The cards are issued by the militia and are usually valid for ten-year
periods to age forty-four, after which they have no expiration date.
They are reissued, however, if the photograph no longer matches the
appearance of the bearer or when a name change--such as that following
marriage--affects the identity. In addition to the photograph and other
data for identification, the card contains blood type and residence
information. Identification cards of prisoners or persons held in
preventive detention are withheld from them.
Ministry of Internal Affairs
The minister of internal affairs is one of the three members of the
Council of Ministers who head governmental agencies charged with defense
of the country and security of the regime and the social system. His
ministry is responsible for the various police and related organizations
that, although controlled from national headquarters, perform most of
their functions at the local level in the defense of law, order, and
property. It cooperates with the Ministry of the Armed Forces and with
the State Security Council, a watchdog committee that oversees police
activities, but neither of those agencies does a large share of its work
with local government or party agencies (see ch. 8).
Two-thirds of the ministry's major directorates deal with the militia.
They include the militia's general inspectorate; its political council;
and directorates relating to firefighting, special guard units, the
Bucharest militia, and Bucharest traffic control. Other directorates of
the ministry deal with prisons and labor settlements, reeducation of
minors, and state archives.
Militia
The militia is organized at the national level under the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and is probably also responsible to the State Security
Council. The chain of command between the ministry and local police
units appears to work from inspectorate general offices in the ministry
through the thirty-nine _judet_ (county) inspectorates and one for the
city of Bucharest. Local police units and local inspectorates, in
addition to being subordinate to their counterparts at the next higher
level, are also responsible to the locally elected people's councils.
This dual subordination probably works because of the overriding
influence of the Romanian Communist Party at all levels.
Most of the police work is done, and by far the greatest part of the
organization is situated, in the many local police offices. These are
located any place in which there are sufficient numbers of people or
enough valuable property to justify them--in towns, communes,
enterprises, or cities, where there may be several. The ministry may
also establish other individual police jurisdictions at railroad
stations, ports, airfields, and large construction sites and in other
special situations on a temporary or permanent basis.
The militia is charged with defense of the regime and the society, with
maintenance of public order, and with enforcement of laws. To accomplish
the more general tasks, it is directed to detect criminal activities and
to apprehend criminals. The militia is also given responsibility for
preventing crime and for guiding, assisting, or directing other
organizations involved in protection of the regime, the citizens, and
state or private property. An increasing portion of routine police work
is required in the control of highway traffic. The militia may also be
called upon to assist in emergencies or in disaster situations.
Militia regulations require the police to respect individual rights and
the inviolability of homes and personal property in normal
circumstances. Restrictions are removed, however, if circumstances
warrant. Police may commandeer any vehicle or means of communication,
private or otherwise, if the situation demands. During chase or during
investigation of flagrant crimes, they may enter private homes without
permission or search them without warrant.
Citizens are directed to assist the militia when called upon or to act
as police--to apprehend and hold violators--if no police are at the
scene when a crime is committed. Provisions authorizing the formation of
auxiliary police groups are established in law. Such auxiliaries would
ordinarily be organized by the militia but, whatever their sponsorship,
they would be expected to cooperate with local police authorities.
According to the law defining the militia's organization, its personnel
consist of military and civilian employees on the staff of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs. Officers, military experts, and noncommissioned
officers are recruited from the graduates of schools operated within the
regular military establishment. Policemen may be drawn from those
selected annually for compulsory military service. The armed forces'
personnel regulations apply to militiamen acquired from the draft
process or from military schools. Graduates of civilian schools are
employed in the police force to meet its requirements for specialists
who are not trained in the armed forces. These individuals and others
who have had no association with the armed forces retain civilian status
and are subject to the provisions of the labor code and other
regulations applicable to civilian employees.
The militia's personnel strength of 500,000 in 1972 means that about one
person in every forty of the country's population is in, or employed by,
the force. The reason for this high ratio is that the militia
organization has branches at all government levels, from the national
ministry down to the village. Also, its working groups include nearly
all of the country's guard, regulatory, investigative, and paramilitary
organizations, as well as those performing police and firefighting
functions.
Security Troops
Security forces organized at the national level to protect the regime
from subversive activities, whether locally or externally generated,
were created in the late 1940s and are still maintained. The force in
1972 numbered roughly 20,000 men. It is organized along military lines,
and most, if not all, of its men have military rank. It receives its
administrative and logistic support from the Ministry of Internal
Affairs but is supervised by the State Security Council.
According to pronouncements made during anniversary ceremonies held in
August of 1968, during their twenty years of service the security troops
had been a consistently reliable force. Their mission was described as
identifying and apprehending foreign espionage agents and combating
local spies, saboteurs, agitators, and terrorists. It was declared that
the forces operated under the leadership and direct guidance of the
party and governmental leadership and that local security forces were
controlled by the party authorities in districts and cities.
Pronouncements by the leadership about their local subordination
notwithstanding, the security troops, which are the direct descendants
of the old secret police, are still controlled at the national level.
Because of their declining mission in counter-espionage and
counter-subversion, they undoubtedly cooperate wherever possible in
usual militia functions, but they appear to have only nominal
responsibilities to local government agencies.
The diminishing role of the security troops is evident in several areas.
Their personnel strength in 1971 was a fraction of that of the militia.
The country's efforts against external threat have been increasingly
relegated to the regular armed forces. Also, although the chairman of
the State Security Council--which was newly established in 1968--is a
member of the Council of Ministers, in 1970 he was the only man on the
security council who was a ranking party member, and he was no more than
an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee
of the Romanian Communist Party. His vice chairmen were military
officers, and only one of them was prominent enough in the party to have
been a member of the Central Committee. It is evident that the State
Security Council in Romania does not have the status of the high-level
groups that in some countries have the responsibility for coordinating
party and governmental activities relating to national security and for
providing basic guidance to all of the various military, paramilitary,
and police agencies.
PUBLIC ORDER
As is the case in the other communist countries that pattern their
systems after that of the Soviet Union, Romania's leadership relies on
the party and several mass organizations to foster a climate in which
the people will actively support and cooperate with the regime. These
organizations involve as large a segment of the population as possible
in a broad spectrum of programs and functions. The efforts they elicit
from their members may consist of activities within the organizations
themselves or in local governments, judicial systems, and security
groups. Mass popular involvement provides an influence that is generally
subtle but that may become direct pressure.
Mass Organizations
The party attempts to attract the most competent and elite element of
the people, to ensure that its members adhere to basic socialist
ideology, and to maintain the power to direct and control all other
groups involved in major social and governmental activities. The mass
organizations support the party and carry its programs to special
interest groups. They keep the party informed of the concerns of their
members and may also, within certain limitations, have an influence upon
the party's actions (see ch. 9).
There are about a dozen mass organizations. The Socialist Unity Front is
not typical of the group, as in theory it encompasses all of the others
as well as the party--although it supports and serves the party. It
functions as a coordinating agency in such things as running the
national elections.
The largest typical groups are the General Union of Trade Unions and the
youth groups. There are three of the latter: the Union of Communist
Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist--UTC), the Pioneers Organization,
and the Union of Student Associations. The UTC is a general group whose
members are between fifteen and twenty-six years of age, although
members in leadership positions may retain their affiliation beyond the
upper age limit. The pioneers are the younger children, seven through
fourteen years old; their program is designed so that they move
naturally into the UTC when they become fifteen. The student groups are
organized in universities or in schools beyond the secondary level. They
have experienced difficulties in attracting members and in persuading
those they have attracted to accept all of the principles set down for
them (see ch. 9).
The other organizations are a miscellaneous aggregation, including a
women's organization, the Red Cross, a sports and physical education
group, one that involves the various ethnic nationalities, another that
is a Jewish federation only, one that is designed to foster ties of
friendship with the Soviet Union, and one designed for the defense of
peace. Although they are highly dissimilar and vary widely in
importance, all are designed to attract groups with special fields of
interest and to guide such groups into activities that promote harmony
and order.
The labor and youth groups, in addition to being the largest, are also
those most actively charged with supporting the regime. Labor union
members are active in auxiliaries of the militia and in the military
reserves. The UTC membership spans most of the age group that is drafted
into the regular armed services and the security forces. Within the
services it forms units throughout the organizational structures that
either direct or actively assist in political indoctrination programs
and manage sports and recreational activities. Where a party cell
exists, the UTC is guided by it; where the military unit is too small to
have a party cell, the UTC functions in its place.
Youth Programs
Although the economy has improved and the internal security situation
has stabilized, youth problems have increased, and much effort is being
expended on their solution. Officials point out that the percentage of
young people that have become criminals or whose antisocial conduct gets
most of the publicity is very small. They complain, however, that the
number of those who will not associate with the UTC and who display
other negative behavior is far too great. Negative behavior on the part
of young people reportedly involves their manner of speech and dress,
which "offends common decency," their creation of public disturbances,
their apathy toward work, and the fact that many of them have become
cynical and infatuated with "wrong beliefs."
Authorities understand the youthful tendency to be nonconformist and
accept the fact that a certain amount of the behavior they deplore is
an attempt to affirm new and differing youth attitudes. Attitudes and
conduct considered to have exceeded permissible bounds, however, are
dealt with firmly. Leaders blame the inadequacies of some educational
facilities; the ignorance, injustice, or excessive indulgence on the
part of some parents and educators; and the overlenient courts.
Solutions that have been proposed since the late 1960s have run the
gamut from advice to parents to the creation of powerful governmental
agencies. Parents are admonished to take a firm attitude toward their
children. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the UTC was
made a member of the Council of Ministers, as minister for youth
problems. University student associations have been given much new
attention, as have the other youth organizations and their programs. The
militia, armed forces, and security troops have been required to
undertake programs to cooperate with youth organizations.
During 1969 the minister for youth problems was provided a research
center by the Council of Ministers. Its purpose was to investigate the
problems experienced by schools, universities, youth mass organizations,
the militia, and the courts. As case studies are documented, the center
is directed to evaluate the problems and the solutions found for them
locally at the time they occurred and to disseminate the information,
with additional comments and recommendations, as widely as possible.
In early 1971 a considerably invigorated program was unveiled for the
UTC. Wherever possible, all programs were to become more mature and more
stimulating. Military exercises would involve field trips and more
realistic maneuvers. Aerial sports would include parachuting, gliding,
and powered flight. Hobbies, such as model ship building, amateur radio,
and the study of topography, were to be given more adequate supervision.
Better equipment and facilities would be supplied for touring,
motorcycling, mountaineering, skiing, and hiking. More youths were to be
scheduled for summer camps. No information concerning the effectiveness
of the new programs had been made available by early 1972.
Many university students held their party-sponsored associations in low
regard during the middle and late 1960s, and eventually the
then-existing student unions were dissolved or consolidated into the new
Union of Student Associations. The incentives and pressures that were
applied, in addition to revamping the union's programs, had succeeded by
1970 in re-animating the association to the point that it was active in
all of the country's universities and institutes of higher learning. It
was authorized to make recommendations applicable to extracurricular
sports and tourist programs, political education, and the entire
academic area of the educational establishment.
Programs for the young pioneer groups have probably not been the object
of the same degree of reform effort that has been applied to the UTC and
the student associations. A party spokesman stated in late 1971,
however, that the 1.6 million pioneers were not too young to develop a
socialist consciousness and to be given a communist education. He stated
that their major programs should feature direct involvement in work of
educational and civic value.
