Party Training

In early 1970 the PCR carried out a major reorganization of its primary

institution for the training of leading party workers, the Stefan

Gheorghiu Party Academy. With the reorganization, the full name of the

institution became the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy for Social-Political

Education and the Training of Leading Cadres. Its tasks were defined as

the training of party activists and the development of party leaders

capable of resolving problems and "applying the science of political

leadership to the party and society."

Ceausescu explained that the reorganization was necessary for upgrading

the training of activists for the party as well as for various sectors

of economic and state life. He also stated that the combination of party

training with state and economic activity is based on the principle that

the PCR is the leading force of the society and, as such, must ensure

the proper training of the personnel needed to guide all sectors of

activity.

As reorganized, the academy is divided into two departments, one for the

training of cadres in the party and in mass organizations and a second

for the training of personnel who work in the economy and state

administration. Each department is subdivided into a number of

institutes, sections, and training centers. Within the first department

is the Institute for Training Cadres in Social-Political Management,

which in turn is subdivided into sections for political-organizational

activity, political-ideological activity, and political-economic

activity. Also within the same department are the Journalism Faculty,

the Center for the Education and Training of Party and Mass Organization

Cadres, the Center for Improving the Political-Ideological Training of

Teachers of Social-Political Sciences in State Schools, and the Center

for Activist Training Courses. The Center for Activist Training Courses

provided programs of study for activists in the party, the youth

organization, labor unions, and workers in offices of foreign affairs.

The last two centers are divided into several sections that specialize

in the training of particular classes of activists.

The second department, that which provided training for state employees

and for those working in economic activities, consists of the Central

Institute for the Education of Leading Cadres in the Economy and State

Administration, a section for short-term courses, and a section for

training in specialized management and organizational problems. The

institute includes sections on the organization and management of

industrial activity, of construction, of transport and telecommunications,

of agriculture, of circulation of goods and services, of planning, and

of state administration. In addition, the department organizes courses

for chairmen of agricultural production cooperatives.

Admission to the academy programs is carefully controlled by the party.

Courses in the first department last for four years, and candidates are

selected from among the activists in the county and city party

committees and the central PCR bodies and from loyal party workers in

the mass organizations. Political activists in the Ministry of the Armed

Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Security Council

are also eligible for training in the first department.

PCR regulations stipulate that candidates for training in the first

department must have worked for at least three years in production and

have had at least three years' experience in mass organizations. In

addition, the candidate must have completed at least a five-month course

in one of the lower level party schools, have a high school diploma or

its equivalent, and be thirty-five years of age or younger.

Courses in the second department last for two years. Requirements for

admission into this department include extensive experience in

organization and management related to industry and labor, at least

eight years of service, membership in the PCR, graduation from a higher

education institute, and an age of forty years or younger.

In addition to the broad program of the academy, the PCR also maintains

other ideological training institutions. These include the Institute of

Historical and Social-Political Studies in Bucharest, which functions

under the direct supervision of the Central Committee, and lower level

training programs that operate under the county party committees.

During 1971 the PCR placed increased emphasis on both the political and

general education of all party workers, and the Central Committee

decreed that only those who can keep up to date in their fields of

activity would be promoted. As a followup to the decree, the Central

Committee initiated a series of twenty- to thirty-day training programs

and required some 15,000 persons from party, state, and mass

organizations to attend the sessions. The order included a warning that

those who did not successfully complete the courses would lose their

jobs.

Observers of Romanian politics stated that the decision to require this

additional training of state and party workers stemmed from the fact

that the majority of personnel on both the central and local levels had

been named to their positions on the basis of faithful party activity

rather than their professional qualifications. The stipulation that

those who do not successfully complete the courses would lose their jobs

enables the party to replace those who are not qualified to fill their

positions.

The study programs, designed to include practical work, discussion of

specific problems, and field trips, cover a number of subjects including

"the basic Marxist-Leninist sciences of management and organization,"

automatic data processing, the utilization of electronic calculators,

methods of socioeconomic analysis, and the projection of plans, as well

as a number of special subjects related to the various fields of

activity of the participants. To facilitate the training of larger

numbers, branches of the Stefan Gheorghiu Party Academy's Center for the

Education and Training of Party and Mass Organization Cadres were set up

in Bucharest and in seven counties.

Mass Organizations

The PCR has fostered the development of a large number of mass

organizations that function as its auxiliaries. Comprised of members of

an interest group or a profession whose welfare they purport to serve,

the mass organizations provide channels for the transmission of policy

and doctrine from the party to the general population. PCR leaders have

described the duties of mass organizations as the mobilization of the

working people for the fulfillment of party policies and the provision

for their participation in the economic, political, and cultural life of

the country. Leaders of the mass organizations are always reliable PCR

members.

Citizens are constitutionally guaranteed the right to join together in

organizations. At the same time, the Constitution defines the leading

role of the party in relation to the mass organizations, asserting that

through such organizations the PCR "achieves an organized link with the

working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the other

categories of working people" and mobilizes them in "the struggle for

the completion of the building of socialism."

Two broad classes of organizations are included under the rubric of mass

organizations: those based on common interests or common categories or

persons, such as youth and women's associations, and those based on

professions, such as the General Union of Trade Unions. Several of the

organizations belong to international organizations and associations,

such as the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of

Democratic Youth.

Among the more important of the mass organizations are the Union of

Communist Youth, the General Union of Trade Unions, and the National

Council of Women. The chairmen of the Union of Communist Youth and the

General Union of Trade Unions sit on the Council of Ministers and have

ministerial rank; the chairman of the youth union serves simultaneously

as head of the Ministry of Youth Problems.

The Union of Communist Youth

At the time of its founding in early 1949 the Union of Communist Youth

(Uniunea Tineretului Comunist--UTC) was looked upon as the youth branch

of the PCR. It was set up with much the same organizational structure as

the party and, in practice, functioned both as a youth political party

and mass organization. Resulting from the party-decreed merger of all

existing youth organizations, the UTC was given the task of educating

the young in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and mobilizing them, under

the guidance of the party, for the building of socialism.

In early 1972 the UTC continued to be one of the most powerful of the

mass organizations in the country, with an estimated membership of 2.5

million. Membership was open to young people between the ages of fifteen

and twenty-six; those who have reached the age of eighteen could also

become members of the PCR. The Tenth Party Congress, meeting in 1969,

introduced the requirement that young people up to the age of twenty-six

would be accepted into the party only if they were UTC members.

Decisions on persons to fill the most important leadership positions in

the UTC were made by the PCR Central Committee.

The structure of the UTC has undergone a number of changes since it was

originally established. In early 1972 the organization functioned on the

national level with an eight-member Secretariat, including the first

secretary who is also the UTC chairman, and a bureau of twenty-one full

and seven alternate members. In each of the thirty-nine countries and

the city of Bucharest there exist UTC committees that are similarly

organized with secretariats and bureaus. The UTC has its own publishing

facilities and publishes its own propaganda organ, _The Spark of Youth_

(Scinteia Tineretului).

Statistics on the composition of the youth organization, reported at the

Ninth UTC Congress held in February 1971, indicated that the membership

consisted of 30 percent workers, 39 percent students, and 17 percent

peasants. The remainder consisted of those who were classified as

intellectuals, clerks, and office workers.

Periodically throughout the 1960s PCR leaders demonstrated growing

concern for what they termed as shortcomings in the political education

of the nation's youth. In 1968 this concern led to the establishment of

the Research Center for Youth Problems and an increased effort to

instill in the young people a sense of "socialist patriotism." Ceausescu

asserted the need for all levels of education to be permeated with

Marxist-Leninist ideology and placed particular emphasis on ideological

training in the universities.

Political education of young people, both members and non-members, and

their mobilization in support of PCR policies is considered the primary

duty of the UTC. It is charged with the organization of political and

patriotic courses in schools, among peasant groups, and among workers

and members of the armed forces. The UTC also guides and supervises the

activities of the Union of Student Associations.

A second youth movement, the Pioneers Organization, was created for

young people between the ages of nine and fourteen. In late 1971 the

Pioneers Organization reported a total membership of 1.6 million. The

organization's responsibilities toward those of its age group parallel

those of the UTC and involve political and patriotic training. Until

1966 the Pioneers Organization functioned as an integral part of the

UTC, but since that time it has been under the direct control of the

party Central Committee.

The General Union of Trade Unions

As the official organization incorporating all blue-collar and

white-collar workers, the General Union of Trade Unions (Uniunea

Generala a Sindicatelr din Romania--UGSR) is the largest of the

country's mass organizations, with a reported membership in early 1972

of 4.6 million. Headed by a general council, the UGSR consists of twelve

component labor union federations and forty area councils, one for each

county and the city of Bucharest. The Central Council is structured with

a chairman, appointed by the PCR Central Committee, seven secretaries,

and an executive committee of twenty-seven full and nine alternate

members. There are an estimated 12,000 local union units.

The primary function of the labor unions is the transmission of party

policies to the rank and file. The UGSR statutes specify that the

organization will carry out all of its activities under the political

leadership of the PCR, and a similar provision is also included in the

statutes of the county UGSR committees. In addition, the statutes of

the central body require the organization to work to mobilize labor

union members to ensure the implementation of party policy. A 1969

resolution of the Central Council of the UGSR declared that all labor

union activities would focus on the mobilization of the working people

to fulfill the state economic plan.

In early 1971, after a period of increased labor discipline problems and

following a time of severe labor unrest in Poland, the PCR took steps to

reform the labor union organization. Announcing what he termed as the

democratization of the UGSR and its component unions, Ceausescu promised

the workers genuine protection of their interests and a voice in the

appointment of industrial management. The goal of the PCR program was to

improve the unions without losing party control, and Ceausescu defined

democratization as meaning that the labor unions would serve the party

as a framework for the organization of consultations with the masses and

as a forum where workers can debate the country's economic and social

development.

New UGSR statutes were introduced in mid-1971. Observers of Romanian

political affairs asserted, however, that there were no major changes in

the system and pointed out that the new statutes still did not give

labor unions the right to take the initiative in matters concerning

wages or the living standard. In this regard the unions could fill only

a watchdog role to assure that the regulations approved by the

appropriate party and management bodies were being correctly carried

out.

PARTY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The major domestic programs that the party sought to promote centered on

the country's economic development, the integration of national

minorities, the extension of so-called socialist democracy, and the

PCR's cultural-ideological campaign. As a means of strengthening its

leading role, the party leaders acted to improve communication between

the central PCR organs and the county, city, and commune organizations

and, at the same time, took additional steps to win mass support.

The Economy

In the area of economics the PCR continued its primary emphasis on

industrial development and was only secondarily concerned with

agriculture and consumer goods. This emphasis was evidenced in the

economic plan adopted for the 1971-75 period, approved by the 1969 party

congress, which concentrates on heavy industry at the expense of

consumer goods. Although Romania was primarily an agricultural country,

the PCR leadership in the early 1960s, rejected the plan of the Council

for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) for a division of labor between

the participating communist states that would have had Romania place the

greatest emphasis on the development of agriculture. Instead, the PCR

launched a drive to modernize the country through industrialization (see

ch. 14; ch. 10).

The policies pursued by the PCR are designed to maintain firm party

control of the economy. In the formulation of Romania's economic

development plans, the will of the party is predominant, and the degree

of party control was augmented by the territorial and administrative

reorganization of 1968 when economic commissions were established in

each of the new counties to function under the direct supervision of the

county PCR committees. These commissions made it possible for the party

to have a direct hand in the local economic programs.

