[Footnote 89: Plat. Prot. p. 345.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Prot. p. 347 D. [Greek: ka)\n ma/nu polu\n

oi)=non pi/ôsin]--a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated

by the persistent dialectic of Sokrates, even at the close of the

Platonic Symposion, after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of

wine.]

[Footnote 91: Plat. Prot. pp. 347-348. This remark--that the poet may

be interpreted in many different ways, and that you cannot produce

him in court to declare or defend his own meaning--is highly

significant, in regard to the value set by Sokrates on living

conversation and dialectic.]

[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he

really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion

for this purpose.]

In spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to resume, and

is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced

by requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of

Sokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the

discussion by saying--"Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any

other purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in

conjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of

us together can do more in this way than any one singly.[92]

[Footnote 92: Plat. Prot. p. 348 C. [Greek: mê\ oi)/ou diale/gesthai

me/ soi a)/llo ti boulo/menon ê)\ a)\ au)to\s a)porô=, e(ka/stote

tau=ta diaske/psasthai.]

The remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the

Sokratic frame of mind. The cross-examination which he bestows, is

not that of one who himself knows--and who only gets up artificial

difficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does. On

the contrary, it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled; and

that which puzzles him he states to others, and debates with others,

as affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and

obtaining a solution.

The grand purpose with Sokrates is to bring into clear daylight the

difficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or "reasoned

truth," and to sift them thoroughly, instead of slurring them over or

hiding them.]

"We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought,

word, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything

new by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to

whom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it.

Moreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose,

especially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous

yourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim

yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done

before. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and

communication on these very subjects?"[93]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Protag. pp. 348-349.]

[Side-note: The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says

that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue.]

After this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still

farther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the

argument as it stood when interrupted. _Sokr._--You,

Protagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness,

courage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the

others, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own.

Do you still adhere to that opinion? _Prot._--I now think that

the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that

courage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is,

that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly

unjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.[94] _Sokr._--Do you

consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and

honourable? _Prot._--I consider it in the highest degree fine

and honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.[95]

[Footnote 94: Plato, Protag. p, 349 D. [Greek: ta\ me\n te/ttara

au)tô=n e)pieikô=s paraplê/sia a)llê/lois e)sti/n, ê( de\ a)ndrei/a

pa/nu polu\ diaphe/ron pa/ntôn tou/tôn.]]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Protag. p. 349 E. [Greek: ka/lliston me\n ou)=n,

ei) mê\ mai/nomai/ ge. o(/lon pou kalo\n ô(s oi(=o/n te ma/lista.]

It is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this, put by

Plato into the mouth of Protagoras. They tend to show that Plato did

not seek (as many of his commentators do) to depict Protagoras as a

corruptor of the public mind.]

[Side-note: Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in

knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates

changes his attack.]

Sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men,

forward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not

affront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those

who know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as

horse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their

profession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such

preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at

all (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a

dishonourable thing, if _they_ were reckoned courageous.[96]

Then (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers

confidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do

so without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in

knowledge or intelligence?[97] Protagoras declines to admit this,

drawing a distinction somewhat confused:[98] upon which Sokrates

approaches the same argument from a different point.

[Footnote 96: Plato, Protag. p. 350 B. [Greek: Ai)schro\n me/nt'

a)\n, e)/phê, ei)/ê, ê( a)ndrei/a; e)pei\ ou(=toi/ ge maino/menoi/

ei)sin.]]

[Footnote 97: Plato, Protag. p. 350 C.]

[Footnote 98: Plato, Protag. pp. 350-351.]

[Side-note: Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the

painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies.

Debate.]

_Sokr._--You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you

think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress?

_Prot._--No. _Sokr._--But if he passes his life pleasurably

until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well?

_Prot._--I think so. _Sokr._--To live pleasurably therefore

is good: to live disagreeably is evil. _Prot._--Yes: at least

provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.[99]

_Sokr._--What! do you concur with the generality of people in

calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good?

_Prot._--That is my opinion. _Sokr._--But are not all

pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good,

unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And

again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things

evil, so far forth as they are painful? _Prot._--To that

question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply

affirmatively--that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful

things evil. I think it safer--with reference not merely to the

present answer, but to my manner of life generally--to say, that

there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are

not good--some painful things which are evil, others which are not

evil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.[100]

_Sokr._--You call those things pleasurable, which either partake

of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? _

Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--When I ask whether pleasurable things

are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable--I ask in other words,

whether pleasure itself be not good? _Prot._--As you observed

before, Sokrates,[101] let us examine the question on each side, to

see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same.

[Footnote 99: Plat. Prot. p. 351 C. [Greek: To\ me\n a)/ra ê(de/ôs

zê=n, a)gatho/n, to\ d' a)êdô=s, kako/n? Ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s g',

e)/phê, zô/|ê ê(do/menos.]]

[Footnote 100: Plato, Protag. p. 351 D. [Greek: a)lla/ moi dokei= ou)

mo/non pro\s tê\n nu=n a)po/krisin e)moi\ a)sphale/steron ei)=nai

a)pokri/nasthtai, _a)lla\ kai\ pro\s pa/nta to\n a)/llon bi/on to\n

e)mo/n_, o(/ti e)/sti me\n a)\ tô=n ê(de/ôn ou)k e)/stin a)gatha/,

e)/sti d' au)= kai\ a(\ tô=n a)niarô=n ou)k e)sti kaka/, e)/sti d'

a(\ e)/sti, kai\ tri/ton a(\ ou)de/tera, ou)/te kaka\ ou)/t'

a)gatha/.]

These words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent note,

about the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so

different from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic

commentators.]

[Footnote 101: Plato, Protag. p. 351 E. [Greek: ô(/sper su\ le/geis,

e(ka/stote, ô)= Sô/krates, skopô/metha au)to/.]

This is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long

before,--[Greek: a(\ au)to\s a)porô= e(ka/stote tau=ta

diaske/psasthai], p. 348 C.]

[Side-note: Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency

in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure

or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.]

_Sokr._--Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of

the question.[102] What is your opinion about knowledge? Do

you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about

pleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither

strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge

is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something

else--passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear--all or any of which

overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a

slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?[103] Or do

you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to

govern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things

are, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to

do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge--his own

intelligence being a sufficient defence to him?[104]

_Prot._--The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others,

it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence

was the governing element of human affairs.

[Footnote 102: Plato, Protag. p. 352 A.]

[Footnote 103: Plato, Protag. p. 352 B-C. [Greek: po/teron kai\

tou=to/ soi dokei= ô(/sper toi=s polloi=s a)nthrô/pois ê)\ a)/llôs?

. . . dianoou/menoi peri\ tê=s e)pistê/mês ô(/sper peri\ a)ndrapo/don,

perielkome/nês u(po\ tô=n a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn.] Aristotle in the

Nikomachean Ethics cites and criticises the opinion of Sokrates,

wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge,

when really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites

it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this

passage of the Protagoras. [Greek: E)pista/menon me\n ou)=n ou)/

phasi/ tines oi(=o/n te ei)=nai [a)krateu/esthai]. deino\n ga/r,

e)pistê/mês e)nou/sês, ô(s ô)/|eto Sôkra/tês, a)/llo ti kratei=n,

kai\ perie/lkein au)tê\n ô(/sper a)ndra/podon. Sôkra/tês me\n ga\r

o(/lôs e)ma/cheto pro\s to\n lo/gon, ô(s ou)k ou)/sês a)krasi/as;

ou)the/na ga\r u(polamba/nonta, pra/ttein para\ to\ be/ltiston,

a)lla\ di' a)/gnoian] (Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24). The

same metaphor [Greek: perie/lketai e)pistê/mê] is again ascribed to

Sokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p.

1147, b. 15.

