of the
Portuguese had been restored in a surprizing manner, and discipline
had been vindicated, in both services, with a rough but salutary
hand; rank had not screened offenders; some had been arrested,
some tried, some dismissed for breach of duty; the negligent were
terrified, the zealous encouraged; in short every department was
reformed with vigour, and it was full time. Confidential officers
commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals and dépôts,
those asylums for malingerers, discovered and drove so many skulkers
to their duty, that the second division alone recovered six hundred
bayonets in one month; and this salutary scouring was rendered more
efficient by the establishment of both permanent, and ambulent
regimental hospitals, a wise measure, and founded on a principle
which cannot be too widely extended; for it is certain that as the
character of a battalion depends on its fitness for service, a moral
force will always be brought to bear upon the execution of orders
under regimental controul which it is in vain to look for elsewhere.
The Douro had been rendered navigable as high up as Castillo de Alva
above the confluence of the Agueda; a pontoon train of thirty-five
pieces had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction had
been built to repair the great loss of mules during the retreat
from Burgos, and a recruit of these animals was also obtained by
emissaries who purchased them with English merchandize, even at
Madrid, under the beards of the enemy, and at the very time when
Clauzel was unable for want of transport to fill the magazines of
Burgos. The ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had been laid
aside for lighter vessels carried by men, the mules being destined
to carry tents instead; it is, however, doubtful if these tents were
really useful on a march in wet weather, because when soaked they
became too heavy for the animal, and seldom arrived in time for use
at the end of a march. Their greatest advantage was found when the
soldiers halted for a few days. Beside these amendments many other
changes and improvements had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese
troops conscious of a superior organization, were more proudly
confident than ever, while the French were again depressed by
intelligence of the defection of the Prussians following on the
disasters in Russia. Nor had the English general failed to amend
the condition of those Spanish troops which the Cortez had placed
at his disposal. By a strict and jealous watch over the application
of the subsidy he had kept them clothed and fed during the winter,
and now reaped the benefit by having several powerful bodies fit
to act in conjunction with his own forces. Wherefore being thus
prepared he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the effects
of his Portuguese political difficulties as well as to keep pace with
Napoleon’s efforts in Germany, and his army was ready to take the
field in April, but he could not concentrate before the green forage
was fit for use, and deferred the execution of his plan until May.
What that plan was and what the means for executing it shall now be
shewn.
[Sidenote: May.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 18.]
The relative strength of the contending armies in the Peninsula
was no longer in favour of the French. Their force which at the
termination of Wellington’s retreat into Portugal was above two
hundred and sixty thousand men and thirty-two thousand horses, two
hundred and sixteen thousand being present with the eagles, was
by the loss in subsequent operations, and by drafts for the army
in Germany reduced in March, 1813, to two hundred and thirty-one
thousand men and twenty-nine thousand horses. Thirty thousand of
these were in hospital, and only one hundred and ninety-seven
thousand men, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with
the eagles. Of this number sixty-eight thousand including sick, were
in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. The remainder with the exception
of the ten thousand left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern
line of communication, from the Tormes to Bayonne, and it has been
already shewn how scattered and how occupied.
But Wellington had so well used the five months’ cessation of active
operations that nearly two hundred thousand allied troops were ready
to take the field, and on each flank there was a British fleet, now a
more effective aid than before, because the French lines of retreat
run parallel to, and near the sea-coast on each side of Spain, and
every part opened by the advance of the allies would furnish a fresh
dépôt for the subsistence of their armies. This mass of troops was
composed in the following manner.
The first army under Copons nominally ten thousand, really about six
thousand strong, was in Catalonia.
The second army under Elio was in Murcia about twenty thousand,
including the divisions of Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and
Empecinado.
The Anglo-Sicilian army under Murray, near Alicant, about sixteen
thousand.
The third army under Del Parque, in the Morena about twelve thousand.
The first army of reserve under the Conde d’Abispal, in Andalusia,
about fifteen thousand.
The fourth army, under Castaños, which included the Spanish divisions
in Estremadura, Julian Sanchez’ Partida and the Gallicians under
Giron, the Asturians under Porlier and Barceña, together with the
Partidas of Longa and Mina, likewise belonged to this army and were
mustered amongst its divisions. This army was computed at forty
thousand men, to which may be added the minor bands and volunteers in
various parts.