During 1970 and 1971 party leaders noted that, whereas the annual

production increase envisaged by the Five-Year Plan (1971-75) had been

fulfilled for industry, that for agriculture fell far short. Ceausescu

called for a renewal of intensive efforts in both industry and

agriculture to meet the requirements of the people and to enable the

country to achieve the true socialist state of development.

National Minorities

The integration of the major non-Romanian national groups into the life

of the country has posed periodic problems for the PCR throughout the

post-World War II era. Each of the communist constitutions guaranteed

equal rights to the national minorities, rights that included the

opportunity to use their own language and to have representation on

local bodies of government. The Hungarian Autonomous Region had been

created by the 1952 Constitution but was not continued under the 1968

territorial reorganization (see ch. 8; ch. 4).

Party leaders explained the decision to abandon the concept of an

autonomous region for the Hungarian population in terms of the need to

integrate all of the minority groups fully into the Romanian political

community. Spokesmen asserted that it is the policy of the PCR to

respect the heritage of the various nationality groups and extend to

them full political rights but at the same time to work to create

conditions that will serve to unite all of the country under the

leadership of the party.

PCR leaders have feared the possibility of attempts by foreign elements

to foster unrest among the country's larger minority groups. This was

particularly true at the time of the Soviet-led invasion of

Czechoslovakia, when Romanian leaders were apprehensive about the

possibility of a similar intervention in their country. At that time PCR

officials visited the areas where there were concentrations of Hungarian

and German minorities, stressing national unity and equal rights for all

national groups.

These efforts were followed in November 1968 by the establishment of

nationality councils: the Council of Working People of Hungarian

Nationality and the Council of Working People of German Nationality.

Units of the Hungarian council were established in fifteen counties, and

units of the German council were established in nine counties. In

counties where there existed substantial Serbian or Ukrainian

populations, similar local councils were established for these groups,

although only the Hungarian and German minorities maintained councils on

the national level. The nationality councils were affiliated with the

Socialist Unity Front. A month after the establishment of the councils

the Grand National Assembly, on the initiative of the party, passed

legislation granting the minorities increased representation on local

government bodies.

In explaining the purposes of the nationality councils, Ceausescu

declared that they would "cultivate socialist patriotism, socialist

internationalism, and devotion for our new order and for the common

fatherland ... against any backward nationalistic concepts and

manifestations." Observers of Romanian political affairs pointed out,

however, that the councils are closely tied to the party and, although

they can serve as means of communication between the PCR and the

minority groups, they function primarily as transmission belts for party

policies and as instruments for PCR political and educational

activities.

Social Democracy and Party Ideology

At the same time that the PCR has sought to present itself as a

progressive force seeking the participation of the people in political

affairs, it has also carried on a campaign to strengthen what it calls

the Marxist character of all ideological, cultural, and educational

activities. Within limits, Ceausescu has encouraged what he has termed

as "socialist democracy"--open communication between the masses and the

party leadership--and he has publicly called for the people to express

their views on political issues.

Socialist democracy is defined by Ceausescu as a spirit of social

responsibility by which the citizens are inspired to perform their

duties in accordance with the needs and imperatives of the society as a

whole. The goal of socialist democracy is to stimulate the masses to

support the cause of socialism by involving them in the programs of the

PCR to such an extent that the individual identifies his personal goals

and values with those of the party.

In mid-1971 Ceausescu announced a new ideological program and the

tightening of party controls over government, science, and cultural

life. Observers gave various interpretations to the campaign. Some saw

it as a move to respond to Soviet criticism of Romanian foreign policy

by reminding Moscow that socialism was not endangered in Romania and

that this pretext could not be used to justify Soviet interference;

others considered it as an assertion of authority by Ceausescu at a time

when he judged it necessary to combat ideological laxity at home. The

action may also have been prompted by a concern that party authority and

discipline were being undermined by Western cultural influences.

Partially directed at the youth of the nation, the campaign included

curbs against alcohol in youth clubs and the screening of foreign

television programs and music. Another objective of the campaign was

increased party control over literature and cultural life; new

ideological guidelines were issued for writers, publishers, and

theaters. In speaking of the role of the arts, Ceausescu declared that

they must serve the single purpose of socialist-communist education. At

the same time, he called for increased guidance of the arts by all

levels of the PCR and requested that works of art and literature be

judged for their conformity with party standards and their service to

the working class. Ceausescu ruled out repressive measures, however, and

asserted that the party would rely on persuasion to implement the new

ideological program (see ch. 7).

The campaign encountered some resistance, although more passive than

overt. A number of writers boycotted the literary magazines in protest

against the restrictions imposed on publishing and, despite the fact

that the official writers' union circulated a statement in support of

the party's stand, many of the more prominent writers refused to endorse

it. In August 1971 the editor of a leading literary journal, who was

also a member of the PCR Central Committee, resigned both positions as a

protest against the stricter party controls.

Resistance was also evident in the party and state bureaucracy, where

the ideological campaign was welcomed in principle but frequently

ignored in practice. Many of the nation's youth also manifested

disagreement with the restrictive content campaign. Assessing the

progress of the program in late 1971, Ceausescu admitted that the new

approach had not been generally adopted among the youth and asserted

that the party organizations had not been diligent enough in the

enforcement of the code. Particular criticism was directed at the

Executive Committee and Secretariat for having failed to implement the

decisions taken for the improvement of ideological activity.

Although it is difficult for outside political observers to detect

differences within the top bodies of the party, in regard to the

ideological campaign tensions have been more evident. For the first time

since Ceausescu came to power in 1965, the Central Committee plenum,

meeting in November 1971, did not report unanimous agreement on all

issues. Some observers indicated that the effect of the campaign has

stimulated opposition to some of Ceausescu's policies. There was no

evidence, however, that such opposition is organized or that it provides

any serious threat to Ceausescu's position, and no leading figure in

either the government or the party has openly expressed views that

differ from those of the general secretary.

POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

The Regime and the People

Inasmuch as the PCR has proclaimed itself to be the only legitimate

source of political power and, as well, the leading force in all aspects

of economic and cultural life, the development of independent political

and cultural values has been thoroughly circumscribed. Party control

extends to all aspects of the society and embraces educational and

professional opportunities. Although PCR leaders have promised changes

in the manner of selection for advancement, promotions have been based

more frequently on party activity and doctrinal reliability than on

professional competence.

Because of the breadth of party control, accurate information on the

attitudes of the people toward the regime and toward specific political

issues is difficult to obtain. The Romanian press functions under the

direct supervision of the PCR, and tight restrictions are placed on

foreign correspondents reporting on events inside the country. Observers

have indicated, however, that not all of the regime's domestic policies

have been welcomed by all segments of the population and that some party

policies have left a wake of latent resentments.

Some observers have pointed to the decrease in the number of peasants in

the party (down 3 percent in the 1969-71 period) as an indication of

peasant dissatisfaction with the poor living conditions in the rural

areas and the low income of most of the agricultural cooperatives (see

ch. 2). Frequently the party responds to signs of discontent by any

segment of the population by increasing the ideological propaganda

directed toward it, but the regime has also attempted various reforms to

counter obvious inadequacies.

Among the more overt examples of discontent with party policy is the

resistance to accepting job assignments in rural areas shown by

technical school graduates. Other graduates have also refused to leave

their home areas to work on collectives; all of these were criticized in

the party press for giving priority to personal interests instead of

considering the interests of the society as a whole. PCR officials

declared that the graduates had been trained at state expense and that

their refusal to fulfill their obligations as assigned by the party

could not be tolerated. This resistance to party-decreed transfers was

also evident among other groups during 1969 and 1970, including

teachers, builders, and administrative workers.

Observers consider such situations as evidence that the party is having

difficulty reconciling an essentially authoritarian system with a policy

of socialist democracy that encourages public initiative and

participation. The persistence with which Ceausescu pursued the new

ideological campaign during 1971 gave some observers the impression that

he had opted to put his weight down on the side of continued

authoritarianism.

Romanian Nationalism

The regime scored a marked success in basing its appeal for popular

support on nationalistic sentiments and in giving emphasis to Romanian

history and cultural traditions. Ceausescu has attempted to broaden the

communist movement to include the aspirations of the people as a whole.

Whereas in the past the PCR leaders made reference only to communist

achievements and attributed everything positive to the work of the

party, Ceausescu has praised Romanian national heroes and has given

positive emphasis to specifically Romanian contributions to socialist

development.

To a significant degree the revival of nationalism has gone hand in hand

with anti-Soviet attitudes. The image of the party was bolstered by the

PCR leader's refusal to follow the Soviet line on a number of

significant national and international issues (see ch. 10). At the time

of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Ceausescu's

denunciation of the action and his call for national mobilization in the

face of the crisis served to unite the population and strengthen his

position. Observers have pointed out, however, that this unity has

appeared to wane with the ebbing of the crisis and with the return to

the realities of everyday life in Romania.

CHAPTER 10

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Throughout the 1960s Romanian foreign policy increasingly diverged from

that of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe as the

Romanian leaders asserted the country's national interests. In early

1972 the government continued to declare that its foreign policy was

based on national independence, sovereignty, and the principle of

noninterference in internal affairs. Government and party leaders

asserted that Romania would continue to seek development of friendly and

cooperative relations with all states without regard to differences in

sociopolitical systems.

Foreign policy was formulated under the direct control of the Standing

Presidium of the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Communist

Roman--PCR) and administered through the government ministries. Although

the regime of PCR General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu has steadfastly

sought to maintain an independent stance in foreign affairs and to

develop political and economic relations with both communist and

noncommunist states, it has continued to assert the Marxist-Leninist

character of both its domestic and foreign policies. PCR leaders have

repeatedly affirmed the party's commitment to the international

communist movement and to the solidarity of all socialist states.

In the development of an independent foreign policy position the PCR has

sought to shift away from economic and political domination by the

Soviet Union and to develop a form of communism geared to the country's

national interests and in keeping with the regime's perspective on world

affairs. Although such a course brought the Romanian party and

government into frequent conflict with the Soviet Union, the Romanian

leadership continued to insist on its own interpretation and adaptation

of communism.

In early 1972 Romania maintained full diplomatic relations with more

than ninety governments, over forty of which maintained embassies in

Bucharest. In addition, trade and cultural relations were conducted with

a number of other states with which formal relations had not been

established. Romania is a member of the United Nations (UN) and a number

of several UN specialized agencies. It is also a member of the communist

military alliance known as the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact)

and the communist economic alliance called the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance (COMECON).

During 1970 and 1971 the regime made increased efforts to cultivate and

strengthen the country's relations with the developing states of Asia

and Africa and to extend its relations with the nations of Latin

America. Personal diplomacy by Ceausescu and other ranking party and

government leaders served as an important means for maintaining the

country's international relations.

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Historical Factors

After coming under full communist control in the early post-World War II

period, the country was closely aligned with the international policies

and goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Romania's

international and domestic policies generally supported the political

and economic goals of the Soviet Union. Beneath the surface, however, an

internal party struggle was being waged in Romania between certain

communist leaders who were fully oriented toward the Soviet Union and

others who sought an orientation that was less Soviet dominated (see ch.

2).

