PROTAGORAS.
[Side-note: Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue.]
The dialogue called Protagoras presents a larger assemblage of varied
and celebrated characters, with more of dramatic winding, and more
frequent breaks and resumptions in the conversation, than any
dialogue of Plato--not excepting even Symposion and Republic. It
exhibits Sokrates in controversy with the celebrated Sophist
Protagoras, in the presence of a distinguished society, most of whom
take occasional part in the dialogue. This controversy is preceded by
a striking conversation between Sokrates and Hippokrates--a youth of
distinguished family, eager to profit by the instructions of
Protagoras. The two Sophists Prodikus and Hippias, together with
Kallias, Kritias, Alkibiades, Eryximachus, Phædrus, Pausanias,
Agathon, the two sons of Periklês (Paralus and Xanthippus),
Charmides, son of Glaukon, Antimoerus of Mende, a promising pupil
of Protagoras, who is in training for the profession of a
Sophist--these and others are all present at the meeting, which is held
in the house of Kallias.[1] Sokrates himself recounts the whole--both his
conversation with Hippokrates and that with Protagoras--to a nameless
friend.
[Footnote 1: Plato, Protag. p. 315.]
This dialogue enters upon a larger and more comprehensive ethical
theory than anything in the others hitherto noticed. But it contains
also a great deal in which we hardly recognise, or at least cannot
verify, any distinct purpose, either of search or exposition. Much of
it seems to be composed with a literary or poetical view, to enhance
the charm or interest of the composition. The personal
characteristics of each speaker--the intellectual peculiarities
of Prodikus and Hippias--the ardent partisanship of Alkibiades--are
brought out as in a real drama. But the great and marked antithesis
is that between the Sophist Protagoras and Sokrates--the Hektor and
Ajax of the piece: who stand forward in single combat, exchange some
serious blows, yet ultimately part as friends.
[Side-note: Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates
to become acquainted with Protagoras.]
An introduction of some length impresses upon us forcibly the
celebrity of the Great Sophist, and the earnest interest excited by
his visit to Athens. Hippokrates, a young man of noble family and
eager aspirations for improvement, having just learnt the arrival of
Protagoras, comes to the house of Sokrates and awakens him before
daylight, entreating that Sokrates will introduce him to the
new-comer. He is ready to give all that he possesses in order that he
may become wise like Protagoras.[2] While they are awaiting a suitable
hour for such introduction, Sokrates puts a series of questions to
test the force of Hippokrates.[3]
[Footnote 2: Plato, Protag. pp. 310-311 A.]
[Footnote 3: Plato, Protag. p. 311 B. [Greek: kai\ e)gô\
popeirô/menos tou= I(ppokra/tous tê=s r(ô/mês diesko/poun au)to\n
kai\ ê)rô/tôn], &c.]
[Side-note: Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose
and expectations from Protagoras.]
_Sokr._--You are now intending to visit Protagoras, and to pay
him for something to be done for you--tell me what manner of man it
is that you are going to visit--and what manner of man do you wish to
become? If you were going in like manner to pay a fee for instruction
to your namesake Hippokrates of Kos, you would tell me that you were
going to him as to a physician--and that you wished to qualify
yourself for becoming a physician. If you were addressing yourself
with the like view to Pheidias or Polykleitus, you would go to them
as to sculptors, and for the purpose of becoming yourself a sculptor.
Now then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me
who he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor?
_Hipp._--They call him a Sophist.[4] _Sokr._--We are going
to pay him then as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--And
what are you to become by going to him? _Hipp._--Why,
judging from the preceding analogies, I am to become a Sophist.
_Sokr._--But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to
the Grecian public as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Yes: if I am to
tell you my real opinion.[5] _Sokr._--Perhaps however you only
propose to visit Protagoras, as you visited your schoolmaster and
your musical or gymnastical teacher: not for the purpose of entering
that career as a professional man, but to acquire such instruction as
is suitable for a private citizen and a freeman? _Hipp._--That
is more the instruction which I seek from Protagoras. _Sokr._--Do
you know then what you are going to do? You are consigning your
mind to be treated by one whom you call a Sophist: but I shall be
surprised if you know what a Sophist is[6]--and if you do not know,
neither do you know what it is--good or evil--to which you are
consigning your mind. _Hipp._--I think I _do_ know. The
Sophist is, as the name implies, one cognizant of matters wise and
able.[7] _Sokr._--That may be said also of painters and
carpenters. If we were asked in what special department are painters
cognizant of matters wise and able, we should specify that it was in
the workmanship of portraits. Answer me the same question about the
Sophist. What sort of workmanship does he direct? _Hipp._--That
of forming able speakers.[8] _Sokr._--Your answer may be
correct, but it is not specific enough: for we must still ask, About
_what_ is it that the Sophist forms able speakers? just as the
harp-master makes a man an able speaker about harping, at the same
time that he teaches him harping. About _what_ is it that the
Sophist forms able speakers: of course about that which he
himself knows?[9] _Hipp._--Probably. _Sokr._--What then is
that, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his
pupil cognizant? _Hipp._--By Zeus, I cannot give you any farther
answer.[10]
[Footnote 4: Plato, Protagoras, p. 311.]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Protag. p. 312 A. [Greek: su\ de/, ê)=n d' e)gô/,
pro\s theô=n, ou)k a)\n ai)schu/noio ei)s tou\s E(/llênas sauto\n
sophistê\n pare/chôn? Nê\ to\n Di/', ô)= Sô/krates, ei)/per ge a)\
dianoou=mai chrê\ le/gein.] Ast (Platon's Leben, p. 78) and other
Platonic critics treat this _Sophistomanie_ (as they call it) of
an Athenian youth as something ludicrous and contemptible: all the
more ludicrous because (they say) none of them goes to qualify
himself for becoming a Sophist, but would even be ashamed of the
title. Yet if we suppose the same question addressed to a young
Englishman of rank and fortune (as Hippokrates was at Athens), "Why
do you put yourself under the teaching of Dr. ---- at Eton or
Professor ---- at Oxford? Do you intend to qualify yourself for
becoming a schoolmaster or a professor?" He will laugh at you for the
question; if he answers it seriously, he will probably answer as
Hippokrates does. But there is nothing at all in the question to
imply that the schoolmaster or the professor is a worthless
pretender--or the youth foolish, for being anxious to obtain
instruction from him; which is the inference that Ast and other
Platonic critics desire us to draw about the Athenian Sophists.]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: o(/, ti de/ pote o(
sophistê/s e)sti, thauma/zoim' a)\n ei) oi)=stha], &c.]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: ô(/s per tou)/noma
le/gei, to\n tô=n sophô=n e)pistê/mona.] (Quasi sophistes
sit--[Greek: o( tô=n sophô=n i)/stês], Heindorf.) If this supposition
of Heindorf be just, we may see in it an illustration of the
etymological views of Plato, which I shall notice when I come to the
Kratylus.]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D. [Greek: poi/as e)rgasi/as
e)pista/tês? e)pista/tên tou= poiê=sai deino\n le/gein.]]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D-E. [Greek: e)rôtê/seôs ga\r
e)/ti ê( a)po/krisis ê(mi=n dei=tai, peri\ o(/tou o( sophistê\s
deino\n poiei= le/gein; ô(/sper o( kitharistê\s deino\n dê/pou poiei=
le/gein peri\ ou(=per kai\ e)pistê/mona, peri\ kithari/seôs.]]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Protag. p. 312 E.]
[Side-note: Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a
Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach.]
_Sokr._--Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit
your mind? If the question were about going to trusting your body to
any one, with the risk whether it should become sound or unsound, you
would have thought long, and taken much advice, before you decided.
But now, when it is about your mind, which you value more than your
body, and upon the good or evil of which all your affairs turn[11]--you
are hastening without reflection and without advice, you are
ready to pay all the money that you possess or can obtain, with a
firm resolution already taken to put yourself at all hazard under
Protagoras: whom you do not know--with whom you have never once
talked--whom you call a Sophist, without knowing what a Sophist is?
