EUTHYDEMUS.
[Side-note: Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus.
Judgments of various critics.]
Dramatic vivacity, and comic force, holding up various persons to
ridicule or contempt, are attributes which Plato manifests often and
abundantly. But the dialogue in which these qualities reach their
maximum, is, the Euthydêmus. Some portions of it approach to the
Nubes of Aristophanes: so that Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other
admiring critics have some difficulty in explaining, to their own
satisfaction,[1] how Plato, the sublime moralist and lawgiver, can
here have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery. Ast even rejects
the dialogue as spurious; declaring it to be unworthy of Plato and
insisting on various peculiarities, defects, and even absurdities,
which offend his critical taste. His conclusion in this case has
found no favour: yet I think it is based on reasons quite as forcible
as those upon which other dialogues have been condemned:[2] upon
reasons, which, even if admitted, might prove that the dialogue was
an inferior performance, but would not prove that Plato was not the
author.
[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Euthydemos, vol. iii. pp.
400-403-407; Stallbaum. Proleg. in Euthydem. p. 14.]
[Footnote 2: Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 408-418.]
[Side-note: Scenery and personages.]
Sokrates recounts (to Kriton) a conversation in which he has just
been engaged with two Sophists, Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus, in the
undressing-room belonging to the gymnasium of the Lykeium. There were
present, besides, Kleinias, a youth of remarkable beauty and
intelligence, cousin of the great Alkibiades--Ktesippus, an adult
man, yet still young, friend of Sokrates and devotedly attached to
Kleinias--and a crowd of unnamed persons, partly friends of
Kleinias, partly admirers and supporters of the two Sophists.
[Side-note: The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus:
manner in which they are here presented.]
This couple are described and treated throughout by Sokrates, with
the utmost admiration and respect: that is, in terms designating such
feelings, but intended as the extreme of irony or caricature. They
are masters of the art of Contention, in its three varieties[3]--1.
Arms, and the command of soldiers. 2. Judicial and political
rhetoric, fighting an opponent before the assembled Dikasts or
people. 3. Contentious Dialectic--they can reduce every respondent to
a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their
questions--whether what he says be true or false.[4] All or each of these
accomplishments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay
the required fee: the standing sarcasm of Plato against the paid
teacher, occurring here as in so many other places. Lastly, they are
brothers, old and almost toothless--natives of Chios, colonists from
thence to Thurii, and exiles from Thurii and resident at Athens, yet
visiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons.[5] Their
dialectic skill is described as a recent acquisition,--made during
their old age, only in the preceding year,--and completing their
excellence as professors of the tripartite Eristic. But they now
devote themselves to it more than to the other two parts. Moreover
they advertise themselves as teachers of virtue.
[Footnote 3: Plato, Euthyd. pp. 271-272.]
[Footnote 4: Plat. Euthyd. p. 272 B. [Greek: e)xele/gchein to\ a)ei\
lego/menon, o(moi/ôs e)a/n te pseu=dos e)a/n t' a)lêthe\s ê)=|]: p.
275 C. [Greek: ou)de\n diaphe/rei, e)a\n mo/non e)the/lê|
a)pokri/nesthai o( neani/skos.]]
[Footnote 5: Plat. Euthyd. p. 273 B-C. "quamvis essent ætate
grandiores et _edentuli_" says Stallbaum in his Proleg. p. 10.
He seems to infer this from page 294 C; the inference, though not
very certain, is plausible.
Steinhart, in his Einleitung zum Euthydemos (vol. ii. p. 2 of
Hieronym. Müller's translation of Plato) repeats these antecedents of
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, as recited in the dialogue before us, as
if they were matter of real history, exemplifications of the
character of the class called Sophists. He might just as well produce
what is said by the comic poets Eupolis and Aristophanes--the
proceedings as recounted by the Sokratic disciple in the [Greek:
phrontistê/rion] (Nubes)--as evidence about the character of
Sokrates.]
[Side-note: Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by
Sokrates, next by the two Sophists.]
The two Sophists, having announced themselves as competent to teach
virtue and stimulate pupils to a virtuous life, are entreated by
Sokrates to exercise their beneficent influence upon the youth
Kleinias, in whose improvement he as well as Ktesippus feels the
warmest interest. Sokrates gives a specimen of what he wishes by
putting a series of questions himself. Euthydêmus follows, and begins
questioning Kleinias; who, after answering three or four
successive questions, is forced to contradict himself. Dionysodorus
then takes up the last answer of Kleinias, puts him through another
series of interrogations, and makes him contradict himself again. In
this manner the two Sophists toss the youthful respondent backwards
and forwards to each other, each contriving to entangle him in some
puzzle and contradiction. They even apply the same process to
Sokrates, who cannot avoid being entangled in the net; and to
Ktesippus, who becomes exasperated, and retorts upon them with
contemptuous asperity. The alternate interference of the two Sophists
is described with great smartness and animation; which is promoted by
the use of the dual number, peculiar to the Greek language, employed
by Plato in speaking of them.
[Side-note: Contrast between the two different modes of
interrogation.]
This mode of dialectic, conducted by the two Sophists, is interrupted
on two several occasions by a counter-exhibition of dialectic on the
part of Sokrates: who, under colour of again showing to the couple a
specimen of that which he wishes them to do, puts two successive
batches of questions to Kleinias in his own manner.[6] The contrast
between Sokrates and the two Sophists, in the same work, carried on
respectively by him and by them, of interrogating Kleinias, is
evidently meant as one of the special matters to arrest attention in
the dialogue. The questions put by the couple are made to turn
chiefly on verbal quibbles and ambiguities: they are purposely
designed to make the respondent contradict himself, and are
proclaimed to be certain of bringing about this result, provided the
respondent will conform to the laws of dialectic--by confining his
answer to the special point of the question, without adding any
qualification of his own, or asking for farther explanation from the
questioner, or reverting to any antecedent answer lying apart from
the actual question of the moment.[7] Sokrates, on the contrary,
addresses interrogations, each of which has a clear and substantive
meaning, and most of which Kleinias is able to answer without
embarrassment: he professes no other design except that of
encouraging Kleinias to virtue, and assisting him to determine
in what virtue consists: he resorts to no known quibbles or words of
equivocal import. The effect of the interrogations is represented as
being, not to confound and silence the youth, but to quicken and
stimulate his mind and to call forth an unexpected amount of latent
knowledge: insomuch that he makes one or two answers very much beyond
his years, exciting the greatest astonishment and admiration, in
Sokrates as well as in Kriton.[8] In this respect, the youth Kleinias
serves the same illustrative purpose as the youthful slave in the
Menon:[9] each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of
Sokrates, into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor
traceable to any teaching. But in the Menon, this magical evocation
of knowledge from an untaught youth is explained by the theory of
reminiscence, pre-existence, and omniscience, of the soul: while in
the Euthydêmus, no allusion is made to any such theory, nor to any
other cause except the stimulus of the Sokratic cross-questioning.
[Footnote 6: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 279-288.]
[Footnote 7: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 275 E--276 E. [Greek: Pa/nta toiau=ta
ê(mei=s e)rôtô=men a)/phukta], pp. 287 B--295 B--296 A, &c.]
[Footnote 8: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 290-291. The unexpected wisdom,
exhibited by the youth Kleinias in his concluding answer, can be
understood only as illustrating the obstetric efficacy of Sokratic
interrogations. See Winckelmann, Proleg. ad Euthyd. pp. xxxiii.
xxxiv. The words [Greek: tô=n kreitto/nôn] must have the usual
signification, as recognised by Routh and Heindorf, though
Schleiermacher treats it as absurd, p. 552, notes.]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Menon, pp. 82-85.]
[Side-note: Wherein this contrast does not consist.]
In the dialogue _Euthydêmus_, then, one main purpose of Plato is
to exhibit in contrast two distinct modes of questioning: one
practised by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; the other, by Sokrates. Of
these two, it is the first which is shown up in the most copious and
elaborate manner: the second is made subordinate, serving mainly as a
standard of comparison with the first. We must take care however to
understand in what the contrast between the two consists, and in what
it does not consist.
The contrast does not consist in this--that Sokrates so contrives his
string of questions as to bring out some established and positive
conclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in
perplexity. Such is not the fact. Sokrates ends without any result,
and with a confession of his inability to find any. Professing
earnest anxiety to stimulate Kleinias in the path of virtue, he is at
the same time unable to define what the capital condition of
virtue is.[10] On this point, then, there is no contrast between
Sokrates and his competitors: if they land their pupil in
embarrassment, so does he. Nor, again, does Sokrates stand
distinguished from them by affirming (or rather implying in his
questions) nothing but what is true and indisputable.[11]
[Footnote 10: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 291 A--293 A; Plat. Kleitophon, pp.
409-410.]
[Footnote 11: See Plat. Euthydêm. p. 281 C-D, where undoubtedly the
positions laid down by Sokrates would not have passed without
contradiction by an opponent.]
[Side-note: Wherein it does consist.]
The real contrast between the competitors, consists, first in the
pretensions--next in the method. The two Sophists are described as
persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue,[12] and
claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Sokrates disdains the fee,
doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to
encourage or help forward on the road a willing pupil. The pupil in
this case is a given subject, Kleinias, a modest and intelligent
youth: and the whole scene passes in public before an indiscriminate
audience. To such a pupil, what is needed is, encouragement and
guidance. Both of these are really administered by the questions of
Sokrates, which are all suggestive and pertinent to the matter in
hand, though failing to reach a satisfactory result: moreover,
Sokrates attends only to Kleinias, and is indifferent to the effect
on the audience around. The two Sophists, on the contrary, do not say
a word pertinent to the object desired. Far from seeking (as they
promised) to encourage Kleinias,[13] they confuse and humiliate him
from the beginning: all their implements for teaching consist only of
logical puzzles; lastly, their main purpose is to elicit applause
from the by-standers, by reducing both the modest Kleinias and every
other respondent to contradiction and stand-still.
[Footnote 12: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 273 D, 275 A, 304 B.]
[Footnote 13: Plat. Euthyd. p. 278 C. [Greek: e)pha/tên ga\r
e)pidei/xasthai tê\n protreptikê\n sophi/an.]]
[Side-note: Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding
for the applause of the by-standers.]