Although the internal struggle involved personal ambitions as much as

political and ideological goals, the group surrounding party First

Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej urged the attainment of national goals

through cooperation with the Soviet Union rather than a position of

complete integration and exclusive dependence on the Soviets. By

mid-1952 Gheorghiu-Dej was able to gain full control of the party, purge

his leading opponents, and assume the dual role of party chief and head

of the government. Shortly after assuming the premiership, Gheorghiu-Dej

began a slow and cautious disengagement from Soviet domination, being

careful, however, not to advocate goals that were at variance with the

policies of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. Domestic politics, in fact,

remained strongly Stalinist in orientation, and it was not until after

Stalin's death in March 1953 that the first significant steps were taken

to diminish Soviet control.

To a significant degree the country's foreign policy during the

Gheorghiu-Dej era reflected the Romanian leader's struggle for his own

political survival, particularly in the face of Soviet Premier Nikita

Khrushchev's campaign to weaken the power of Stalinist-oriented Eastern

European communist leaders. Important also was the growing Romanian

determination to limit the influence of the Soviet Union in the

country's internal affairs, especially in the realm of economic

development. Political events within the communist world during the

remainder of the 1950s and the early 1960s provided Gheorghiu-Dej the

opportunity to assert an increasingly independent stance and to gain

concessions from the Soviets.

Faced with Khrushchev's emphasis on de-Stalinization and his demands for

communist unity under Soviet leadership, the Gheorghiu-Dej regime

responded by giving lip service to Soviet policies while, at the same

time, supporting moves aimed at weakening Soviet hegemony in the

communist world. In early 1954 Gheorghiu-Dej sensed the political

significance of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" theme for Romania

and began to exploit the situation to gain leverage for the extracting

of concessions from the Soviet Union. The first significant achievement

came later that same year when negotiations led to the dissolution of

the joint Soviet-Romanian industrial enterprises that had been the

primary instrument of Soviet economic exploitation during the postwar

period.

The regime also sought to gain increased domestic support by emphasizing

the country's historical traditions, by calling for "Romanian solutions

to Romanian problems," and by cautiously exploiting the population's

latent anti-Soviet sentiments. In August 1954, on the occasion of the

tenth anniversary of the country's liberation from Nazi forces,

Gheorghiu-Dej asserted that the primary credit for driving out the

occupiers belonged to Romanian Communists rather than to the Soviet

army, a view that was subsequently condemned by the Soviets and

supported by the Communist Chinese.

Although the Gheorghiu-Dej regime formally supported the Soviet action

in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian revolt, the Romanian leaders attempted

to exploit the situation in order to obtain additional concessions from

the Soviets and to gain recognition of the legitimacy of the so-called

Romanian road to socialism. At that time, one of their primary aims was

the removal of Soviet occupation forces that had remained in the country

throughout the post-World War II period. Although the regime was not

successful in obtaining formal Soviet recognition of a Romanian variant

of communism, an agreement was reached placing a time limit on the

presence of the Soviet troops, the forces finally being withdrawn in

1958.

Important problems were posed to the Gheorghiu-Dej regime by the

reactivation of COMECON and the Soviet intentions to integrate the

economies of the member states. Initially established in 1949 as the

Soviet counterpart to the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan),

COMECON was largely dormant until 1955, when Khrushchev decided to

revitalize the organization as an instrument of Soviet economic policy

in Eastern Europe. COMECON plans called for the subordination of

national economic plans to an overall planning body that would determine

economic development for the member states as a whole. Romania was to be

assigned the role of a supplier of raw materials and agricultural

produce for the more industrially developed members (see ch. 2).

Gheorghiu-Dej rejected such a subservient role for Romania and proceeded

with his own plans for the country's industrial development, asserting

the right of each COMECON member state to develop its own economy in

accord with national needs and interests, a position that was, in turn,

rejected by the Soviets. As a reaction to Soviet pressures and the need

to lessen Romanian dependence on COMECON, the regime initiated a gradual

and cautious expansion of economic relations with noncommunist states.

In 1957 Ion Gheorghe Maurer became minister of foreign affairs and,

under the direction of Gheorghiu-Dej, initiated programs that emphasized

the national character of Romanian foreign policy. Included in these

programs were plans for the attainment of self-sufficiency in the

machine-tool industry and in the production of iron and steel. At the

same time, additional steps were taken to increase trade with Western

Europe and the United States.

The conflict with the Soviet Union became more acute in 1962 when

Gheorghiu-Dej again rejected the COMECON plan for Romania and, later in

the year, announced that a contract for the construction of a large

steel mill at Galati had been concluded with a British-French

consortium. Romanian statements in support of Albania further

antagonized the Soviet leaders. During 1963 and 1964 Romanian-Soviet

relations continued to deteriorate as the Gheorghiu-Dej regime sought to

exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute and moved closer to the Communist

Chinese position on the equality of communist states and the rejection

of the leading role of the Soviet party. In November 1963 Maurer

declared the readiness of Romania to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute, a

suggestion that Moscow considered arrogant and anti-Soviet.

A statement issued by the party Central Committee in April 1964 declared

the right of Romania and all other nations to develop national policies

in the light of their own interests and domestic requirements. During

the remainder of that year the volume of economic and cultural contacts

with Western nations increased significantly. The increased role of the

United States in the Vietnam hostilities, however, served to curb the

Gheorghiu-Dej regime's efforts to improve relations with the United

States, and the sudden death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965 raised

questions as to the future direction of Romanian foreign policy.

Under Gheorghiu-Dej's successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania's foreign

policy continued to diverge from that of the Soviet Union and the other

members of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Increasingly assertive of

national interests, the Ceausescu regime antagonized the Soviet Union by

its establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of

Germany (West Germany) in 1967 and by its refusal to follow the Soviet

lead in breaking relations with Israel in the wake of the 1967

Arab-Israeli War.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces of the Warsaw Pact

in August 1968 posed a particular threat to Romania. Observers of

Eastern European political affairs saw the invasion as a severe blow to

the basic assumptions of Romanian foreign policy, which included the

belief that the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily against

another member of the Warsaw Pact as long as the system of communist

party rule was firmly maintained and membership in the pact was

continued.

From the outset of the Czechoslovak crisis the Ceausescu regime asserted

that the only basis for relations between states was respect for

national independence and sovereignty and a policy of noninterference in

another state's internal affairs. The actual invasion, however, marked a

reversal for Romanian foreign policy and, although the initial response

was one of condemnation and defiance, Romania was put on the defensive.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia marked something of a turning point in

Romania's relations with COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet

enunciation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine--the concept that the

protection of socialism in any communist state is the legitimate concern

of all communist states--was intended as a clear warning to the

Ceausescu regime.

Pressures mounted on Romania to cooperate more fully in the Warsaw Pact

and to agree to a supranational planning body within the framework of

COMECON. Economic conditions as well as the political and military

pressures pushed the Ceausescu regime toward closer cooperation with

COMECON, although the Romanians continued to resist the Soviet efforts

toward economic integration.

As a result of these pressures, the 1968-70 period was one of relative

passivity for the Romanians in foreign affairs, although the period was

marked by several important events, including the visit of President

Richard M. Nixon to Romania in August 1969 and the long-delayed signing

of the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in July 1970. By early

1971 the Ceausescu regime again became more assertive of its independent

line in foreign policy.

Principles of Foreign Policy

According to the 1965 Constitution, the foreign policy of the country is

based on strict respect for the principles of national independence and

sovereignty, equality of rights, noninterference in internal affairs,

and interstate relations based on mutual advantage. The Constitution

declares the nation's desire to maintain friendly and fraternal

relations with all socialist states as well as to promote friendship and

cooperation with states of other sociopolitical systems. Participation

in international organizations is directed toward the furthering of

peace and international understanding.

Spokesmen for the regime have repeatedly asserted these principles as

the only acceptable basis for relations between states both within and

outside the world communist movement. In contrast to the Soviet position

that socialism can only be fully realized by transcending national

forms, Romanian policy gives primary emphasis to the distinct

requirements of the nation. At the same time, however, Romania

recognizes the duties of each socialist state toward cooperative and

mutually advantageous relations with all socialist nations and fraternal

communist parties.

In keeping with these principles the PCR has rejected the so-called

Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist states. Instead,

regime spokesmen have asserted that within the socialist system all

Marxist-Leninist parties are equal and have the exclusive right to

determine appropriate solutions for their own problems and manage their

own affairs. Romanian policy maintains that relations between socialist

states must be based on equal rights, complete trust, mutual respect,

and fraternal cooperation. In defending the country's policies, PCR

leaders have repeatedly argued that, because the construction of

communism is being carried out under a great variety of conditions,

there will inevitably be different opinions regarding the forms and

procedures employed as well as different points of view regarding

international problems. Such differences, however, should not affect

relations between socialist states or the unity of the socialist

movement.

In response to Soviet calls for socialist solidarity, a ranking member

of the PCR Standing Presidium declared, "it would be unrealistic to

think that fourteen socialist countries spread over three continents,

each with its specific characteristics, should show themselves strictly

identical in the building of a new society." Additional party statements

insisted that each country must be allowed to apply the principles of

Marxism-Leninism to its own particular conditions and that no general

line for all parties could be established. In adjusting Marxism-Leninism

to national needs each party must be able to make its own unique

contribution to the enrichment of the entire communist movement.

During the negotiations for the renewal of the friendship treaties with

the other Warsaw Pact countries, the Ceausescu government repeatedly

stressed that its own formula for developing international relations

with noncommunist nations was based on the same principles as those

applied to socialist states and that Romania was open to the

establishment of such relations "without regard for difference in the

social order." A party spokesman asserted that the country's foreign

relations are not determined by short-term circumstances that are valid

at one moment and superseded the next but by policies directed at

long-term cooperation in all fields of common interests.

PCR policy has sought to support the country's independent political

stance by increasing its economic independence. This has led to the

rejection of COMECON attempts to integrate the economies of its member

states and to establish a division of labor among them. Instead, the PCR

has followed a policy aimed at the industrialization of the country,

based on the proposition that an expanded industrial base is what is

most needed for Romania's overall economic development.

In the same manner that the PCR has resisted complete integration into

COMECON, the regime has also opposed Soviet plans for the fuller

integration of military forces under the Warsaw Pact. Romanian

objections to such integration stem from a concern for the preservation

of the country's national sovereignty and a desire to limit Soviet

hegemony in Eastern Europe. PCR leaders have described military blocs

and the existence of foreign troops and military bases on the territory

of other states as being incompatible with national independence and as

the primary obstacles to cooperation among nations. On the other hand,

party spokesmen have frequently stated that, as long as the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is continued, the socialist

countries will be forced to maintain the Warsaw Pact.

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Policy Formation

The Constitution assigns to the Grand National Assembly the

responsibility for establishing the general line of foreign policy and

assigns its implementation to the Council of Ministers. It is the

Council of State, however, that is given the overall executive functions

of ratifying international treaties and establishing diplomatic

relations with other states. As the head of state, the president of the

Council of State is charged with representing the country in its

international relations.

In practice, however, the basic foreign policy decisions are made by the

Standing Presidium of the PCR rather than the Grand National Assembly.

Owing to the fact that the same men occupy leading positions in both

party and government, decisions reached in the Standing Presidium are

promulgated as decisions of the Council of State. Party spokesmen have

described the country's foreign policy as being the result of the

"unitary thinking and action of the leading party bodies based on the

principle of collective leadership" (see ch. 8; ch. 9).

Within the PCR, foreign policy decisions are channeled through the

Central Committee's directorate for international affairs, which in turn

transmits them in the form of directives to the appropriate government

agencies and oversees their implementation. A commission on foreign

policy in the Grand National Assembly functions largely to channel party

decisions to the assembly for its official approval.