We see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon _the doctrine

of Sokrates_, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic

Sokrates in the Protagoras; the citation of this particular metaphor

establishes the identity.

In another passage of the Nikom. Eth., Aristotle also cites a fact

respecting the Sophist Protagoras, which fact is mentioned in the

Platonic dialogue Protagoras--respecting the manner in which that

Sophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching

(Ethic. Nik. ix. 1, 1164, a. 25).]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Protag. p. 352 C. [Greek: a)ll' i(kanê\n

ei)=nai tê\n phro/nêsin boêthei=n tô=| a)nthrô/pô|.]]

[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to

knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a

preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures.]

_Sokr._--You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most

men are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what

is best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by

pain. _Prot._--Most men think so: incorrectly, in my judgment,

as they say many other things besides.[105] _Sokr._--When they

say that a man, being overcome by food or drink or other temptations,

will do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what

ground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart

pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and

other such things, for the future?[106] Most men would reply, I

think, that they called these things evil not on account of the

present pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their

ulterior consequences--poverty and disease being both of them

distressing? _Prot._--Most men would say this. _Sokr._--It

would be admitted then that these things were evil for no other

reason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of

pleasure.[107] _Prot._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Again, when it

is said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as

gymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no

one will say that these things are good because of the immediate

suffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of

health, wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus,

these also are good for no other reason, than because they end in

pleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.[108] Or can you

indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these

matters evil? _Prot._--No other end can be indicated.

[Footnote 105: Plato, Protag. pp. 352-353.]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Protag. p. 353 D. [Greek: ponêra\ de\ au)ta\

pê=| phate ei)=nai? po/teron o(/ti tê\n ê(donê\n tau/tên e)n tô=|

parachrê=ma pare/chei kai\ ê(du/ e)stin e(/kaston au)tô=n, ê)\ o(/ti

ei)s to\n u(/steron chro/non no/sous te poiei= kai\ peni/as kai\

a)/lla toiau=ta polla\ paraskeua/zei?]]

[Footnote 107: Plato, Protag. p. 353 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n phai/netai.

. . . di' ou)de\n a)/llo tau=ta kaka\ o)/nta, ê)\ dio/ti ei)s a)ni/as

te a)poteleuta=| kai\ a)/llôn ê(donô=n a)posterei=?]]

[Footnote 108: Plato, Protag. p. 354 B-C. [Greek: Tau=ta de\ a)gatha/

e)sti di' a)/llo ti ê)\ o(/ti ei)s ê(dona\s a)poteleuta=| kai\ lupô=n

a)pallaga\s kai\ a)potropa/s? ê)\ e)/chete/ ti a)/llo te/los le/gein,

ei)s o(\ a)poble/psantes au)ta\ a)gatha\ kalei=te, a)ll' ê)\ ê(dona/s

te kai\ lu/pas? ou)k a)\n phai=en, ô(s e)gô)=|mai. . . . Ou)kou=n tê\n

me\n ê(donê\n diô/kete ô(s a)gatho\n o)/n, tê\n de\ lu/pên pheu/gete

ô(s kako/n?]]

[Side-note: Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No

man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between

pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and

pain.]

_Sokr._--It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and

avoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good: pain is what you

think evil: for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it

either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon

you pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any other

ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be

evil? If there be any other between reason, or any other end, tell us

what it is.[109] _Prot._--There is none whatever. _Sokr._--The

case is similar about pains: you call pain good, when it

preserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future

balance of pleasure. If there be any other end to which you look when

you call pain good, tell us what it is. _Prot._--You speak

truly. _Sokr._--If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic

now before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain

what is meant by being overcome by pleasure; and that the whole proof

hinges upon this point--whether there is any other good than

pleasure, or any other evil than pain; and whether it be not

sufficient, that we should go through life pleasurably and without

pains.[110] If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can

be pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the

consequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and

painful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily,

knowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure:

that is, under the overpowering influence of good.[111] How can

it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It

never can be wrong, except in this case--when the good obtained is of

smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent

evil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between

pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity--greater or

less, more or fewer?[112] If an objector tells me that there is a

material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and

pleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply,

Is there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An

intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures

and the pains, the present and the future, so as to determine the

balance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the

more and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the

less. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the

former, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from

the act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it.

_Prot._--The objectors could have nothing to say against

this.[113]

[Footnote 109: Plato, Protag, p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei\ ei) kat'

a)/llo ti au)to\ to\ chai/rein kako\n kalei=te kai\ ei)s a)/llo ti

te/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\n kai\ ê(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll'

ou)ch e(/xete. Ou)d' e)moi\ dokou=sin, e)/phê o( Prôtago/ras.]]

[Footnote 110: Plato, Protag. p. 354 E. [Greek: e)/peita e)n tou/tô|

ei)si\ pa=sai ai( a)podei/xeis; a)ll' e)/ti kai\ nu=n a)nathe/sthai

e)/xestin, ei) pê| e)/chete a)/llo ti pha/nai ei)=nai to\ a)gatho\n

ê)\ tê\n ê(donê/n, ê)\ to\ kako\n a)/llo ti ê)\ tê\n a)ni/an, ê)\

a)rkei= u(mi=n to\ ê(de/ôs katabiô=nai to\n bi/on a)/neu lupô=n?]]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Protag. p. 355 C.]

[Footnote 112: Plato, Protag. p. 356 A. [Greek: kai\ ti/s a)/llê

a)xi/a ê(donê=| pro\s lu/pôn e)sti\n a)ll' ê)\ u(perbolê\ a)llê/lôn

kai\ e)/lleipsis? tau=ta d' e)sti\ mei/zô te kai\ smikro/tera

gigno/mena a)llê/lôn, kai\ plei/ô kai\ e)la/ttô, kai\ ma=llon kai\

ê(=tton.]]

[Footnote 113: Plato, Protag. p. 356 C.]

[Side-note: Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing

pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it.]

_Sokr._--Well then--I shall tell them farther--you know that the

same magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near

than when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our

choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really

less, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of

mensuration, or in the apparent impression?[114] Would not the latter

lead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice

between great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would

not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by

revealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and

security to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves

acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of

mensuration? _Prot._--They would acknowledge it. _Sokr._--Again,

If the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd

and even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less,

whether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in

a certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic?

_Prot._--They would concede to you that also. _Sokr._--Well then, my

friends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on

the right choice of pleasure and pain--between the more and fewer,

greater and less, nearer and farther--does it not come to a simple

estimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other

words, to mensuration, art, or science?[115] What kind of art or

science it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our

argument, enough has been done when we have shown that it _is_

science.

[Footnote 114: Plato, Protag. p. 356 D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n e)n tou/tô|

ê(mi=n ê)=n to\ eu)= pra/ttein, e)n tô=| ta\ me\n mega/la mê/kê kai\

pra/ttein kai\ lamba/nein, ta\ de\ smikra\ kai\ pheu/gein kai\ mê\

pra/ttein, ti/s a)\n ê(mi=n sôtêri/a e)pha/nê tou= bi/ou? a)=ra ê(

metrêtikê\ te/chnê, ê)\ ê( tou= phainome/nou du/namis? . . . A)=r' a)\n

o(mologoi=en oi( a)/nthrôpoi pro\s tau=ta ê(ma=s tê\n metrêtikê\n

sô/zein a)\n te/chnên, ê)\ a)/llên?]]

[Footnote 115: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A-v. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\

ê(donê=s te kai\ lu/pês e)n o)rthê=| tê=| ai(re/sei e)pha/nê

_ê(mi=n ê( sôtêri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos_ kai\

e(la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikrote/ron kai\ por)r(ôte/rô kai\

e)ggute/rô, a)=ra prô=ton me\n ou) metrêtikê\ phai/netai, u(perbolê=s

te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/têtos pro\s a)llê/las ske/psis?

