OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE TAGUS.
[Sidenote: 1813. February.]
In December 1812 general Copons had been appointed captain-general
of Catalonia instead of Eroles, but his arrival was delayed and the
province was not relieved from Lacy’s mischievous sway until February
1813, when Eroles, taking the temporary command, re-established the
head-quarters at Vich. The French, being then unmolested, save by the
English ships, passed an enormous convoy to France, but Eroles was
not long idle. Through the medium of a double spy, he sent a forged
letter to the governor of Taragona, desiring him to detach men to
Villa Nueva de Sitjes, with carts to transport some stores; at the
same time he gave out that he was himself going to the Cerdaña, which
brought the French moveable column to that quarter, and then, Eroles,
Manso, and Villamil, making forced marches from different points,
reached Torre dem barra where they met the British squadron. The
intention was to cut off the French detachment on its march to Villa
Nueva and then to attack Taragona, but fortune rules in war; the
governor received a letter from Maurice Mathieu of a different tenor
from the forged letter, and with all haste regaining his fortress
balked this well-contrived plan.
Sarzfield, at enmity with Eroles, was now combining his operations
with Villa Campa, and they menaced Alcanitz in Aragon; but general
Pannetier who had remained at Teruel to watch Villa Campa, and to
protect Suchet’s communications, immediately marched to Daroca,
Severoli came from Zaragoza to the same point, and the Spaniards,
alarmed by their junction, dispersed. Sarzfield returned to
Catalonia, Bassecour and the Empecinado remained near Cuenca, and
Villa Campa as usual hung upon the southern skirts of the Albaracyn
mountain, ready to pounce down on the Ebro or on the Guadalquivir
side as advantage might offer. Meanwhile Suchet was by no means
at ease. The successes in Catalonia did not enable him to draw
reinforcements from thence, because Napoleon, true to his principle
of securing the base of operations, forbad him to weaken the army
there, and Montmarie’s brigade was detached from Valencia to preserve
the communication between Saguntum and Tortoza. But Aragon which was
Suchet’s place of arms and principal magazine, being infested by
Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and Sarzfield, was becoming
daily more unquiet, wherefore Pannetier’s brigade remained between
Segorbé and Daroca to aid Severoli. Thus although the two armies of
Aragon and Catalonia mustered more than seventy thousand men, that
of Aragon alone having forty thousand, with fifty field-pieces,
Suchet could not fight with more than sixteen thousand infantry,
two thousand cavalry and perhaps thirty guns beyond the Xucar. His
right flank was always liable to be turned by Requeña, his left by
the sea which was entirely at his adversary’s command, and his front
was menaced by fifty thousand men, of which three thousand might be
cavalry with fifty pieces of artillery.
The component parts of the allied force were the Anglo-Sicilians
which, including Whittingham’s and Roche’s divisions, furnished
eighteen thousand soldiers. Elio’s army furnishing twelve thousand
exclusive of the divisions of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the
Empecinado, which, though detached, belonged to him. Del Parque’s
army reinforced by new levies from Andalusia, and on paper twenty
thousand. Numerically this was a formidable power if it had
been directed in mass against Suchet; but on his right the duke
of Dalmatia, whose head-quarters were at Toledo, sent forward
detachments which occupied the army of Del Parque; moreover the
secret negociations for the defection of the latter were now in
full activity, and from the army of the centre a column was sent
towards Cuenca to draw Bassecour and the Empecinado from Suchet’s
right flank; but those chiefs had five thousand men, and in return
continually harassed the army of the centre.
[Sidenote: 1813.]
On the side of the Morena and Murcia, Soult’s operations were
confined to skirmishes and foraging parties. Early in January his
brother, seeking to open a communication with Suchet by Albacete,
defeated some of Elio’s cavalry with the loss of fifty men, and
pursued them until they rallied on their main body, under Freyre;
the latter offered battle with nine hundred horsemen in front of
the defile leading to Albacete; but Soult, disliking his appearance
turned off to the right, and passing through Villa Nueva de los
Infantes joined a French post established in Valdepeña at the foot
of the Morena, where some skirmishes had also taken place with Del
Parque’s cavalry. The elder Soult thus learned, that Freyre, with two
thousand five hundred horsemen, covered all the roads leading from La
Mancha, to Valencia and Murcia; that Elio’s infantry was at Tobara
and Hellin, Del Parque’s head-quarters at Jaen; that the passes of
the Morena were guarded, and magazines formed at Andujar, Linares,
and Cordoba, while on the other side of La Mancha, the Empecinado had
come to Hinojoso with fifteen hundred horsemen, and the column sent
from the army of the centre was afraid to encounter him.