_Hipp._--I must admit the case to be as you say.[12]
_Sokr._--Perhaps the Sophist is a man who brings for sale those
transportable commodities, instruction or doctrine, which form the
nourishment of the mind. Now the traders in food for the body praise
indiscriminately all that they have to sell, though neither they nor
their purchasers know whether it is good for the body; unless by
chance any one of them be a gymnastic trainer or a physician.[13] So,
too, these Sophists, who carry about food for the mind, praise all
that they have to sell: but perhaps some of them are ignorant, and
assuredly their purchasers are ignorant, whether it be good or bad
for the mind: unless by accident any one possess medical knowledge
about the mind. Now if you, Hippokrates, happen to possess such
knowledge of what is good or bad for the mind, you may safely
purchase doctrine from Protagoras or from any one else:[14] but if
not, you are hazarding and putting at stake your dearest
interests. The purchase of doctrines is far more dangerous than that
of eatables or drinkables. As to these latter, you may carry them
away with you in separate vessels, and before you take them into your
body you may invoke the _Expert_, to tell you what you may
safely eat and drink, and when, and how much. But this cannot be done
with doctrines. You cannot carry away _them_ in a separate
vessel to be tested; you learn them and take them into the mind
itself; so that you go away, after having paid your money, actually
damaged or actually benefited, as the case may be.[15] We will
consider these matters in conjunction with our elders. But first let
us go and talk with Protagoras--we can consult the others afterwards.
[Footnote 11: Plato, Protag. p. 313 A. [Greek: o(\ de\ peri\
plei/onos tou= sô/matos ê(gei=, tê\n psuchê\n, kai\ e)n ô)=| pa/nt'
e)sti\ ta\ sa\ ê)\ eu)= ê)\ kalô=s pra/ttein, chrêstou= ê)\ ponêrou=
au)tou= genome/nou], &c.]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Protag. p. 313 C.]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Protag. p. 313 D.]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Protag. p. 313 E. [Greek: e)a\n mê/ tis tu/chê|
peri\ tê\n psuchê\n au)= i)atriko\s ô)/n. ei) me\n ou)=n su\
tugcha/neis e)pistê/môn tou/tôn ti/ chrêsto\n kai\ ponêro/n,
a)sphale/s soi ô)nei=sthai mathê/mata kai\ para\ Prôtago/rou kai\
par' a)/llou o(tounou=n; ei) de\ mê/, o(/ra, ô)= phi/ltate, mê\ peri\
toi=s philta/tois kubeu/ê|s te kai\ kinduneu/ê|s.]]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Protag. p. 314 A. [Greek: siti/a me\n ga\r kai\
pota\ pria/menon e)/xestin e)n a)/llois a)ggei/ois a)pophe/rein, kai\
pri\n de/xasthai au)ta\ e)s to\ sô=ma pio/nta ê)\ phago/nta,
katathe/menon oi)/kade e)/xesti sumbouleu/sasthai parakale/santa to\n
e)pai+/onta, o(/, ti te e)deste/on ê)\ pote/on kai\ o(/, ti mê/, kai\
o(po/son, kai\ o(po/te; . . . . mathê/mata de\ ou)k e)/stin e)n a)/llô|
a)ggei/ô| a)penegkei=n, a)ll' a)na/gkê katathe/nta tê\n timê\n to\
ma/thêma e)n au)tê=| tê=| psuchê=| labo/nta kai\ matho/nta a)pie/nai
ê)\ beblamme/non ê)\ ô)phelême/non.]]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of
knowledge brought to light.]
Such is the preliminary conversation of Sokrates with Hippokrates,
before the interview with Protagoras. I have given it (like the
introduction to the Lysis) at considerable length, because it is a
very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic point of view.
It brings to light that false persuasion of knowledge, under which
men unconsciously act, especially in what concerns the mind and its
treatment. Common fame and celebrity suffice to determine the most
vehement aspirations towards a lecturer, in one who has never stopped
to reflect or enquire what the lecturer does. The pressure applied by
Sokrates in his successive questions, to get beyond vague
generalities into definite particulars--the insufficiency, thereby
exposed, of the conceptions with which men usually rest
satisfied--exhibit the working of his Elenchus in one of its most
instructive ways. The parallel drawn between the body and the mind--the
constant precaution taken in the case of the former to consult the
professional man and to follow his advice in respect both to
discipline and nourishment--are in the same vein of sentiment
which we have already followed in other dialogues. Here too, as
elsewhere, some similar _Expert_, in reference to the ethical
and intellectual training of mind, is desiderated, as still more
imperatively necessary. Yet where is he to be found? How is the
business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue
without him? Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? We
shall presently see.
* * * * *
[Side-note: Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of
Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras.]
Sokrates and Hippokrates proceed to the house of Kallias, and find
him walking about in the fore-court with Protagoras, and some of the
other company; all of whom are described as treating the Sophist with
almost ostentatious respect. Prodikus and Hippias have each their
separate hearers, in or adjoining to the court. Sokrates addresses
Protagoras.
[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the
latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and
his own openness in avowing himself a sophist.]
_Sokr._--Protagoras, I and Hippokrates here are come to talk to
you about something. _Prot._--Do you wish to ta]k to me alone,
or in presence of the rest? _Sokr._--To us it is indifferent:
but I will tell you what we come about, and you may then determine
for yourself. This Hippokrates is a young man of noble family, and
fully equal to his contemporaries in capacity. He wishes to become
distinguished in the city; and he thinks he shall best attain that
object through your society. Consider whether you would like better
to talk with him alone, or in presence of the rest.[16] _Prot._--Your
consideration on my behalf, Sokrates, is reasonable. A person
of my profession must be cautious in his proceedings. I, a foreigner,
visit large cities, persuading the youth of best family to frequent
my society in preference to that of their kinsmen and all others; in
the conviction that I shall do them good. I thus inevitably become
exposed to much jealousy and even to hostile conspiracies.[17]
The sophistical art is an old one;[18] but its older professors,
being afraid of enmity if they proclaimed what they really were, have
always disguised themselves under other titles. Some, like Homer,
Hesiod, and Simonides, called themselves poets: others, Orpheus,
Musæus, &c., professed to prescribe religious rites and
mysteries: others announced themselves as gymnastic trainers or
teachers of music. But I have departed altogether from this policy;
which indeed did not succeed in really deceiving any leading
men--whom alone it was intended to deceive--and which, when found out,
entailed upon its authors the additional disgrace of being considered
deceivers. The true caution consists in open dealing; and this is
what I have always adopted. I avow myself a Sophist, educating men. I
am now advanced in years, old enough to be the father of any of you,
and have grown old in the profession: yet during all these years,
thank God, I have suffered no harm either from my practice or my
title.[19] If therefore you desire to converse with me, it will be
far more agreeable to me to converse in presence of all who are now
in the house.[20]
[Footnote 16: Plat. Prot. p. 316.
The motive assigned by Hippokrates, for putting himself under the
teaching of Protagoras, is just the same as that which Xenophon
assigns to his friend Proxenus for taking lessons and paying fees to
the Leontine Gorgias (Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16).]
[Footnote 17: The jealousy felt by fathers, mothers, and relatives
against a teacher or converser who acquired great influence over
their youthful relatives, is alluded to by Sokrates in the Platonic
Apology (p. 37 E), and is illustrated by a tragical incident in the
Cyropædia of Xenophon, iii. 1. 14-38. Compare also Xenophon, Memorab.
i. 2, 52.]
[Footnote 18: Plat. Prot. p. 316 D. [Greek: e)gô\ de\ tê\n
sophistikê\n te/chnên phêmi\ me\n ei)=nai palaia/n.]]
[Footnote 19: Plat. Prot. p. 317 C. [Greek: ô(/ste su\n theô=|
ei)pei=n mêde\n deino\n pa/schein dia\ to\ o(mologei=n sophistê\s
ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 20: Plat. Prot. p. 317 D. In the Menon, the Platonic
Sokrates is made to say that Protagoras died at the age of seventy;
that he had practised forty years as a Sophist; and that during all
that long time he had enjoyed the highest esteem and reputation, even
after his death, "down to the present day" (Menon, p. 91 E).