A)ll' a)na/gkê. E)pei\ de\ metrêtikê/, a)na/gkê| dê/pou te/chnê kai\

e)pistê/mê.]]

[Side-note: To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad

phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance.]

For when _we_ (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing

was more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in

whatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing

else--_you_ (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the

contrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the

instructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our

principles, what that mental affection was, which people called,

being overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you

that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the

gravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the

choice of pleasures and pains--that is, in the choice of good and

evil things--go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or

science of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge,

is done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure

is thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras,

Prodikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we

now address) not believing it to be ignorance, or perhaps

unwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore

go on doing ill, both privately and publicly.[116]

[Footnote 116: Plato, Protag. p. 357 E.]

[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions

which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable.]

Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I

turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false?

(All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.)

_Sokr._--You all agree, then, all three, that the pleasurable is good,

and that the painful is evil:[117] for I take no account at present of

the verbal distinctions of Prodikus, discriminating between the

_pleasurable_, the _delightful_, and the _enjoyable_.

If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of

pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the

honourable deed, good and profitable?[118] (In this, all persons

present concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does

anything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power

to be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than

ignorance: to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom.

Ignorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived

respecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly,

no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he

believes to be evil; nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon

what he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is

compelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the

greater when he might take the less.[119] (Agreed to by all three.)

Farther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other

things are open to him, of which he is not afraid: for fear is an

expectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to

be an evil,--and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)[120]

[Footnote 117: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuô=s e)do/kei

a(/pasin a)lêthê= ei)=nai ta\ ei)rême/na. O(mologei=te a)/ra, ê)=n d'

e)gô/, to\ me\n ê(du\ a)gatho\n ei)=nai, to\ de\ a)niaro\n kako/n.]]

[Footnote 118: Plato, Protag. p. 358 B. [Greek: ai( e)pi\ tou/tou

pra/xeis a(/pasai e)pi\ tou= a)lu/pôs zê=n kai\ ê)de/ôs, a)=r' ou)

kalai/? kai\ to\ kalo\n e)/rgon, a)gatho/n te kai\ ô)phe/limon?]]

[Footnote 119: Plato, Protag. p. 358 C-D. [Greek: e)pi/ ge ta\ kaka\

ou)dei\s e(kô\n e)/rchetai, ou)de\ e)pi\ a(\ oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai,

ou)d' e)sti\ tou=to, ô(s e)/oiken, e)n a)nthrô/pou phu/sei, e)pi\ a(\

oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai e)the/lein i)e/nai a)nti\ tô=n a)gathô=n;

o(/tan te a)nagka/sthê| duoi=n kakoi=n to\ e(/teron ai)rei=sthai,

ou)dei\s to\ mei=zon ai(rê/setai, e)xo\n to\ e)/latton.]]

[Footnote 120: Plato, Protag. p. 358 E.]

[Side-note: Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise

estimate of things terrible and not terrible.]

_Sokr._--Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given

by Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were

tolerably similar; but that courage differed greatly from all of

them. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage;

yet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and

stupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt

things which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are

these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt?

Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible?

_Prot._--That is impossible, as you have shown just now.

_Sokr._--No one will enter upon that which he believes to be

terrible,--or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be

evil: a man who does so is inferior to himself--and this, as we have

agreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both

timid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in

this respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the

same.[121] _Prot._--How can this be? The things which the timid

and the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the

latter are willing to go to war, which the former are not.

_Sokr._--Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable?

_Prot._--Honourable. _Sokr._--If it be honourable, it must

also be good:[122] for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that

all honourable things were good. _Prot._--You speak truly.[123]

I at least always persist in thinking so. _Sokr._--Which of the

two is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an

honourable and good thing? _Prot._--The cowards. _Sokr._--But

if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also

pleasurable? _Prot._--Certainly that has been admitted.[124]

_Sokr._--Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into

war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable?

_Prot._--We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding

admissions. _Sokr._--What about the courageous man? does not he

affront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more

pleasurable? _Prot._--It cannot be denied. _Sokr._--Courageous

men then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are

afraid, are honourable and good--not dishonourable or bad: and whose

confidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and

good?[125] On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both

fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions?

_Prot._--Agreed. _Sokr._--When they thus view with confidence things

dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from

ignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a

stupid estimate of things terrible? And is it not in this ignorance,

or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible--that

cowardice consists? Lastly,[126]--courage being the opposite of

cowardice--is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things

terrible and things not terrible, that courage consists?

[Footnote 121: Plato, Protag. p. 359 D. [Greek: e)pi\ me\n a(\ deina\

ê(gei=tai ei)=nai ou)dei\s e)/rchetai, e)peidê\ to\ ê(/ttô ei)=nai

e(autou= eu(re/thê a)mathi/a ou)=sa. Ô(molo/gei. A)lla\ mê\n e)pi\

a(/ ge thar)r(ou=si pa/ntes au)= e)/rchontai, kai\ deiloi\ kai\

a)ndrei=oi, kai\ tau/tê| ge e)pi\ ta\ au)ta\ e)/rchontai oi( deiloi/

te kai\ oi( a)ndrei=oi.]]

[Footnote 122: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: po/teron kalo\n o(\n

i)e/nai (ei)s to\n po/lemon) ê)\ ai)schro/n? Kalo/n, e)/phê.

Ou)kou=n, ei)/per kalo/n, kai\ a)gatho\n ô(mologê/samen e)n toi=s

e)/mprosthen; ta\s ga\r kala\s pra/xeis a(pa/sas a)gatha\s

ô(mologê/samen?]]

[Footnote 123: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: A)lêthê= le/geis,

kai\ a)ei\ e)/moige dokei= ou(/tôs.]

This answer, put into the mouth of Protagoras, affords another proof

that Plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many

commentators impute.]

[Footnote 124: Plato, Protag. p. 360 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n, ê)\n d'

e)gô/, ei)/per kalo\n kai\ a)gatho/n, kai\ ê(du/? Ô(molo/gêtai gou=n,

e)/phê.]]

[Footnote 125: Plato, Protag. p. 360 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/lôs oi(

a)ndrei=oi ou)k ai)schrou\s pho/bous phobou=ntai, o(/tav phobô=ntai,

ou)de\ ai)schra\ tha/r)r(ê tha/r)r(ou=sin? . . . Ei) de\ mê\ ai)schra/,

a)=r' ou) kala/? . . . Ei) de\ kala/, kai\ a)gatha/?]]

[Footnote 126: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ê( tô=n

deinôn kai\ mê\ deinô=n a)mathi/a deili/a a)\n ei)/ê? . . . Ê( sophi/a

a)/ra tô=n deinô=n kai\ mê\ deinô=n, a)ndrei/a e)sti/n, e)nanti/a

ou)=sa tê=| tou/tôn a)mathi/a|?]]

[Side-note: Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering.

Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still

in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras.

Amicable reply of Protagoras.]

Protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with

increasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines

altogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.[127]

_Sokr._--Why will you not answer my question, either

affirmatively or negatively? _Prot._--Finish the exposition by

yourself. _Sokr._--I will only ask you one more question. Do you

still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely

stupid, but extremely courageous? _Prot._--You seem to be

obstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with

your wish: I say that according to our previous admissions, it

appears to me impossible. _Sokr._--I have no other motive for

questioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth

stands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself.[128] To

determine this, is the way to elucidate the question which you

and I first debated at length:--I, affirming that virtue was not

teachable--you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation

renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be

teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which

is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed

that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in every

thing rather than knowledge: on which supposition it would be hardly

teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly

confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear

them up;[129] and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through

the whole investigation--First, what Virtue is,--Next, whether it is

teachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of

my own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted

to have you as a coadjutor.[130] _Prot._--I commend your

earnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I

think myself not a bad man in other respects: and as to jealousy, I

have as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that

I admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance--decidedly

more than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you

became one day illustrious for wisdom.