To give young people a sense of accomplishment, as well as to keep them
occupied in meaningful and productive work, large numbers of them are
organized into youth construction groups. In typical situations
temporary housing or camps are built near the project, and all necessary
facilities are provided at the site. During the spring of 1970, for
example, five such groups were scattered throughout the country,
operating concurrently. A majority of the projects have involved land
reclamation, irrigation, or drainage. Many of them are major
undertakings, and thousands of young people take part in the program.
CRIME AND THE PENAL SYSTEM
During a 1971 discussion on the judiciary's philosophy with regard to
the general subjects of law and freedom, the chairman of the Supreme
Court stated that the penal code and criminal procedures adopted in 1968
assign to the law the role of regulator of social behavior. The law has
become, he said, not simply an instrument stipulating the rights and
obligations of the citizen; its important social role provides a firm
foundation for society's behavior. Other spokesmen have amplified this
theme. They emphasize that, once an individual understands the law and
its objectives, he appreciates the fact that individual freedom is
related to the freedom of others and that a free individual is bound to
respect accepted ideological concepts and accepted moral and judicial
standards.
Public prosecutors have a broad range of responsibility in the judicial
and penal systems. Their duties are not confined to handling the
prosecution of indicted individuals who have been brought to trial. As
the appointed protectors of the civil liberties of the people, their
duties extend from crime prevention to rehabilitation of criminals
serving prison sentences. They are responsible for seeing that crimes
are detected and investigated and that penal action is taken against the
criminal. They also see to it that the criminal is held in preventive
detention, if necessary, before trial. After sentencing, the prosecutors
have access to any place in which the criminal might be detained and
pass on the legalities of the detention and the conditions within the
penal institution. If a sentence either does not involve imprisonment
(but is, for example, in the form of a fine, restriction, or extra work)
or is suspended, the prosecutors ensure that the terms of the sentence
are carried out.
Public prosecutors are monitored by the Office of the Prosecutor General
at the national level. The prosecutor general (attorney general) assures
that the work of local public prosecutors is consistent throughout the
country, both in the choice of cases to pursue and in the diligence with
which the prosecution is undertaken (see ch. 8).
Crime
Statistics released to the public do not include crime rates. Reliable
data that would include petty crime would, in any event, be difficult to
obtain because many minor infractions of law and all but the more
serious of personal disputes are not termed crimes and are tried before
the hundreds of local judicial commissions.
A rough assessment of the overall crime situation can, however, be made
from the concern expressed in the many speeches and articles published
by government and party spokesmen. It is apparent that certain types of
crime are considered to be adequately under control and occur
infrequently enough to be statistically tolerable. There are, for
example, few trials in the political category, such as those where
dissidents are accused of attempting to undermine the authority of the
regime or to subvert the population from the approved ideology. In an
exceptional case (apparently at least his second serious offense) an
engineer found guilty of passing economic information to a foreigner
received a twenty-five-year sentence in March 1971 for espionage.
Similar trials were a frequent occurrence during the early 1950s, but
much of the publicity they have received since the mid-1960s has
occurred because they have become so infrequent as to be noteworthy.
Furthermore, to emphasize the more moderate and strictly legal
procedures adhered to by police forces and the judiciary, some of the
1950 political trials are being reexamined. Most of those sentenced to
imprisonment from such trials have been amnestied, the largest group in
1964. A few of those who were executed are still being posthumously
rehabilitated.
On the other hand, there is a greater percentage of crimes in the
categories that are sometimes attributed to an improvement in the
standard of living but that reflect dissatisfaction with the rate of the
improvement. These include economic crimes--theft and embezzlement--misuse
or abuse of property, and antisocial crimes and crimes of violence, which
are committed most frequently by younger people. Party officials also
deplore the prevalence of laxity in the use of state property and in the
safeguarding of official information and documents.
Measures taken to combat crime have had varying degrees of success.
Speculation is illegal, but efforts to prevent private sales of new and
used cars at excessive profit have been ineffective. Cars two to five
years old sell for more than their original cost. Crimes such as
vagrancy, begging, and prostitution were, as of late 1970, defying the
best efforts of the militia and the courts. This type of crime had been
prevalent during the early post-World War II period but declined after
about 1950. During the late 1960s it again began to increase. The
militia has also encountered a problem in the amount of popular
cooperation it is able to count upon. Individuals who have identified
persons as having committed criminal acts have been subjected to
reprisals. The militia has, however, been able to show good results
against vandalism, pilfering, and petty theft. By mid-1971 crimes of
that category had been reduced to pre-1969 levels.
The 1968 Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) invasion of
Czechoslovakia generated a certain amount of disillusion that probably
contributed to the increase, during the late 1960s, in attempts to
emigrate illegally. An émigré reported that about 40 percent of the
prison populations at Arad and Timisoara, or some 500 inmates, had
failed in attempts to cross the border into Hungary. Most of them were
reportedly twenty to thirty years old and were serving sentences of from
one to five years.
Modern crime-fighting facilities have been introduced more slowly than
has been the case in the more prosperous European countries. During 1970
the Ministry of Justice established the Central Crime Laboratory and two
branch, or interdistrict, laboratories. All of them serve the militia,
the security and armed forces, the courts, and the public prosecutors.
They are equipped to assist in the investigation of all aspects of
crimes except those where medical and legal services are required. They
include facilities for handwriting, fingerprint, and ballistic analyses
and analysis of documents (for counterfeiting or alteration) and for
performing a number of other physical and chemical tests.
Traffic Control
Traffic control demands a sizable portion of police energies, although
by 1972 highway use remained low in comparison to the rest of the
continent. There had been few motor vehicles before World War II, and
numbers for personal use or for motor transport increased slowly during
the immediate postwar years. Since about 1955, however, both categories
have become available at an accelerated rate.
In 1963 traffic was up over 200 percent (and in 1965 approximately 300
percent) from 1955 levels. Total numbers of vehicles increased at about
10 percent a year during the late 1960s, and the number of those that
were privately licensed doubled during the two-year period 1968 and
1969. Encouraged by the government during approximately the same period,
tourist traffic tripled.
Irresponsible driving, lack of traffic controls, and lack of concern for
their danger on the part of pedestrians, bicyclists, and wagon drivers
contributed to an acceleration in the number of accidents and casualties
that paralleled the increase in traffic. In 1969 there were 2,070 deaths
resulting from about 5,300 reported accidents. Only about 40 percent of
the victims were occupants of the vehicles involved and, of them, a
considerably larger number of passengers than drivers were killed.
Nearly 50 percent of the total fatalities were pedestrians; the
remainder were on bicycles or wagons.
Considering accident statistics higher than warranted by the rising
volume of traffic, the regime had enacted a series of stricter control
measures, the bulk of them in 1968. Officials analyzing the problem
attributed most of the poor record to disregard for driving regulations
and inadequate traffic controls. Excessive speed had accounted for about
40 percent of the accidents. Driving under the influence of alcohol,
failure to pay attention, and failure to yield the right of way
accounted, in that order, for most of the others. Drivers were blamed
for about 65 percent of accidents, pedestrians for 31 percent, and
malfunction of vehicles for 4 percent. Accidents in which alcohol was a
factor tended to be the most serious. One in every 2.3 alcohol-related
accidents resulted in a fatality.
After 1968 the more stringent regulations and measures to enforce them
began to yield results. By 1970, although both the numbers of local
automobiles and tourist traffic had continued to increase steadily,
accidents had decreased by 8 percent; and deaths and injuries from them
were down by 7 and 8 percent, respectively. Officials gave credit to an
educational program in secondary schools, the beginnings of a vehicle
inspection program, and positive actions taken to reduce driving after
drinking, as well as to the new regulations and enforcement efforts.
During 1970 the militia suspended about 20,000 operators' licenses,
canceling a number of them.
Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure
The penal code in effect before 1968 was one of the most severe in
Europe. The penal code and the code of criminal procedure that have
replaced it attempt to ensure that criminals are not able to evade the
penalties provided for in the law but, at the same time, there is a
stated guarantee against the arrest, trial, or conviction of innocent
persons. Protective measures for accused persons are to be respected by
all law enforcement and judicial agencies.
It is emphasized that an individual is found guilty according to the
relevant evidence in his case. Courts are instructed to base sentences
on the crime, rather than on an individual's reputation or extenuating
circumstances. A Romanian assumes legal responsibility and is subject to
the codes at age fourteen; he is considered an adult before the courts
at age sixteen.
If the possible sentence for an alleged crime is five years or more, the
accused is guaranteed counsel during any part of the investigation that
involves his presence after he has been taken into custody, in the
preparation of his defense, and throughout his trial. Minors and
enlisted military personnel are authorized counsel without regard to the
possible sentence. The defense counsel has access to all findings that
are uncovered by the prosecutor or other investigators during the
investigation of the case. Except in special cases specified in the law,
trials are public. Decisions as to guilt or innocence and the sentence
handed down are concurred in by a majority vote of the judges and
people's assessors on the court.
The maximum prison sentence for a first offense is twenty years; for a
repeated serious offense, it may be twenty-five years. The death
sentence is also authorized, but it may be commuted to life
imprisonment. The most severe sentences are still authorized for crimes
in the political category--those endangering the state, the regime, or
the society. Serious crimes against property and crimes of violence
against a person are also considered grave but, unless they are
exceptional, are not punishable by death. A person receiving the death
penalty has five days in which to request a pardon. If the sentence is
carried out, execution is by a firing squad.
The new codes attempt to reduce court time spent on minor offenses.
Those that constitute no significant danger to society and should be
prevented from recurring by social pressures have been removed from the
list of crimes and have been relegated to the judicial commissions. In
other cases, where an act is still classified as a crime, an offender
may elect to plead guilty without a trial. If he does, he is charged
one-half the minimum fine for the offense, and the case is closed.
Pretrial preventive detention is authorized to protect the individual,
to assure that he will not elude trial, or to prevent his committing
further criminal acts. Detention is ordinarily limited to five days for
investigation of a crime or to thirty days if the person has been
arrested and is awaiting trial. Extensions up to ninety days are
authorized if requested by the prosecutor in the case. Longer extensions
may be granted by the court.
According to the Romanian press, which has commented on the way that the
new codes have served the people, examples of poor performance are
usually attributable to the inertia of the bureaucracy. When citizens'
rights are withheld, red tape or over-worked personnel are most
frequently to blame. Occasionally, however, officials are unresponsive
to individuals' requests and provide services grudgingly without an
adequate justification for delay.
Courts
The Constitution charges the judiciary with the defense of socialist
order and the rights of citizens in the spirit of respect for the law.
It also gives the courts responsibility for correcting and educating
citizens who appear before them, to prevent further violations of the
law. Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu, in a 1970 pronouncement, indicated
that the party leadership may feel that the law should stress to an even
greater extent the defense of the state and society rather than the
rights of the individual. According to his statement, the first
obligation of the courts is to collaborate with the militia and security
forces and apply lawful punishment to those who disregard order and the
laws of the country. He went on to say that he considered that the
concepts of "solicitude for man" and "extenuating circumstances" were
poorly understood and were abused by overlenient courts. In his view the
courts had not shown sufficient firmness in cases involving trivial
infractions, such as rowdiness or minor infractions of the norms of
social relationships, or in cases dealing with persons who wish to live
without working (see ch. 8).
Nonetheless, the court organization, as it was redesigned in 1968, is
required to operate within a framework that is compatible with the penal
codes and is thoroughly described and established in the law. Of greater
significance, there has been an effort to make sure that the system is
run by adequately qualified personnel. People's assessors, who need have
no legal education, may outnumber the judges on the lower courts.