Lastly there was the noble Anglo-Portuguese army which now furnished
more than seventy thousand fighting men, with ninety pieces of
artillery; and the real difference between the French and the
allies was greater than the apparent difference. The French returns
included officers, sergeants, drummers, artillery-men, engineers, and
waggoners, whereas the allies’ numbers were all sabres and bayonets.
Moreover this statement of the French number was on the 15th of
March, and as there were drafts made by Napoleon after that period,
and as Clauzel and Foy’s losses, and the reserves at Bayonne must be
deducted, it would be probably more correct to assume that the whole
number of sabres and bayonets in June, was not more than one hundred
and sixty thousand, of which one hundred and ten thousand were on the
northern line of invasion.
The campaign of 1812 had taught the English general the strength of
the French lines of defence, especially on the Duero, which they had
since entrenched in different parts, and most of the bridges over
it, he had himself destroyed in his retreat. But for many reasons it
was not advisable to operate in the central provinces of Spain. The
country there was exhausted, the lines of supply would be longer and
more exposed, the army further removed from the sea, the Gallicians
could not be easily brought down to co-operate, the services of the
northern Partidas would not be so advantageous, and the ultimate
result would be less decisive than operations against the great
line of communication with France; wherefore against the northern
provinces he had early resolved to direct his attack and had well
considered how to evade those lines which he could scarcely hope to
force.
All the enemy’s defences on the Lower Duero could be turned by a
movement on the right, across the Upper Tormes, and from thence
skirting the mountains towards the Upper Duero; but that line
although most consonant to the rules of art, because the army would
thus be kept in one mass, led through a very difficult and wasted
country, the direct aid of the Gallicians must have been dispensed
with, and moreover it was there the French looked for the allies.
Hence Wellington resolved not to operate by his right, and with great
skill and dexterity, he had by the disposition of his troops in
winter-quarters, by false reports and false movements masked his real
intentions. For the gathering of the Partidas in the valley of the
Tagus, the demonstrations made in Estremadura and La Mancha by Penne
Villemur, Morillo and Del Parque’s army, together with the presence
of Hill at Coria, that general’s hold of the passes of Bejar, and the
magazines formed there, all intimated a design of moving either by
the valley of the Tagus or by the district of Avila; and the great
magazines collected at Celerico, Viseu, Penamacor, Almeida, and
Ciudad Rodrigo, in no manner belied the other indications. But half
the army widely cantoned in the interior of Portugal, apparently for
the sake of subsistence or health, was really so placed as to be in
the direction of the true line of operations which was by the left
through the Tras os Montes.
Wellington’s plan was to pass the Duero, within the Portuguese
frontier, with a part of his army; to ascend the right bank of that
river towards Zamora, and then crossing the Esla, to unite with the
Gallician forces, while the remainder of the army, advancing from the
Agueda, forced the passage of the Tormes. By this great movement,
which he hoped to effect so suddenly that the king would not have
time to concentrate the French armies in opposition, the front of the
allies would be changed to their right, the Duero and the Pisuerga
would be turned, and the enemy forced in confusion over the Carion.
Then with his powerful army well in hand the English general could
march in advance without fear, strong enough to fight and strong
enough to turn the right flank of any position which the French might
take up; and with this advantage also, that at each step he would
gain additional help by the junction of the irregular Spanish forces
until he gave his hand to the insurgents in Biscay, and every port
opened would furnish him a new dépôt and magazines.