[Footnote 127: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: ou)ke/ti e)ntau=tha

ou)/t' e)pineu=sai ê)the/lêsen, e)si/ga te.]]

[Footnote 128: Plato, Protag. p. 360-361. [Greek: Ou)/toi a)/llou

e(/neka e)rôtô= pa/nta tau=ta, ê)\ ske/psasthai boulo/menos pô=s pot'

e)/chei ta\ peri\ tê=s a)retê=s, kai\ _ti/ pot' e)sti\n au)to\ ê(

a)retê/_. Oi)=da ga\r o(/ti tou/tou phanerou= genome/nou ma/list'

a)\n kata/dêlon ge/noito e)kei=no, peri\ ou)= e)gô/ te kai\ su\

makro\n lo/gon e(ka/teros a)petei/namen, e)gô\ me\n le/gôn, ô(s ou)

didakto\n a)retê/, su\ d', ô(s didakto/n.]]

[Footnote 129: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C. [Greek: e)gô\ ou)=n pa/nta

tau=ta kathorô=n a)/nô ka/tô taratto/mena deinô=s, pa=san prothumi/an

e)/chô kataphanê= au)ta\ gene/sthai, kai\ bouloi/mên a)\n _tau=ta

diexeltho/ntas ê(ma=s e)xelthei=n kai\ e)pi\ tê\n a)retê\n o(/ ti

e)/stin_.]]

[Footnote 130: Plato, Protag. p. 361 D. [Greek: promêthou/menos

u(pe\r tou= bi/ou tou= e)mautou= panto/s.]]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the

least allusion to Hippokrates.]

Such is the end of this long and interesting dialogue.[131] We remark

with some surprise that it closes without any mention of Hippokrates,

and without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request

for admission to the society of Protagoras: though such request had

been presented at the beginning, with much emphasis, as the sole

motive for the intervention of Sokrates. Upon this point[132]

the dialogue is open to the same criticism as that which Plato (in

the Phædrus) bestows on the discourse of Lysias: requiring that every

discourse shall be like a living organism, neither headless nor

footless, but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each

other.

[Footnote 131: Most critics treat the Protagoras as a composition of

Plato's younger years--what they call his _first period_--before

the death of Sokrates. They fix different years, from 407

B.C. (Ast) down to 402 B.C. I do not agree with

this view. I can admit no dialogue earlier than 399 B.C.:

and I consider the Protagoras to belong to Plato's full maturity.]

[Footnote 132: Plato, Phædrus, p. 264 C. [Greek: dei=n pa/nta lo/gon

ô(/sper zô=on sunesta/nai, sô=ma/ ti e)/chonta au)to\n au(tou=, ô/ste

mê/te a)ke/phalon ei)=nai mê/te a)/poun], &c.]

[Side-note: Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics

exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of

Sokrates.]

In our review of this dialogue, we have found first, towards the

beginning, an expository discourse from Protagoras, describing the

maintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community:

next, towards the close, an expository string of interrogatories by

Sokrates, destined to establish the identity of Good with

Pleasurable, Evil with Painful; and the indispensable supremacy of

the calculating or measuring science, as the tutelary guide of human

life. Of the first, I speak (like other critics) as the discourse of

Protagoras: of the second, as the theory of Sokrates. But I must

again remind the reader, that both the one and the other are

compositions of Plato; both alike are offspring of his ingenious and

productive imagination. Protagoras is not the author of that which

appears here under his name: and when we read the disparaging

epithets which many critics affix to his discourse, we must recollect

that these epithets, if they were well-founded, would have no real

application to the historical Protagoras, but only to Plato himself.

He has set forth two aspects, distinct and in part opposing, of

ethics and politics: and he has provided a worthy champion for each.

Philosophy, or "reasoned truth," if it be attainable at all, cannot

most certainly be attained without such many-sided handling: still

less can that which Plato calls knowledge be attained--or such

command of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a Sokratic

cross-examination in it.

[Side-note: Order of ethical problems, as conceived by

Sokrates.]

In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[133] we find him

proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What

virtue really is? upon which there prevails serious confusion of

opinions. It was a second question--important, yet still second and

presupposing the solution of the first--Whether virtue is teachable?

We noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two

questions delivered by Sokrates in the Menon.[134]

[Footnote 133: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C.]

[Footnote 134: See the last preceding chapter of this volume, p.

242.**

Upon this order, necessarily required, of the two questions,

Schleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general Einleitung to

the works of Plato, p. 26. Eberhard (he says) affirms that the end

proposed by Plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble

Athenian youth, so as to make them virtuous citizens. Schleiermacher

controverts the position of Eberhard; maintaining "that this is far

too subordinate a standing-point for philosophy,--besides that it is

reasoning in a circle, since philosophy has first to determine what

the virtue of a citizen is".]

[Side-note: Difference of method between him and Protagoras

flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue

is, without enquiry.]

Now the conception of ethical questions in this order--the reluctance

to deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and

settled--is one fundamental characteristic of Sokrates. The

difference of method, between him and Protagoras, flows from this

prior difference between them in fundamental conception. What virtue

is, Protagoras neither defines nor analyses, nor submits to debate.

He manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis: he

accepts the ground already prepared for him by King Nomos: he thus

proceeds as if the first step had been made sure, and takes his

departure from hypotheses of which he renders no account--as the

Platonic Sokrates complains of the geometers for doing.[135] To

Protagoras, social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum,

about which no one can mistake: which must be possessed, in greater

or less measure, by every man, as a condition of the existence of

society: which every individual has an interest in promoting in all

his neighbours: and which every one therefore teaches and enforces

upon every one else. It is a matter of common sense or common

sentiment, and thus stands in contrast with the special professional

accomplishments; which are confined only to a few--and the

possessors, teachers, and learners of which are each an assignable

section of the society. The parts or branches of virtue are, in like

manner, assumed by him as known, in their relations to each other and

to the whole. This persuasion of knowledge, without preliminary

investigation, he adopts from the general public, with whom he is in

communion of sentiment. What they accept and enforce as virtue, he

accepts and enforces also.

[Footnote 135: See suprà, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 358 and ch. xvii.** p.

136, respecting these remarks of Plato on the geometers.]

[Side-note: Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures

addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in

harmony.]

Again, the method pursued by Protagoras, is one suitable to a teacher

who has jumped over this first step; who assumes virtue, as something

fixed in the public sentiments--and addresses himself to those

sentiments, ready-made as he finds them. He expands and illustrates

them in continuous lectures of some length, which fill both the ears

and minds of the listener--"Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna": he

describes their growth, propagation, and working in the community: he

gives interesting comments on the poets, eulogising the admired

heroes who form the theme of their verses, and enlarging on their

admonitions. Moreover, while resting altogether upon the authority of

King Nomos, he points out the best jewel in the crown of that

potentate; the great social fact of punishment prospective,

rationally apportioned, and employed altogether for preventing and

deterring--instead of being a mere retrospective impulse, vindictive

or retributive for the past. He describes instructively the machinery

operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think

right: he teaches, in his eloquent expositions and interpretations,

the same morality, public and private, that every one else teaches:

while he can perform the work of teaching, somewhat more effectively

than they. Lastly, his method is essentially showy and popular;

intended for numerous assemblies, reproducing the established creeds

and sentiments of those assemblies, to their satisfaction and

admiration. He is prepared to be met and answered in his own way, by

opposing speakers; and he conceives himself more than a match for

such rivals. He professes also to possess the art of short

conversation or discussion. But in the exercise of this art, he runs

almost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of

continuous speech: besides that the points which he raises for

discussion assume all the fundamental principles, and turn only upon

such applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons

to be open questions, not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy.