Such is the real contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, and
such is the real scene which we read in the dialogue. The presence,
as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd in the
Lykeium, are essential features of the drama.[14] The point of
view which Plato is working out, is, the abusive employment, the
excess, and the misplacement, of logical puzzles: which he brings
before us as administered for the humiliation of a youth who requires
opposite treatment, in the prosecution of an object which they do not
really promote and before undiscerning auditors, for whose applause
the two Sophists are bidding.[15] The whole debate upon these
fallacies is rendered ridiculous; and when conducted with Ktesippus,
degenerates into wrangling and ribaldry.
[Footnote 14: The [Greek: o)/chlos] (surrounding multitude) is
especially insisted on in the first sentence of the dialogue, and is
perpetually adverted to throughout all the recital of Sokrates to
Kriton, pp. 276 B-D, 303 B.]
[Footnote 15: Plat. Euthydêm. p. 303 B.]
[Side-note: Comparison of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês.]
The bearing of the Euthydêmus, as I here state it, will be better
understood if we contrast it with the Parmenidês. In this
last-mentioned dialogue, the amount of negative dialectic and
contradiction is greater and more serious than that which we read in
the Euthydêmus. One single case of it is elaborately built up in the
long Antinomies at the close of the Parmenidês (which occupy as much
space, and contain nearly as much sophistry, as the speeches assigned
to the two Sophists in Euthydêmus), while we are given to understand
that many more remain behind.[16] These perplexing Antinomies
(addressed by the veteran Parmenides to Sokrates as his junior),
after a variety of other objections against the Platonic theory of
Ideas, which theory Sokrates has been introduced as affirming,--are
drawn up for the avowed purpose of checking premature affirmation,
and of illustrating the difficult exercises and problems which must
be solved, before affirmation can become justifiable. This task,
though long and laborious, cannot be evaded (we are here told) by
aspirants in philosophy. But it is a task which ought only to be
undertaken in conjunction with a few select companions. "Before any
large audience, it would be unseemly and inadmissible: for the public
are not aware that without such roundabout and devious journey in all
directions, no man can hit upon truth or acquire intelligence."[17]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. I shall revert to this point
when I notice the Parmenidês.]
[Footnote 17: Plat. Parmen. pp. 135-136. [Greek: e(/lkuson de\
sauto\n kai\ gu/mnasai ma=llon dia\ tê=s dokou/sês a)chrê/stou
ei)=nai kai\ kaloume/nês u(po\ tô=n pollô=n a)doleschi/as, e(/ôs
e(/ti ne/os ei)=--ei) me\n ou)=n plei/ous ê(=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion
ê)=n dei=sthai], (to request Parmenides to give a specimen of
dialectic) [Greek: a)prepê= ga\r ta\ toiau=ta pollô=n e)nanti/on
le/gein, a)/llôs te kai\ têlikou/tô|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\
o(/ti a)/neu tau/tês tê=s dia\ pa/ntôn diexo/dou te kai\ pla/nês,
a)du/naton e)ntucho/nta tô=| a)lêthei= nou=n schei=n.]]
[Side-note: Necessity of settling accounts with the
negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both:
in the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is
vulgarised and ludicrous.]
This important proposition--That before a man can be entitled to lay
down with confidence any affirmative theory, in the domain of
philosophy or "reasoned truth," he must have had before him the
various knots tied by negative dialectic, and must find out the way
of untying them--is a postulate which lies at the bottom of Plato's
Dialogues of Search, as I have remarked in the eighth chapter of this
work. But there is much difference in the time, manner, and
circumstances, under which such knots are brought before the student
for solution. In the Parmenidês the process is presented as one both
serious and indispensable, yet requiring some precautions: the public
must be excluded, for they do not understand the purpose: and the
student under examination must be one who is competent or more than
competent to bear the heavy burthen put upon him, as Sokrates is
represented to be in the Parmenidês.[18] In the Euthydêmus, on the
contrary, the process is intended to be made ridiculous; accordingly
these precautions are disregarded. The crowd of indiscriminate
auditors are not only present, but are the persons whose feelings the
two Sophists address--and who either admire what is said as dexterous
legerdemain, or laugh at the interchange of thrusts, as the duel
becomes warmer: in fact, the debate ends with general mirth, in which
the couple themselves are among the loudest.[19] Lastly, Kleinias,
the youth under interrogation, is a modest novice; not represented,
like Lysis in the dialogue just reviewed, as in danger of corruption
from the exorbitant flatteries of an Erastes, nor as requiring a
lowering medicine to be administered by a judicious friend. When the
Xenophontic (historical) Sokrates cross-examines and humiliates
Euthydêmus (a youth, but nevertheless more advanced than Kleinias in
the Platonic Euthydêmus is represented to be), we shall see that he
not only lays a train for the process by antecedent suggestions, but
takes especial care to attack Euthydêmus when alone.[20] The
cross-examination pursued by Sokrates inflicts upon this accomplished
young man the severest distress and humiliation, and would have been
utterly intolerable, if there had been by-standers clapping their
hands (as we read in the Platonic Euthydêmus) whenever the respondent
was driven into a corner. We see that it was hardly tolerable even
when the respondent was alone with Sokrates; for though Euthydêmus
bore up against the temporary suffering, cultivated the society of
Sokrates, and was handled by him more gently afterwards; yet there
were many other youths whom Sokrates cross-examined in the same way,
and who suffered so much humiliation from the first solitary
colloquy, that they never again came near him (so Xenophon expressly
tells us)[21] for a second. This is quite enough to show us how
important is the injunction delivered in the Platonic Parmenidês--to
carry on these testing colloquies apart from indiscriminate auditors,
in the presence, at most, of a few select companions.
[Footnote 18: See the compliments to Sokrates, on his strenuous
ardour and vocation for philosophy, addressed by Parmenides, p. 135
D.]
[Footnote 19: Plat. Euthyd. p. 303 B. [Greek: E)ntau=tha me/ntoi, ô)=
phi/le Kri/tôn, ou)deis o(/stis ou) tô=n paro/ntôn u(perepê/nese to\n
lo/gon, kai\ tô\ a)/ndre] (Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus) [Greek:
gelô=nte kai\ krotou=nte kai\ chai/ronte o)li/gou pareta/thêsan.]]
[Footnote 20: Xenophon. Memor. iv. 2, 5-8. [Greek: ô(s d' ê)/|stheto]
(Sokrates) [Greek: au)to\n e)toimo/teron u(pome/nonta, o(/te
diale/goito, kai\ prothumo/teron a)kou/onta, _mo/nos ê)=lthen_
ei)s to\ ê(niopoiei=on; parakathezome/non d' au)tô=| tou=
Eu)thudê/mou, Ei)=pe/ moi, e)/phê], &c.]
[Footnote 21: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39-40. Compare the remarks of Sokrates
in Plato, Theætêtus, p. 151 C.]
[Side-note: Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the
Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in
which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors.]
Stallbaum, Steinhart, and other commentators denounce in severe terms
the Eristics or controversial Sophists of Athens, as disciples of
Protagoras and Gorgias, infected with the mania of questioning and
disputing every thing, and thereby corrupting the minds of youth.
They tell us that Sokrates was the constant enemy of this school, but
that nevertheless he was unjustly confounded with them by the comic
poets, and others; from which confusion alone his unpopularity with
the Athenian people arose.[22] In the Platonic dialogue of Euthydêmus
the two Sophists (according to these commentators) represent the way
in which Protagoras and Gorgias with their disciples reasoned: and
the purpose of the dialogue is to contrast this with the way in which
Sokrates reasoned.
[Footnote 22: Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 9-11-13;
Winckelmann, Proleg. ad eundem, pp. xxxiii.-xxxiv.]
[Side-note: That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more
Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by
continuous speech or lecture.]
Now, in this opinion, I think that there is much of unfounded
assumption, as well as a misconception of the real contrast intended
in the Platonic Euthydêmus. Comparing Protagoras with Sokrates,
I maintain that Sokrates was decidedly the more Eristic of the two,
and left behind him a greater number of active disciples. In so far
as we can trust the picture given by Plato in the dialogue called
Protagoras, we learn that the Sophist of that name chiefly manifested
himself in long continuous speeches or rhetoric; and though he also
professed, if required, to enter into dialectic colloquy, in this art
he was no match for Sokrates.[23] Moreover, we know by the evidence
of Sokrates himself, that _he_ was an Eristic not only by taste,
but on principle, and by a sense of duty. He tells us, in the
Platonic Apology, that he felt himself under a divine mission to go
about convicting men of ignorance, and that he had prosecuted this
vocation throughout many years of a long life. Every one of these
convictions must have been brought about by one or more disputes of
his own seeking: every such dispute, with occasional exceptions, made
him unpopular, in the outset at least, with the person convicted: the
rather, as his ability in the process is known, upon the testimony of
Xenophon[24] as well as of Plato, to have been consummate. It is
therefore a mistake to decry Protagoras and the Protagoreans (if
there were any) as the special Eristics, and to represent Sokrates as
a tutelary genius, the opponent of such habits. If the commentators
are right (which I do not think they are) in declaring the Athenian
mind to have been perverted by Eristic, Sokrates is much more
chargeable with the mischief than Protagoras. And the comic poets,
when they treated Sokrates as a specimen and teacher of Eristic,
proceeded very naturally upon what they actually saw or heard of
him.[25]
[Footnote 23: See Plat. Protag., especially pp. 329 and 336. About
the eristic disposition of Sokrates, see the striking passage in
Plato, Theætêt. 169 B-C; also Lachês, 187, 188.]
[Footnote 24: Xen. Mem. i. 2.]
[Footnote 25: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydêm. pp. 50-51. "Sed
hoc utcunque se habet, illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ex
ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum
scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis, in vanissimorum sophistaram loco
habitum fuisse."]
[Side-note: Sokrates in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to
the purpose of that dialogue.]
The fact is, that the Platonic Sokrates when he talks with the two
Sophists in the dialogue Euthydêmus, is a character drawn by Plato
for the purpose of that dialogue, and is very different from the real
historical Sokrates, whom the public of Athens saw and heard in
the market-place or gymnasia. He is depicted as a gentle, soothing,
encouraging talker, with his claws drawn in, and affecting inability
even to hold his own against the two Sophists: such indeed as he
sometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons (so
Xenophon[26] takes pains to remind his readers in the Memorabilia),
but with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive
Elenchus for which he himself (in the Platonic Apology) takes credit,
and which the auditors usually heard him exhibit.