It must be remembered that the speech, of which I have just given an
abstract, is delivered not by the historical, real, Protagoras, but
by the character named _Protagoras_, depicted by Plato in this
dialogue: _i.e._ the speech is composed by Plato himself. I
read, therefore, with much surprise, a note of Heindorf (ad p. 316
D), wherein he says about Protagoras: "Callidé in postremis reticet,
quod addere poterat, [Greek: chrê/mata dido/ntas]." "Protagoras
cunningly keeps back, what he might have here added, that people gave
him money for his teaching." Heindorf must surely have supposed that
he was commenting upon a real speech, delivered by the historical
person called Protagoras. Otherwise what can be meant by this charge
of "cunning reticence or keeping back?" Protagoras here speaks what
Plato puts into his mouth; neither more nor less. What makes the
remark of Heindorf the more preposterous is, that in page 328 B the
very fact, which Protagoras is here said "cunningly to keep back,"
appears mentioned by Protagoras; and mentioned in the same spirit of
honourable frankness and fair-dealing as that which pervades the
discourse which I have just (freely) translated. Indeed nothing can
be more marked than the way in which Plato makes Protagoras dwell
with emphasis on the frankness and openness of his dealing: nothing
can be more at variance with the character which critics give us of
the Sophists, as "cheats, who defrauded pupils of their money while
teaching them nothing at all, or what they themselves knew to be
false".]
[Side-note: Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of
the assembled company.]
On hearing this, Sokrates--under the suspicion (he tells us) that
Protagoras wanted to show off in the presence of Prodikus and
Hippias--proposes to convene all the dispersed guests, and to talk in
their hearing. This is accordingly done, and the conversation
recommences--Sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had
preferred on behalf of Hippokrates.
[Side-note: Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young
men as virtuous citizens.]
_Sokr._--Hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the
city, and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing
himself under your instruction. He would gladly learn, Protagoras,
what will happen to him, if he comes into intercourse with you.
_Prot._--Young man, if you come to me, on the day of your first
visit, you will go home better than you came, and on the next day the
like: each successive day you will make progress for the better.[21]
_Sokr._--Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that:
but towards _what_, and about _what_, will he make
progress? _Prot._--Your question is a reasonable one, and I am
glad to reply to it. I shall not throw him back--as other Sophists
do, with mischievous effect--into the special sciences, geometry,
arithmetic, astronomy, music, &c., just after he has completed
his course in them. I shall teach him what he really comes to learn:
wisdom and good counsel, both respecting his domestic affairs, that
he may manage his own family well--and respecting the affairs of the
city, that he may address himself to them most efficaciously, both in
speech and act. _Sokr._--You speak of political or social
science. You engage to make men good citizens. _Prot._--Exactly
so.[22]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Protag. p. 318 A. "Qui ad philosophorum scholas
venit, quotidie secum aliquid boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat,
aut sanabilior." Seneca, Epistol. 108, p. 530.]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. pp. 318-319.
The declaration made by Protagoras--that he will not throw back his
pupils into the special arts--is represented by Plato as intended to
be an indirect censure on Hippias, then sitting by.]
[Side-note: Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable.
Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is
or not.]
_Sokr._--That is a fine talent indeed, which you possess, if you
_do_ possess it; for (to speak frankly) I thought that the thing
had not been teachable, nor intentionally communicable, by man to
man.[23] I will tell you why I think so. The Athenians are
universally recognised as intelligent men. Now when our public
assembly is convened, if the subject of debate be fortification,
ship-building, or any other specialty which they regard as learnable
and teachable, they will listen to no one except a professional
artist or craftsman.[24] If any non-professional man presumes to
advise them on the subject, they refuse to hear him, however rich and
well-born he may be. It is thus that they act in matters of any
special art;[25] but when the debate turns upon the general
administration of the city, they hear every man alike--the
brass-worker, leather-cutter, merchant, navigator, rich, poor,
well-born, low-born, &c. Against none of them is any exception taken,
as in the former case--that he comes to give advice on that which he has
not learnt, and on which he has had no master.[26] It is plain that
the public generally think it not teachable. Moreover our best and
wisest citizens, those who possess civic virtue in the highest
measure, cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue,
though they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which
paid masters can impart. Periklês and others, excellent citizens
themselves, have never been able to make any one else excellent,
either in or out of their own family. These reasons make me conclude
that social or political virtue is not teachable. I shall be glad if
you can show me that it is so.[27]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Protag. p. 319 B. [Greek: ou) didakto\n ei)=nai,
mêd' u(p' a)nthrô/pôn paraskeuasto\n a)nthrô/pois.]]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Protag. p. 319 C. [Greek: kai\ ta)/lla pa/nta
ou(/tôs, o(/sa ê(gou=ntai mathêta/ te kai\ didakta\ ei)=nai. e)a/n
de/ tis a)/llos e)picheirê=| au)toi=s sumbouleu/ein o(\n e)kei=noi
mê\ oi)/ontai dêmiourgo\n ei)=nai], &c.]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n ô(=n
_oi)/ontai e)n te/chnê| ei)=nai_, ou(/tô diapra/ttontai.]]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: kai\ tou/tois ou)dei\s
tou=to e)piplê/ssei ô(sper toi=s pro/teron, o(/ti ou)damo/then
mathô/n, ou)de\ o)/ntos didaska/lou ou)deno\s au)tô=|, e)/peita
sumbouleu/ein e)picheirei=; dê=lon ga\r o(/ti ou)ch ê(gou=ntai
didakto\n ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Protag. pp. 319-320.]
[Side-note: Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a
mythe.]
_Prot._--I will readily show you. But shall I, like an old man
addressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe?[28] or
shall I go through an expository discourse? The mythe perhaps will be
the more acceptable of the two.
[Footnote 28: Plato, Protag. p. 320 C. [Greek: po/teron u(mi=n, ô(s
presbu/teros neôte/rois, mu=thon le/gôn e)pidei/xô, ê)\ lo/gô|
diexelthô/n?]
It is probable that the Sophists often delivered illustrative mythes
or fables as a more interesting way of handling social matters before
an audience. Such was the memorable fable called the choice of
Hêraklês by Prodikus.]
[Side-note: Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods.
Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by
the latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus.]
There was once a time when Gods existed, but neither men nor
animals had yet come into existence. At the epoch prescribed by
Fate, the Gods fabricated men and animals in the interior of the
earth, out of earth, fire, and other ingredients: directing the
brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus to fit them out with suitable
endowments. Epimetheus, having been allowed by his brother to
undertake the task of distributing these endowments, did his work
very improvidently, wasted all his gifts upon the inferior animals,
and left nothing for man. When Prometheus came to inspect what had
been done, he found that other animals were adequately equipped, but
that man had no natural provision for clothing, shoeing, bedding, or
defence. The only way whereby Prometheus could supply the defect was,
by breaking into the common workshop of Athênê and Hephæstus, and
stealing from thence their artistic skill, together with fire.[29]
Both of these he presented to man, who was thus enabled to construct
for himself, by art, all that other animals received from nature and
more besides.
[Footnote 29: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322. [Greek: a)pori/a| ou)=n
e)cho/menos o( Promêtheu\s ê(/ntina sôtêri/an tô=| a)nthrô/pô|
eu(/roi, kle/ptei Ê(phai/stou kai\ A)thêna=s tê\n e(/ntechnon
sophi/an su\n puri/. . . . Tê\n me\n ou)=n peri\ to\n bi/on sophi/an
a)/nthrôpos tau/tê| e)/sche, tê\n de\ politikê\n ou)k ei)=chen; ê)=n
ga\r para\ tô=| Di/i+], &c.
If the reader will compare this with the doctrine delivered in the
Platonic Timæus--that the inferior animals spring from degenerate
men--he will perceive the entire variance between the two (Timæus,
pp. 91-92).]
[Side-note: Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of
individual wants, but could not give them the social art. Mankind are
on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions
essential for society.]
Still however, mankind did not possess the political or social art;
which Zeus kept in his own custody, where Prometheus could not reach
it. Accordingly, though mankind could provide for themselves as
individuals, yet when they attempted to form themselves into
communities, they wronged each other so much, from being destitute of
the political or social art, that they were presently forced again
into dispersion.[30] The art of war, too, being a part of the
political art, which mankind did not possess--they could not get up a
common defence against hostile animals: so that the human race would
have been presently destroyed, had not Zeus interposed to avert such
a consummation. He sent Hermês to mankind, bearing with him
Justice and the sense of Shame (or Moderation), as the bonds and
ornaments of civic society, coupling men in friendship.[31] Hermês
asked Zeus--Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among
mankind? Shall I distribute them in the same way as artistic skill is
distributed, only to a small number--a few accomplished physicians,
navigators, &c., being adequate to supply the wants of the entire
community? Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every
man? Undoubtedly, to every man (was the command of Zeus). All without
exception must be partakers in them. If they are confined exclusively
to a few, like artistic or professional skill, no community can
exist.[32] Ordain, by my authority, that every man, who cannot take a
share of his own in justice and the sense of shame, shall be slain,
as a nuisance to the community.
