GORGIAS.
[Side-note: Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the
historical Gorgias.]
Aristotle, in one of his lost dialogues, made honourable mention of a
Corinthian cultivator, who, on reading the Platonic Gorgias, was
smitten with such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields
and his vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the
tuition of Plato.[1] How much of reality there may be in this
anecdote, we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to
justify such warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the
nature and purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to
include a comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline
of positive ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three
distinct interlocutors--Gorgias, Polus, and Kalliklês; but I must
again remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted
by Plato himself.[2] It may indeed be considered almost as three
distinct dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical
Gorgias, a native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of
the Grecian rhetors; an elderly man during Plato's youth. He paid
visits to different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons
in rhetoric to numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious
aspirations.[3]
[Footnote 1: Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 356, Dindorf. [Greek: O( de\
geôrgo\s o( Kori/nthios tô=| Gorgi/a| xuggeno/menos--ou)k au)tô=|
e)kei/nô| Gorgi/a|, a)lla\ tô=| lo/gô| o(\n Pla/tôn e)/grapsen e)p'
e)le/gchô| tou= sophistou=--au)ti/ka a)phei\s to\n a)/gron kai\ tou\s
a)mpe/lous, Pla/tôni u(pe/thêke tê\n psuchê\n kai\ ta\ e)kei/nou
e)spei/reto kai\ e)phuteu/eto; kai\ ou(=to/s e)stin o(\n tima=|
A)ristote/lês e)n tô=| dialo/gô| tô=| Korinthi/ô|.]]
[Footnote 2: Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. p. 387, Dindorf. [Greek: Ti/s
ga\r ou)k oi)=den, o(/ti kai\ o( Sôkra/tês kai\ o( Kalliklê=s kai\ o(
Gorgi/as kai\ o( Pô=los, pa/nta tau=t' e)sti\ Pla/tôn, pro\s to\
dokou=n au)tô=| tre/pôn tou\s lo/gous?] Though Aristeides asks
reasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this?--the remarks of Stallbaum
and others often imply forgetfulness of it.]
[Footnote 3: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22)
is of opinion that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning
from his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C.
I shall not contradict this: but I see nothing to prove it. At the
same time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in the
Ekklesiazusæ alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his
Republic (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 20). Putting these two
statements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of
composition than the Republic, which I hardly think probable.
However, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the
Ekklesiazusæ makes any allusion to the Republic of Plato. Nor shall I
believe, until some evidence is produced, that the Republic was
composed at so early a date as 390 B.C.]
[Side-note: Introductory circumstances of the dialogue.
Polus and Kalliklês.]
Sokrates and Chærephon are described as intending to come to a
rhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as having been accidentally
detained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished,
with brilliant success. Kalliklês, however, the host and friend of
Gorgias, promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions
put by Sokrates; which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the
same time that no one had asked him any new question for many years
past.[4] Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is?
what it is that he teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not
receiving a satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of
his own: out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing:
carried on by Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against
Kalliklês. Both these two are represented as voluble speakers, of
confident temper, regarding the acquisition of political power and
oratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life. Polus had even
composed a work on Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone
of this dialogue would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from
such evidence) that the style of the work was affected, and the
temper of the author flippant.
[Footnote 4: Plato, Gorg. pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to
be carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to
the auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455
C.]
[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a
good definition.]
Here, as in the other dialogues above noticed, the avowed aim of
Sokrates is--first, to exclude long speaking--next, to get the
question accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner.
Specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which
Sokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain
by contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the
thing defined, or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place
of what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to
find a definition are always instructive, and must have been
especially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had
never yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis.
[Side-note: Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is
the artisan of persuasion.]
About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias?
_Gorg._--About words or discourses. _Sokr._--About what
discourses? such as inform sick men how they are to get well?
_Gorg._--No. _Sokr._--It is not about all discourses?
_Gorg._--It makes men competent to speak: of course therefore
also to think, upon the matters on which they speak.[5]
_Sokr._--But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each
with reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference
between them and Rhetoric? _Gorg._--The difference is, that each
of these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or
performance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are
subsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses
alone.[6] _Sokr._--But the same may be said about arithmetic,
geometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from
Rhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with
which Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I
asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy.
_Gorg._--The discourses, with which Rhetoric is conversant, turn upon
the greatest of all human affairs. _Sokr._--But this too, Gorgias,
is indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast,
the money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the
greatest of all.[7] _Gorg._--The function of Rhetoric, is to
persuade assembled multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth
the greatest benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the
speaker.[8] _Sokr._--Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion.
Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers?
_Gorg._--It is so.
[Footnote 5: Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n peri\ ô(=nper
le/gein, kai\ phronei=n? Pô=s ga\r ou)/?]]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B-C. [Greek: tê=s r(êtorikê=s
. . . . pa=sa ê( pra=xis kai\ ê( ku/rôsis dia\ lo/gôn e)sti/n . . . .]]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 451-452.]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Gorgias, p. 452 D. [Greek: O(/per e)/sti tê=|
a)lêthei/a| me/giston a)gatho/n, kai\ ai)/tion, a)/ma me\n
e)leutheri/as au)toi=s toi=s a)nthrô/pois, a)/ma de\ tou= a)/llôn
a)/rchein e)n tê=| au(tou= po/lei e(ka/stô|.]]
[Side-note: The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon
what matters is he competent to advise?]
_Sokr._--But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who
produce persuasion? Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every
other teacher, produce persuasion? How does the Rhetor differ
from them? What mode of persuasion does he bring about? Persuasion
about what? _Gorg._--I reply--it is that persuasion which is
brought about in Dikasteries, and other assembled multitudes--and
which relates to just and unjust.[9] _Sokr._--You recognise that
to have learnt and to know any matter, is one thing--to believe it,
is another: that knowledge and belief are different--knowledge being
always true, belief sometimes false? _Gorg._--Yes. _Sokr._--We
must then distinguish two sorts of persuasion: one carrying with
it knowledge--the other belief without knowledge. Which of the two
does the Rhetor bring about? _Gorg._--That which produces belief
without knowledge. He can teach nothing. _Sokr._--Well, then,
Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? When
the people are deliberating about the choice of generals or
physicians, about the construction of docks, about practical
questions of any kind--there will be in each case a special man
informed and competent to teach or give counsel, while the Rhetor is
not competent. Upon what then can the Rhetor advise--upon just and
unjust--nothing else?[10]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Gorgias, p. 454 B.]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Gorgias, p. 455 D.]
[Side-note: The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter,
even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know,
among the ignorant.]
The Rhetor (says Gorgias) or accomplished public speaker, will give
advice about all the matters that you name, and others besides. He
will persuade the people and carry them along with him, even against
the opinion of the special _Expert_. He will talk more
persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own
business. The power of the Rhetor is thus very great: but he ought to
use it, like all other powers, for just and honest purposes; not to
abuse it for wrong and oppression. If he does the latter, the misdeed
is his own, and not the fault of his teacher, who gave his lessons
with a view that they should be turned to proper use. If a man, who
has learnt the use of arms, employs them to commit murder, this abuse
ought not to be imputed to his master of arms.[11]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 456-457.]
You mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from
you, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade the
multitude:--that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired an
engine of persuasion; so that he will appear, when addressing the
ignorant, to know more than those who really do know.[12]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Gorgias, p. 459 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ peri\
ta\s a)/llas a(pa/sas te/chnas ô(sau/tôs e)/chei o( r(ê/tôr kai\ ê(
r(êtorikê/; au)ta\ me\n ta\ pra/gmata ou)de\n dei= au)tê\n ei)de/nai
o(/pôs e)/chei, mêchanê\n de/ tina peithou=s eu(rêke/nai, ô(/ste
phai/nesthai toi=s ou)k ei)do/si ma=llon ei)de/nai tô=n ei)do/tôn.]]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus
takes up the debate with Sokrates.]