[Side-note: Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the

problem which Protagoras had left out.]

Upon all these points, Sokrates is the formal antithesis of

Protagoras. He disclaims altogether the capacities to which that

Sophist lays claim. Not only he cannot teach virtue, but he professes

not to know what it is, nor whether it be teachable at all, He

starts from a different point of view: not considering virtue as a

known datum, or as an universal postulate, but assimilating it to a

special craft or accomplishment, in which a few practitioners suffice

for the entire public: requiring that in this capacity it shall be

defined, and its practitioners and teachers pointed out. He has no

common ground with Protagoras; for the difficulties which he moots

are just such as the common consciousness (and Protagoras along with

it) overleaps or supposes to be settled. His first requirement,

advanced under the modest guise of a small doubt[136] which

Protagoras must certainly be competent to remove, is, to know--What

virtue is? What are the separate parts of virtue--justice,

moderation, holiness, &c.? What is the relation which they bear

to each other and to the whole--virtue? Are they homogeneous,

differing only in quantity or has each of them its own specific

essence and peculiarity?[137] Respecting virtue as a whole, we must

recollect, Protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently, as

of a matter perfectly known. He is now called back as it were to meet

an attack in the rear: to answer questions which he had never

considered, and which had never even presented themselves to him as

questions. At first he replies as if the questions offered no

difficulty;[138] sometimes he does not feel their importance, so that

it seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the

affirmative or negative.[139] But he finds himself brought round, by

a series of questions, to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless

thinks untrue, and which are certainly unwelcome. Accordingly, he

becomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical

interrogation: and at length answers with such impatience and

prolixity, that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted. Here

comes in the break--the remonstrance of Sokrates--and the mediation

of the by-standers.

[Footnote 136: Plato, Protag. p. 328 E. [Greek: plê\n smikro/n ti/

moi e)mpodô/n, o(/ dê=lon o(/ti Prôtago/ras r(a|di/ôs e)pekdida/xei],

&c.]

[Footnote 137: Respecting Ariston of Chios, Diogenes Laertius tells

us--[Greek: A)reta\s d' ou)/te polla\s ei)sê=gen, ô(s o( Zê/nôn,

ou)/te mi/an polloi=s o)no/masin kaloume/nên--a)lla\ kai\ to\ pro\s

ti/ pôs e)/chein] (Diog. Laert. vii. 161).]

[Footnote 138: Plato, Protag. p. 329 D. [Greek: A)lla\ r(a/|dion

tou=to/ g', e)/phê, a)pokri/nasthai], &c.]

[Footnote 139: Plato, Protag. p. 321 D. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei,

e)/stô ê(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/nê o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tês di/kaion. Mê/

moi, ê)=n d' e)gô/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "_ei) bou/lei_"

tou=to kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te

kai\ se/.]]

[Side-note: Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and

the analytical cross-examiner.]

It is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer, and the

analytical enquirer and cross-examiner, which the dialogue seems

mainly intended to set forth. Protagoras professes to know that which

he neither knows, nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom. Upon

this false persuasion of knowledge, the Sokratic Elenchus is brought

to bear. We are made to see how strange, repugnant, and perplexing,

is the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor: how

incompetent he is to go through it without confusion: how little he

can define his own terms, or determine the limits of those notions on

which he is perpetually descanting.

[Side-note: Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong,

though he is described as brought to a contradiction.]

It is not that Protagoras is proved to be wrong (I speak now of this

early part of the conversation, between chapters 51-62--pp. 329-335)

in the substantive ground which he takes. I do not at all believe (as

many critics either affirm or imply) that Plato intended all which he

in the composed under the name of Protagoras to be vile perversion of

truth, with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions. I do

not even believe that Plato intended all those observations, to which

the name of Protagoras is prefixed, to be accounted silly--while all

that is assigned to Sokrates,[140] is admirable sense and acuteness.

It is by no means certain that Plato intended to be understood as

himself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to

Sokrates: and it is quite certain that he does not always make the

Sokrates of one dialogue consistent with the Sokrates of another. For

the purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy

the exigencies of analysis, we need not necessarily suppose that the

conclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one. If

the respondent be brought, through his own admissions, to a

contradiction, this is enough to prove that he did not know the

subject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions.

[Footnote 140: Schöne, in his Commentary on the Protagoras, is of

opinion that a good part of Plato's own doctrine is given under the

name of Protagoras (Ueber den Protag. von Platon, p. 180 seq.).]

[Side-note: Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is

affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere.]

But whatever may have been the intention of Plato, if we look at the

fact, we shall find that what he has assigned to Sokrates is not

always true, nor what he has given to Protagoras, always false.

The positions laid down by the latter--That many men are courageous,

but unjust: that various persons are just, without being wise and

intelligent: that he who possesses one virtue, does not of necessity

possess all:[141]--are not only in conformity with the common

opinion, but are quite true, though Sokrates is made to dispute them.

Moreover, the arguments employed by Sokrates (including in those

arguments the strange propositions that justice is just, and that

holiness is holy) are certainly noway conclusive.[142] Though

Protagoras, becoming entangled in difficulties, and incapable of

maintaining his consistency against an embarrassing

cross-examination, is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he

professes to know--the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue

in itself, nor even shown to be apparently untrue.

[Footnote 141: Plato, Protag. p. 329 E. Protagoras is here made to

affirm that many men are courageous who are neither just, nor

temperate, nor virtuous in other respects. Sokrates contradicts the

position. But in the Treatise De Legibus (i. p. 630 B), Plato himself

says same thing as Protagoras is here made to say: at least assuming

that the Athenian speaker in De Legg. represents the sentiment of

Plato himself at the time when he composed that treatise.]

[Footnote 142: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C, p. 333 B.

To say "Justice is just," or "Holiness is holy," is indeed either

mere tautology, or else an impropriety of speech. Dr. Hutcheson

observes on an analogous case: "None can apply moral attributes to

the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities: or call his moral

Sense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the power of

tasting, sweet or bitter--or the power of seeing, straight or

crooked, white or black" (Hutcheson on the Passions, sect. i. p.

234).]

[Side-note: The harsh epithets applied by critics to

Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same

ground as the common consciousness.]

As to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the Platonic

commentators ascribe to Protagoras, more is said than the reality

justifies. He pretends to know what virtue, justice, moderation,

courage, &c., are, and he is proved not to know. But this is what

every one else pretends to know also, and what every body else

teaches as well as he--"_Hæc Janus summus ab imo Perdocet: hæc

recinunt juvenes dictata senesque_". What he pretends to do,

beyond the general public, he really can do. He can discourse,

learnedly and eloquently, upon these received doctrines and

sentiments: he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public

in favour of that which he, in common with the public, believes to be

good--and against that which he and they believe to be bad: he

can thus teach virtue more effectively than others. But whether that

which is received as virtue, be really such--he has never analysed or

verified: nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis.

Here again he is in harmony with the general public; for they hate,

as much as he does, to be dragged back to fundamentals, and forced to

explain, defend, revise, or modify, their established sentiments and

maxims: which they apply as _principia_ for deduction to

particular cases, and which they recognise as axioms whereby other

things are to be tried, not as liable to be tried themselves.

Protagoras is one of the general public, in dislike of, and

inaptitude for, analysis and dialectic discussion: while he stands

above them in his eloquence and his power of combining, illustrating,

and adorning, received doctrines. These are points of superiority,

not pretended, but real.

[Side-note: Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude

about the song of Simonides.]

The aversion of Protagoras for dialectic discussion--after causing an

interruption of the ethical argument, and an interlude of comment on

the poet Simonides--is at length with difficulty overcome, and the

argument is then resumed. The question still continues, What is

virtue? What are the five different parts of virtue? Yet it is so far

altered that Protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue

which Sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical, really

are tolerably alike: but he nevertheless contends that courage is

very different from all of them, repeating his declaration that many

men are courageous, but unjust and stupid at the same time. This

position Sokrates undertakes to refute. In doing so, he lays out one

of the largest, most distinct, and most positive theories of virtue,

which can be found in the Platonic writings.