[Footnote 30: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B. [Greek: e)zê/toun dê\
a)throi/zesthai kai\ sô/zesthai kti/zontes po/leis; o(/t' ou)=n
a)throisthei=en, ê)di/koun a)llê/lous, a(/te ou)k e)/chontes tê\n
politikê\n te/chnên, ô(/ste pa/lin skedannu/menoi diephthei/ronto.]
Compare Plato, Republic, i. p. 351 C, p. 352 B, where Sokrates sets
forth a similar argument.]
[Footnote 31: Plato, Protagor. p. 322 C. [Greek: E(rmê=n pe/mpei
a)/gonta ei)s a)nthrô/pous ai)dô= te kai\ di/kên, i(/n' ei)=en
po/leôn ko/smoi te kai\ desmoi\ phili/as sunagôgoi/.]]
[Footnote 32: Plato, Protag. p. 322 C-D. [Greek: ei)=s e)/chôn
i)atrikê\n polloi=s i(kano\s i)diô/tais, kai\ oi( a)/lloi
dêmiourgoi/. kai\ di/kên dê\ kai\ ai)dô= ou(/tô thô= e)n toi=s
a)nthrô/pois, ê)\ e)pi\ pa/ntas nei/mô? E)pi\ pa/ntas, e)/phê o(
Zeu/s, kai\ pa/ntes metecho/ntôn; ou) ga\r a)\n ge/nointo po/leis,
ei) o)li/goi au)tô=n mete/choien ô(/sper a)/llôn technô=n. kai\
no/mon ge the\s par' e)mou=, to\n mê\ duna/menon ai)doou=s kai\
di/kês mete/chein, ktei/nein ô(s no/son po/leôs.]
We see by p. 323 A that [Greek: sôphrosu/nê] is employed as
substitute or equivalent for [Greek: ai)dô/s]: yet still [Greek:
ai)dô\s] is the proper word to express Plato's meaning, as it denotes
a distinct and positive regard to the feelings of others--a feeling
of pain in each man's mind, when he discovers or believes that he is
disapproved by his comrades. Hom. Il. O. 561--[Greek: ai)dô=
the/sth' e)ni\ thumô=| A)llê/lous t' ai)dei=sthe kata\ kratera\s
u(smi/nas.]]
[Side-note: Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse.
Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but
are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all.]
This fable will show you, therefore, Sokrates (continues Protagoras),
that the Athenians have good reason for making the distinction to
which you advert. When they are discussing matters of special art,
they will hear only the few to whom such matters are known. But when
they are taking counsel about social or political virtue, which
consists altogether in justice and moderation, they naturally hear
every one; since every one is presumed, as a condition of the
existence of the commonwealth, to be a partaker therein.[33]
Moreover, even though they know a man not to have these virtues in
reality, they treat him as insane if he does not proclaim himself to
have them, and make profession of virtue: whereas, in the case of the
special arts, if a man makes proclamation of his own skill as a
physician or musician, they censure or ridicule him.[34]
[Footnote 33: Plat. Prot. pp. 322-323.]
[Footnote 34: Plato, Protag. p. 323 C.]
[Side-note: Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of
punishment.]
Nevertheless, though they account this political or social virtue an
universal endowment, they are far from thinking that it comes
spontaneously or by nature. They conceive it to be generated by care
and teaching. For in respect of all those qualities which come by
nature or by accident, no one is ever angry with another or blames
another for being found wanting. An ugly, dwarfish, or sickly man is
looked upon simply with pity, because his defects are such as he
cannot help. But when any one manifests injustice or other qualities
the opposite of political virtue, then all his neighbours visit him
with indignation, censure, and perhaps punishment: implying clearly
their belief that this virtue is an acquirement obtained by care and
learning.[35] Indeed the whole institution of punishment has no other
meaning. It is in itself a proof that men think social virtue to be
acquirable and acquired. For no rational man ever punishes
malefactors because they _have_ done wrong, or simply with a
view to the past:--since what is already done cannot be undone. He
punishes with a view to the future, in order that neither the same
man, nor others who see him punished, may be again guilty of similar
wrong. This opinion plainly implies the belief, that virtue is
producible by training, since men punish for the purpose of
prevention.[36]
[Footnote 35: Plato, Protag. pp. 323-324.]
[Footnote 36: Plato, Protag. p. 324 A-B. [Greek: ou)dei\s ga\r
kola/zei tou\s a)dikou=ntas pro\s tou/tô| to\n nou=n e)/chôn kai\
tou/tou e(/neka o(/ti ê)di/kêsen, o(/stis mê\ ô(/sper thêri/on
a)logi/stôs timôrei=tai; o( de\ meta\ lo/gou e)picheirô=n kola/zein
ou) tou= parelêlutho/tos e(/neka a)dikê/matos timôrei=tai--ou) ga\r
a)\n to/ ge prachthe\n a)ge/nêton thei/ê--a)lla\ tou= me/llontos
cha/rin, i(/na mê\ au)=this a)dikê/sê| mê/te au)to\s ou(=tos mê/te
a)/llos o( tou=ton i)dô\n kolasthe/nta. kai\ toiau/tên ei)=nai
a)retê/n; _a)potropê=s gou=n e(/neka kola/zei_.]
This clear and striking exposition of the theory of punishment is one
of the most memorable passages in Plato, or in any ancient author.
And if we are to believe the words which immediately follow, it was
the theory universally accepted at that time--[Greek: tau/tên ou)=n
tê\n do/xan pa/ntes e)/chousin, o(/soi per timôrou=ntai kai\ i)di/a|
kai\ dêmosi/a|.] Compare Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933, where the same
doctrine is announced: Seneca, De Irâ, i. 16. "Nam, ut Plato ait,
nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Revocari enim
præterita non possunt: futura prohibentur." Steinhart (Einleit. zum
Protag. p. 423) pronounces a just encomium upon this theory of
punishment, which, as he truly observes, combines together the
purposes declared in the two modern theories--Reforming and
Deterring. He says further, however, that the same theory of
punishment reappears in the Gorgias, which I do not think exact. The
purpose of punishment, as given in the Gorgias, is simply to cure a
distempered patient of a terrible distemper, and thus to confer great
benefit on him--but without any allusion to tutelary results as
regards society.]
[Side-note: Why eminent men cannot make their sons
eminent.]
I come now to your remaining argument, Sokrates. You urge that
citizens of eminent civil virtue cannot communicate that virtue to
their own sons, to whom nevertheless they secure all the
accomplishments which masters can teach. Now I have already shown you
that civil virtue is the one accomplishment needful,[37] which every
man without exception must possess, on pain of punishment or final
expulsion, if he be without it. I have shown you, moreover that every
one believes it to be communicable by teaching and attention. How can
you believe then that these excellent fathers teach their sons other
things, but do not teach them this, the want of which entails such
terrible penalties?
[Footnote 37: Plato, Protag. p. 324 E. [Greek: Po/teron e)/sti ti
e(/n, ê)\ ou)k e)/stin, ou)= a)nagkai=on pa/ntas tou\s poli/tas
mete/chein, ei)/per me/llei po/lis ei)=nai? e)n tou/tô| ga\r au(/tê
lu/etai ê( a)pori/a ê(\n su\ a)porei=s.]]
[Side-note: Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws,
dikastery, &c.]
The fact is, they _do_ teach it: and that too with great
pains.[38] They begin to admonish and lecture their children, from
the earliest years. Father, mother, tutor, nurse, all vie with each
other to make the child as good as possible: by constantly telling
him on every occasion which arises, This is right--That is
wrong--This is honourable--That is mean--This is holy--That is unholy--Do
these things, abstain from those.[39] If the child obeys them, it is
well: if he do not, they straighten or rectify him, like a crooked
piece of wood, by reproof and flogging. Next, they send him to a
schoolmaster, who teaches him letters and the harp; but who is
enjoined to take still greater pains in watching over his orderly
behaviour. Here the youth is put to read, learn by heart, and recite,
the compositions of able poets; full of exhortations to excellence
and of stirring examples from the good men of past times.[40] On the
harp also, he learns the best songs, his conduct is strictly watched,
and his emotions are disciplined by the influence of rhythmical and
regular measure. While his mind is thus trained to good, he is sent
besides to the gymnastic trainer, to render his body a suitable
instrument for it,[41] and to guard against failure of energy
under the obligations of military service. If he be the son of a
wealthy man, he is sent to such training sooner, and remains in it
longer. As soon as he is released from his masters, the city publicly
takes him in hand, compelling him to learn the laws prescribed by old
and good lawgivers,[42] to live according to their prescriptions, and
to learn both command and obedience, on pain of being punished. Such
then being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster
virtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? You
might much rather wonder if it were not so.[43]
[Footnote 38: Plato, Protag. p. 325 B.]