Thus far, the conversation is carried on between Sokrates and
Gorgias. But the latter is now made to contradict himself--apparently
rather than really--for the argument whereby Sokrates reduces him to
a contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the Platonic
doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may be relied
on to act as a just man;[13] in other words, that virtue consists in
knowledge.
[Footnote 13: Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. [Greek: o( ta\ di/kaia
memathêkô/s, di/kaios]. Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates,
who falls into it also in the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph.
Memorab. iv. 2, 20, iii. 9, 5.]
[Side-note: Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of
Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an
empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers,
analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head
flattery.]
Polus now interferes and takes up the conversation: challenging
Sokrates to furnish what _he_ thinks the proper definition of
Rhetoric. Sokrates obeys, in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric (he
says) is no art at all, but an empirical knack of catering for the
pleasure and favour of hearers; analogous to cookery.[14] It is a
talent falling under the general aptitude called Flattery; possessed
by some bold spirits, who are forward in divining and adapting
themselves to the temper of the public.[15] It is not honourable, but
a mean pursuit, like cookery. It is the shadow or false imitation of
a branch of the political art.[16] In reference both to the body and
the mind, there are two different conditions: one, a condition really
and truly good--the other, good only in fallacious appearance,
and not so in reality. To produce, and to verify, the really good
condition of the body, there are two specially qualified professions,
the gymnast or trainer and the physician: in regard to the mind, the
function of the trainer is performed by the law-giving power, that of
the physician by the judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating,
are both branches of the political art, and when put together make up
the whole of it. Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body
towards its really best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the
same in regard to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a
sham counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head
_flattery_--taking no account of what is really best, but only
of that which is most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick
recommending itself to a fallacious esteem.[17] Thus Cosmetic, or
Ornamental Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the
counterfeit of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately
agreeable to the body, without considering whether it be good or
wholesome: and does this moreover, without any truly scientific
process of observation or inference, but simply by an empirical
process of memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by
scientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body,
whether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as
the counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is
_good_ for the body, while it really knows only what food is
_agreeable_. In like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up
the body to a false appearance of that vigour and symmetry, which
Gymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically.
[Footnote 14: Plato, Gorgias, p. 462 C. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a . . . .
cha/rito/s tinos kai\ ê(donê=s a)pergasi/as]. In the Philêbus (pp.
55-56) Sokrates treats [Greek: i)atrikê\] differently, as falling
short of the idea of [Greek: te/chnê], and coming much nearer to what
is here called [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] or [Greek: stochastikê/].
Asklepiades was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling
[Greek: grammatikê\] by the name of [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] instead of
[Greek: te/chnê]: see Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615,
Bekk.]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. [Greek: dokei= moi ei)=nai/
ti e)pitê/deuma, techniko\n me\n ou)/, psuchê=s de\ stochastikê=s
kai\ a)ndrei/as kai\ phu/sei deinê=s prosomilei=n toi=s a)nthrô/pois;
kalô= de\ au)tou= e)gô\ to\ kepha/laion _kolakei/an_.]]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. [Greek: politikê=s mori/ou
ei)/dôlon].]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. [Greek: tetta/rôn dê\ tou/tôn
ou)sô=n, kai\ a)ei\ pro\s to\ be/ltiston therapeuousô=n, tô=n me\n
to\ sô=ma, tô=n de\ tê\n psuchê/n, ê( kolakeutikê\ ai)sthome/nê, ou)
gnou=sa le/gô a)lla\ stochasame/nê, te/tracha e(autê\n dianei/masa,
u(podu=sa u(po\ e(/kaston tô=n mori/ôn, prospoiei=tai ei)=nai tou=to
o(/per u(pe/du; kai\ tou= me\n belti/stou ou)de\n phronti/zei, tô=|
de\ a)ei\ ê(di/stô| thêreu/etai tê\n a)/noian kai\ e)xapata=|, ô(/ste
dokei= plei/stou a)xi/a ei)=nai.]]
[Side-note: Distinction between the true arts which aim at the
good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to
the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure.]
The same analogies hold in regard to the mind. Sophistic is the
shadow or counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of judging or
adjudicating. The lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the
mind: the Sophist and the Rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it. This
distinction between them (continues Sokrates) is true and real:
though it often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by
others, confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he
deals with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the
same manner, is confounded with the judge.[18] The Sophist and the
Rhetor, addressing themselves to the present relish of an
undiscerning public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the
credit of their more severe and far-sighted rivals.
[Footnote 18: Plato, Gorgias, p. 465 C. [Greek: die/stêke me\n ou(/tô
phu/sei; a(/te de\ e)ggu\s o)/ntôn, phu/rontai e)n tô=| au)tô=| kai\
peri\ tau)ta\ sophistai\ kai\ r(ê/tores, kai\ ou)k e)/chousin o(/, ti
chrê/sôntai ou)/te au)toi\ e(autoi=s ou)/te oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi
tou/tois.]
It seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as being
confounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the Rhetor
with the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion, three lines
farther on, to the confusion between the cook and the physician.
Heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded
are, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to be the
meaning of Plato.]
[Side-note: Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the
Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they
really wish.]
This is the definition given by Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the
Rhetor. Polus then asks him: You say that Rhetoric is a branch of
Flattery: Do you think that good Rhetors are considered as flatterers
in their respective cities? _Sokr._--I do not think that[19]
they are considered at all. _Polus._--How! not considered? Do
not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities?
_Sokr._--No: if you understand the possession of power as a good
thing for the possessor. _Polus._--I do understand it so.
_Sokr._--Then I say that the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the
very minimum of power. _Polus._--How can that be? Do not they,
like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please?
_Sokr._--I admit that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems
good to themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or
exile upon others: but I say that nevertheless they have no
power, because they can do nothing which they really wish.[20]
[Footnote 19: Plat. Gorg. p. 466 B. _Polus._ [Greek: A)=r'
ou)=n dokou=si/ soi ô(s ko/lakes e)n tai=s po/lesi phau=loi
nomi/zesthai oi( a)gathoi\ r(ê/tores? . . . . ] _Sokr._ [Greek:
Ou)de\ nomi/zesthai e)/moige dokou=sin.]
The play on words here--for I see nothing else in it--can be
expressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little
pertinence; because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had
considerable importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little
Plato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be
seen by what immediately follows--where he compares the Rhetors to
Despots? and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill
or banish any one whom they choose.]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Gorgias, p. 466 E. [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r poiei=n
ô(=n bou/lontai, ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n; poiei=n me/ntoi o(\, ti a)\n
au)toi=s do/xê| be/ltiston ei)=nai.]]
[Side-note: All men wish for what is good for them. Despots
and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good
for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will,
and therefore have no real power.]
That which men wish (Sokrates lays down as a general proposition) is
to obtain good, and to escape evil. Each separate act which they
perform, is performed not with a view to its own special result, but
with a view to these constant and paramount ends. Good things, or
profitable things (for Sokrates alternates the phrases as
equivalent), are wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things. Evil
things are the contraries of these.[21] Many things are in themselves
neither good nor evil, but may become one or the other, according to
circumstances--such as stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or
moving, &c. When we do any of these indifferent acts, it is with
a view to the pursuit of good, or to the avoidance of evil: we do not
wish for the act, we wish for its good or profitable results. We do
every thing for the sake of good: and if the results are really good
or profitable, we accomplish what we wish: if the contrary, not. Now,
Despots and Rhetors, when they kill or banish or impoverish any one,
do so because they think it will be better for them, or
profitable.[22] If it be good for them, they do what they wish: if
evil for them, they do the contrary of what they wish and therefore
have no power.