Decisions of these courts may, however, be appealed and, if higher court
panels are not made up exclusively of professional judges, the judges
always outnumber the people's assessors. Judges must be lawyers and are
preferably doctors of law.
The court system under the Ministry of Justice consists of the Supreme
Court, _judet_ courts, and lower courts. The lower courts, which might
be considered lower municipal courts, are usually referred to only as
"the courts." Bucharest has a court that is an equivalent of a _judet_
court, and it has several of the lower courts (see ch. 8).
The lower courts are courts of first instance in all cases they hear.
This could include cases that had previously been heard by judicial
commissions. Such cases would not be considered to have been legally
tried and would require reinvestigation and altogether new prosecutions,
making sure that rights of the accused and all legal procedures were
properly observed.
Appeals from the lower courts are heard by _judet_ courts, which are
also courts of first instance in more serious cases. Final appeal is to
the Supreme Court. There is no appeal from its decisions, but it is not
totally free and independent. It is within one of the government's
ministries and is also responsive to the party leadership.
Judicial commissions function at a level below the formal court system.
Each such commission is composed of several members (usually five),
handles a wide variety of cases, and attempts to hear as many of them as
possible in public. Because the judicial commissions are not a part of
the court system, their cases are not included among criminal
statistics. Unless appealed, however, their sentences are binding.
Official documents describe the commissions as public organs for
exerting influence and legal control, organized so as to bring about
broad participation of the masses, providing them with a socialist
education in legality and promoting a correct attitude toward work and
good social behavior. The educational benefits are intended both for
those serving on the commissions and for those who are judged by them.
The commissions handle small damage or personal disagreement suits
between individuals--small first offense cases involving public
property, petty thefts, misuse of property when no willful abuse is
involved, negligence cases, and traffic violations. Judicial commissions
set up in enterprises or collectives handle minor labor disputes and
work-grievance cases. In all situations the commissions attempt to exert
the influence of public opinion and, in personal disputes, to achieve
reconciliations.
Penal Institutions
Depending upon the seriousness of a crime, its category, and the age and
occupation of the individual, until the mid-1960s a convicted person was
confined in a correction camp, a labor colony, a prison or, if subject
to military law, a military disciplinary unit. Prisons included
penitentiaries, prison factories, town jails, and detention facilities
of the security troops.
A majority of labor colony inmates were political prisoners and, if
there were a few of them that had not completed their sentences or were
not released in amnesties by the mid-1960s, they were probably
transferred to penitentiaries. Increased use of judicial commissions for
petty crimes and an accompanying change minimizing confinement in lesser
cases have further reduced prison populations and eliminated the need
for separate categories of correction institutions. As a result, the
1970 law on the execution of court sentences treats all places of
confinement as prisons or penitentiaries (under the authority of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs) or as military disciplinary units (under
the Ministry of the Armed Forces).
Place of detention vary, nonetheless. Maximum security prisons are
provided for those convicted of crimes against the state's security,
serious economic crimes, homicides or other violent crimes, and
recidivists. All convicted persons are obliged to perform useful work,
and an effort must be made to educate and rehabilitate the inmates.
Consequently, all but town jails and those facilities designed to hold
persons for short stays have labor and educational facilities.
A convict is paid according to the country's standard wage scales. He
receives 10 percent of his wages; the remainder goes to the penitentiary
administration as state income. The maximum working day is twelve hours.
If work norms are regularly exceeded, sentences are shortened
accordingly.
Inmates are segregated for various reasons. Women are separated from
men; minors, from adults; and recidivists and those convicted of serious
crimes, from those serving short terms. Drug addicts and alcoholics are
isolated whenever possible. Persons held in preventive arrest, not yet
convicted of a crime, are separated when possible from convicted
persons. Unless their conduct is considered intolerably uncooperative,
they are not denied the ordinary prison privileges.
Usual convict privileges include some visits, packages, and
correspondence. Privileges allowed vary with the severity of the
original sentence and may be increased, reduced, or done away with
altogether, depending upon the inmate's attitude and behavior.
Consistently good conduct may also earn parole. An inmate who performs
an exceptional service may be pardoned altogether; many were freed for
their work in combating the great floods during the spring of 1970.
Other disciplinary measures include reprimand, simple isolation, severe
isolation, or transfer to an institution with a more severe regimen.
All convict mail is censored, and correspondence whose content is
considered unsuitable is withheld. Conversation during visits is limited
to Romanian or to a language familiar to someone available to monitor
what is said.
Amnesties are granted periodically. Some, such as those that freed
political prisoners in 1964 and the one in late 1970, reduce prison
populations considerably. They may, as in 1964, free a particular
category of prisoner or, as in the December 30, 1970, amnesty, serve to
reduce sentences of all types but on a basis of the amount of the term
unserved. At that time full pardon was granted all who had less than a
year of their sentences to serve, even if an individual had been
sentenced but had not yet begun to serve the term. Full pardon was also
granted to pregnant women, women with children under five years of age
who had up to three years of their sentences remaining, and to all women
over the age of sixty. The amnesty even applied to cases in court.
Trials were to continue, but the amnesty would take effect if it were
applicable to the sentence. If, however, an amnestied person committed
another crime within three years, he would be confined for the unserved
portion of his commuted sentence in addition to the new one.
CHAPTER 13
ARMED FORCES
In 1971 Romania was a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw
Pact), but it was not fully cooperating in its activities nor in total
agreement with the Soviet Union's interpretation of the organization's
mission. Romania saw little threat to its territorial boundaries or to
its ideology from the West. On the other hand, since the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 by other pact members, various Romanian leaders
have expressed concern about the danger to individual sovereignty from
within the pact itself.
Much of the nation's military history has been that of an alliance
partner. It has not fought a major battle in any other capacity. How
well it has fared at peace tables has depended in large part on the fate
of its allies or how the peacemakers believed that the Balkan area of
the continent should be divided. In this tradition Romania aligns itself
without significant reservation with the Warsaw Pact.
The military establishment consists of ground, naval, air and air
defense, and frontier forces. They are administered by a defense
ministry, which in turn is responsible to the chief of state. At topmost
policy levels, party leaders are interwoven into the controlling group.
Political education throughout the forces is supervised by a directorate
of the ministry, but the directorate is responsible to the Romanian
Communist Party.
Military service has become a national tradition, although the tradition
is based largely on the continuing existence of sizable armed forces.
The people accept the military establishment willingly enough even
though conscription removes a great part of the young male population
from the labor force for periods of from sixteen to twenty-four months.
The military services are not an overwhelming financial burden and, in
local terms, the forces undoubtedly have value to the regime. They
support it and give it an appearance of power. Also, the discipline and
political indoctrination given the conscripts during their military
service is considered beneficial to them and to the country.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The armed forces have been dependent on some major power for arms supply
during most of the country's independent history. Equipment and
assistance were furnished by Germany between 1870 and 1916. During that
time, although the country's population was hardly more than 10 million,
with German help it was able to support a large army. It fielded about
500,000 men against Bulgaria in 1913 during the Second Balkan War, for
example. In 1916 Romania joined the World War I Allies, but its forces
were defeated within a few months and were idled until a few days before
the armistice in November 1918. From then until just before World War II
they were assisted by France and, to a lesser degree by Great Britain
(see ch. 2).
Because of the political situation at the time, Romania was unable to
offer resistance when the Soviet Union, by terms of its agreement with
Germany in 1939, annexed Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. In June 1941,
however when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Romania joined the
Germans. Its forces fought the Soviets until 1944 but, after the battle
for Stalingrad in 1943, they became too war weary to perform at their
best. In 1944, as the Germans were being pushed westward, Romania was
overrun by Soviet armies and joined them against Germany.
Nearly all of the military tradition cited by communist regimes since
World War II starts at this point. On occasions honoring the forces they
are reminded that they mobilized more than 500,000 men for this
campaign, suffered 170,000 casualties, and liberated 3,800 localities
while helping to push the German armies about 600 miles from central
Romania.
A postwar buildup of Romania's forces began in 1947. Since then all
major weapons and heavy equipment have been of Soviet design, and
organization and training largely followed the Soviet model.
When the Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955 its members were given alliance
responsibilities, and new procedures were introduced to enable them to
perform as an integrated force. More modern equipment was furnished,
basic units were brought closer to authorized combat strengths, and
training was undertaken on a larger and more exacting scale. Romania's
forces were expanded to nearly the maximum that could be readily
sustained by universal conscription. Strengths were greatest before
1964, especially during the Berlin and Cuban crises of the early 1960s.
Reduction of the tour of duty in 1964 to sixteen months for most
conscripts necessitated a slight reduction in the overall size of the
forces.
GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES
The Ministry of the Armed Forces is the governmental agency that
administers the military forces, but policymaking is a prerogative of
the party hierarchy. Top ministry officials are always party members and
often concurrently hold important party posts. In 1971 Nicolae
Ceausescu--as president and chief of state, supreme commander of the
armed forces, and chairman of the Defense Council--was, in each case,
the immediate superior of the minister of the armed forces. At the same
time, the minister of the armed forces was an alternate member of the
executive committee of the party and, as such, not only was an important
party leader but was again responsible to Ceausescu, this time in the
latter's capacity as the party's general secretary.
One of the deputy ministers of the armed forces is secretary of the
Higher Political Council. Although administered within the ministry,
this council is responsible to the party's Central Committee. It is in
charge of political education in the military establishment and has an
organization paralleling, and collocated with, that of the regular
services. It penetrates into the lower service units to monitor the
content and effectiveness of political training in troop units.
The Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist--UTC), the
junior affiliate of the Romanian Communist Party, has responsibility for
premilitary training and for active political work among the troops in
their duty organizations. The UTC's premilitary programs prepare youth
for military duty by introducing them to basic training and technical
skills in addition to political indoctrination. Within the military
organization, UTC work includes political educational programs conducted
on duty and sports, cultural, and recreational activities conducted off
duty (see ch. 12).
ORGANIZATION AND MISSION
The regular forces, which include the frontier troops, are under
administrative and tactical control of the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
The minister has a number of deputies, including the chiefs of the main
directorates for training, political affairs, and rear services
(logistics) and the chief of the general staff. The heads of operational
or major tactical commands are also immediately subordinate to the
minister. The highest level of the tactical organization includes the
headquarters of the naval and air forces, the frontier troops, and the
military regions (see fig. 10).
Area organization includes two military regions, with headquarters at
Cluj and Iasi, and the Bucharest garrison. Regional headquarters, which
are simultaneously corps headquarters of the ground forces, control
support facilities for all services.
[Illustration:
President
|
Defense Council
|
Council of
Ministers
|
Ministry of the
Armed Forces
|
---------------------------+---------------------------
| | | | |
General Staff Directorate for | Directorate for Directorate of
Political Affairs | Rear Services Training
| (Logistics)
|
---------------------------+---------------------------
| | | | |
| | Air and |
Ground Forces Naval Forces | Air Defense Frontier Troops
| Forces
|
------------------------+---------------------
| | |
Bucharest Garrison Cluj Military Region Iasi Military Region
_Figure 10. Romania, Organization of the Armed Forces, 1972._]
All commanders and force personnel subordinate to the minister are part
of the regular military establishment, although appointments to the
higher commands may be determined in varying degrees by political
considerations. The minister is a political appointee but, whether or
not he has had a military background, he assumes a senior military rank.