[Footnote 39: Plato, Protag. p. 325 D. [Greek: par' e(/kaston kai\
e)/rgon kai\ lo/gon dida/skontes kai\ e)ndeiknu/menoi o(/ti to\ me\n
di/kaion, to\ de\ a)/dikon, kai\ to/de me\n kalo/n, to/de de\
ai)schro/n], &c.]
[Footnote 40: Plato, Protag. p. 325 E--326 A. [Greek: paratithe/asin
au)toi=s e)pi\ tô=n ba/thrôn a)naginô/skein poiêtô=n a)gathô=n
poiê/mata kai\ e)kmantha/nein a)nagka/zousin, e)n oi(=s pollai\ me\n
nouthetê/seis e)/neisi, pollai\ de\ die/xodoi kai\ e)/painoi kai\
e)gkô/mia palaiô=n a)ndrô=n a)gathô=n, i(/na o( pai=s zêlô=n mimê=tai
kai\ o)re/gêtai toiou=tos gene/sthai.]]
[Footnote 41: Plato, Protag. p. 326 B. [Greek: i(/na ta\ sô/mata
belti/ô e)/chontes u(pêretô=si tê=| dianoi/a| chrêstê=| ou)/sê|],
&c.]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Protag. p. 326 D. [Greek: no/mous u(pogra/psasa,
a)gathô=n kai\ palaiô=n nomothetô=n eu(rê/mata], &c.]
[Footnote 43: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E.]
[Side-note: All learn virtue from the same teaching by all.
Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his
own individual aptitude.]
How does it happen, then, you ask, that excellent men so frequently
have worthless sons, to whom, even with all virtue from these
precautions, they cannot teach their own virtue? This is not
surprising, when you recollect what I have just said--That in regard
to social virtue, every man must be a craftsman and producer; there
must be no non-professional consumers.[44] All of us are interested
in rendering our neighbours just and virtuous, as well as in keeping
them so. Accordingly, every one, instead of being jealous, like a
professional artist, of seeing his own accomplishments diffused,
stands forward zealously in teaching justice and virtue to every one
else, and in reproving all short-comers.[45] Every man is a teacher
of virtue to others: every man learns his virtue from such general
teaching, public and private. The sons of the best men learn it in
this way, as well as others. The instruction of their fathers counts
for comparatively little, amidst such universal and paramount
extraneous influence; so that it depends upon the aptitude and
predispositions of the sons themselves, whether they turn out better
or worse than others. The son of a superior man will often turn out
ill; while the son of a worthless man will prove meritorious. So
the case would be, if playing on the flute were the one thing needful
for all citizens; if every one taught and enforced flute-playing upon
all others, and every one learnt it from the teaching of all
others.[46] You would find that the sons of good or bad flute-players
would turn out good or bad, not in proportion to the skill of their
fathers, but according to their own natural aptitudes. You would find
however also, that all of them, even the most unskilful, would be
accomplished flute-players, if compared with men absolutely untaught,
who had gone through no such social training. So too, in regard to
justice and virtue.[47] The very worst man brought up in your society
and its public and private training, would appear to you a craftsman
in these endowments, if you compared him with men who had been
brought up without education, without laws, without dikasteries,
without any general social pressure bearing on them, to enforce
virtue: such men as the savages exhibited last year in the comedy of
Pherekrates at the Lenæan festival. If you were thrown among such
men, you, like the chorus of misanthropes in that play, would look
back with regret even upon the worst criminals of the society which
you had left, such as Eurybatus and Phrynondas.[48]
[Footnote 44: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E. [Greek: o(/ti tou/tou tou=
pra/gmatos, tê=s a)retê=s, ei) me/llei po/lis ei)=nai, ou)de/na dei=
_i)diôteu/ein_.]
It is to be regretted that there is no precise word to translate
exactly the useful antithesis between [Greek: i)diô/tês] and [Greek:
techni/tês] or [Greek: dêmiourgo/s].]
[Footnote 45: Plato, Protag. p. 327 A. [Greek: ei) kai\ tou=to kai\
i)di/a| kai\ dêmosi/a| pa=s pa/nta kai\ e)di/daske kai\ e)pe/plêtte
to\n mê\ kalô=s au)lou=nta, kai\ mê\ e)phtho/nei tou/tou, ô(/sper
nu=n tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ tô=n nomi/môn ou)dei\s phthonei= ou)d'
a)pokru/ptetai, ô(/sper tô=n a)/llôn technêma/tôn--lusitelei= ga\r,
oi)=mai, ê(mi=n ê( a)llê/lôn dikaiosu/nê kai\ a)retê\; dia\ tau=ta
pa=s panti\ prothu/môs le/gei kai\ dida/skei kai\ ta\ di/kaia kai\
ta\ no/mima.]]
[Footnote 46: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C.]
[Footnote 47: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C-D. [Greek: O(/stis soi
a)dikô/tatos phai/netai a)/nthrôpos tô=n e)n no/mois kai\
a)nthrô/pois tethramme/nôn, di/kaion au)to\n ei)=nai kai\
_dêmiourgo\n tou/tou tou= pra/gmatos_, ei) de/oi au)to\n
kri/nesthai pro\s a)nthrô/pous, oi(=s mê/te paidei/a e)sti\ mê/te
dikastê/ria mê/te no/moi mê/te a)na/gkê mêdemi/a dia\ panto\s
a)nagka/zoousa a)retê=s e)pimelei=sthai.]]
[Footnote 48: Plato, Protag. p. 327 D.]
[Side-note: Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special
teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than
others.]
But now, Sokrates, you are over-nice, because all of us are teachers
of virtue, to the best of every man's power; while no particular
individual appears to teach it specially and _ex professo_[49]
By the same analogy, if you asked who was the teacher for speaking
our vernacular Greek, no one special person could be pointed out:[50]
nor would you find out who was the finishing teacher for those sons
of craftsmen who learnt the rudiments of their art from their own
fathers--while if the son of any non-professional person learns a
craft, it is easy to assign the person by whom he was taught.[51]
So it is in respect to virtue. All of us teach and enforce
virtue to the best of our power; and we ought to be satisfied if
there be any one of us ever so little superior to the rest, in the
power of teaching it. Of such men I believe myself to be one.[52] I
can train a man into an excellent citizen, better than others, and in
a manner worthy not only of the fee which I ask, but even of a still
greater remuneration, in the judgment of the pupil himself. This is
the stipulation which I make with him: when he has completed his
course, he is either to pay me the fee which I shall demand--or if he
prefers, he may go into a temple, make oath as to his own estimate of
the instruction imparted to him, and pay me according to that
estimate.[53]
[Footnote 49: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: nu=n de\ trupha=|s,
ô)= Sô/krates, dio/ti pa/ntes dida/skaloi/ ei)sin a)retê=s, kath'
o(/son du/natai e(/kastos, kai\ ou)dei/s soi phai/netai.]]
[Footnote 50: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: ei)=th' ô(/s per a)\n
ei) zêtoi=s ti/s dida/skalos tou= e(llêni/zein, ou)d' a)\n ei(=s
phanei/ê.]]
[Footnote 51: Plato, Protag. p. 328 A.]
[Footnote 52: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B. [Greek: A)lla\ ka)\n ei)
o)li/gon e)/sti tis o(/stis diaphe/rei ê(mô=n probiba/sai ei)s
a)retê/n, a)gapêto/n. Ô(=n dê\ e)gô\ oi)=mai ei(=s ei)=nai],
&c.]
[Footnote 53: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B.]
[Side-note: The sons of great artists do not themselves become
great artists.]