As head of the PCR and president of the Council of State, Ceausescu

personally exercised the primary decisionmaking powers in matters of

foreign policy just as he did in domestic affairs. Observers of Eastern

European politics also ascribe influential roles in the determination of

foreign policy to Prime Minister Maurer and Foreign Minister Corneliu

Manescu.

Since coming to power in 1965 Ceausescu has been the dominant figure in

the political life of the country and its principal spokesman in

international affairs. Believing in the importance of personal

diplomacy, Ceausescu has made frequent visits to other nations and

cultivated personal relationships with other heads of state. The prime

minister and the minister of foreign affairs have also made frequent

visits to other states to foster international support for the country's

foreign policy. Manescu had developed broad international contacts

during his term as president of the twenty-second session of the UN

General Assembly in 1967.

Administration of Foreign Affairs

The Council of Ministers is charged with the coordination and

implementation of foreign policy and exercises these responsibilities

through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign

Trade. Since decisionmaking powers rest in the top echelons of the

party, the ministries function almost exclusively as administrative

agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the

implementation of party directives in the country's foreign diplomatic

relations and in the areas of educational, cultural, and scientific

relations with other states and with international organizations. The

Ministry of Foreign Trade functions as the central organ for the

country's international trade and economic activities.

In early 1972 the organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs remained essentially the same as it had been established after

the adoption of the new Constitution of 1965. The ministry is organized

into six geographical departments, twelve functional directorates, and

three administrative offices. The geographical directorates are

designated as: the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary;

the Balkans and the Near East; Western and Central Europe; North America

and South America; Africa and the Middle East; and the Far East and

Southeast and South Asia.

The functional directorates are: international organization; cultural

relations; political synthesis; economic relations; legal and treaties;

consular; press; protocol; personnel; finance, accounting, and work

organization; technical and administrative; and secretariat. The three

administrative offices are designated the Chancellery, the Office of

Services to the Diplomatic Corps, and the Legal Office. The entire

organization functioned under the direction of the minister of foreign

affairs and five deputy ministers.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade is organized into nine bureaus, a legal

office, and an office for protocol. Bureaus listed under the ministry in

1970, the latest year for which information was available in early 1972,

included: economic relations with socialist countries; economic

relations with developed capitalist countries; economic relations with

emerging nations; currency and plan coordination; imports and exports;

personnel and training; administration; budgets; and accounting. The

ministry functions under the direction of the minister of foreign trade,

four deputy ministers, and a secretary general.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In early 1972 diplomatic relations were maintained with ninety-six

countries and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of the

Republic of South Vietnam (Viet Cong). Of these, forty-two governments

maintained embassies in Bucharest. Nine other governments conducted

relations through their embassies in Moscow; seven, through their

embassies in Belgrade; two through their embassies in Prague; and one,

through its embassy in Athens. The total includes Brazil, with which

relations were maintained at the legation level, and Spain and San

Marino, where Romania maintained consulates. Thirty-two of the states

with which Romania maintained diplomatic relations had not established

permanent embassies or legations in the country as of early 1972. Trade

relations were conducted with several other states with which the

government had not established formal diplomatic ties (see ch. 14).

Relations with Communist States and Communist Parties

The Soviet Union

Romania's pursuit of an independent foreign policy has resulted in

frequent conflicts with the Soviet Union and tense relations between the

two states. In general, the policy disagreements have centered on

Romania's unwillingness to participate more fully in the Warsaw Pact,

rejection of the concept of economic integration under COMECON, refusal

to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and development of a foreign

policy toward the West that runs contrary to Soviet desires. Soviet

leaders have interpreted the Romanian policies as a direct challenge to

the leading role of the Soviet party in the world communist movement and

a rejection of the PCR's obligations to promote "socialist solidarity."

The general policy differences between the two countries were repeatedly

demonstrated during the 1967-71 period in such instances as the Romanian

establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany, the refusal to

follow the Soviet lead in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the

refusal to participate in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and

Ceausescu's strong denunciation of the action, and the rejection of the

Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

Perhaps the most important element complicating relations with the

Soviet Union has been Romania's refusal to take the Soviet side in the

Sino-Soviet dispute. In keeping with its policy of maintaining friendly

and fraternal relations with all socialist states, the Ceausescu regime

has cultivated relations with the People's Republic of China and is

thought by some observers to have played a role in the establishment of

contacts between the Communist Chinese and the United States. In

mid-1971 Romanian leaders also mediated the restoration of relations

between the People's Republic of China and Yugoslavia. These actions led

to charges in the Soviet press that Romania was organizing an

anti-Soviet bloc in the Balkans under the patronage of the People's

Republic of China.

Despite the ups and downs of Soviet-Romanian relations throughout the

period of the Ceausescu regime, the two states signed a twenty-year

treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in July 1970.

This treaty replaced a similar 1948 accord that had been set to expire

in 1968 but continued in force under an automatic five-year renewal

clause. Negotiated before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia,

the actual signing of the treaty was delayed because of strained

relations between the two states and Soviet attempts to insert a clause

containing the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Ceausescu

government refused to renegotiate the original agreement, however, and

the treaty was finally signed at ceremonies in Bucharest.

Brezhnev did not attend the ceremonies and, in contrast to similar

Soviet treaties with other Eastern European communist states, which were

signed by both the party leaders and the prime ministers of each

country, the Soviet-Romanian treaty was signed only by the prime

ministers. Coming in the midst of serious disagreements between the two

countries, the signing of the treaty was considered by some observers as

a formality and something of a smokescreen intended to cover a widening

split.

Other Communist States

In general, relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German

Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, and Poland mirrored

Romania's relations with the Soviet Union. The communist leaders of

these countries followed the Soviet lead in the policy differences with

the Ceausescu regime and, although each state had friendship treaties

that expired in 1968 and 1969, only the treaty with Czechoslovakia was

renewed before the Soviet-Romanian treaty was signed. The Czechoslovakia

treaty was concluded during the period of the government of Alexander

Dubcek before the 1968 invasion.

In its relations with the Eastern European communist regimes Romania had

adhered to the principle of cultivating fraternal relations with all

socialist countries despite policy differences. Long-term bilateral

trade agreements were concluded with Hungary and Bulgaria in late 1969,

and the major portion of the country's foreign trade continued to be

with COMECON states throughout 1970 and 1971. Visits on the ministerial

level were regularly exchanged. Relations with the East German regime

proved more difficult, however, the major obstacle being Romania's

establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany in early 1967.

Despite the recognition of the West German government, however, the

Ceausescu regime has continued to insist on the reality of two German

states and has pressed for international recognition of East Germany.

Relations with Bulgaria had been generally cool throughout the latter

period of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime but improved significantly after

Ceausescu came to power in Romania in 1965. By the beginning of 1968,

however, the policies pursued by the Ceausescu regime led to serious

differences, although formal amenities continued to be observed.

Relations remained correct but not cordial until after the signing of

the Soviet-Romanian treaty of friendship and alliance in July 1970. This

action paved the way for improved relations with Bulgaria, and in

September Ceausescu met with Bulgarian prime minister Todor Zhivkov,

marking the first top-level bilateral contact between the two

governments in three years. This meeting was followed by the exchange of

a series of high-level delegations with the announced purpose of

improving relations and increasing cooperation.

Friction with Hungary arose in mid-1971 over the Romanian region of

Transylvania and the sizable Hungarian minority residing there. In the

period of strained--Soviet-Romanian relations, the Budapest regime

revived the Transylvanian minority question in order to put pressure on

the Ceausescu government. Frequent visits of Soviet embassy personnel to

Transylvania added to the concern of Romanian leaders, who initiated

increased efforts to meet the needs and expectations of the country's

minority groups (see ch. 4; ch. 9). By February 1972, tension between

Hungary and Romania had eased and a friendship treaty was renewed.

Relations with Albania and Yugoslavia differed from those with the other

Eastern European communist regimes, as neither participated in the

Warsaw Pact and both had also pursued policies independent of the Soviet

Union. In 1960 Albania sided with the Communist Chinese in the

Sino-Soviet dispute and withdrew its ambassadors from all the Eastern

European countries after Khrushchev denounced the Albanian regime at the

Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in

1961. The Romanian position of neutrality in regard to the Sino-Soviet

dispute opened the way for improved relations with Albania, and the

Ceausescu government returned its ambassador to Tirana in 1964.

The Ceausescu regime has maintained that the policies of the Albanian

Communists (the Albanian Workers' Party) are legitimate manifestations

of socialism developed according to national needs. Common fears of

Soviet designs against their countries after the Warsaw Pact invasion of

Czechoslovakia brought about increased cooperation between the two

governments.

Relations with Yugoslavia had progressed along lines of mutual interest

throughout the period of the Ceausescu regime, and close cooperation had

developed between the Romanian and Yugoslav heads of state as they

sought each other's support for their independent foreign policies. The

PCR was the only Eastern European party to send a delegation to the

Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1969.

Although the two governments indicated almost identical views on all

important international issues, they manifested widely divergent

approaches to domestic affairs and, owing to the fact that their

economies are not complementary, economic relations between the two

countries have not kept pace with political relations. Efforts to

increase economic relations resulted in a new five-year trade agreement

in 1971 designed to increase the exchange of goods by 128 percent in the

period covered. Cooperation between the two states was also demonstrated

in the joint construction of the Iron Gate hydroelectric station on the

Danube (see ch. 3).

During 1971 the PCR renewed efforts to promote cooperative relations

among the Balkan states. The regime emphasized that the geographical

isolation and the socialist systems of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,

and Romania make for common interest in increased economic, political,

and cultural cooperation. Observers of Eastern European politics pointed

out that Romania shares lengthy borders with Bulgaria, Hungary, and the

Soviet Union and that improving relations with the other Balkan states

would serve to overcome the country's relative physical isolation.

PCR leaders have also called for all of the Balkan area, including both

the communist and the noncommunist states, to be designated a nuclear

free zone and for the removal of United States military bases from the

area. Observers pointed out that the Ceausescu regime believed that such

actions would serve to reduce the strategic significance of Romania in

the eyes of the Soviet leaders and possibly result in greater tolerance

for Romanian deviation from the Soviet line. Political observers also

attributed the growing willingness of Albania and Yugoslavia to increase

cooperation and give support to Romania's initiatives for the Balkan

area to the growth of Soviet naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Ceausescu regime successfully cultivated relations with the People's

Republic of China and persisted in the development of these relations

despite tremendous pressures from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact

states. An important byproduct of these relations has been increased

economic exchanges between the two countries; in late 1970 the Communist

Chinese extended Romania a long-term, interest-free credit amounting to

the equivalent of US$244 million.

In June 1971 Ceausescu made a twenty-five day visit to Asia that

included nine days in mainland China, the first such visit by a party

leader of a Warsaw Pact state since the Sino-Soviet dispute became

public. In a joint communiqué the Communist Chinese and Romanian leaders

emphasized the necessity of sovereign and equal relations among all

communist states and parties. Ceausescu reiterated his government's

support for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the

United Nations and asserted that the rightful sovereignty over Taiwan

belonged to the Peking regime. In August 1971 a Communist Chinese

military delegation attended the twenty-seventh anniversary celebrations

of the liberation of Romania from Nazi occupation.

