alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful).
HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes
(hurtful).
HERMOGENES: Good.
SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm
(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to
hold or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a
term of censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream)
would properly be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved
into blaberon.
HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of
names; and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining
that you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some
prelude to Athene.
SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not
mine.
HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?
SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?—let me remark, Hermogenes,
how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of
words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight
permutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may
instance the word deon, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds
me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable
language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered
the original meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes, which in the
old language is clearly indicated.
HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers
loved the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most
conservative of the ancient language, but now they change iota into eta
or epsilon, and delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the
grandeur of the sound.
HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either
imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e).
HERMOGENES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention
of the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for
(imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is
therefore called imera, from imeros, desire.
HERMOGENES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the
meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera
because it makes things gentle (emera different accents).
HERMOGENES: Such is my view.
SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon?
HERMOGENES: They did so.
SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,—it ought to be duogon, which
word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the
purpose of drawing;—this has been changed into zugon, and there are
many other examples of similar changes.
HERMOGENES: There are.
SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the
word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the
other appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is,
nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore
own brother of blaberon.
HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain.
SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to
be the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the
epsilon into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree
with other words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good,
and is a term of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted
himself, but in all these various appellations, deon (obligatory),
ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful),
agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same
conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which
is praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is
censured. And this is further illustrated by the word zemiodes
(hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into delta as in the
ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you will
perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion).
HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia
(desire), and the like, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great
difficulty about them—edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends
to advantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been eone,
but this has been altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears
to be derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in
sorrow; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai);
algedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is
derived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called from the
putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) “the word too
labours,” as any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of the
fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is so
called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may
be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been
altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia
explain themselves; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has
been changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul
moving (pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi
ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos
(passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul;
imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia
ten esin tes roes—because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses
a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, and
is termed imeros from possessing this power; pothos (longing) is
expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and
in another place (pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is
applied to things absent, as imeros is to things present; eros (love)
is so called because flowing in (esron) from without; the stream is not
inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from
flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time when they used
omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is substituted
for omicron. But why do you not give me another word?
HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of
words?
SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses
the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting
of a bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis
(thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of
the soul to the essential nature of each thing—just as boule (counsel)
has to do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the
notion of aiming and deliberating—all these words seem to follow doxa,
and all involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of
counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of
the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.
HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I
have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and
ekousion (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon)
and unresisting—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing,
yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in
accordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being
contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken
from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and
overgrown, and impedes motion—and this is the derivation of the word
anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But while my
strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere
with your questions.
HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such
as aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not
forgetting to enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of
our discussion, has this name of onoma.
SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)?
HERMOGENES: Yes;—meaning the same as zetein (to enquire).
SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying
on ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more
obvious in onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real
existence is that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia
is also an agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the
divine motion of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of
motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation
and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the
original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of psi; on
and ousia are ion with an iota broken off; this agrees with the true
principle, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be
said of not being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki
on = ouk ion).
HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that
some one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon
and doun?—show me their fitness.
SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been
already suggested.
HERMOGENES: What way?
SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign
origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this
kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have
been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all
manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when
compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous
tongue.
HERMOGENES: Very likely.
SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest
attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a
person go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the
elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always
repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up
the enquiry in despair.
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the
enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the
elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed
to be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is,
as we were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift).
And probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of
others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution,
then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary
element, which need not be resolved any further.
HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right.
SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should
turn out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be
examined according to some new method?
HERMOGENES: Very likely.
SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to
this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I
shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some
absurdity in stating the principle of primary names.
HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.
SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle
is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary—when they are
regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.
HERMOGENES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to
indicate the nature of things.
HERMOGENES: Of course.
SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the
secondary names, is implied in their being names.
HERMOGENES: Surely.
SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance
from the primary.
HERMOGENES: That is evident.
SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede
analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which
they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a
question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to
communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb,
make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?
HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates.
SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of
our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and
downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if
we were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we
should make our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them.
HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else.
SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever
express anything.
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice,
or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that
which we want to express.
HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think.
SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal
imitator names or imitates?
HERMOGENES: I think so.
SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not
reached the truth as yet.
HERMOGENES: Why not?
SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the
people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which
they imitate.
HERMOGENES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying?
HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me,
Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?
SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation,
although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music
imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the
matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have
colour?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with
imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music
and drawing?
HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there
is a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound
as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?
HERMOGENES: I should think so.
SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing
in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each
thing?
HERMOGENES: Quite so.
SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you
gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?
HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or
name-giver, of whom we are in search.
SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to
consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention),
about which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has
grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as
to imitate the essence or not.
HERMOGENES: Very good.
SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others?
HERMOGENES: There must be others.
SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them,
and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by
syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the
letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the
powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have
done so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first
separating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which
are neither vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the
received distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are
neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the
vowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of
things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in the case of
letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred (cf.
Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether
they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have
well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they
resemble—whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether
there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting,
the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or
any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method
is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind—he uses
his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too, we
shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters
when required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables, as
they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at
last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language,
large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so
shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by
some other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I
was carried away—meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we
but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must
take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of
the whole subject, and we must see whether the primary, and also
whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they
are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry
piece of work, and in the wrong direction.
HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe.
SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse
them in this way? for I am certain that I should not.
HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able.
SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if
we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability,
saying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the
truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of
them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we
proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would
analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the
circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you
think?
HERMOGENES: I very much approve.
SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and
so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be
avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth
of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help,
like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in
the air; and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying
that “the Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.”
This will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be
even better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the
barbarians are older than we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast
a veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the last; for all
these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons
concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first
or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they
can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of
languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first
names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest.
Do you not suppose this to be true?
HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and
ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you
desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything
better which you may have.
HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best.
SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the
general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet
explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going);
for the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed
epsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as
ienai. And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in
corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and
allowing for the change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have
kinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the
negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now
the letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an
excellent instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently
uses the letter for this purpose: for example, in the actual words rein
and roe he represents motion by rho; also in the words tromos
(trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words such as krouein
(strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein (break),
kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of movements
he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I
imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at
rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in
order to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the
subtle elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the
letter iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is
another class of letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the
pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are
used in the imitation of such notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon
(seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and are always
introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is
phusodes (windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and
pressure of the tongue in the utterance of delta and tau was expressive
of binding and rest in a place: he further observed the liquid movement
of lambda, in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this
he found the expression of smoothness, as in leios (level), and in the
word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon (sleek), in the word
kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of gamma detained the
slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a
glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The nu he
observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of
inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he
assigned to the expression of size, and nu of length, because they are
great letters: omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there
is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did
the legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and
impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation
compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of
names; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.
HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus
mystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never
explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his
obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the
presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying
about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have,
tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates,
or Socrates and I will learn of you.