[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1; iv. 2, 40.]
[Side-note: The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be
taken as real persons, or representatives of real persons.]
This picture, accurate or not, suited the dramatic scheme of the
Euthydêmus. Such, in my judgment, is the value and meaning of the
Euthydêmus, as far as regards personal contrasts. One style of
reasoning is represented by Sokrates, the other by the two Sophists:
both are the creatures of Plato, having the same dramatic reality as
Sokrates and Strepsiades, or the [Greek: Di/kaios Lo/gos] and [Greek:
A)/dikos Lo/gos], of Aristophanes, but no more. That they correspond
to any actual persons at Athens, is neither proved nor probable. The
comic poets introduce Sokrates as talking what was either
nonsensical, or offensive to the feelings of the Athenians: and
Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) complains that the Dikasts judged
him, not according to what he had really said or done, but according
to the impression made on them by this dramatic picture. The Athenian
Sophists would have equal right to complain of those critics, who not
only speak of Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus with a degree of acrimony
applicable only to historical persons, but also describe them as
representative types of Protagoras, Gorgias, and their disciples.[27]
[Footnote 27: The language of Schleiermacher is more moderate than
that of Stallbaum, Steinhart, and others. He thinks moreover, that
the polemical purpose of this dialogue is directed not against
Protagoras or Gorgias, but against the Megarics and against
Antisthenes, who (so Schleiermacher supposes) had brought the attack
upon themselves by attacking Plato first (Einleitung zum Euthyd. p.
404 seq.). Schleiermacher cannot make out who the two Sophists were
personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no
notice.
This is a conjecture which admits of no proof; but if any real victim
is here intended by Plato, we may just as reasonably suppose
Antisthenes as Protagoras.]
[Side-note: Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of
good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use
them.]
The conversation of Sokrates with the youth Kleinias is
remarkable for its plainness and simplicity. His purpose is to
implant or inflame in the youth the aspiration and effort towards
wisdom or knowledge ([Greek: philosophi/a], in its etymological
sense). "You, like every one else, wish to do well or to be happy.
The way to be happy is, to have many good things. Every one knows
this: every one knows too, that among these good things, wealth is an
indisputable item:[28] likewise health, beauty, bodily activity, good
birth, power over others, honour in our city, temperance, justice,
courage, wisdom, &c. Good fortune does not count as a distinct
item, because it resolves itself into wisdom.[29]--But it is not
enough to have all these good things: we must not only have them but
use them: moreover, we must use them not wrongly, but rightly. If we
use them wrongly, they will not produce their appropriate
consequences. They will even make us more miserable than if we had
them not, because the possession of them will prompt us to be active
and meddlesome: whereas, if we have them not, we shall keep in the
back-ground and do little.[30] But to use these good things rightly,
depends upon wisdom, knowledge, intelligence. It thus appears that
the enumerated items are not really good, except on the assumption
that they are under the guidance of intelligence: if they are under
the guidance of ignorance, they are not good; nay, they even produce
more harm than good, since they are active instruments in the service
of a foolish master.[31]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 279 A. [Greek: a)gatha\ de\ poi=a
a)/ra tô=n o)/ntôn tugcha/nei ê(mi=n o)/nta? ê)\ ou) chalepo\n ou)de\
semnou= a)ndro\s pa/nu ti ou)de\ tou=to e)/oiken ei)=nai eu(rei=n?
pa=s ga\r a)\n ê(mi=n ei)/poi o(/ti to\ ploutei=n a)gatho/n?]]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 279-280.]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 281 C. [Greek: ê(=tton de\ kakô=s
pra/ttôn, a)/thlios ê(=tton a)\n ei)/ê.]]
[Footnote 31: Plato, Euthyd. p. 282 E. If we compare this with p. 279
C-D we shall see that the argument of Sokrates is open to the
exception which he himself takes in the case of [Greek: eu)tuchi/a--di\s
tau)ta\ le/gein]. Wisdom is counted twice over.]
[Side-note: But intelligence--of what? It must be such
intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what
we want, and the right use of it when made.]
"But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? Is it _all_
intelligence? Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by
the possession of which we shall become good and happy?[32]
Obviously, it must be must be such as will be profitable to us.[33]
We have seen that there is no good in possessing wealth--that we
should gain nothing by knowing how to acquire wealth or even to turn
stones into gold, unless we at the same time knew how to use it
rightly. Nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make
ourselves healthy, or even immortal, unless we knew how to employ
rightly our health or immortality. We want knowledge or intelligence,
of such a nature, as to include both acting, making, or construction
and rightly using what we have done, made, or constructed.[34] The
makers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill, but they cannot play
upon the instruments which they have made: the logographers compose
fine discourses, but hand them over for others to deliver. Even
masters in the most distinguished arts--such as military commanders,
geometers, arithmeticians, astronomers, &c., do not come up to
our requirement. They are all of them varieties under the general
class _hunters_: they find and seize, but hand over what they
have seized for others to use. The hunter, when he has caught or
killed game, hands it over to the cook; the general, when he has
taken a town, delivers it to the political leader or minister: the
geometer makes over his theorems to be employed by the dialectician
or comprehensive philosopher.[35]
[Footnote 32: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 282 E. Sokrates here breaks off the
string of questions to Kleinias, but resumes them, p. 288 D.]
[Footnote 33: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 288 D. [Greek: ti/na pot' ou)=n
a)\n ktêsa/menoi e)pistê/mên o)rthô=s ktêsai/metha? a)=r' ou) tou=to
me\n a(plou=n, o(/ti tau/tên ê(/tis ê(ma=s o)nê/sei?]]
[Footnote 34: Plato, Euthyd. p. 289 B. [Greek: toiau/tês tino\s a)/r'
ê(mi=n e)pistê/mês dei=, e)n ê(=| sumpe/ptôken a(/ma to/ te poiei=n
kai\ to\ e)pi/stasthai chrê=sthai ô(=| a)\n poiê=|.]]
[Footnote 35: Plato, Euthyd. p.290 C-D.]
[Side-note: Where is such an art to be found? The regal or
political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No
answer can be found. Ends in puzzle.]
"Where then can we find such an art--such a variety of knowledge or
intelligence--as we are seeking? The regal or political art looks
like it: that art which regulates and enforces all the arrangements
of the city. But what is the work which this art performs? What
product does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and
the farmer's art, provision? What good does it effect? You may say
that it makes the citizens wealthy, free, harmonious in their
intercourse. But we have already seen that these acquisitions are not
good, unless they be under the guidance of intelligence: that nothing
is really good, except some variety of intelligence.[36] Does the
regal art then confer knowledge? If so, does it confer every
variety of knowledge--that of the carpenter, currier, &c., as
well as others? Not certainly any of these, for we have already
settled that they are in themselves neither good nor bad. The regal
art can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is
_itself_? how are we to use it? If we say, that we shall render
other men _good_--the question again recurs, _Good_--in
what respect? _useful_--for what purpose?[37]
[Footnote 36: Plato, Euthyd. p. 292 B. [Greek: A)gatho\n de/ ge/ pou
ô(mologê/samen a)llê/lois--ou)de\n ei)=nai a)/llo ê)\ e)pistê/mên
tina/.]]
[Footnote 37: Plat. Euthydêm. p. 292 D. [Greek: A)lla\ ti/na dê\
e)pistê/mên? ê(=| ti/ chrêso/metha? tô=n me\n ga\r e)/rgôn ou)deno\s
dei= au)tê\n dêmiourgo\n ei)=nai tô=n mê/te kakô=n mê/te a)gathô=n,
e)pistê/mên de\ paradido/nai mêdemi/an a)/llên ê)\ au)tê\n e(autê/n;
le/gômen dê\ ou)=n, ti/s pote e)/stin au(tê\ ê(=| ti/
chrêso/metha?]]
"Here then" (concludes Sokrates), "we come to a dead lock: we can
find no issue.[38] We cannot discover what the regal art does for us
or gives us: yet this is the art which is to make us happy." In this
difficulty, Sokrates turns to the two Sophists, and implores their
help. The contrast between him and them is thus brought out.
[Footnote 38: Plat. Euthyd. p. 292 E.]
[Side-note: Review of the cross-examination just pursued by
Sokrates. It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look
for.]
The argument of Sokrates, which I have thus abridged from the
Euthydêmus, arrives at no solution: but it is nevertheless eminently
suggestive, and puts the question in a way to receive solution. What
is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others?
A man has many different impulses, dispositions, qualities,
aptitudes, advantages, possessions, &c., which we describe by
saying that he is an artist, a general, a tradesman, clever, just,
temperate, brave, strong, rich, powerful, &c. But in the course
of life, each particular situation has its different exigencies,
while the prospective future has its exigencies also. The whole man
is one, with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes:
in following one impulse, he must resist others--in turning his
aptitudes to one object, he must turn them away from others--he must,
as Plato says, distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong,
by virtue of knowledge, intelligence, reason. Such discriminating
intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political
art,--what is the object of it? It is intelligence or knowledge,--But
_of what_? Not certainly of the way how each particular act is
to be performed--how each particular end is to be attained. Each
of these separately is the object of some special knowledge. But the
whole of a man's life is passed in a series of such particular acts,
each of which is the object of some special knowledge: what then
remains as the object of Regal or political intelligence, upon which
our happiness is said to depend? Or how can it have any object at
all?
[Side-note: Comparison with other dialogues--Republic,
Philêbus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the
Protagoras.]
The question here raised is present to Plato's mind in other
dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is
good? Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but
what is Good? In the Republic he raises this question, but declines
to answer it, confessing that he could not make it intelligible to
his hearers:[39] in the Gorgias, he takes pains to tell us what it
_is not_: in the Philêbus, he does indeed tell us what it is,
but in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which
they are brought to explain. There is only one dialogue in which the
question is answered affirmatively, in clear and unmistakable
language, and with considerable development--and that is, the
Protagoras: where Sokrates asserts and proves at length, that Good is
at the bottom identical with pleasure, and Evil with pain: that the
measuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life,
upon which the attainment of Good depends: and that the object of
that intelligence--the items which we are to measure, calculate, and
compare--is pleasures and pains, so as to secure to ourselves as much
as possible of the former, and escape as much as possible of the
latter.