The Romanian practice deviates from the usual in such situations,
however, where the minister is expected to have an actual or honorary
rank superior to any officer in his forces. The minister of the armed
forces in 1971, for example, was appointed in 1966. He was promoted from
colonel general to army general after about four years in his position
and, during the early period, was technically subordinate in rank to an
army general who commanded the General Military Academy in Bucharest.
In 1972 there were about 200,000 men in the regular forces. About 75
percent were in ground force or in support units common to all services.
About 5 percent were naval; 10 percent, air force; and the remainder,
frontier troops. The air force percentage included air defense forces.
When the mission of the armed forces is being described in relation to
the Warsaw Pact, it is pointed out that the forces are structured and
trained for major operations in concert with their allies against a
common enemy. Because organized Romanian forces have not been involved
in a major conflict except as junior partners in an alliance force, this
experience makes the concept of participation in the Warsaw Pact mission
easy to accept. Since about 1960, however, leaders have expressed
ambitions to act somewhat independently of the Warsaw Pact. In this
context the pact mission is occasionally downgraded or passed over in
nonspecific terms. The forces' mission is then described as defense of
the country only, and their use is said to be allowable only to resist
aggression against Romania.
Ground Forces
The ground forces are commonly referred to as the army, although the
Romanian People's Army comprises all of the regular armed forces
administered by the Ministry of the Armed Forces. The ground forces
proper have two tank and seven motorized-rifle divisions and a few other
smaller combat units, including mountain, airborne, and artillery
outfits of varying sizes. Combat units are thought to be kept at about
90 percent of their full authorized strengths. Most of the support
agencies that provide services needed by all service organizations are
manned by ground force personnel. Strength of the ground forces in 1972
was estimated at between 130,000 and 170,000.
Divisions are organized on the same pattern as those in the other Warsaw
Pact countries. Tank divisions have one artillery, one motorized-rifle,
and three tank regiments. Motorized-rifle divisions have one tank, one
artillery, and three motorized-rifle regiments.
The division is the basic combat unit, and all of them have their own
essential service and support outfits. They are, however, subordinate to
corps headquarters of the military regions rather than directly to the
Ministry of the Armed Forces.
Air and Air Defense Forces
The commander of the air and air defense forces occupies a position
parallel to that of the commanders of the military districts and the
naval and frontier forces. His immediate superior is the minister of the
armed forces. His tactical units include about twenty fighter-bomber and
fighter-interceptor squadrons and a squadron each of transports,
reconnaissance aircraft, and helicopters. These units have a total of
about 250 aircraft; there are about the same number of trainers and
light utility planes.
Of the combat aircraft, MiG-17s would be used in the ground support
role; MiG-19s and MiG-21s are interceptors that would be used in
air-to-air combat. The reconnaissance squadron has Il-28 twin jet-engine
light bombers. These airplanes are obsolescent, if not obsolete, and
their crews are trained for reconnaissance only. A limited transport
capability is provided by about a dozen twin-engine, piston-type
transports. They are old and slow but are adequate for the
short-distance work required of them. The helicopter squadron is
equipped for air evacuation, for delivery of supplies to inaccessible
areas, and for short-range reconnaissance.
Interceptor squadrons are presumably integrated into the Warsaw Pact air
defense network, which is designed to function as a unit over all of
Eastern Europe. The small numbers of fighter-bombers are probably
capable of providing no more than marginal support for Romania's own
ground forces.
Air defenses include surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery,
and early warning and aircraft control sites. Surface-to-air missiles
and their launching equipment, larger antiaircraft guns, radars, and
most of the complex communication equipment are furnished by the Soviet
Union.
Air defenses in all of the Warsaw Pact countries are integrated into a
common network. Romania's are important because the southwestern border
with Yugoslavia is the point at which an attack from the western
Mediterranean Sea could be first detected. Within the country, Bucharest
and Ploiesti have point missile defenses.
Naval Forces
The naval organization includes headquarters, schools, a major base at
Mangalia, a minor base at Constanta, and stations on the Danube River.
Mangalia is a Black Sea port about twenty-five miles south of Constanta
and just north of the Bulgarian border. Naval personnel in 1972 numbered
somewhat fewer than 10,000. The force has almost 200 vessels, but they
are an assortment of old and miscellaneous ships that have little
capability outside their local environment. None of them is designed to
operate more than a few miles from the coast line and definitely not
beyond the Black Sea.
Ships include minesweepers, escort vessels, patrol and torpedo boats,
and a large assortment of small miscellaneous craft. Five of the patrol
boats are of the modern Soviet Osa class and carry a short-range
surface-to-surface missile. A few of the torpedo boats are fast,
although they are not the latest models. Minesweepers have limited
offshore capability but, if protected, could clear the Danube River and
essential parts of its delta.
Frontier Troops
Borders with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have defenses and are guarded, and
there is some effort to patrol the Black Sea coastline. Borders with the
Soviet Union and Hungary are not controlled except at highway and rail
crossing points. Because the Danube River forms the greater share of the
controlled borders, much of the patrolling is done by boat.
During the 1950s and early 1960s frontier or border troops were
subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and were difficult to
distinguish, except in their deployment, from that ministry's security
troops. During the latter part of the 1960s authority over the border
forces passed to the Ministry of the Armed Forces, but the move was
apparently accomplished over a period of time, and the decree
formalizing the transfer was not published until September 1971. The
commander of the frontier troops is one of the major operational
commanders under the minister of the armed forces and is on a level with
the chiefs of the military regions, the air and air defense force, and
naval forces.
Regulations defining border areas to be controlled and describing the
authority of the forces were amended in late 1969. The border strip is a
prohibited area, which is fenced in some places and often patrolled. On
level, dry ground, it is sixty-five-feet wide but, where the borderline
crosses marshy or rugged terrain, it may be widened enough to afford the
troops easier access and control.
A border zone varies in width but extends into the country from the
strip and includes towns and communes. Frontier troops have overall
control within the zone. They are instructed not to interfere more than
necessary with usual human activities in it and to cooperate with the
local police, whom they do not supplant. Although they are paramount in
the zone, they are not restricted to it and may work fifteen or twenty
miles into the interior if necessary.
Troops are charged with controlling people, goods, and communications at
the border and preventing unauthorized passage and smuggling. The major
port city of Constanta, on the Black Sea coast, is listed as an
exception to most of the border control regulations. Its city territory
does not have a border strip, nor is it within a border zone. The
regulation is presumably intended to facilitate port and shipping
operations and to keep the more stringent controls inland from the port
so that they do not interfere with international trade or tourist
traffic.
FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS
Romania is a member of the Warsaw Pact, having joined when the pact was
created in 1955. It also has bilateral treaties of friendship,
cooperation, and mutual assistance with each of the other pact nations.
Since each pact member has signed one of these treaties with all other
members, all are bound to come to the assistance of any other that is
attacked. In practical terms all are bound to the defense of any pact
member in any conflict in which it might become involved since, no
matter how it started, the other country would be branded the aggressor.
Pact members commit a substantial portion, or all, of their fully
trained and equipped units to the pact's use. Committed units are
considered to be part of an integral force. Romanian forces have a role
in pact plans but, because they have failed to participate in several
recent pact maneuvers, Western observers have expressed doubt that the
organization would depend upon effective Romanian cooperation during the
first phase of a major conflict or for any participation in an action
such as the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968.
At the time of the pact's inception, leaders of the various member
states were preoccupied with the security of their countries and their
regimes. A threat from the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
was real to them, as was danger from dissident elements within their own
borders. It is doubtful whether in 1955 any one of the leadership groups
seriously considered that its regime might--by itself or in deference to
the wishes of its people--undertake economic or social practices or
deviate from the ideology in ways that could be considered dangerous to
the solidarity of the alliance. By 1965, however, Romania had embarked
upon an independent course, to the extent that it, like Czechoslovakia,
had reason to fear that it could be the object of retaliatory pact
action.
In his Bucharest Declaration of July 1966, Nicolae Ceausescu--who at
that time was head of the party but had not yet taken over as chief of
state--announced that he considered the Warsaw Pact a temporary alliance
and that it would lose its validity if NATO were to cease functioning.
Then, in 1968, Romania openly supported the Czechoslovak government,
denounced the pact's invasion of that country, and did not participate
in it. Since that time Romania has not permitted other Warsaw Pact
forces either to hold exercises on its soil or to cross it for maneuvers
in another country. As a result, Bulgaria can send forces to other
Eastern European countries only by air or by way of the Black Sea and
the Soviet Union. Pact exercises held in Bulgaria during the summer of
1971 were performed by Bulgarian troops; other countries, including
Romania, sent observers.
In addition to holding its military relations with the Warsaw Pact to a
minimum, Romania's armed forces have attempted to make contacts with the
military establishments in other countries. A military delegation
visited Yugoslavia in 1971, and feelers have been put out to arrange
other such conferences. A ranking military spokesman has stated that the
army was developing friendly relations with its counterparts in all the
countries of the socialist system in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. He
added that Romania is increasing its relations of cooperation and
collaboration with the nonsocialist states, as a contribution to the
development of mutual trust.
MANPOWER, TRAINING, AND SUPPORT
Manpower
There are approximately 4.86 million men in the military age group, that
is, the male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-nine.
About 3.4 million--70 percent--are considered physically and otherwise
fit for military service (see ch. 3).
A somewhat larger percentage, however, of the 180,000 young men who
reach the draft age annually are physically able to serve. The
preponderance of armed forces and most security troop personnel are
acquired during the annual draft calls. Because of the short duty tours
required of conscripts, it was necessary in 1971 to call up most of the
eligible group in order to maintain the forces' strengths.
Men released from active duty, whether they served voluntarily or
involuntarily, remain subject to recall until the age of fifty. Although
nearly 100,000 men have been released from the services each year since
about 1950, only a small portion of them are considered trained
reserves. Only those recently discharged could be mobilized quickly and
go into action without extensive retraining. There is insufficient
emphasis on periodic reserve training to keep many of the older men in
satisfactory physical condition or up to date on new weapons and
tactics.
Young men of draft age are potentially good soldier material. There is
almost no illiteracy within the adult population under fifty-five years
of age. A large percentage of conscripts have rural, village, or small
city backgrounds and are in better physical condition than the average
urban youth. On the minus side, because the country has a low standard
of living, conscripts have little familiarity with mechanical and
electronic equipment.
Based on the numbers of males in lower age groups, the size of the
annual military manpower pool will remain at about 1971 levels
throughout the 1970s. It will then drop by nearly 25 percent during the
first half of the 1980s but will rise sharply--and again temporarily--in
the latter half of that decade. With the exception of the high and low
periods during the 1980s, governmental population experts expect little
overall change in available manpower during the remainder of the
century.
Training
Since about the mid-1960s little public attention has been focused on
the armed forces. Their capabilities, reliability, and preparedness have
been taken for granted or have not been the subject of undue concern.
Unit training and small exercises have been given little coverage in
local media. Training programs, however, are dictated in large degree by
organization and equipment and have changed little since 1960.
With the standardization of units, weapons, and tactics accompanying the
formation of the Warsaw Pact, training was accomplished in Romania as
directed in translated Soviet manuals. In the Warsaw Pact system the
training cycle starts when a conscript arrives at his duty organization
for individual training. This includes strenuous physical conditioning,
basic instruction in drill, care and use of personal weapons, and
schooling in a variety of subjects ranging from basic military skills
and tactics to political indoctrination.
Individual training develops into small group instruction, usually
around the weapon or equipment the individual will be using. As groups
became more proficient with their equipment, they use it in exercises
with larger tactical units under increasingly realistic conditions.