I have thus proved to you, Sokrates--That virtue is teachable--That
the Athenians account it to be teachable--That there is nothing
wonderful in finding the sons of good men worthless, and the sons of
worthless men good. Indeed this is true no less about the special
professions, than about the common accomplishment, virtue. The sons
of Polyklêtus the statuary, and of many other artists, are nothing as
compared with their fathers.[54]
[Footnote 54: Plato, Protag. p. 328 C.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain
the manner in which the established sentiment of a community
propagates and perpetuates itself.]
Such is the discourse composed by Plato and attributed to the
Platonic Protagoras--showing that virtue is teachable, and intended
to remove the difficulties proposed by Sokrates. It is an exposition
of some length: and because it is put into the mouth of a Sophist,
many commentators presume, as a matter of course, that it must be a
manifestation of some worthless quality:[55] that it is either empty
verbiage, or ostentatious self-praise, or low-minded immorality. I am
unable to perceive in the discourse any of these demerits. I think it
one of the best parts of the Platonic writings, as an exposition
of the growth and propagation of common sense--the common,
established, ethical and social sentiment, among a community:
sentiment neither dictated in the beginning, by any scientific or
artistic lawgiver, nor personified in any special guild of craftsmen
apart from the remaining community--nor inculcated by any formal
professional teachers--nor tested by analysis--nor verified by
comparison with any objective standard: but self-sown and
self-asserting, stamped, multiplied, and kept in circulation, by the
unpremeditated conspiracy of the general[56] public--the omnipresent
agency of King Nomos and his numerous volunteers.
[Footnote 55: So Serranus (ad 326 E), who has been followed by many
later critics. "Quæstio est, Virtusne doceri possit? Quod instituit
demonstrare Sophista, sed ineptissimis argumentis et quæ contra
seipsum faciant."
To me this appears the reverse of the truth. But even if it were
true, no blame could fall on Protagoras. We should only be warranted
in concluding that it suited the scheme of Plato here to make him
talk nonsense.]
[Footnote 56: This is what the Platonic Sokrates alludes to in the
Phædon and elsewhere. [Greek: oi( tê\n dêmotikê\n te kai\ politikê\n
a)retê\n e)pitetêdeuko/tes, ê(\n dê\ kalou=si sôphrosu/nên te kai\
dikaiosu/nêv, e)x e)/thous te kai\ mele/tês gegonui=an, a)/neu
philosophi/as te kai\ nou=.] Phædon, p. 82 B; compare the same
dialogue, p. 68 C; also Republic, x. p. 619 C--[Greek: e)/thei a)/neu
philosophi/as a)retê=s meteilêpho/ta].]
The account given by Mr. James Mill (Fragment on Mackintosh, p.
259-260) of the manner in which the established morality of a society
is transmitted and perpetuated, coincides completely with the discourse
of the Platonic Protagoras. The passage is too long to be cited: I
give here only the concluding words, which describe the [Greek:
dêmotikê\ a)retê\ a)/neu philosophi/as]--
"In this manner it is that men, in the social state, acquire the
habits of moral acting, and certain affections connected with it,
before they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which
recommend the acts either to praise or blame. Nearly at this point
the greater part of them remain: continuing to perform moral acts and
to abstain from the contrary, chiefly from the habits which they have
acquired, and the authority upon which they originally acted: though
it is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing
of reason, without perceiving at least in an indistinct and general
way, the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one
another in one way rather than another."]
[Side-note: Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether
virtue is to be assimilated to a special art.]
In many of the Platonic dialogues, Sokrates is made to dwell upon the
fact that there are no recognised professional teachers of virtue;
and to ground upon this fact a doubt, whether virtue be really
teachable. But the present dialogue is the only one in which the fact
is accounted for, and the doubt formally answered. There are neither
special teachers, nor professed pupils, nor determinate periods of
study, nor definite lessons or stadia, for the acquirement of virtue,
as there are for a particular art or craft: the reason being, that in
that department every man must of necessity be a practitioner, more
or less perfectly: every man has an interest in communicating it to
his neighbour: hence every man is constantly both teacher and
learner. Herein consists one main and real distinction between virtue
and the special arts; an answer to the view most frequently
espoused by the Platonic Sokrates, assimilating virtue to a
professional craft, which ought to have special teachers, and a
special season of apprenticeship, if it is to be acquired at all.
The speech is censured by some critics as prolix. But to me it seems
full of matter and argument, exceedingly free from superfluous
rhetoric. The fable with which it opens presents of course the
poetical ornament which belongs to that manner of handling. It is
however fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm--in my
judgment, it is even superior to any other fable in Plato.
[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse
of Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some
of the fundamental assumptions.]
When the harangue, lecture, or sermon, of Protagoras is concluded,
Sokrates both expresses his profound admiration of it, and admits the
conclusion--That virtue is teachable--to be made out, as well as it
can be made out by any continuous exposition.[57] In fact, the
speaker has done all that could be done by Perikles or the best
orator of the assembly. He has given a long series of reasonings in
support of his own case, without stopping to hear the doubts of
opponents. He has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public
sentiment, accepting all the established beliefs--appealing to his
hearers with all those familiar phrases, round which the most
powerful associations are grouped--and taking for granted that
justice, virtue, good, evil, &c., are known, indisputable,
determinate data, fully understood, and unanimously interpreted. He
has shown that the community take great pains, both publicly and
privately, to inculcate and enforce virtue: that is, what _they_
believe in and esteem as virtue. But is their belief well founded? Is
that which they esteem, really virtue? Do they and their elegant
spokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? If so, _how_ do they
know it, and can they explain it?
[Footnote 57: Plato, Protag. pp. 328-329.
Very different indeed is the sentiment of the principal Platonic
commentators. Schleiermacher will not allow the mythus of Protagoras
to be counted among the Platonic mythes: he says that it is composed
in the style of Protagoras, and perhaps copied from some real
composition of that Sophist. He finds in it nothing but a
"grobmaterialistiche Denkungsart, die über die sinnliche Erfahrung
nicht hinaus philosophirt" (Einleitung zum Protagoras, vol. i. pp.
233-234).
To the like purpose Ast (Plat. Leb. p. 71)--who tells us that what is
expressed in the mythus is, "the vulgar and mean sentiment and manner
of thought of the Sophist: for it deduces every thing, both arts and
the social union itself, from human wants and necessity". Apparently
these critics, when they treat this as a proof of meanness and
vulgarity, have forgotten that the Platonic Sokrates himself does
exactly the same thing in the Republic--deriving the entire social
union from human necessities (Republ. ii. 369 C).
K. F. Hermann is hardly less severe upon the Protagorean discourse
(Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 460).
For my part, I take a view altogether opposed to these learned
persons. I think the discourse one of the most striking and
instructive portions of the Platonic writings: and if I could believe
that it was the composition of Protagoras himself, my estimation of
him would be considerably raised.
Steinhart pronounces a much more rational and equitable judgment than
Ast and Schleiermacher, upon the discourse of Protagoras (Einleitung
zum Prot. pp. 422-423).]
[Side-note: One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast
continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer.]
This is the point upon which Sokrates now brings his Elenchus to
bear: his method of short question and answer. We have seen what long
continuous speaking can do: we have now to see what short
cross-questioning can do. The antithesis between the two is at least
one main purpose of Plato--if it be not even _the_ purpose (as
Schleiermacher supposes it to be) in this memorable dialogue.
[Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and
indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are
homogeneous or heterogeneous?]
After your copious exposition, Protagoras (says Sokrates), I have
only one little doubt remaining, which you will easily explain.[58]
You have several times spoken of justice, moderation, holiness,
&c., as if they all, taken collectively, made up virtue. Do you
mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote
distinct parts of it? Or are the three names all equivalent to
virtue, different names for one and are the same thing?
_Prot._--They are names signifying distinct parts of virtue.
_Sokr._--Are these parts like the parts of the face,--eyes, nose,
mouth, ears--each part not only distinct from the rest, but having
its own peculiar properties? Or are they like the parts of gold,
homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in
magnitude? _Prot._--The former. _Sokr._--Then some men may possess one
part, some another. Or is it necessary that he who possesses one
part, should possess all? _Prot._--By no means necessary. Some
men are courageous, but unjust: others are just, but not intelligent.
_Sokr._--Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of
virtue? _Prot._--They are so. Wisdom is the greatest of the
parts: but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another: each
of them has its own peculiar property.[59]
[Footnote 58: Plato, Protag. pp. 328 E--329 B. [Greek: plê\n smikro/n
ti/ moi e)mpodô/n, o(\ dê=lon o(/ti Prôtago/ras r(a|di/ôs
e)pekdida/xei. . . . smikrou= tinos e)ndeê/s ei)mi pa/nt' e)/chein],
&c.]