[Footnote 39: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 505-506.]
In my remarks on the Protagoras, I shall state the view which I take
of the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by Sokrates. Persons may
think the answer insufficient: most of the Platonic critics declare
it to be absolutely wrong. But at any rate it is the only distinct
answer which Plato ever gives, to the question raised by Sokrates in
the Euthydêmus and elsewhere.
[Side-note: The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically
admired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real
admiration, but the contrary.]
From the abstract just given of the argument of Sokrates in the
Euthydêmus, it will be seen to be serious and pertinent, though
ending with a confession of failure. The observations placed in
contrast with it and ascribed to the two Sophists, are
distinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent; but parodies of
debate for the most part, put together for the express purpose of
appearing obviously silly to the reader. Plato keeps up the dramatic
or ironical appearance, that they are admired and welcomed not only
by the hearers, but even by Sokrates himself. Nevertheless, it is
made clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony, and that
the talk which Plato ascribes to Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus
produced, according to his own showing, no sentiment of esteem for
their abilities among the by-standers, but quite the reverse. Whether
there were individual Sophists at Athens who talked in that style, we
can neither affirm nor deny: but that there were an established class
of persons who did so, and made both money and reputation by it, we
can securely deny. It is the more surprising that the Platonic
commentators should desire us to regard Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus
as representative samples of a special class named Sophists, since
one of the most eminent of those commentators (Stallbaum),[40] both
admits that Sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and
called by the name and affirms also (incorrectly, in my opinion) that
the interrogations of Sokrates, which in this dialogue stand
contrasted with those of the two Sophists, do not enunciate the
opinions either of Sokrates or of Plato himself, but the opinions of
these very Sophists, which Plato adopts and utters for the
occasion.[41]
[Footnote 40: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydem. p. 50. "Illud
quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ipso Platone evidenter apparet,
Socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis in
vanissimorum sophistarum numero habitum fuisse." Ib. p. 49 (cited in
a previous note). "Videtur pervulgata fuisse hominum opinio, quâ
Socratem inter vanos sophistas numerandum esse existimabant." Again
p. 44, where Stallbaum tells us that Sokrates was considered by many
to belong "misellorum Sophistarum gregi".]
[Footnote 41: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Euthydem. p. 30. "Cavendum
est magnopere, ne quæ hic à Socrate disputantur, pro ipsius decretis
habeamus: _sunt enim omnia ad mentem Sophistarum disputata_,
quos ille, reprehensis eorum opinionibus, sperat eo adductum iri, ut
gravem prudentemque earum defensionem suscipiant." Compare p. 66.
Stallbaum says that Plato often reasons, adopting for the occasion
the doctrine of the Sophists. See his Prolegg. to the Lachês and
Charmidês, and still more his Proleg. to the Protagoras, where he
tells us that Plato introduces his spokesman Sokrates not only as
arguing _ex mente Sophistarum_, but also as employing captious
and delusive artifice, such as in this dialogue is ascribed to
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.--pp. 23-24. "Itaque Socrates, missâ
hujus rei disputatione, repentè ad alia progreditur, scilicet
_similibus loqueis_ hominem denuo irretiturus. Nemini facilé
obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco Protagoram _argutis conclusiunculis
deludi_" (_i.e._ by Sokrates) "atque _callidé eo
permoveri,_" &c. "Quanquam nemo erit, quin videat, _callidé
deludi Protagoram_, ubi ex eo, quod qui injusté faciat, is
neutiquam agat [Greek: sôphro/nôs], protinus colligitur justitiam et
[Greek: sôphrosu/nê] unum idemque esse."--p. 25. "Disputat enim
Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ."--p. 30.
"Platonem ipsum hæc non probâsse, sed e vulgi opinione et mente
explicasse, vel illud non obscuré significat," &c.--p. 33.]
[Side-note: Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's
definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between
the Sophist and the Dialectician.]
The received supposition that there were at Athens a class of men
called Sophists who made money and reputation by obvious fallacies
employed to bring about contradictions in dialogue--appears to me to
pervert the representations given of ancient philosophy. Aristotle
defines a Sophist to be "one who seeks to make money by apparent
wisdom which is not real wisdom":--the Sophist (he says) is an
Eristic who, besides money-making, seeks for nothing but victory in
debate and humiliation of his opponent:--Distinguishing the
Dialectician from the Sophist (he says), the Dialectician impugns or
defends, by probable arguments, probable tenets--that is, tenets
which are believed by a numerous public or by a few wise and eminent
individuals:--while the Sophist deals with tenets which are probable
only in appearance and not in reality--that is to say, tenets which
almost every one by the slightest attention recognises as false.[42]
This definition is founded, partly on the personal character and
purpose ascribed to the Sophist: partly upon the distinction between
apparent and real wisdom, assumed to be known and permanent. Now such
pseudo-wisdom was declared by Sokrates to be the natural state of all
mankind, even the most eminent, which it was his mission to expose:
moreover, the determination, what is to be comprised in this
description, must depend upon the judges to whom it is
submitted, since much of the works of Aristotle and Plato would come
under the category, in the judgment of modern readers both vulgar and
instructed. But apart from this relative and variable character of
the definition, when applied to philosophy generally--we may
confidently assert, that there never was any real class of
intellectual men, in a given time or place, to whom it could possibly
apply. Of individuals, the varieties are innumerable: but no
professional body of men ever acquired gain or celebrity by
maintaining theses, and employing arguments, which every one could
easily detect as false. Every man employs sophisms more or less;
every man does so inadvertently, some do it by design also; moreover,
almost every reasoner does it largely, in the estimation of his
opponents. No distinct line can be drawn between the Sophist and the
Dialectician: the definition given by Aristotle applies to an ideal
in his own mind, but to no reality without: Protagoras and Prodikus
no more correspond to it than Sokrates and Plato. Aristotle observes,
with great truth, that all men are dialecticians and testers of
reasoning, up to a certain point: he might have added that they are
all Sophists also, up to a certain point.[43] Moreover, when he
attempts to found a scientific classification of intellectual
processes upon a difference in the purposes of different
practitioners--whether they employ the same process for money or
display, or beneficence, or mental satisfaction to themselves--this
is altogether unphilosophical. The medical art is the same, whether
employed to advise gratis, or in exchange for a fee.[44]
[Footnote 42: Aristotel. Topic, i. 1, p. 100, b. 21. [Greek: e)/ndoxa
de\ ta\ dokou=nta pa=sin ê)\ toi=s plei/stois ê)\ toi=s sophoi=s,
kai\ tou/tois ê)\ pa=sin ê)\ toi=s plei/stois ê)\ toi=s ma/lista
gnôri/mois kai\ e)ndo/xois. E)ristiko\s de\ e)/sti sullogismo\s o(
e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn, mê\ o)/ntôn de\--kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xôn
ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. Ou)the\n ga\r tô=n
legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipolai/on e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an,
katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken
e)/chein. Parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\
sunora=|n duname/nois, kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous
e)/sti phu/sis.]
De Sophisticis Elenchis, i. p. 165, a. 21. [Greek: e)/sti ga\r ê(
sophistikê\ phainome/nê sophi/a, ou)=sa d' ou)/; kai\ o( sophistê\s
chrêmatistê\s a)po\ phainome/nês sophi/as, a)ll' ou)k ou)/sês], p.
165, b. 10, p. 171, b. 8-27. [Greek: Oi( phile/rides, e)ristikoi\,
a)gônistikoi\], are persons who break the rules of dialectic ([Greek:
a)dikomachi/a]) for the purpose of gaining victory; [Greek: oi(
sophistai\] are those who do the same thing for the purpose of
getting money. See also Metaphys. iii. 1004, b. 17.]
[Footnote 43: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 172, a. 30.]
[Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhetor, i. 1, 1355, b. 18. He here admits that
the only difference between the Dialectician and the Sophist lies in
their purposes--that the mental activity employed by both is the
same. [Greek: o( ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n tê=| duna/mei a)ll' e)n
tê=| proaire/sei; plê\n e)ntau=tha me\n] (in Rhetoric) [Greek:
e)/stai o( me\n kata\ tê\n e)pistê/mên o( de\ kata\ tê\n proai/resin,
r(ê/tôr, e)kei= de\] (in Dialectic) [Greek: sophistê\s me\n kata\
tê\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s de\ ou) kata\ tê\n proai/resin, a)lla\
kata\ tê\n du/namin.]]
[Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus--exposure
of fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of
particular examples.]
Though I maintain that no class of professional Sophists (in the
meaning given to that term by the Platonic critics after Plato and
Aristotle) ever existed--and though the distinction between the paid
and the gratuitous discourser is altogether unworthy to enter into
the history of philosophy--yet I am not the less persuaded that the
Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, and the treatise of Aristotle De
Sophisticis Elenchis, are very striking and useful compositions. This
last-mentioned treatise was composed by Aristotle very much
under the stimulus of the Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, to which it
refers several times--and for the purpose of distributing the variety
of possible fallacies under a limited number of general heads, each
described by its appropriate characteristic, and represented by its
illustrative type. Such attempt at arrangement--one of the many
valuable contributions of Aristotle to the theory of reasoning--is
expressly claimed by him as his own. He takes a just pride in having
been the first to introduce system where none had introduced it
before.[45] No such system was known to Plato, who (in the
Euthydêmus) enumerates a string of fallacies one after another
without any project of classifying them, and who presents them as it
were in concrete, as applied by certain disputants in an imaginary
dialogue. The purpose is, to make these fallacies appear
conspicuously in their character of fallacies: a purpose which is
assisted by presenting the propounders of them as ridiculous and
contemptible. The lively fancy of Plato attaches suitable accessories
to Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. They are old men, who have been all
their lives engaged in teaching rhetoric and tactics, but have
recently taken to dialectic, and acquired perfect mastery thereof
without any trouble--who make extravagant promises--and who as
talkers play into each other's hands, making a shuttlecock of the
respondent, a modest novice every way unsuitable for such treatment.
[Footnote 45: See the last chapter of the treatise De Sophisticis
Elenchis.]
[Side-note: Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a
classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without
classification.]