[Side-note: Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at

length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation

of pleasures and pains of the agent.]

Virtue, according to this theory, consists in a right measurement and

choice of pleasures and pains: in deciding correctly, wherever we

have an alternative, on which side lies the largest pleasure or the

least pain--and choosing the side which presents this balance. To

live pleasurably, is pronounced to be good: to live without pleasure

or in pain, is evil. Moreover, nothing but pleasure, or comparative

mitigation of pain, is good: nothing but pain is evil.[143]

Good, is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain: evil,

with greatest pain: meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when

looked at along with its consequences and concomitants. The grand

determining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge: the

knowledge, science, or art, of correctly measuring the comparative

value of different pleasures and pains. Such knowledge (the theory

affirms), wherever it is possessed, will be sure to command the whole

man, to dictate all his conduct, and to prevail over every temptation

of special appetite or aversion. To say that a man who knows on which

side the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies, will act against

his knowledge--is a mistake. If he acts in this way, it is plain that

he does not possess the knowledge, and that he sins through

ignorance.

[Footnote 143: The substantial identity of Good with Pleasure, of

Evil with Pain, was the doctrine of the historical Sokrates as

declared in Xenophon's Memorabilia. See, among other passages, i. 6,

8. [Greek: Tou= de\ mê\ douleu/ein gastri\ mêde\ u(/pnô| kai\

lagnei/a|, oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)tiô/teron ei)=nai, ê)\ to\ e(/tera

e)/chein tou/tôn ê(di/ô, a(\ ou) mo/non e)n chrei/a| o)/nta

eu)phrai/nei, a)lla\ kai\ e)lpi/das pare/chonta ô)phelê/sein a)ei/?

Kai\ mê\n tou=to/ ge oi)=stha, o(/ti oi( me\n oi)o/menoi mêde\n eu)=

pra/ttein ou)k eu)phrai/nontai, oi( de\ ê(gou/menoi kalô=s

prochôrei=n e(autoi=s, ê)\ geôrgi/an ê)\ nauklêri/an ê)\ a)/ll' o(/,

ti a)\n tugcha/nôsin e)rgazo/menoi, ô(s eu)= pra/ttontes

eu)phrai/nontai. Oi)/ei ou)=n a)po\ pa/ntôn tou/tôn tosau/tên

ê(donê\n ei)=nai, o(/sên a)po\ tou= e(auto/n te ê(gei=sthai belti/ô

gi/gnesthai kai\ phi/lous a)mei/nous kta=sthai? E)gô\ toi/nun

diatelô= tau=ta nomi/zôn.]

Locke says, 'Essay on Human Understanding,' Book ii. ch. 28, "Good or

Evil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us--or that which procures

pleasure or pain to us. Moral good or evil then is only the

conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law,

whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the

law-maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our

observance or breach of the law, is that we call reward or punishment."

The formal distinction here taken by Locke between pleasure and that

which procures pleasure--both the one and the other being called

Good--(the like in regard to pain and evil) is not distinctly stated

by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though he says nothing inconsistent

with it: but it is distinctly stated in the Republic, ii. p. 357,

where Good is distributed under three heads. 1. That which we desire

immediately and for itself--such as Enjoyment, Innocuous pleasure. 2.

That which we desire both for itself and for its consequences--health,

intelligence, good sight or hearing, &c. 3. That which we

do not desire (perhaps even shun) for itself, but which we accept by

reason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring

greater pleasures.

This discrimination of the varieties of Good, given in the Republic,

is quite consistent with what is stated by Sokrates in the

Protagoras, though it is more full and precise. But it is not

consistent with what Sokrates says in the Gorgias, where he asserts a

radical dissimilarity of nature between [Greek: ê(du\] and [Greek:

a)gatho/n].]

[Side-note: Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory.]

Protagoras agrees with Sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the

paramount importance and ascendancy of knowledge: but does not at

first agree with him in identifying good with pleasure, and evil with

pain. Upon this point, too, he is represented as agreeing in

opinion with the Many. He does not admit that to live pleasurably is

good, unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things. He

thinks it safer, and more consistent with his own whole life, to

maintain--That pleasurable things, or painful things, may be either

good, or evil, or indifferent, according to the particular case.

[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates.]

This doctrine Sokrates takes much pains to refute. He contends that

pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, are always good--and

painful things, so far forth as painful, always evil. When some

pleasures are called evil, that is not on account of any thing

belonging to the pleasure itself, but because of its ulterior

consequences and concomitants, which are painful or distressing in a

degree more than countervailing the pleasure. So too, when some pains

are pronounced to be good, this is not from any peculiarity in the

pain itself, but because of its consequences and concomitants: such

pain being required as a condition to the attainment of health,

security, wealth, and other pleasures or satisfactions more than

counter-balancing. Sokrates challenges opponents to name any other

end, with reference to which things are called _good_, except

their tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of

pleasure: he challenges them to name any other end, with reference to

which things are called _evil_, except their tendency to produce

pains and to intercept or destroy pleasures. In measuring pleasures

and pains against each other, there is no other difference to be

reckoned except that of greater or less, more or fewer. The

difference between near and distant, does indeed obtrude itself upon

us as a misleading element. But it is the special task of the

"measuring science" to correct this illusion--and to compare

pleasures or pains, whether near or distant, according to their real

worth: just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in

regard to near and distant objects.

[Side-note: Application of that reasoning to the case of

courage.]

Sokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the

explanation of courage given by Protagoras. He shows, or tries to

show, that courage, like all the other branches of virtue, consists

in acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains. No

man affronts evil, or the alternative of greater pain, knowing it

to be such: no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible

enterprise, knowing it to be so: neither the brave nor the timid do

this. Both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not

terrible, or the least terrible of two alternatives: but they

estimate differently what is such. The former go readily to war when

required, the latter evade it. Now to go into war when required, is

honourable: being honourable, it is good: being honourable and good,

it is pleasurable. The brave know this, and enter upon it willingly:

the timid not only do not know it, but entertain the contrary

opinion, looking upon war as painful and terrible, and therefore

keeping aloof. The brave men fear what it is honourable to fear, the

cowards what it is dishonourable to fear: the former act upon the

knowledge of what is really terrible, the latter are misled by their

ignorance of it. Courage is thus, like the other virtues, a case of

accurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains, or of good and

evil.[144]

[Footnote 144: Compare, respecting Courage, a passage in the

Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, which is better stated there (though

substantially the same opinion) than here in the Protagoras.

The opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence

from the funeral oration delivered by Periklês, Thucyd. ii. 43, fin.

[Greek: A)lgeinote/ra ga\r a)ndri/ ge phro/nêma e)/chonti ê( e)n tô=|

meta\ tou= malakisthê=nai ka/kôsis, ê)\ o( meta\ r(ô/mês kai\ koinê=s

e)lpi/dos a(/ma gigno/menos a)nai/sthêtos tha/natos]--which Dr.

Arnold thus translates in his note: "For more grievous to a man of

noble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice, than

the unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and

hopes for the common welfare."

So again in the Phædon (p. 68) Sokrates describes the courage of the

ordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from

fear of greater evils (which is the same view as that of Sokrates in

the Protagoras), while the philosopher is courageous on a different

principle; aspiring only to reason and intelligence, with the

pleasures attending it, he welcomes death as releasing his mind from

the obstructive companionship of the body.

The fear of disgrace and dishonour, in his own eyes and in those of

others, is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds

and death in the service of his country. See Plato, Leg. i. pp.