These dispositions, and the strength of the Spaniards, not only
prevented the younger Soult from penetrating into Murcia, but delayed
the march of a column, under general Daricau, destined to communicate
with Suchet, and bring up the detachments baggage and stores, which
the armies of the south and centre had left at Valencia. The scouting
parties of both sides now met at different points, and on the 27th
of January, a sharp cavalry fight happened at El Corral, in which
the French commander was killed, and the Spaniards, though far the
most numerous, defeated. Meanwhile Daricau, whose column had been
reinforced, reached Utiel, opened the communication with Suchet by
Requeña, cut off some small parties of the enemy, and then continuing
his march received a great convoy, consisting of two thousand
fighting men, six hundred travellers, and the stores and baggage
belonging to Soult’s and the king’s armies. This convoy had marched
for Madrid by the way of Zaragoza, but was recalled when Daricau
arrived, and under his escort, aided by a detachment of Suchet’s army
placed at Yniesta, it reached Todelo in the latter end of February
safely, though Villa Campa came down to the Cabriel River, to trouble
the march.
During these different operations numerous absurd and contradictory
reports, principally originating in the Spanish and English
newspapers, obtained credit in the French armies, such as, that sir
Henry Wellesley and Infantado had seized the government at Cadiz;
that Clinton, by an intrigue, had got possession of Alicant; that
Ballesteros had shewn Wellington secret orders from the cortez not
to acknowledge him as generalissimo, or even as a grandee; that
the cortez had removed the regency because the latter permitted
Wellington to appoint intendants and other officers to the Spanish
provinces; that Hill had devastated the frontier and retired
to Lisbon though forcibly opposed by Morillo; that a nephew of
Ballesteros had raised the standard of revolt; that Wellington was
advancing, and that troops had been embarked at Lisbon for a maritime
expedition, with other stories of a like nature, which seem to have
disturbed all the French generals save Soult, whose information as
to the real state of affairs continued to be sure and accurate. He
also at this time detected four or five of Wellington’s emissaries,
amongst them, was a Portuguese officer on his own staff; a man called
Piloti, who served and betrayed both sides; and an amazon called
Francisca de la Fuerte, who, though only twenty-two years old, had
already commanded a partida of sixty men with some success, and was
now a spy. But in the latter end of February the duke of Dalmatia was
recalled, and the command of his army fell to Gazan, whose movements
belong rather to the operations north of the Tagus. Wherefore turning
to Suchet, I shall proceed to give an exact notion of his resources
and of the nature of the country where his operations were conducted.
[Sidenote: See Plan 6.]
The city of Valencia, though nominally the seat of his power, was
not so. He had razed all the defences constructed by the Spaniards,
confining his hold to the old walls and to a small fortified post
within the town sufficient to resist a sudden attack, and capable of
keeping the population in awe; his real place of arms was Saguntum,
and between that and Tortoza he had two fortresses, namely, Oropesa
and Peniscola; he had also another line of communication, but for
infantry only, through Morella, a fortified post, to Mequinenza.
Besides these lines there were roads both from Valencia and Saguntum,
leading through Segorbé to Teruel a fortified post, and from thence
to Zaragoza by Daroca another fortified post. These roads were
eastward of the Guadalaviar, and westward of that river Suchet had
a line of retreat from Valencia to Madrid by Requeña, which was
also a fortified post. Now if the whole of the French general’s
command be looked to, his forces were very numerous, but that command
was wide, and in the field his army was, as I have before shewn,
not very numerous. Valencia was in fact a point made on hostile
ground which, now that the French were generally on the defensive,
was only maintained with a view of imposing upon the allies and
drawing forth the resources of the country as long as circumstances
would permit. The proper line for covering Valencia and the rich
country immediately around it was on the Xucar, or rather beyond
it, at San Felippe de Xativa and Moxente, where a double range of
mountains afforded strong defensive positions, barring the principal
roads leading to Valencia. On this position Suchet had formed his
entrenched camp, much talked of at the time, but slighter than fame
represented it; the real strength was in the natural formation of the
ground.