Maintenance of friendly relations with the People's Republic of China

has also gained the Ceausescu regime support from other communist

parties that have been critical of the Soviet Union in its conflict with

the Communist Chinese, most notably the French and Italian parties. The

PCR has taken special pains to cultivate relations with nonruling

communist and workers' parties, efforts that were reflected in visits of

top leaders from at least thirty of these parties to Romania during

1970. All of these visitors were received personally by Ceausescu.

Observers pointed out that the cultivation of relations with the

nonruling parties was an important means of gaining support for

Romania's independent policies.

Relations With Noncommunist States

Romania has continued to improve relations with Western nations and has

sought to cultivate ties with the developing countries of Africa and

Asia. The expansion of relations beyond the Soviet alignment system was

cautiously initiated in the mid-1950s by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime when

pressures were building for Romania's full economic integration into

COMECON. In addition to the desire to develop trade relations with

Western nations, the government was interested in utilizing Western

technology and in seeking an increased measure of detente in the cold

war.

West Germany

In the period that followed the initiation of limited relations with

noncommunist states, Romania's resistance to the Soviet Union

contributed to a receptive attitude on the part of several Western

states. Aside from the gradual development of trade relations, however,

significant political relations with Western Europe did not materialize

until January 1967, when the Ceausescu regime agreed to establish formal

diplomatic relations with West Germany, becoming the first of the Warsaw

Pact states, other than the Soviet Union, to do so.

Romanian leaders based the establishment of relations with West Germany

on the so-called Bucharest Declaration issued by the leaders of the

Warsaw Pact countries in 1966. The declaration affirmed that there were

in West Germany "circles that oppose revanchism and militarism" and that

seek the development of normal relations with countries of both the East

and the West as well as a normalization of relations "between the two

German states." Also included in the declaration was a statement

affirming that a basic condition for European security was the

establishment of normal relations between states "regardless of their

social systems." The Ceausescu regime interpreted this as implying that

bilateral relations could be developed between Eastern European states

and West Germany.

Although the West German government made overtures to other Eastern

European communist states, Romania was the only one to agree to the

establishment of formal diplomatic ties at that time. Political

observers saw the move as a means for Romania to dramatically

demonstrate independence from the Soviet Union and, as well, a means of

avoiding COMECON integration pressures by increasing trade and the

possibility of obtaining economic aid from the West.

The establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany did not alter the

PCR position on the existence of two German states. Each country, at the

time the diplomatic exchange was made public, simply reasserted its own

positions: the West German government reiterated its right and

obligation to speak for the entire German people, and the Bucharest

government asserted that one of the fundamental realities of the

post-World War II era "is the existence of two German states." Although

Romania reaffirmed the existence of East Germany as a separate state, it

did not make recognition of the East German regime by West Germany a

precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the West

German government.

The East German regime was highly critical of the Romanian establishment

of relations with West Germany, and there followed a serious decline in

Romanian-East German relations. PCR leaders responded to East German

criticisms by declaring that "the foreign policy of a socialist state is

laid down by the party and the government of the country in question and

they need render account only to their people."

In the period since 1967 relations with West Germany have continued

without major difficulties. Although the Ceausescu regime has not

hesitated to criticize elements of German policy with which it does not

agree, the two governments have sought to minimize differences in

ideology and in foreign and domestic policies in the interest of

maintaining good relations. In economic exchanges between the two

countries Romania has had a continuous balance of trade deficit, a

situation that both countries were attempting to correct. In mid-1970

Prime Minister Maurer paid an official visit to Bonn, becoming the first

Eastern European head of government to do so. In May 1971 the West

German government reciprocated, President Gustav Heinemann making a

state visit to Romania.

The United States

Relations with the United States were initiated on a limited scale in

the early 1960s, and ambassadors were exchanged in 1964, but relations

declined with the increasing United States role in the Republic of

Vietnam (South Vietnam). After the opening of the Paris peace talks and

particularly after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia that same

year, relations between the two states improved significantly. Trade

relations remained minimal, however, partly because of United States

legal restrictions on trade with Eastern European countries.

The improved relations between the two nations were demonstrated by the

visit of President Nixon to Romania in August 1969, marking the first

visit of a United States head of state to a communist country since the

1945 Yalta Conference. Press reports indicated that the president

received an enthusiastic welcome from the Romanian people and that in

meetings with Ceausescu a wide range of international problems were

discussed.

At the close of the visit President Nixon reaffirmed that the United

States "respects the sovereignty and equal rights of all countries,

large and small, as well as their right to preserve their own national

character." The two heads of state agreed upon the reciprocal

establishment of libraries, the opening of negotiations for the

conclusion of a consular convention, and the development and

diversification of economic ties.

The presidential visit was reciprocated by Ceausescu in October 1970

when the Romanian leader traveled to New York to attend the twenty-fifth

anniversary session of the UN General Assembly. Ceausescu followed the

UN visit with a two-week coast-to-coast tour of the United States and

talks at the White House with President Nixon. The Nixon administration

moved to increase economic relations with Romania, and in early 1972

legislation was pending in the United States Congress to grant that

country most-favored-nation status (see ch. 14).

Other States

As part of its campaign to improve relations among the Balkan states and

in keeping with its policy of establishing relations with all states

regardless of their political systems, the Ceausescu regime initiated

efforts to ameliorate its relations with Greece and Turkey. The

development of ties with Turkey has progressed without serious setback

throughout the period of Ceausescu's rule, but Greco-Romanian relations

have fluctuated. Although the regime has followed a policy of

noninterference in the internal affairs of another state, it left the

Romanian embassy in Athens without an ambassador for a year after the

1967 Greek military coup. In July 1968 the Romanian government returned

an ambassador to Greece as a first step in improving relations between

the two states. Increased trade and cultural exchanges followed,

although the differing ideologies of the two regimes have kept official

relations at a correct but cool level.

Although Turkey did not respond positively to the Romanian call for a

nuclear free zone in the Balkans and the removal of foreign military

bases from the area, asserting that such an agreement would have to be

included in a wider accord between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations,

relations between the two states have continued to improve. Ceausescu

paid a state visit to Turkey in 1969, and the Turkish president visited

Romania in April 1970. The satisfactory political ties have resulted in

a number of cultural and economic agreements, Romania obtaining Turkish

raw materials, particularly iron, chrome, and manganese, and exporting

machinery to Turkey.

Political, economic, and cultural ties were expanded with a number of

other Western countries during the 1965-70 period, particularly with

Austria, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The Ceausescu regime

placed primary emphasis on the cultivation of economic relations with

these states, and several substantial trade agreements were concluded

and high-level visits were exchanged during 1970 and 1971.

PCR policy statements have proclaimed that one of the principal

guidelines of Romanian foreign policy is the steady cultivation and

broadening of political and economic relations with the young

independent states of Asia and Africa as well as with the countries of

Latin America. The regime has also repeatedly affirmed its support for

"the struggle of the peoples of Africa, Asia and other regions of the

world for liberation and national independence against neocolonialism

and the aggressive actions of imperialism."

Policy statements have also consistently voiced support for the

communist effort in South Vietnam. The communist Provisional

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) is

recognized as the legitimate government of South Vietnam and maintains

an embassy in Bucharest.

The Middle East situation has posed a dilemma for the Ceausescu

government, which has sought to maintain relations with both sides in

the conflict. When, in August 1969, Romania and Israel announced an

agreement to elevate their relations to the ambassadorial level, Syria

and Sudan retaliated by breaking relations with Romania, and Iraq and

the United Arab Republic reduced the level of their representation in

Bucharest. Despite these actions by the Arab states, PCR leaders

continued to voice support for "the struggle of the Arab people to

defend their national independence and sovereignty" but called for a

negotiated settlement of the conflict.

The Ceausescu regime systematically cultivated relations with the

developing countries, and particular efforts were directed toward

increasing relations with African nations during 1970 and 1971.

Ceausescu made a state visit to Morocco, and other high Romanian

officials visited Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa)--in late 1971

became the Republic of Zaire--Burundi, Kenya, the Malagasy Republic,

Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. Several prominent African leaders, among

them President Jean Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic and

President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire visited Romania. Trade agreements were

signed with a number of African nations, but little had been done to

implement these agreements as of early 1972. As another means of

increasing its influence in Africa and broadening relations there, the

Ceausescu government established more than 400 scholarships for African

students to study in Romania.

Relations With International Organizations

Romania became a member of the UN in 1955 and as of early 1972 also held

membership in the following UN specialized agencies: the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United

Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations

Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also participates in the work of the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The two most important communist organizations to which the country

belongs are the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. The Warsaw Pact was established

in 1955 as a twenty-year mutual defense pact between the Soviet Union,

Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and

Romania. (Albania ceased its participation in the organization in 1961

and officially withdrew in 1968 as a symbol of protest against the

invasion of Czechoslovakia). As an instrument of Soviet foreign policy,

the Warsaw Pact has served to maintain Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe

and to provide the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops on the

territory of some of the participating states.

Romania has consistently refused to acquiesce in Soviet proposals for

greater integration of the military forces of the Warsaw Pact states and

did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. After the

Czechoslovak invasion the Ceausescu government established a defense

council and proclaimed that foreign troops were not to enter Romania for

any purpose without prior approval of the Grand National Assembly.

During the 1968-71 period the Romanians limited their participation in

pact activities as much as possible. Rather than Romanian troops taking

part in joint maneuvers of pact forces, participation has generally been

limited to a small group of staff officers who attend the exercises as

observers.

Official Romanian views on the integration of Eastern European communist

forces under the pact were forcefully reiterated in early 1970 after the

Soviet chief of staff spoke of "combined" or "unified" pact forces.

Ceausescu responded by declaring that Romania's armed forces are not

subordinated to any authority other than "the Romanian party,

government, and Supreme National Command." Although he pledged continued

cooperation with the pact and a fulfillment of his country's

responsibilities, he asserted that no part of the party's and

government's right to command and lead the armed forces would be ceded

to any other body. In addition, Ceausescu gave emphasis to the defensive

nature of the Warsaw Pact and reiterated the Romania position on

noninterference in the internal affairs of another country.

Romanian policy toward COMECON has been cooperative in regard to

mutually advantageous trade relations with the other member states but

has consistently opposed pressures for the integration of their

economies. The Soviet Union and the more industrialized of the Eastern

European communist states have pressed for economic integration that

would include a division of labor among COMECON members and a

specialization of production. Romanian leaders, preferring to develop a

diversified national economy, have refused the role of supplier of

agricultural goods and raw materials that COMECON would have assigned to

their country.

During the mid-1960s Romania successfully reoriented a substantial share

of its trade toward the West and reduced its participation in COMECON.

Trade with the West, however, produced sizable deficits and, along with

other economic problems, including the disastrous floods of early 1970,

forced the Ceausescu regime to again rely on its economic ties with the

COMECON states. Despite these difficulties, the country has continued to

develop its trade relations with noncommunist nations and has continued

to resist COMECON integration pressures.

In 1970 a prominent Romanian economist proposed that COMECON become an

open-ended organization in which all countries, socialist and

nonsocialist, could participate on a voluntary basis. In mid-1971 an

official PCR party spokesman declared that economic cooperation with

COMECON must "in no way affect the national economic plans or the

independence of the economic units in each country."

CHAPTER 11

PUBLIC INFORMATION

In the early 1970s the media of public information, under complete party

and government control and supervision, were utilized primarily to

propagandize and indoctrinate the population in support of the regime's

domestic and foreign policy objectives. The system of control was highly

centralized and involved an interlocking group of party and state

organizations, supervising bodies, and operating agencies whose

authority extended to all radio and television facilities, film studios,

printing establishments, newspapers, book publishers, and the single

news agency. In addition, this control apparatus also regulated the

access of the public to foreign publications, films, newscasts, books,

and radio and television programs.