[Footnote 21: Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n le/geis
ei)=nai a)gatho\n me\n sophi/an te kai\ u(gi/eian kai\ plou=ton kai\
ta)/lla ta\ toiau=ta, kaka\ de\ ta)nanti/a tou/tôn? E)/gôge.]]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B-C. [Greek: ou)kou=n kai\
a)pokti/nnumen, ei)/ tin' a)pokti/nnumen, . . . . oi)o/menoi a)/meinon
ei)=nai ê(mi=n tau=ta ê)\ mê/? . . . e(/nek' a)/ra tou= a)gathou=
a(/panta tau=ta poiou=sin oi( poiou=ntes . . . . e)a\n me\n ô)phe/lima
ê)=| tau=ta, boulo/metha pra/ttein au)ta/; blabera\ de\ o)/nta, ou)
boulo/metha. . . . . ta\ ga\r a)gatha\ boulo/metha, ô(=s phê\|s su/],
&c.]
To do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen
to any one; the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men.
The person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied; but
much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer. If I
have a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any
one whom I choose: but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of
great power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished. The
result is not profitable, but hurtful: therefore the act is not
good, nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.[23] It is
sometimes good to kill, banish, or impoverish--sometimes bad. It is
good when you do it justly: bad, when you do it unjustly.[24]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Gorgias, p. 469-470.]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.]
[Side-note: Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of
Macedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one
thinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless
denies it.]
_Polus._--A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of
Archelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or
miserable? _Sokr._--I do not know: I have never been in his
society. _Polus._--Cannot you tell without that, whether he is
happy or not? _Sokr._--No, certainly not. _Polus._--Then
you will not call even the Great King happy? _Sokr._--No: I do
not know how he stands in respect to education and justice.
_Polus._--What! does all happiness consist in that?
_Sokr._--I say that it does. I maintain that the good and
honourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked,
miserable.[25] _Polus._--Then Archelaus is miserable, according
to your doctrine? _Sokr._--Assuredly, if he is wicked.
_Polus._--Wicked, of course; since he has committed enormous
crimes: but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is
there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be
Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia?[26] _Sokr._--All the
public, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them,
will agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do
not agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and
gain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove
my case without calling any other witness than yourself.[27] Do you
think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been
defeated in his conspiracy and punished? _Polus._--Certainly
not: he would then have been very miserable. _Sokr._--Here again
I differ from you: I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man,
is under all circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if
afterwards punished, than he would be if unpunished and
successful.[28] _Polus._--How say you? If a man, unjustly
conspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture,
mutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages
inflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children--do
you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his
enterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority
over his city--envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and
strangers alike?[29] _Sokr._--More happy, I shall not say: for
in both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on
the former supposition.
[Footnote 25: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. [Greek: A)ll' e)gô/ soi ei)=s
ô)\n ou)ch o(mologô=. . . . e)gô\ de\ a)\n mê\ se\ au)to\n e(/na o)/nta
ma/rtura para/schômai o(mologou=nta peri\ ô(=n le/gô, ou)de\n
oi)=mai a)/xion lo/gou pepera/nthai peri\ ô(=n a)\n ê(mi=n o( lo/gos
ê)=|; oi)=mai de\ ou)de\ soi/, e)a\n mê\ e)gô/ soi marturô= ei(=s
ô)\n mo/nos, tou\s d' a)/llous pa/ntas tou/tous chai/rein e)a=|s.]]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.]
[Side-note: Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil
to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong,
it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished.]
_Sokr._--Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer
wrong? _Polus._--To suffer wrong. _Sokr._--Which of the two
is the most disgraceful? _Polus._--To do wrong. _Sokr._--If
more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? _Polus._--By no
means. _Sokr._--You do not think then that the good--and the
fine or honourable--are one and the same; nor the bad--and the ugly
or disgraceful? _Polus._--No: certainly not. _Sokr._--How
is this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies,
colours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some
common property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from
rendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the
spectator who contemplates them?[30] And are not figures, colours,
voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the
same reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or
both? _Polus._--Certainly: your definition of the fine or
honourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory.
_Sokr._--Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be
defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil?
_Polus._--Doubtless.[31] _Sokr._--If therefore one thing be
finer or more honourable than another, this is because it
surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be
more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other
either in pain, or in evil? _Polus._--Yes.
[Footnote 30: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 D. [Greek: e)a\n e)n tô=|
theôrei=sthai chai/rein poiê=| tou\s theôrou=ntas?]]
[Footnote 31: Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 E. _Sokr._ [Greek: Kai\
mê\n ta/ ge kata\ tou\s no/mous kai\ ta\ e)pitêdeu/mata, ou) dê/pou
e)kto\s tou/tôn e)sti\ ta\ kala/, tou= ê)\ _ô)phe/lima ei)=nai ê)\
ê(de/a ê)\_ a)mpho/tera.] _Pol._ [Greek: Ou)k e)/moige
dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ tô=n mathêma/tôn ka/llos
ô(sau/tôs?] _Pol._ [Greek: Pa/nu ge; kai\ kalô=s ge nu=n
o(rizei, _ê(donê=| te kai\ a)gathô=|_ o(rizo/menos to\ kalo/n.]
_Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ ai)schro\n tô=| e)nanti/ô|,
_lu/pê| te kai\ kakô=|_?] _Pol._ [Greek: A)na/gkê.]
A little farther on [Greek: blabê\] is used as equivalent to [Greek:
kako/n]. These words--[Greek: kalo/n, ai)schro/n]--(very difficult to
translate properly) introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment
of spectators, or of an undefined public, not concerned either as
agents or sufferers.]
[Side-note: Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and
Turpe--Proof of the first point.]
_Sokr._--Well, then! what did you say about doing wrong and
suffering wrong? You said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the
two, but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful. Now, if to do
wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because
it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil?
_Polus._--Undoubtedly. _Sokr._--Has it a preponderance of pain? Does
the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer?
_Polus._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Then it must have a preponderance
of evil? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--To do wrong therefore is
worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful?
_Polus._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Since therefore it is
both worse and more disgraceful, I was right in affirming that
neither you, nor I, nor any one else, would choose to do wrong in
preference to suffering wrong. _Polus._--So it seems.[32]
[Footnote 32: Plato, Gorgias, p. 475 C-D.]
[Side-note: Proof of the second point.]
_Sokr._--Now let us take the second point--Whether it be the
greatest evil for the wrong-doer to be punished, or whether it be not
a still greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the
wrong-doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things
fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? _Polus._--I
think so. _Sokr._--When a man does anything, must there not be
some correlate which suffers; and must it not suffer in a way
corresponding to what the doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there
must also be something stricken: and if he strikes quickly or
violently, there must be something which is stricken quickly or
violently. And so, if any one burns or cuts, there must be something
burnt or cut. As the agent acts, so the patient suffers.
_Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now if a man be punished for wrong
doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just?
_Polus._--He does. _Sokr._--You admitted that all just
things were honourable: therefore the agent does what is honourable,
the patient suffers what is honourable.[33] But if honourable, it
must be either agreeable--or good and profitable. In this case,
it is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and
profitable. The wrong-doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is
good and is profited. _Polus._--Yes.[34] _Sokr._--In what
manner is he profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his
mind--by being relieved from badness of mind.
_Polus._--Probably. _Sokr._--Is not this badness of mind the greatest
evil? In regard to wealth, the special badness is poverty: in regard
to the body, it is weakness, sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard
to the mind, it is ignorance, injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not
injustice, and other badness of mind, the most disgraceful of the
three? _Polus._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--If it be most
disgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. _Polus._--How?
_Sokr._--It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest
preponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the
preponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being
unjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being poor
and sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil.
Mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty, or
disease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human evils.
_Polus._--It appears so.[35]
[Footnote 33: See Aristotle, Rhet. i. 9, p. 1366, b. 30, where the
contrary of this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.]
[Footnote 34: Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.]
[Footnote 35: Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.]
[Side-note: The criminal labours under a mental distemper,
which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only
cure for him. To be punished is best for him.]