[Sidenote: February.]
[Sidenote: See Plan 7.]
Beyond his left flank the coast road was blocked by the castle of
Denia, but his right could be turned from Yecla and Almanza, through
Cofrentes and Requeña, and he was forced to keep strict watch and
strong detachments always towards the defile of Almanza, lest Elio’s
army and Del Parque’s should march that way. This entrenched camp was
Suchet’s permanent position of defence, but there were reasons why
he should endeavour to keep his troops generally more advanced; the
country in his front was full of fertile plains, or rather coves,
within the hills, which run in nearly parallel ranges, and are
remarkably rocky and precipitous, enclosing the plains like walls,
and it was of great importance who should command their resources.
Hence as the principal point in Suchet’s front was the large and
flourishing town of Alcoy, he occupied it, and from thence threw
off smaller bodies to Biar, Castalla, Ibi, and Onil, which were on
the same strong ridge as the position covering the cove of Alcoy.
On his right there was another plain in which Fuente La Higuera,
Villena, and Yecla were delineated at opposite points of a triangle,
and as this plain and the smaller valleys ministered to Suchet’s
wants because of his superior cavalry, the subsistence of the French
troops was eased, while the cantonments and foraging districts of the
Sicilian army were contracted: the outposts of the allied army were
in fact confined to a fourth and fifth parallel range of mountains
covering the towns of Elda, Tibi, Xixona, and Villa Joyosa which was
on the sea-coast.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16, 17.]
Suchet thus assumed an insulting superiority over an army more
numerous than his own, but outward appearances are deceitful in
war; the French general was really the strongest, because want,
ignorance, dissention, and even treachery, were in his adversary’s
camps. Del Parque’s army remained behind the Morena, Elio’s was at
Tobarra and Hellin, and of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the British
only were available in the hour of danger, and they were few. When
general Campbell quarrelled with Elio the latter retired for a time
towards Murcia, but after Wellington’s journey to Cadiz he again came
forward, and his cavalry entering La Mancha skirmished with general
Soult’s and communicating with Bassecour and the Empecinado delayed
the progress of Daricau towards Valencia. Meanwhile general Campbell
remained quiet, in expectation that lord William Bentinck would come
with more troops to Alicant, but in February fresh troubles broke
out in Sicily, and in the latter end of that month sir John Murray
arriving, assumed the command. Thus in a few months, five chiefs with
different views and prejudices successively came to the command,
and the army was still unorganized and unequipped for vigorous
service. The Sicilians, Calabrese, and French belonging to it were
eager to desert, one Italian regiment had been broken for misconduct
by general Maitland, the British and Germans were humiliated in
spirit by the part they were made to enact, and the Spaniards under
Whittingham and Roche were starving; for Wellington knowing by
experience how the Spanish government, though receiving a subsidy,
would, if permitted, throw the feeding of their troops entirely upon
the British, forbade their being supplied from the British stores,
and the Spanish intendants neglected them.
[Sidenote: General Donkin’s papers.]
Murray’s first care was to improve the equipment of his troops, and
with the aid of Elio he soon put them in a better condition. The two
armies together furnished thirty thousand effective men, of which
about three thousand were cavalry, and they had thirty-seven guns,
yet very inadequately horsed, and Whittingham’s and Elio’s cavalry
were from want of forage nearly unfit for duty. The transport mules
were hired at an enormous price, the expense being at the rate of one
hundred and thirty thousand pounds annually, and yet the supply was
bad, for here as in all other parts of Spain, corruption and misuse
of authority prevailed. The rich sent their fine animals to Alicant
for sanctuary and bribed the Alcaldes, the mules of the poor alone
were pressed, the army was ill provided, and yet the country was
harassed. In this state it was necessary to do something, and as the
distress of Whittingham and Roche’s troops could not be removed, save
by enlarging their cantonments, Murray after some hesitation resolved
to drive the French from the mountains in his front, and he designed,
as the first step, to surprise fifteen hundred men which they had
placed in Alcoy. Now five roads led towards the French positions. 1º.