[Footnote 59: Plato, Protag, pp. 329-330.]
[Side-note: Whether justice is just, and holiness holy?
How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an
answer, "If you please".]
_Sokr._--Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these
parts is. Tell me--is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is
some thing: are you of the same opinion?[60] _Prot._--Yes.
_Sokr._--Now this thing which you call _justice_: is it
itself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you
say?[61] _Prot._--I think so too. _Sokr._--Holiness also is
some thing: is the thing called _holiness_, itself holy or
unholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should
reply--Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness
itself be not holy. Would you say the same?
_Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--Justice being admitted to be just,
and holiness to be holy--do not you think that justice also is holy,
and that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your
former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any
other part? _Prot._--I do not altogether admit that justice is
holy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment:
if you please, let both of them stand as admitted. _Sokr._--Not
so:[62] I do not want the debate to turn upon an "If you please": You
and I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best
without "Ifs". _Prot._--I say then that justice and holiness are
indeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point
of analogy between white and black,[63] hard and soft, and between
many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally.
_Sokr._--Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a
small point of analogy between them? _Prot._--Not exactly so:
but I do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the
other. _Sokr._--Well then! since you seem to follow with
some repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.[64]
[Footnote 60: Plato, Protag. p. 330 B. [Greek: koinê=| skepsô/metha
_poi=o/n ti au)tô=n e)stin e(/kaston_. prô=ton me\n to\
toio/nde; ê( dikaiosu/nê pra=gma/ ti/ e)stin? ê)\ ou)de\n pra=gma?
e)moi\ me\n ga\r dokei=; ti/ de\ soi/?]]
[Footnote 61: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C. [Greek: tou=to to\ pra=gma o(/
ô)noma/sate a)/rti, ê( dikaiosu/nê, au)to\ tou=to di/kaio/n e)stin
ê)\ a)/dikon?]]
[Footnote 62: Plato, Protag. p. 331 C. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei,
e)/stô ê(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/nê o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tês di/kaion. Mê/
moi, ê(=n d' e)gô/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "ei/ bou/lei" tou=to
kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te kai\
se/.]
This passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of
Protagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion. The
[Greek: a)kribologi/a] of Sokrates and Plato was not merely
unfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men.
Protagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions
drawn by Sokrates too nice, not worth attending to. Many of the
contemporaries of both shared this opinion. One purpose of our
dialogue is to bring such antitheses into view.]
[Footnote 63: Plat. Prot. p. 331 D.]
[Footnote 64: Plat. Prot. p. 332 A.]
[Side-note: Intelligence and moderation are identical, because
they have the same contrary.]
Sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are
identical with each other ([Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek:
sôphrosu/nê]). The proof which he produces, elicited by several
questions, is--that both the one and the other are contrary to folly
([Greek: a)phrosu/nê]), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have
more than one single contrary.[65]
[Footnote 65: Plat. Protag. p. 332.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom
cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.]
Sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving
all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same
thing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice
and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:[66] though
we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by
Protagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the
other is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the
maxim--that nothing can have more than one single contrary--Plato seems
to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different
senses. Because the term folly ([Greek: a)phrosu/nê]), is used
sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation ([Greek:
sôphrosu/nê]), sometimes the opposite of intelligence ([Greek:
sophi/a]), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are
the same thing.[67] Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of
the other point, _viz._: That holiness and justice are the same,
or as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is
assumed to form the proof, _viz._: That holiness is holy, and
that justice is just--is either tautological, or unmeaning; and
cannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile,
that if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras and not in that
of Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an
illustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore
little has been done to elucidate the important question to which
Sokrates addresses himself--What is the extent of analogy between the
different virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under
different names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist?
[Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 338 B. [Greek: sche/don ti tau)to\n
o)/n.]]
[Footnote 67: Aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as
this. One important point (as I have already remarked, vol. ii. p.
170) in which he is superior to Plato is, in being far more careful
to distinguish the different meanings of the same word--[Greek: ta\
pollachô=s lego/mena]. Plato rarely troubles himself to notice such
distinction, and seems indeed generally unaware of it. He constantly
ridicules Prodikus, who tried to distinguish words apparently
synonymous.]
[Side-note: Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated.]
But though little progress has been made in determining the question
mooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify
Protagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man,
so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the
analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of
promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very
subjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself
brought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion
which--whether conclusively proved or not--is proved in a manner binding
upon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He
becomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing
reluctance,[68] and is at last so provoked as to break out of the
limits imposed upon a respondent.
[Footnote 68: Plato, Protag. pp. 333 B, 335 A.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose
is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry
prolixity.]
Meanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that
justice ([Greek: dikaiosu/nê]) and moderation ([Greek: sôphrosu/nê])
are identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with
moderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the
affirmative, though many people say so. _Sokr._--It is
indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only
you consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion
itself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the
questioner, and the respondent along with me, undergo examination at
the same time.[69] You answer then (though without adopting the
opinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation,
or with intelligence: that is, that they follow a wise policy in
committing injustice. _Prot._--Be it so. _Sokr._--You admit
too that there exist certain things called good things. Are those
things good, which are profitable to mankind? _Prot._--By Zeus,
I call some things good, even though they be not profitable to men
(replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).[70] _Sokr._--Do
you mean those things which are not profitable to any _man_, or
those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call
these latter _good_ also? _Prot._--Not at all: but there
are many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to
different animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and
heterogeneous.[71]
[Footnote 69: Plato, Protag. p. 333 C. [Greek: to\n ga\r lo/gon
e)/gôge ma/lista e)xeta/zô, sumbai/nei me/ntoi i)/sôs kai\ e)me\ to\n
e)rôtô=nta kai\ to\n e)rôtô/menon e)xeta/zesthai.]
Here again we find Plato drawing special attention to the conditions
of dialectic debate.]
[Footnote 70: Plato, Protag. p. 333 E.]
[Footnote 71: Plato, Protag. p. 334 B. [Greek: Ou(/tô de\ poiki/lon
ti/ e)sti to\ a)gatho\n kai\ pantodapo/n], &c.
The explanation here given by Protagoras of _good_ is the same
as that which is given by the historical Sokrates himself in the
Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 8). Things called good are diverse in
the highest degree; but they are all called _good_ because they
all contribute in some way to human security, relief, comfort, or
prosperity. To one or other of these ends _good_, in all its
multifarious forms, is relative.]
[Side-note: Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as
inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates
rises to depart.]
Protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable
length, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the
hearers.[72] Upon this Sokrates replies, "I am a man of short memory,
and if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you
wish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers."
_Prot._--What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers?
Do you mean shorter than the case requires? _Sokr._--No,
certainly not. _Prot._--But who is to be judge of the brevity
necessary, you or I? _Sokr._--I have understood that you profess
to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech:
what I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect
me to follow you. _Prot._--Why, Sokrates, I have carried on many
debates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked
just as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any
reputation at all. _Sokr._--Be it so: in that case I must
retire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make
long speeches, nor follow them.[73]
[Footnote 72: Plato, Protag. p. 334 D.]
[Footnote 73: Plato, Prot. pp. 334 E, 335 A-C.]
[Side-note: Interference of Kallias to get the debate
continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that
Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.]
Here Sokrates rises to depart; but Kallias, the master of the house,
detains him, and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be
continued. A promiscuous conversation ensues, in which most persons
present take part. Alkibiades, as the champion of Sokrates, gives,
what seems really to be the key of the dialogue, when he says--"Sokrates
admits that he has no capacity for long speaking, and that he is no
match therein for Protagoras. But as to dialectic debate, or
administering and resisting cross-examination, I should be surprised
if any one were a match for him. If Protagoras admits that on this
point he is inferior, Sokrates requires no more: if he does not, let
him continue the debate: but he must not lengthen his answers so that
hearers lose the thread of the subject."
[Side-note: Claim of a special _locus standi_ and
professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.]
This remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan
of Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose--if not the main
purpose--of Plato in the dialogue. "Sokrates acknowledges the
superiority of Protagoras in rhetoric: if Protagoras acknowledges the
superiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied."[74] An
express _locus standi_ is here claimed for dialectic, and a
recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground.
Protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short
speech: but in the last he must recognise a superior.
[Footnote 74: Plat. Prot. p. 336 C-D.]
[Side-note: Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and
invites Protagoras to question him.]
Kritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his
own) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both
parties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be
continued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet on condition
that Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the
dialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as
long as he pleases: when he has finished, I will question him. The
Sophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance
of those around, to accede to this proposition.[75]
[Footnote 75: Plat. Prot. pp. 337-338.]
[Side-note: Protagoras extols the importance of knowing
the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of
Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.]
For the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of
Simonides: prefacing it with a remark, that the most important
accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master
of the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them
correctly, and answer all questions respecting them.[76] Sokrates
intimates that he knows and admires the song: upon which Protagoras
proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other,
and asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.[77]
The latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikus;
who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen
Simonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid
and ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,[78] with
disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the
song, but without promise of any result--Sokrates offers to give an
exposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that
the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment
which Protagoras had so emphatically extolled--complete mastery of
the works of the poets.[79]
[Footnote 76: Plat. Prot. p. 339 A. [Greek: ê(gou=mai e)gô\ a)ndri\
paidei/as me/giston me/ros ei)=nai, peri\ e)pô=n deino\n ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 77: Plat. Prot. p. 339 C-D.]
[Footnote 78: Plat. Prot. pp. 340-341.]
[Footnote 79: Plat. Prot. p. 342 A. [Greek: ei) bou/lei labei=n mou
pei=ran o(/pôs e)/chô, o(\ su\ le/geis tou=to, peri\ e)pô=n.]]
[Side-note: Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of
the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous
concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.]
He then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of
which appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first
speech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had
represented that the sophistical art was ancient:[80] and that
the poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium
of the name, and professed a different avocation with another title.
Sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in
Krete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not
distinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well
as male, in those regions, than anywhere else: but that they
concealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy
them and acquire the like eminence:[81] that they pretended to
devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic--a pretence
whereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The
special characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short
and emphatic speech--epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and
thoroughly prostrating an opponent.[82] The Seven Wise Men, among
whom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme
excellence: which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief
aphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus
acquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and
composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him.
Having stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going
through the song, with exposition and criticism of several different
passages.[83] As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias[84]
compliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on
the same song: which he would willingly deliver: but Alkibiades and
the rest beg him to postpone it.
[Footnote 80: Plat. Prot. pp. 316-317.]
[Footnote 81: Plat. Prot. p. 342.]
[Footnote 82: Plat. Prot. p. 342 E, 343 B-C. [Greek: O(/ti ou(=tos o(
tro/pos ê)=n tô=n palaiô=n tê=s philosophi/as, brachulogi/a tis
Lakônikê/.]]
[Footnote 83: Plat. Prot. pp. 344-347.]
[Footnote 84: Plat. Prot. p. 347.]
[Side-note: Character of this speech--its connection with the
dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in
continuous speech.]
No remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance
that Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here
delivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and
more than half as long as the second, which contains a large
theory--nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the
Simonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced--so
violent in distorting the meaning of the poet--so evidently
predetermined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a
lyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince[85]--that if such an
exposition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics
would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest
perversions by the Sophists.[86] It appears as if Plato, intending in
this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous
speech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras,
and short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by
Sokrates--having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part
of the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own
accomplishment--has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a
pleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par.
And if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced
comparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans)--we must
remember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with
Protagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the
weapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive
triumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he
seems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a
rhetorician.
[Footnote 85: Especially his explanation of [Greek: e(kô\n e)rdê=|]
(p. 345 D.). Heyne (Opuscula, i. p. 160) remarks upon the strange
interpretation given by Sokrates of the Simonidean song. Compare
Plato in Lysis, p. 212 E, and in Alkib. ii. p. 147 D. In both these
cases, Sokrates cites passages of poetry, assigning to them a sense
which their authors plainly did not intend them to bear. Heindorf in
his note on the Lysis (l. c.) observes--"Videlicet, ut exeat
sententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram,
neglecto plané sermonis usu, hanc statuit.--Cujusmodi
interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in Alcib. ii. p. 147
D."
See also Heindorf's notes on the Charmidês, p. 163 B; Lachês, p. 191
B; and Lysis, p. 214 D.
M. Boeckh observes (ad Pindar. Isthm. v. p. 528) respecting an
allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod--
"Num malé intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba
Hesiodi? Non credo: sed bene sciens, consulto alium sensum intulit,
suo consilio accommodatum! Simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor
Plato Theætet. p. 155 D." Stallbaum in his note on the Theætêtus
adopts this remark of Boeckh. Groen van Prinsterer gives a similar
opinion. (Prosopographia Platonica, p. 17.)]
[Footnote 86: K. F. Hermann observes (Gesch. der Plat. Philos, p.
460) that Sokrates, in his interpretation of the Simonidean song,
shows that he can play the Sophist as well as other people can.]
[Side-note: Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the
poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from
themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the
task of answering.]
Moreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of
poetical lore ([Greek: peri\ e)pô=n deino\s]), he at the same time
claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way. He considers
the poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things
without rational understanding (we have seen this in the Apology and
the Ion)--or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth
lying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both
these views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here
represented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are
here contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets.
Protagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of
instruction: and seek to interpret them literally, as an
intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or
recited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the
usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on
the contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal
distinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own
purpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men,
and even as inspired men in whose verses wisdom and virtue must be
embodied and discoverable[87]--only that they are given in an obscure
and enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination
of the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is
for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of
them. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He
discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts ([Greek:
u(ponoi/as]):[88] distinctions of Platonic Metaphysics (between
[Greek: ei)=nai] and [Greek: gene/sthai]), and principles of Platonic
Ethics ([Greek: ou)dei\s e(/kô kako/s])--he proceeds to point out
passages in which they are to be found, and explains the song
conformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning
and verbal structure.[89] But though Sokrates accepts, when required,
the task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them
according to his own point of view--yet he presently lets us see that
they are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by
himself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted
shall be resumed and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent.
"To debate about the compositions of poets" (says Sokrates), "is to
proceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets: where
they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls.
Noble and well-educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to
interest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so
much wine.[90] Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by
singers nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they
mean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one
to mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any
decisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay
aside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you
wish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent
to answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a
close."[91]
[Footnote 87: See Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 A-B; Apol. p. 22 B-C; Ion,
pp. 533-534.
Compare the distinction drawn in Timæus, p. 72 A-B, between the
[Greek: ma/ntis] and the [Greek: prophê/tês].]
[Footnote 88: About the [Greek: u(po/noiai] ascribed to the poets,
see Repub. ii. p. 378 D.; Xen. Sympos. iii. 6; and F. A. Wolf,
Prolegom. Homer. p. clxii.-clxiv.
F. A. Wolf remarks, respecting the various allegorical
interpretations of Homer and other Greek poets--
"Sed nec prioribus illis, sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua
ipsi crediderunt, sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt, idonea
deest excusatio. Ita enim ratio comparata est, ut libris, quos a
teneris statim annis cognoscimus, omnes propé nostras nostræque
ætatis opiniones subjiciamus: ac si illi jampridem populari usu
consecrati sunt, ipsa obstat veneratio, quominus in iis absurda et
ridicula inesse credamus. Lenimus ergo atque adeo ornamus
interpretando, quicquid proprio sensu non ferendum videtur. Atque ita
factum est omni tempore in libris iis, qui pro sacris habiti sunt."
The distinction was similar in character, and even more marked in
respect of earnest reciprocal antipathy, between the different
schools of the Jews in Alexandria and Palestine about the
interpretation of the Pentateuch. 1. Those who interpreted literally,
[Greek: kata\ tê\n r(êtê\n dia/noian]. 2. Those who set aside the
literal interpretation, and explained the text upon a philosophy of
their own, above the reach of the vulgar (Eusebius, Præp. Ev. viii.
10). Some admitted both the two interpretations, side by side.
Respecting these allegorising schools of the Hellenistic Jews, from
Aristobulus (150 B.C.) down to Philo, see the learned and
valuable work of Gfrörer--_Philo und die Jüdisch.-Alexandr.
Theosophie_, vol. i. pp. 84-86, ii. p. 356 seq.]