646-647. He is [Greek: phobero\s meta\ no/mou, meta\ di/kês], p. 647 E.

Such is the way in which both Plato and Thucydides conceive the

character of the brave citizen as compared with the coward.

It is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different

estimate of prospective pains; the case being one in which pleasure

is not concerned. That the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the

eyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom, need

hardly be remarked. At the same time the sentiments here conceived

embrace a wide field of sympathy, comprising the interests, honour,

and security, of others as well as of the individual agent.]

[Side-note: The theory which Plato here lays down is more

distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues.]

Such is the ethical theory which the Platonic Sokrates enunciates in

this dialogue, and which Protagoras and others accept. It is positive

and distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato. We shall find that

he theorises differently in other dialogues; whether for the

better or the worse, will be hereafter seen. He declares here

explicitly that pleasure, or happiness, is the end to be pursued; and

pain, or misery, the end to be avoided: and that there is no other

end, in reference to which things can be called good or evil, except

as they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering, on the one

side--to entail pain or suffering on the other. He challenges

objectors to assign any other end. And thus much is certain--that in

those other dialogues where he himself departs from the present

doctrine, he has not complied with his own challenge. Nowhere has he

specified a different end. In other dialogues, as well as in the

Protagoras, Plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art

of calculation: but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly

what are the items to be calculated.

[Side-note: Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates.

It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential.]

I perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by Sokrates in the

Protagoras, that pain or suffering is the End to be avoided or

lessened as far as possible--and pleasure or happiness the End to be

pursued as far as attainable--by intelligent forethought and

comparison: that there is no other intelligible standard of

reference, for application of the terms Good and Evil, except the

tendency to produce happiness or misery: and that if this standard be

rejected, ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion,

and becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments,

authoritative and self-justifying, prevalent in each community. But

the End just mentioned is highly complex, and care must be taken to

conceive it in its full comprehension. Herein I conceive the argument

of Sokrates (in the Protagoras) to be incomplete. It carries

attention only to a part of the truth, keeping out of sight, though

not excluding, the remainder. It considers each man as an individual,

determining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures

and pains: as a prudent, temperate, and courageous agent, but neither

as just nor beneficent. It omits to take account of him as a member

of a society, composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with

himself. Now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner

(such as Plato both professes to be and really is) to study the means

of happiness, not simply for the agent himself, but for that

agent together with others around him--for the members of the

community generally.[145] The Platonic Sokrates says this himself in

the Republic: and accordingly, he there treats of other points which

are not touched upon by Sokrates in the Protagoras. He proclaims that

the happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent

with the security, and to a certain extent with the happiness, of

others: he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their

pleasures and pains from the same causes: common pleasures, and

common pains, to all.[146] The doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras

requires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important

elements. Since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of

others, he must be called upon to take account of its consequences

under both aspects, especially where it goes to inflict hurt or

privation upon others. Good and evil depend upon that scientific

computation and comparison of pleasures and pains which Sokrates in

the Protagoras prescribes: but the computation must include, to a

certain extent, the pleasures and pains (security and rightful

expectations) of others besides the agent himself, implicated in the

consequences of his acts.[147]

[Footnote 145: Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 420-421, v. p. 466 A.]

[Footnote 146: Plato, Republ. v. pp. 462 A-B-D, 464 A-D.

Throughout the first of these passages we see [Greek: a)gatho\n] used

as the equivalent of [Greek: ê(donê/], [Greek: kako\n] as the

equivalent of [Greek: lu/pê].]

[Footnote 147: See, especially on this point, the brief but valuable

Tract on Utilitarianism by Mr. John Stuart Mill. In page 16 of that

work attention is called to the fact, that in Utilitarianism the

standard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone,

but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. So that we cannot

with exactness call the doctrine of Sokrates, in his conversation

with Protagoras, "the theory of Utilitarianism," as Mr. Mill calls it

in page 1.]

[Side-note: Comparison with the Republic.]

As to this point, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates not always

correct, nor even consistent with himself. This will appear

especially when we come to see the account which he gives of Justice

in the Republic. In that branch of the Ethical End, a direct regard

to the security of others comes into the foreground. For in an act of

injustice, the prominent characteristic is that of harm, done to

others--though that is not the whole, since the security of the agent

himself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment

of these obligations. It is this primary regard to others, and

secondary regard to self, implicated in one complex feeling--which

distinguishes justice from prudence. The Platonic Sokrates in

the Republic (though his language is not always clear) does not admit

this; but considers justice as a branch of prudence, necessary to

ensure the happiness of the individual agent himself.

[Side-note: The discourse of Protagoras brings out an

important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by

Sokrates.]

Now in the Protagoras, what the Platonic Sokrates dwells upon (in the

argument which I have been considering) is prudence, temperance,

courage: little or nothing is said about justice: there was therefore

the less necessity for insisting on that prominent

reference to the security of others (besides the agent himself) which

justice involves. If, however, we turn back to the earlier part of

the dialogue, to the speech delivered by Protagoras, we see justice

brought into the foreground. It is not indeed handled analytically

(which is not the manner of that Sophist), nor is it resolved into

regard to pleasure and pain, happiness and misery: but it is

announced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally

necessary from every man towards every other ([Greek: di/kê--ai)dô\s]),

distinguishable from those endowments which supply the

wants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself. The very

existence of the social union requires, that each man should feel a

sentiment of duties on his part towards others, and duties on their

parts towards him: or (in other words) of rights on his part to have

his interests considered by others, and rights on their parts to have

their interests considered by him. Unless this sentiment of

reciprocity--reciprocal duty and right--exist in the bosom of each

individual citizen, or at least in the large majority--no social

union could subsist. There are doubtless different degrees of the

sentiment: moreover the rights and duties may be apportioned better

or worse, more or less fairly, among the individuals of a society;

thus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable.

But without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual

bosom, even the worst constituted society could not hold together.

And it is this sentiment of reciprocity which Protagoras (in the

dialogue before us) is introduced as postulating in his declaration,

that justice and the sense of shame (unlike to professional

aptitudes) must be distributed universally and without exception

among all the members of a community. Each man must feel them,

in his conduct towards others: each man must also be able to reckon

that others will feel the like, in their behaviour towards him.[148]

[Footnote 148: Professor Bain (in his work on the Emotions and the

Will, ch. xv. On the Ethical Emotions, pp. 271-3) has given remarks

extremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which Plato

has here placed under the name of Protagoras.

"The supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into

the two following particulars. First, the common end of _public

security_, which is also individual preservation, demands certain

precautions that are everywhere very much alike, and can in no case

be dispensed with. Some sort of constituted authority to control the

individual impulses and to protect each man's person and property,

must exist wherever a number of human beings live together. The

duties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially

the same in all societies. . . They have a pretty uniform character

all over the globe. If the sense of the common safety were not

sufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some

common regulations, society could not exist. . . . It is no proof of

the universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral

distinctions, but of a certain rational appreciation of what is

necessary for the very existence of every human being living in the

company of others: Doubtless, if the sad history of the human race

had been preserved in all its details, we _should have many

examples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception

of a social system, or to the restraints imposed by it_. We know

enough of the records of anarchy, to see how difficult it is for

human nature to comply in full with the social conditions of

security; but if this were not complied with at all, the result would

be mutual and swift destruction. . . . In the second place, mankind

have been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon

individual members of societies some observances or restraints of

purely _sentimental_ origin, having no reference, direct or

indirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the

safeguards implied in it. Certain maxims founded in taste, liking,

aversion, or fancy, have, in every community known to us, been raised

to the dignity of authoritative morality; being rendered (so to

speak) 'terms of communion,' and have been enforced by punishment.

. . . In the rules, founded on men's sentiments, likings, aversions,

and antipathies, there is nothing common but the fact that some one

or other of these are carried to the length of public requirement,

and mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society

together."