Romanian forces have not participated since the late 1960s in the Warsaw
Pact exercises that are usually held at the conclusion of the training
cycle.
During early individual training, men are selected for a variety of
special schools. Short courses, in cooking and baking or shoe repairing,
from which a man emerges ready to work, do not require volunteers and do
not extend the mandatory duty tour. Longer courses may involve schooling
for most of the conscript tour or require time on the job after the
school is completed to develop a fully useful capability, leaving no
time for the newly acquired skill to be of value to the service. In such
cases, selections to a school are made from volunteers who are willing
to extend their period of active duty.
The most capable and cooperative conscripts are offered the opportunity
to attend noncommissioned officer schools. They must accept voluntarily
and agree to a longer period of service.
Frontier troops receive much the same individual training as ground
force conscripts. Their later instruction involves less large-unit
tactics and more police training and special subjects dealing with order
documents and regulations. Larger percentages of naval and air forces
personnel are required in mechanical or electronic work. Most of those
who attend technical schools are required to serve for two years.
Reserve training receives little publicity and probably has low
priority. A few reserves are sometimes called to active outfits for
short refresher training, but there is little, if any, formal reserve
training in local all-reserve types of units. The militia (a
paramilitary organization subordinate to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs) would probably be drawn upon to augment the services in an
emergency. It could be expected to provide better trained personnel, in
better physical condition, than would be acquired calling up untrained
reserves (see ch. 12).
The General Military Academy in Bucharest--usually called the Military
Academy--is a four-year university-level school whose graduates receive
regular officer commissions and who are expected to serve as career
officers. It also offers mid-career command and staff types of courses.
An advanced academy, the Military Technical Academy, requires that its
applicants have a university degree; they may be military officers, but
they are not required to have had military service or military education
of any sort. The academy offers advanced degrees in military and
aeronautical engineering and in a variety of other technical areas.
Morale and Conditions of Service
The mandatory tour of duty for basic ground and air force personnel was
set at sixteen months in 1964. Naval conscripts and some air force
personnel are required to serve two years. The length of extra service
required of those who apply and are accepted for special training or who
wish to become noncommissioned officers varies with the amount of
training required, with the rank attained, or with the added
responsibility of the new duty assignment; but it is accepted or
rejected on a voluntary basis.
Officers and noncommissioned officers serve voluntarily, and morale is
usually satisfactory within those groups. The service experience of the
noncommissioned-officer applicants and the long training period required
of officer candidates assure that both leadership groups understand and
freely accept the conditions of service before they assume their duty
responsibilities.
Conditions are reasonably good, and morale in the armed forces is not a
source of unusual concern to the national leadership. There are few
exhortations to put extra effort into political indoctrination; a
large, heavily armed security force to counter a possibly unreliable
army has not been created; and there are less elaborate ceremonial
affairs involving the forces than is typical of the Eastern European
countries.
Romania has had compulsory military service at all times within the
memory of the draft age group, and it is accepted as a routine fact of
life. Exemptions from the draft are few, and a large proportion of them
reflect upon the man because he cannot meet the qualifications for
service. The tour of duty is brief. The standard of living in the
country is low, and service life may offer some of the back-country
young men the best opportunities for travel and excitement that they
have yet experienced.
Medicine
Physicians required in the armed forces are ordinarily recruited from
medical schools but may be called from their practices or from hospital
residence assignments. They then attend a military medical institute in
Bucharest for specialized instruction in procedures and practices that
are peculiar to military medical work.
Emergency treatment is given military personnel in the most convenient
facility, whether or not it is a military clinic. The same is true for
the civilian population. Inasmuch as military facilities are equipped to
cope with wartime casualties, they are often better able to deal with
emergencies or disasters than nonmilitary hospitals, although they are
seldom kept at wartime strengths during peacetime. They were especially
commended for their assistance during the great floods that occurred in
the spring of 1970.
Military Justice
The national penal code enacted in 1968 applies both to military
personnel and to the public at large. A special section of the code,
however, deals with military crimes. These are crimes committed by
military personnel or by nonmilitary personnel on military installations
or infractions of military regulations. In theory, any court may pass
judgment on a military crime, but the military court system employs
specialists in military law who are better able to understand the
seriousness of crimes committed in relation to the military
establishment. Military courts seldom surrender cases over which they
have jurisdiction to civil courts.
There are two types of military courts: military tribunals and
territorial military tribunals. The former are the lesser of the two and
are established at major installations or are attached to large tactical
units. They are the courts of first instance in all cases that come
before them. The chairman, or judge, must be a major or higher ranking
officer and have a degree in law. The judge is assisted by two people's
assessors who, on military courts, are active duty officers. People's
assessors need have no legal training but, as is the case for civil
courts, they must be twenty-three years of age, have been graduated from
secondary school, have a good reputation, and have no criminal record.
In all military trials the judge and people's assessors must hold the
same rank as, or higher than, the accused.
The higher territorial military tribunals are the courts of first
instance for very serious crimes or the courts to which sentences of
lower courts are appealed. In cases in which they are the courts of
first instance, the court panel consists of at least two judges and
three people's assessors. When they are hearing an appealed case, the
panel has a minimum of three judges.
The Supreme Court of the land has final appeal jurisdiction over any
case it may decide to hear, and it may review any case it chooses or
that is sent to it by higher governmental agencies. It has a special
military section that is headed by an officer of major general or higher
rank. It may be the court of first instance for cases involving the most
serious crimes or in lesser situations when an important legal precedent
may be established.
Logistics
Military leaders state that their forces have adequate quantities of
excellent and modern equipment. As is the situation with all other
Warsaw Pact countries, Romania has received its heavy weapons and more
complex equipment from the Soviet Union. Initially the Soviets
distributed surplus World War II stocks. As these wore out or became
obsolete, nearly all items were eventually replaced by postwar models.
More complex and expensive weapons sometimes were used by Soviet forces
first and appeared in Eastern Europe only after they had been replaced
in the Soviet Union. In most circumstances, whether they were newly
manufactured or secondhand, items have been supplied to other forces
considerably after they were first issued to Soviet troops.
Equipment that is in short supply has not been distributed to each of
the pact allies on an equal priority basis. Distribution has depended
upon the strategic importance of the recipient, capability for
maintaining and using the equipment effectively, and probable
reliability as an alliance partner. Romania is located where it would
not be involved in first contacts with any potential enemy of the pact;
its conscripts' tour, and the resulting time to train individual
soldiers, is short; it is an underdeveloped country; and it has been
probing for ways to assert its independence from Moscow. It has not
therefore been the first to receive newer equipment. The distribution
of tanks is illustrative. Romania has received adequate numbers to equip
its combat units and has received all models that have been distributed
among the pact allies. Romania, however, has been authorized a smaller
ratio of armored, as compared with motorized-rifle, divisions than is
average for pact members. Poland and Czechoslovakia have many more
tanks, and larger percentages of them are modern.
Ground forces have Soviet-made artillery, antitank guns and antitank
wire-guided missiles, and some short-range surface-to-surface missiles.
Weapons manufactured locally for the ground forces include all types of
hand-carried weapons, antitank and antipersonnel grenade launchers, and
mortars. Ammunition and explosives for most weapons, whether or not the
weapon is locally produced, are manufactured in the country, as are
common varieties of communication equipment and spare parts.
All of the air forces' combat aircraft and nearly all of its training
and miscellaneous types are received from the Soviet Union. Romania
produces some small utility models. A new one, designed for spraying
forests and crops, was introduced in 1970 and can be used for military
liaison.
Approximately the same situation exists with regard to naval vessels.
The larger vessels and more complex smaller craft are built in the
Soviet Union or by other members of the pact. Romania produces river
craft and some smaller types, probably including the inshore
minesweepers that operate in the Black Sea.
Romania is attempting to reduce its dependence upon the Warsaw Pact by
producing more military matériel within the country. The armed forces
maintain the Military Achievements Exhibit, designed to show progress in
local production capability. The exhibit is visited periodically by
important party and government personalities. Much is made of these
visits, attempting to show all possible encouragement to the various
projects.
Ranks, Uniforms, and Decorations
Ranks conform to those in armies worldwide with a few minor exceptions.
There are the usual four general officer ranks. Field grades are
conventional and have the three most frequently used titles--major,
lieutenant colonel, and colonel. Company grade ranks include captain and
three lieutenant ranks. There are no warrant officers.
Enlisted ranks also have familiar titles when translated. Basic soldiers
hold the ranks of private and private first class. Conscripts serve their
entire tours as privates unless they acquire a speciality or are put in
charge of a small group. Corporal is the lowest noncommissioned officer
rank. Senior noncommissioned-officer grades include the ordinarily used
sergeant ranks, including one (and possibly more) that is seldom seen
but is equivalent to sergeant major or senior master sergeant.
Rank insignia tends to be ornate. All uniforms except the work and
combat types display it on shoulderboards. Those of general officers
have intricate gold designs with large gold stars. Other officer ranks
have smaller stars clustered at the outer ends and stripes running the
length of the boards. Stripes and borders on any one board are the same
color, but the various service branches have different colors to
identify them. For example, armored troops have black; frontier troops
have light green.
Enlisted men's shoulderboards have no borders, and the background color,
like the stripes and borders of the officers', indicates the service
branch. Rank is shown by stripes that run across the outer end of the
board. Privates have no stripes, corporals and privates first class have
yellow stripes, and sergeants have brass. Other devices that also
identify the service branch appear on the inward end of the
shoulderboard on all ranks except those of the general officers and
privates.
Cap insignia is more easily distinguished than that on the
shoulderboard. Enlisted men wear a large brass star. General officers
wear a star with a round blue center and red points mounted on an ornate
round background. Other officers wear the red and blue star but without
background.
There is less variety in uniforms than is common in Western and most of
the other Warsaw Pact forces. Other than for extreme weather and rough
work, enlisted men have one type of uniform for winter and one for
summer. Material for winter wear is olive-green wool; for summer it is
cotton and may be olive green or khaki.
Officers have a field or service uniform, which is similar to the
enlisted men's, and a blue uniform for dress. The dress blouse has no
belt, and shoes are low cut. The service uniform blouse is sometimes
worn with a Sam Browne belt. Overcoats, except for buttons and insignia,
are plain and conventional.
Service and dress uniforms are generally well tailored and made from
durable materials. Cloth in the officers' uniforms is more closely woven
and of finer texture; that in enlisted men's uniforms is warmer and more
durable, but it is bulkier and does not hold its shape as well. Combat
and extreme-weather clothing is heavy and loose fitting, reminiscent of
the Soviet World War II winter wear.
A variety of decorations may be awarded to service personnel; a number
of them may be given in three classes, and at least one of them is given
in five. About a dozen have been authorized by the communist regime
since 1948. Romanians may wear on their uniforms medals awarded by
other Warsaw Pact countries but not those of any other foreign country.
The highest decoration is the Hero of Socialist Labor--Golden Medal,
Hammer and Sickle. This is considered a dual award, although the parts
are always awarded together, and the medal itself is a single one. Other
awards that may be given to both military personnel and civilians
include the Order of the Star, Order of Labor, and a medal commemorating
"Forty Years Since the Founding of the Communist Party of Romania." The
third one of the group is given those who were active in the Communist
Party between 1921 and 1961 or those who did party work between the two
world wars or during the early days of the country's communist regime.