But in executing this movement the army would necessarily be divided
into three separate divisions each too weak to beat the whole French
force singly; the march of the centre division by the Tras os Montes,
upon the nice execution of which the concentration of the whole
depended, would be through an extremely difficult and mountainous
country, and there were three great rivers to pass. The operation
was therefore one of extreme delicacy requiring nice and extensive
arrangements; yet there was not much danger to be apprehended from
failure; because as each separate corps had a strong country to
retire upon, the probable extent of the mischief would only be the
loss of time, and the disadvantage of pursuing other operations when
the harvest being ripe the French could easily keep in masses. The
secret then was to hide the true plan as long as possible, to gain
some marches for the centre corps, and by all means to keep the
French so scattered and occupied by minor combinations, that they
should be unable to assemble in time to profit from their central
positions. Now the bridge equipage being prepared at Abrantes in the
interior of Portugal was unknown, and gave no intimation of the real
design, for the bullocks which drew it came with cars from Spain to
Lamego and from thence went down to Abrantes; the free navigation of
the Douro up to the Agueda was more conducive to a movement by the
right, and it furnished abundance of large boats wherewith to pass
that river without creating any suspicion from their presence; the
wide cantonments of the allies permitted various changes of quarters
under the pretence of sickness, and the troops thus gradually closed
upon the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier, unobserved of the
enemy who was likewise deceived by many reports purposely spread
abroad. The menacing head which Hill, and the Spaniards in southern
Estremadura and Andalusia, carried towards the valley of the Tagus
and towards the Avila district, also contributed to draw the enemy’s
attention away from the true point of danger; but more than all other
things the vigorous excitement of the insurrection in the north
occupied the French, scattered their forces, and rendered the success
of the English general’s plan nearly certain.
[Sidenote: 1813.]
Neither did lord Wellington fail to give ample employment to Suchet’s
forces, for his wings were spread for a long flight even to the
Pyrennees, and he had no desire to find that marshal’s army joined
with the other French forces on the Ebro. The lynx eyes of Napoleon
had scanned this point of war also, and both the king and Clauzel
had received orders to establish the shortest and most certain line
of correspondence possible with Suchet, because the emperor’s plan
contemplated the arrival of the army of Aragon in the north, but
Wellington furnished a task for it elsewhere. Sir John Murray as we
have seen, had just repulsed the French at Castalla, and general
Frere’s cavalry had joined the Andalusian reserve under Abispal,
but Elio with the third army remained near Alicant and Wellington
destined Del Parque’s army to join him. This with the Anglo-Sicilian
army made more than fifty thousand men, including the divisions of
Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and other partizans always lying
on Suchet’s right flank and rear. Now with such a force, or even half
this number of good troops, the simplest plan would have been to
turn Suchet’s right flank and bring him to action with his back to
the sea; but the Spanish armies were not efficient for such work and
Wellington’s instructions were adapted to the actual circumstances.
To win the open part of the kingdom, to obtain a permanent footing
on the coast beyond the Ebro, and to force the enemy from the lower
line of that river by acting in conjunction with the Catalans, these
were the three objects which Wellington proposed to reach and in the
following manner. Murray was to sail against Taragona, to save it
Suchet would have to weaken his army in Valencia; Elio and Del Parque
might then seize that kingdom. If Taragona fell, good. If the French
proved too strong, Murray could return instantly by sea, and secure
possession of the country gained by the Spanish generals. These last
were however to remain strictly on the defensive until Murray’s
operations drew Suchet away, for they were not able to fight alone,
and above all things it was necessary to avoid a defeat which would
leave the French general free to move to the aid of the king.
The force necessary to attack Taragona Wellington judged at ten
thousand, and if Murray could not embark that number there was
another mode of operating. Some Spanish divisions, to go by sea,
were then to reinforce Copons in Catalonia and enable him to hold
the country between Taragona, Tortoza, and Lerida; meanwhile Murray
and Elio were to advance against Suchet in front, and Del Parque
in conjunction with the Portuguese troops to turn his right flank
by Requeña; and this operation was to be repeated until the allies
communicated with Copons by their left, the partizans advancing in
proportion and cutting off all communication with the northern parts
of Spain. Thus in either case Suchet would be kept away from the
Upper Ebro, and there was no reason to expect any interruption from
that quarter.
But Wellington was not aware that the infantry of the army of
Portugal were beyond the Ebro; the spies deceived by the multitude
of detachments passing in and out of the Peninsula supposed the
divisions which reinforced Clauzel to be fresh conscripts from
France; the arrangements for the opening of the campaign were
therefore made in the expectation of meeting a very powerful force
in Leon. Hence Freire’s cavalry, and the Andalusian reserve under
the Conde de Abispal, received orders to march upon Almaraz, to
pass the Tagus there by a pontoon bridge which was established
for them, and then crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, to
march upon Valladolid while the Partidas of that quarter should
harass the march of Leval from Madrid. Meanwhile the Spanish troops
in Estremadura were to join those forces on the Agueda which were
destined to force the passage of the Tormes. The Gallicians under
Giron were to come down to the Esla, and unite with the corps
destined to pass that river and turn the line of the Duero. Thus
seventy thousand Portuguese and British, eight thousand Spaniards
from Estremadura, and twelve thousand Gallicians, that is to say,
ninety thousand fighting men would be suddenly placed on a new front,
and marching abreast against the surprised and separated masses of
the enemy would drive them refluent to the Pyrennees. A grand design
and grandly it was executed! For high in heart and strong of hand
Wellington’s veterans marched to the encounter, the glories of twelve
victories played about their bayonets, and he the leader so proud
and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier
of Spain, he rose in his stirrups and waving his hand cried out
“Farewell Portugal!”