Freedom of information, although never fully recognized in precommunist

Romania, completely disappeared under the Communists after 1948. In late

1971, as a result of an ideological campaign launched by the regime, the

communications media experienced measures that served further to

reemphasize their assigned role as political tools in the indoctrination

of the people. The effects of this campaign had not become fully evident

in early 1972, but changes and modifications had begun to appear that

tended to inhibit liberalizing trends, which had been incorporated

gradually into the system during the 1960s.

GOVERNMENT AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

Although freedom of information was theoretically guaranteed by the

early constitutions of precommunist Romania, censorship of the press was

not unusual and commonly took the form of banning or confiscating

newspapers and periodicals considered hostile to the ruling group.

Newspapers had traditionally been published by political parties and

special interest groups, only a few being uncontrolled and truly

independent. In consequence, the public has long regarded the press as

generally biased, tainted with propaganda, and not reliable as a source

of objective news.

Under the dictatorship imposed by King Carol II in 1938 and during the

wartime regime of Marshal Ion Antonescu, censorship was officially

proclaimed and rigidly enforced. Since that time the communications

media have enjoyed only one period of relative freedom, lasting only a

few weeks following the coup d'etat of King Michael in August 1944.

After Michael's deposition and during the struggle for power that

followed, the Communists effectively controlled the press and radio

through the unions serving these facilities, which they had heavily

infiltrated. After their seizure of power in 1948, the Communists

instituted a system of censorship and control that has continued without

interruption.

The 1965 Constitution, the third promulgated by the Communists since

their takeover of the government, is less moderate in tone than its

predecessors in preserving the fiction of the right of citizens to

individual freedoms. The document states that freedom of speech, of the

press, and of assembly "cannot be used for aims hostile to the socialist

system and to the interests of the working people." This same article

also prohibits associations of a "fascist" or "anti-democratic" nature,

as well as the participation of citizens in such associations. The

Constitution names the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Communist

Roman--PCR) as the leading political force in the country; by virtue of

its position, the party has become the ultimate authority in determining

actions that are "fascist," "anti-democratic," or "hostile to the

socialist system."

In 1972 the regime continued to utilize the conventional information

media--newspapers, magazines, books, radio, television, and motion

pictures--as an integrated, governmental system for the indoctrination

of the population and the molding of public opinion in support of the

state and its policies. In keeping with this overall objective, a

campaign for the increased ideological and political indoctrination of

the public was undertaken in July 1971 that brought about a

reenforcement of party authority over the highest information control

and policymaking bodies in the government (see ch. 7). The former State

Committee for Culture and Art, established with ministerial rank under

the Council of Ministers, was reconstituted as the Council on Socialist

Culture and Education and was made directly subordinate to the Central

Committee of the PCR. Similar changes were made in the Committee of

Radio and Television, which became the Council of Romanian Radio and

Television.

Under the direct guidance of the press and propaganda sections of the

Central Committee, these two councils formulate policy guidelines and

supervise all publication and dissemination procedures throughout the

communications media. The policies and directives, in turn, are

implemented by other government-controlled operating agencies, such as

the General Directorate for the Press and Printing, the Romanian press

agency, and the individual publishing houses, printing establishments,

book distribution centers, motion picture studios, and radio and

television stations. To further assure a uniform collective effort

consistent with the party line, and two national councils are also

empowered to organize wherever necessary permanent commissions,

temporary working groups, and local committees to assist the councils in

"analyzing" the way decisions are applied and in "improving" local

activities.

THE PRESS

Newspapers

According to the latest official statistics, there were a total of

seventy-six "general information" newspapers published throughout the

country in 1969. Of these, fifty-one were dailies, twenty-three were

weeklies, and two appeared at infrequent intervals, from two to three

times per week. Daily circulation estimates were available for very few

newspapers. Together, these newspapers had a total annual circulation of

more than 1.1 billion copies, a substantial increase over the 1950 level

of 870 million copies that was achieved by the seventy-five newspapers

then being published. The acceptance of high circulation figures as an

indicator of reader appeal is of doubtful value, however, since many

readers were required to subscribe to newspapers because of their party

or work affiliation. Also, certain functionaries throughout the

governmental apparatus and many supervisory workers had subscription

costs automatically deducted from their salaries.

Newspapers traditionally have been published in the national minority

languages, but since the mid-1960s the government has published no

official statistics on them, apparently in keeping with its

integrationist policy (see ch. 7). In 1964 it was estimated by Western

observers that the ethnic minorities were served by approximately twenty

newspapers, including eight dailies, with an annual circulation of

slightly more than 103 million copies.

All newspapers are licensed by the General Directorate for the Press and

Printing, the state agency that also controls the allocation of

newsprint, the manufacture of ink and other printing supplies, and the

distribution of all publications. Thus the government is in a position

to prohibit the appearance of any newspaper or other publication either

directly by revoking the license or indirectly by withholding essential

supplies or services. Each newspaper is organized into a collective

enterprise made up of the entire personnel of all departments. Chief

responsibility for the content of the paper is vested in an "editorial

collegium" headed by the chief editor. Meetings are held periodically

between all chief editors and party representatives, which serve as an

effective means of followup control in lieu of prepublication

censorship.

Major mass organizations, government-sponsored groups, local government

organs, and the PCR and its subsidiaries publish the most important and

influential papers, both in Bucharest and in the larger cities of the

various counties (see table 3). Little latitude is allowed in the

presentation of news, and almost all papers follow a serious, monotonous

format that has little popular appeal. Shortly after renewed emphasis

was placed on the ideological and political education of the population

in mid-1971, a Western journalist likened the nation to a huge classroom

in which unpopular and trite subjects were being presented to an

unreceptive class by an exhortative mass media.

The most authoritative and widely read newspaper is _Scinteia_, founded

in 1931 as the official organ of the Central Committee of the party. It

has, by far, the largest daily circulation and enjoys considerable

prestige as the outlet for party policy pronouncements as well as for

semiofficial government attitudes on both national and international

issues. The eight-page newspaper appears seven days a week and is

national in scope. Its editorials, feature sections, and chief articles

are frequently reprinted, in whole or in part, by smaller newspapers in

outlying areas. Quotations and summaries are also repeated regularly in

shop bulletins and in information letters put on by many enterprises,

plants, and factories.

The next most important dailies are _Romania Libera_, established by the

Socialist Unity Front in 1942; _Munca_, founded in 1943 as the voice of

the Central Council of the General Union of Trade Unions and _Scinteia

Tineretului_, the organ of the Union of Communist Youth, which has been

published since 1944. Each of these newspapers is much smaller than

_Scinteia_ and is directed at a particular group of readers of level of

society. Although _Romania Libera_ contains items of both national and

international interest, it deals primarily with the problems associated

with the "building of socialism" at the local level. Similarly, _Munca_

directs its major effort at the labor force and stresses the cooperative

relationship between workers and industry. _Scinteia Tineretului_, in

like manner, concentrates on the younger element of the population and

stresses the ideological and political training of youth as the basis

for a "sound socialist society."

_Table 3. Principal Romanian Daily Newspapers, 1971_

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Daily

Publication Circulation Place Publisher

(in thousands)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

_Crisana_ ___ Oradea Romanian Communist Party

_Dobrogea Noua_ ___ Constanta Do.

_Drapelul Rosu_ 54 Timisoara Do.

_Drum Nou_ ___ Brasov Do.

_Drumul Socialismului_ ___ Deva Do.

_Elore_[1] ___ Bucharest Hungarian People's Council

_Faclia_ ___ Cluj Romanian Communist Party

_Faklya_[1] ___ Oradea Hungarian People's Council

_Flacara Iasului_ ___ Iasi Romanian Communist Party

_Flacara Rosie_ ___ Arad Do.

_Flamura Prahovei_ ___ Ploiesti Do.

_Igazsag_ ___ Cluj Do.

_Inainte_ ___ Craiova Do.

_Inainte_ ___ Braila Do.

_Informatia Bucurestiului_ ___ Bucharest Do.

_Munca_ ___ do General Union of Trade Unions

_Neuer Weg_[2] 100 do German People's Council

_Romania Libera_ 200 do Socialist Unity Front

_Satul Socialist_ ___ do Union of Agricultural

Production Cooperatives

_Scinteia_ 1,000 do Romanian Communist Front

_Scinteia Tineretului_ 300 do Union of Communist Youth

_Sportul Popular_ ___ do Union of Culture and Sports

_Steagul Rosu_ ___ do Romanian Communist Front

_Steau Rosie_ ___ Tirgu Mures Do.

_Szabad Szo_[1] ___ Timisoara Hungarian People's Council

_Viata Noua_ ___ Galati Romanian Communist Party

_Voros Zaszlo_[1] ___ Tirgu Mures Hungarian People's Council

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

___ circulation unknown

1. Published in Hungarian.

2. Published in German.

The principal and most widely known minority-language newspapers are the

Hungarian daily _Elore_ and the German _Neuer Weg_, also a daily. Both

of these newspapers contain generally the same news as Romanian

newspapers with additional local items of minority interest, such as

cultural developments and problems associated with minority language use

in education and other fields.

Periodicals

The number of periodicals published throughout the country increased

from a total of 387 in 1960 to 581 in 1969, according to the latest

government statistics. The total annual circulation of periodicals

almost doubled during this time, increasing from about 105 million

copies to approximately 209 million. More than 340 of these magazines

and journals were published either quarterly or annually, the remainder

appearing either weekly, monthly, or at some other intervals. No

indication was given within this general classification of the number of

publications that were issued in the minority languages or were directed

at special minority interest groups.

All periodicals are considered official publications of the various

sponsoring organizations and are subject to the same licensing and

supervising controls as newspapers. Virtually all magazines and journals

are published by mass organizations and party or government-controlled

activities, such as institutes, labor unions, cultural committees, and

special interest groups. They cover a broad range of subjects and

include technical and professional journals, among them magazines on

literature, art, health, sports, medicine, statistics, politics,

science, and economics. The technical and scientific journals are

intended for scholars, engineers, and industrial technicians; cultural

and political periodicals are aimed at writers, editors, journalists,

artists, party workers, and enterprise managers; and general

publications are intended to appeal to various segments of the

population, such as youth, women, and both industrial and agricultural

workers.

Two of the best known and most widely circulated magazines are _Lupta de

Clasa_ and _Contemporanul_. _Lupta de Clasa_, a monthly published by the

Central Committee of the PCR, had an estimated circulation of about

70,000 in 1969 and was considered to be the foremost political review.

It deals with the theory of socialism and is extensively quoted in the

daily press as a semiofficial voice in domestic affairs.

_Contemporanul_, the weekly organ of the Council on Socialist Culture

and Education, had a circulation of approximately 65,000 and was a

leading authority on political, cultural, and social affairs. Through

its wide range of articles it serves as a primary vehicle for conveying

party policy to writers, journalists, editors, and publishers in all

fields.