On the left the great road from Alicant passing through Monforte,
Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, where it joins the
great road from Valencia to Madrid, which runs through Almanza. This
way turned both the ridges occupied by the armies. 2º. A good road
leading by Tibi to Castalla, from whence it sent off two branches,
on the left hand, one leading to Sax, the other through the pass of
Biar to Villena; two other branches on the right hand went, the one
through Ibi to Alcoy, the other through Onil to the same place. 3º.
The road from Alicant to Xixona, a bad road, leading over the very
steep rugged ridge of that name to Alcoy. At Xixona also there was a
narrow way on the right hand, through the mountains to Alcoy, which
was followed by Roche when he attacked that place in the first battle
of Castalla. 4º. A carriage-road running along the sea-coast as far
as Villa Joyosa, from whence a narrow mountain-way leads to the
village of Consentayna, situated in the cove of Alcoy and behind that
town.
[Sidenote: March.]
On the 6th of March the allied troops moved in four columns, one
on the left by Elda, to watch the great Madrid road; one on the
right composed of Spanish troops under colonel Campbell, from Villa
Joyosa, to get to Consentayna behind Alcoy; a third, under lord
Frederick Bentinck, issuing by Ibi, was to turn the French right;
the fourth was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, and to
pursue the remainder of Habert’s division, which was behind that
town. Lord Frederick Bentinck attacked in due time, but as colonel
Campbell did not appear the surprise failed, and when the French
saw the main body winding down the Sierra in front of Alcoy, they
retired, pursued by general Donkin with the second battalion of the
twenty-seventh regiment. The head of lord Frederick Bentinck’s column
was already engaged, but the rear had not arrived, and the whole of
Habert’s division was soon concentrated a mile beyond Alcoy, and
there offered battle; yet sir John Murray, instead of pushing briskly
forward, halted, and it was not until several demands for support
had reached him, that he detached the fifty-eighth to the assistance
of the troops engaged, who had lost about forty men, chiefly of the
twenty-seventh. Habert, fearing to be cut off by Consentayna, and
seeing the fifty-eighth coming on, retreated, and the allies occupied
Alcoy, which greatly relieved their quarters; but the want of vigour
displayed by sir John Murray when he had gained Alcoy did not escape
the notice of the troops.
[Sidenote: Plan 7.]
After this affair the armies remained quiet until the 15th, when
Whittingham forced the French posts with some loss from Albayda, and
general Donkin, taking two battalions and some dragoons from Ibi,
drove back their outposts from Rocayrente and Alsafara, villages
situated beyond the range bounding the plain of Alcoy. He repassed
the hills higher up with the dragoons and a company of the grenadiers
of twenty-seventh, under captain Waldron, and returned by the main
road to Alcoy, having in his course met a French battalion, through
which the gallant Waldron broke with his grenadiers. Meanwhile
sir John Murray, after much vacillation, at one time resolving to
advance, at another to retreat, thinking it impossible first to
force Suchet’s entrenched camp, and then his second line behind the
Xucar, a difficult river with muddy banks, believing also that the
French general had his principal magazines at Valencia, conceived
the idea of seizing the latter by a maritime expedition. He judged
that the garrison which he estimated at eight hundred infantry, and
one thousand cavalry, would be unable to resist, and that the town
once taken the inhabitants would rise; Suchet could not then detach
men enough to quell them without exposing himself to defeat on
the Xucar, and if he moved with all his force he could be closely
followed by the allies and driven upon Requeña. In this view he made
fresh dispositions.
On the 18th Roche’s division reinforced by some troops from Elio’s
army and by a British grenadier battalion, was selected for the
maritime attack, and the rest of the army was concentrated on
the left at Castalla with the exception of Whittingham’s troops
which remained at Alcoy, for Suchet was said to be advancing, and
Murray resolved to fight him. But to form a plan and to execute it
vigorously, were with sir John Murray very different things. Although
far from an incapable officer in the cabinet, he shewed none of the
qualities of a commander in the field. His indecision was remarkable.
