learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any
rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very
greatest of all.
HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, “to
add little to little” is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that
you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a
little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a
claim upon you.
SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which
Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to
say what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall
gladly accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you
have found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on
these matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better
theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your
disciples.
CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study
of these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But
I fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself
moved to say to you what Achilles in the “Prayers” says to Ajax,—
“Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, You appear to
have spoken in all things much to my mind.”
And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers
much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some
Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to
yourself.
SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own
wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask
myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than
self-deception—when the deceiver is always at home and always with
you—it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my
steps and endeavour to “look fore and aft,” in the words of the
aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been
saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:—has
this proposition been sufficiently proven?
CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is
quite true.
SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?
CRATYLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And who are they?
CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.
SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me
explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their
figures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders
also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them
worse.
CRATYLUS: True.
SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work
better and some worse?
CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you.
SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others
worse?
CRATYLUS: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?
CRATYLUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?
CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all.
SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes,
which was mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature
of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his
name at all?
CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but
only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who
has the nature which corresponds to it.
SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be
even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call
him Hermogenes, if he is not.
CRATYLUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this
is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars
in all ages.
CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say
something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing
which is not?
SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But
I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who
think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?
CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said.
SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting
you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: “Hail,
Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion”—these words, whether
spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you
but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?
CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking
nonsense.
SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell
me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and
partly false:—which is all that I want to know.
CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no
purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise
of hammering at a brazen pot.
SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a
meeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with
the thing named?
CRATYLUS: I should.
SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an
imitation of the thing?
CRATYLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of
things, but in another way?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand
you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both
pictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the
things of which they are the imitation.
CRATYLUS: They are.
SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness
of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?
CRATYLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to
the woman, and of the woman to the man?
CRATYLUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the
first?
CRATYLUS: Only the first.
SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to
each that which belongs to them and is like them?
CRATYLUS: That is my view.
SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have
a good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you:
the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I
call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and
the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call
wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong.
CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may
be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names—they must be always
right.
SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to
him, “This is your picture,” showing him his own likeness, or perhaps
the likeness of a woman; and when I say “show,” I mean bring before the
sense of sight.
CRATYLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, “This is your
name”?—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say
to him—“This is your name”? and may I not then bring to his sense of
hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, “This is a man”; or of a
female of the human species, when I say, “This is a woman,” as the case
may be? Is not all that quite possible?
CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say,
Granted.
SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be
disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to
objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong
assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment
of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of
verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made
up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?
CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true.
SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and
in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and
figures, or you may not give them all—some may be wanting; or there may
be too many or too much of them—may there not?
CRATYLUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and
he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a
good one.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the
nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a
good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps
adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer
that some names are well and others ill made.
CRATYLUS: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be
bad?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may
be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?
CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is
different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha
or beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or
subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only
written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases
becomes other than a name.
SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct,
Cratylus.
CRATYLUS: How so?
SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which
must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number
ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted,
and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is
qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I
should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the
entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the
existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other
the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God
makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your
outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like
yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses
motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all
your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say
that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were
two Cratyluses?
CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses.
SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other
principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an
image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do
you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which
are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?
CRATYLUS: Yes, I see.
SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on
things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the
doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the
names and which were the realities.
CRATYLUS: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name
may be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that
the name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the
occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a
noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence
which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing
may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the
thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will
remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular
instance of the names of the letters.
CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember.
SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if
some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is
signified;—well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a
few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we
be punished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the street late
at night: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived
too late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness
of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a
thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be
inconsistent with yourself.
CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very
reasonable.
SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether
a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names
which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be
made up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness;
but there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the
beauty and formation of the word: you would admit that?
CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you,
since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a
name at all.
SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?
CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some
derived?
CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are
representations of things, is there any better way of framing
representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you
can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who
say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have
agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things
intended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and
whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite
one, according to which you call small great and great small—that, they
would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these
two notions do you prefer?
CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better
than representation by any chance sign.
SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the
letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like
things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could
any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if
there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated,
and out of which the picture is composed?
CRATYLUS: Impossible.
SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing
thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore
some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the
imitation: And the original elements are letters?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were
saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is
expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in
saying so?
CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right.
SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness,
and the like?
CRATYLUS: There again you were right.
SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us
sklerotes, is by the Eretrians called skleroter.
CRATYLUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there
the same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to
us in sigma, or is there no significance to one of us?
CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.
SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?
CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like.
SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike?
CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that
is expressive not of hardness but of softness.
CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates,
and should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in
my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters
upon occasion.
SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when
I say skleros (hard), you know what I mean.
CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.
SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I
understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound:
this is what you are saying?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an
indication given by me to you?
CRATYLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well
as from like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is
true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the
correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which
are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they
are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you
distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say
that the signification of words is given by custom and not by likeness,
for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we
are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence
gives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to
contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the
instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you
will find names resembling every individual number, unless you allow
that which you term convention and agreement to have authority in
determining the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words
should as far as possible resemble things; but I fear that this
dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing,
which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a
view to correctness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost
always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be
the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the most
imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is
the use of them?
CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to
inform: the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the
things which are expressed by them.
SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so
also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the
other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same
art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names
will also know things.
CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean.
SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information
about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the
best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?
CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of
information about them; there can be no other.
SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who
discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the
method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and
discovery.
CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery
are of the same nature as instruction.
SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names
in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great
danger of being deceived?
CRATYLUS: How so?
SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to
his conception of the things which they signified—did he not?
CRATYLUS: True.
SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names
according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his
followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?
CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely
have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at
all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and
the proof is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in
speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and
purpose?
SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin
in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the
original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in
this, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight
and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are
consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is
the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention
on the consideration of his first principles:—are they or are they not
rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will
follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really
consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we
not saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and
that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive
that to be the meaning of them?
CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.
SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how
ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at
things than going round with them; and therefore we should leave the
beginning as at present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an
insertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but
epiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the
expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word
istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of
the stream; and the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates
cessation of motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may see,
expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as
amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of
their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other
words which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai,
sumpheresthai); and much the same may be said of amathia and akolasia,
for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia
as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances
we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same
principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would
take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of
names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that
they are at rest; which is the opposite of motion.
CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express
motion.
SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and
is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of
whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?
CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable.
SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and
proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think
with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of
names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and
that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?
CRATYLUS: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers
of the first names, know or not know the things which they named?
CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been
ignorant.
CRATYLUS: I should say not.
SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were
saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the
things which he named; are you still of that opinion?
CRATYLUS: I am.
SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also
a knowledge of the things which he named?
CRATYLUS: I should.