Thus different is the Platonic manner, from the Aristotelian manner,
of exposing fallacies. But those exhibited in the former appear as
members of one or more among the classes framed by the latter. The
fallacies which we read in the Euthydêmus are chiefly verbal: but
some are verbal, and something beyond.
[Side-note: Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two
Sophists in the Euthydêmus.]
Thus, for example, if we take the first sophism introduced by the two
exhibitors, upon which they bring the youth Kleinias, by suitable
questions, to declare successively both sides of the
alternative--"Which of the two is it that learns, the wise or the
ignorant?"--Sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms
used are equivocal:[46] You might answer it by using the language ascribed
to Dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue--"Neither and
Both".[47] The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D--"Are
there persons who speak of things as they are? Good men speak of
things as they are: they speak of good men well, of bad men badly:
therefore, of course, they speak of stout men stoutly, and of hot men
hotly. Ay! rejoins the respondent Ktesippus, angrily--they speak of
cold men coldly, and say that they talk coldly."[48] These are
fallacies of double meaning of words--or double construction of
phrases: as we read also in page 287 D, where the same Greek verb
([Greek: noei=n]) may be construed either to _think_ or to
_mean_: so that when Sokrates talks about what a predication
_means_--the Sophists ask him--"Does anything _think_,
except things having a soul? Did you ever know any predication that
had a soul?"
[Footnote 46: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 275 D--278 D. Aristotle also
adverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthydêmus. See Soph.
El. 4, 165, b. 30.]
[Footnote 47: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 300 D. [Greek: Ou)de/tera kai\
a)mpho/tera]]
[Footnote 48: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 284 E. [Greek: tou\s gou=n
psuchrou\s psuchrô=s le/gousi/ te kai\ phasi\ diale/gesthai.] The
metaphorical sense of [Greek: psuchro\s] is _pointless_,
_stupid_, _out of taste_, _out of place_,
_&c._]
[Side-note: Fallacies--_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum
simpliciter_--in the Euthydêmus.]
Again, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as
the youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. "Can
any existing thing _be_ that which it is, and at the same time
_not be_ that which it is?--No.--You know some things?--Yes.--Then
if you know, _you are knowing_?--Certainly. I am knowing of
those particular things.--That makes no difference: if you are
knowing, you necessarily know everything.--Oh! no: for there are many
things which I do not know.--Then if there be anything which you do
not know, _you are not knowing_?--Yes, doubtless--of that
particular thing.--Still you are _not knowing_: and just now you
said that you were _knowing_: and thus, at one and the same
time, you are what you are, and you are not what you are.[49]
[Footnote 49: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 293 C. Aristotle considers
_know_ to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses
you may both _know_ and _not know_ the same thing. Anal.
Prior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25.]
"But _you_ also" (retorts Sokrates upon the couple), "do not
you also know some things, not know others?--By no means.--What!
do you know nothing?--Far from it.--Then you know all
things?--Certainly we do,--and you too: if you know one thing, you know
all things.--What! do you know the art of the carpenter, the currier, the
cobbler--the number of stars in the heaven, and of grains of sand in
the desert, &c.?--Yes: we know all these things."
[Side-note: Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their
replies--determination not to contradict themselves.]
The two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the
affirmative to each of these successive questions: though Ktesippus
pushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse
specialties.[50] This is one of the purposes of the dialogue: to
represent the two Sophists as willing to answer any thing, however
obviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the
dispute--as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the
position of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents--and
as exacting a categorical answer--Yes or No--to every question
which they put without any qualifying words, and without any
assurance that the meaning of the question was understood.[51]
[Footnote 50: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 293-294.]
[Footnote 51: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 295-296.]
The base of these fallacious inferences is, That respecting the same
subject, you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate: you
cannot say, A is knowing--A is not knowing ([Greek: e)pistê/môn]).
This is a fallacy more than verbal: it is recognised by Aristotle
(and by all subsequent logicians) under the name--_à dicto secundum
quid, ad dictum simpliciter_.
It is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed
by very competent reasoners, including both Plato and Aristotle.
[Side-note: Farther verbal equivocations.]
Again--Sophroniskus was my father--Chæredemus was the father of
Patrokles.--Then Sophroniskus was different from a father: therefore
he was not a father. You are different from a stone, therefore you
are not a stone: you are different from gold, therefore you are not
gold. By parity of reasoning, Sophroniskus is different from a
father--therefore he is not a father. Accordingly, you, Sokrates,
have no father.[52]
[Footnote 52: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 297-298.]
But (retorts Ktesippus upon the couple) your father is different
from my father.--Not at all.--How can that be?--What! is your father,
then, the father of all men and of all animals?--Certainly he is. A
man cannot be at the same time a father, and not a father. He cannot
be at the same time a man, and not a man--gold, and not gold.[53]
[Footnote 53: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in the
dialogue ([Greek: Po/teron o(rô=sin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\ dunata\
o(ra=|n ê)\ ta\ a)du/nata? . . . Ê)= ou)ch oi(=o/n te sigô=nta
le/gein?] p. 300 A) are hardly translatable into English, since they
depend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language.
Aristotle refers them to the general head [Greek: par'
a)mphiboli/an]. The same about [Greek: prosê/kei to\n ma/geiron
katako/ptein], p. 301 D.]
You have got a dog (Euthydêmus says to Ktesippus).--Yes.--The dog is
the father of puppies?--Yes.--The dog, being a father, is
yours?--Certainly.--Then your father is a dog, and you are brother
of the puppies.
You beat your dog sometimes? Then you beat your father.[54]
[Footnote 54: Plat. Euthyd. p. 298.]
Those animals, and those alone are _yours_ (sheep, oxen,
&c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure.
But Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê are _your_ Gods. The Gods have a
soul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you
told us that those alone were your animals, which you could give
away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away,
or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê.[55]
[Footnote 55: Plat. Euthydêm. p. 302. This same fallacy, in
substance, is given by Aristotle, De Sophist. El. 17, 176 a. 3, 179,
a. 5, but with different exemplifying names and persons.]
This fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of
_yours_--one of its different explanations being treated as if
it were the only one.
[Side-note: Fallacies involving deeper logical
principles--contradiction is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible.]
Other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper:--Contradiction is
impossible--To speak falsely is impossible.[56] These paradoxes were
maintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters
of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries. I
shall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and
Antisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is
represented as put to silence by them, and Sokrates as making an
answer which is no answer at all.[57] We see how much trouble these
paradoxes gave to Plato, when we read the Sophistês, in which he
handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my
judgment) unsatisfactory.
[Footnote 56: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 285-286.]
[Footnote 57: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 286 B--287 A.]
[Side-note: Plato's Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt
to set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies
is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the
conclusion proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd.]
The Euthydêmus of Plato is memorable in the history of philosophy as
the earliest known attempt to set out, and exhibit to attention, a
string of fallacious modes of reasoning. Plato makes them all absurd
and ridiculous. He gives a caricature of a dialectic debate, not
unworthy of his namesake Plato Comicus--or of Aristophanes, Swift, or
Voltaire. The sophisms appear for the most part so silly, as he puts
them, that the reader asks himself how any one could have been ever
imposed upon by such a palpable delusion? Yet such confidence is by
no means justified. A sophism, perfectly analogous in character to
those which Plato here exposes to ridicule, may, in another case,
easily escape detection from the hearer, and even from the reasoner
himself. People are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the
same word bearing two senses, from double construction of the same
phrase, from unconscious application of a _dictum secundum
quid_, as if it were a _dictum simpliciter_; from Petitio
Principii, &c., Ignoratio Elenchi, &c. Neither Plato himself,
nor Aristotle, can boast of escaping them.[58] If these fallacies
appear, in the examples chosen by Plato for the Euthydêmus, so
obviously inconclusive that they can deceive no one--the reason lies
not in the premisses themselves, but in the particular conclusions to
which they lead: which conclusions are known on other grounds to be
false, and never to be seriously maintainable by any person. Such
conclusions as--"Sokrates had no father: Sophroniskus, if father of
Sokrates, was father of all men and all animals: In beating your dog,
you beat your father: If you know one thing, you know everything,"
&c., being known _aliunde_ to be false, prove that there has
been some fallacy in the premisses whereby they have been
established. Such cases serve as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the
antecedent process. They make us aware of one mode of liability
to error, and put us on our guard against it in analogous cases. This
is a valuable service, and all the more valuable, because the
liability to error is real and widespread, even from fallacies
perfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular
exemplifications which Plato selects and exposes. Many of the
illustrations of the Platonic Euthydêmus are reproduced by Aristotle
in the Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, together with other
fallacies, discriminated with a certain method and system.[59]
[Footnote 58: See a passage in Plato's Charmidês, where Heindorf
remarks with propriety upon his equivocal use of the words [Greek:
eu)= zê=|n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein]--also the Gorgias, p. 507 D,
with the notes of Routh and Heindorf. I have noticed both passages in
discussing these two dialogues.]
[Footnote 59: Aristotle, De Sophist. Elench.; also Arist. Rhet. ii.
p. 1401, a-b.]
[Side-note: Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been
invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent
inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of
thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them.]
The true character of these fallacies is very generally overlooked by
the Platonic critics, in their appreciation of the Euthydêmus; when
they point our attention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the
persons whom they called Sophists, as well as to mischievous
corruptions alleged to arise from Eristic or formal contentious
debate. These critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies
were the special inventions of Athenian Sophists for the purposes of
Athenian Eristic: as if such causes of error were inoperative on
persons of ordinary honesty or intelligence, who never consulted or
heard the Sophists. It has been the practice of writers on logic,
from Aristotle down to Whately, to represent logical fallacies as
frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners, whose art
Whately assimilates to that of jugglers.
This view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It
substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and
essential. The various sophisms, of which Plato in the Euthydêmus
gives the _reductio ad absurdum_, are not the inventions of
Sophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process,
frequently incident to human thought and speech: specimens of those
ever-renewed "inadvertencies of ordinary thinking" (to recur to a
phrase cited in my preface), which it is the peculiar mission of
philosophy or "reasoned truth" to rectify. Moreover the practice of
formal debate, which is usually denounced with so much asperity--if
it affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fallacies,
presents not merely equal opportunity, but the only effective means,
for exposing and confuting them. Whately in his Logic,[60] like
Plato in the Euthydêmus, when bringing these fallacies into open
daylight in order that every one may detect them, may enliven the
theme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a Sophist.