_Sokr._--The money-making art is, that which relieves us from
poverty: the medical art, from sickness and weakness: the judicial or
punitory, from injustice and wickedness of mind. Of these three
relieving forces, which is the most honourable? _Polus._--The
last, by far. _Sokr._--If most honourable, it confers either
most pleasure or most profit? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now,
to go through medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a
man to undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to
become well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is
less miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well,
than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the man
who is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never becomes so; but
if a man has become so, the next best course for him is, to undergo
punishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst lot of all is, that
of him who remains mentally bad, without ever getting rid of
badness.[36]
[Footnote 36: Plato, Gorgias, p. 478 D-E.]
[Side-note: Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our
friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we
ought to keep him unpunished.]
This last, Polus (continues Sokrates), is the condition of Archelaus,
and of despots and Rhetors generally. They possess power which
enables them, after they have committed injustice, to guard
themselves against being punished: which is just as if a sick man
were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being
cured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the
profit of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have
an unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.[37] There is
therefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be,
to avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to
resist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present
ourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives
have done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves
to accuse them, and to invoke punishment upon them also.[38] On the
other hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take precautions
against suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if he has done
wrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or deed, not to
bring him to punishment, but to prevent him from suffering punishment
or making compensation: so that he may live as long as possible in
impunity.[39] These are the purposes towards which rhetoric is
serviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it seems of no great
use.[40]
[Footnote 37: Plato, Gorgias, p. 479 B. [Greek: to\ a)lgeino\n
au)tou= kathora=|n, pro\s de\ to\ ô)phe/limon tuphlô=s e)/chein, kai\
a)gnoei=n o(/sô| a)thliô/tero/n e)sti mê\ u(giou=s sô/matos mê\
u(giei= psuchê=| sunoikei=n, a)lla\ sathra=| kai\ a)di/kô| kai\
a)nosi/ô|.]]
[Footnote 38: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 480 C, 508 B. [Greek: katêgorête/on
ei)/ê kai\ au(tou= kai\ ui(e/os kai\ e(tai/ron, e)a/n ti a)dikê=|],
&c.
Plato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron as a
reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as I
have already observed in reviewing the Euthyphron, which see above,
vol. i. ch. xi., p. 442.]
[Footnote 39: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 A. [Greek: e)a\n de\ a)/llon
a)dikê=| o( e)chthro/s, panti\ tro/pô| paraskeuaste/on kai\
pra/ttonta kai\ le/gonta, o(/pôs mê\ dô=| di/kên. . . . e)a/n te
chrusi/on ê(rpakô\s ê)=| polu/, mê\ a)podidô=| tou=to, a)ll' e)/chôn
a)nali/skêtai . . . a)di/kôs kai\ a)the/ôs], &c.]
[Footnote 40: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.]
* * * * *
This dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a
representation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous
than is usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably
copious abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its
reasoning.
[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed
by Kallikles whether he means it seriously.]
The whole tenor of its assumptions, as well as the conclusions in
which it ends, are so repugnant to received opinions, that Polus,
even while compelled to assent, treats it as a paradox: while
Kallikles, who now takes up the argument, begins by asking from
Chærephon--"Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only
jesting?"[41] Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He
has nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics--and
the verdict of philosophy.[42] This however is a matter of little
moment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except in
so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a
matter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning--which at
the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as
plausible--whether he may agree or disagree with others.
[Footnote 41: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.]
[Side-note: Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one
acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of
misery.]
Plato has ranked the Rhetor in the same category as the Despot: a
classification upon which I shall say something presently. But
throughout the part of the dialogue just extracted, he treats the
original question about Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical
question.[43] Every one (argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment
of good and for the avoidance of evil. Every one performs each
separate act with a view not to its own immediate end, but to one or
other of these permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is
happy: in so far as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs
the evil, he is unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or
woman is happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or
employed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not
thereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs
the contrary, evil and misery. The man who does wrong is more
miserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all is
he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.[44]
[Footnote 43: I may be told that this comparison is first made by
Polus (p. 466 C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from him to
comment upon. True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the
composition of Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are
apt to forget this.]
[Footnote 44: Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect.
126, pp. 257-347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced
by Plato, treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and
which none but a few men pretending to be wise would
proclaim--[Greek: a(/per a(/pantes me\n a)\n oi( nou=n e)/chontes
e)/lointo kai\ boulêthei=en, o)li/goi de/ tines tô=n prospoioume/nôn
ei)=nai sophô=n, e)rôtêthe/ntes ou)k a)\n phê/saien.]
In this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind, though
without pronouncing the name.]
Polus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has "waded
through slaughter" to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy man both in
his own feelings and in those of every one else, envied and admired
by the world generally: That to say--Archelaus would have been more
happy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his enterprise and had
been put to death under cruel torture--is an untenable paradox.
[Side-note: Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness.]
The issue here turns, and the force of Plato's argument rests
(assuming Sokrates to speak the real sentiments of Plato), upon
the peculiar sense which he gives to the words
Good--Evil--Happiness:--different from the sense in which they are
conceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by Polus.
It is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of
themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be
the most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than any amount of
suffering: moreover, that if they could conceive themselves as having been
thus guilty, the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would
be one of expiatory pain. This, taken as the personal sentiment of
Plato, admits of no reply. But when he attempts to convert this
subjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all, he
fails of success, and misleads himself by equivocal language.
[Side-note: Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with
the Platonic meaning.]
Plato distinguishes two general objects of human desire, and two of
human aversion. 1. The immediate, and generally transient,
object--Pleasure or the Pleasurable--Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant,
ulterior, and more permanent object--Good or the profitable--Evil or
the hurtful.--In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil
consists happiness. But now comes the important question--In what
sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? What did
Plato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind generally? Have
mankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer to this question, we
must say, that neither Plato, nor mankind generally, are consistent
or unanimous in their use of the words: and that Plato sometimes
approximates to, sometimes diverges from, the more usual meaning.
Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and
Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know
it: we learn only, that Good is a mental perfection--Evil a mental
taint--answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in
Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this
circumstance--That they have no reference either to pleasure or pain.
In the vulgar sense, Good stands distinguished from pleasure (or
relief from pain), and Evil from pain (or loss of pleasure), as the
remote, the causal, the lasting from the present, the product, the
transient. Good and Evil are explained by enumerating all the things
so called, of which enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in
this dialogue: elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of
Good, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that
all men aim at good, he gives, as examples of good things--Wisdom,
Health, Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these,
Stupidity, Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course
might be much enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the
common property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a
large portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and
avoid the latter:--that the approach which they make to happiness
depends, speaking generally, upon the success which attends their
exertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent
ends: and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to
each man's own feelings.
But this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates
proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most
miserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest
of all evils.
[Side-note: Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency
between the general answer of Polus and his previous
declarations--Law and Nature.]
Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[45]
which of the two is most disgraceful--To do wrong--or to suffer
wrong? Polus answers--To do wrong: and this answer is
inconsistent with what he had previously said about Archelaus. That
prince, though a wrong-doer on the largest scale, has been declared
by Polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration: while
Sokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all
mankind, except himself. To be consistent with such an assertion,
Polus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer,
when the general question is afterwards put to him: or at least he
ought to have said--"Sometimes the one, sometimes the other". But
this he is ashamed to do, as we shall find Kallikles intimating at a
subsequent stage of the dialogue:[46] because of King Nomos, or the
established habit of the community--who feel that society rests upon
a sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one,
and require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with
censure in general words, however widely the critical feeling may
depart from such censure in particular cases.[47] Polus is forced to
make profession of a faith, which neither he nor others (except
Sokrates with a few companions) universally or consistently apply. To
bring such a force to bear upon the opponent, was one of the known
artifices of dialecticians:[48] and Sokrates makes it his point of
departure, to prove the unparalleled misery of Archelaus.
[Footnote 45: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.]
[Footnote 46: Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that [Greek: to\
a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai] was an [Greek: a)/doxos
u(po/thesis]--one which it was [Greek: chei/ronos ê)/thous
e(le/sthai]: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not
to defend (Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15).]