But while straining every nerve, and eager to strike, as well to
escape from the Portuguese politics as to keep pace with Napoleon’s
efforts in Germany, the English general was mortified by having again
to discuss the question of a descent on Italy. Lord William Bentinck
had relinquished his views upon that country with great reluctance,
and now, thinking affairs more favourable than ever, again proposed
to land at Naples, and put forward the duke of Orleans or the
arch-duke Francis. He urged in favour of this project the weak state
of Murat’s kingdom, the favourable disposition of the inhabitants,
the offer of fifteen thousand auxiliary Russians made by admiral
Grieg, the shock which would be given to Napoleon’s power, and the
more effectual diversion in favour of Spain. He supported his opinion
by an intercepted letter of the queen of Naples to Napoleon, and by
other authentic documents, and thus, at the moment of execution,
Wellington’s vast plans were to be disarranged to meet a new scheme
of war which he had already discussed and disapproved of, and which,
however promising in itself, would inevitably divide the power of
England and weaken the operations in both countries.
His reply was decisive. His opinion on the state of affairs in
Sicily was, he said, not changed, by the intercepted letters, as
Murat evidently thought himself strong enough to attack the allies.
Lord William Bentinck should not land in Italy with less than forty
thousand men of all arms perfectly equipped, since that army would
have to depend upon its own means and to overcome all opposition
before it could expect the people to aid or even to cease to oppose
it. The information stated that the people looked for protection from
the French and they preferred England to Austria. There could be no
doubt of this, the Austrians would demand provisions and money and
would insist upon governing them in return, whereas the English would
as elsewhere defray their own expenses and probably give a subsidy in
addition. The south of Italy was possibly for many reasons the best
place next to the Spanish Peninsula for the operations of a British
army, and it remained for the government to choose whether they would
adopt an attack on the former upon such a scale as he had alluded to.
But of one thing they might be certain, that if it were commenced on
a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the
last, and by raising, feeding, and clothing armies of the natives,
the plan would fail and the troops would re-embark with loss and
disgrace.
[Sidenote: April.]
This remonstrance at last fixed the wavering judgment of the
ministers, and Wellington was enabled to proceed with his own plans.
He designed to open the campaign in the beginning of May, and as the
green forage was well advanced, on the 21st of April, he directed
Murray, Del Parque, Elio, and Copons to commence their operations
on the eastern coast; Abispal and Freire were already in march and
expected at Almaraz on the 24th; the Spanish divisions of Estremadura
had come up to the Coa, and the divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese
force were gradually closing to the front. But heavy rains broke
up the roads, and the cumbrous pontoon train being damaged, on its
way from the interior, did not reach Sabugal before the 13th and
was not repaired before the 15th. Thus the opening of the campaign
was delayed, yet the check proved of little consequence, for on the
French side nothing was prepared to meet the danger.
[Sidenote: May.]
Napoleon had urged the king to send his heavy baggage and stores to
the rear and to fix his hospitals and dépôts at Burgos, Vittoria,
Pampeluna, Tolosa, and San Sebastian. In neglect of this the
impediments remained with the armies, the sick were poured along the
communications, and in disorder thrown upon Clauzel at the moment
when that general was scarcely able to make head against the northern
insurrection.
Napoleon had early and clearly fixed the king’s authority as
generalissimo and forbad him to exercise his monarchical authority
towards the French armies. Joseph was at this moment in high dispute
with all his generals upon those very points.
Napoleon had directed the king to enlarge and strengthen the works of
Burgos castle and to form magazines in that place, and at Santona,
for the use of the armies in the field. At this time no magazines
had been formed at either place, and although a commencement had been
made to strengthen the castle of Burgos, it was not yet capable of
sustaining four hours’ bombardment and offered no support for the
armies.