On the morning of the 18th he resolved to fight in front of Castalla,
and in the evening he assumed a weaker position behind that town,
abandoning the command of a road, running from Ibi in rear of Alcoy,
by which Whittingham might have been cut off. And when the strong
remonstrances of his quarter-master general induced him to relinquish
this ground, he adopted a third position, neither so strong as the
first nor so defective as the last.
In this manner affairs wore on until the 26th, when Roche’s division
and the grenadier battalion marched to Alicant to embark, with
orders, if they failed at Valencia, to seize and fortify Cullera at
the mouth of the Xucar; and if this also failed to besiege Denia.
But now the foolish ministerial arrangements about the Sicilian
army worked out their natural result. Lord Wellington, though he
was permitted to retain the Anglo-Sicilian army in Spain beyond the
period lord William Bentinck had assigned for its stay, had not the
full command given to him; he was clogged with reference to the
state of Sicily, until the middle of March, and this new arrangement
was still unknown to lord William Bentinck and to sir John Murray.
Thus there were at this time, in fact, three commanding officers;
Wellington for the general operations, Murray for the particular
operations, and lord William Bentinck still empowered to increase or
diminish the troops, and even upon emergency to withdraw the whole.
And now in consequence of the continued dissentions in Sicily, the
king of that country having suddenly resumed the government, lord
William did recal two thousand of Murray’s best troops, and amongst
them the grenadier battalion intended to attack Valencia. That
enterprize instantly fell to the ground.
[Sidenote: Appendix to Phillipart’s Military Calendar.]
Upon this event sir John Murray, or some person writing under his
authority, makes the following observations. “The most careful
combination could not have selected a moment when the danger of such
authority was more clearly demonstrated, more severely felt. Had
these orders been received a very short time before, the allied army
would not have been committed in active operations; had they reached
sir John Murray a week later, there is every reason to believe that
the whole country from Alicant to Valencia would have passed under
the authority of the allied army, and that marshal Suchet cut off
from his magazines in that province, and in Aragon, would have been
compelled to retire through a mountainous and barren country on
Madrid. But the order of lord William Bentinck was peremptory, and
the allied army which even before was scarcely balanced, was now so
inferior to the enemy that it became an indispensible necessity
to adopt a system strongly defensive, and all hope of a brilliant
commencement of the campaign vanished.”
Upon this curious passage it is necessary to remark, 1º. that
Suchet’s great magazines were not at Valencia but at Saguntum; 2º.
that from the castle of Denia the fleet would have been descried,
and the strong garrison of Saguntum could have reinforced the troops
in Valencia; Montmarie’s brigade also would soon have come up from
Oropesa. These were doubtless contingencies not much to be regarded
in bar of such an enterprize, but Suchet would by no means have
been forced to retire by Requeña upon Madrid, he would have retired
to Liria, the road to which steered more than five miles clear of
Valencia. He could have kept that city in check while passing, in
despite of sir John Murray, and at Liria he would have been again
in his natural position, that is to say, in full command of his
principal lines of communication. Moreover, however disagreeable to
Suchet personally it might have been to be forced back upon Madrid,
that event would have been extremely detrimental to the general
cause, as tending to reinforce the king against Wellington. But the
singular part of the passage quoted, is the assertion that the delay
of a week in lord William Bentinck’s order would have ensured such a
noble stroke against the French army. Now lord William Bentinck only
required the troops to proceed in the first instance to Mahon; what a
dull flagging spirit then was his, who dared not delay obedience to
such an order even for a week!
[Sidenote: April.]
[Sidenote: General Donkin’s Papers, MSS.]
The recalled troops embarked for Sicily on the 5th of April, and
Suchet alarmed at the offensive position of the allies, which he
attributed to the general state of affairs, because the king’s march
to Castile permitted all the Spanish armies of Andalusia to reinforce
Elio, resolved to strike first, and with the greater avidity because
Elio had pushed general Mijares with an advanced guard of three
or four thousand men to Yecla where they were quite unsupported.