[Footnote 47: This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration
from the third chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral
Sentiments, entitled, "Of the corruption of our moral sentiments,
which is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great,
and to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition". He
says--"The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and
the powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor
and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain
the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same
time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our
moral sentiments. . . . They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly--a
select, though I am afraid, a small party--who are the real and
steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are
the admirers and worshippers--and what may seem more extraordinary,
most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers--of wealth
and greatness. . . . . It is scarce _agreeable to good morals_, or
even to good language, perhaps, to say that mere wealth and
greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We
must acknowledge, however, that they _almost constantly obtain
it_: and _that they may therefore in a certain sense be
considered as the natural objects of it_."
Now Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of
the mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly, power and
greatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the last sentence
illustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and Kalliklês. Adam
Smith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in great power, such
as those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship from the vast
majority of disinterested spectators: and that, therefore they are in
a certain sense the _natural objects_ of such a sentiment
([Greek: kata\ phu/sin]). But if the question be put to him, Whether
such proceedings, with such a position, are _worthy of honour_,
he is constrained by good morals ([Greek: kata\ no/mon]) to reply in
the negative. It is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the
small minority, while Polus shares the opinion of the large majority.
But what is required by King Nomos must be professed even by
dissentients, unless they possess the unbending resolution of
Sokrates.]
[Footnote 48: Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he
contrasts the opinions which men must make a show of holding, with
those which they really do--[Greek: ai( phanerai\ do/xai--ai(
a)phanei=s, a)pokekrumme/nai, do/xai.]]
[Side-note: The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by
Sokrates, will not hold.]
He proceeds to define Pulchrum and Turpe ([Greek:
kalo\n-ai)schro/n]). When we recollect the Hippias Major, in which
dialogue many definitions of Pulchrum were canvassed and all rejected,
so that the search ended in total disappointment--we are surprised to
see that Sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to
himself and Polus: and we are the more surprised, because the
definition here admitted without a remark, is in substance one of
those shown to be untenable in the Hippias Major.[49] It depends upon
the actual argumentative purpose which Plato has in hand, whether he
chooses to multiply objections and give them effect--or to ignore
them altogether. But the definition which he here proposes, even if
assumed as incontestable, fails altogether to sustain the conclusion
that he draws from it. He defines Pulchrum to be that which either
confers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it, or
produces ulterior profit or good--we must presume profit to the
spectator, or to him along with others--at any rate it is not said
_to whom_. He next defines the ugly and disgraceful ([Greek: to\
ai)schro\n]) as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or
evil. If then (he argues) to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful
than to suffer wrong, this must be either because it is more painful--or
because it is more hurtful, more evil (worse). It certainly is
not more painful: therefore it must be worse.
[Footnote 49: Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 45-46. See above, vol. ii. ch.
xiii.]
[Side-note: Worse or better--for whom? The argument of
Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for
his inference, the definition would be inadmissible.]
But worse, for whom? For the spectators, who declare the proceedings
of Archelaus to be disgraceful? For the persons who suffer by his
proceedings? Or for Archelaus himself? It is the last of the three
which Sokrates undertakes to prove: but his definition does not
help him to the proof. Turpe is defined to be either what causes
immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt--to whom? If we say
to the spectator--the definition will not serve as a ground of
inference to the condition of the agent contemplated. If on the other
hand, we say--to the agent--the definition so understood becomes
inadmissible: as well for other reasons, as because there are a great
many Turpia which are not agents at all, and which the definition
therefore would not include. Either therefore the definition given by
Sokrates is a bad one--or it will not sustain his conclusion. And
thus, on this very important argument, where Sokrates admits that he
stands alone, and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly
cogent--an argument too where the great cause (so Adam Smith terms
it) of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be
combated--Sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike
far-fetched and irrelevant. What increases our regret is, that the real
arguments establishing the turpitude of Archelaus and his acts are obvious
enough, if you look for them in the right direction. You discover
nothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself: far from
presenting any indications of misery, which Sokrates professes to
discover, he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they
see it. But when you turn to the persons whom he has killed,
banished, or ruined--to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted--and
to the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful
iniquity spread through all societies where they become known--there
is no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a
reflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man. This argument
however is here altogether neglected by Plato. Here, as elsewhere, he
looks only at the self-regarding side of Ethics.
[Side-note: Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness
and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of
Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it.]
Sokrates proceeds next to prove--That the wrong-doer who remains
unpunished is more miserable than if he were punished. The wrong-doer
(he argues) when punished suffers what is just: but all just things
are honourable: therefore he suffers what is honourable. But all
honourable things are so called because they are either agreeable, or
profitable, or both together. Punishment is certainly not agreeable:
it must therefore be profitable or good. Accordingly the
wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good. He
is benefited, by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness, which is
a worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty. In proportion to
the magnitude of this evil, is the value of the relief which removes
it, and the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who
continues to live under it.[50]
[Footnote 50: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 477-478.]
Upon this argument, I make the same remark as upon that immediately
preceding. We are not expressly told, whether good, evil, happiness,
misery, &c., refer to the agent alone or to others also: but the
general tenor implies that the agent alone is meant. And in this
sense, Plato does not make out his case. He establishes an arbitrary
standard of his own, recognised only by a few followers, and
altogether differing from the ordinary standard, to test and compare
happiness and misery. The successful criminal, Archelaus himself, far
from feeling any such intense misery as Plato describes, is satisfied
and proud of his position, which most others also account an object
of envy. This is not disputed by Plato himself. And in the face of
this fact, it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove,
by an elaborate process of deductive reasoning, that Archelaus
_must_ be miserable. That step of Plato's reasoning, in which he
asserts, that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is
profitable or good--is only true if you take in (what Plato omits to
mention) the interests of society as well as those of the agent. His
punishment is certainly profitable to (conducive to the security and
well being of) society: it may possibly be also profitable to
himself, but very frequently it is not so. The conclusion brought out
by Plato, therefore, while contradicted by the fact, involves also a
fallacy in the reasoning process.
[Side-note: If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of
view in which punishment is considered would be reversed.]
Throughout the whole of this dialogue, Plato intimates decidedly how
great a paradox the doctrine maintained by Sokrates must appear: how
diametrically it was opposed to the opinion not merely of the less
informed multitude, but of the wiser and more reflecting citizen--even
such a man as Nikias. Indeed it is literally exact--what
Plato here puts into the mouth of Kallikles--that if the doctrine
here advocated by Sokrates were true, the whole of social life would
be turned upside down.[51] If, for example, it were true, as Plato
contends,--That every man who commits a crime, takes upon him thereby
a terrible and lasting distemper, incurable except by the application
of punishment, which is the specific remedy in the case--every theory
of punishment would, literally speaking, be turned upside down. The
great discouragement from crime would then consist in the fear of
that formidable distemper with which the criminal was sure to
inoculate himself: and punishment, instead of being (as it is now
considered, and as Plato himself represents it in the Protagoras) the
great discouragement to the commission of crime, would operate in the
contrary direction. It would be the means of removing or impairing
the great real discouragement to crime: and a wise legislator would
hesitate to inflict it. This would be nothing less than a reversal of
the most universally accepted political or social precepts (as
Kallikles is made to express himself).
[Footnote 51: Plato, Gorg. p. 481 C. _Kall._--[Greek: ei) me\n
ga\r spouda/zeis te kai\ tugcha/nei tau=ta a)lêthê= o)/nta a(\
le/geis, a)/llo ti ê)\ ê(mô=n o( bi/os a)natetramme/nos a)\n ei)/ê
tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, kai\ pa/nta ta\ e)nanti/a pra/ttomen, ê)\ a(\
dei=?]]
[Side-note: Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental
distemper and bodily distemper--Material difference between the
two--Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons.]