Doubtless they are so by accident: yet their essential character is
that of infirmities incident to the _intellectus sibi
permissus_: operative at Athens before Athenian Sophists existed,
and in other regions also, where these persons never penetrated.]
[Footnote 60: Whately's Logic, ch. v. sect. 5. Though Whately, like
other logicians, keeps the Sophists in the foreground, as the
fraudulent enemy who sow tares among that which would otherwise come
up as a clean crop of wheat--yet he intimates also incidentally how
widespread and frequent such fallacies are, quite apart from
dishonest design. He says--"It seems by most persons to be taken for
granted, that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned
and wielded by a skilful Sophist: or, if they allow that a man may
with honest intentions slide into one, unconsciously, in the heat of
_argument_--still they seem to suppose, that where there is no
_dispute_, there is no cause to dread Fallacy. Whereas there is
much danger, even in what may be called _solitary reasoning_, of
sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far
deceived as even to act upon the conclusion so obtained. By
_solitary reasoning_, is meant the case in which we are not
seeking for arguments to prove a given question, but labouring to
elicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference."
"To speak of all the Fallacies that have ever been enumerated, as too
glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned--because the simple
instances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and
consequently most easily detected form, are such as (in that form)
would deceive no one--this, surely, shows either extreme weakness or
extreme unfairness."--Aristotle himself makes the same remark as
Whately--That the man who is easily taken in by a Fallacy advanced by
another, will be easily misled by the like Fallacy in his own
solitary reasoning. Sophist. Elench. 16, 175, a. 10.]
[Side-note: Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief,
misguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates,
Plato, Bacon, &c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by
Mill.]
The wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such infirmities is
attested not less by Sokrates in his last speech, wherein he declares
real want of knowledge and false persuasion of knowledge, to be
universal, the mission of his life being to expose them, though he
could not correct them--than by Bacon in his reformatory projects,
where he enumerates the various Idola worshipped by the human
intellect, and the false tendencies acquired "_in primâ digestione
mentis_". The psychological analysis of the sentiment of belief
with its different sources, given in Mr. Alexander Bain's work on the
Emotions and the Will, shows how this takes place; and exhibits true
or sound belief, in so far as it ever is acquired, as an acquisition
only attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error.[61] Of
such error, and of the different ways in which apparent evidence
is mistaken for real evidence, a comprehensive philosophical
exposition is farther given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the fifth
book of his System of Logic, devoted to the subject of Fallacies.
Every variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more
of the general heads of Fallacy there enumerated. It is the Fallacies
of Ratiocination, of which the two Sophists, in the Platonic
Euthydêmus, are made to exhibit specimens: and when we regard such
Fallacies, as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme,
we shall see at once that they are not inventions of the Athenian
Sophists--still less inventions for the purpose of Eristic or formal
debate. For every one of these Fallacies is of a nature to ensnare
men, and even to ensnare them more easily, in the common, informal,
conversation of life--or in their separate thoughts. Besides mistakes
on matters of fact, the two main causes which promote the
success and encourage the multiplication of Fallacies generally, are
first, the emotional bias towards particular conclusions, which
disposes persons to accept any apparent evidence, favourable to such
conclusion, as if it, were real evidence: next, the careless and
elliptical character of common speech, in which some parts of the
evidence are merely insinuated, and other parts altogether left out.
It is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very
extensive class of Fallacies called by Mr. Mill Fallacies of
Confusion: a class so large, that the greater number of Fallacies
might plausibly be brought under it.[62]
[Footnote 61: See the instructive and original chapter on the
generation, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain's work,
'Emotions and Will,' p. 568 seq. After laying down the fundamental
characteristic of Belief, as referable altogether to intended action,
either certain to come, or contingent under supposed circumstances,
and after enumerating the different Sources of Belief.--1. Intuitive
or Instinctive. 2. Experience. 3. The Influence of the Emotions
(sect. x. p. 579)--Mr. Bain says: "Having in our constitution
primordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary
impulses, we follow the first clue that experience gives us, and
accept the indication with the whole force of these natural
promptings. Being under the strongest impulses to act somehow, an
animal accepts any lead that is presented, and if successful, abides
by that lead with unshaken confidence. This is that instinct of
credulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind. It is not the
single instance, or the repetition of two or three, that makes up the
strong tone of confidence; it is the mind's own active determination,
finding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends, and
abiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character,
until the occurrence of some check, failure, or contradiction. The
force of belief, therefore, is not one rising from zero to a full
development by slow degrees, according to the length of the
experience. We must treat it rather as a strong primitive
manifestation, derived from the natural activity of the system, and
taking its direction and rectification from experience (p. 583). The
anticipation of nature, so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, is the
offspring of this characteristic of the mental system. With the
active tendency at its maximum, and the exercise of intelligence and
acquired knowledge at the minimum, there can issue nothing but a
quantity of rash enterprises. The respectable name
_generalisation_, implying the best products of enlightened
scientific research, has also a different meaning, expressing one of
the most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored
human nature. To extend some familiar and narrow experience, so as to
comprehend cases the most distant, is a piece of mere reckless
instinct, demanding severe discipline for its correction. I have
mentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like
our own. The veriest infant has got this length in the career of
fallacy. Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth,
is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the
conquering of a country in hostile occupation. This is a fact common
both to the individual and to the race. Observation is unanimous on
the point. It will probably be long ere the last of the delusions
attributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards
can be eradicated from humanity." [3rd ed., p. 505 seq.]]
[Footnote 62: Mill, 'System of Logic,' Book V., to which is prefixed
the following citation from Hobbes's 'Logica'. "Errare non modo
affirmando et negando, sed etiam in sentiendo, et in tacitâ hominum
cogitatione, contingit."
Mr. Mill points out forcibly both the operation of moral or emotional
bias in perverting the intellect, and causing sophisms or fallacies
to produce conviction; and the increased chance afforded for the
success of a sophism by the suppression of part of the premisses,
which is unavoidable in informal discussions.
"Bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions (v. 1-3). We cannot
believe a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to
believe it. Bias acts indirectly by placing the intellectual grounds
of belief in an incomplete or distorted shape before a man's eyes. It
makes him shrink from the irksome labour of a rigorous induction. It
operates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent
reasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist those
which are repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the
interests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons
are accepted or pass current which would not for a moment be listened
to in that character, if the conclusion had nothing more powerful
than its reasons to speak in its behalf. The natural or acquired
prejudices of mankind are perpetually throwing up philosophical
theories, the sole recommendation of which consists in the premisses
which they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or justifying
favourite feelings; and when any one of these theories has become so
thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is
always ready to take its place."--"Though the opinions of the
generality of mankind, when not dependent upon mere habit and
inculcation, have their root much more in the inclinations than in
the intellect, it is a necessary condition to the triumph of the
moral bias that it should first pervert the understanding."
Again in v. 2, 3. "It is not in the nature of bad reasoning to
express itself unambiguously. When a sophist, whether he is imposing
upon himself or attempting to impose upon others, can be constrained
to throw his argument into so distinct a form, it needs, in a large
number of cases, no farther exposure. In all arguments, everywhere
but in the schools, some of the links are suppressed: _à
fortiori_, when the arguer either intends to deceive, or is a lame
and inexpert thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning
processes to any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning
which are made in this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly
unconscious, manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to
detect the fallacy the proposition thus silently assumed must be
supplied, but the reasoner, most likely, has never really asked
himself what he was assuming; his confuter, unless permitted to
extort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must
himself judge what the suppressed premiss ought to be, in order to
support the conclusion." Mr. Mill proceeds to illustrate this
confusion by an excellent passage cited from Whately's 'Logic'. I may
add, that Aristotle himself makes a remark substantially the same--That
the same fallacy may be referred to one general head or to
another, according to circumstances. Sophist. Elench. 33, 182, b. 10.]
[Side-note: Value of formal debate as a means for testing
and confuting fallacies.]
We thus see not only that the fallacious agencies are self-operative,
generating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and
speech, without being planted by Athenian Sophists or watered by
Eristic--but that this very Eristic affords the best means of
restraining their diffusion. It is only in formal debate that the
disputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare
explicitly to others, without reserve or omission, all the premisses
upon which his conclusion rests--that every part of these premisses
becomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent--that the
question comes distinctly under consideration, what is or is not
sufficient evidence--that the premisses of one argument can be
compared with the premisses of another, so that if in the former you
are tempted to acquiesce in them as sufficient because you have a
bias favourable to the conclusion, in the latter you may be made to
feel that they are _insufficient_, because the conclusion which
they prove is one which you know to be untrue (_reductio ad
absurdum_). The habit of formal debate (called by those who do not
like it, Eristic[63]) is thus an indispensable condition both for the
exposure and confutation of fallacies, which exist quite independent
of that habit--owing their rise and prevalence to deep-seated
psychological causes.
[Footnote 63: The Platonic critics talk about the Eristics (as they
do about the Sophists) as if that name designated a known and
definite class of persons. This is altogether misleading. The term is
vituperative, and was applied by different persons according to their
own tastes.
Ueberweg remarks with great justice, that Isokrates called all
speculators on philosophy by the name of Eristics. "Als ob jener
Rhetor nicht (wie ja doch Spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat) alle
und jede Spekulation mit dem Nahmen der Eristik bezeichnete."
(Untersuchungen über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften, p. 257.) In
reference to the distinction which Aristotle attempts to draw between
Dialectic and Eristic--the former legitimate, the latter
illegitimate--we must remark that even in the legitimate Dialectic
the purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an
opponent. He enjoins that you are not only to guard against your
opponent, lest he should out-manoeuvre you, but you are to conceal
and disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manoeuvre
him. [Greek: Chrê\ d' o(/per phula/ttesthai paragge/llomen
a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.]
Anal. Prior. ii. 66, a. 32. Compare Topic. 108, a. 25, 156, a. 23,
164, b. 35.]
[Side-note: Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could
not have composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De
Sophisticis Elenchis.]