This movement had been concerted in March, with Murray who was to
occupy Villena, and be prepared to fall upon the French left, if the
Spaniards were attacked at Yecla; and in return the Spaniards were
to fall on the French right if Murray was attacked. Elio however
neglected to strengthen his division at Yecla with cavalry, which
he had promised to do, nor did Murray occupy Villena in force;
nevertheless Mijares remained at Yecla, Elio with the main body
occupied Hellin, and the cavalry were posted on the side of Albacete,
until the departure of the troops for Sicily. Roche then joined the
army at Castalla, and Elio’s main body occupied Elda and Sax to cover
the main road from Madrid to Alicant.
On the night of the 11th Suchet having by a forced march assembled
sixteen battalions of infantry, ten squadrons of cavalry, and twelve
pieces of artillery at Fuente la Higuera, marched straight upon
Caudete, while Harispe’s division by a cross road endeavoured to
surprise the Spaniards at Yecla. The latter retired fighting towards
Jumilla by the hills, but the French artillery and skirmishers
followed close, and at last the Spaniards being pierced in the
centre, one part broke and fled, and the other part after some
farther resistance surrendered. Two hundred were killed, and fifteen
hundred prisoners, including wounded, fell into the hands of the
victors, who lost about eighty men and officers.
Suchet’s movement on Fuente la Higuera was known in the night of the
10th at Castalla, where all the Anglo-Sicilian army was in position,
because Whittingham had come from Alcoy, leaving only a detachment
on that side. Hence while Harispe was defeating Mijares at Yecla,
Suchet in person remained at Caudete with two divisions and the heavy
cavalry in order of battle, lest Murray should advance by Biar and
Villena. The latter town, possessing an old wall and a castle, was
occupied by the regiment of Velez-Malaga, a thousand strong, and in
the course of the day Murray also came up with the allied cavalry and
a brigade of infantry. Here he was joined by Elio, without troops,
and when towards evening Harispe’s fight being over and the prisoners
secured, Suchet advanced, Murray retired with the cavalry through the
pass of Biar leaving his infantry, under colonel Adam, in front of
that defile. He wished also to draw the Spanish garrison from Villena
but Elio would not suffer it, and yet during the night, repenting of
his obstinacy, came to Castalla entreating Murray to carry off that
battalion. It was too late, Suchet had broken the gates of the town
the evening before, and the castle with the best equipped and finest
regiment in the Spanish army had already surrendered.
[Sidenote: See Plan 7.]
Murray’s final position was about three miles from the pass of Biar.
His left, composed of Whittingham’s Spaniards, was entrenched on a
rugged sierra ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its old
castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, closed the right of that
wing and was occupied in strength by Mackenzie’s division.
A space between Whittingham’s troops and the town was left on the
sierra for the advanced guard, then in the pass of Biar; Castalla
itself, covered by the castle, was prepared for defence, and the
principal approaches were commanded by strong batteries, for Murray
had concentrated nearly all his guns at this point. The cavalry was
partly behind partly in front of the town on an extensive plain which
was interspersed with olive plantations.
The right wing, composed of Clinton’s division and Roche’s Spaniards,
was on comparatively low ground, and extended to the rear at right
angles with the centre, but well covered by a “_barranco_” or bed of
a torrent, the precipitous sides of which were, in some places, one
hundred feet deep.
Suchet could approach this position, either through the pass of Biar,
or turning that defile, by the way of Sax; but the last road was
supposed to be occupied by Elio’s army, and as troops coming by it
must make a flank march along the front of the position, it was not a
favourable line of attack; moreover the allies, being in possession
of the defiles of Biar, and of Alcoy, might have gained the Xucar,
either by Fuentes de la Higuera or by Alcoy, seeing that Alicant,
which was their base, was safe, and the remnants of Elio’s army could
easily have got away. Murray’s army was however scarcely active
enough for such an operation, and Suchet advanced very cautiously, as
it behoved him to do, for the ground between Castalla and Biar was
just such as a prompt opponent would desire for a decisive blow.