Other periodicals cover a broad spectrum and included _Femeia_, the

monthly magazine of the National Council of Women; _Probleme Economice_,

the monthly review of the Society of Economic Sciences; _Tinarul

Leninist_, a monthly magazine for members of the Union of Communist

Youth; _Luceafarul_, a semimonthly review of foreign policy matters

published by the Union of Writers; _Romania Literara_, a literary,

artistic, and sociopolitical weekly also published by the Union of

Writers; _Urzica_, a humorous and satirical semimonthly review published

by the PCR; _Volk und Kultur_, a monthly review published in German by

the Council on Socialist Culture and Education; and _Korunk_, the

monthly sociocultural review in Hungarian, published by the Hungarian

Peoples' Council.

One of the magazines best known outside the country is _Romania Azi_, a

richly illustrated social, economic, and cultural monthly magazine

published by the Foreign Language Press. In addition to Romanian, it is

also published in English, Chinese, French, German, Russian, and

Spanish. The government also sponsors a series of scholarly reviews

dealing with studies on southeastern Europe, the history of art,

Romanian historical and artistic development, and linguistics. These

reviews appear at infrequent intervals and, in addition to the Romanian

edition, are offered on subscription in English, French, German,

Russian, and Spanish.

News Agencies

The Romanian Press Agency (Agentia Romana de Presa--Agerpres) was

established in 1949, with the exclusive right to the collection and

distribution of all news, pictures, and other press items, both domestic

and foreign. In recent years, however, it has concerned itself almost

exclusively with news from foreign countries, leaving much of the

domestic news coverage to the correspondents of the larger daily

newspapers. Agerpres, in 1972, operated as an office of the central

government under the direct supervision and control of the Central

Committee of the party.

The headquarters for Agerpres is maintained in Bucharest, with some

sixteen branch offices located in other major towns and cities

throughout the country. In addition, it staffs on a full-time basis

twenty-one bureaus abroad, principally in the larger capital cities of

Europe, Africa, South America, and the Far East. Until 1960 its most

important source of foreign news was the Soviet central news agency,

through which it received the bulk of its foreign news releases and

international news summaries. This arrangement was replaced by news

exchange agreements with selected agencies of both the Western countries

and the countries of Eastern Europe.

In addition to the Soviet agency, foreign news bureaus are maintained in

Bucharest by the press agencies of Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,

Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (East

Germany). To service these bureaus and its own correspondents abroad

Agerpres issues the daily Agerpres News of the Day and the weekly

Agerpres Information Bulletin. For domestic consumption Agerpres

distributes about 45,000 words of foreign news coverage daily to

official government and party offices, to various newspapers and

periodicals, and to radio and television broadcasting stations.

RADIO AND TELEVISION

Radio Broadcasting

In 1971 domestic radio broadcast service was provided by twenty AM

(amplitude modulation) stations located in sixteen cities and by six FM

(frequency modulation) stations located in Bucharest, Cluj, and

Constanta. These stations are government owned and operate under the

direct supervision of the Council of Romanian Radio and Television, an

agency of the party's Central Committee. All broadcast stations are

grouped into three major networks, known as Program I, Program II, and

Program III. In addition, broadcast facilities are augmented by an

extensive wired-broadcast network, which extended coverage into outlying

areas where direct transmissions are subject to either geographic or

atmospheric interference.

The most powerful stations are located in Brasov, Iasi, Boldur,

Bucharest, and Timisoara. They range in power from 135 to 1200 kilowatts

and transmit in the low- and medium-frequency bands. The FM stations

operate exclusively in the very high frequency range and are all

moderately powered at four kilowatts. The majority of the programs

originate at studios in Bucharest and are rebroadcast by the network

stations, which add short local news broadcasts and, from time to time,

originate coverage of special events of local interest. In addition to

government-provided subsidies, the industry also benefits from the

license fees collected from the almost 3.1 million owners of radio

receivers.

In 1971 scheduled regional programming was revised to include additional

broadcast time for programs in the minority languages. These broadcasts

were carried by four major stations including Radio Bucharest, with

programs in Hungarian and German; Radio Cluj and Radio Tirgu Mures, with

programs in Hungarian; and Radio Timisoara with programs in German and

Serbo-Croatian. Most of these offerings are short and stress news,

features, and talks by local personalities. These programs are also

relayed over wire lines to local centers for distribution to public

establishments, factories, and schools.

The programs offered on Programs I and II are generally of good quality

but have a high ideological content and are lacking in diversity. In

addition to news and weather reports, programs include special

broadcasts for children and rural listeners, scientific, theatrical,

cultural, and literary presentations, and a great variety of musical

programs. Program III, which is limited principally to the Sunday

evening hours, carries many of the regular concerts given by the various

national orchestras and choirs. Despite its limited broadcast schedule,

Program III also carries indoctrination programs in the form of

interviews and panel discussions.

Foreign broadcasts in thirteen languages were beamed to Europe and

overseas by Radio Bucharest on one mediumwave and six shortwave

transmitters in early 1972. These programs were on the air for a

combined total of approximately 200 hours per week, averaged one-half

hour in length, and generally carried domestic news and comments on

international developments. In addition to Romanian, the broadcasts to

European listeners were presented in English, German, French, Greek,

Italian, Portuguese, Serbo-Croatian, and Spanish. Overseas programs were

beamed to North Africa and the Near East in Arabic, English, French, and

Turkish; to Asia, in English and Persian; to the Pacific area, in

English; to North America, in English, Romanian, and Yiddish; and to

Latin America, in Portuguese and Spanish.

Radio Audience

The communist regime has long recognized the importance of radio

broadcasting as a medium for both informing the people and for molding a

favorable public attitude toward the government. As a result, the

construction of broadcast facilities and the production of receiving

sets have been steadily increased since 1960. Also, during this same

period the number of radio receivers increased more than 50 percent,

from 2 million in 1960 to almost 3.1 million in 1970. The number of

licensed receiving sets included approximately 870,000 wired receivers

and amplifiers that usually reached group audiences in public areas.

By early 1972 the government had given no indication as to the results

achieved by the radio in the intensified ideological campaign launched

in mid-1971. Press reports revealed that, whereas radio programs

continued to be criticized as to content and purpose, changes more

favorable to the socialist concept of culture and political thought have

not yet been extensive. Western programs, though fewer, were still being

offered, and certain musical programs were being revised to favor the

light and popular music of native composers over the modern Western

style. Listener resistance to changes intended to improve the "communist

education of the masses" was revealed by official statements that called

for the need of radio editors and program coordinators "to improve their

skill" in arousing and focusing the interest of the radio audience on

"up-to-date" programs.

Television Broadcasting

Since its inception in 1956, television broadcasting has been closely

linked with radio, by the regime, as an increasingly important

instrument of "propaganda and socialist education of the masses." Like

radio, television operated under supervision of the Council of Romanian

Radio and Television, whose policy guidelines were received directly

from the party apparatus. Also, as in the case of radio, television came

under close scrutiny and criticism in mid-1971 in the intensified

ideological campaign initiated by President Nicolae Ceausescu. By early

1972 changes in television network programming resulting from this

campaign had not been revealed, but the press indicated that most of

them were intended to limit foreign influence in literary, theatrical,

film, and artistic broadcasts and to stress the Marxist-Leninist

interpretation in presenting current events.

Although only recently developed as a new medium in mass communications,

television has expanded more rapidly than radio. From the six stations

that were operational in 1960, the industry had increased to a total of

eighty-five in 1971. Of these, sixteen were principal transmitting

stations located in various parts of the country, and sixty-nine were

repeater stations. The number of television sets also increased

significantly during this period, from 55,000 to almost 1.3 million. It

was estimated by government authorities that programs aired over the 1.3

million licensed sets covered more than 80 percent of the country and

could be seen by between 5 million and 6 million viewers.

The television network operates the Central European System of 625-line

definition and broadcasts over two systems, Program I and Program II.

Program I was on the air daily during the evening hours for a total of

thirty-eight hours per week. Program II broadcast weekday mornings and

evenings for a total of eighteen hours. Most presentations originate on

Program I and include, in addition to political, literary, and cultural

programs, sports, news, documentaries, and special programs for children

and workers. Program II usually repeats most of the programs shown on

Program I or summarizes certain telecasts for combined showings with

other short features.

Foreign programs, chiefly from neighboring communist countries, are also

available to Romanian televiewers. Most of this material is procured on

a mutual exchange basis through Intervision (Eastern European

Television), an organization to which Romania belongs. A substantial

number of foreign telecasts, however, are also available to residents in

border areas, by direct transmission.

BOOK PUBLISHING

Before World War II Romania was one of the leading Balkan nations in the

publishing field. Annually, some 2,500 titles were commonly published in

editions of 2,000 to 5,000 copies, with a high percentage representing

original works of Romanian authors. After the communist takeover in 1948

all publishing facilities were nationalized, and the entire industry was

converted to serve as a major propaganda and indoctrination instrument

in support of the new regime. Between 1949 and 1953 the revamped

publishing concerns turned out more than 13,500 separate titles, with a

total of almost 250 million copies. This record amount of officially

approved and censored material represented a whole new series of

communist-oriented material needed to operate the highly centralized

government, to reeducate the people, and to regulate their activities.

By 1955 the number of titles issued annually had decreased to a little

more than 5,000, but total circulation remained relatively high at more

than 48 million copies. From 1955 to 1966 the number of titles gradually

increased and reached a plateau of about 9,000, where it remained

through 1969. Annual circulation figures over the same periods of time

fluctuated in a fairly regular pattern showing a controlled average

number of copies issued per title each year also to be about 9,000.

Thus, the planned publishing requirements as set by the government

apparently were achieved in 1966 and have varied very little since then.

Publication

Government and party control of all printing and publishing activities

is centered in the Council on Socialist Culture and Education. This

party-state organization formulates policy guidelines for the publishing

industry and utilizes other government-controlled or government-owned

agencies, such as the General Directorate for the Press and Printing,

the various publishing houses, and book distribution centers to

supervise and coordinate day-to-day operations. Within this control

machinery all short- and long-range publication plans are approved, and

the distribution of all printed material is specified. This central

authority also allocates paper quotas, determines the number of books to

be printed, and sets the prices at which all publications are to be

sold.

In 1972 about twenty-five publishing houses were in operation; of these,

twenty-three were located in Bucharest, and one each was in Cluj and

Iasi. Each of these enterprises produced books, pamphlets, periodicals,

and other printed material within its own specialized field and was

responsible, through its director, for the political acceptability and

quality of its work. In 1969 some decentralization in publishing took

place with the opening of branch offices of the larger houses in a few

of the more heavily populated districts. Although this program was

ostensibly initiated for the purpose of securing "a broader scope of

reader preference" in the number and type of books to be published,

press reports published in late 1971 indicated very little popular

support for this experiment.

Of the 9,399 titles published in 1969, the greatest numbers were in the

fields of technology, industry, agriculture, and medicine. Also included

in this group were books, treatises, studies, and reports in the general

economic field as well as translations from foreign sources. This

category of titles, although representing about 33 percent of those

published, had an average circulation of only about 3,500 copies per

title--well below the overall average of approximately 9,000.

The second largest group of published titles was in the field of social

sciences and represented approximately 22 percent of the total. This

classification included all books dealing with political science and

socioeconomic theory as well as all textbooks and materials used in the

educational system. A particularly large segment of books in this area

were documents and manuals used for party training, Marxist-Leninist

classics, and party-directed studies and monographs dealing with the

historical, philosophical, or sociological development of the communist

movement.