Decorations designed exclusively for the armed forces include the Order
of Defense of the Fatherland, the Medal of Military Valor, and the Order
of Military Merit. Others recognize service during specific events, such
as the Liberation from the Fascist Yoke medal and the Order of 23
August, both of which commemorate World War II service against Germany.
Despite the number of decorations authorized and the many classes
provided for in several of them, medals are awarded less profusely in
Romania's forces than in many armies, especially those that are made up
largely of conscripts or that serve in a largely internal security role.
Ceremonies that occur most often involve awards from foreign delegations
at the conclusion of their visits to the country or the retirement of
older, senior-ranking officers.
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
Although the labor force is smaller than the national leadership
considers adequate, almost all physically fit young men are conscripted.
Only a few, those who are essential to the support of a family or who
have other exceptional circumstances, are deferred or exempted. On the
other hand, the approximately 4 percent of men in the military age group
that serve in Romania's armed forces is about the European average and
is lower than average for the Warsaw Pact nations.
Some Romanian officials have suggested that the burden on the economy
may be greater than that indicated by a comparison of national
statistics arguing that, because labor productivity is low, the loss of
4 percent of the labor force may diminish total production. On the other
hand, some Western analysts have argued that, because most of the
conscripts are unskilled and underemployed, the military's drain on the
manpower pool entails no great loss to productive enterprise (see ch.
14).
In monetary terms the armed forces have been somewhat less of a burden.
Between 1967 and 1970 their costs averaged approximately 3.1 percent of
the gross national product (GNP), which is low when compared either with
the average for Europe or with the average of the other Warsaw Pact
members. Beginning in 1970, however, in an effort to reduce dependence
upon the Soviet Union, Romania began to stimulate local production of
military matériel and to purchase some items from other countries. This
resulted in a sharp increase in defense spending in 1970. Unless the
size of the armed forces is reduced, some continuing increase in
expenses over pre-1970 levels will be necessary if Romania chooses to
continue its policy of nondependence upon the Soviet Union.
The armed forces engage in construction projects on a scale that local
leaders say is an important contribution to the economy. They are
employed in industrial construction, roadbuilding, railroad maintenance,
and important agricultural and irrigation projects. Large numbers of
troops participated in the disaster relief efforts made necessary by the
great floods during the spring of 1970.
SECTION IV. ECONOMIC
CHAPTER 14
CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
In 1972 Romania entered the second year of a five-year economic plan
that is intended by the leadership to advance the country on the road to
industrialization and to increase its economic potential sufficiently to
make the economy one of the most dynamic in the world. This goal is to
be attained mainly through a continued high rate of investment, a
significant improvement in productivity, and an expanded and more
efficient foreign trade. Although significant strides in industrial
development had been made in the past, this achievement entailed a
neglect of agriculture, an inadequate provision for consumer needs, and
a balance of payments deficit with Western industrial nations that
threatened to undermine the leadership's policy of political and
economic independence from the Soviet Union (see ch. 10).
Rigidly controlled by the PCR (see Glossary), the economy suffers from
the basic weakness common to all centrally controlled economies, that
is, a lack of adequate incentives for managers and workers. Rapid
industrialization since 1950, made possible by massive inputs of capital
and labor and aided by heavy imports of advanced Western industrial
plants and technology, has involved a waste of resources on a scale that
may hamper economic progress at the present stage of development. In
trying to evolve a system of incentives that would lead to a more
economic use of resources, the PCR is facing a dilemma. Greater
efficiency requires more flexibility, which, in turn, implies a greater
freedom of initiative at lower economic levels than the PCR has been
prepared to grant thus far. In the search for a solution numerous
administrative changes have been made since 1968 without basically
altering the nature of the system.
A major problem facing the economy is its heavy dependence on imports of
raw materials and equipment and the failure, thus far, to develop a
sufficient volume of exports salable in world markets. At the present
stage of development, Romanian industrial products compete poorly with
the output of advanced Western nations. Expansion of agricultural
exports, which have a ready market in many areas, has been hampered by
the slow development of the country's agricultural potential and by a
growing domestic demand. Although greater attention is to be devoted to
agriculture under the current Five-Year Plan (1971-75), the additional
resources to be allocated to this sector are not commensurate with the
magnitude of its needs. Instead, major emphasis is placed in the
five-year period on the development of the chemical, electronic, and
precision tool industries for domestic needs and export.
The state of the economy in the early 1970s was revealed by two Romanian
economists in articles evaluating their country's economic progress.
According to their calculations, the per capita national income in
Romania in 1975, provided that the economic targets for that year are
reached, will approach the level attained by Italy and Austria in 1968
and will be somewhat larger than half that in France and the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany) in the same year. At the same time
they estimated that, even with continued acceleration of the rates of
industrial modernization and growth of labor productivity, it will
require several more five-year periods to reach the 1971 economic level
of the more developed nations.
ORGANIZATION
The economy is highly socialized. The state owns virtually all industry
and shares with collective farms ownership of more than nine-tenths of
the farmland. Private artisan shops contribute only a fraction of 1
percent to the industrial output, and private farmers' limited holdings
are confined mainly to marginal lands. The state owns all natural
resources other than the collective and private farmlands; maintains
complete control over the country's physical resources, finances, and
labor; and has a monopoly of foreign trade and foreign exchange. The
functioning of the economy is directed by comprehensive long-term and
annual state plans, which are binding for all economic entities.
Control over the economy is strongly centralized, despite half-hearted
attempts since 1968 to grant more freedom of initiative to lower
management levels in the interest of greater flexibility and efficiency.
Supreme decisionmaking power rests with the Standing Presidium of the
PCR and the Council of State, the memberships of which are almost
identical (see ch. 9). Compliance with PCR decisions is enforced through
an administrative hierarchy that consists of three distinct levels: the
Council of Ministers, all of whose members hold high positions in the
PCR; economic ministries, which are responsible for specific sectors of
the economy; and trusts and combines, which group enterprises along
functional or territorial lines. Specialized committees with ministerial
rank administer certain aspects of economic activity; chief among these
are the State Planning Committee and the Committee for Prices (see ch.
8).
The organizational structure of the economy has undergone frequent
changes in efforts to resolve economic problems by administrative means.
Officially, the reorganizations have been declared necessary to keep
economic management abreast of the requirements of socialist economic
development. The frequency of the changes, however, and a lack of
clarity in many of the directives have brought about a blurring of
jurisdictional lines with consequent overlapping of functions and
conflicts of authority. The organizational problem has been compounded
by the contradictory nature of the motives that have prompted the
reforms--to grant more discretionary power to enterprise managers and,
at the same time, to strengthen central controls by enhancing the
directing role of the compulsory economic plans. In 1971 economic
officials considered important aspects of the economic organization to
be still in an experimental stage.
STRUCTURE AND GROWTH
Data on gross output and national income in absolute terms have not been
published. Official statistics on these social accounts have been
limited to a few index series for overall, productive sector, and per
capita values and a percentage breakdown of gross output and national
income by productive sector. The arbitrary nature of the pricing system
and differences in statistical treatment compared to Western practice
preclude a direct comparison of the published growth rates of the
economy and its components with similar rates in Western countries. The
same holds true for comparisons of economic structure. Independent
studies of the economy by Western scholars in Western statistical terms
yielded significantly lower rates of growth and a different structure of
economic activities from those officially announced.
According to official data, national income (net material product, which
excludes private and government services not directly related to
production) more than doubled between 1960 and 1970, and industrial
output more than tripled. Agricultural production, by contrast,
increased by less than one-third. The rates of economic and industrial
growth, even when translated into Western terms, have been relatively
high and among the highest in countries of Eastern Europe. Such high
growth rates have usually been associated with early stages of
industrial development. The high growth rates were made possible by an
official policy that allocated more than 30 percent of national income
to investment. Growth rates in the 1966-70 period were somewhat lower
than in the preceding five years, with the exception of agriculture, the
performance of which was slightly better.
The predominant growth of industry has been a direct consequence of the
leadership's policy. This policy was reflected in a disproportionately
large allocation of investment to industry at the expense of other
economic sectors. In the 1966-70 period, for instance, industry received
55 percent of total investment--60 percent if the construction industry
is included--compared to less than 13 percent granted to agriculture.
Within industry preponderant emphasis has been placed on the development
of the capital goods sector at the expense of consumer goods. Whereas
total industrial output increased at an average annual rate of 11.8
percent from 1966 to 1970, production of capital goods rose at a rate of
12.7 percent, and production of consumer goods grew by only 9.5 percent
annually.
As a consequence of the uneven sectoral growth, the structure of the
economy changed significantly between 1960 and 1970. According to
official data the contribution of industry to the net material product
rose from 44 to 61 percent, whereas that of agriculture declined from 33
to 20 percent (see table 4). The relative importance of construction and
transport rose slightly, but that of trade declined by half. A
strikingly different structure of the economy emerges in terms of the
Western concept of gross national product (GNP), which includes housing
and services and treats both taxes and subsidies in a different manner.
The contribution of industry was less than that of agriculture in 1960,
but by 1967 it had increased more rapidly than is indicated by the
official data (see table 5). The role of agriculture, on the other hand,
declined more rapidly.
_Table 4._ _National Income (Net Material Product) of Romania, by
Economic Sector, 1960, 1967, and 1970_ (in percent)
----------------------------------------------------------
Economic Sector 1960 1967 1970
----------------------------------------------------------
Industry and handicrafts 44.1 51.7 60.8
Construction 9.0 8.4 9.6
Agriculture 33.1 28.6 20.0
Transport and communications 3.8 4.2 4.2
Trade 6.5 4.6 3.2
Other sectors 3.5 2.5 2.2
----- ----- -----
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
----------------------------------------------------------
Source: Adapted from _Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste
Romania, 1970_ (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic
of Romania, 1970), Bucharest, 1970; and U.S. Department of
Commerce, Office of Technical Services, Joint Publications
Research Service--JPRS Series (Washington), _Translations on
Eastern Europe: Economic and Scientific Affairs_, "Development
of National Income Discussed," _Probleme Economice_, Bucharest,
April 1971, (JPRS 53,521, Series No. 491, 1971).
Published labor statistics leave many serious gaps, and unofficially
reported data do not always agree with official figures in the annual
statistical yearbooks. Information released on the size of the
economically active population is limited to percentage changes over the
years.
The economically active population increased by only 3.5 percent from
1960 to 1967 and remained stationary thereafter to 1969. During the
ten-year period the number of persons active in industry increased by
half, whereas the number of those engaged in agriculture declined by 19
percent. Nevertheless, in 1970 about half the population was still
engaged in agriculture, and only 22 percent were active in industry.
Although there is no officially recognized unemployment, a substantial
amount of underemployment is reported to exist in industry and, even
more so, in agriculture. The reasons advanced by Romanian economists for
this situation are the duty and the right of every citizen to work and
the inability to achieve quickly full and efficient employment in a
country that inherited a backward and predominantly agrarian economy
with a large peasant population. Efforts toward obtaining full and
efficient employment have been handicapped by the rapidly rising volume
of investment needed to create new nonagricultural jobs. The average
investment per nonagricultural job increased almost fivefold to 324,000
lei (for value of leu, see Glossary) from the 1951-55 period to the
1966-70 period, and a further 40 percent rise in cost was projected for
the 1971-75 period.