It will indeed be at once seen, that the taint or distemper with
which Archelaus is supposed to inoculate himself, when he commits
signal crime--is a pure fancy or poetical metaphor on the part of
Plato himself.[52] A distemper must imply something painful,
enfeebling, disabling, to the individual who feels it: there is no
other meaning: we cannot recognise a distemper, which does not make
itself felt in any way by the distempered person. Plato is misled by
his ever-repeated analogy between bodily health and mental health:
real, on some points--not real on others. When a man is in bad bodily
health, his sensations warn him of it at once. He suffers pain,
discomfort, or disabilities, which leave no doubt as to the
fact: though he may not know either the precise cause, or the
appropriate remedy. Conversely, in the absence of any such warnings,
and in the presence of certain positive sensations, he knows himself
to be in tolerable or good health. If Sokrates and Archelaus were
both in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily health, each would
be made aware of the fact by analogous evidences. But by what measure
are we to determine _when_ a man is in a good or bad mental
state? By his own feelings? In that case, Archelaus and Sokrates are
in a mental state equally good: each is satisfied with his own. By
the judgment of by-standers? Archelaus will then be the better of the
two: at least his admirers and enviers will outnumber those of
Sokrates. By my judgment? If my opinion is asked, I agree with
Sokrates: though not on the grounds which he here urges, but on other
grounds. Who is to be the ultimate referee--the interests or security
of other persons, who have suffered or are likely to suffer by
Archelaus, being by the supposition left out of view?
[Footnote 52: The disposition of Plato to build argument on a
metaphor is often shown. Aristotle remarks it of him in respect to
his theory of Ideas; and Aristotle in his Topica gives several
precepts in regard to the general tendency--precepts enjoining
disputants to be on their guard against it in dialectic discussion
(Topica, iv. 123, a. 33, vi. 139-140)--[Greek: pa=n ga\r a)saphe\s
to\ kata\ metaphora\n lego/menon], &c.]
Polus is now dismissed as vanquished, after having been forced,
against his will, to concede--That the doer of wrong is more
miserable than the sufferer: That he is more miserable, if
unpunished,--less so, if punished: That a triumphant criminal on a
great scale, like Archelaus, is the most miserable of men.
[Side-note: Kallikles begins to argue against Sokrates--he
takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of
Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly
understood.]
Here, then, we commence with Kallikles: who interposes, to take up
the debate with Sokrates. Polus (says Kallikles), from deference to
the opinions of mankind, has erroneously conceded the point--That it
is more disgraceful to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. This is indeed
true (continues Kallikles), according to what is just by law or
convention, that is, according to the general sentiment of mankind:
but it is not true, according to justice by nature, or natural
justice. Nature and Law are here opposed.[53] The justice of Nature
is, that among men (as among other animals) the strong individual
should govern and strip the weak, taking and keeping as much as he
can grasp. But this justice will not suit the weak, who are the
many, and who defeat it by establishing a different justice--justice
according to law--to curb the strong man, and prevent him from having
more than his fair share.[54] The many, feeling their own weakness,
and thankful if they can only secure a fair and equal division, make
laws and turn the current of praise and blame for their own
protection, in order to deter the strong man from that encroachment
and oppression to which he is disposed. _The just according to
law_ is thus a tutelary institution, established by the weak to
defend themselves against _the just according to nature_. Nature
measures right by might, and by nothing else: so that according to
the right of nature, suffering wrong is more disgraceful than doing
wrong. Hêraklês takes from Geryon his cattle, by the right of nature
or of the strongest, without either sale or gift.[55]
[Footnote 53: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482 E. [Greek: ô(s ta\ polla\ de\
tau=ta e)nanti/a a)llê/lois e)sti/n, ê(/ te phu/sis kai\ o(
no/mos.]]
[Footnote 54: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B. [Greek: a)ll', oi)=mai, oi(
tithe/menoi tou\s no/mous oi( a)sthenei=s a)/nthrôpoi/ ei)si kai\ oi(
polloi\. Pro\s au(tou\s ou)=n kai\ to\ au)toi=s sumphe/ron tou/s te
no/mous ti/thentai kai\ tou\s e)pai/nous e)painou=si kai\ tou\s
pso/gous pse/gousin, e)kphobou=nte/s te tou\s e)r)r(ômeneste/rous
tô=n a)nthrô/pôn kai\ dunatou\s o)/ntas ple/on e)/chein, i(/na mê\
au)tô=n ple/on e)/chôsin, le/gousin ô(s ai)schro\n kai\ a)/dikon to\
pleonektei=n, kai\ tou=to e)sti to\ a)dikei=n, to\ zêtei=n tô=n
a)/llôn ple/on e)/chein; a)gapô=si ga/r, oi)=mai, au)toi\ a)\n to\
i)/son e)/chôsi phaulo/teroi o)/ntes.]]
[Footnote 55: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-488.]
But (rejoins Sokrates) the many are by nature stronger than the one;
since, as you yourself say, they make and enforce laws to restrain
him and defeat his projects. Therefore, since the many are the
strongest, the right which they establish is the right of (or by)
nature. And the many, as you admit, declare themselves in favour of
the answer given by Polus--That to do wrong is more disgraceful than
to suffer wrong.[56] Right by nature, and right by institution,
sanction it alike.
[Footnote 56: Plato, Gorgias, p. 488 D-E.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample
of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês--rhetor and
politician.]
Several commentators have contended, that the doctrine which Plato
here puts into the mouth of Kalliklês was taught by the Sophists at
Athens: who are said to have inculcated on their hearers that true
wisdom and morality consisted in acting upon the right of the
strongest and taking whatever they could get, without any regard to
law or justice. I have already endeavoured to show, in my
History of Greece, that the Sophists cannot be shown to have taught
either this doctrine, or any other common doctrine: that one at least
among them (Prodikus) taught a doctrine inconsistent with it: and
that while all of them agreed in trying to impart rhetorical
accomplishments, or the power of handling political, ethical,
judicial, matters in a manner suitable for the Athenian public--each
had his own way of doing this. Kalliklês is not presented by Plato as
a Sophist, but as a Rhetor aspiring to active political influence;
and taking a small dose of philosophy, among the preparations for
that end.[57] He depreciates the Sophists as much as the
philosophers, and in fact rather more.[58] Moreover Plato represents
him as adapting himself, with accommodating subservience, to the
Athenian public assembly, and saying or unsaying exactly as they
manifested their opinion.[59] Now the Athenian public assembly would
repudiate indignantly all this pretended right of the strongest, if
any orator thought fit to put it forward as over-ruling established
right and law. Any aspiring or subservient orator, such as Kalliklês
is described, would know better than to address them in this strain.
The language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kalliklês is noway
consistent with the attribute which he also ascribes to him--slavish
deference to the judgments of the Athenian Dêmos.
[Footnote 57: Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C, 485.]
[Footnote 58: Plato, Gorgias, p. 520 A.]
[Footnote 59: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481-482.]
[Side-note: Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an
authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The
theory of Kalliklês is made to appear repulsive by the language in
which he expresses it.]