Without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at
Athens, Plato could not have composed his Euthydêmus, exhibiting a
_reductio ad absurdum_ of several verbal fallacies--nor could we
have had the logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the
Analytica and Topica with its annexed treatise De Sophisticis
Elenchis, in which various fallacies are discriminated and
classified. These theories, and the corollaries connected with them,
do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle: but
he could not have conceived them without previous study of the
ratiocinative process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had
before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or
open to be contested, at every step by an opponent.[64] Towards such
habit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many
of the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally:
but those who felt thus, had probably little interest in the
speculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic
critics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not
consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and
logician of antiquity: nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when
they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as
factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by
the rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikus, and others.
[Footnote 64: Mill, 'System of Logic.' Book VI. 1, 1. "Principles of
Evidence and Theories of Method, are not to be constructed _à
priori_. The laws of our rational faculty, like those of every
other natural agency, are only got by seeing the agent at work."]
[Side-note: Probable popularity of the Euthydêmus at
Athens--welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic.]
I think it probable that the dialogue of Euthydêmus, as far as the
point to which I have brought it (_i.e._, where Sokrates
finishes his recital to Kriton of the conversation which he had had
with the two Sophists), was among the most popular of all the
Platonic dialogues: not merely because of its dramatic vivacity and
charm of expression, but because it would be heartily welcomed by the
numerous enemies of Dialectic at Athens. We must remember that in the
estimation of most persons at Athens, Dialectic included Sokrates and
all the _viri Sokratici_ (Plato among them), just as much as the
persons called Sophists. The discreditable picture here given of
Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus, would be considered as telling against
Dialectic and the Sokratic Elenchus generally: while the rhetors, and
others who dealt in long continuous discourse, would treat it as a
blow inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue, by the professor
of the dialogue himself. In Plato's view, the dialogue was the
special and appropriate manifestation of philosophy.
[Side-note: Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to
obviate this inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates
and Kriton.]
That the natural effect of the picture here drawn by Plato, was, to
justify the antipathy of those who hated philosophy--we may see by
the epilogue which Plato has thought fit to annex: an epilogue so
little in harmony with what has preceded, that we might almost
imagine it to be an afterthought--yet obviously intended to protect
philosophy against imputations. Sokrates having concluded the
recital, in his ironical way, by saying that he intended to become a
pupil under the two Sophists, and by inviting Kriton to be a pupil
along with him--Kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain
instruction from any one who can give it, but that he has no sympathy
with Euthydêmus, and would rather be refuted by him, than learn from
him to refute in such a manner. Kriton proceeds to report to Sokrates
the remarks of a by-stander (an able writer of discourses for the
Dikastery) who had heard all that passed; and who expressed his
surprise that Sokrates could have remained so long listening to such
nonsense, and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish
men. Nevertheless (continued the by-stander) this couple are among
the most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy. This shows you
how worthless a thing philosophy is: prodigious fuss, with
contemptible result--men careless what they say, and carping at every
word that they hear.[65]
[Footnote 65: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 304-305.]
Now, Sokrates (concludes Kriton), this man is wrong for depreciating
philosophy, and all others who depreciate it are wrong also. But he
was right in blaming you, for disputing with such a couple before a
large crowd.
_Sokr._--What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? Is he
a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? Or is he only a composer
of discourses to be spoken by others? _Krit._--The latter. I do
not think that he has ever spoken in court: but every one says that
he knows judicial practice well, and that he composes admirable
speeches.[66]
[Footnote 66: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305.]
[Side-note: Altered tone in speaking of
Euthydêmus--Disparagement of persons half-philosophers,
half-politicians.]
_Sokr._--I understand the man. He belongs to that class whom
Prodikus describes as the border-men between philosophy and politics.
Persons of this class account themselves the wisest of mankind, and
think farther that besides being such in reality, they are also
admired as such by many: insomuch that the admiration for them would
be universal, if it were not for the professors of philosophy.
Accordingly they fancy, that if they could once discredit these
philosophers, the prize of glory would be awarded to themselves,
without controversy, by every one: they being in truth the wisest men
in society, though liable, if ever they are caught in dialectic
debate, to be overpowered and humbled by men like Euthydêmus.[67]
They have very plausible grounds for believing in their own wisdom,
since they pursue both philosophy and politics to a moderate extent,
as far as propriety enjoins; and thus pluck the fruit of wisdom
without encountering either dangers or contests. _Krit._--What
do you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? It seems to me specious.
_Sokr._--Yes, it is specious, but not well founded. You cannot
easily persuade them, though nevertheless it is true, that men who
take a line mid-way between two pursuits, are _better_ than
either, if both pursuits be bad--_worse_ than either, if both
pursuits be good, but tending to different ends--_better_ than
one and _worse_ than the other, if one of the pursuits be bad
and the other good--_better_ than both, if both be bad, but
tending to different ends. Such being the case, if the pursuit of
philosophy and that of active politics be both of them good, but
tending to different objects, these men are inferior to the pursuers
of one as well as of the other: if one be good, the other bad, they
are worse than the pursuers of the former, better than the pursuers
of the latter: if both be bad, they are better than either. Now I am
sure that these men themselves account both philosophy and politics
to be good. Accordingly, they are inferior both to philosophers and
politicians:[68] they occupy only the third rank, though they pretend
to be in the first. While we pardon such a pretension, and
refrain from judging these men severely, we must nevertheless
recognise them for such as they really are. We must be content with
every one, who announces any scheme of life, whatever it be, coming
within the limits of intelligence, and who pursues his work with
persevering resolution.[69]
[Footnote 67: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305 D. [Greek: ei)=nai me\n ga\r tê=|
a)lêthei/a| spha=s sophôta/tous, e)n de\ toi=s i)di/ois lo/gois
o(/tan a)polêphthô=sin, u(po\ tô=n a)mphi\ Eu)thu/dêmon
kolou/esthai.]
[Greek: Oi( a)mphi\ Eu)thu/dêmon] may mean Euthydêmus himself and
alone; yet I incline to think that it here means Euthydêmus and his
like.]
[Footnote 68: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 B.]
[Footnote 69: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 C. [Greek: suggignô/skein me\n
ou)=n au)toi=s chrê\ tê=s e)pithumi/as kai\ mê\ chalepai/nein,
ê(gei=sthai me/ntoi toiou/tous ei)=nai oi(=oi/ ei)si; pa/nta ga\r
a)/ndra chrê\ a)gapa=|n, o(/stis kai\ o(tiou=n le/gei e)cho/menon
phronê/seôs pra=gma, kai\ a)ndrei/ôs diaponei=tai.]]
[Side-note: Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the
education of his sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him
to search for himself.]
_Krit._ I am always telling you, Sokrates, that I too am embarrassed
where to seek instructors for my sons. Conversation with you has
satisfied me, that it is madness to bestow so much care upon the
fortune and position of sons, and so little upon their instruction.
Yet when I turn my eyes to the men who make profession of
instructing, I am really astonished. To tell you the truth, every one
of them appears to me extravagantly absurd,[70] so that I know not
how to help forward my son towards philosophy. _Sokr._--Don't
you know, Kriton, that in every different pursuit, most of the
professors are foolish and worthless, and that a few only are
excellent and above price? Is not this the case with gymnastic,
commercial business, rhetoric, military command? Are not most of
those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly?[71]
_Krit._--Unquestionably: nothing can be more true. _Sokr._--Do
you think _that_ a sufficient reason for avoiding all these
pursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? _Krit._ No:
it would be wrong to do so. _Sokr._--Well then, don't do so.
Take no heed about the professors of philosophy, whether they are
good or bad; but test philosophy itself, well and carefully. If it
shall appear to you worthless, dissuade not merely your sons, but
every one else also, from following it.[72] But if it shall appear to
you as valuable as I consider it to be, then take courage to pursue
and practise it, you and your children both, according to the
proverb.--
[Footnote 70: Plato, Euthyd. p. 306 E. [Greek: kai/ moi dokei= ei)=s
e(/kastos au)tô=n skopou=nti pa/nu a)llo/kotos ei)=nai], &c.]
[Footnote 71: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)n e(ka/stê| tou/tôn
tou\s pollou\s pro\s e(/kaston to\ e)/rgon ou) katagela/stous
o(ra=|s?]]
[Footnote 72: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)a/sas chai/rein
tou\s e)pitêdeu/ontas philosophi/an, ei)/te chrêstoi/ ei)sin ei)/te
ponêroi/, au)to\ to\ pra=gma basani/sas kalô=s te kai\ eu)=, e)a\n
me/n soi phai/nêtai phaulo\n o)/n], &c.]
[Side-note: Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of
Dialectic and philosophy.]
The first part of this epilogue, which I have here given in
abridgment, has a bearing very different from the rest of the
dialogue, and different also from most of the other Platonic
dialogues. In the epilogue, Euthydêmus is cited as the representative
of true dialectic and philosophy: the opponents of philosophy are
represented as afraid of being put down by Euthydêmus: whereas,
previously, he had been depicted as contemptible,--as a man whose
manner of refuting opponents was more discreditable to himself than
to the opponent refuted; and who had no chance of success except
among hearers like himself. We are not here told that Euthydêmus was
a bad specimen of philosophers, and that there were others better, by
the standard of whom philosophy ought to be judged. On the contrary,
we find him here announced by Sokrates as among those dreaded by men
adverse to philosophy,--and as not undeserving of that epithet which
the semi-philosopher cited by Kriton applies to "one of the most
powerful champions of the day".
Plato, therefore, after having applied his great dramatic talent to
make dialectic debate ridiculous, and thus said much to gratify its
enemies--changes his battery, and says something against these
enemies, without reflecting whether it is consistent or no with what
had preceded. Before the close, however, he comes again into
consistency with the tone of the earlier part, in the observation
which he assigns to Kriton, that most of the professors of philosophy
are worthless; to which Sokrates rejoins that this is not less true
of all other professions. The concluding inference is, that
philosophy is to be judged, not by its professors but by itself; and
that Kriton must examine it for himself, and either pursue it or
leave it alone, according as his own convictions dictated.
This is a valuable admonition, and worthy of Sokrates, laying full
stress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person
examining may form for himself. But it is no answer to the question
of Kriton; who says that he had already heard from Sokrates, and was
himself convinced, that philosophy was of first-rate importance--and
that he only desired to learn where he could find teachers to forward
the progress of his son in it. As in so many other dialogues, Plato
leaves the problem started, but unsolved. The impulse towards
philosophy being assured, those who feel it ask Plato in what
direction they are to move towards it. He gives no answer. He can
neither perform the service himself, nor recommend any one else, as
competent. We shall find such silence made matter of pointed
animadversion, in the fragment called Kleitophon.
