that is obvious to anybody.
HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets
into your head.
SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of
Ares.
HERMOGENES: What is Ares?
SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and
manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature,
which is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every
way appropriate to the God of war.
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I
am afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how
the steeds of Euthyphro can prance.
HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of
whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I
shall know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.
SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech,
and signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or
thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal
to do with language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is
expressive of the use of speech, and there is an often-recurring
Homeric word emesato, which means “he contrived”—out of these two
words, eirein and mesasthai, the legislator formed the name of the God
who invented language and speech; and we may imagine him dictating to
us the use of this name: “O my friends,” says he to us, “seeing that he
is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him
Eirhemes.” And this has been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes.
Iris also appears to have been called from the verb “to tell” (eirein),
because she was a messenger.
HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying
that I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand
at speeches.
SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the
double-formed son of Hermes.
HERMOGENES: How do you make that out?
SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is
always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form
which dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men
below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods
have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is
the place of them?
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and
the perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called
aipolos (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in
his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as
the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that
brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my
dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.
HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why
should we not discuss another kind of Gods—the sun, moon, stars, earth,
aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?
SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I
will not refuse.
HERMOGENES: You will oblige me.
SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him
whom you mentioned first—the sun?
HERMOGENES: Very good.
SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric
form, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him
because when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is
always rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from
aiolein, of which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate),
because he variegates the productions of the earth.
HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)?
SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.
HERMOGENES: How so?
SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the
moon receives her light from the sun.
HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much
the same meaning?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old
(enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his
revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the
previous month.
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia.
HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new
(enon neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and
this when hammered into shape becomes selanaia.
HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do
you say of the month and the stars?
SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because
suffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived
from astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the
upsetting of the eyes (anastrephein opa).
HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)?
SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of
Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in
the word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt
whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.
HERMOGENES: What is it?
SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you
can tell me what is the meaning of the pur?
HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.
SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of
this and several other words?—My belief is that they are of foreign
origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion
of the barbarians, often borrowed from them.
HERMOGENES: What is the inference?
SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the
fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not
according to the language from which the words are derived, is rather
likely to be at fault.
HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.
SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the
word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and
the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed,
just as they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words.
HERMOGENES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided;
for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid
of pur and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element
which raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei
rei), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the
winds “air-blasts,” (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to
speak, air-flux (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun);
and because this moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs
the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as
aeitheer; this may be correctly said, because this element is always
running in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The
meaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of
gaia, for the earth may be truly called “mother” (gaia, genneteira), as
in the language of Homer (Od.) gegaasi means gegennesthai.
HERMOGENES: Good.
SOCRATES: What shall we take next?
HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the
year, eniautos and etos.
SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire
to know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai
because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and
the fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the
same,—“that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth
in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto
exetazei)”: this is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto,
and etos from etazei, just as the original name of Zeus was divided
into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition means that his power of
reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words etos and
eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition.
HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.
SOCRATES: I am run away with.
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed.
HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you
would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in
those charming words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of
them?
SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are
disinterring; still, as I have put on the lion’s skin, I must not be
faint of heart; and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of
wisdom (phronesis) and understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome),
and knowledge (episteme), and all those other charming words, as you
call them?
HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their
meaning.
SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into
my head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names
were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in
their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from
constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world
is going round and round and moving in all directions; and this
appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they
suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing
stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is
always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of
the names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.
HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been
just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely
indicated.
HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it.
SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is
a name indicative of motion.
HERMOGENES: What was the name?
SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis
(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing
of motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion);
gnome (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or
consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to
consider; or, if you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just
now mentioned, which is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word
neos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver
of the name wanted to express this longing of the soul, for the
original name was neoesis, and not noesis; but eta took the place of a
double epsilon. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that
wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme
(knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good
for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither
anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word should
rather be read as epistemene, inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis
(understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion;
the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like
epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company
with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears
not to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or
stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of
the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word esuthe (he
rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Sous
(Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and
the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by sophia, for all things
are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name which is given
to the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although all things move,
still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but
there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this
admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is
clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just); but the actual
word dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent
about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose
all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a
mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power which
passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and
is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the subtlest,
and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by
other things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate
through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all
things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter
k is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying,
there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but I,
Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery
that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world:
now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one
comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because
partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what
he has said, to interrogate him gently: “Well, my excellent friend,”
say I, “but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.”
Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over
the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try
to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they
quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only
is the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the
guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I
am answered by the satirical remark, “What, is there no justice in the
world when the sun is down?” And when I earnestly beg my questioner to
tell me his own honest opinion, he says, “Fire in the abstract”; but
this is not very intelligible. Another says, “No, not fire in the
abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.” Another man
professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that
justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes
with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At
last, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the
nature of justice than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of
opinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given
to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned.
HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you
must have heard this from some one else.
SOCRATES: And not the rest?
HERMOGENES: Hardly.
SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in
the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think
that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),—injustice (adikia),
which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating
principle (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of
andreia seems to imply a battle;—this battle is in the world of
existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the
counterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract the delta from andreia, the
name at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that
andreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but only to that
which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have been
praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar
allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune
(woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth): thelu (female)
appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is
like rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai).
HERMOGENES: That is surely probable.
SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure
the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is
expressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein
(running), and allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when
I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought
to be of importance, which have still to be explained.
HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example.
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the
possession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two
omichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and
eta.
HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology.
SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original
names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and
stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and
bedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share
in the change. Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter
rho inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares
nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into
shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can
possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is
the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx, phiggos,
and there are other examples.
HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any
letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name
may be adapted to any object.
HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like
yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.
HERMOGENES: Such is my desire.
SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a
precisian, or “you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).” When you
have allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be
at the top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great
accomplishment—anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these
two, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying,
being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning
of the two words arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet
understand, but kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles
which preceded, for all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos
ion (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has
the general name of kakia, or vice, specially appropriated to it. The
meaning of kakos ienai may be further illustrated by the use of deilia
(cowardice), which ought to have come after andreia, but was forgotten,
and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. Deilia
signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (desmos), for lian
means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest and
strongest bond of the soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the
same nature (from a (alpha) not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything
else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia
appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of
which the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And
if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete will be the opposite
of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the
stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute
of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called
arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps
have had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is
more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I
daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I
think that if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also
right.
HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great
a part in your previous discourse?
SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an
opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.
HERMOGENES: What device?
SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this
word also.
HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these
words and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron.
SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon
roes (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with
our former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to
stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that
which hindered the flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten
together into aischron.
HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon?
SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the
quantity, and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into
omicron.
HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind.
HERMOGENES: How so?
SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is
not the principle which imposes the name the cause?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their
names, and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)?
HERMOGENES: That is evident.
SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of
praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does
the works of a carpenter?
HERMOGENES: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?
HERMOGENES: Of course.
SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?
HERMOGENES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works
which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?
HERMOGENES: That is evident.
SOCRATES: What more names remain to us?
HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and
kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and
their opposites.
SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may
discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,—for it is
a sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul
accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle
are called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with
the world.
HERMOGENES: That is probable.
SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain),
but you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning;
for this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the
name intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and
universal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he
inserted a delta instead of a nu, and so made kerdos.
HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)?
SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the
profitable the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they
use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable
(lusiteloun), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence,
allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always,
if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), and makes
motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears to
me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun—being that which looses
(luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is
derived from ophellein, meaning that which creates and increases; this
latter is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.
HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites?
SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need
speak.
HERMOGENES: Which are they?