Kalliklês is made to speak like one who sympathises with the right of
the strongest, and who decorates such iniquity with the name and
authority of that which he calls Nature. But this only shows the
uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority.[60] It may be
pleaded in favour of different and opposite theories. Nature prompts
the strong man to take from weaker men what will gratify his desires:
Nature also prompts these weaker men to defeat him and protect
themselves by the best means in their power. The many are
weaker, taken individually--stronger taken collectively: hence they
resort to defensive combination, established rules, and collective
authority.[61] The right created on one side, and the opposite right
created on the other, flow alike from Nature: that is, from
propensities and principles natural, and deeply seated, in the human
mind. The authority of Nature, considered as an enunciation of actual
and wide-spread facts, may be pleaded for both alike. But a man's
sympathy and approbation may go either with the one or the other; and
he may choose to stamp that which he approves, with the name of
Nature as a personified law-maker. This is what is here done by
Kalliklês as Plato exhibits him.[62] He sympathises with, and
approves, the powerful individual. Now the greater portion of mankind
are, and always have been, governed upon this despotic principle, and
brought up to respect it: while many, even of those who dislike
Kalliklês because they regard him as the representative of
Athenian democracy (to which however his proclaimed sentiments stand
pointedly opposed), when they come across a great man or so-called
hero, such as Alexander or Napoleon, applaud the most exorbitant
ambition if successful, and if accompanied by military genius and
energy--regarding communities as made for little else except to serve
as his instruments, subjects, and worshippers. Such are represented
as the sympathies of Kalliklês: but those of the Athenians went with
the second of the two rights--and mine go with it also. And though
the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kalliklês, in
describing this second right, abounds in contemptuous rhetoric,
proclaiming offensively the individual weakness of the multitude[63]--yet
this very fact is at once the most solid and most respectable
foundation on which rights and obligations can be based. The
establishment of them is indispensable, and is felt as indispensable,
to procure security for the community: whereby the strong man whom
Kalliklês extols as the favourite of Nature, may be tamed by
discipline and censure, so as to accommodate his own behaviour to
this equitable arrangement.[64] Plato himself, in his Republic,[65]
traces the generation of a city to the fact that each man
individually taken is not self-sufficing, but stands in need of many
things: it is no less true, that each man stands also in fear of many
things, especially of depredations from animals, and depredations
from powerful individuals of his own species. In the mythe of
Protagoras,[66] we have fears from hostile animals--in the speech
here ascribed to Kalliklês, we have fears from hostile strong
men--assigned as the generating cause, both of political communion and
of established rights and obligations to protect it.
[Footnote 60: Aristotle (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173, a. 10) makes
allusion to this argument of Kalliklês in the Gorgias, and notices it
as a frequent point made by disputants in Dialectics--to insist on
the contradiction between the Just according to Nature and the Just
according to Law: which contradiction (Aristotle says) all the
ancients recognised as a real one ([Greek: oi( a)rchai=oi pa/ntes
ô)/|onto sumbai/nein]). It was doubtless a point on which the
Dialectician might find much to say on either side.]
[Footnote 61: In the conversation between Sokrates and Kritobulus,
one of the best in Xenophon's Memorabilia (ii. 6, 21), respecting the
conditions on which friendship depends, we find Sokrates clearly
stating that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity,
though different and opposite, nevertheless both exist _by
nature_. [Greek: A)ll' e)/chei me/n, e)/phê o( Sôkra/tês,
poiki/lôs pôs tau=ta: Phu/sei ga\r e)/chousin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\
me\n philika/--de/ontai/ te ga\r a)llê/lôn, kai\ e)leou=si, kai\
sunergou=ntes ô)phelou=ntai, kai\ tou=to sunie/ntes cha/rin
e)/chousin a)llê/lois--ta\ de\ polemika/--ta/ te ga\r au)ta\ kala\
kai\ ê(de/a nomi/zontes u(pe\r tou/tôn ma/chontai kai\
dichognômonou=ntes e)nantiou=ntai; polemiko\n de\ kai\ e)/ris kai\
o)rgê/, kai\ dusmene\s me\n o( tou= pleonektei=n e)/rôs, misêto\n de\
o( phtho/nos. A)ll' o(/môs dia\ tou/tôn pa/ntôn ê( phili/a
diaduome/nê suna/ptei tou\s kalou/s te ka)gathou/s], &c.
We read in the speech of Hermokrates the Syracusan, at the congress
of Gela in Sicily, when exhorting the Sicilians to unite for the
purpose of repelling the ambitious schemes of Athens, Thucyd. iv. 61:
[Greek: kai\ tou\s me\n A)thênai/ous tau=ta pleonektei=n te kai\
pronoei=sthai pollê\ xuggnô/mê, kai\ ou) toi=s a)/rchein boulome/nois
me/mphomai a)lla\ toi=s u(pakou/ein e(toimote/rois ou)=si; _
pe/phuke ga\r to\ a)nthrô/peion dia\ panto\s a)/rchein me\n tou=
ei)/kontos, phula/ssesthai de\ to\ e)pio/n_. o(/soi de\
gignô/skontes au)ta\ mê\ o)rthô=s proskopou=men, mêde\ tou=to/ tis
presbu/taton ê(/kei kri/nas, to\ koinô=s phobero\n a(/pantas eu)=
the/sthai, a(marta/nomen.] A like sentiment is pronounced by the
Athenian envoys in their debate with the Melians, Thuc. v. 105:
[Greek: ê(gou/metha ga\r to/ te thei=on do/xê|, to\ a)nthrô/peio/n te
saphô=s dia\ panto/s, u(po\ _phu/seôs a)nagkai/as_, ou)= a)\n
kratê=|, a)/rchein.] Some of the Platonic critics would have us
believe that this last-cited sentiment emanates from the corrupt
teaching of Athenian Sophists: but Hermokrates the Syracusan had
nothing to do with Athenian Sophists.]
[Footnote 62: Respecting the vague and indeterminate phrases--Natural
Justice, Natural Right, Law of Nature--see Mr. Austin's Province of
Jurisprudence Determined, p. 160, ed. 2nd. [Jurisp., 4th ed, pp. 179,
591-2], and Sir H. S. Maine's Ancient Law, chapters iii. and iv.
Among the assertions made about the Athenian Sophists, it is said by
some commentators that they denied altogether any Just or Unjust by
_nature_--that they recognised no Just or Unjust, except by
_law or convention_.
To say that the _Sophists_ (speaking of them collectively)
either affirmed or denied anything, is, in my judgment, incorrect.
Certain persons are alluded to by Plato (Theætêt. 172 B) as adopting
partially the doctrine of Protagoras (_Homo Mensura_) and as
denying altogether the Just by _nature_.
In another Platonic passage (Protagor. 337) which is also cited as
contributing to prove that the Sophists denied [Greek: to\ di/kaion
phu/sei]--nothing at all is said about [Greek: to\ di/kaion]. Hippias
the Sophist is there introduced as endeavouring to appease the angry
feeling between Protagoras and Sokrates by reminding them, "I am of
opinion that we all (_i.e._ men of literature and study) are
kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by _nature_ though not by
_law_: for law, the despot of mankind, carries many things by
force, contrary to nature". The remark is very appropriate from one
who is trying to restore good feeling between literary disputants:
and the cosmopolitan character of literature is now so familiar a
theme, that I am surprised to find Heindorf (in his note) making it
an occasion for throwing the usual censure upon the Sophist, because
some of them distinguished Nature from the Laws, and despised the
latter in comparison with the former.
Kalliklês here, in the Gorgias, maintains an opinion not only
different from, but inconsistent with, the opinion alluded to above
in the Theætêtus, 172 B. The persons noticed in the Theætêtus
said--There is no Natural Justice: no Justice, except Justice by Law.
Kalliklês says--There is a Natural Justice quite distinct from (and
which he esteems more than) Justice by Law: he then explains what he
believes Natural Justice to be--That the strong man should take what
he pleases from the weak.
Though these two opinions are really inconsistent with each other,
yet we see Plato in the Leges (x. 889 E, 890 A) alluding to them both
as the same creed, held and defended by the same men; whom he
denounces with extreme acrimony. Who they were, he does not name; he
does not mention [Greek: sophistai/], but calls them [Greek: a)ndrô=n
sophô=n, i)diôtô=n te kai\ poiêtô=n].
We see, in the third chapter of Sir H. S. Maine's excellent work on
Ancient Law, the meaning of these phrases--Natural Justice, Law of
Nature. It designated or included "a set of legal principles entitled
to supersede the existing laws, on the ground of intrinsic
superiority". It denoted an ideal condition of society, supposed to
be much better than what actually prevailed. This at least seems to
have been the meaning which began to attach to it in the time of
Plato and Aristotle. What this ideal perfection of human society was,
varied in the minds of different speakers. In each speaker's mind the
word and sentiment was much the same, though the objects to which it
attached were often different. Empedokles proclaims in solemn and
emphatic language that the Law of Nature peremptorily forbids us to
kill any animal. (Aristot. Rhetor. i. 13, 1373 b. 15.) Plato makes
out to his own satisfaction, that his Republic is thoroughly in
harmony with the Law of Nature: and he insists especially on this
harmony, in the very point which even the Platonic critics admit to
be wrong--that is, in regard to the training of women and the
relations of the sexes (Republic, v. 456 C, 466 D). We learn from
Plato himself that the propositions of the Republic were thoroughly
adverse to what other persons reverenced as the Law of Nature.