[Side-note: Who is the person here intended by Plato,
half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?]
The person, whom Kriton here brings forward as the censor of Sokrates
and the enemy of philosophy, is peculiarly marked. In general, the
persons whom Plato ranks as enemies of philosophy are the rhetors and
politicians: but the example here chosen is not comprised in either
of these classes: it is a semi-philosopher, yet a writer of
discourses for others. Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Spengel, suppose
that Isokrates is the person intended: Winckelmann thinks it is
Thrasymachus: others refer it to Lysias, or Theodorus of
Byzantium:[73] Socher and Stallbaum doubt whether any special person
is intended, or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a
class described by attributes. I rather agree with those who refer
the passage to Isokrates. He might naturally be described as one
steering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric: which in
fact he himself proclaims in the Oration De Permutatione, and which
agrees with the language of Plato in the dialogue Phædrus, where
Isokrates is mentioned by name along with Lysias. In the Phædrus,
moreover, Plato speaks of Isokrates with unusual esteem, especially
as a favourable contrast with Lysias, and as a person who, though not
yet a philosopher, may be expected to improve, so as in no long time
to deserve that appellation.[74] We must remember that Plato in
the Phædrus attacks by name, and with considerable asperity, first
Lysias, next Theodorus and Thrasymachus the rhetors--all three
persons living and of note. Being sure to offend all these, Plato
might well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of Isokrates at the
same time, and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar
professors of rhetoric. In the Euthydêmus (where the satire is
directed not against the rhetors, but against their competitors the
dialecticians or pseudo-dialecticians) he had no similar motive to
address compliments to Isokrates: respecting whom he speaks in a
manner probably more conformable to his real sentiments, as the
unnamed representative of a certain type of character--a
semi-philosopher, fancying himself among the first men in Athens, and
assuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher; but
entitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem, such as
belonged to sincere mediocrity of intelligence.
[Footnote 73: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyd. p. 47; Winckelmann.
Proleg. p. xxxv.
Heindorf, in endeavouring to explain the difference between Plato's
language in the Phædrus and in the Euthydêmus respecting Isokrates,
assumes as a matter beyond question the theory of Schleiermacher,
that the Phædrus was composed during Plato's early years. I have
already intimated my may dissent from this theory.]
[Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 E.
I have already observed that I do not agree with Schleiermacher and
the other critics who rank the Phædrus as the earliest or even among
the earliest compositions of Plato. That it is of much later
composition I am persuaded, but of what particular date can only be
conjectured. The opinion of K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and others,
that it was composed about the time when Plato began his school at
Athens (387-386 B.C.) is sufficiently probable.
The Euthydêmus may be earlier or may be later than the Phædrus. I
incline to think it later. The opinion of Stallbaum (resting upon the
mention of Alkibiadês, p. 275 A), that it was composed in or before
404 B.C., appears to me untenable (Stallbaum, Proleg. p.
64). Plato would not be likely to introduce Sokrates speaking of
Alkibiadês as a deceased person, whatever time the dialogue was
composed. Nor can I agree with Steinhart, who refers it to 402
B.C. (Einleitung, p. 26). Ueberweg (Untersuch. über die
Zeitfolge der Plat. Schr. pp. 265-267) considers the Euthydêmus later
(but not much later) than the Phædrus, subsequent to the
establishment of the Platonic school at Athens (387-386
B.C.) This seems to me more probable than the contrary.
Schleiermacher, in arranging the Platonic dialogues, ranks the
Euthydêmus as an immediate sequel to the Menon, and as presupposing
both Gorgias and Theætêtus (Einl. pp. 400-401). Socher agrees in this
opinion, but Steinhart rejects it (Einleit. p. 26), placing the
Euthydêmus immediately after the Protagoras, and immediately before
the Menon and the Gorgias; according to him, Euthydêmus, Menon, and
Gorgias, form a well marked Trilogy.
Neither of these arrangements rests upon any sufficient reasons. The
chronological order cannot be determined.]
[Side-note: Variable feeling at different times, between Plato
and Isokrates.]
That there prevailed at different times different sentiments, more or
less of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jealousy, between Plato and
Isokrates, ought not to be matter of surprise. Both of them were
celebrated teachers of Athens, each in his own manner, during the
last forty years of Plato's life: both of them enjoyed the favour of
foreign princes, and received pupils from outlying, sometimes
distant, cities--from Bosphorus and Cyprus in the East, and from
Sicily in the West. We know moreover that during the years
immediately preceding Plato's death (347 B.C.), his pupil
Aristotle, then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric, was
engaged in acrimonious literary warfare, seemingly of his own
seeking, with Isokrates (then advanced in years) and some of the
Isokratean pupils. The little which we learn concerning the literary
and philosophical world of Athens, represents it as much distracted
by feuds and jealousies. Isokrates on his part has in his
compositions various passages which appear to allude (no name being
mentioned) to Plato among others, in a tone of depreciation.[75]
[Footnote 75: Isokrates, ad Philipp. Or. v. s. 14, p. 84; contra
Sophistas, Or. xiii.; Or. xiii. s. 2-24, pp. 291-295; Encom. Helenæ,
Or. x. init.; Panathenaic. Or. xii. s. 126, p. 257; Or. xv. De
Permutatione, s. 90, p. 440, Bekk.]
Isokrates seems, as far as we can make out, to have been in early
life, like Lysias, a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in
the Dikastery. This lucrative profession was tempting, since his
family had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of Athens at the
close of the Peloponnesian war. Having gained reputation by such
means, Isokrates became in his mature age a teacher of Rhetoric, and
a composer of discourses, not for private use by clients, but for the
general reader, on political or educational topics. In this
character, he corresponded to the description given by Plato in the
Euthydêmus: being partly a public adviser, partly a philosopher. But
the general principle under which Plato here attacks him, though
conforming to the doctrine of the Platonic Republic, is contrary to
that of Plato in other dialogues, "You must devote yourself either
wholly to philosophy, or wholly to politics: a mixture of the two is
worse than either"--this agrees with the Republic, wherein Plato
enjoins upon each man one special and exclusive pursuit, as well as
with the doctrine maintained against Kalliklês in the Gorgias--but it
differs from the Phædrus, where he ascribes the excellence of
Perikles as a statesmen and rhetor, to the fact of his having
acquired a large tincture of philosophy.[76] Cicero quotes this last
passage as applicable to his own distinguished career, a combination
of philosophy with politics.[77] He dissented altogether from the
doctrine here laid down by Plato in the Euthydêmus, and many other
eminent men would have dissented from it also.
[Footnote 76: See the facts about Isokrates in a good Dissertation by
H. P. Schröder, Utrecht, 1859, Quæstiones Isocrateæ, p. 51, seq.
Plato, Phædrus, p. 270; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Plato, Republic,
iii. p. 397.]
[Footnote 77: Cicero, De Orator. iii. 34, 138; Orator. iv. 14;
Brutus, 11, 44.]
As a doctrine of universal application, in fact, it cannot be
defended. The opposite scheme of life (which is maintained by
Isokrates in De Permutatione and by Kalliklês in the Platonic
Gorgias)[78]--that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the
earlier years of life as an intellectual training, to arm the mind
with knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the
active duties of life--is at least equally defensible, and suits
better for other minds of a very high order. Not only Xenophon and
other distinguished Greeks, but also most of the best Roman citizens,
held the opinion which Plato in the Gorgias ascribes to Kalliklês and
reprobates through the organ of Sokrates--That philosophical study,
if prolonged beyond what was necessary for this purpose of adequate
intellectual training, and if made the permanent occupation of life,
was more hurtful than beneficial.[79] Certainly, a man may often fail
in the attempt to combine philosophy with active politics. No one
failed in such a career more lamentably than Dion, the friend of
Plato--and Plato himself, when he visited Sicily to second Dion.
Moreover Alkibiadês and Kritias were cited by Anytus and the other
accusers of Sokrates as examples of the like mischievous conjunction.
But on the other hand, Archytas at Tarentum (another friend of Plato
and philosopher) administered his native city with success, as long
(seemingly) as Periklês administered Athens. Such men as these two
are nowise inferior either to the special philosopher or to the
special politician. Plato has laid down an untenable generality, in
this passage of the Euthydêmus, in order to suit a particular point
which he wished to make against Isokrates, or against the
semi-philosopher indicated, whoever else he may have been.
[Footnote 78: Isokrates, De Permutatione, Or. xv. sect. 278-288, pp.
485-480, Bekk.; Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-485.]
[Footnote 79: The half-philosophers and half-politicians to whom
Sokrates here alludes, are characterised by one of the Platonic
critics as "jene oberflächlichen und schwächlichen Naturen die sich
zwischen beiden Richtungen stellen, und zur Erreichung
selbstsüchtiger und beschränkter Zwecke von beiden aufnehmen was sie
verstehen und was ihnen gefällt" (Steinhart, Einleit. p. 25). On the
other hand we find in Tacitus a striking passage respecting the
studies of Agricola in his youth at Massilia. "Memoriâ teneo, solitum
ipsum narrare, se in primâ juventâ studium philosophiæ acrius, ultra
quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse--ni prudentia matris
incensum ac flagrantem animum exercuisset: Scilicet sublime et
erectum ingenium, pulchritudinem ac speciem excelsæ magnæque gloriæ
vehementius quam lauté appetebat: retinuitque, quod est
difficillimum, ex sapientiâ modum" (Vit. Agr. c. 4).
Tacitus expresses himself in the same manner about the purpose with
which Helvidius Priscus applied himself to philosophy (Hist. iv. 6):
"non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo
constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret".
Compare also the memorable passage in the Funeral Oration pronounced
by Periklês (Thuc. ii. 40)--[Greek: philosophou=men a)/neu
malaki/as], &c., which exhibits the like views.
Aulus Gellius (x. 22), who cites the doctrine which Plato ascribes to
Kalliklês in the Gorgias (about the propriety of confining philosophy
to the function of training and preparation for active pursuits),
tries to make out that this was Plato's own opinion.]