_Table 5. Gross National Product of Romania, by Sector of Origin, 1960
and 1967_ (in percent)
-------------------------------------------------
Economic Sector 1960 1967
-------------------------------------------------
Industry and handicrafts 24.4 32.9
Agriculture and forestry 31.8 22.0
Construction 7.6 11.1
Transport and communications 7.6 8.8
Trade 6.5 5.4
Housing 9.2 7.0
Government and other services 12.9 12.8
----- -----
Total 100.0 100.0
-------------------------------------------------
Source: Adapted from U.S. Congress, 91st, 2d Session, Joint
Economic Committee, _Economic Developments in Countries of
Eastern Europe_, Washington, GPO, 1970.
PLANNING
As in all communist states, comprehensive economic planning has been a
basic element of the PCR's dogma. Planning is conceived of as an
indispensable tool for economic development. Traditionally, five-year
and annual plans for all segments and aspects of the economy have been
formulated by a central planning agency with the participation of
economic ministries, trusts, and enterprises. Planning has proceeded
from broadly defined goals set by the PCR to minute instructions for all
economic enterprises. In line with the established priorities, the main
planning effort has been devoted to industry.
The major problem in planning has been posed by the need to balance
supply and demand, not only with regard to the final consumers but also
at all stages of the production process and for each individual
enterprise. This task entails detailed decisions on the allocation of
thousands of different materials, machinery and equipment items,
specialized labor skills, energy, and investment funds. With the
expansion and growing complexity of the economy and, more particularly,
of industry, the balancing task has assumed dimensions that defy
solution by traditional means.
At the same time, the imposition of detailed operational prescriptions
deprived enterprises of the freedom to exercise constructive initiative
and of the flexibility needed to meet unforeseen contingencies. A
failure by an enterprise to fulfill its planned assignment necessarily
produces a chain reaction involving the production programs of
enterprises dependent upon the missing output. Failures of this nature
have been frequent.
The breakdown of the planning mechanism brought about a disorganization
of the material and technical supply for enterprises, with adverse
effects on productivity and output. It has been responsible for a
general lag in the economy's performance in relation to official plans.
The deficiency of the traditional system of central planning was
officially recognized in 1967, when a decision was made by the National
Party Conference to raise the quality of planning to the level demanded
by the needs of a modern industrial state. This aim was to be achieved
by granting a larger degree of autonomy to individual enterprises
while, at the same time, maintaining and even strengthening the
directing role of the central plan. The prolonged and intensive
discussion engendered by the PCR decision has brought to light many
flaws and proposals for change but has not provided a clear insight into
the current planning process.
Modifications of the traditional pattern have taken place as a result of
organizational and administrative changes introduced after 1967. The
intended adoption of a new system, however, that would take into account
market relationships and give greater weight to the needs of consumers
has been delayed by differences of views among economists and officials
on essential elements of the system, by disagreement on the nature of
such basic concepts as productivity, economic efficiency, and profit,
and by the need for a prior reform of the price system. A draft of a new
planning law was reported to be in preparation toward the end of 1971.
As a means of decentralizing planning and mastering the intractable
supply problem, the task of coordinating requirements with supplies was
delegated to the centrals (see Glossary), trusts, and other enterprise
associations and, ultimately, to the enterprises themselves by a law on
economic contracts enacted in December 1969. Under the law, industrial
and trade enterprises must enter into contracts with suppliers for all
products and services needed to fulfill the tasks of the next year's
economic plan. In theory, the demands of final consumers for consumption
and capital goods would determine the nature of the contracts through
all stages of production down to the producers of raw materials. This
has not been the case in practice.
Most contracts must be concluded at least six months before the
beginning of the plan year because they are supposed to serve as the
basis for developing the final version of the annual plan; they must
take into account the economic tasks set for that year by the five-year
plan. The central planning authorities formulate the ultimate annual
plan by modifying individual contracts, where deemed necessary, in the
light of official policies and anticipated availabilities of materials
and other inputs. Correction of original contracts was reported to be
essential because enterprises tended to exaggerate their true
requirements as determined by official norms and standards. In 1970
initial orders exceeded available resources of materials by from 20 to
200 percent.
In 1970 and 1971 a large number of inter-enterprise contracts were not
concluded on time and, despite legal provisions for financial and other
sanctions, thousands of contracts were not adhered to. This entailed a
disruption of supplies and production, nonfulfillment of export
obligations, and insufficient deliveries to the domestic market. In an
attempt to cope with the supply problem, the Ministry of
Technical-Material Supply and Control of the Management of Fixed Assets
was created in September 1971--yet another example of trying to solve
economic problems by administrative means.
The final stage in the planning process, as in the past, continues to be
the assignment to each enterprise of specific tasks bearing on all
aspects of its operations. These tasks, generally known as plan
indicators, spell out in minute detail such items as the production and
investment program, the size of the labor force and the wage bill, costs
of production, and profits. They also specify norms for the use of all
materials, equipment, and labor and set goals for raising productivity.
In the case of large enterprises the number of indicators runs into the
thousands. The indicators are also used to evaluate the performance of
enterprises in relation to the plan. The entire process has been said to
represent the application of democratic centralism to planning.
The number and type of indicators to be assigned to enterprises and
their associations and the nature of the system of indicators best
suited to stimulate greater efficiency and technological innovation have
been subjects of wide-ranging and intensive debates. No clarification of
the underlying issues, however, much less a consensus on appropriate
measures to be undertaken, had emerged by early 1972. Officials have
ascribed the lack of any significant progress in the planning reform to
general inertia, organizational confusion, bureaucratic interests, and a
reluctance on the part of many enterprise directors to assume the added
measure of responsibility that is inherent in a greater freedom to
exercise initiative. Most of the officials are aware, nevertheless, that
the basic problem lies in the absence of adequate incentives. The
reconciliation of an obligatory central plan with enterprise autonomy
has thus far proved elusive.
Planning in the field of collective agriculture has also been highly
centralized, at least through 1971, despite measures introduced at the
end of 1970 to reduce the number of plan indicators for individual
farms. Detailed instructions on crop and livestock production and on the
volume of farm products to be delivered to the state have been handed
down to farms by higher authorities insufficiently familiar with their
natural and economic conditions. This method of planning has entailed
significant losses through improper use of land and other resources.
The relatively minor relaxation of central controls beginning in 1971
was intended to eliminate this waste. The extent to which central
controls over farming operations were retained even after the announced
decentralization of agricultural planning was illustrated by the Grand
National Assembly's enactment of a law toward the end of 1971 concerning
correct methods of producing and using livestock fodder. Information on
the method of planning for state farms was not available.
PRICE SYSTEM
As in all centrally directed economies, prices are set by the
government. In 1967 the National Party Conference called for a reform of
the price system on the grounds that the prevailing prices failed to
ensure the desired balance in economic development or to promote greater
efficiency in production and foreign trade. After four years of
intensive debate, a new price law was enacted in December 1971.
Preliminary information on the provisions of the law indicated that
prices would continue to be fixed by the government, although the method
of calculating them had been modified. In contrast to the announced
policy of decentralizing economic management, the law provided for
strengthening central controls over prices.
Until March 1970 there was no unified control over prices. The State
Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance administered industrial
wholesale prices, and the State Committee for Prices had jurisdiction
over prices of consumer goods and government procurement prices for farm
products. In 1970 the reorganized State Committee for Prices was given
authority to control all prices. Representation on the committee has
been provided for the State Planning Committee; the ministries of
finance, domestic trade, and foreign trade; the Central Statistical
Bureau; and the Central Council of the General Union of Trade Unions.
Participation by delegates from economic ministries and other organs is
to be ensured at all sessions in which problems of interest to them are
brought up for discussion.
The basic criticism leveled against the price system concerned its
tendency to undermine the government's drive for economic efficiency
through the failure of prices to reflect production costs, improper
relationships among prices, and price inflexibility. A comprehensive,
unified approach to price reform was considered beyond the capability of
the authorities; a piecemeal approach of dealing separately with
different types of prices was therefore decided upon. Priority in this
program was given to the improvement of industrial wholesale prices.
Wholesale prices for industrial products have been based on average
costs for each product in the relevant industrial branch. Prices have
therefore been profitable for enterprises having below-average costs,
whereas enterprises with costs above the average have had to rely upon
state subsidies for continued operation. Wholesale prices were last
fixed in 1963, and subsequent changes in technology and other aspects of
production magnified the dissociation of prices and costs. For political
reasons and because of general shortages the closing of uneconomic
enterprises was not considered feasible. Maintenance of fixed prices
over long periods of time has been deemed essential for purposes of
planning.
Under the prevailing price system, which assured high profits to many
enterprises and provided subsidies for unprofitable ones, there was no
incentive for enterprises to reduce costs. This tendency was reinforced
by the methods used to calculate costs and prices. The fact that cost
calculations did not include any charges for rent or capital induced
waste in the use of land and equipment. Prices included an element of
planned profit determined as a percentage of cost. In the price-setting
procedure it was therefore advantageous for enterprises to overstate
actual costs. This practice has been widely prevalent in fixing prices
for new products.
Prices for raw materials, including products of the extractive
industries and agriculture, were generally set below the cost of
production. This policy has been responsible for a wasteful use of many
materials in manufacturing. A price discrepancy also served to negate
the official fuel policy. Efforts to increase the use of coal in
electric power production were frustrated by the relatively much lower
price for natural gas. This led some economists to advocate that prices
for fuels be based on their caloric content. The price system has also
been reported to have produced various other inimical results, such as
inhibiting innovation and rewarding the continued production of obsolete
goods.
Procurement prices for farm products have been deliberately kept low in
relation to industrial prices; prices for farm requisites and consumer
goods, on the other hand, have been fixed far above cost through the
medium of a turnover tax channeled into the budget. In this manner the
price system has served to transfer resources from agriculture to
industry and to keep consumption low for the benefit of investment.
Pending the completion of price reform legislation, a provisional
measure was adopted in 1970 to lower wholesale prices for export goods
and to reduce excess profits through a so-called regularization tax on
domestic sales of the main products manufactured by state industry. The
measure involved a recalculation of wholesale prices, based on the
average cost of products within an industrial branch and a profit
allowance of only 10 percent of cost. The difference between the
recalculated prices and those in effect at the time was to be channeled
into the budget by the tax. In the case of high-cost producers who would
suffer losses under this procedure, the profit margin included in the
price could be raised to a maximum of 15 percent. The new price measure
put pressure on enterprises to lower the cost of production.
The comprehensive new law on prices for goods and services that will
come into effect in March 1972 will have no immediate impact on prices.
On the basis of criteria outlined in the law and upon approval by the
State Committee for Prices, economic ministries, central government
agencies, collectives, and other public organizations are supposed first
to issue norms for establishing and correlating prices within the areas
of their respective jurisdictions, in accordance with the specific
conditions of each producing branch, subbranch, or group of enterprises
and the specific features of each product and service.
The law makes provision for fixed and ceiling prices. Both types of
prices may be either uniform or differentiated. Uniform prices will
apply throughout the entire country and will be applicable to the main
products and to services of major importance to the economy and the
standard of living. Differentiated prices for a product may be set at
various levels depending upon territorial or seasonal factors and the
nature of the producers or buyers. These provisions will also apply to
agricultural procurement prices.
As in the past, uniform wholesale prices will be based on pre-calculated
average costs for each product at branch level. For the first time,
however, cost will also include taxes on capital and land (interest and
rent) and expenditures for the introduction of new technology. An
important change will also be made in determining the profit element of
the wholesale price. In the future the planned profit level for
enterprises, differentiated by branch and subbranch, will be calculated
in relation to the fixed and circulating capital employed rather than in
relation to cost.