The material published in the fields of art, games, sports, and music

dominated the third largest group and ranged from children's

entertainment to musical scores. The fourth largest group, representing

about 15 percent of the national publishing effort, related to general

literature. This field covered novels, essays, short stories, and poetry

written by recognized authors as well as by less well established modern

writers, both domestic and foreign. The books selected from foreign

sources were carefully scrutinized, and very few were published that

dealt with contemporary Western subjects. Also banned, as a matter of

general principle, was all material that (in the judgment of chief

editors) "did not contribute actively to the socialist education of the

new man" within the communist society.

Distribution and Foreign Exchange

The distribution and sale of books, both domestic and foreign, are

vested in the Book Central, a state-owned organization that is also

responsible for the coordination of all book production. The Book

Central, with headquarters in Bucharest, operates directly under the

Council on Socialist Culture and Education and maintains a network of

bookshops throughout the country in district centers and other major

towns. In addition to supplying major outlets such as libraries and

schools with publications, the local bookshops also set up and operate

bookstalls and book departments in rural areas, usually at industrial

enterprises and farm collectives. Traveling bookmobiles are also used to

serve factories, mines, or other isolated activities in outlying areas.

Discount book clubs were reportedly established as early as 1952, but

recent information was lacking as to their continued existence, size,

and method of operation.

After receiving approval of their individual publishing plans, the

publishing houses distribute catalogs, bulletins, and other

informational material to the Book Central for distribution to major

purchasing outlets. In addition, the local bookshops issue periodic

lists of all books in stock as well as those scheduled to be printed

during specific periods. Official statistics concerning the wholesale

and retail sale of books are not habitually published, but recurrent

articles in the press criticize the lack of enthusiasm and general

ineptness of booksellers as major factors in lagging book sales to

individual buyers.

The Book Central in Bucharest conducts all transactions involving the

foreign exchange of publications. This agency issues annual lists of

available Romanian publications, together with short bibliographic

annotations or summaries as well as subscription details. Also, the sale

of books is fostered at the various international book fairs in which

Romania participates.

LIBRARIES

The Romanian library network consists of two broad categories--general

libraries, administered by the central government and its territorial

organs, and the various libraries administered by mass organizations,

institutes, and enterprises. Those in the latter category are generally

referred to as documentary libraries since most of them specialize in

scientific and technical holdings. The number of general libraries

declined appreciably from a total of almost 35,000 in 1960 to slightly

more than 18,000 in 1971, due principally to the consolidation of

facilities. Over the same period the number of documentary libraries

remained fairly constant, averaging slightly more than 4,000, the total

number existing in 1971.

The greatest proportion of general libraries, by far, are those

associated with primary and secondary schools and those that serve the

general public. In addition, the state operates two national libraries,

and forty-three others function as part of university and other higher

level institutions. The total holdings of all these facilities exceeded

95 million volumes, and the number of registered readers in the public

libraries was reported to have reached almost 5 million in 1971. No

information was available as to the total annual circulation of books on

personal and interlibrary loan in the general library system, but the

two national libraries were reported to have circulated 55,000 volumes

in 1968, and the combined circulation of the forty-three

university-level libraries approximated 178,000 volumes in the same

year.

The two national libraries, the Library of the Academy of the Socialist

Republic of Romania and the Central State Library, together maintain

stocks in excess of 10 million volumes, and both function as central

book depositories. The Library of the Academy of the Socialist Republic

of Romania, a precommunist institution founded in 1867, holds special

collections of Romanian, Greek, Slavonic, Oriental, and Latin

manuscripts, maps, and engravings as well as rare collections of

documents, medals, and coins. The Central State Library, founded in

1955, also has important collections of books, periodicals, musical

works, maps, and photographs and, in addition, acts as the Central

Stationery Office and the National Exchange for books. It also issues

the National Bibliography and annual catalogs, which list all books

printed in Romania and the holdings of all foreign books in the state

library system.

The largest libraries among the universities, each of which holds more

than 1.5 million volumes, are those at Bucharest, Iasi, and Cluj. These

holdings include the book stocks maintained in the libraries of the

various faculties, hostels, and institutes associated with the

universities as well as the central university library itself. The

largest documentary library, the Library of the Medical-Pharmaceutical

Institute, operates ninety-nine branch facilities, and its annual book

inventory has been in excess of 1.2 million volumes.

FILMS

As in the case of other elements of the mass media, the small motion

picture industry has also been affected by the intensified ideological

campaign of mid-1971. In general, the regime has attempted to further

limit the importation of foreign films, particularly those from the

West, which are considered violent and decadent. There has also been a

move to stimulate the production of more native films with a truly

"profound ideological content which will express our Marxist-Leninist

world outlook, convey the message of our own society in highly artistic

terms, and reflect the life of the new man." Until more Romanian films

of the appropriate type can be offered, the industry has been advised to

utilize additional films from the National Film Library and to emphasize

foreign presentations that are based on socialist concepts.

Production

Film production, distribution, and exhibition were controlled by the

National Center of Cinematography, a state agency that operates under

the supervision of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education. The

national center operates two production studios: the Alexandru Sahia

Film Studio in Bucharest, which produces documentaries, newsreels,

cartoons, and puppet films, and the Bucharest Film Studio, which

produces feature films at Buftea, a suburb about fifteen miles northwest

of the capital.

In 1970 cinema production consisted of thirty-nine feature and short

pictures, about 1960 documentary films (including animated cartoons),

and seventy-six newsreels. This output reflected a two-fold increase

since 1960 in both feature and documentary films but a decrease of about

15 percent in the number of newsreels. The largest growth in the motion

picture industry occurred between 1923 and 1930, when production rose

from about seven motion pictures per year to about twenty-five. This

increased output was a combination of native films and features

coproduced with France, Germany, and Hungary. After the communist

takeover of the government in 1948, film production fell drastically and

did not again reach its pre-World War II level until 1955.

Romanian films, until 1968, continued to reflect much of the earlier

French influence. Both the native and coproduced pictures of this period

were of high quality, and several won awards at film festivals in

Cannes, Trieste, and Chicago. Subjects treated were well diversified and

included historical adventure, strong dramas, and both satirical and

classical comedies. Beginning in 1968, the regime launched widespread

criticism of the industry, and the quality of production decreased

appreciably. The 1971 ideological campaign forced film making into a

further regression. Western observers characterized post-1968 films as

being totally lacking in originality.

Because of the relatively low number of Romanian films produced, the

industry has generally depended on the importation of sizable numbers of

foreign films to meet its needs. The government no longer publishes

official statistics dealing with film imports, but in 1960 the regime

reported that 188 feature films and 150 documentaries from foreign

countries were shown. Approximately 40 percent of these films came from

the Soviet Union; the remainder came from France, East Germany, England,

Italy, Czechoslovakia, and the United States.

Distribution

Despite the emphasis placed by the government on motion pictures as both

a propaganda and an entertainment medium, the number of theaters and

attendance at film showings has decreased steadily since 1965. This

trend was due principally to the competition offered by the expanding

television industry, but the falling off in the quality of films was

also a contributing factor.

Film theaters are of two types, those which show pictures regularly in

designated movie houses or, periodically, in multipurpose recreation

centers, and mobile film units, which exhibit documentary and

educational films in schools or other local facilities in outlying

areas. Motion picture houses of both types decreased in number from

6,499 in 1965 to 6,275 in 1970, and in the same period annual attendance

dropped more than 6 million from the 1965 high of almost 205 million.

INFORMAL INFORMATION MEDIA

Lectures, public and organizational meetings, exhibits, and

demonstrations also serve as means of communication between the

government and the population at large. Although less significant than

the formal mass media, these events are fostered by officials of the

regime as highly effective elements in the indoctrination process

because they offer direct personal confrontations at the lower levels.

Word-of-mouth communication is also an important and effective medium,

particularly as a means of spreading news heard from Western radio

transmissions, which were no longer subject to government jamming as a

matter of policy.

SECTION III. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 12

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY

By 1972 the internal security situation in Romania had changed a great

deal from that of the post-World War II period and the first few years

of the communist regime. In those days the regime had feared for its

existence and for that of the system it was attempting to establish. It

had feared interference from outside the country and active opposition

from a large segment of the local population and had also doubted the

reliability of a considerable number of those within its own ranks.

In the police state atmosphere of that time a good portion of the people

had also, and frequently with good reason, feared the regime. People

whose greatest crime might have been lack of enthusiasm feared that they

might be suspected of deviant political beliefs. Because of the brief

time then being spent on investigation of a crime and seeking out an

individual's possible innocence, such persons could easily emerge from

hasty trials as political prisoners.

By 1972 the security troops--successors to the secret police that had

held the population in dread and terror twenty years before--still

existed in considerable force. They had receded into the background,

however, and only infrequently had any contact with the average citizen

as he went about his daily routine.

The population was undoubtedly not altogether content in 1972 and often

chafed at bureaucratic red tape, at lackluster performance on the part

of minor officials, and at other irritations. The youth, in particular,

was showing reluctance to be molded into the uncompromising pattern of

socialist society, and some of its resistance took on characteristics

considered intolerable by the regime. On the other hand, there was

little, if any, sign of organized opposition to the system or the

leadership. The dominant attitude throughout the country was cooperative

to the degree that, if the system was seen to be in need of change, it

was preferable to attempt reform from within the system itself and along

accepted guidelines.

Reflecting the easing of internal tensions, the formal framework of the

judicial system--the penal code, the code of criminal procedure, and the

courts--was extensively changed in 1968. Although the new code

emphasized protection of the state and society more than individual

rights, the code it replaced had been one of the most severe and

inflexible in Europe. The new codes clearly specified that there was no

crime unless it was so defined in law and that there was to be no

punishment unless it had been authorized by law.

Procedures for criminal prosecution were set down in readily

understandable language that, if adhered to, guaranteed equitable

treatment during investigation, trial, and sentencing to a degree

hitherto unknown in the court system. There were also provisions for

appeal of lower and intermediate court sentences.

Petty cases were disposed of by judicial commissions that did not have

court status. Such commissions were set up in villages, institutions,

collectives, or enterprises comprising as few as 200 people. Although

authorized to administer only small fines or penalties, they were

established in a fashion designed to involve large numbers of people in

the judicial process and to exert local pressures on those appearing

before them.

INTERNAL SECURITY

During the mid-1950s the militia (civil police force) and security

troops were busily engaged in apprehending alleged spies, traitors,

saboteurs, and those who persisted in voicing beliefs considered

dangerous to the regime and the socialist system. In the early 1970s

directives for security agencies still identified the 1950 threats to

the regime and exhorted the agencies to continue to combat the same old

enemies of the people. The emphasis has been altered, however, and

national authorities appeared generally satisfied with the improved

internal security situation in 1972.

The regime had by then become seriously concerned much less over mass

violence or organized subversion than over levels of unrest or passive

resistance that are evidenced by widespread laxity, carelessness,

indolence, or an obvious lack of popular support. The militia blamed a

rash of railroad accidents in 1970 on laxity when investigation

determined that the equipment had, in nearly all cases, operated

properly and the people had received sufficient training to make the

system work safely. It also blamed an excessive number of fires on

carelessness and negligence. Classified political and economic data were

found on several occasions during routine checks of unoccupied and

unsecured automobiles. New laws were published in 1970 to deal with

vagrancy, begging, prostitution, and persons not seeking employment or

living what the authorities termed "useless lives."

Although they have been relaxed, controls over the population remain

strict by Western standards. A 1971 decree on the establishment of

private residence placed rigid limitations on movement to the cities,

allowing only those who get employment and are allocated housing to

move. For example, military personnel must have had previous residence

in a city in order to establish residence there after retiring from the

service.