In the notes of Beck and Heindorf on Protagor. p. 337 we read,
"Hippias præ cæteris Sophistis contempsit leges, iisque opposuit
Naturam. Naturam legibus plures certé Sophistarum opposuisse, easque
præ illâ contempsisse, multis veterum locis constat." Now this
allegation is more applicable to Plato than to the Sophists. Plato
speaks with the most unmeasured contempt of existing communities and
their laws: the scheme of his Republic, radically departing from them
as it does, shows what he considered as required by the exigencies of
human nature. Both the Stoics and the Epikureans extolled what they
called the Law of Nature above any laws actually existing.
The other charge made against the Sophists (quite opposite, yet
sometimes advanced by the same critics) is, that they recognised no
Just by Nature, but only Just by Law: _i.e._ all the actual laws
and customs considered as binding in each different community. This
is what Plato ascribes to some persons (Sophists or not) in the
Theætêtus, p. 172. But in this sense it is not exact to call
Kalliklês (as Heindorf does, Protagor. p. 337) "germanus ille
Sophistarum alumnus in Gorgià Callicles," nor to affirm (with
Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theætêt. p. 183) that Plato meant to
refute Aristippus under the name of Kallikles, Aristippus maintaining
that there was no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law or
Convention.]
[Footnote 63: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B, p. 492 A. [Greek: oi(
polloi\, a)pokrupto/menoi tê\n e(autô=n a)dunami/an], &c.]
[Footnote 64: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 E.]
[Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B. [Greek: o(/ti tugcha/nei
ê(mô=n e(/kastos ou)k au)tarkê\s ô)/n, a)lla\ pollô=n e)ndeê/s.]]
[Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Sokrates maintains that self-command and
moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others.
Kalliklês defends the negative.]
Kalliklês now explains, that by _stronger_ men, he means better,
wiser, braver men. It is they (he says) who ought, according to right
by nature, to rule over others and to have larger shares than others.
_Sokr._--Ought they not to rule themselves as well as
others:[67] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober
and temperate? _Kall._--No, they would be foolish if they did.
The weak multitude must do so; and there grows up accordingly among
_them_ a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all.
But it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this
necessity. The right of nature authorises them to have the largest
desires, since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the
desires. It would be silly if a king's son or a despot were to limit
himself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen
must be content; and worse than silly if he did not enrich his
friends in preference to his enemies. He need not care for that
public law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among
the many. A full swing of enjoyment, if a man has power to procure
and maintain it, is virtue as well as happiness.[68]
[Footnote 67: Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 D.]
[Footnote 68: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 A-C.]
[Side-note: Whether the largest measure of desires is good for
a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all
varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good
are identical?]
_Sokr._--I think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life,
regulated according to present means and circumstances, is better
than a life of immoderate indulgence.[69] _Kall._--The man who
has no desires will have no pleasure, and will live like a stone. The
more the desires, provided they can all be satisfied, the happier a
man will be. _Sokr._--You mean that a man shall be continually
hungry, and continually satisfying his hunger: continually thirsty,
and satisfying his thirst; and so forth. _Kall._--By having and
by satisfying those and all other desires, a man will enjoy
happiness. _Sokr._--Do you mean to include all varieties of
desire and satisfaction of desire: such for example as itching and
scratching yourself:[70] and other bodily appetites which might be
named? _Kall._--Such things are not fit for discussion.
_Sokr._--It is you who drive me to mention them, by laying down
the principle, that men who enjoy, be the enjoyment of what sort it
may, are happy; and by not distinguishing what pleasures are
good and what are evil. Tell me again, do you think that the
pleasurable and the good are identical? Or are there any pleasurable
things which are not good?[71] _Kall._--I think that the
pleasurable and the good are the same.
[Footnote 69: Plato, Gorgias, p. 493 C. [Greek: e)a/n pôs oi(=o/s t'
ô)= pei=sai metathe/sthai kai\ a)nti\ tou= a)plê/stôs kai\
a)kola/stôs e)/chontos bi/ou to\n kosmi/ôs kai\ toi=s a)ei\ parou=sin
i(kanô=s kai\ e)xarkou/ntôs e)/chonta bi/on e(le/sthai.]]
[Footnote 70: Plato, Gorg. p. 494 E.]
[Footnote 71: Plato, Gorg. pp. 494-495. [Greek: ê)= ga\r e)gô\ a)/gô
e)ntau=tha, ê)\ e)kei=nos o(\s a)\n phê=| a)ne/dên ou(/tô tou\s
chai/rontas, o(/pôs a)\n chairôsin, eu)dai/monas ei)=nai, kai\ mê\
diori/zêtai tô=n ê(donô=n o(poi=ai a)gathai\ kai\ kakai/? a)ll' e)/ti
kai\ nu=n le/ge, po/teron phê\| ei)=nai to\ au)to\ ê(du\ kai\
a)gatho/n, ê)\ ei)=nai ti tô=n ê(de/ôn o(\ ou)k e)/stin a)gatho/n?]]
[Side-note: Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are
identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad.
A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them.]
Upon this question the discussion now turns: whether pleasure and
good are the same, or whether there are not some pleasures good,
others bad. By a string of questions much protracted, but subtle
rather than conclusive, Sokrates proves that pleasure is not the same
as good--that there are such things as bad pleasures and good pains.
And Kalliklês admits that some pleasures are better, others
worse.[72] Profitable pleasures are good: hurtful pleasures are bad.
Thus the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, if they impart to
us health and strength--bad, if they produce sickness and weakness.
We ought to choose the good pleasures and pains, and avoid the bad
ones. It is not every man who is competent to distinguish what
pleasures are good, and what are bad. A scientific and skilful
adviser, judging upon general principles, is required to make this
distinction.[73]
[Footnote 72: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 496-499.]
[Footnote 73: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 499-500. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n
panto\s a)ndro/s e)stin e)kle/xasthai poi=a a)gatha\ tô=n ê(de/ôn
e)sti\ kai\ o(poi=a kaka/, ê)= technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston?
Technikou=.]]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and
Sokrates in the Protagoras.]
This debate between Sokrates and Kalliklês, respecting the "Quomodo
vivendum est,"[74] deserves attention on more than one account. In
the first place, the relation which Sokrates is here made to declare
between the two pairs of general terms, Pleasurable--Good:
Painful--Evil: is the direct reverse of that which he both declares
and demonstrates in the Protagoras. In that dialogue, the Sophist
Protagoras is represented as holding an opinion very like that which
is maintained by Sokrates in the Gorgias. But Sokrates (in the
Protagoras) refutes him by an elaborate argument; and demonstrates
that pleasure and good (also pain and evil) are names for the same
fundamental ideas under different circumstances: pleasurable and
painful referring only to the sensation of the present moment--while
good and evil include, besides, an estimate of its future
consequences and accompaniments, both pleasurable and painful, and
represent the result of such calculation. In the Gorgias, Sokrates
demonstrates the contrary, by an argument equally elaborate but not
equally convincing. He impugns a doctrine advocated by Kalliklês, and
in impugning it, proclaims a marked antithesis and even repugnance
between the pleasurable and the good, the painful and the evil:
rejecting the fundamental identity of the two, which he advocates in
the Protagoras, as if it were a disgraceful heresy.
[Footnote 74: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 D. [Greek: i(/na tô=| o)/nti
kata/dêlon ge/nêtai, pô=s biôte/on], &c. 500 C: [Greek: o(/ntina
chrê\ tro/pon zê=|n.]]
[Side-note: Views of critics about this contradiction.]