The advanced guard, in the pass of Biar, about two thousand five
hundred men was composed of two Italian regiments and a battalion
of the twenty-seventh British; two companies of German riflemen,
a troop of foreign hussars and six guns, four of which were
mountain-pieces. The ground was very strong and difficult but at two
o’clock in the afternoon the French, having concentrated in front
of the pass, their skirmishers swarmed up the steep rocks on either
flank, with a surprising vigour and agility, and when they had gained
the summit, the supporting columns advanced. Then the allies who had
fought with resolution for about two hours abandoned the pass with
the loss of two guns and about thirty prisoners, retreating however
in good order to the main position, for they were not followed
beyond the mouth of the defile. The next day, that is the 13th about
one o’clock, the French cavalry, issuing cautiously from the pass,
extended to the left in the plain as far as Onil, and they were
followed by the infantry who immediately occupied a low ridge about
a mile in front of the allies’ left; the cavalry then gained ground
to the front, and closing towards the right of the allies menaced the
road to Ibi and Alcoy.
Murray had only occupied his ground the night before, but he had
studied it and entrenched it in parts. His right wing was quite
refused, and so well covered by the barranco that nearly all the
troops could have been employed as a reserve to the left wing, which
was also very strongly posted and presented a front about two miles
in extent. But notwithstanding the impregnable strength of the ground
the English general shrunk from the contest, and while the head of
the French column was advancing from the defile of Biar, thrice he
gave his quarter-master general orders to put the army in retreat,
and the last time so peremptorily, that obedience must have ensued
if at that moment the firing between the picquets and the French
light troops had not begun.
BATTLE OF CASTALLA.
Suchet’s dispositions were made slowly and as if he also had not made
up his mind to fight, but a crooked jut of the sierra, springing from
about the middle of the ridge, hid from him all the British troops,
and two-thirds of the whole army, hence his first movement was to
send a column towards Castalla, to turn this jut of the sierra and
discover the conditions of the position. Meanwhile he formed two
strong columns immediately opposite the left wing, and his cavalry,
displaying a formidable line in the plain closed gradually towards
the barranco. The French general however soon discovered that the
right of the allies was unattackable. Wherefore retaining his reserve
on the low ridge in front of the left wing, and still holding the
exploring column of infantry near Castalla, to protect his flank
against any sally from that point, he opened his artillery against
the centre and right wing of the allies, and forming several columns
of attack commenced the action against the allies’ left on both sides
of the jut before spoken of.
The ascent in front of Whittingham’s post, being very rugged and
steep, and the upper parts entrenched, the battle there resolved
itself at once into a fight of light troops, in which the Spaniards
maintained their ground with resolution; but on the other side of
the jut, the French mounted the heights, slowly indeed and with many
skirmishers, yet so firmly, that it was evident nothing but good
fighting would send them down again. Their light troops spread
over the whole face of the Sierra, and here and there attaining
the summit were partially driven down again by the Anglo-Italian
troops; but where the main body came upon the second battalion of
the twenty-seventh there was a terrible crash. For the ground having
an abrupt declination near the top enabled the French to form a line
under cover, close to the British, who were lying down waiting for
orders to charge; and while the former were unfolding their masses
a grenadier officer, advancing alone, challenged the captain of
the twenty-seventh grenadiers to single combat. Waldron an agile
vigorous Irishman and of boiling courage instantly sprung forward,
the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, the swords of
the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman’s head was cleft
in twain, and the next instant the twenty-seventh jumping up with a
deafening shout, fired a deadly volley, at half pistol-shot distance,
and then charged with such a shock that, maugre their bravery and
numbers, the enemy’s soldiers were overthrown and the side of the
Sierra was covered with the killed and wounded. In Murray’s despatch
this exploit was erroneously attributed to colonel Adam, but it was
ordered and conducted by colonel Reeves alone.
The French general seeing his principal column thus overthrown,
and at every other point having the worst of the fight, made two
secondary attacks to cover the rallying of the defeated columns, but
these also failing, his army was separated in three parts, namely
the beaten troops which were in great confusion, the reserve on the
minor heights from whence the attacking columns had advanced, and
the cavalry, which being far on the left in the plain, was also
separated from the point of action by the bed of the torrent, a
bridge over which was commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from
Castalla and a general advance would have obliged the French reserves
to fall back upon Biar in confusion before the cavalry could come to
their assistance, and the victory might have been thus completed; but
Murray, who had remained during the whole action behind Castalla,
gave the French full time to rally all their forces and retire in
order towards the pass of Biar. Then gradually passing out by the
right of the town, with a tedious pedantic movement, he changed his
front, forming two lines across the valley, keeping his left at the
foot of the heights, and extending his right, covered by the cavalry,
towards the Sierra of Onil. Meanwhile Mackenzie moving out by the
left of Castalla with three British, and one German battalion, and
eight guns followed the enemy more rapidly.
Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass with his infantry
cavalry and tumbrils in one mass, leaving a rear-guard of three
battalions with eight guns to cover the passage; but these being
pressed by Mackenzie, and heavily cannonaded, were soon forced to
form lines and offer battle, answering gun for gun. The French
soldiers were heavily crushed by the English shot, the clatter of
musketry was beginning, and one well-directed vigorous charge,
would have overturned and driven the French in a confused mass upon
the other troops then wedged in the narrow defile; but Mackenzie’s
movement had been made by the order of the quarter-master-general
Donkin, without Murray’s knowledge, and the latter instead of
supporting it strongly, sent repeated orders to withdraw the troops
already engaged, and in despite of all remonstrance caused them to
fall back on the main body, when victory was in their grasp. Suchet
thus relieved at a most critical moment immediately occupied a
position across the defile with his flanks on the heights, and though
Murray finally sent some light companies to attack his left the
effort was feeble and produced no result; he retained his position
and in the night retired to Fuente de la Higuera.
On the 14th Murray marched to Alcoy where a small part of
Whittingham’s forces had remained in observation of a French
detachment left to hold the pass of Albayda, and through this pass he
proposed to intercept the retreat of Suchet, but his movements were
slow, his arrangements bad, and the army became so disordered, that
he halted the 15th at Alcoy. A feeble demonstration on the following
days towards Albayda terminated his operations.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s official despatch to the king, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
[Sidenote: Murray’s despatch.]
In this battle of Castalla, the allies had, including Roche’s
division, about seventeen thousand of all arms, and the French about
fifteen thousand. Suchet says that the action was brought on, against
his wish, by the impetuosity of his light troops, and that he lost
only eight hundred men; his statement is confirmed by Vacani the
Italian historian. Sir John Murray affirms that it was a pitched
battle and that the French lost above three thousand men. The reader
may choose between these accounts. In favour of Suchet’s version
it may be remarked that neither the place, nor the time, nor the
mode of attack, was such as might be expected from his talents and
experience in war, if he had really intended a pitched battle; and
though the action was strongly contested on the principal point, it
is scarcely possible that so many as three thousand men could have
been killed and wounded. And yet eight hundred seems too few, because
the loss of the victorious troops with all advantages of ground, was
more than six hundred. One thing is however certain that if Suchet
lost three thousand men, which would have been at least a fourth
of his infantry, he must have been so disabled, so crippled, that
what with the narrow defile of Biar in the rear, and the distance
of his cavalry in the plain, to have escaped at all was extremely
discreditable to Murray’s generalship. An able commander having a
superior force, and the allies were certainly the most numerous,
would never have suffered the pass of Biar to be forced on the 12th,
or if it were forced, he would have had his army well in hand behind
it, ready to fall upon the head of the French column as it issued
into the low ground.
Suchet violated several of the most important maxims of art. For
without an adequate object, he fought a battle, having a defile in
his rear, and on ground where his cavalry, in which he was superior,
could not act. Neither the general state of the French affairs, nor
the particular circumstances, invited a decisive offensive movement
at the time, wherefore the French general should have been contented
with his first successes against the Spaniards, and against Colonel
Adam, unless some palpable advantage had been offered to him by
Murray. But the latter’s position was very strong indeed, and the
French army was in imminent danger, cooped up between the pass of
Biar and the allied troops; and this danger would have been increased
if Elio had executed a movement which Murray had proposed to him in
the night of the 12th, namely, to push troops into the mountains from
Sax, which would have strengthened Whittingham’s left and menaced the
right flank of the enemy. Elio disregarded this request, and during
the whole of the operations the two armies were unconnected, and
acting without concert, although only a few miles distant from each
other. This might have been avoided if they had previously put the
castle and town of Villena in a good state of defence, and occupied
the pass of Biar in force behind it. The two armies would then have
been secure of a junction in advance, and the plain of Villena would
have been commanded. To the courage of the troops belongs all the
merit of the success obtained, there was no generalship, and hence
though much blood was spilt no profit was derived from victory.