Napoleon had desired that a more secure and shorter line of
correspondence than that by Zaragoza should be established with
Suchet; for his plan embraced though it did not prescribe the march
of that general upon Zarogoza, and he had warned the king repeatedly
how dangerous it would be to have Suchet isolated and unconnected
with the northern operations. Nevertheless the line of correspondence
remained the same and the allies possessed the means of excising
Suchet’s army from the operations in the north.
Napoleon had long and earnestly urged the king to put down the
northern insurrection in time to make head against the allies on
the Tormes. Now when the English general was ready to act, that
insurrection was in full activity, and all the army of the north and
the greatest part of the army of Portugal was employed to suppress it
instead of being on the lower Duero.
Napoleon had clearly explained to the king the necessity of keeping
his troops concentrated towards the Tormes in an offensive position,
and he had desired that Madrid might be held in such a manner that it
could be abandoned in a moment. The campaign was now being opened,
the French armies were scattered, Leval was encumbered at Madrid,
with a part of the civil administration, with large stores and parcs
of artillery, and with the care of families attached to Joseph’s
court, while the other generals were stretching their imaginations
to devise which of the several projects open to him Wellington
would adopt. Would he force the passage of the Tormes and the Duero
with his whole army, and thus turn the French right? Would he march
straight upon Madrid either by the district of Avila or by the valley
of the Tagus or by both; and would he then operate against the north,
or upon Zaragoza, or towards the south in co-operation with the
Anglo-Sicilians? Every thing was vague, uncertain, confused.
The generals complained that the king’s conduct was not military, and
Napoleon told him if he would command an army he must give himself
up entirely to it, thinking of nothing else; but Joseph was always
demanding gold when he should have trusted to iron. His skill was
unequal to the arrangements and combinations for taking an initiatory
and offensive position, and he could neither discover nor force his
adversary to show his real design. Hence the French armies were
thrown upon a timid defensive system, and every movement of the
allies necessarily produced alarm, and the dislocation of troops
without an object. The march of Del Parque’s army towards Alcaraz,
and that of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, towards the
Agueda, in the latter end of April were judged to be the commencement
of a general movement against Madrid, because the first was covered
by the advance of some cavalry into La Mancha, and the second by the
concentration of the Partidas, in the valley of the Tagus. Thus the
whole French army was shaken by the demonstration of a few horsemen,
for when Leval took the alarm, Gazan marched towards the Guadarama
with three divisions, and D’Erlon gathered the army of the centre
around Segovia.
Early in May a fifth division of the army of Portugal was employed
on the line of communication at Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca,
and Reille remained at Valladolid with only one division of infantry
and his guns, his cavalry being on the Esla. D’Erlon was then at
Segovia and Gazan at Arevalo, Conroux’s division was at Avila, and
Leval still at Madrid with outposts at Toledo. The king who was at
Valladolid could not therefore concentrate more than thirty-five
thousand infantry on the Duero. He had indeed nine thousand
excellent cavalry and one hundred pieces of artillery, but with such
dispositions to concentrate for a battle in advance was not to be
thought of, and the first decided movement of the allies was sure to
roll his scattered forces back in confusion. The lines of the Tormes
and the Duero were effaced from the system of operations.
About the middle of May, D’Armagnac’s division of the army of the
centre came to Valladolid, Villatte’s division of the army of the
south reinforced by some cavalry occupied the line of the Tormes from
Alba to Ledesma. Daricau’s, Digeon’s, and D’Armagnac’s divisions were
at Zamora, Toro, and other places on both sides of the Duero, and
Reille’s cavalry was still on the Esla. The front of the French was
thus defined by these rivers, for the left was covered by the Tormes,
the centre by the Duero, the right by the Esla. Gazan’s head-quarters
were at Arevalo, D’Erlon’s at Segovia, and the point of concentration
was at Valladolid; but Conroux was at Avila, and Leval being still
at Madrid was thrown entirely out of the circle of operations. At
this moment Wellington entered upon what has been in England called,
not very appropriately, the march to Vittoria. That march was but one
portion of the action. The concentration of the army on the banks of
the Duero was the commencement, the movement towards the Ebro and
the passage of that river was the middle, the battle of Vittoria was
the catastrophe, and the crowning of the Pyrennees the end of the
splendid drama.