The new law also contains provisions for pricing imports and exports and
for establishing retail prices of consumer goods. Retail prices will
include a profit for the trade organization and a variable turnover tax
applied to the wholesale price. The tax is to be relatively low on goods
produced for children and high on those manufactured in small quantities
and on luxury products. Changes in retail prices may be made only in
the light of planned provisions for the real income of the population.
Authority to set prices and control over the implementation of price
policy will be shifted from the Council of Ministers to the Council of
State and the Grand National Assembly. The Council of State will make
decisions not only concerning general price levels and price changes but
also about specific prices for products and services of particular
importance to the economy and the standard of living and on prices of
products earmarked exclusively for the defense sector. In an effort to
ensure a uniform price policy under a decentralized process of price
fixing, the law spells out the responsibilities of all entities
concerned with pricing, from the Council of State down to the individual
enterprise. Jurisdiction over prices for products and services is to be
allocated among the various sectors and levels of the economy, and the
State Committee for Prices will be responsible for the correct
application of the law.
In order to prevent further abuses in the formulation and changing of
prices, a state price control inspectorate is to be created within the
State Committee for Prices with power to supervise price control
agencies in each county. Penalties for infractions of trade regulations
have been increased to 2,000 lei, and persons guilty of price
irregularities will be subject to prosecution under sections of the
penal code on profiteering and fraud, which provide for imprisonment of
from six months to seven years.
The intricacy of price formulation, the complexity of the price law
(which contains 157 paragraphs), and disagreement among officials about
the efficacy of some of the law's provisions suggest that the new
measure may not be the final answer to the country's price problems. The
determination of the authorities to retain firm control over prices and
not to allow market forces to play any significant role in price
determination, however, was made clear in a statement by the chairman of
the State Committee for Prices to the effect that the building of
socialism cannot be directed by transferring the leadership and
decisionmaking to some self-regulating mechanism or to instruments that
cannot be controlled.
BUDGET
The annual state budgets are more comprehensive than budgets in Western
countries because they also cover economic activities that are the
province of private enterprise in the West. Information on the manner in
which budgets are formulated is not available, except that they are
closely related to the annual economic plans and are prepared under the
direction of the Ministry of Finance. Budgets must be approved by the
Council of Ministers, the PCR, and the Grand National Assembly. The
consolidated budget is divided into a central and a local budget; the
local budget is roughly one-fifth the size of the central budget.
Official statistics on the budget are deficient in that only summary
data are published on the major elements of revenue and expenditures and
the source of one-third or more of the revenue is not disclosed. The
published data show a small budgetary surplus each year, regardless of
the vicissitudes of the economy and unforeseen emergency outlays.
Information is not available on budgetary performance in 1970, when the
country suffered a disastrous flood. In the planned budgets for 1971 and
1972 revenues and expenditures were perfectly balanced.
Budgetary revenues increased steadily from about 58 billion lei in 1960
to 147 billion lei in 1969, and expenditures rose correspondingly from
about 55 billion lei to 143 billion lei. The budgets for 1971 and 1972
were planned to balance at a little more than 138 billion lei and 152
billion lei, respectively. Reasons for the decline in the size of the
1971 budget, the only decline reported in at least a decade, are not
known.
A turnover tax levied on consumer goods, farm products, and farm
supplies and a profit on the income of economic enterprises and
organizations constitute the main sources of budgetary revenue. The
relative importance of the two levies changed after 1966; the yield from
the profit tax approached that from the turnover tax in 1967 and grew
relatively larger in 1968 and 1969. Together, these two levies accounted
for from 50 to 56 percent of the annual revenues. Direct taxes on the
population yielded close to 6 percent from 1960 to 1969, except that in
the first and last years of that period their proportion approached 7
percent. The magnitude of direct taxes does not reflect the real tax
burden borne by the population, because the population ultimately pays
both the turnover and the profit tax through higher prices of consumer
goods.
Financing the national economy absorbed an average of 64.6 percent of
annual expenditure in the first half of the 1960s and 68.3 percent in
the second half of the decade. At the same time the proportion of
outlays for social and cultural purposes declined from an average of
24.9 percent to 23.2 percent, although the absolute amount of these
outlays more than doubled. Expenditures for defense declined from 6.1
percent of total outlays in 1960 to 4.4 percent in 1969.
BANKING
The banking system operative in early 1972 was the end product of
several institutional reorganizations, the last of which was completed
in May 1971. The main purpose of the reorganizations was to make bank
credit a more effective tool for promoting economic development and for
controlling the operations of economic enterprises and organizations.
Control through credit extension has been officially considered an
important means for inducing enterprises and trusts to attain the
targets of the economic plans. Little information is available on the
banks' operations beyond the formal statement of their functions. Data
relating to the money supply and foreign exchange reserves have also
been kept secret.
Banking Institutions
The banking system consists of the National Bank of the Romanian
Socialist Republic (referred to as the National Bank), the Investment
Bank, the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank, the Bank for Agriculture and the
Food Industry, and the Savings and Loan Bank. The functions of the
Romanian Foreign Trade Bank and of the Bank for Agriculture and the Food
Industry had been exercised to a more limited extent by the National
Bank until 1968. The Economy and Consignment Fund, a department of the
Savings and Loan Bank, makes credit available for the construction of
privately owned housing--a function exercised by the Investment Bank
until the end of 1969. Information on the interrelations between the
specialized banks and the National Bank or between the banks and the
Ministry of Finance was not available in early 1972.
The National Bank, as reconstituted in December 1970 with a
capitalization of 1 billion lei, is the country's central bank of issue,
but it also acts as a banker for the government, a bankers' banker for
the specialized financial institutions, and a short-term credit and
discount agency for economic organizations. The main functions of the
National Bank in the field of domestic finance include: the issue of
currency and control over its circulation; management of the budgetary
cash resources; coordination of all short-term credit and discount
activities; and participation in the formulation of annual and five-year
credit and cash plans, jointly with the State Planning Committee and the
Ministry of Finance.
The National Bank establishes official foreign exchange rates, engages
in foreign exchange operations directly or through the Romanian Foreign
Trade Bank and other authorized organizations, and participates in
working out the balance of foreign payments and in following up on its
execution. The National Bank also controls the production, processing,
and use of precious metals and gems and, together with the State
Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance, develops plans for their
acquisition and allocation at home and abroad. The bank has exclusive
authority to purchase from individuals items made of precious metals or
stones and items of artistic, historic, or documentary value.
The National Bank is managed by an administrative council, the members
of which must be approved by the Council of Ministers upon the
recommendation of the bank's governor, who is also chairman of the
administrative council. In addition to the chairman, the administrative
council includes several vice presidents of the bank; the directors of
the bank's fourteen divisions; superintendents of some of the
subordinated units; delegates of the management of the Investment Bank,
the Bank for Agriculture and the Food Industry, and the Romanian Foreign
Trade Bank; experienced specialists from the bank's professional staff
and from the outside; and a delegate of the labor unions, designated by
the General Union of Trade Unions. The council as a whole and each
individual member are responsible to the Council of Ministers for the
entire activity of the bank.
The Investment Bank, created in 1948 and last reorganized in September
1971 with a capitalization of 700 million lei, serves to finance, and
exercise control over, investment projects of all state, collective,
consumer-cooperative, and other public organizations, with the exception
of collective farms and organizations subordinate to the Ministry of
Agriculture, Food Industry, and Waters. The control powers of the bank
extend not only to projects financed with its own resources but also to
projects financed through budgetary allocations and out of enterprise
profits. The bank's management is organized along the lines of the
administrative council of the National Bank.
The Investment Bank must participate in the preparation of draft plans
for the financing of all investment projects undertaken by central and
local state organizations from the ministerial down to the enterprise
level. During the formulation and implementation of these plans the bank
must ensure the most economical use of available resources. The bank is
also called upon to determine appropriate rates of depreciation for
fixed assets and to ensure that the required amortization payments to
the budget are made on time.
Two of the bank's main functions are the review of technical and
economic investment criteria submitted to it for approval by ministries
and other state agencies and the evaluation of the feasibility of
proposed investment projects on the basis of accepted standards; the
more important of these standards also require approval by the Council
of Ministers. Approval may be granted by the bank only for investment
projects that satisfy all legal requirements regarding need,
suitability, and adherence to prescribed norms; have an adequate raw
materials base and assured sales outlets; and serve to improve the
economic performance of the organization that undertakes the investment.
In the event of disagreement between the bank and the organization
seeking investment approval, appeal may be made to higher authorities.
The Romanian Foreign Trade Bank was established in July 1968. Its
principal functions are to facilitate exports and, through strict
controls over exchange allocations, to encourage import substitution by
domestic producers. In 1970 about 73 percent of the bank's credits were
devoted to exports, and only 21 percent were granted for imports. The
remaining 6 percent of the credits were used to finance internal
transport.
In July 1971 the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank and a group of eight French
financial institutions opened the Romanian-French Bank in Paris. This
bank was organized as a private limited-liability company with a capital
of 20 million French francs underwritten in equal parts by the Romanian
Foreign Trade Bank and the French bankers. In the second half of 1971
the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank acquired affiliates in London and Rome.
The Bank for Agriculture and the Food Industry was created in May 1971
by expanding the functions and changing the name of the Agricultural
Bank established three years earlier. This reorganization followed the
consolidation of previously independent ministries into the Ministry of
Agriculture, Food Industry, and Waters (referred to as the Ministry of
Agriculture). The bank was capitalized at 500 million lei and was
required to create a reserve out of profits equal to the amount of its
capitalization. The bank's function is to provide investment and
operating credits for enterprises under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Agriculture, including collective farms, and to finance the
distribution of their products within the country.
A few summary data on credits extended by the Bank for Agriculture and
the Food Industry to collective farms have been released to the
country's press in an obvious effort to publicize official concern for
this important but neglected farm sector (see ch. 15). Information on
other aspects of this bank's operations have not been disclosed.
The Savings and Loan Bank, an institution nationalized at an early stage
of communist rule, had 1,560 branches and agencies in 1971, most of
which were located in rural areas. The main function of the bank has
been to mobilize the cash resources of the population for investment,
through obligatory periodic transfers of deposited funds to the National
Bank. In the 1966-70 period subsidiary functions of the bank gained in
importance, including small-scale commercial bank transactions, personal
loans, and tax collections. Receipts from personal savings deposits
accounted for 70 percent of total cash receipts in 1970. Since the
beginning of 1970 the bank has also made loans for private housing
construction.
The schedule of payments to the National Bank has been sufficiently
stringent to induce the Savings and Loan Bank to mount special
educational programs for attracting savings, particularly in rural
areas, and to seek ways of stimulating cash collections from its other
activities. To this end the bank is giving special attention to finding
more effective means for identifying cash reserves held by the
population. One avenue the bank has been exploring is to gain greater
knowledge of the timing of income receipts and of the uses to which
incomes are put.
The volume of savings has been steadily mounting; it rose at an average
annual rate of more than 20 percent in the 1966-70 period and was 2.5
times larger at the period's end than at its beginning. In 1970, 13.6
percent of the population's cash income was deposited in savings
accounts, compared to 5.8 percent in 1960. More than 65 percent of the
population's cash assets in 1970 were on deposit in savings accounts, as
against 56.6 percent five years earlier. Under the economic plan for the
1971-75 period, savings deposits of the Savings and Loan Bank are
scheduled to increase by 87 percent--the equivalent of an annual 13.4
percent growth rate. An important reason for the growth of savings has
been a general shortage of consumer goods.