The postulate of the Platonic Protagoras--that [Greek: di/kê] and

[Greek: ai)dô\s] must be felt to a certain extent in each man's

bosom, as a condition to the very existence of society--agrees with

the first of the two elements here distinguished by Mr. Bain, and

does not necessarily go beyond it. But the unsystematic teaching and

universal propagandism, which Protagoras describes as the agency

whereby virtue is communicated, applies alike to both the two

elements distinguished by Mr. Bain: to the factitious exigencies of

King Nomos, as well as to his tutelary control. It is this mixed mass

that the Sokratic analysis is brought to examine.]

[Side-note: The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of

Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of

other persons besides the agent himself.]

If we thus compare the Ethical End, as implied, though not explicitly

laid down, by Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue,--and as

laid down by Sokrates in the later part--we shall see that while

Sokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and

pleasures of the agent himself, Protagoras enlarges it so as to

include a direct reference to those of others also, coupled with an

expectation of the like reference on the part of others.[149]

Sokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating

prudence for his own pleasures and pains: while Protagoras proclaims

that after this attribute had been obtained by man, and individual

wants supplied, still there was a farther element necessary in the

calculation--the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted

in every one's bosom: without this the human race would have

perished. Prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence;

but if men are to live and act in social communion, the services as

well as the requirements of each man must be shaped, in a certain

measure, with a direct view to the security of others as well as to

his own.

[Footnote 149: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322.]

In my judgment, the Ethical End, exclusively self-regarding, here

laid down by Sokrates, is too narrow. And if we turn to other

Platonic dialogues, we shall find Sokrates still represented as

proclaiming a self-regarding Ethical End, though not the same as what

we read in the Protagoras. In the Gorgias, Republic, Phædon, &c.,

we shall find him discountenancing the calculation (recommended in

the Protagoras) of pleasures and pains against each other, as

greater, more certain, durable, &c., and insisting that all shall

be estimated according as they bear on the general condition or

health of the mind, which he assimilates to the general condition or

health of the body. The health of the body, considered as an End to

be pursued, is essentially self-regarding: so also is the health of

the mind. I shall touch upon this farther when I consider the

above-mentioned dialogues: at present, I only remark that they agree

with the Sokrates of the Protagoras in assuming a self-regarding Ethical

End, though they do not agree with him in describing what that End

should be.

[Side-note: Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or

satisfactory, especially about courage.]

The application which Sokrates makes (in the Protagoras) of his own

assumed Ethical End to the explanation of courage, is certainly

confused and unsatisfactory. And indeed, we may farther remark that

the general result at which Plato seems to be aiming in this

dialogue, viz.: That all the different virtues are at the bottom one

and the same, and that he who possesses one of them must also

possess the remainder--cannot be made out even upon his own

assumptions. Though it be true that all the virtues depend upon

correct calculation, yet as each of them applies to a different set

of circumstances and different disturbing and misleading causes, the

same man who calculates well under one set of circumstances, may

calculate badly under others. The position laid down by Protagoras,

that men are often courageous but unjust--just, but not wise--is

noway refuted by Plato. Nor is it even inconsistent with Plato's own

theory, though he seems to think it so.

[Side-note: Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not

correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended

by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists.]

Some of the Platonic commentators maintain,[150] that the doctrine

here explicitly laid down and illustrated by Sokrates, _viz._:

the essential identity of the pleasurable with the good, of the

painful with the evil--is to be regarded as not serious, but as taken

up in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating Protagoras.

Such an hypothesis appears to me untenable; contradicted by the whole

tenor of the dialogue. Throughout all the Platonic compositions,

there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more

serious, and more elaborate, than that by which Sokrates here proves

the identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil (p. 351 to

end). Protagoras begins by denying it, and is only compelled to

accept the conclusion against his own will, by the series of

questions which he cannot otherwise answer.[151] Sokrates admits that

the bulk of mankind are also opposed to it: but he establishes it

with an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the

hearers around.[152] The commentators are at liberty to impeach

the reasoning as unsound; but to set it aside as mere banter and

mockery, is preposterous. Assume it even to be intended as

mockery--assume that Sokrates is mystifying the hearers, by a string of

delusive queries, to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue

and silly--how can the mockery fall upon Protagoras, who denies the

thesis from the beginning?[153] The irony, if it were irony, would be

misplaced and absurd.

[Footnote 150: See Brandis, Gesch. d. Griech.-Röm., Phil. Part ii.

sect. 114, note 3 p. 458; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Protag.

pp. 15-33-34.

So too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras: (p. 765)

"Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est

scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum

malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. _Neque

affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifesté omnino negatur._ De

hoc enim in Gorgiâ Phileboque et alibi," &c.

When a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is surely

under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by

Sokrates _in the Protagoras_, whether it be consistent or not

with the Gorgias and Philêbus. Yet here we find Ficinus

misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony

with the other two.]

[Footnote 151: This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find

Zeller (among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts

for the occasion the _Standpunkt_ of his enemies (Philos. der

Griech. vol. ii. p. 380, ed. 2nd).]

[Footnote 152: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuô=s e)do/kei

a(/pasin a)lêthê= ei)=nai ta\ ei)rême/na.]]

[Footnote 153: When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by

Sokrates as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other

Sophists (Proleg. p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with

the dialogue, p. 351.

Schleiermacher maintains that this same thesis (the fundamental

identity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether

"unsokratic and unplatonic"; that it is handled here by Sokrates in a

manner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the

argument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and

imposed upon by such obvious fallacies (Einleitung zum Protag. 230,

bottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher

says, Einl. zum Gorgias, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities.

Upon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras

is intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present

must be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at

the close, to the thesis as having been proved (Prot. p. 358 A):

next, that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or

the irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible.

The argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing

which we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive

altogether (not only here but also in his Einleitung zum Gorgias, p.

10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the Protagoras. To

describe the identity between [Greek: ê(du\] and [Greek: a)gatho\n]

as a "scheinbare Voraussetzung" is to depart from the plain meaning

of words.

Again, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine

(identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil), "not as his own

opinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the

absurd consequences which many deduced from it--only as the received

world-morality, as the opinion of the majority" (Einleit. zum Protag.

p. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue, I am

at a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates

introducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and

against that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition

from Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether

the opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation

himself, along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and

ultimately brings out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all

present.

These forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics

cannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis

substantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this

point, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits the

thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue--states that it was

really the opinion of the historical Sokrates--and adds that it was

also the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic stadium,

when the Protagoras (as he thinks) was composed (Gesch. und Syst. der

Plat. Phil. pp. 462-463).

Most of the critics agree in considering the Protagoras to be one of

Plato's earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it

to 407 B.C. when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I

have already given my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic

dialogues were composed before 399 B.C. The Protagoras

belongs, in my opinion, to Plato's most perfect and mature period.]

[Side-note: Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency.]

The commentators resort to this hypothesis, partly because the

doctrine in question is one which they disapprove--partly

because doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other

Platonic dialogues. These are the same two reasons upon which, in

other cases, various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine

works of Plato. The first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant:

we must accept what Plato gives us, whether we assent to it or not.

The second reason also, I think, proves little. The dialogues are

distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and

purpose: we have no right to require that they shall be all

consistent with each other in doctrine, especially when we look to

the long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that the elaborate

reasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the Protagoras is mere

irony, intended to mystify both Protagoras himself and all the

by-standers, who accept it as earnest and convincing--appears to me far

less reasonable than the admission, that the dialectic pleading

ascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that

assigned to him in another.

[Side-note: Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the

close of the dialogue.]

Though there is every mark of seriousness, and no mark of irony, in

this reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must remember that he does not

profess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On

the contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and

perplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is

teachable? remains undecided.